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Page 1: Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 4-1- TB-31

Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 4-1- TB-31

Mullah Omar: 'Jihad Strategies and a Future Vision’ a follow-upBy Capt (Ret) C de Waart, feel free to share: in Confidence

C: It's a classic military mistake to leave a partially defeated enemy on the battlefield in one form or another -- let them survive; as they (TB) say ‘United we stand, divided we fall’.

The US imperative of security at any cost after the ouster of the Taliban created an atmosphere of absolute impunity among Afghan authorities and strongmen, who could get away with murder, torture and all other possible human rights abuses, HRW reports. The years of occupation in Afghanistan have been marked with the utmost iniquity of Afghan authorities and warlords associated with them, claims the new 96-page Human Rights Watch report "Today We Shall All Die”: Afghanistan’s Strongmen and the Legacy of Impunity. 1" March 3, 2015 This 96-page report profiles eight “strongmen” linked to police, intelligence, and militia forces responsible for serious abuses in recent years. The report documents emblematic incidents that reflect longstanding patterns of violence for which victims obtained no official redress. The impunity enjoyed by powerful figures raises serious concerns about Afghan government and international efforts to arm, train, vet, and hold accountable Afghan National Police units, National Directorate of Security officials, and Afghan Local Police forces. The fall of the Taliban government in late 2001 opened way to unprecedented debauchery in Afghanistan, when justice was violated not by terrorists or extremists, but by high-ranking Afghan officials and government forces or armed groups under their command.

US-Pak would trust Omar over Bhagdadi, Mullah Omar like Osama Bin Laden enjoys a cult status. In a bid to have control over Afghanistan, a Mullah Omar becomes extremely important

Afghan officials reported that the insurgents had raised the black flag of the Islamic State and were burning down homes and beheading captured security forces and local residents alike. -- the Taliban cannot recognize the existence of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the Caliph, in part because Mullah Mohammad Omar, the Supreme Leader of the Taliban, had been deemed Amir ul-Momimeen (Commander of the Faithful Believers) in 1996, a position perceived by Omar’s supporters as superior to Badghdadi’s current role as Caliph.

While the catastrophic consequences of failing to establish a lasting peace in Afghanistan loom larger than any time before, it seems that the US has started to reformulate its strategy amid criticism from opposition Republicans that the Democratic commander in chief was beating a hasty and risky retreat.

Factors such as brutal attacks by the terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the realization of the gravity of the threat posed by the extremist ideology in the region have contributed in bringing Afghanistan and Pakistan closer.

Moreover, as a result of operations against militants in Pakistan's Waziristan, the security challenges of Afghanistan have multiplied as terrorists are being pushed into Afghanistan

Yet Afghanistan remains significantly challenged in 2015 and will remain so for the foreseeable future, Like international donations, international business investment in Afghanistan beyond 2015 awaits proof of stability and security

The most dangerous threats to Afghan security have not changed much in the past twenty years.

1 http://www.hrw.org/reports/2015/03/03/today-we-shall-all-die-0

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First, the Taliban insurgency remains Afghanistan’s most pressing security issue.  Second, the security dilemma competition between India and Pakistan weighs heavily

on future Afghanistan internal security prospects.  Finally, Afghanistan will remain a top tier target for international terrorist

organizations seeking safe haven from which to plan, plot and launch catastrophic global attacks against US and western interests. 

In his September 2014 announcement of al Qaeda of the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri signaled to all Salafi jihadist groups in South Asia that their main calling should be to fully resource the Taliban-led effort to re-establish a Salifist emirate in Afghanistan as western military forces depart.

Despite late 2014 statements by US military officials in Afghanistan that Pakistan military operations into North Waziristan have disrupted the ability of the Haqqani Network to launch terrorist attacks on Afghan territory – statements dramatically amplified in Pakistani press – there is little to suggest that even if true, these will produce lasting effect

Why is US not chasing Mullah Omar any more Posted by: Vicky Nanjappa Updated: Wednesday, March 4, 2015, There is more than what meets the eye in Afghanistan. Mullah Omar is off the most wanted list of the United States of America even as Afghanistan sent some of its soldiers to train at the elite officer academy in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The United States of America did manage to hunt down, Osama Bin Laden, but a decade on, they still claim that they are clueless about the whereabouts of Mullah Omar, the Supreme Commander of the Taliban. The US claims that Mullah Omar could be hiding in Quetta or Balochistan. The claim has however been denied by Pakistan repeatedly although there is ample evidence to suggest that Pakistan is lying.Is Obama mending ties with the Afghan Taliban? Although the United States does not mention anything in the open, the actions clearly point towards a thaw in the relations with the Afghan Taliban. The name of Mullah Omar has gone missing from the FBI's most wanted list. However the US claims that he figures in the State Department's list under the Reward for Justice programme, offering $10 million to anyone who provides information. Although the United States continues to deny any deal with the Afghan Taliban there are certain actions that are clearly indicative of them going soft on Mullah Omar. There have been a series of meetings that were held in Qatar between officials from Washington and the Taliban. The Taliban has a political office in Qatar and it is said that several meetings were held here in a bid to pave the way for talks with the Taliban in Afghanistan. US-Pak would trust Omar over Bhagdadi, Mullah Omar like Osama Bin Laden enjoys a cult status. After all he had openly denied handing over of Bin Laden to the US. He also has a good command over the Taliban which the Pakistanis now call the Good Taliban. The announcement of the ISIS to float its Afghan wing, the Al-Khorasan is being watched very closely by both Pakistan and the US. If the Khorasan manages to set foot in Afghanistan and succeed in no way are they going to be under the control of either the US and Pakistan. The taking over of the al Qaeda by Ayman al-Zawahiri has had no impact since he is not revered to as a leader like Osama Bin Laden was. The Taliban on the other hand which is very familiar with the terrain could see itself breaking if it is not controlled by a leader with a cult status. Given this scenario and in a bid to have control over Afghanistan, a Mullah Omar becomes extremely important. Omar is the only other terrorist leader in the world other than Abu Bakr Al-Bhagdadi of the ISIS who enjoys a cult status. In addition to this, Mullah Omar would also realize the importance of keeping the ISIS away from Afghanistan and would choose Pakistan

