Download - Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules? · Section 3 explains the indefeasibility view, and section 4 argues against it. Section 5 argues against contributory rules, and Section 6

volume19,no.3 january2019

Are There Indefeasible

Epistemic Rules?

Darren BradleyUniversity of Leeds

© 2019 DarrenBradleyThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/019003/>

1. Introduction

Whatifyourpeerstellyouthatyoushoulddisregardyourperceptions?Worse,whatifyourpeerstellyoutodisregardthetestimonyofyourpeers?Howshouldwerespondifwegetevidencethatseemstoun-dermineourepistemicrules?Severalphilosophershavearguedthatepistemicrulesareindefeasible.Iwillarguethatallepistemicrulesaredefeasible.Theresultisakindofepistemicparticularism,accordingtowhichtherearenosimplerulesconnectingdescriptiveandnormativefacts. Iwillarguethatthistypeofparticularismismoreplausibleinepistemologythaninethics.Theresultisanunwieldyandpossiblyin-finitelylongepistemicrule—anUber-rule.IwillarguethattheUber-ruleappliestoallagents,butisstilldefeasible—onemaygetmislead-ingevidenceagainstitandrationallylowerone’scredenceinit.

Section 2 explains the problem of undermining and three possi-bleresponses.Section3explainstheindefeasibilityview,andsection4 argues against it. Section 5 argues against contributory rules, andSection6containsthecoreofthepositiveproposal,arguingthattheproblemcanbesolvedbyunderstandingepistemicrulesashedged.Section7developstheproposalusingageneralizationoftheconceptofadmissibleevidence.Section8extendsanddefendstheresultingposition—wheretheonlyunhedgedruleisasingleUber-rule.Section9comparesourpositiontoQuineanholism.Section10concludes.

2. The Problem of Undermining and Three Responses

InthissectionIwillexplaintheproblemofundermining,andthere-sponsethatepistemicrulesareindefeasible.InthenextsectionIwillarguethatthisresponseisadhoc.

Considersomeepistemicrulesthathavebeendiscussedinthere-centliterature:

darrenbradley Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules?

philosophers’imprint –2– vol.19,no.3(january2019)

Third,thenormativeconceptsintheconsequentshouldbeunder-stoodintheepistemicsense,asopposedtothepragmaticoranyothersense.Forexample,ifyouareoffered$1mtobelieveinGod,thereisasenseinwhichyououghttobelieveinGod.Iamnotconcernedwiththispragmaticsenseof‘should’.

Fourth, thenormative concepts in the consequent shouldbeun-derstoodasrelativetotheagent’ssituation.Thereisasenseof‘ought’inwhichyououghttobelievepiffpistrue.5Thereisalsoasenseof‘ought’inwhichyououghttobelievepiffpisjustifiedinyoursitua-tion.ItisthislattersensewhichIwilluse.6

Fifth,Itake‘defeasible’tomean‘canberationallydoubted’.Sixth,Iwillcallruleslikethese“simple”todistinguishthemfrom

thecomplicatedUber-ruleIwilldefendinsections6and7.Seventh, the antecedents contain specific positive claims about

agents’states,butdonotcontaintotalityfactse.g. ‘theagenthasnootherperceptions/testimony’.

Ourproblemisthatitiseasytogeneratecaseswherenarrow-scoperulesconflictorunderminethemselves.Foranexampleinethics,sup-poseacrazedmurdererasksyouwheretheirtargetis.Theprinciplenottolieconflictswiththeprincipletopreventothersfromcomingtoharm.7Foranexampleinepistemology,supposeatablelooksredbutyouaretoldthatitisblue.PerceptionconflictswithTestimony.

Theepistemologyliteraturehasfocussedoncaseswherearuleisself-undermining.Startwithacaseofpeerdisagreement:

Supposethatyouandafriendindependentlyevaluateafactualclaim,basedonthesamerelevantevidenceandarguments.Youbecomeconfidentthattheclaimistrue.Butthenyoufindoutthatyourfriend—whosejudgmentyourespect—hasbecomejustasconfidentthattheclaimisfalse.Shouldthatnewsatallreduceyourconfidencein

5. SeeFassio(20182.b.)fordiscussionofthetruthnormofbelief.

6. Hedden2012p.344.

7. ThisisaproblemforKantianethics.SeeTimmerman(2013).

TestimonyIfanagent’ssituation1includestestimonythatx,thentheagentisrationallyrequiredtobelievethatx.(CompareElga[2007],Titelbaum[2015].)

Perception If an agent’s situation includes a perceptionthatx,thentheagentisrationallyrequiredtobelievethatx. (Compare Chisholm [1966], Huemer [2000], Pryor[2000],Boghossian[2008].)2

Credence-chance linkIfanagent’ssituationincludesfullbe-liefthatthechanceofxisy%,thentheagentisrationallyrequiredtohavecredenceinxofy%.(CompareLewis’s[1980]PrincipalPrinciple.)3

Let me make some clarificatory comments about these rules. First,these rules have descriptive (bywhich Iwillmean non-normative)conceptsintheantecedentandnormativeconceptsintheconsequent,makingthemnarrow-scoperules.4

Second,thesupervenienceofthenormativeonthenon-normativeentailsthattherewillbesomesuchnarrow-scoperules.Onecantakethemtobegroundingprinciples.

1. Theterm‘situation’isusedbymostauthorsinthisliterature.Titelbaumoffersadefinitionof‘situation’:“Iwillassumeonlythatwhateverthetruetheoryofrationalityis,itmayspecifycertainaspectsofanagent’scircumstancesasrelevanttodeterminingwhichoverallstatesarerationallypermittedtoher.Takentogether,theserelevantaspectscomprisewhatI’llcalltheagent’s‘situ-ation.’”Itakeitthisiscompatiblewithallauthors’usages.

2. It is controversialwhether this rule requires a different treatment, as howthingslookisnotapsychologicalattitude.Ithinksimilarruleswillstillholdfornon-attitudinalpsychologicalstates,butitwon’tmatterformyarguments.

3. Lewis formulated thePrincipalPrinciple in termsof conditional epistemicprobabilitiese.g.Cr(A|KnownchanceofA isxandE)=x,and Idonotintend todiverge fromthisversion. Ihaveusedaconditional toshowthesimilaritytotheotherrules.Moreonthisinsection7.

4. Narrow-scoperuleshavetheform[ifpthenyououghttobelieveq].Awide-scope rule would have the form ‘you ought to believe [if p then q]’. SeeBroome(1999).



without believing Testimony. So Elga’s argument against TestimonyimplicitlyassumesthatrationalagentsareneverAkratic.

Although I’ve no interest in defending anti-Akrasia, I thinkAnti-Akrasiaisplausible,andthatwecannotblockElga’sargumentbysim-plyallowingAkrasia.9SoIwillgrantAnti-AkrasiaandblockElga’sar-gumentforadifferentreason.

Returning to themain thread, let’s distinguish three ways of re-sponding to the self-undermining problem. One might ignore col-leaguesandmaintainahighcredenceinTestimony.10Whenitcomestoyourbeliefinbeingconciliatory,youshouldstubbornlyignoreyourcolleagues.Conciliatorinessisindefeasible.Theresultisthatrational-ity haswhat Titelbaum calls “fixed points”—these are propositionsexpressing the rules of rationality, and they are indefeasible. Theseruleshavebuilt-inrestrictionstoensuretheycannotbeundermined,soTitelbaumcallsthem“restrictedrules”.

Asecondresponse,whichIwilldefend,istheviewthatyoushould bemovedbyyourcolleagues.Testimonymightstartoffwithahighprior,butyoucangetevidenceagainstitanddecreaseyourcredence,justlikeanyotherbelief.(Andifyourationallydisbelievethatsomeruleisarequirementofrationality,thenitdoesn’tapplytoyou.)Iwilldevelopthisviewusingthedistinctionbetweenhedged and unhedged

9. SeeHorowitz (2014) for anumberof powerful arguments againstAkrasia.Elga(2010)doesn’tmentionAkrasia;Titelbaum(2015)discussesAkrasiaindetail,butdoesn’tengagewithElga’sargument.Hereisanobjectiontomyview:“Yourpositionisthattherearenosimpleunhedgedrules;asAnti-Akra-siaisasimpleunhedgedrule,howcanyouassumeAnti-Akrasia?”Response:OntheviewIwilldevelop,ifAkrasiaiseverrational,itwillberationalonlyinhighlyunusualcases,e.g.whereyourationallybelievethatanexperttellsyou: ‘pandyoushouldnotbelievep’.This isastrangesituation(compareWorsnip2018p.24),soweshouldexpecttobeinastrangebeliefstate.NosuchsituationarisesinthecaseElgadiscusses,soIdon’tthinkallowingAkra-siaisagoodwaytoblockElga’sargument.(NotethattherulesIdiscussarenarrow-scopeepistemicrules,whileAnti-Akrasiaisawide-scopecoherencerequirement[Worsnip2018].)Thankstoarefereeforpressingthispoint.