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and the US for support. He too would realize that he would require strong support from both these countries in order to take control over Afghanistan especially in the wake of external threats in the form of the ISIS. Where is Mullah Omar and can he still lead? The million dollar question is where exactly is Mullah Omar? Speaking to several officers in the Intelligence Bureau, one gets the impression that he is alive, but not fit enough to lead a battle. He will be more of a symbolic figure for the Taliban and his presence is good enough for the Taliban to stand united, an officer informed. As per the confession of Mullah Mujahid Sakhidad, Mullah Omar was in Quetta in the year 2004. Mullah Mujahid is a very close aide of Mullah Omar. In the year 2006, former Afghanistan President, Hamid Karzai made it clear that Mullah Omar was hiding in Pakistan with the support of Islamabad.In another confession by Abul Haq Haqi a Taliban operative, Mullah Omar was running a shadow government from Quetta. There are also reports suggesting that the health of Mullah Omar is not in great shape. He was a fierce commander until 2011, but a cardiac arrest slowed him down. This has raised doubts about his ability to fight and lead his forces. However Indian agencies say that his presence is sufficient for the Taliban as he is the only one who can keep them united.

LWJ: Mapping the emergence of the Islamic State in AfghanistanBY LWJ STAFF | March 5th, 2015 | [email protected] |

Ever since disaffected Afghan and Pakistani Taliban insurgents began pledging allegiance to the Islamic State during the summer of 2014, rumors and reports have emerged indicating how the Islamic State has expanded its presence throughout South Asia. A chronological narrative of the rise of the jihadist group in Afghanistan follows below and the above graphic depicts its emergence.In late September 2014, fierce battles raged between Afghan security forces and insurgents reported to be associated with the Islamic State in the Arjistan District of Ghazni Province. At the time, Afghan officials reported that the insurgents had raised the black flag of the Islamic State and were burning down homes and beheading captured security forces and local residents alike. The incident in Arjistan is mired in controversy, as local Afghan officials allegedly recanted their versions of events and admitted to embellishing the presence of Islamic State fighters as a ploy to obtain more resources, according to a report by The New York Times. It should also be noted that in early February 2015, the Chief of Police for Ghazni

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denied that the Islamic State had created a presence in the area, stating that the insurgents fighting against the Afghan Government were local Taliban members.In mid-October 2014, a small group of disaffected Pakistani Taliban commanders, including the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan’s Emir for Arakzai Agency, announced their initial pledge to the Islamic State. [See Long War Journal report, Discord dissolves Pakistani Taliban coalition]

In January 2015, the same disgruntled Pakistani Taliban leaders, this time joined by a few little-known disaffected Afghan Taliban commanders, published a propaganda video pledging allegiance to the Islamic State. Within days of the video’s release, the Islamic State announced its expansion into “Khorassan Province” and officially appointed Hafiz Saeed Khan as the Wali (Governor) of Khorassan. The Islamic State also appointed former Guantanamo Bay detainee and senior Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim as Khan’s deputy. While Khan was primarily responsible for Islamic State activities in the tribal areas of Pakistan, Khadim was based in Helmand Province, particularly in his native village located in Kajaki district. It did not take long before clashes broke out between Khadim’s supporters and their rivals belonging to local Taliban factions.In southwestern Afghanistan, former Taliban insurgents who defected to the Islamic State established a training camp in Farah Province in mid-January and were reportedly operating between Bakwa and Khak-e Safid Districts. The Islamic State faction in Farah was reportedly led by two brothers, Abdul Malik, who was also known as Mansur, and Abdul Raziq, according to an in-depth report by Pajhwok Afghan News.Also in mid-January, in northern Sar-i-Pul Province, local officials reported that insurgents had raised the black flag of the Islamic State in Kohistanat District and other insurgents had begun recruitment activities on behalf of the jihadist group in the nearby Darzab District of Jawzjan Province. Afghan security commanders in Jawzjan later estimated that some 600

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insurgents had raised the black flag and were now fighting on behalf of the Islamic State in Jawzjan.Similar reports emerged from Kunduz Province, and the Kunduz Governor estimated that nearly 70 insurgents affiliated with the Islamic State had “started activities” in Dasht-e Archi and Chaharadarah districts.Afghan officials in Ghazni and Paktika Provinces announced in mid-January that hundreds of foreign fighters associated with the Islamic State had recently entered areas of eastern Afghanistan posing as refugees. According to the officials, some 200 foreign nationals had entered the Nawa and Gilan Districts of Ghazni and raised the black flag, and 850 families, including Arabs, Pakistanis, and Chechens, had entered Pakitka and Zabul Provinces disguised as refugees, some of whom later established households in the Nawbahar, Ab Band, and Shamulzai Districts of Zabul.On February 9, Khadim was killed in a drone strike in Helmand Province. [See Long War Journal report, US kills Islamic State’s deputy emir for ‘Khorasan province’ in airstrike.]

A few weeks later, insurgents loyal to the local Islamic State Emir for Logar Province, Sa’ad al-Amirati, burned down the Khwaja Ali shrine in the Charkh District of Logar Province. The insurgents also stormed local homes and destroyed television sets, deeming them “unIslamic,” and reportedly killed a local Taliban commander named Abdul Ghani and three of his bodyguards during the same incident, according to Pajhwok Afghan News.In Nangarhar Province, also in mid-February, rival Taliban factions and Islamic State-affiliated insurgents clashed in what was widely reported to be a turf war between the two groups.In late February, mysterious masked gunmen abducted 31 Hazara travelers in Zabul Province. Local Afghan authorities attributed the attack to a wide range of culprits, including the Islamic State, although no group has publicly claimed credit for the attack. After the Afghan Government failed to secure the release of the hostages through negotiations, the Afghan National Army (ANA) launched a rescue operation which reportedly killed dozens of the suspected kidnappers, including foreign fighters from Kyrgyzstan, solidifying earlier reports that foreign fighters associated to the Islamic State had relocated from Pakistan to Zabul.On March 5, ANA officials reported that a clash between rival Taliban and Islamic State factions in the Arghandab District of Zabul had killed seven Islamic State insurgents; however, further details about the clash could not be ascertained. Many of the claims and reports concerning the presence of fighters in Afghanistan associated with the Islamic State cannot be easily verified, but the jihadist group’s creation of the “Khorasan Province” in mid-January demonstrates its willingness to expand operations into South Asia. While

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sectarian agendas among insurgent groups are rare, if not nonexistent, in Afghanistan, it remains unclear whether the Islamic State in Khorasan Province will adopt and implement the sectarian objectives glorified by the group in Iraq and Syria. Similarly, given the numerous clashes between the Taliban and the Islamic State-affiliated insurgents in Afghanistan, the Islamic State will likely continue to face considerable resistance from the spectrum of well-established local anti-state actors like the Taliban, who perceive their resistance to the Afghan Government and coalition forces as the primary and most legitimate alternative to the current political system.In addition, the Taliban cannot recognize the existence of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the Caliph, in part because Mullah Mohammad Omar, the Supreme Leader of the Taliban, had been deemed Amir ul-Momimeen (Commander of the Faithful Believers) in 1996, a position perceived by Omar’s supporters as superior to Badghdadi’s current role as Caliph . However, the Islamic State has challenged the Taliban and Omar directly, and Baghdadi has described Omar as an “illiterate warlord” and “fool” who does not deserve political or spiritual authority. Omar has not been publicly seen since the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001. These fundamental ideological conflicts will not be easily reconciled between the Islamic State and the Afghan Taliban.

IEA 5 March, GHAZNI, Mar. 01   -  The militias locally termed Arbakis, in latest series of crimes and evils,  set fire to  a Masjid (mosque), the holiest  Muslims` sites  and parts of the most sacred books, the Holy Quran in southern Afghanistan’s Ghazni province. The incident came after a new Masjid was built in a village in Shalgar district of the province where the residents were unwilling to perform Salah due to the existence of their Masjid, which was the oldest in the area, while most of the locals opposed to building a new Masjid in the area and giving up Salah in their 70 years old Masjid. The Arbaki hoodlums forced the villagers to perform their Salah in the newly-built Masjid and resorted to burning down their old Masjid with many parts of Holy Qurans the other night following the firm stance of the locals. Much to everyone’s surprise and shame, the savage lapdogs attributed the incident to Mujahideen who would never ever do such a crime in million years as their sole purpose is to safeguard the Masajids (mosques). As Ulama (scholars) and Talibs (students), Mujahideen, deem it their greatest obligation respect Masajid and lay down their life for Quran and to make sure that everyone in our country does so. In contrast, those who sell their country, faith and belief and wear the chain of slavery in return for money would go to any length and would commit any sin and crime against the religion and country.

IS threatens Afghanistan peace hopes 5 March By Jan Agha Iqbal While the catastrophic consequences of failing to establish a lasting peace in Afghanistan loom larger than any time before, it seems that the US has started to reformulate its strategy amid criticism from opposition Republicans that the Democratic commander in chief was beating a hasty and risky retreat.

US Defense Secretary Ash Carter said during his first visit to Afghanistan that the US was considering slowing its military withdrawal by keeping larger troops than planned because the new Afghan government was proving to be more reliable as a partner. He also said at a news conference with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani that President Barack Obama had plans to discuss a range of options for US military withdrawal when Ghani visits the White House this month. A more active and larger US military presence in Afghanistan will not only demoralize the terrorists but will also help Afghanistan and Pakistan deal with insurgency on both sides in an effective manner. This presence will also provide some guarantee towards the fulfillment of the commitments made by Pakistan and Afghanistan aimed at improving their

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relations. A move by President Ghani to enter into direct talks with the Pakistan Army chief, which did not go well with some in Afghanistan, was hailed by the international community as a clever and honest step towards building trust. Pakistan on its part reciprocated this goodwill gesture through some visits by Chief of Army Staff General Raheel Sharif and ISI Chief General Rizwan Akhtar. As a result of these positive developments, signs of improvement in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations are more visible. Factors such as brutal attacks by the terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the realization of the gravity of the threat posed by the extremist ideology in the region have contributed in bringing Afghanistan and Pakistan closer.

These challenges have also prompted China, which has growing concerns about the training of extremist Chinese Muslims and their infiltration to China, to take part in the process by supporting Kabul-Taliban reconciliation while representatives of the Afghan Taliban have visited Beijing. This is in addition to the role Afghanistan can play as a land bridge between Pakistan and Central Asian countries, which can help Pakistan increase its export and business and import the energy that it seriously needs. In his address on National Teacher’s Day in Kabul, President Ghani referred to the Taliban and militant groups as "political opposition", while Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah in a meeting with the commanders of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police has asked the government to clearly define the terms "enemy" and "friend", fearing the continuation of uncertainty in dealing with insurgents and their supporters. These statements may resonate with the change in the US’s reclassification of the Taliban from "a terrorist group" to "an armed insurgency". This policy shift has resulted in separate but coordinated US backed peace initiatives with the Taliban by the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Turkey and Pakistan.

Fears and concerns Change comes at a price, and this is no exception. Pakistan and Afghanistan need to be ready to give necessary concessions to make the process succeed. They also need to deal with the internal pressures and opposition from some powerful quarters. Recent developments show that Islamabad is helping Kabul to hold talks with the Afghan Taliban, but these efforts should be judged by the outcome. The leadership of the Taliban still continue to make the same maximalist demands, such as withdrawal of foreign troops and changing the Afghan constitution. Some even believe that Pakistan has not yet done much to reciprocate the goodwill initiatives of Afghanistan. While President Ghani has been under immense pressure of being accused of making a clandestine deal with Pakistan without taking the Afghan people into his confidence, Afghanistan did not stop short of fulfilling its commitments. He has been quoted saying that he does not want to deal with the matter through public diplomacy. This situation has led some analysts to fear the exploitation of loopholes of the deal by Pakistan, elements from the Taliban and the Hekmatyar Group being given some share in the government in Kabul without ending their insurgency.