10. Elga(2010)andTitelbaum(2015)defendthistypeofapproach.Elgawrites:“[O]neshouldbemovedbydisagreementaboutsomesubjectmatters,butnotaboutdisagreementitself…”(p.184).

thedisputedclaim?Conciliatoryviewsondisagreementanswer“yes.”(Elga2010p.175)

Elga(2007) initiallydefendedaconciliatoryview.Forsimplicity,wecanconsiderthemostextremeconciliatoryview:

Testimony Ifanagent’s situation includes testimony thatx,thentheagentisrationallyrequiredtobelievethatx.

ButElgafoundthatmanyofhiscolleaguesdisagreedwithhim.Elgawrites:

Suppose that youhave a conciliatory viewondisagree-ment, but you find out that your respected [colleague]disagrees.Hehasarrivedatacompetingview(aboutdis-agreement),andtellsyouallaboutit.Ifyourconciliatoryviewiscorrect,youshouldchangeyourview.Youshouldbe pulled part way toward thinking that your friend isright.Inotherwords,yourviewondisagreementrequiresyoutogiveupyourviewondisagreement.(p.179)

SoTestimony looksunstable: ifElga receives testimonyagainstTes-timony, andappliesTestimony,hemustgiveupTestimony.8Concil-iatory views sometimes call for their own rejection.This is the self-underminingproblem.

There is an important implicit premise in Elga’s argument weshouldmakeclear–Anti-Akrasia.

Anti-Akrasia:Itisneverrationaltobelieve[xandIshouldnotbelievex]

WithoutAnti-Akrasiaarationalagentcouldbelievetestimony(i.e.be-lievex ifsomeonetellsyoux)andalsobelievethatoneshouldnotbelievetestimony.Theformeristhelower-levelbeliefx;thelatterisahigher-levelbeliefaboutbeliefs.TheagentwouldfollowTestimony

8. SeeElga2010p.181–2andTitelbaum2015p.271.



Hedged Unhedged

Absolute Me,Holton?Väyrynen?

Sections6,7and8

Elga,Lasonen-Aarnio,

Titelbaum.

Sections3and4

Contributory Endofsection6 Ross,Christensen?

Section5

Iargueagainstcontributory rules insection5. Iwilldefendhedgedrulesinsections6and7.InthenexttwosectionsIwillexplainandthenargueagainstrestrictedrules.

3. Restricted Rules

Elga (2010) defends the first option—restriction—arguing that weneedtomakeamodificationtoTestimonytomake it immunefromdefeat. Titelbaum (2015) builds on this and suggests that epistemicruleshavethefollowingform:13

Restricted Testimony: Ifanagent’ssituationincludestesti-mony that x, the agent is rationally required tobelievethatx—unless14xcontradicts[Testimony15].

IfxcontradictsTestimony,thenignorexandcontinuebe-lievingothertestimony.16

13. Titelbaum doesn’t actually defend Restricted Testimony. His point is thatepistemicrulesmusthavethisform,whatevertheyturnouttobe.

14. ‘Unless’means‘ifnot’.Roughly,ifthereisnocontradiction,thenbelievetes-timony.Noticethissaysnothingaboutwhattodoifthereisacontradiction.That’swhyweneedthenextline.

15. Theoriginal textsays “this rule”. Iassume ‘this rule’ refers toTestimony. Itwon’tmattermuchif itreferstoRestrictedTestimony.Iarguethatholdingsuchrulestobeindefeasibleisadhoc,whatevertheirexactcontentis.

16. I’ve added “If x contradicts Testimony, then ignore x and continue believ-ing other testimony.” Titelbaum isn’t explicit about how to respond if x

rules.11Hedged ruleshave ceteris paribus clauses, stating situationswhere the rule fails to apply;one such situation iswhereyou ratio-nallydisbelievethatsomeruleisarequirementofrationality.Iwillar-guethatrulesofrationalityarehedged—onecanalwaysgetevidenceagainstthembeingrequirementsofrationality.Theresultisthatthereareno“fixedpoints”,norulesthatrationalagentsshouldalwaysbe-lievetoberequirementsofrationality—allaredefeasible.

Athirdresponseisalsoworthdiscussing.ThereisadifferentwaytoweakenTestimony,suggestedbyChristensen(2010,2013).12Distin-guishabsoluteandcontributory rules.Absoluteruleshaveaconsequentthatsaysthatyouarerequiredtobeinsomestate,ortoperformsomeaction;contributoryruleshaveaconsequentthatsaysthatyouhavea reasontobeinsomestate,ortoperformsomeaction.Appliedtoepis-temology,absoluterulessaywhatyoushould(orshouldnot)believe,whereascontributoryrulessaywhatcountsinfavourof(oragainst)abelief.Testimonyisanabsoluterule;butconsideracontributoryver-sionofTestimony:

Contributory Testimony:Ifanagent’ssituationincludestes-timonythatx,thentheagenthasa reasontobelievethatx.

Paradoxisavoidedbecauseonecanhaveareasontobelievexandareasonnottobelievex.ButIwillrejectcontributoryrulesduetocasesof“valence-switching”,i.e.wherewhatisusuallyareasonforbecomesareasonagainst.

Hereisamapofthemainpositions,thesectionsinwhichtheyarediscussed and (tentative) suggestions forwhere somephilosophersmightbeplaced:

11. SeeHolton2002;Väyrynen2006,2009;Schroeder2004section5.

12. SeeDancy(2013section1).Christensen’s(2010p.203–4;2013p.92–3)talkof“ideals”couldbeunderstoodastalkofunhedgedcontributoryrules.Hisearlierwork(e.g.2007)suggeststhatthereisaresidualbad-makingfeatureofviolatingideals/rules,inwhichcasetheruleswouldnotbecontributory.



inhercurrentsituation.Anagentcanreflectonhersitu-ationandcometorecognizefactsaboutwhatthatsitua-tionrationallyrequires.Notonlydoesthisreflectionpro-videherwithjustificationtobelievethosefacts;thatjus-tificationisultimatelyempiricallyindefeasible.17(p.276)

Butthisisveryhardtobelieve.Christensen(2013)writes:

Suppose…thatIfollow[ProperlyRestrictedTestimony]and remain absolutely confident in its correctness, de-spite the fact that it’s rejectedbymanyepistemologistsIrespect,andevenrateasmysuperiorsinphilosophicalskill.HowshouldIviewmyownreasoningonthistopic?ShouldI thinkthatwhileI’mgenerallyonlymoderatelyreliable when I think about philosophy, neverthelesswhen I think about arguments for general conciliation,andfornotbeingconciliatoryaboutconciliation,I’mes-peciallyimmunefromerror?Thatseemsextremelydubi-ous.(p.89)

Given the difficulty of formulating rational rules, the claim thatweshouldbecertain,orevenhighlyconfident,ofwhattheyare,eveninthefaceofopposingarguments,seemstomeuntenable.

Furthermore, suppose you do hear testimony against some (cor-rect)ruleofrationality.Titelbaumsuggeststhatyoushouldnotbelievesuchtestimonytoanydegree.Itnaturallyfollowsthatyoushouldnot

17. Titelbaumaddsafootnote,sayingthattherules“couldbeopposedbyempiri-calevidencepointingintheotherdirection….Butthosepropositionaljusti-ficationsareultimatelyindefeasibleinthesensethattheempiricalconsider-ationswillneveroutweighthemandmakeitall-things-consideredrationalfortheagenttoformfalsebeliefsaboutwhathersituationrequires.”Idon’tunderstandthis.Ifempiricalconsiderationscancountagainsttherules,whycan’twe imagine increasingly strong empirical considerations that eventu-allyoutweightherules?Andtherestrictionsheplacesontherulesseemtoensurethatempiricalconsiderationscannotcountagainstrationalrulesatall.Andhislaterclaim(section6)thattheFixedPointThesisleadstotheRightReasonsviewsuggeststhatempiricalevidencecannotcountagainstrationalrules.

RestrictedTestimony cannotundermine itself. It sayswe shouldbe-lievetestimonyonmosttopics,butnotwithregardtothequestionofwhetherweshouldbelievetestimony.ItfollowsthatourcredenceinRestrictedTestimonyshouldstaythesame,eveninthelightofoppos-ingtestimony.Thus,RestrictedTestimonyisindefeasiblebytestimony.