Ghani is losing popularity based on the fact that he is giving too much away, including suspension of a US$400 million tank and aircraft refurbishing plant funded by India, agreeing to greater military cooperation with Pakistan, and fighting the Pakistani Taliban in Afghanistan's Kunar province, without gaining anything in return. Moreover, as a result of operations against militants in Pakistan's Waziristan, the security challenges of Afghanistan have multiplied as terrorists are being pushed into Afghanistan. While some Afghan and Western officials have been quoted blaming the Pakistani military as well as some powerful political and religious parties in that country for supporting insurgency in Afghanistan, it is now time for Islamabad to go beyond its conventional rhetoric. As the influence of such networks remains intact with the inner circles of pro-Taliban (and al-Qaeda) groups, the

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situation gets more complicated for Afghanistan to aspire for a brighter future.

Islamic State as a common threat These developments take place when militants of Islamic State (IS) are making inroads in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban may have some rivalries with IS, but the proximity between their ideologies, goals and methodologies and tactics will bring them all under the black flag of IS. Adding fuel to the fire, the speedy growth of the Islamic State in Afghanistan has filled some insurgents, particularly those unwilling to join the peace deal, with hope and energy to win the war. The IS has recently announced its expansion into the land of Khorasan, which mainly refers to Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan. In Afghanistan, many among the Taliban and al-Qaeda either have pledged to IS openly or clandestinely or plan to do so, though there have been reports of clashes between Taliban fighters and IS militants. In southern Zabul and Helmand provinces, Mullah Abdul Rauf, a former Taliban commander who was recently killed, was actively recruiting fighters for IS, while in Kunar and Farah provinces the group has established training camps. Similarly, Afghan government officials have reported about the activities of IS militants in Ghazni and Kunduz provinces in central and northern Afghanistan. The police chief of Kunduz has confirmed that 70 IS militants were operating in the province and planned to expand their activities to other provinces. Some 30 members of the Hazara ethnic community have recently been abducted on the Kabul-Kandahar highway by gunmen wearing black clothing and black masks. and believed to be IS militants.

A spokesman for the Islamic State, in an audio tape published on January 26, announced the appointment of Hafez Saeed Khan, a former commander of the Pakistani Taliban (Tahreek-Taliban Pakistan), as the "governor" of Khorasan province, and Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadi, a former senior Taliban commander in southern Afghanistan, as the deputy governor. The Islamic State in Khorasan has claimed that the group has deployed over 10,000 troops on the borders of Pakistan and Afghanistan. This poses a common threat to both the countries. They have to cooperate and stand together against the enemy. In the meantime, in order to overcome this security and ideological threat, a regional cooperation that should also include China, Central Asian countries, Gulf states and Iran is of paramount importance. The rapid expansion of Islamic State in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan casts serious doubt over the relevance of any peace deal with the Taliban. If not pre-empted well in advance, the Islamic State has the potential to challenge peace initiatives by taking the insurgency in Afghanistan to a higher level. Jan Agha Iqbal is a former diplomat and international affairs analyst. He has served as representative of Afghanistan to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation as well as head of department in the same organization. He has been published widely and has vast experience in diplomacy and international relations.

There Is Still Time To Keep Afghanistan From Going The Way Of Iraq – AnalysisMarch 7, 2015 Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute Leave a comment By Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute By Thomas F. Lynch III*On October 1, 2014, the Obama Administration announced that it had concluded a long-awaited Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the newly-formed government in Kabul, Afghanistan.[1]  The announcement of this ten-year security arrangement, which had languished for almost a year, alleviated fears that Afghanistan’s lingering political morass might require the full departure of American and western forces from that country by the end of 2014. But the details behind this agreement, one primarily focused on a post-2014 US counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan, remain a source for serious concern. A parallel bilateral deal struck between Kabul and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), where the United States is a member state, continues a heavily circumscribed post-2014 NATO mission of training, advising and equipping Afghan security forces.

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Nothing in these agreements places a formal, low-threshold limitation on post-2014 US or western military forces in Afghanistan. Indeed, there are strong indications that the newly seated Afghan government of President Ashraf Ghani would welcome a far more robust and capable extension of US and western military forces in the country. [2]  Yet President Ghani inherited a situation where the Obama Administration – in partial concert with an alienated Karzai Administration – generated a self-limiting framework for BSA implementation in which US and NATO support troops in Afghanistan were voluntarily constrained to 12,500 in total beginning on January 1, 2015 – about 9,800 of them U.S. troops[3] and another 2,700 NATO forces[4] – with complete withdrawal of American military forces promised by President Obama for the end of 2016.[5] On November 21, 2014, the Obama Administration announced a modest extension in to 2015 of some of the pre-2014 use-of-force authorities for remaining US military forces in Afghanistan. But this represented no revisit of the basic premise of comprehensive military and intelligence withdrawal from Afghanistan.[6]

The Obama Administration has argued that the steady and steeply sloped withdrawal of American military forces constitutes a responsible transition to 350,000 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) taking the lead for national security.  It asserts that the residual 12,500 member US/western military force left in early 2015, then tapered to around a couple thousand by late 2016 will be sufficient to facilitate ANSF responsibility for national security by 2017. It will assure American freedom of action in the conduct of counter-terrorism operations against any renewed presence of international terrorist outfits for the coming decade.[7]

The assurances of a low risk transition to security in Afghanistan do not withstand scrutiny.  The residual force planned is too small to offset the major operational support shortcomings of the under-resourced ANSF, making it unlikely that outside financial donors or entrepreneurs will accept the risks of significant economic investment in Afghanistan. Its sizing constraints and operational limitations require confinement to locations insufficient to disrupt the inevitable rise in intra-regional militant and proxy outfit conflicts, with too little attention paid to intelligence collection and information fusion regarding the rapidly evolving South Asian terrorist threats.

Assessing the Environment: Afghanistan & the Wider Region Undeniably, Afghanistan entered 2015 in a better place than it did 2002. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) completed formation in late 2014 a third democratically elected government and the first peaceful transition of power between outgoing and incoming administrations in Afghanistan’s modern history.  Enormous international attention and investments between 2003 and 2010[8] have advanced Afghanistan’s capacity for self-governance, improved national health care, expanded schooling opportunities for Afghan youth, especially girls, and better connected Afghanistan to the outside world than ever before. Afghanistan also began 2015 with a 350,000-member security force consisting of an army, a limited air force, national police and border and customs forces.These improvements and others are important. Yet Afghanistan remains significantly challenged in 2015 and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Economically, Afghanistan is extremely poor, landlocked and highly dependent on foreign aid. Almost 40 percent of the population is below the official poverty line. A similar percentage is unemployed. Most Afghans continue to suffer from shortages of housing, clean water, electricity and medical care. Assistance remains critical; as Afghanistan had a 9 percent budget deficit in 2012 that grew to a 13 percent in 2013 as the decade-long artificial economy fueled by international security-related investments rapidly contracted. The US and other international donors fund almost 60 percent of Afghanistan’s national budget.[9] In 2014 GIRoA experienced two major budget crises. These halted critical infrastructure projects and required an international bailout

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of $537 (US) million to pay civil servant salaries including those for its military and police.[10]  Few post-2015 donations, beyond those promised by India and China, now exist. [11]  It seems clear that the international community anxiously awaits evidence that Afghanistan can provide acceptable domestic security and stability to warrant the investments.Like international donations, international business investment in Afghanistan beyond 2015 awaits proof of stability and security. Serious investment also requires belief that the Kabul leadership is taking verifiable steps to curb the expansive corruption in Afghanistan. [12] China and India have already contracted to invest billions in mining Afghan natural resource deposit areas, but security fears have dramatically limited the pace and cash-flow of these ventures.[13]  Afghanistan’s viability between 2015 and 2024 relies upon an outside donor and investor perception that ANSF units, under direction from Kabul, can provide protection against major security threats.The most dangerous threats to Afghan security have not changed much in the past twenty years. There are three main regional security dynamics that impact stability in Afghanistan, each also affecting major US/western security interests in preventing Afghanistan from again becoming an insurgent-riven nation, a civil war battle ground, an international terrorist safe haven or a combination of all three.

First, the Taliban insurgency remains Afghanistan’s most pressing security issue.  It is uncertain that the Afghan Taliban will be able to unseat GIRoA ever, much less in 2015. Although it is an indigenous insurgent group, the Afghan Taliban is substantively abetted by Afghanistan’s cross-border rival, Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban’s patrons, the Pakistani military and intelligence services, support Taliban militant operations (but not country-wide governance) against GIRoA forces and coalition support formations within Afghanistan. [14]

Such a presence challenges GIRoA authority and puts at risk Afghanistan’s major economic transit route, the Ring Road – a serious risk that can only negatively impact outside donor and investor confidence.

Second, the security dilemma competition between India and Pakistan weighs heavily on future Afghanistan internal security prospects.  India and Pakistan have a longstanding history of treating influence in Afghanistan as a zero-sum game.  The fear of being squeezed in an Indian security nutcracker has led Pakistan’s ISI to keep the Afghan Taliban in play as a security proxy in Afghanistan when it was placed under duress by US and NATO military forces from 2001-2012. Since 2012, Pakistan has increasingly come to fear a growing intelligence nexus between the Afghan national intelligence service (NDS) and the Indian foreign intelligence service (RAW).  Pakistani officials point to a growing number of reported contacts between NDS and anti-Pakistan Taliban insurgents (TTP) as evidence that GIRoA and India are colluding to topple the government in Islamabad.[15]  While shrill, there appears to be modest substance behind these Pakistani complaints making it certain that Pakistani security concerns in Afghanistan will only grow worse as western forces meet drawdown timetables.The mistrust between Kabul and Pakistani’s military-intelligence establishment runs deep and will not be overcome easily.  Pakistan’s ISI cannot be trusted to share fully with the Afghan NDS its interactions with an array of Pashtun militant groups operating from within Pakistan.  Faced with such an asymmetry in transparency, the Afghan NDS will not decouple from historic ties to the Indian RAW, leaving Pakistan’s ISI wary of NDS-RAW support for anti-Pakistan militant leaders and outfits that may be hiding in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.For its part, India has been relatively circumspect in security-based interactions with Afghanistan during the decade of US/NATO security leadership, preferring not to provoke Pakistan while the prospect for outside-generated security and stability in Afghanistan was present.  Nonetheless, Indian military and civilian leaders uniformly fear any Afghan Taliban

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return to power would carve-out a safe haven for Islamist militant training and staging for terrorism against Indian and Indian interests.  Increasingly, India has been offering more direct support to Afghan security forces – training, equipping and education – as western forces stand down.  At the same time, New Delhi has been expanding and extending its military and intelligence footprint at locations in Tajikistan that can be used to provide support for a GIRoA fight against militant groups, simultaneously setting the diplomatic conditions in Iran and the military-intelligence access conditions in Tajikistan to sustain organized militant resistance should GIRoA suddenly collapse under the weight of Pakistani-abetted insurgency.[16]

Finally, Afghanistan will remain a top tier target for international terrorist organizations seeking safe haven from which to plan, plot and launch catastrophic global attacks against US and western interests.  Robust American counterterrorism activities on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border during 2008-2013 greatly disrupted the activities of a host of groups, killing dozens of prominent global jihadist outfit leaders and denying these areas for unfettered terrorism plotting. 

In his September 2014 announcement of al Qaeda of the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri signaled to all Salafi jihadist groups in South Asia that their main calling should be to fully resource the Taliban-led effort to re-establish a Salifist emirate in Afghanistan as western military forces depart.[17]  A growing array of South Asian based jihadist groups have been reported infesting eastern Afghanistan.  Afghanistan will remain a highly contested space for bruised but unrepentant international jihadist organizations – and in combinations that will be a challenge to even well-resourced and well-focused intelligence agencies to address.The successful disruption of jihadi terror organizations from 2009-13 in Pakistan and Afghanistan emanated from eastern Afghanistan and functioned on the backbone of US military presence there.  A primary feature of the 2008-09 military uplift, this backbone enabled the coalition to independently generate rich and timely human, signals and electronic information about militant interactions on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. [18]  While the size of this U.S. intelligence backbone was never sustainable indefinitely, the complexity of the challenges it faced in tracking a fluid cross-border terrorist and militant milieu has not diminished dramatically.  It is thus more than fair to ask how well the residual arrangements for a post-2014 Afghanistan accommodate the retention of this important intelligence capability.