Titelbaum(2015)defendssimilarrestrictionsonallepistemicrules,e.g.:

Restricted Perception:Ifanagent’ssituationincludesaper-ceptionthatx,theagentisrationallyrequiredtobelievethatx—unlessxcontradicts[Perception].(p.273)

Andnotonlycanrulesunderminethemselves—theycanundermineeachother,e.g.youmightbetoldthatyourperceptionisunreliable.ToblockRestrictedTestimonyfromunderminingotherrules,Titelbaumdefends:

Properly Restricted Testimony: If an agent’s situation in-cludestestimonythatx,theagentisrationally…requiredtobelievex—unlessx contradicts [a] truthaboutwhatrationalityrequires.(p.274)

Thisstructureisintendedtogeneralizetoallrules,e.g.:

Properly Restricted Perception: If an agent’s situation in-cludesaperceptionthatx,theagentisrationallyrequiredtobelievethatx—unlessxcontradictsatruthaboutwhatrationalityrequires.

Titelbaumsuggeststhatweshouldhavecredence1intherulesofra-tionality;theyareindefeasible fixed points.Tousehismemorablephrase:mistakesaboutrationalityaremistakesofrationality:

[E]very agent possesses a priori, propositional justifica-tionfortruebeliefsabouttherequirementsofrationality

contradictsTestimony,butIthinkhemustbecommittedtothisline.I’llleavethisimplicitwhennotneeded.



This isclose tosaying that fundamental rulesare those thatarenotdefeasible.Butthenthequestionis:Whyshouldwethinkthatthereareanysuchrules?IndeedIwillarguethattherearenone.

Elga argues that fundamental rules are dogmatic using the fol-lowingexample:Imagineamagazine,Consumer Reports,consistentlyrating itself as thebest consumermagazine.19When facedwith thecomplaintthatthemagazineisbiasedwhenitrecommendsitself,Elgaendorsesaneditorsaying:

Toputforwardourrecommendationsabouttoastersandcars is to put them forward as good recommendations.Andwecan’tconsistentlydothatwhilealsoclaimingthatcontrary recommendations are superior. So our alwaysratingourselves #1doesnot result fromanarbitraryoradhocexceptiontoourstandards.Weareforcedtorateourselves#1inordertobeconsistentwithourotherrat-ings.(p.185)

ButIthinkthisbringsouttheimportanceofthedistinctionbetweenfundamentalandnon-fundamental rules.Theadviceofa consumermagazineisnotaplausiblecandidatetobeafundamentalrule,anditiseasytoimaginecaseswhereConsumer Reportsallowsthatitsrec-ommendations canbedefeated. Suppose the editor ofConsumer Re-ports knowsthatherrivalmagazinehasalargerbudgetand,asaresult,makesrecommendationsbasedonmoreevidence.Thiseditorshouldrecommend that consumers rate this rivalmagazine’s recommenda-tionsoverthoseofConsumer Reports.Itwouldbeadhocfortheeditortoignoreevidenceagainsthermagazine’srecommendations.

It is only fundamental epistemic rules that are plausibly (non-ad-hocly) indefeasible. Elga needs to argue that there are simple funda-mentalepistemicrules,and,togettheconsequenceshewantsregard-ingthepeerdisagreementdebate,heneedstoarguethatRestricted

19. BasedonLewis(1971).

believeyouhaveany reason,nomatterhowweak,torejectthatruleofrationality.Weareledtotheviewthatwhat seems like evidence doesn’t even count as evidence. Lasonen-Aarnio18 is sympathetic to this view,writingthatit“restsmerelyonadesiretoavoidparadox”(p.342).Butthispositionseemsatleastasparadoxicalasanyofthealternatives.

Sowheredidwegowrong? Iwillargue in thenext section thatElga’s(2010) initialmovetoarestrictiononTestimony—amoveex-tendedbyTitelbaum—wasastepinthewrongdirection.

4. Elga’s Argument for Ubiquitous Indefeasibility

Whenfacedwitharulethatunderminesitself,Elgamodifiestherulesothatitignoresevidencethatthreatenstoundermineitself.Butthislooksadhoc.Whatreasondowehavetobelievethis,otherthanthefactthatitavoidstheunderminingproblem?Afterall,mostofourbe-liefsaresubjecttodoubtinthelightofopposingevidence,sowhyarebeliefsaboutdisagreementdifferent?

Elgaarguesthatall fundamentalepistemicrulesmustbenon-un-derminable.Hewrites:

Inordertobeconsistent,afundamental…rule…mustbedogmaticwithrespecttoitsowncorrectness.(p.185)

Butwhatdoes‘fundamental’meanhere?Elga(2010)writes:

afundamental[rule]isonewhoseapplicationisnotgov-erned…byanyother[rule]….(p.179)

18. “Itmaycomeasasurprise that insomecasesastatecanbeperfectlyepis-temicallyrationalevenifonehaswhatwouldseemlikestrongevidenceforthinkingthatitisnot”(Lasonen-Aarnio2014p.342,italicsadded).Althoughthenextsentencedoesseemtocounttheapparentevidenceasrealevidence.And she then says, “Thatone shouldbelieve thatone shouldn’tφdoesn’tentailthatoneshouldn’tφ”(p.343).SoitseemsLasonen-Aarniodoesacceptthat there is evidenceagainstφ,whichaffectshigher-levelbeliefsbutnotfirst-orderbeliefs,andthussheacceptsAkrasia.



circumstances,hisdutytosavethechild[outweighs]21hisdutytomeetBetty.(p.256)

Let’ssaythatruleswhichcanbeoutweighedarecontributory.Andwecantakeitthatthedistinguishingfeatureofcontributoryrulesisthatthere is a residual bad-making featurewhen they are not followed,evenwhennotfollowingthemistherightthingtodo(duetoother,weightier rules).22When rules are voided, there is no residual bad-makingfeature.InthissectionIwillargueagainstcontributoryrulesinepistemology.

Inmeta-ethics,contributoryrulesareassociatedwithRoss(1930),whoarguedthatwehavenumerousduties,andwhatweoughttododepends on the overall weighting of these duties. In epistemology,theanalogousview is thatwehavenumerousepistemic reasons tobelieve,andwhatweepistemicallyoughttobelievedependsontheoverallweightofthesereasons.Wecanmakethisexplicitbyweaken-ingtheconsequentofourrules:

Testimony:Ifanagent’ssituationincludestestimonythatx,thentheagentisrationallyrequiredtobelievethatx

to

Contributory Testimony:Ifanagent’ssituationincludestes-timonythatx,thentheagenthasa reasontobelievethatx.

(Assume fornowthat the rule isunhedged.)Thisavoids theunder-miningproblemsabove.Anagentwhohastestimonythatxandaper-ceptionthatnotxhasareasontobelievexandareasontobelievenot x.23No paradox;what they should believe depends on the cor-rectweighingofthesereasons.Andanagentwhodoesn’tbelievethat

21. Frederickuses ‘overridden’but Iprefer ‘outweighed’,whichmakesexplicitthattheystillhaveweight.

22. Schaffer2015p.659.

23. Similarly, testimony against Testimony is compatible with Testimony stillprovidinga reasontobelievetestimony.

Testimony(orsomethingsimilar)isamongthem.20Butnosuchargu-mentsareoffered.SorestrictingTestimonytomakeitindefeasibleisadhocafterall.

Someonemightobjectthatwhatisfundamentalissomeotherrulethat is more complicated than Testimony (and Titelbaum takes nostandonwhatthefundamentalrulesare).Butoncewestartmakingqualifications,weareonthepathtotheUber-ruleandtheviewthatallrulesaredefeasible.ThisisthepathIthinkweshouldbeon.Beforepresentingmypositiveview, Iwillargueinthenextsectionagainstcontributory rules inepistemology. (Thoseuninterested in contribu-toryrulescanskipthenextsectionwithoutlossofcontinuity.)

5. Against Contributory Rules

Distinguishtwotypesofdefeasiblerules—rulescanbeoutweighed,ortheycanbevoided(andpossiblyboth).Frederick(2015)makesthedis-tinctionasfollows:

[N]ormally,ifAlfpromisesBettythathewillmeetherforlunch,AlftherebyacquiresadutytomeetBettyforlunch.However,ifAlf’spromisetoBettywasmadeunderthreatofforce,hispromisefailstoengenderthatduty,becausethecircumstancewasduty-voiding.

Normally, ifAlfhasthedutytomeetBetty for lunch,then he ought tomeet Betty for lunch.However, if onhiswaytomeetBettyheseesachilddrowninginapool,andhecansavethechildwithoutmuchrisktohimself,thenAlfhasadutytosavethechild….IfAlfcannotbothsavethechildandmeetBettyforlunch,hehastwodutieswhichconflict.PerhapsallwouldagreethatAlfoughttosavethechild;buthisdutytomeetBettyremains.Inthe

20.Thisisworthemphasizing.AlthoughElgaisnotexplicitthatconciliationismis a fundamental rule, itmust beone if Elga’s argument that fundamentalrulesareindefeasibleistohaveimplicationsforconciliationism.



In the basic case, you are standing outside the library,whenyou seeTomGrabit exit,pull abook fromunderhisshirt,cacklegleefully,andscurryoff.ThisgivesyouprettygoodreasontobelievethatTomjuststoleabookfromthelibrary.

Case2 is just the sameas thefirst case, except thatTomhasanidenticaltwin,Tim,fromwhomyoucan’tvi-suallydistinguishhim.Inthiscase,ithasseemedtothejudgmentofmanyphilosophersthatyourvisualevidenceisnotareasontobelievethatTomstoleabook.(p.333–4)

ButSchroederthinksyourvisualevidenceremainsareasontobelievethatTomstoleabook.Todemonstratethis,heextendstheexample:

Considerathirdversionofthecase,exactlyliketheothertwoexceptthatinthethirdcase,inadditiontoTim,Tomhasathird identicalsibling,Tam,fromwhomyoucan’tvisually distinguish him. This third case underwrites acompellingargumentagainsttheintuitivejudgmentthatinthesecondcase,yourvisualevidencewasnoreasontobelievethatTomstolethebook.Forifyougoontocon-clude,inthethirdcase,thatTomstolethebook,thenyouaredoingworsethanifyouhadgoneontoconcludethisinthesecondcase.YourreasontobelievethatTomstolethebookthereforedoesn’tseemtohavegoneawayinthesecondcase;itmerelyseemstohavegottensubstantiallyweaker.(p.334)

Schroederseemstoberightaboutthiscase,wherethedefeaterweak-ensthestrengthofthereason.ButIdon’tseehowhecansaythesameaboutthepreviouscaseinwhichadrugmakesbluethingslookredandredthingslookblue.Inthatcase,thedefeaterchangesthevalenceofthereason,i.e.whatwasareasonforbecomesareasonagainst.Socontributoryrulesarestilltoostrong.

ContributoryTestimonyisarequirementofrationalitystillplausiblyhasareason(aweakone)tobelievetestimony.

Myobjectionisthatcontributoryrulessaythatafeaturethatisareasontobelievexisalwaysareasontobelievex.Anditisplausiblethat insomecasesa feature thatusually isa reasontobelievexbe-comesareasontobelievenotx.Anditisespeciallyplausibleinepis-temologywithregardtoPerception:

[I]nacasewhereI…believethatIhaverecentlytakenadrugthatmakesbluethingslookredandredthingslookblue,theappearanceofared-lookingthingbeforemeisreason forme tobelieve that there is ablue,not a red,thingbeforeme.Itisnotasifitissomereasonformetobelievethatthereissomethingredbeforeme,butthatassuchareasonitisoverwhelmedbycontraryreasons.Itisnolongeranyreasonatalltobelievethatthereissome-thingredbeforeme;indeeditisareasonforbelievingtheopposite.(Dancy2013)

These strongundercutting defeaters24provideanargument for reasons holism:“afeaturethatisareasoninonecasemaybenoreasonatall,oranoppositereason,inanother”(Dancy2004p.7).

TheconsequencehereisthateventhecontributoryversionofPer-ception isrefuted.Therearesituations inwhichtheperceptionofared-lookingthingisno reason at alltobelieveitisred.SimilarexamplesforTestimonycanbedevised,perhapswheretheagentfindsherselfinsidealogicpuzzleontheislandofLiars.Soweshouldrejectcon-tributoryepistemicprinciplesastoostrong.

Schroeder(2011)objectsthatthereisstillareason,justaweakerone.25Heusesthefollowingcase:

24.Undercuttingdefeaters suggest thatone’sground for thebelief isnot suffi-cientlyindicativeofthetruthofthebelief—thegroundherebeingtheexperi-ence.SeePollock1967.

25. Schroeder(2011fn.8)doesnotactuallydenyreasonsholism.Nevertheless,theargumentheofferscanbenaturallyunderstoodasanargumentagainstreasonsholism.



6. Hedged Rules

Let’srecap.SofarIhavearguedthatitisadhoctoholdthatsimpleepistemicrulesareindefeasible,andthatepistemicrulesarenotcon-tributory.Mypositiveviewis:For any (simple or complex) epistemic rule, rational agents can acquire evidence that it is not a requirement of rationality, causing them to decrease their credence that it is a requirement of rationality. Ifthecredenceislowenough,theruledoesnotapplytotheagent(byAnti-Akrasia).

Let’sconnectthistofamiliarviewsinethics.RecallFrederick’sex-ample: ifAlf’spromise toBettywasmadeunder threatof force,hispromise fails toengender thatduty,because the situationwasduty-voiding.So,startingwithasimpleethicalrule:

ifyoupromisedtop,thenyouarerequiredtop

it isplausible thatyouhaveno reason top if thepromisewasmadeunderduress.Thesimpleethicalrulecanbevoided.Inordertoallowforthis,weneedthefullruletobe:

ifyoupromisedtop,thenyouarerequiredtop,unlessthepromisewasmadeunderduress.

We’llsaythatthefullruleishedged.28

Inepistemology,usingtheexampleofPerception,abetterspecifi-cationoftheruleswouldmoveusfrom:

28.This idea has been suggested inmeta-ethics byHolton (2002) andHorty(2007).Hortywrites that “thegeneralprinciple that lying iswrongshouldbe taken tomean simply that lying iswrongbydefault—that is, to afirstapproximation,thatoncewelearnthatanactioninvolveslying,weoughttojudgethat it iswrong,unlesscertaincomplicatingfactors interfere”(p.23).Holtonsuggests thatethical rulesneed ‘That’s it’clausesstating that therearenoother ethically relevant features, e.g. ‘Anyaction thathas such-and-suchfeaturesandThat’sIt iswrong’.Onechoice-pointhereiswhetherthehedgelistsamanageablenumberofexceptions(e.g.‘underduress’)orisaplace-holderforanopen-endedlistofexceptions(e.g.‘andtherearenootherrelevantnormativefeatures’).Thisisthetopicofsection8.SeeField(2000p.135andAppendix)forrelatedpoints.

Furthermore,amotivationforwantingcontributoryreasonineth-icsdoesnotapplytoepistemology.Astrongmotivationforcontribu-toryreasonsinethicsisaneedforoutweighedreasons.Dancywrites:

Scanlon[whoistakentorejectcontributoryrules26]has…deprivedhimselfoftheideaofadefeatedreason,andthereby prevented himself even from addressing thequestionwhattheappropriateresponseistosuchathing.Normallywewouldspeakof regretand residualduties,but if all conflict is, as Scanlon suggests,merely appar-ent, there arenodefeated [outweighed] considerationscapableofdemandingregret,andnothingtogeneratearesidualduty.27(Dancy2004p.26)

The idea that contributory reasons keep their force even when de-featedismostplausibleinethics,especiallyifwethinkofourethicalsystemasconsistinginduties.Ourdutiesremaineveniftheyarede-featedbyotherduties.Yourdutynottolieremains,evenifyouhaveastrongerdutytosavealifebylying.

By contrast, our epistemic duties do not seem to have the samepowertoremainevenifdefeated.Forexample,supposeyouseeared-lookingtable inasituationwhereyouknowyouhavetakenadrugthatmakesbluethingslookredandredthingslookblue.Youdon’tbelieve that the table is red.Do you regret that youhavenot liveduptoyourepistemicdutytobelievethingsareastheyappeartobe?Surelynot.Asignaturefeatureofaviolationofacontributoryruleisthatitinvolvesaresidualbad-makingfeature.Buttheredoesn’tseemtobeanythingbadaboutbelievingthetableisblue.Sothecontribu-toryviewlookstobeunmotivatedinepistemology.Sotherejectionofcontributoryrulesismoreplausibleinepistemologythaninethics.

26. IamneutralonwhetherthisisagoodinterpretationofScanlon.

27. This argument is central to Dancy’s position. He later (p. 28–9) rejectsHolton’sPrincipledParticularismforthesamereason.

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response,Isuggestthattheagentcanmovestraighttoastablestateinwhich E has higher credence than before and that-Perception-is-a-requirement-of-rationality-in-this-situationhaslowercredencethanbefore.