Fully Appreciating the Security Risks Disturbingly, signs abounded in 2014 that the US/NATO military drawdown has dramatically increased risk in all three areas of the Afghan security challenge. To begin with, the Afghan National Army (ANA)  has demonstrated considerable weakness in maintaining security against Taliban resurgence Afghanistan’s south, its east and in Kabul itself – areas where US/NATO combat troop presence had all but vanished by mid-2014. In the south and east, Afghan military units have lost many hard-won gains from the US/NATO uplift of 2009-11. By the end of October 2014, Afghan Army and National Police forces had suffered more than 4,600 deaths for the year – an unsustainable rate of attrition.[19] ANSF field units lack sufficient aerial resupply, casualty evacuation capabilities, and intelligence support, as well as timely indirect fires or air strike support. [20]  ANSF performance in late 2014 has eroded international confidence in Afghanistan as a secure environment for financial investments.Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies exhibit no fundamental change in support for the Afghan Taliban and other anti-Indian jihadi outfits operating in Afghanistan. Despite late 2014 statements by US military officials in Afghanistan that Pakistan military operations into North Waziristan have disrupted the ability of the Haqqani Network to launch terrorist

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attacks on Afghan territory – statements dramatically amplified in Pakistani press – there is little to suggest that even if true, these will produce lasting effect.[21]

Pakistan military-intelligence accusations that Afghan government and ANSF forces are unable to capture or kill escaping North Waziristan militants and that Afghanistan’s NDS is actually working with Indian intelligence services to “turn” fleeing Pakistani Taliban into agents for use against the Pakistan government grow greater every day.[22]  The historic Indo-Pakistani animus is palpable in Afghanistan and the space for this animus to grow in size and scale increases with every withdrawn US/NATO military asset.

Finally, the American draw-down of 2013-14 has already badly compromised the linchpin of a successful future counter-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan: a robust and autonomous intelligence backbone.  But most of this backbone has been lost already – a direct casualty of the Obama Administration’s move to a skeletal military footprint by December 2014. CIA officials made it clear that while intelligence assets and contractors are used to guard its bases, it relies on military transportation, logistics and emergency medical evacuation and cannot risk significant deployment in Afghanistan’s rural areas without US troops nearby. Without another 3,000-3,500 US troops – about a military intelligence brigade with supporting logistical and force protection forces – the American contingent will wind through 2015-16 increasingly unable to monitor, anticipate and counteract what certainly will remain a rapidly evolving and increasingly complex set of terrorist interactions.

The worrisome security indicators in Afghanistan during 2014 must give one pause – and especially in light of the outcomes witnessed in Iraq and Syria. There, Iraqi-demanded US/western military departure clearly contributed to a too-late discernment of a major terrorist-insurgent threat requiring a taxing and expensive US military response.[23] Two lessons from Iraq/Syria stand out.  First, the nexus between insurgents and Salafi jihadist terrorism is pernicious and fast-moving.  A robust, autonomous US/western intelligence network is vital as local intelligence agents cannot be counted on for unbiased collection and transmission of important nuances of network interactions. Second, once lost in a country, a viable US military-interagency intelligence nexus is very costly and time-consuming to reconstruct.[24]

Into 2015:  It’s Late – But Not Too Late A truly serious level of security commitment by the US and its allies in Afghanistan and for the wider region must meet three main objectives, none of which are sufficiently accommodated as of late 2014 in the announced implementation framework for the US-Afghan BSA and the NATO-Afghanistan security pact.

First, any serious commitment must include independent and robust intelligence and strike assets to track in detail and act swiftly against international terrorist organizations looking to establish sanctuary in Afghanistan.

Second, it must provide ANSF with sufficient direct operational support in the key counterinsurgency capabilities these units inherently lack: aero-medical casualty evacuation, aerial troop transport to crisis areas, heavy indirect fire support from air and artillery, rapid and reliable logistical resupply, and reconnaissance and intelligence support down to brigade and regimental levels. 

Finally, it must sustain sufficient training and operational military presence in Afghanistan to dampen the incentives for proxy militia agents sparking internecine war in Afghanistan or cross-border war in Pakistan.In November 2014, new American forces commander, US Army General John Campbell, publicly signaled a desire to revisit the severe limitations of the Obama Administration drawdown plans, telling American media outlets that he was conducting a review to make sure it, “….still made sense.”[25]  This review is overdue, and its conclusions already clear.

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This post-2014 residual American military presence should be composed of 20,000 personnel, augmented by 4,500-5,000 NATO trainers and advisors.  This force should remain at a 20,000 level until political and security accommodations between Pakistan and Afghanistan and Pakistan and India mature to the point where regional collaboration on Afghan stability is assured.  Such an American force could easily be sustained with an annual budget of $20B.Three thousand of these Americans would provide multi-dimensional air and ground logistical support for tactically capable but operationally limited ANA. Another 10,000 Americans are necessary for advise and assist missions with the ANA and with selected Afghan National Police (ANP) formations down to the levels of divisions and brigades – a far more robust undertaking than the present limitations to ANA corps level and above. There is no way to fight a credible counter-insurgency in the inhospitable and mountainous terrain of Afghanistan without indirect fire support, timely aerial strike support, aero-resupply, and aero-medical evacuation. A modest commitment supplementing Afghan Air Forces of a US Army helicopter lift battalion, an attack battalion and a dedicated US Air Force Fighter wing would comprise about 3,500-4,000 of this 10,000 person package.A robust U.S. Special Operations element of 3,000 members must remain to assure responsive and capable counter-terrorism capability. These will assist Afghan special units against threats to Afghan sovereignty and must conduct autonomous counter-terrorism operations against potential encroachment by international terrorist organizations. Finally, some 4,000 military intelligence troops must remain to assure quality and timely tracking of the threats faced by Afghan and American forces; and, more importantly, to autonomously track the complex interplay of jihadist outfits across Afghanistan and Pakistan, assuring rapid US operational responsiveness to metastasizing threats and an robust independent capability to assess what will surely be biased assessments from the Afghan NDS and Pakistan ISI.

The U.S. also would be wise to fashion a recurring annual (or biannual) field training exercise featuring an Afghan division paired with an American brigade rotated in from the United States – thereby demonstrating continuing commitment and U.S.-Afghan interoperability. Major American force concentrations would best base from Bagram, Kabul, Kandahar and points north and west, with only those advise-assist troops, autonomous intelligence and Special Forces assets necessary for the south and east basing within compounds there run by the ANA. The composition, disposition and authorities of a post-2014 American residual force are the most important aspects of leverage available now for American policy in a very dangerous portion of the world. The United States cannot ‘fix’ the region or eliminate the three major challenges to security most dominant within Afghanistan. However, America can be better postured to deter the worst threats, better enable support to already faltering ANSF units, be better informed than it might otherwise be about the evolving nature of Indo-Pakistani proxy hostilities, be better assured that it has timely and relevant intelligence and the evolving nature of international jihadist outfits.   The promised post-2014 US/NATO military presence and operational authorities are insufficient to meet these major requirements.Residual American bases and forces in South Korea have been performing precisely such a crisis deterrence and crisis response capability for at least the past 40 years. The absence of US intelligence and operational forces in Iraq from 2011-14 surely blinded America and her allies from the dangerous convergence of resurgent jihadist groups and politically disaffected Iraq and Syrian Sunni tribes, denying a timely or effective early response.  American security interests in South Asia are no less demanding than in Northeast Asia or the northern arc of the Middle East. Thus, why not scope the residual American military presence in Afghanistan to size and a posture able to address the intractable dilemmas that remain? The hour is late, but the means to reduce presently unacceptable local, regional and international security risks in Afghanistan are clear. With sober reflection on aftermath of too-dramatic exit from Iraq, a

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comprehensive policy and strategy review for post-2014 military-intelligence support to Afghanistan needs be conducted in early 2015.About the author: *Thomas F. (Tom) Lynch III is a Distinguished Research Fellow for South Asia and the Near East at the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies. He was also the Special Assistant for South Asian security matters for then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen from 2008-10, an Army regional support commander with responsibilities in Afghanistan from 2005-07, A Special Assistant to the US CENTCOM Commander for South Asia security matters from 2004-05, and a Military Special Assistant to the US Ambassador to Afghanistan to Kabul in 2004. The opinions expressed in this commentary represent his own views and are not those of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the United States Government. This is a condensed version of an article that will appear in Orbis, Spring 2015.Source:This article was published by FPRI.[1] Marherita Stancati and Nathan Hodge, “U.S.-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement Signed,” The Wall Street Journal, September 30, 2014 at http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-afghan-bilateral-security-agreement-signed-1412076436.[2] “Afghan lower house approves 12,500 NATO-led troops remaining,” Agence Francais Presse (AFP) in The Japan Times, November 23, 2014 at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/11/23/world/politics-diplomacy-world/afghan-lower-house-approves-12500-nato-led-troops-remaining/#.VH9okDGkPME; Clar Ni Chonghaile, “Afghanistan: what will happen when the troops – and their dollars – depart,” The Guardian (UK), November 27, 2014 at http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/nov/27/afghanistan-nato-troops-withdraw-ashraf-ghani; and. Rod Nordland and Taimoor Shah, “Afghanistan Quietly Lifts Ban on Night Raids,” The New York Times, November 23, 2014 at   http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/24/world/asia/afghanistan-quietly-lifts-ban-on-night-raids.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=photo-spot-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=1.[3] Karen DeYoung, “Obama to Leave 9,800 U.S. Troops in Afghanistan,” The Washington Post, May 27, 2014 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-to-leave-9800-us-troops-in-afghanistan-senior-official-says/2014/05/27/57f37e72-e5b2-11e3-a86b-362fd5443d19_story.html. Also see Adam Entous, Julian E. Barnes and Caril E. Lee, U.S. to Leave 10,000 Troops in Afghanistan After 2014,”  The Wall Street Journal, May 27, 2014 at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304811904579588022751706240.[4] Erik Kirshcbaum and Steve Scherer, Germany and Italy to keep up to 1,350 soldiers in Afghanistan, Reuters, November 18, 2014 at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/18/us-afghanistan-germany-troops-idUSKCN0J211820141118. Also “Security and Defense Cooperation Agreement Between the United States of American and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, November 20, 2013 at http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/bsa; and, Charles Recknagel, “Explainer: Key Points In US-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement,” Radio Free Europe – Radio Liberty, December 3, 2014 at http://www.rferl.org/content/explainer-bsa-afghan-us-security-agreement-bsa/26613884.html.[5] The US-Afghanistan BSA makes no guarantees of minimal military assistance, monetary contributions or basing locations.[6] Mark Mazetti and Eric Schmitt, “In a Shift, Obama Extends U.S. Role in Afghan Combat,” The New York Times, November 21, 2014 at  http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/us/politics/in-secret-obama-extends-us-role-in-afghan-combat.html; Steve Holland and Mirwais Harooni, “Obama widens post-2014 combat role for U.S. forces in Afghanistan,” Reuters, November 23, 2014 at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/23/us-usa-afghanistan-idUSKCN0J60OV20141123; and Azam Ahmed, “1,000 Extra U.S. Soldiers Will Remain in Afghanistan,” The New York Times, December 6, 2014 at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/world/asia/1000-extra-us-soldiers-will-remain-in-afghanistan-.html?_r=0.[7] Gordon Lubold, “Obama Orders 9,800 Troops to Remain in Afghanistan with All Out by 2016,” ForeignPolicy.com, May 27, 2014 at http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/05/27/obama_to_announce_9800_troops_to_remain_in_afghanistan_all_out_by_2016; and, Adam Entous and Carol Lee, “Obama Details Plan for Forces in Afghanistan,” The Wall Street Journal, May 28, 2014 at  http://online.wsj.com/articles/obama-details-plan-for-forces-in-afghanistan-1401234489.[8] Afghanistan Economy Profile 2014, Index Mundi at http://www.indexmundi.com/afghanistan/economy_profile.html; Also see  Tony Capaccio, “US Military Classifying Assessments of Afghan Military,” October 30, 2014 at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-30/u-s-military-classifying-assessments-of-afghan-military.html.[9] See David Lerman and Eltaf Najafizada, “Afghan Deal Rekindles Question on U.S. Pace in Leaving,” Bloomberg News, October 1, 2014 at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-01/afghan-deal-rekindles-questions-on-u-s-pace-in-leaving.html.