Sosituationswhererulesappear toconflictare in factsituationswheretherulesareincompletelyspecified.Thisavoidsthesmellofadhoccery—wearenotassertingthatrulesareimmunetoconflictingev-idence;weareplacinglimitsonwhentheruleapplies,amovewhichis familiar inethicsandphilosophyofscience.31 It isalsofamiliar inepistemology—itisthestrategysuggestedbyLewis(1980)regardingobjectivechancewhichIdevelopinthenextsection.

7. Two Types of Inadmissibility

Let’sstartwithasimplecredence-chancelink:

Credence-Chance Link:Ifanagent’ssituationincludesfullbeliefthatthechanceofpisx,thentheagentisrationallyrequiredtohavecredenceofpinx.

Thisruledoesnotapplyinallsituations.Anagentcanhaveevidencethatjustifiestheirhavingcredencesthatdifferfromthechances.Callsuch evidence inadmissible. Themost familiar form is evidence thatgivesusdirectinformationabouttheevent.Forexample,ifyouseeafaircoinlandingHeadsinacrystalballyouknowtobereliable,youshouldnothavecredenceof½thatitwilllandHeads.Thisisanoppos-ingdefeater.SotheCredence-ChanceLinkshouldbehedged.Indeed,LewisdefendedahedgedversionoftheCredence-ChanceLink—thePrincipalPrinciple(PP),ofwhichwe’lluseasimplifiedversion:32

31. CompareCartwight(1983),PietroskiandRey(1995).

32. Precisely,itsays:“LetCbeanyreasonableinitialcredencefunction.Lettbeanytime.Letxbeanyrealnumberintheunitinterval.LetXbetheproposi-tionthatthechance,attimet,ofA’sholdingequalsx.LetEbeanyproposi-tioncompatiblewithXthatisadmissibleattimet.ThenC(AIXE)=x”(p.266).Thisbrings invarious featureswhicharen’t relevant toour concerns.Onethat isworthmentioning is thatLewis’s rule requires that agentsnotonlyhavecredencesthatmatchtheknownchances,butalsoupdateinsuchaway

Perception: If an agent’s situation includes a perceptionthatx,thentheagentisrationallyrequiredtobelievethatx

to

Hedged Perception:Ifanagent’ssituationincludesapercep-tionthatx,thentheagentisrationallyrequiredtobelievethatx,unlesstheyhaveevidenceagainstPerception.29

WhatifanagentdoeshaveevidenceagainstPerception?IsuggestwetakeHedgedPerceptiontoinclude:

IftheyhaveevidenceagainstPerception,30thentheircre-dence thatPerception is a requirementof rationality inthissituationshoulddecrease.

Where there ismoderate evidence that Perception is not a require-mentofrationalityinthissituation,therationalagentmightretainamiddlingcredence thatPerception isa requirementof rationality inthissituation. WherethereisoverwhelmingevidencethatPerceptionisnotarequirementofrationalityinthissituation,therationalagentmightdisbelievethatPerceptionisarequirementofrationalityinthissituation. Assuming Anti-Akrasia, (which links beliefs about the re-quirementsofrationalitywithrequirementsofrationality),itfollowsthatPerceptionisnotarequirementofrationalityinthissituation.Afortiori,Perceptionisnotarequirementofrationalityinallsituations.

A referee objects thatwhere believing E is based on Perception,whichisthenunderminedbyE,thesupportforEvanishes,thustheruleisbelievedagain,andthepositionisdiachronicallyunstable.In

29.NoticethatalthoughHedgedPerceptioncontains‘unless’,itisverydifferentfromTitelbaum’s restricted rules.Restricted rules tell us to ignore evidence thatconflictswiththerules;hedgedrulestellustolowercredenceintherules (inoursituation)whenthereisevidenceunderminingthem.

30.IintendthistocovercaseswheretheevidenceisthatPerceptionfailstoap-plyintheircurrentsituation,andcaseswheretheevidenceisthatPerceptionfailstoapplyinallsituations.



to have credence of x in p, unless they have evidence-inadmissible-relative-to-the-Credence-Chance-Link, or unless they have evidence-inadmissible-relative-to-the-PP*.

Isuggestthatotherrulesworkthesameway,andthatweneedtogen-eralizethenotionofinadmissibilitytoapplytotheotherrules.

Let’sworkthroughhowthisappliestoTestimony.

Testimony:Ifanagent’ssituationincludestestimonythatx,theagentisrationallyrequiredtobelievethatx.

Like theCredence-ChanceLink, thisneeds tohaveexceptionsbuiltin.Onetypeofexceptionoccurswhentheagenthasotherevidenceagainstx.Perhaps theagenthasdirectly seen thatx is false; this isanopposingdefeater.Adifferent typeof exceptionwouldbe if theagentrationallybelievesthatthepersontestifyingisunreliable;thisisanundercuttingdefeater.OrsupposeanapparentlyreliableagenttellsthemthatTestimonyisfalse;thisisamoregeneralundercuttingdefeater,relevanttoothertestifierstoo.Callevidencethatjustifiesanagent innotbelieving testimony inadmissible-relative-to-Testimony.SoTestimonyshouldbehedgedasfollows:

Hedged Testimony: If an agent’s situation includes tes-timony that x, then the agent is rationally requiredto believe that x, unless they have evidence that is inadmissible-relative-to-Testimony.

Mutatismutandisforothersimpleepistemicrules(includingHedgedTestimony).Thus,Isuggestthatallsimpleepistemicrulesarehedged.

Theunderminingproblemsdisappear,astheproblemcasesdescribedsituationswheretheagentdoeshaveevidenceinadmissibletosomerule,sotheagenthaslowcredencethattheruleisarequirementofrationality,sobyAnti-Akrasia(whichlinksbeliefsabouttherequire-mentsofrationalitywiththerequirementsofrationality),theruledoesnotapply.34Wehavearrivedatmyviewthatepistemicruleswillbe

34.Objection: Our hedged simple rules will almost never apply. Hedged

PP If an agent’s situation includes full belief that thechance of p is x, then the agent is rationally requiredto have credence of p in x,unless they have inadmissible evidence.

Butthereisasecondtypeofinadmissibleevidencethathasnotbeendiscussed in the objective chance literature—theCredence-ChanceLinkcanhaveundercuttingdefeaters.Theremightbeevidencethatre-ducesyourconfidencethataruleisarequirementofrationality.33Sup-poseanapparently reliableagent tellsyou that chance isnot some-thingwhichyourcredencesshouldmatch.Youmightbeconfusedbysuchastatement,butthisconfusionissurelyenoughtojustifyyourcredences’notperfectlymatchingthechances.SuchevidencereducesconfidenceintheCredence-ChanceLink.

Similarly, supposeanapparently reliableagent tellsyou that thePP is false (i.e. evenwith thehedge). Then you should lower yourcredencethatPP isaruleofrationality.SoPPalsoneedstobehedged.Just as the hedge of theCredence-Chance Link generated the PP,weneedanewprinciplegeneratedbythehedgeofthePP.

Oneway tosystematizeall this is tomake theconceptofadmis-sibilityrelativetoarule.SowecanrestatePPas:

PP*: If an agent’s situation includes full belief thatthe chance of p is x, then the agent is rationally re-quired to have credence of x in p, unless they have evidence-inadmissible-relative-to-the-Credence-Chance-Link.

AndPP*needstobehedgedinturn:

Qualified PP*:Ifanagent’ssituationincludesfullbeliefthatthechanceofpisx,thentheagentisrationallyrequired

that,givenanypossibleadmissibleevidence,theywillcontinuetodoso.Wecouldsetupallourrulesinthesameway,butIwillusethesimplerformula-tion.Thankstox.

33. Suchevidencemostdirectlyreducesyourconfidencethataruleisarequire-mentofrationalityinyoursituation;afortioriitreducesyourconfidencethataruleisarequirementofrationalityinallsituations.



epistemicrules,thispositionisstilldefensibleasanepistemictheory.SointhenextsectionIwilldefendanUber-rule.

Beforethat,thereisalooseendtotieup.Supposeweaccepthedgedrules—aretheycontributoryorabsolute?Intheethicscase,weused:

Hedged, Absolute: If you promised to p, then you are re-quiredtop,unlessthepromisewasmadeunderduress,etc.

Butthealternativeis:

Hedged, Contributory:Ifyoupromisedtop,thenyouhaveareasontop,unlessthepromisewasmadeunderduress,etc.

The advantage of contributory rules is that they don’t underminethemselvesoreachother;butwehavenoneedofthisadvantagehere,asthehedgecanensurethatthereisnoconflict.Andifthereisnocon-flictingrule,thensurelyapromisetopmeansthatyouarerequiredtop;theHedged,Absoluteruleiscorrect.

Theepistemologycaselookssimilar.

Hedged, Absolute:Ifitlooksred,thenyoushouldbelieveitisred,unlessyourationallybelieveyouhaverecentlytakenadrug,etc.

Hedged, Contributory: If it looksred,thenyouhavearea-sontobelieveitisred,unlessyourationallybelieveyouhaverecentlytakenadrug,etc.

ThestrongerHedged,Absolute rule looksplausible, so I tentativelyendorseit.

8. For the Uber-rule

SofarIhavearguedthatthelinkbetweendescriptiveandnormativeconceptscanbedescribedonlybyatapestryofinterlockinghedged

notthesimpleruleswithwhichwebegan,butcomplexrulesfullofhedges.

Dancy(2004)attributesananalogousviewtoScanlon(1998):35

Scanlon’s view… seems to be that… there are no ac-tualconflicts,onlyappearancesofconflict.Iftwoofour[rules]seemtogetineachother’sway,whatthisshowsisthatatleastoneofthemisincompletelyspecified,andthematter isresolvedbyamorecompletespecification.Supposewe[canhelpsomeoneinneedatthecostofkill-ingsomeoneelse].36Theideahereisthatinaproperun-derstandingofthe[rule]thatrequiresustohelpthoseinneed,therewouldprobablybeincludedanexceptiontothatdutyforallcaseswheretohelponewehavetokillanother.Properlyunderstood,therefore,thedutytohelpcannotconflictwiththedutynottokill.(p.25)

But a new danger emerges if the complexity spirals out of control.Startingwithsimplerules,cantheexceptionsbefinitelystated?Ideally,wewouldliketohavefiniteexceptions,asthiswouldallowamanage-ablesetofrulesthatcouldbeusedtoguideourdeliberation.

I don’t know if this is possible, so Iwill concede the point, anddefendthepossibility that theexceptionsareopen-ended.The ideaisthat,evenifweareleftwithaninfinitelistofexceptionstosimple

Perceptionmightstart:“Ifitlookslikep,thenbelievep,unlessyouhaverea-sontodistrustyourvisionor….”Anyonewhohaseverexperiencedanillu-siondoeshavesomesuchreason.Thispointiscorrect—hedgedsimplerulesmight rarelyapply toanyactualpeople—but this isnotaproblem.Again,comparethePrincipalPrinciple.Lewisformulatedittoapplyonlytoinitialcredencefunctions,soitdoesnotapplytoanyrealpeople.Nevertheless,itis(ifcorrect)asubstantiveandinformativeruleofrationality.

35. DancycitesScanlon(1998p.197–200).ButDancyadmitsthattheinterpretiveclaimisnotbeyonddispute,andIrefrainfromattributingthistoScanlon.

36.Bizarrely,theoriginalsentenceis“Supposewefaceachoicebetweenkillingonepersonandhelpinganother.” I take itDancy intended todescribe theexampleIuse.



so theprior distribution encodeswhat agents shouldbelieve givenanyevidence.ThepriordistributioncanencodeanUber-rule.

Arethereanysimplerulesthatapplyinallsituations,i.e.allovertheVenndiagram?Iseenoreasontoexpectso.Wecannotsayyoushouldbelieveyour senses,because there ispossibleevidence/ar-easof theVenndiagramwhereyoushouldnotbelieveyoursenses.Indeed,foranysimpleruleyoumightstate,thereispossibleevidence/areasoftheVenndiagramwhereyoushouldnotfollowthatsimplerule.ThebestwecouldhopeforwouldbepatternsinsomeareasoftheVenndiagramthatcouldbehelpfullydescribedwithsimplerules.

WemightmakeacomparisonwithHumeanlaws.FortheHumean,lawsdonotexplainevents;eventsarefundamentalandlawsarede-rived fromevents, soHumean lawsare just informative summaries.Similarly,inBayesianepistemologythepriorsarefundamental;somesimpleepistemicrulesmightbederivedfromthepriors,but,likeHu-meanlaws,theyarejusthelpfulsummaries.39

Forafurtherintuitiveargument,considersomedifficultquestion,suchas thecorrect credence that climatechange isman-made. Is itplausiblethatafinitenumberofsimpleepistemicruleswouldgener-atetherationalcredence?Itstrikesmeasentirelyimplausible.

Intherestofthissectionwe’llconsidertwoobjectionstotheUber-rulebasedon(i)guidanceand(ii)coherence.

8.1. GuidanceLasonen-Aarnio (2014) offers the most detailed discussion, and

39.Thussimplerulescanstillhelpexplainrationalrequirements;wejusthavetorememberthatthesimplerulesarethemselvesexplainedbythepriors.SothisseemscompatiblewithChristensen’scomment:“Ifweaskwhythedis-agreementofothercompetentthinkerswiththesameevidenceshouldaffectmyconfidence,thecorrectexplanationmaystillbethatsincetheirdisagree-mentisevidencethatmyinitialbeliefwasbasedonanepistemicerror,itcre-atesrationalpressuretogivecredencetotheclaimthatmyinitialbeliefwasbasedonerror,andthat…thiscreatesrationalpressuretobackoffofthatinitialbelieftoatleastsomeextent”(Christensen2013p.93,italicsadded).However,Christensen(2010p.203–4)offerssomeconsiderationsthatsug-gestthatsomesimplerulesareexplanatoryinastrongersensethanIallow.

rules.Cantheserulesbefinitelystated?Ifnot,wehaveaversionofparticularism:

Principled Particularism:Anyfinitesetof ruleswillbe in-sufficienttocaptureallnormativetruths.37

Thustheconnectionbetweendescriptiveandnormativetruthsisex-pressibleonlywithaninfinitelylongrule:anUber-rule.WiththisoneUber-rule,whichpresumablydoesnotundermineitself,theproblemsofunderminingareavoided.

IwilldefendtheUber-ruleinepistemology.AsfarasIcantell,theterm‘Uber-rule’wasintroducedbyChristensen(2010)anddescribedasfollows:

Suppose we specify, for every possible evidential situ-ation inwhich an agentmay find herself,what the ap-propriate doxastic response is. The resultwould be anoverarching rulewhich took into account every sort ofevidence.Wemight thenthinkof thatruleasencodingtheoneandonlytrueepistemic[rule].(p.203)

IaddthattheUber-rulecannotbefinitelyexpressed.Thispositioncanbegeneratedbyconjoininganinfinitenumberofsimplerules,orpos-itingafinitenumberofsimpleruleswithatleastoneinfinitelylonghedge.AstheUber-ruleappliesinallsituations,itisunhedged;Iwillarguebelow(8.2)thatitisalsodefeasible.

SofartheonlydetaileddiscussionsoftheUber-rulehavearguedagainst it.38 Let me sketch a way of thinking about rationality thatmakesanUber-ruleplausible.Insteadofthinkingaboutrationalityasemergingoutofsimplerules,thinkoftheBayesianapproachwhereagents begin with a prior distribution of probabilities. Imagine allepistemicallypossibleworldsonavastVenndiagram.Bayesiansonlyallow updating by conditionalization (or Jeffrey conditionalization),

37. CompareHolton(2002)andMcKeeverandRidge(2006p.16).

38.Christensen(2010,2013),Lasonen-Aarnio(2014).

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However,thispositionmightbehardertodefendinepistemologythaninethics.Inethics,oftenonlyasmallnumberofconsiderationsarerelevanttowhetheraparticularactionisright.But,turningtoepis-temology,considerwhetherIshouldtrustmyvisionandbelievethereisaredtableinfrontofme.Presumablythetrack-recordofmyvisionisrelevant,soeveryvisualexperienceinmylife—andwhetheritwasveridical—willberelevant.Andwealreadyseemtohavearulethatistoocomplicatedtoguideme.

Atthispointwecouldretreattotheviewthatalthoughwecannev-er(ornotalways)saythattherearenootherrelevantfeatures,theseotherrelevantfeaturescanberationallyignored.Defendingtheviewthattherearemorereasonsthanwenormallytakeintoaccount,MarkSchroeder(2005)writes:

IfGodmade a list of all of the pros and cons of somecourseofaction,itmightbeinfinitelylong.Butyoucan’tpossiblytakeeverythingintoaccount—onlythereasonsnearthetopofthelist.(p.15)

Sowecouldbeguidedby theUber-rulebypayingattention to themostimportantpartsoftheruleforoursituation.

Aproblemmightremain if someone insisted thatguidancemustbeprovidedbythefullepistemictheory,i.e.thewholeUber-rule.ThefullUber-rulecannotbefinitelyformulated,andperhapswecannotbeguidedbyruleswecannotformulate.

Butanagentmightbeguidedbytheruleswithoutbeingabletoformulatethem.Forexample,whenyoujudgethatasentenceisun-grammatical,youareguidedbylinguisticrulesthatyouareunabletoformulate.

Furthermore,youmightevenbedisposedtogettheruleswrongifyoutriedtoformulatethem.Forexample,Arpaly(2003)arguesthatHuckleberryFinnisguidedbythetruemoralrulesinnotturninginanescapedslave,evenifhewronglybelievesthatheshouldturnin

focussesontwomainworries.StartwiththeworrythatwecannotbeguidedbytheUber-rule:40

Now,theproblemfortheUber-ruleviewisthatanUber-rulejustdoesn’tseemlikethekindofrulethatcanoffergenuineguidance.Forone,itcannotevenbeexpressedasasetoffinite, informativegeneralisations.…Even ifonearguesthatsubjectsmanagetogenuinelyfollowtheUber-rulebyemployingmoreordinarykindsofepistemicrulesasheuristicguides,thefactremainsthattheyneedguidancetofollowtheUber-ruleitself.Hence,theUber-rule isaveryawkwardcandidate forarulethat is itselfsupposed toplay the roleofofferinggenuineguidance.(p.333)

InmyviewtheUber-ruleneednotofferguidance.IprefertheBayes-ianviewabove,accordingtowhichagentsare“guided”bytheirpriorsandtheevidence.

Still, Lasonen-Aarnio’s worry may survive as the worry that wemeremortalsareunabletobeguidedbythefullidealpriorprobabilityfunction,whichrequiresassigningprobabilitiestoaninfinitenumberofpropositions.Solet’saddressthisworryintheformthatLasonen-Aarnioputsit—thattheUber-rulecannotofferguidance.

Inresponse,itisarguablethatanUber-rulecouldofferguidance.Inthehappiestcases,agentsknowthattheceterisparibusclauseofasimpleruleistrue,i.e.otherthingsareequal,sotheycanbeguidedbytherule.Forexample,someonewhohasconclusivereasontobe-lievethattheirsensesarereliablecanfollowPerception,andPercep-tionwillbeonepartofthelargerUber-rule.ThoughneverguidedbytheentireUber-rule,agentsmightusuallybeguidedbythepartoftherulethatisrelevanttothem—itlooksred,therearenootherrelevantfeatures,sobelieveitisred.41

40.CompareBoghossian2008p.496.

41. SeeVäyrynen(2008)foradetaileddefenceofasimilarpositioninmetaethics.



Uber-ruleinthatsituationare.…Nowimaginethatyouhearanepistemologyoracletellyouthattherecommen-dationsmadebytheUber-ruleintheverysituationyouareinrightnowareincorrect.Insofarastheruleiscom-plete…thechartmustsaysomethingaboutyourcurrentsituation.Imaginethat,asthecharttellsyou,therulerec-ommendsbeinginstateS.But insofarastheoracle istobetrusted,doesn’thertestimonyactasahigher-orderdefeaterforanysuchrecommendation?(p.331)

Asstated,Ithinkthisimaginedsituationisincoherent.TheproblemisthatweareimaginingacasewhereyouaretoldthattheUber-ruleisincorrect.Butwehavedefined‘Uber-rule’asthecorrectrule.Soanyrulethatfailstobecorrectisn’ttheUber-rule.SoanyspeakerwhotellsyoutheUber-ruleisincorrectissayingsomethingincoherent,andyoushouldnotfollowtheiradvice.44Evenworse,we’vebeentoldthatitisan“epistemologyoracle”whoistellingustheUber-ruleis incorrect.Presumably,thephrase‘epistemologyoracle’appliesonlytosomeonewho speaks the truth. So ‘epistemology oracle’ cannot be correctlyappliedtoanyonewhotellsustheUber-ruleisincorrect(underanymodeofpresentation),astheUber-ruleisbydefinitioncorrect.

Acoherentscenario inthisarea is thatarationalagentmightbetoldsomething falseabout theUber-rulebyaplausible-lookingbutmisleadinginformant.AndwhatmightbeworryingLasonen-Aarnioisthethoughtthat,inthisscenario,agentscanhaverationaldoubtsaboutthecontentoftheUber-rule.ItlooksparadoxicalfortheUber-ruletoapplyinallsituations,beunhedged,andyetbedefeasible.45

Ithinkparadoxcanbeavoided.Let’sworkthroughacase.Supposethesumtotalofyourevidenceisacurrentredexperience.Supposethe

44. Theymightsay,“Theruleyouarefollowingisincorrect”,butthat’sadifferentsituation,asitinvolvesadifferentmodeofpresentationoftheUber-rule.

45. CompareChristensen(2013):“IftheagentcontinuestofollowtheUber-rulewhiledoubtingitscorrectness,itseemsinevitablethatshewillinsomecasesviolate [Anti-Akrasia]” (p. 93).Theexample showshowwe candoubt theUber-rulewithoutAkrasia.

theslave.42HuckleberryFinn’sinabilitytoformulatetherulesdoesnotstophimfrombeingguidedbytherules.

PerhapsourpositioninepistemologyisanalogoustoHuckleberryFinn’spositioninethics.WecannotformulatetheUber-ruleanymorethanHuckleberryFinncan formulate theethical rules.But it ispos-siblethathiscompassionmakeshimperformtherightaction,sothereisasenseinwhichheisguidedbyethicalrules.Similarly,itispossiblethat our good sense, or epistemic intuition,makesus form rationalbeliefs,sothereisasenseinwhichweareguidedbytheUber-rule.43

Tosumup,althoughtheUber-ruleisincompatiblewithsomeviewsthat involvestrongrequirementsonourability to formulateandbeguidedbynormativerules,suchstrongrequirementscanberejected.

8.2 CoherenceLasonen-Aarnio’sotherworryisthattheremightbenoUber-ruletobe found—“findinga rulenot susceptible todefeat is surelyharderthanmerelydefiningonetobesuch!”(p.331).TheideaseemstobethattheconceptofanUber-rulemightbeincoherent,justasthecon-ceptofasquarecircleis.

Onemight immediatelybe suspicioushere—surely, for anypos-sibleevidentialstate,thereisarationalresponse,andtheUber-rulestateswhattherationalresponsesare.Nevertheless,Lasonen-Aarniooffersthefollowingcasetodefendthisposition:

[A]ssumethatyouarestaringatachartrepresentingtheUber-rule: for each possible epistemic situation… thechartspecifieswhat therecommendationsmadebythe

42. SeeRaz(2000) for furtherdiscussion.Onemightbe tempted toappeal tothefamiliardistinctionbetweenatheoryofrightnessandadecision-makingprocedure(Bales1971).Butweareworkingonlywiththesubjectiveought,sothetheoryofrightnesslooksirrelevant(orperhapsbetter:thedistinctioncollapses).

43. Adifferentproblemwith an infinitely longUber-rule is thatwewouldbeunabletograspepistemicconcepts.Thus,Jackson,PettitandSmith(2000)giveasemanticobjectiontoparticularism.Thisseemstobeagoodreasonforpositingalongbutfiniterule.



AsafinalpointindefenceoftheUber-rule,itisworthemphasiz-ing Holton’s point that Principled Particularism is compatible withutilitarianism:

[S]upposeyouwereautilitarian.Thenyoucouldn’tde-terminewhichactiontoperformonthebasisofalistofpleasuresandpainscausedbypossibleactionsofyours.Youwouldneedtoknow,inaddition,thatthesewereallthepleasuresandpainsthateachactioncaused;andthatthesewereallyourpossibleactions.(p.206)

Nomatterhowmuchof theworldwedescribe, it isnot enough toensure that an act is right—rightnessdependson thewholeworld,justasgeneralizationslike ‘allswansarewhite’do.47Similarly, ifwefocusonnarrow-scoperuleswithdescriptiveantecedentswithoutto-talityfacts,thenwecanneverstopatfiniterules—whatyououghttobelievedependsonyourwholementalstate.Butthisdoesn’truleout

Thisfollowsfromtheinternalistintuitionthatagentshaveepistemicaccesstotherationality-makers.Butonecanhaverationalfalsebeliefsaboutwhatothersshouldbelieve:

Titelbaum’s-Principle-I-Deny:Foranygivenagentandsituation,iftheyare mistakenaboutwhatoneshouldbelieveinasituationotherthantheir own,thentheyaremakingamistakeofrationality.

Thedifferencecanbeput in termsof thescopeof thequantifiers.Foranyagentandsituation, thereareepistemic rules theyought tobelieveare re-quirementsofrationality;buttherearenoepistemicrulestheyoughttobe-lievearerequirementsofrationalityinallsituations.Anotherwayofputtingthisisthatyoucanberationallymistakenaboutwhatsomeoneelseshouldbelieve, but not aboutwhat you should believe.Why the asymmetry? Be-causewhatanagentshouldbelievedependsontheir ownhigher-orderbeliefsaboutrationality,whereaswhatanagentshouldbelievedoesnotdependonsomeone else’shigher-orderbeliefsabout rationality.TheasymmetrycanbereadofftheAnti-Akraticrule(thisisanadhominemcriticismofTitelbaum,asAnti-Akrasiaiscentraltohistheory)—itisirrationaltobelievepandbe-lievethatitisirrationaltobelievep;itisnotirrationaltobelievepandbelievethatitisirrationalforsomeoneelsetobelievep.Titelbaum(2015)mentionsthispossibleasymmetrybutimmediatelyrejectsit:“[E]veryplausiblestoryI’vebeenabletocomeupwithisgeneralizable:itappliesjustaswelltoanagent’sconclusionsaboutwhat’srationallyrequiredinothersituationsasitdoestoconclusionsaboutwhat’srequiredinhercurrentsituation”(p.276).

47. CompareSchroeder2011.

Uber-rulesaysthattherationalresponsetothisevidenceistobe90%certainthatthereisaredobjectinfrontofyou.Youarerational,soyouare90%certainthatthereisaredobjectinfrontofyou.Andyouarereflective,soyouhavethesecond-orderbeliefthattheUber-rulesaysthatagentswiththesumtotalofaredexperienceshouldbe90%cer-tainthatthereisaredobjectinfrontofthem.Sayyouaren%certainofthissecond-orderbelief.Nowaddaninformantwhosays(falsely)thattherationalresponsetoyourcurrentredexperienceistobeonly50%certainthatthereisaredobjectinfrontofyou.

Distinguishfirst-orderandsecond-orderresponses.Themost im-mediate response is lowering your second-order credence that theUber-rulesaysthatagentswithexactlytheevidenceofaredexperi-enceshouldbe90%certainthatthereisaredobjectinfrontofthem.Thisfallsfromn%.Thefirst-orderresponseisthatyourcredencethatthereisaredobjectinfrontofyoudropsbelow90%.Ifyoufullytrust-edtheinformant,itwouldfallto50%,butlet’ssayitsettlesat70%.

ThereisnoviolationoftheUber-rule.Yourepistemicpositionhaschanged—yourevidencenowincludestheredexperienceand the tes-timony.Anditiscompatiblewiththisstorythattherecommendationof theUber-rule for someonewith this evidence is “Have 70% cre-dencethatthereisaredobjectinfrontofyou.”

Noparadoxsofar.PerhapstheproblemisthatyoucandoubtthecontentoftheUber-rule.YouarenotcertainthattheUber-rulerecom-mendsa90%credencethatthereisaredobjecttoagentswithjustaredexperience.Similarly,youshouldnotbecertain that70% is therationalcredenceinyourcurrentsituation.ButarationalagentmaydoubttheUber-rulewithoutbelievingthatthebeliefsitprescribesareirrational.Thepossibilitythatyourcredenceshouldbemorethan70%needstoperfectly balancethepossibilitythatyourcredenceshouldbelessthan70%.46

46.WhataboutTitelbaum’smemorablephrase—mistakesaboutrationalityaremistakesofrationality?Icanendorsethisphraseifwefillitoutasfollows:

Titelbaum’s-Principle-I-Accept:Foranygivenagentandsituation,iftheyare mistakenaboutwhattheyshouldbelieveintheirsituation,thentheyare makingamistakeofrationality.



usedtorefertoeitheroftheseproperties.(Compare:Thereisnothingrationalaboutanidealgas.Theassumptionoftheidealnessofagasisanalogoustotheassumptionoftheprobabilismofagents.49)

In one sense, this type of revisability is stronger thanQuine al-lowed,foronewayQuinethinkswemightgiveupasentenceisawaythatwewouldnaturallydescribeasachangeinthemeaningofthesentence.(Quinedeniedthatwecouldseparatemeaningchangefrombelief change, due to his rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinc-tion.)WhereasIamhappytotalkaboutpropositionsandinclinedtohold thatnoproposition is immune from revision.But there are re-latedQuineanviewsthatIdonotendorse.

First,Idonotrejecttheapriori.IthinkthePrincipalPrinciple(andotherprinciples)areaprioriyetdefeasible.Somephilosophersiden-tifytheaprioriwithimmunityfromrevision—soIrejectthe“apriori”onlyinthissense.50

Second, I donot reject analyticity. Let an analytic sentencebe asentencethatonecanbeinapositiontojustifiablybelieveinvirtueofunderstandingit.Thisallowstheexistenceofdefeatersthatblockthejustification.Onecanrejectananalyticsentenceasfalseifonemistak-enlydoubtsthatitisanalytic.51Imaginebeingtoldthat‘Allbachelorsaremen’ is falsebyamisleadingbuteminentsource.Orbeingtoldthatyouhaveingestedadrugthatgeneratesfalsebeliefsaboutwhichsentencesareanalytic.Itmightberationaltorejectthesentence,soevenanalyticsentencesarenotimmunefromrevision.52

49.Hájek2006.

50.Casullo(2003)arguesthatthereisnoexperientialindefeasibilityconditionintheconceptofapriorijustification;andSummerfield(1991)andThurow(2006)arguethatapriorijustificationisdefeasiblebyexperience.

51. Alternatively, perhaps analytic sentences canbe rejected in the sense thattheyarebelievedtofailtousefullyapplytotheworld.Forexample,onecanrejectthesentence‘Etherconductsheat’onthegroundsthatthereisnoether.Eklund(2017p.89)holdsthatanalyticsentencescanbefalse.

52.Williamson(2007)writesthat“thecentralideabehindepistemologicalcon-ceptionsofanalyticity is that, insuchcases, failure toassent isnotmerelygoodevidenceoffailuretounderstand;itisconstitutiveofsuchfailure”(p.73).Irejecttheanalyticinthissense.

generalizations.Sothisversionofparticularismisnotdevastatingfornormativetheorizing.

ThiscompletesmydefenceoftheUber-rule.Inthenextsection,Iwillconnecttheresultingpositiontobroaderissuesregardingdefea-sibilityandtheapriori.

9. Against Certainty

IarguedintheprevioussectionthateventheUber-rulecanberatio-nallydoubted.ThissupportsaviewassociatedwithQuine—thatnostatement is immune from revision.Epistemic rules are good candi-datesforstatementsthatareimmunefromrevision,sobyarguingthattheyarenotimmunefromrevision,thegeneralcasethatnostatementisimmunefromrevisionissupported.

Still,Ihaveonlydiscussednarrow-scoperulesconnectingdescrip-tivewithnormative statements.Mypositiondoesnot entail thatnostatementisimmunefromrevision.Forexample,onemightstillholdthatrationalagentsarecertainoftautologies.

Nevertheless,Ithinkrationaldoubtcanberaisedevenabouttau-tologies, and for similar reasons. For example, suppose a heavenlyvoicetellsyouthatp-and-not-p,ortellsyouthatyourcredencesshouldsumto0.8.Bafflingsituationsforsure,buttheyseemtoprovidesomereasontodoubttautologies.48

ThisisachallengetoBayesianism,whichmodelsagentsasproba-bilistic,andsorequiresthatagentsarecertainoftautologies.Ithinkthe Bayesian should respond that their models, like most models,makeidealizations—thatis,theymakeassumptionsthatareknowntobefalseinordertomakethemodeleasiertoworkwith.Probabilismissuchanassumption.SoprobabilisticagentsinBayesianmodelsareidealized;buttheyarenotnecessarilyideal,inthesenseofbeingper-fectlyrational.Wehaveunfortunateterminologywhere‘ideal’canbe

48. SeeWilliams(forthcoming)foradefenceof“rationalillogicality”;Schechter(2013)offersrelatedargumentsagainstbeingcertain.AtoddswiththisistheliteraturebasedonMcFetridge(1990)(e.g.Hale2002,Ahmed2000,Leech2015),whichseemstoassumethattheremustbesomeruleswhichareim-munetodoubt.



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10. Conclusion

Theproblemsofthispaperweregeneratedbytheparadoxthatemerg-esinsituationswhereepistemicrulesunderminethemselvesoreachother.Onewaytoavoidparadoxistomaintainthatepistemicrulesareindefeasibleandignoreallopposingevidence.Ihavearguedinsteadthatweshouldthinkofsimpleepistemicrulesashedgedrules.Theyapplyonlyifagentsdon’thaveevidencethatisinadmissiblerelativetothoserules.IhavedefendedtheviewthattheonlyrulethatappliesinallsituationsisanUber-rulewhichstateswhatagentsshouldbelievegivenanypossibleevidence.ButeventhecontentoftheUber-rulecanberationallydoubted.53

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