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[10] Kevin Sieff and Joshua Partlow, “ Afghan economy facing serious revenue shortage,” The Washington Post, April 15, 2014 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/afghan-economy-facing-serious-revenue-shortage/2014/04/15/6ddce38a-5be9-46ad-8f3b-1eb2ef4ed9bd_story.html; and, “Letter from the Office of the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) and US Department of State Response,” September 26 and October 10, 2014 at http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/special%20projects/SIGAR-14-101-SP.pdf.[11] See Brian Spegele and Nathan Hodge, “China Pledges $327 Million in Aid to Afghanistan,” the Wall Street Journal, October 29, 2014 at http://online.wsj.com/articles/china-pledges-327-million-in-aid-to-afghanistan-1414566221; Gareth Price, India’s Policy Towards Afghanistan, AS_ 2013/14, Chatham House, August 2013, p. 5-6, at http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Asia/0813pp_indiaafghanistan.pdf; “India promises more reconstruction aid for Afghanistan,” Press TV, May 22, 2013 at http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/05/22/304832/india-vows-to-send-aid-to-afghanistan/; and Lucy Westcott, “Afghanistan Conference: U.S., U.K., Pledge Support to Fledgling Government,” Newsweek.com, December 4, 2014 at http://www.newsweek.com/afghanistan-conference-us-uk-pledge-support-fledgling-government-289338.[12]  Karen DeYoung and Joshua Partlow, “Corruption in Afghanistan still a problem as international donors meet,” The Washington Post, July 6, 2012 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/corruption-in-afghanistan-still-a-problem-as-international-donors-meet/2012/07/06/gJQAhxjgSW_story.html.[13] See Lynne O’Donnell, “China’s MCC turns back on US$3b Mes Aynak Afghanistan mine deal,” South China Morning Post, March 21, 2014 at http://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/1453375/chinas-mcc-turns-back-us3b-mes-aynak-afghanistan-mine-deal.[14] Matthew Waldman, The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan Insurgents,” Crisis States Research Centre Discussion Papers – London School of Economics, June 2010 at http://www.aljazeera.com/mritems/Documents/2010/6/13/20106138531279734lse-isi-taliban.pdf, Vahid Brown and Don Rassler, Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012, London: Oxford University Press, 2013, especially pp. 129-234.[15] See Umar Farooq, “Afghanistan-Pakistan: The Covert War,” The Diplomat, January 1, 2014 at http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/afghanistan-pakistan-the-covert-war/.[16] Rajeev Sharma, “India’s Anyi military base in Tajikistan is Russia-locked,” Russia and India Report, October 26, 2012 at http://in.rbth.com/articles/2012/10/26/indias_ayni_military_base_in_tajikistan_is_russia-locked_18661.html;  and, “India, Tajikistan to step up counter-terrorism cooperation,” Business Standard, September 11, 2014 at http://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/india-tajikistan-to-step-up-counter-terrorism-cooperation-114091101203_1.html.[17] See “Al-Qaeda chief Zawahiri launches al-Qaeda in South Asia,” BBC News Asia, September 4, 2014 at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29056668; and, “Full Text of Al Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri’s audio message,” at http://www.thedailystar.net/upload/gallery/pdf/transcription-zawahiri-msg.pdf.[18] See Stephen Tankel, Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan, US Institute of Peace, July 2013, especially pp. 15-21 at http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/8112~v~Domestic_Barriers_to_Dismantling_the_Militant_Infrastructure_in_Pakistan.pdf.[19] See Andrew Tilghman, New Afghanistan Commander reviews Drawdown Plans,” Military Times, November 14, 2014 at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/11/14/afghanistan-drawdown-review/19041195/.[20] See Jonahtan Schroden, et. al., Independent Assessment of the Afghan National Security Forces, Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), January 2014 at http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/CNA%20Independent%20Assessment%20of%20the%20ANSF.pdf.[21] See “Pakistani Army’s operation in North Waziristan disrupted Haqqani network: US commander,” Newsnation Pakistan, November 6, 2014 at http://www.newsnation.in/article/60114-pakistani-armys-operation-north-waziristan-disrupted-haqqani-network.html; “Pakistani forces target militants without discrimination in Waziristan – security advisor,” Xinhuanet China News Service, July 21, 2014 at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2014-07/21/c_133500222.htm; and, “US military leaders say it’s too soon to evaluate Pakistan offensive in N. Waziristan,” Associated Press, August 29, 2014 at  http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/08/29/us-military-leaders-say-it-too-soon-to-evaluate-pakistan-offensive-in-n/.[22] “Pakistan censures NATO over militant safe havens in Afghanistan,” English Islam Times, June 26, 2012 at http://www.islamtimes.org/en/doc/news/174377/en/doc/news/423234/israeli-soldiers-shoot-injure-palestinian-teen-in-west-bank; “Striking revelations: Hakimullah Mehsud’s top aide in US custody,” The Express Tribune, October 12, 2013 at http://tribune.com.pk/story/616941/striking-revelations-hakimullah-mehsuds-top-aide-in-us-custody/; Matthew Rosenberg, “U.S. Disrupts Afghans’ Tack on Militants,” The New York Times, October 28,

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2013 at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/us-disrupts-afghans-tack-on-militants.html?pagewanted=all&module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3As%2C%7B%222%22%3A%22RI%3A13%22%7D; and Farooq (January 1, 2014).[23] See Rick Brennan, “Withdrawal Symptoms: The Bungling of the Iraq Exit,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2014 at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142204/rick-brennan/withdrawal-symptoms.[24] See Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations, Joint & Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA), Suffolk, Virginia, June 15, 2012 especially pages 2-5, 25-28 and 36-37.[25] Tilghman, “New Afghanistan Commander reviews Drawdown Plans,” at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/11/14/afghanistan-drawdown-review/19041195/.Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute