1
3rd International Conference
on Public Policy (ICPP3)
June 28-30, 2017 – Singapore
Panel T03P09 Session 2
Authoritarian Deliberation Revisited: What Does It Mean for
Our Understanding of Democratic Governance?
Educational Inequality in China: The Implementation of
China’s ‘New-Type Urbanisation Plan’ to Reduce
Educational Inequality of Migrant Children in Changsha
Zhen Lu
University of Sheffield
United Kingdom
Email: [email protected]
29th June 2017
2
Abstract
Sincetheeconomicreformstartedinthelate1970s,Chinahasgreatlyupgraded
itseconomicstructure,andprofoundchangeshavetakenplaceinChina’ssociety.
During the past three decades, more than 200 million rural migrant workers
(nonminggong)havemigratedtocitiesforaliving(NBS,2012).Thislarge-scale,
persistent,internalmigrationphenomenonisoneofthemaindriversofChina’s
economicgrowth. It is alsooneof themainmanifestationsof theurbanisation
processinthiscountry(NBS,2012).However,ruralmigrantworkershavefound
thatsettlingdownandassimilatingtothecitiescanbeverychallengingforthem
(Zhu,2007).Amongall thesocialproblemsthathavebeenbroughtby internal
migration in China and the difficulties migrants have encountered in their
integration process, the problems of rural migrant children to gain access to
education in cities have attracted extensive attention not only from the
government,butalsofromthesocialmedia,scholars,andhaveevenstimulated
public protests in China. Along with the increasing migrant population, the
developmentofcitizenshipandperceptionsof it,afast-developingcivilsociety,
especiallythegrowingcollectiveactionandloudervoiceforbetterconditionsof
migrantworkers,haveemerged.BecausethepositionoftheChineseCommunist
Partyanditsdirectcontroloverkeyareasinthecountryremainsunchallenged,
Chinalookslikeahugemonolithicone-party-statetoanoutsider.Yetthereare
spacesleftfordemocraticactivitieswithinanauthoritariansetting.China’shighly
decentralizedgovernmentsystem,thevariegatedpolicybehaviourofstateactors,
and complicated relationships between governmental and non-governmental
actors,areexamplesofsuchpotentialspacesforthedemocraticactivities.
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Introduction
ThisresearchisabouteducationalinequalityinChina.Theresearchquestionis
howgovernmentsindifferentlevelsdealwitheducationalinequalityexperienced
bymigrantchildreninChina.EducationalinequalityinChinamanifestsitselfas
that nowadaysmanymigrant children have experienced difficulties in gaining
accesstoeducationincitiesinChinaduetotheeducationallaws/policiesinChina
have tied children’s school enrolmentwith their residence, specifying that the
possessionofanaccommodation incertainareas is requiredwhenapplying to
schoolsinrespectivedistricts(StandingCommitteeoftheSixthNationalPeople’s
Congress, 1986). The housing situation ofmigrant families therefore has been
connectedwiththeeducationalproblemsexperiencedbyruralmigrantchildren.
AseducationalinequalityindirectisinconflictwithkeyvaluesofCommuniststate,
theChineseCommunistPartydecidedthatitcannotbetolerated.Also,educational
inequalityhasledtoirruptionofprotestinvariouscities.Inthispaper,Iwilllook
at how local governments in China implement central policies in local level to
addresstheeducationalinequalityexperiencedbymigrantchildren.Thispaper
has following structure: educational inequality in China, education system and
hukou system in China, public reaction to the educational inequality problem
(especially migrant parents), reaction of governments on different level, the
practical situation in the case city, and theanalysisof researchdata. Iwill use
theories of policy implementation to analyse data, adopting an interpretivist
strategy,drawingonsemi-structured interviews,directobservations,reviewof
documentationandarchivalrecords. It isdesignedasacasestudyofChangsha
city. Qualitative interviews, direct observations, review of documentation and
archivalrecordswillbethemainsourcesofevidenceinmystudytosupportthe
researchconclusion.
1. ManifestationofEducationalInequalityinChina
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AsstatedintheAnnualSurveyofMigrantWorkers(2015)conductedbyNational
BureauofStatistics,thenumberofruralmigrantworkers(labourerswitharural
household registration, i.e. hukou, employed in urban workplace. They work
or/andliveincities,yetremainclassifiedasruralmigrantsduetotheinflexibility
ofthehouseholdregistrationsystem)inChinahasclimbedto274millionin2014
(NationalBureauofStatisticsofthePRC,2015).Whentheyareextensivelyneeded
foreconomicdevelopmentinmostmajorcitiesinChina,theydonotenjoyequal
rights with urban residents. Specifically, according to statistics, 234 million
migrant workers (overall 274 million migrant workers in 2014) and their
accompanyingfamilieshavenotbeenabletoenjoyequalbasicpublicservicewith
urban residents on education, employment, medical care, pension, affordable
housingandotheraspects(Centralgovernmentportal,2014).Asadisadvantaged
group in China’s urban society, theway that themigrant population has been
treatedoneducationandresidenceissuehasshowntheexistenceofinjusticein
bothpoliciesandpractices.
SincethefirstversionofTheLawofCompulsoryEducationinthePeople’sRepublic
ofChinawasenactedin1986,theprincipleofEnteringNearbySchoolhasbeen
adopted.Thetargetgroupofthislawarestudentswithinthestageofcompulsory
education (primary education and secondary education). TheEntering Nearby
School principal in the compulsory education law has implied that school
attendance of children in China is strictly restrained by their hukou status,
registeredpermanentresidence,andtheirlivingaddress(TheFourthMeetingof
theSixthNationalPeople’sCongress,1986).Currently,thelocalgovernmentsof
areaswhere thosemigrant childrenwent to accept compulsory education are
responsible for education provision of those migrant children, instead of
governments of areas where those migrant children registered their hukou
initially (The Twentieth Meeting of the Tenth National People’s Congress,
2006). Therigidbindingamongthesethreeaspectshasbeenloosenedbutnot
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eliminated in the second (also the current) version ofThe Law of Compulsory
EducationLawinChina,whichwasissuedin2006,andispartiallyresponsiblefor
theeducationalinequalityexperiencedbymigrantchildren.
AccordingtoareportmadebyAll-ChinaWomen’sFederation(2005),therewere
atleast35.81millionruralmigrantchildren(liudongertong)accompanyingtheir
parents (migrant workers) come to cities, but accepting education in cities
remains an intractable problem formost of them.Most ruralmigrantworkers
considertheirchildren’senrollmentintolocalpublicschoolsdifficultforseveral
reasons, such as too complicated procedures of enrollment, demanding
evidentiarymaterialsrequiredformigrationchildrentoenrollintopublicschools
incities,highsponsorshipfeesomeschoolsrequirefrommigrantstudents(The
CentralResearchInstituteofEducationScience,2008).Inaddition,manymigrant
studentshavebeenfoundgettingeducated inschoolswithpoor infrastructure,
incompetent teachers, and poor traffic condition. Somemigrant students have
been reported discriminated by others in local public schools, when their
counterparts in cities are competing for seats in elite schoolswithmuchmore
advancedinfrastructureandteachingresources(ZhouandMa,2015).
2.BasicOverviewofEducationSystemandHukousysteminChina
2.1ComparisonbetweenPublicandPrivateSchools
AccordingtoTheEducationalLawofthePeople’sRepublicofChina, theChinese
education system can be divided into five parts: Pre-school Education, Basic
Education (Elementary Education), Secondary Education, Higher Education or
VocationalandTechnicalEducation,andAdultEducation(MinistryofEducationof
the people’s Republic of China, 1995). Compulsory education stage in China is
consists of primary education and secondary education. They are both free of
charge in public education system (Xinyu, 2009). This researchwill bemainly
limited to the discussion of situation within the compulsory education stage.
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Becausefirstly,theschoolattendancewithinthisstageistiedupwiththehukou
system (household registration system) and residence of students in China.
Secondly, providing basic education to all children within certain scope of
jurisdictionisoneofmostimportantresponsibilitiestolocalgovernmentsonall
levels inChina(MinistryofEducationof thepeople’sRepublicofChina,1995).
Whether government could distribute educational opportunities and allocate
educational resources evenly to all groups of children in society is a key issue
discussedundertheframeworkofsocialjustice(Goodburn,2009;Fan,2010).Itis
through these three conditions, admission age, residence address, and hukou
status,toallocateanddecidewhichprimary/middleschoolastudentcouldattend
withinbasiceducationstage.Enrolmentinhighschoolsanduniversities/colleges,
ontheotherhand,isdecidedthroughexaminationstestingstudents’abilityand
intelligence(Xinyu,2009).
WhenmostschoolsinChinaarepublicschools,thenumberofprivateschoolsis
significantly lower. Public schools in China are supported by the government
financially.IthasbeenstatedinCompulsoryEducationLaw(2006)inChinathat
the compulsory education funds are fully coveredwithin the scopeof national
budget, while local governments at various levels contribute to the national
budget through tuning in revenue to the central government every year.
Specifically,theStateCouncilandlocalgovernmentsinChinaarerequiredtolay
thecompulsoryeducationfundsintotheirbudgetinadvance,andappropriatethe
fundstopublicschoolsinfullandintime.Theamountoffundsisdecidedonthe
basis of standards for teaching and administrative staff arrangement register,
wages, school construction, and average amount of funds per student etc. The
funds fromtheStateCounciland localgovernmentsareusedtoensurenormal
operation of schools, safety of schoolhouse, and the payment of teaching and
administrativestaff’swagesasrequiredbytheCompulsoryEducationLaw.
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Privateschools,however,aresupportedbynon-governmentalorganisationsor
individuals.Asstated inPrivateEducationPromotionLaw (2002) inChina, it is
suggested that the local governments in various levels should take the
developmentofprivateschooleducation into theNationalEconomicandSocial
DevelopmentPlan,while theadministrativedepartmentofeducationunder the
StateCounciltakestheresponsibilityofoverallplanningandmacro-management
of private school education work. On the one hand, there is no compulsory
requirementoffundsfromthegovernmenttosupportprivateschoolsinlaw;on
theotherhand,accordingtothePrivateEducationPromotionLaw(2002),private
schools inChina are entitled to enjoypreferential taxpolicies andpreferential
policiesonlanduse/constructionforpublicutilities.
2.2EmergenceofMigrantSchools
Whenthemigrationpatternformigrantworkershadshiftedfrom‘migratingto
citiesoneself’ to ‘migrating tocitieswithwhole family’ in1980s, theeducation
problem of migrant children firstly emerged in China (Zhou and Ma, 2015).
Initially,duetothenumberofmigrantworkersandmigrantchildrenincitieswere
notasmuchastoday,therewerestillenoughplacesformigrantchildreninpublic
schoolsandprivateschools inurbanarea. In1990s,withincreasingnumberof
migrant children, public and private schools in cities no longer have enough
capacityforallmigrantchildren.Therefore,migrantschools,asonetypeofprivate
schools,hademergedandbeenacceptedlimitedlybythestateinChina(Zhouand
Ma,2015).
Inthefirstplace,migrantschoolsareconstructedbymigrantworkersthemselves,
under the circumstances that public schools in cities refuse to take migrant
children, ormigrant parents cannot afford sponsorship fee required by public
schools(itisanextrafeerequiredfromstudentswhosehukouarenotregistered
withinthesameadministrativedistrictwiththeschoolstheyapply).Themigrant
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schoolhasanothername,‘simpleandeasyschool’,sincemostofthemcannothit
the accreditation criterion set for private schools. Many migrant schools are
actually illegalschoolswithsubstandardsafety,sanitation,dietandotherbasic
schoolconditions.Thesedisapprovedmigrantschools,on theotherhand,have
broughtdifficultiesonmanagementtolocaleducationdepartment(Kwong,2004).
Specifically, asmigrant children are not as stable as local students in termsof
residence(theymightneedtomovetoanotherplacewiththeirmigrantworker
parentsoncetheirparentschangedjoborresidence).Therefore,theyhavehigher
likelihood to transfer toanother school.This temporalityandvarietyof school
choice could disrupt regular order of school management in most cases (The
MinistryofFinancialScienceInstitute,2012).
2.3HukousysteminEducationalInequality
AsasysteminitiallydesignedforcontrollingtheflowofpopulationinChinasince
1958, it has resulted in many unintended negative consequences in terms of
inequality (Bie, 2013). It has divided citizens into urban population and rural
population,according topeople’sbirthplace,with the imbalanceddevelopment
betweencitiesandruralareas,thehukousystemhascausedhugedisparitiesof
social welfare and rights between urban and rural population (The Central
CommitteeoftheCommunistPartyofChinaLiteratureResearch,1995,citedin
Bie, 2013, p. 80; Cheng and Selden, 1994).Hereafter, socialwelfare, especially
socialsecurityandchildren’seducation,havebecomemoreandmoredependent
onnon-ruralhukou(Bei,2013).Suchhukou-socialwelfaredependentmechanism
has worsened educational inequality formigrant children. It also undermined
socialjusticeinothercrucialwelfare-relatedrightsandschemesbetweenpeople
possessinganurbanhukouandthosewhopossessaruralhukou.
3. HowHastheEducationalInequalityProblemBeenResponded?
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The emergence of large numbers of migrant children has resulted in serious
problemsandchallengesforvariouslevelsoftheeducationaladministrationinin
China’sgovernment(LiangandChen,2007).Asaresult,in2010,nearly61million
childrenhavebeenleftathomeinruralareas,separatedwiththeirparentswho
work in cities, becoming leftover children (The All-ChinaWomen’s Federation,
2013).‘Leftoverchildren’aredefinedaschildrenunder18years’oldwhocannot
follow their parents working in cities and far from home, and are left home,
educatedandtakencarebysubstituteguardiansorthemselves(Liu,2008).The
education problem of ruralmigrant children hereafter has become a pressing
issueattractingextensiveattentionfromthepublicandtheChinesegovernment
(ZaiandYiu,2005).
3.1ReactionofthePublic
The education problem has been considered far from resolved from the
perspective of the public, especially migrant workers. As mentioned earlier,
accessing to local public schools in cities for migrant children faces several
challenges,whileattendingtoprivateschoolsincitiesfinanciallydemandsmore
frommigrantfamilies.Insomeextremecasesreportedbymassmedia,therehave
beenpublicprotestsestablishedbymigrantgroups,asshowninFigure1,Figure
2, and Figure 3. The migrant schools their children enrolled into had been
compulsively demolished by the government few days before starting date
withoutgivinganyannouncementstostudentsandparentsinadvance(Wangyi
News, 2011). The demolition of migrant schools has made migrant parents
considerthemselvesas‘abandonedgroups’(bythesocietyandthegovernment),
asreportedinmassmedia(IFENG,2011).
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Figure1.Migrantparentsprotestingbylyingonthegroundinfrontofthedemolishedmigrantschool
Referencesource:http://news.163.com/photoview/00AP0001/17058.html#p=7BIK52PC00AP0001
Figure2.Migrantparentsfoundnoplacetosafeguardtheirrights
Referencesource:http://news.163.com/photoview/00AP0001/17058.html#p=7BIK5PKB00AP0001
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Figure3.Migrantchildrenstandinginfrontofthedemolishedmigrantschoolhewassupposedtogo.
Referencesource:http://news.163.com/photoview/00AP0001/17058.html#p=7BIK5T5500AP0001
3.2ReactionofGovernments
3.2.1TheCentralGovernmentIssuePolicyonNationalLevel
Sincetheeducationofmigrantchildrenhasbecomeasocialproblemin1980s,it
receivedaseriesofpublicresponses.Thecentralgovernmenthasstartedworking
ontheformationoflawsinguaranteetheeducationalrightsofmigrantchildren
andimprovingeducationalequalityinChina. Thestatepromulgatedaseriesof
policies, regulations, and laws to address this education problem, including
TemporaryMeasuresforFloatingChildrenorAdolescentsinSchooling(1998),The
Decision on the FoundationEducationReformandDevelopment of State Council
(2001),TheSuggestionsonFurtherWorkonEducationofMigrantChildren(2003),
TheNotificationoftheStateCouncilonDeepeningtheReformofRuralCompulsory
Education Funds Safeguard Mechanism (2005), the new version of The
Compulsory-EducationLaw(2006).
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FromtheperspectiveofthestateandpoliticiansworkingingovernmentinChina,
theeducationproblemofmigrantchildrenisnotonlyasocialproblemthatties
withcountlesshouseholdsandindividualsanymore,butalsoapoliticalproblem
associatedwithnationaldevelopmentandsocialharmony(ZhouandMa,2015).
After2006,thestatehasmade‘educationalequality’abasicsocialvalue,madethe
nationalurbanandruralcompulsoryeducationfreeofcharge,andincludedrural
migrantchildreninCompulsoryEducationSysteminChina(ZhouandMa,2015).
After2010,theeducationproblemofmigrantchildrenhasbeenconnectedwith
strategies on national urbanisation and urban-rural integration (Zhou andMa,
2015).Moreover,TheNationalMediumandLong-termPlanforEducationReform
and Development from 2010-2020 (2010) has explicitly raised the education
problemofmigrantchildrentothelevelofnationalcoordinativedevelopment.
Meanwhile, after the Chinese Economic Reform (refers to the programme of
SocialismwithChinesecharacteristics)andOpening-upPolicypromulgatedin1978,
withexpediteddevelopmentofindustrializationinChina,urbanizationinChina
has experienced a fast-developing process from a low beginning point. Sharp
contradictionsandproblemsalsoemergedintheprocessofurbanization(Central
government portal, 2014). It has been noted and concerned by the central
governmentinChinathatthereisalargenumberofruralmigrantpopulationhas
experiencedvariousdifficulties,tryingtointegrateintourbansociety.Educational
inequality is one of pressing problems need to be addressed. Aiming at this
situation, in 16thMarch2014, CPCCentral Committee and the State Council in
Chinahavepromulgatedadocumentthatstrikesupthelargestsocialreformsince
theestablishmentofNewChina,New-TypeUrbanisationPlanfrom2014to2020
(Centralgovernmentportal,2014).
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AsisthefirstplanningprogramreleasedjointlybythePartyCentralCommittee
and the State Council of China. It shows that the state pays high attention to
urbanisation progress along with its problem. In China, ‘urbanisation’ is
consideredasocialprojectthatiscooperatedandparticipatedbyfourmainbodies:
thegovernment,theenterprise,theresident,andthinktank(notsurewhothey
work for). It is believed by the government that the only way of proceeding
urbanisationprocesssmoothlyinChinaistoletthemarketplaysthedecisiverole
inallocatingresources,undertheguideofthegovernment,cooperatingwithother
threemainbodies(Lietal.,2016).
This programme intends to carry out the hukou system reform, and achieve
equalizationofbasicpublicserviceatthesametime(Centralgovernmentportal,
2014).Inordertohelpmigrantgroupstointegrateintocities;enablethemaccess
tourbanbasicpublicservicesandrights;andcompletecitizenizationofmigrants
in cities by2020, theprogrammehasmadeplans in following aspects (2014):
firstly,differentiatehukousettlingpolicyamongsmalltowns,medium-sizedcity,
andmegacities(itsuggestsrelaxingtheconditionsrequiredforhukousettlingin
middle-large cities; and eliminating the conditions for hukou settling in small
towns.Meanwhile,theunificationofurban-ruralhouseholdregistrationsystemis
considered as an important purpose of hukou system reform. Through
implementing residential certificate system, basic public services that were
dependentonurbanhukoustatusareexpectedbeenbroughttomigrantworkers
without an urban hukou); secondly, guarantee migrant children’s rights of
accepting compulsory education equally with urban local children (it was
suggested that migrant children’s education should be covered in local
governments’ education development plan and financial security. Meanwhile,
when migrant children cannot be enrolled into public schools, government’s
purchaseofservicewillbeadoptedtoassuremigrantchildren’seducationalrights
throughprovidingeducationininclusiveprivateschools);andbroadenchannelof
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housingsecurityformigrants(itwassuggestedthatlivingconditionsofmigrant
workers should be improved through giving them access to low-rent housing,
publicrentinghousing,andrentalsubsidies).
3.2.2LocalGovernmentsImplementNationalPoliciesonLocalLevel
Even though the central governmenthasmost authority and control inpolicy-
formationat thenational level, ithas limited influenceondecision-makingand
policyimplementationonlocallevel.Whilethecentralgovernmenthaveauthority
to command officials in local governments to implement their policies, local
governments still have a certain degree of autonomy tomake regulations, and
implementpoliciesonlocallevelonthebasisoftheirspecificsituation.Streetlevel
servants in local governments have a certain degree of discretion on how to
interpret the policy on local level and adopt specific strategies to cope with
citizens.Theirdiscretion,however, is constrainedbyexternal factors including
laws,policies,regulations,moraletc.,andthelimitsaredifferentiatedaccording
toparticularsituationinChina’scontext.
Theoretically,suggestionsmentionedinNew-TypeUrbanisationPlancouldhelp
reducing educational inequality and injustice in residence problem between
migrant population and local population. Yetwhether or towhat extent these
programme and policies would help address education and housing issues of
migrants;andtowhatextentcouldthisprogrammereduceinequalityineducation
enrolment mechanism for migrant children in practice remain unknown.
Therefore, itmade this implementation study necessary. In the next section, I
wouldliketointroducethecaseinChinausingtheoriesofpolicyimplementation,
borrowing basic concepts in implementation study from scholars like Deleon
(1999),Ferman(1990),MichaelandPeter(2002).
4AnalysisofPolicyImplementationProcessintheCaseCity
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4.1BriefIntroductionofHunanProvince
Beforetheimplementationanalysisofthecasetofindoutwhathappensbetween
policy expectations and perceived policy results (DeLeon, 1999a: 314-15,
paraphrasingFerman,1990:39)inNew-TypeUrbanisationinChangsha,I’dliketo
introduce thecasecity firstbriefly.Myresearch isbasedonChangshacity, the
provincial capital of Hunan province. Hunan province is located at the south
centralChina,whereitseconomicdevelopmentisrelativelyhystereticcompared
withmegacitieslikeBeijing,Shanghaiandcoastalcitiesatsoutheastcoastalareas
of China. Yet it has sufficient labour resources,which enables it export labour
power to other cities out of Hunan province on a large scale, especially to
Guangdong and other southeast coastal cities. However, with it undertaking
industrialgradienttransferfromeasternareasofChina,thespeedofbackflowof
themigrantworkers(itmeansmigrantworkerscomingbacktotheirhometown)
inHunan keeps climbing (Li et al.,2016). The total area of Hunan province is
2,118,000squarekilometres,including13prefecture-levelcities,oneautonomous
prefecture,122 counties,2151villagesand towns,361 sub-districtoffices, and
4152 communities. The total number of people in Hunan province is around
707,900million,with663,893millionpeoplebeingpermanentresidents,354,187
millionpeopleasruralpopulation,and300,00millionruraltransferringlabours
whichisranked7thinChina’sprovinces(Lietal,2016).
4.2BriefIntroductionofChangshaCity
Changsha,asitsprovincialcapital,hastotalareaaround11,800squarekilometres,
with around 7.43 million permanent residents, and permanent resident
urbanizationratebeing74.38%(Changshastatisticyearbook,2015).InHunan’s
rural transferring labours, 70%of themgettingnon-agriculturalwork in other
provinces, concentrating at Pearl River Delta area, Yangtze River Delta area,
Beijing-Tianjinareaandotherareas,while30%ofthemgettingnon-agricultural
workwithinHunanprovince.However,thenumberofruraltransferringlabours
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whostay inHunanprovince isclimbingwhile thenumberof rural transferring
labourswhogotootherprovincesdeclining(Lietal.,2016).
UnderthecontextofNewTypeUrbanisation,from“ruralmigrants”to“agricultural
migratingpopulation”,theconceptof“agriculturalmigratingpopulation”hasbeen
more explicit. Cost Prediction and Sharing Mechanism Research Group about
UrbanisationofAgriculturalMigratingPopulationinChangshahasmadespecific
definition of this group: those rural labours whose primary activities was
agricultural,butgaveupagriculturalactivitiesand live inmulti-business in the
processoftransferringtothesecondaryandthetertiaryindustryduetospecific
needs(e.g. improvinglivingcondition,raisingfamily income,goingandseeking
refugewith friendsorrelativesandsoon).Undercertaincondition, it includes
children ofmigrantworkers or elderly ofmigrantworkers in need of provide.
Therefore, the concept of agricultural migrating population is richer than the
conceptofmigrantworkers.
4.3DifferentInterestsUndertheCommonGoal
IntheimplementationprocessofNew-TypeUrbanisationPlaninChangsha,there
areactorsinvolved:thecentralgovernmentisactingaspolicyformulator(officials
in the central government as decision-maker), while local governments (and
streetlevelservants/officialsinlocalgovernments),localpublic/migrantschools,
realestatedevelopers,migrantparents/childrenaspolicy implementers.While
theyshareacommongoal,implementingtheNew-TypeUrbanisationPlaninorder
to reduce educational inequality experiencedbymigrant children, each actor’s
interestsandvaluesarecompletelydifferentinthiscase.Thecentralgovernment
needstoguaranteeeducationalaccessibilityofmigrantchildren,becauseitcould
improveintegrationofruralmigrants,whichgeneratesbettersocialmanagement;
contributes to constructionofharmonious community; enhances social justice;
boostsdevelopmentofurbanization; andmaintain stable reignofCCP. In local
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governments’case,theguaranteeofeducationalaccessibilityofmigrantchildren
would bring greater pressure on financial expenditure to provide education
services and to purchase more lands for educational use, especially for local
governmentsofmigrantchildren-receivingareas. It is important torealizethat
thedistributionofresponsibilityandcooperationbetweenlocalgovernmentsof
migrant-outflow areas (wheremigrants come from) and local governments of
migrant-inflow areas (wheremigrants come to) is still unclear. In local public
schools’ interests, increasing migrant children would bring overwhelming
pressure on their receiving capacity. Inmigrant workers and children’smind,
betteraccessibilitytoqualityeducationincitieswouldmakeintegrationprocess
intocitieseasier;whenthevaluesofrealestatedevelopersremainunknown.But
howdotheycooperate?
4.4TheShareMechanismofCostinChangshaCity
According to Cost Prediction and Sharing Mechanism Research Group about
UrbanisationofAgriculturalMigratingPopulationinChangsha(2016),buildingthe
sharemechanismofcostofurbanisationofagriculturaltransferringpopulationis
thekeytocompletetheworkofNewTypeUrbanisationforChangsha’sgovernment.
Thecostofurbanisationofagriculturalmigratingpopulationrepresentseconomic
inputneededforagriculturalmigratinglabourstogetemployedandsettledown
withequalpublicservicesandrespectivewelfare,includingeducationservicesin
cities in Changsha. The costs are shared by three main bodies, the central
government and local governments, enterprises, and individuals (agricultural
migratingpopulation).Dividedbysource, thewholecost isconsistingofpublic
cost (governmentalcost),enterprisecostandpersonalcost.Categorizedbythe
purpose,thecostofurbanisationofagriculturalmigratingpopulationisdivided
into six types: compulsory education cost, social security cost, employment
servicecost,basichousingsecuritycost,publicserviceandpublicfacilitiescost,
and living cost, as showed in Table.1 (Cost Prediction and SharingMechanism
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Research Group about Urbanisation of Agricultural Migrating Population in
Changsha,2016).Itcouldbefoundinthetablethattheeducationalcostofmigrant
childrenwithincompulsoryeducationstagearebeardbygovernmentsonly.Yet
we do not know how the cost on this part has been shared between central
governmentandlocalgovernmentinChina.
Table1.TheIndexSystemofUrbanizationofAgriculturalMigrating
PopulationinChangsha
First-tierIndex
Second-tierIndex DetailedMeaningSubjectofCostSharing
GovernmentalCost
CompulsoryEducationCost
Costonprovidingcompulsoryeducationtomigrantchildren
TheCentralGovernmentandLocal
Governments
SocialSecurityCostCostonprovidingsocialsecuritytoagriculturaltransferringpopulation
EmploymentServiceCost
Costonprovidingemploymentservicetoagriculturaltransferringpopulation
BasicHousingSecurityCost
Costonprovidinghousingsecuritytoagriculturaltransferringpopulation
CostonPublicServicesandPublicFacilities
Localgovernmentsprovidecostonnormalpublicservices,publicsafetyandbuildinginfrastructuretonewagriculturaltransferringpopulation
EnterpriseCost
CostonSocialSecurityEnterprises‘costonpayingsocialinsuranceforagriculturaltransferring
Enterprises
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population
Costonhousing
Enterprises‘costonparticipatinginbuildingindemnificatory/securityhousing
PersonalCost
LivingCostTheextracostneededtotransferdailylifefromruralareatourbancities
IndividualsinAgriculturalmigratingpopulation
HousingCost
Housingcostundertookbyindividualsintheprocessofurbanisationofagriculturaltransferringpopulation
SocialSecurityCost
Socialsecuritycostundertookbyindividualsintheprocessofurbanisationofagriculturaltransferringpopulation
Source:CostPredictionandSharingMechanismResearchGroupaboutUrbanisationofAgriculturalMigrating
PopulationinChangsha.
From2015to2020,theaverageannualeducationalfundscostofmigrantchildren
inChangshawasexpectedaround710,480,000yuan(around82,901,200pounds
whentherateis8.5:1),whilethetotalcostinfiveyearsisaround3,552,400,000
yuan(around410,500,000pounds)asstatedinTable2.Statisticsaboutcostof
constructingschoolbuilding formigrantstudentswithincompulsoryeducation
stagecouldbefoundinTable3.Thecostspendsondifferentprojectsinvolvedin
compulsory education is showed as Table 4. It could be found thatmore new
primary schools areneeded thanmiddle schools inChangsha, and the cost for
buildingschoolsforprimarymigrantstudentsalmostdoubledthecostofschool
buildingforsecondarymigrantstudents,whichpotentiallyimpliedthatthelack
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ofschoolpositionsphenomenoninChangshawithincompulsoryeducationstage
mainly concentrated at primary schools. Most cost of providing compulsory
educationtomigrantchildrenhasbeenspentoneducationalappropriation(takes
up around 47% in overall cost) and purchasing lands for constructing school
building(takesuparound43%inoverall cost),while theconstructionworkof
schoolbuildingonlytakesuparound10%oftheoverallcost.
Table.2CostCalculationonEducationFundsofChildrenofAgricultural
MigratingPopulation
StudentType
OriginofChildrenofAgriculturalTransferrin
gPopulation
EducationSubsidies(yuan/person)
Totalnumberofnewchildren
ofagricult-ural
migrate-ng
populati-on
Thenumberofnewlyarrivedchildren
ofagricultu-ral
transferr-ing
populati-on
YearlySubsidie
s(10,000yuan)
Educationcostof5years(10,000yuan)
Elementa-rySchoolStudents
othercities&otherprovinces
13500
43,000
36,378 49,110
355,240
Changshacity(HunanProvince)
4350 6622 2,880
Secondar-ySchoolStudents
othercities&otherprovinces
19000
11,600
9814 18,647
Changshacity(HunanProvince)
2300 1786 411
Source:CostPredictionandSharingMechanismResearchGroupaboutUrbanisationofAgriculturalMigrating
21
PopulationinChangsha.
Table.3CostCalculationonBuildingSchoolsforChildrenofAgricultural
MigratingPopulation
StudentType
SchoolBuildingConstructionAreaperStudent
(m2/student)
NewSchoolBuildingAreaNeeded(m2)
ConstructionUnitPricefor
SchoolBuilding
(yuan/m2)
Construct-ionCost(10,000yuan)
OverallConstructionCostforSchoolBuilding(10,000yuan)
PrimaryStudent
8.34 191,820
2500
47,955
76,027Seconda-ry
Student9.68 112,288 28,072
Source:CostPredictionandSharingMechanismResearchGroupaboutUrbanisationofAgriculturalMigrating
PopulationinChangsha.
Table.4CalculationCostonCompulsoryEducationofAgriculturalMigrating
Population
CostofCompulsoryEducation
ProjectIndicatorsAverageCost
(yuan)
OverallCost(10,000yuan)
CostofEducationalAppropriation
1438.22 355,240
CostofSchoolBuildingConstruction
307.80 76,027
LandOpportunityCost 1337.30 330,312
Overall 3083.32 761,564Source:CostPredictionandSharingMechanismResearchGroupaboutUrbanisationofAgriculturalMigrating
PopulationinChangsha.
22
5AnalysisofInterviewData
5.1LookingthroughEducationBureau’sEyes
FrominterviewswithofficersinChangshaEducationBureau,itisclearthatthis
institutioncooperatesmainlywithConstructionCommitteeandHumanResource
and Social Security Bureau to implement their policies about education
arrangementofmigrantchildren.ConstructionCommitteeisresponsibletoprove
thelivingstatusofmigrantchildrenandmigrantparents,whileHumanResource
and Social Security Bureau is responsible to verify migrant parents’ social
insurance records. Within all agencies cooperating together in policy
implementationprocess,sometimesoneparticularagency/departmentwouldbe
designated as the main responsible body (such as Development and Reform
Committee in many cases) to coordinate job among different departments,
monitoringprogress,actingascoordinator.
AccordingtointerviewswithgovernmentalofficersworkinChangshaEducation
Bureau,asapartofgovernmentsystem,ChangshaEducationBureauonmunicipal
level has showed optimistic opinion towards the effectiveness of their policy
targeting at differences in education quality of different groups of students,
particularlybetweenlocalurbanstudentsandmigrantstudents.Thelocalurban
studentrepresentsthosewhoseparentsarelocalresidentsinChangshawithan
urban hukou, while the migrant student represents those whose parents are
migrantscomingfromotherplaceswitharuralhukouorhukouregisteredinother
cities,yetworkand/orlive inChangshacity.Thesetwostudentgroupsarethe
twomain categories of students identified by the ChangshaEducationBureau.
EventhoughtheChangshaEducationBureauhasadmittedpressureinproviding
enough school positions to migrant children in certain districts, like Yu Hua
Qu/District,showedinFigure4),theyhaveshowedconfidenceinthe‘fact’that
they have created an education environment that basically achieved no
discriminationordisparatetreatmenttowardsmigrantchildren,notonlyinterms
23
ofpolicy-makingandimplementationtowardseducationopportunity,butalsoin
termsofeducationresourceallocationtowardsthesetwogroupsofstudents.
Figure4.ChangshaFiveDistricts
Source:http://www.chinanon-stop.com/2012/11/changsha-five-districts.html
5.2LookingthroughMigrantParents’Eyes
However,therearedifferentperspectivesfrommigrantparents,whichshowed
conflictswiththisoptimistic‘fact’believedbytheEducationBureau.Duringthe
interviews, migrant parents group have showed a certain degree of sense of
approvaltotheimplementationofEnteringNearbySchoolpolicy.Becausetheir
childrenwouldatleasthaveaschooltoattendto,ifnottheidealone,underthe
protection of this policy. Enrolling into local public schools is much more
challenging beforewhenmigrant parents get school position in cities through
theirsocialtiesorpayingalargeamountofsponsorshipfee.
24
Migrant Mother: …Since last year, as long as you got a job and social
insurance,yourchildwillbearrangedintoalocalschoolnomatterwhat.
Butthisisn’tthecasefortheyearbeforelastyear.Itonlybecomelikethis
since last year. (The entering nearby school policy) basically has been
implementedin2016,notin2015,that’sthechange.WhatdoIthinkofthe
policy,isthattheycomeouttightabit,thenlooseabit,thenbecometight
again,andthengolooseagain,tightthenlooseanyway…Parents(usedto)
queueupthroughoutthenighttosignuptoschoolfortheirkids.Butnomore
ofthatsincelastyear.
Yet because of the ‘entering nearby school’ policy, it’s not easy or normal for
migrantparentstogettheirchildrenenrollintopublicschoolswithrelativehigh
teaching quality and better teaching resources. According to interviews with
migrant parents, schools located in their district are normally equipped with
substitute teachers who just graduated from Education Colleges instead of
experiencedteachersinthoseeliteschools,whichmakesteachingqualityoftheir
schoolsonthebottomofallschoolsinChangsha.
Migrant Mother: …and those students graduating from teachers college,
aren’ttheygototheseschoolsfirst?Whenyourlevel’srisingup,youtransfer
to better schools. Anyway, it’s principal’s employment now, right? I don’t
know if those substitute teachers are in the establishment. They can get
establishment through passing exams. It’s ok to teach in schoolswithout
getting establishmentwhen they firstarrive schools.Theynormally leave
thoseschoolsaftertheygetintotheestablishment.Theyarenotstayingin
thoseschools.
Those young substitute teachers normally do not stay long in those migrant-
children-concentrated schools. Migrant children concentrated schools are like
25
steppingstonesoftheirteachingcareer.Manyofthemleavetheschoolinseveral
years,afterobtainingenoughteachingexperiencesandgettinginsidetheteacher
establishment.Schoolteachergroupsseemsnotsoworriedabouttheeducation
situation of migrant children, and some of them have experienced the lower
performance of migrant student in schools. Teacher’s quality in schools is
different,while the schoolswithmoremigrant students get inexperiencedand
substituteteachers.Itindicatesunstableteachingresourcesinmigrantchildren
concentratedschools.
Except what mentioned above, the controversy over the existence of migrant
schools in Changsha is also one of examples of the policy struggle targeted at
reducing educational inequality between and providing non-discrimination
treatmenttobothlocalurbanchildrenandmigrantchildren.Ininterviewswith
governmentofficersinChangshaEducationBureau,theyhavedeniedthatthere
aremigrantschoolsinChangsha,whilesomemigrantparentssayingtheopposite.
Frommyperspective,therearetwopossiblereasonsbehindEducationBureau’s
denialofexistenceofmigrantschools.Firstly,admittingtheexistenceofmigrant
schoolstocertainextentsequalsadmittingthediscriminatorytreatmenttowards
migrantchildren,astheexistenceofmigrantschoolsisconsideredaproofofgaps
existingbetweenlocalgovernment’scommitmenttomigrantworkersabouttheir
children’seducation,andtherealitiesofcapacityinlocalpublicschools.Because
thecapacitiesof localpublicschoolsare limited, localgovernments inmigrant-
receivingareasfindtakingthefullresponsibilityofeducationalrightsofmigrant
children difficult. However, except building new schools, expanding the old
schoolhouses, and integrating old schools, there are few suggestionsmade on
developing capacities of public schools. The local governments need certain
number of migrant schools to share the responsibility of migrant children’s
education.Thishasputlocalgovernmentsthemselvesindilemma.Inaddition,it
involvesthedefinitionof‘migrantschool’fromtheperspectiveofgovernmental
26
officials.Itwasfirstlydefinedaspublicorprivateschoolsopenedbymigrants(or
privateorganizations)toaddresstheeducationproblemofmigrantchildren in
cities, whichmainly pass the quality certification of Education Bureau (Baike,
2017).According toagovernmentofficer inChangshaEducationBureau, there
were migrant schools which their names includes ‘migrant (student)’, and
only/mainlyacceptmigrantchildren.Whenthenameofthoseschoolschanged,
deleting‘migrant(student)’outoftheschoolname,andwhentheywereopened
bygovernments,acceptingnotonlymigrantchildren,theybecomenormalschools
insteadofmigrantschoolsbydefinitioninthemindofEducationBureau.However,
because there are certain districts in Changsha wheremigrants (also migrant
children) are concentrated more than in other districts (such as Yu Hua
Qu/District), schools in thosemigrants/migrant children-concentrateddistricts
naturallyhavemoremigrantstudentsthanschoolsinotherdistrictswherelocal
residents/local urban students concentrated. From perspectives of migrant
parents, those schools with much more migrant students are still considered
migrantschoolsintermsofitsstudentcomposition.
5.3LimitedChannelforCitizenstoMakeVoices
5.3.1VoicethroughAppealing
DivisionofComplaintsandAppealdepartmentinallgovernmentinstitutionsbear
themainjobofcommunicatinganddealingwithcitizens’problemsanddifficulties.
Normally,whencitizenscometoDivisionofComplaintsandAppealdepartment
inagovernmentalinstitution,forexample,ConstructionCommittee,officerswork
inthisdivisionareresponsibletodealingwithlettersfrompetitioners,respond
within15workingdays.Sometimestheyarealsoresponsibletothereceptionof
petitionerswhentheycometothedivisioninperson.Officerswouldmeetwith
petitioners, listen to their problems and experiences, give advice, and if the
problemsdiscussedareconsiderednotinaccordancewithpolicies,theycannot
always help with the difficulties citizens encountered. Instead, they would
27
proceed to report to Division of Complaints and Appeal department in higher
levels,orpasson/assignto/informotherrespectivedepartmentsaccordingtothe
types of problem. Therefore, the real possibility for appeal is quite limited by
policyandpetitioningprocedures.
5.3.2VoicethroughCollectiveAction
“Civic/collective action” has been an important factor contribute to China’s
political development. There are various forms of collective action in different
countriesandsituation.I’dliketonarrowthediscussionofcollectiveactioninmy
researchtothoseaimedmainlyatchallengingandchangingsomeaspectofthe
sociopoliticalorderthatshowsinequalityinpracticeinChina(Jacka,Kipnis,and
Sargeson,2013).Since1980s,therehavebeensignificantshiftsresultedfromlaws
enactedbythestatethatincreasedpoliticalopportunitiesforcollectiveactionin
China,suchastheLaborLaw(enactedin1995)andthePropertyLaw(enactedin
2007).Whentheyhavenotcontributedmuchinprotectingcitizensandtheirlegal
rights,theyhavenurturedanewunderstandinginChinesecitizens’mind:citizens
inChinahavelegalrightsthatandtherightstoprotestagainstthebehaviorthat
violates their rights. Laws enacted have also provided both legitimacy to and
avenuesforcertaintypesofcollectiveactioninChina(Jacka,Kipnis,andSargeson,
2013).
AsreportedbymanyChinaobservers,nowadaystheChinesegovernmentattach
great importanceatmaintainingstability(King,Pan,andRoberts,2013).When
collectiveactionpotentialtoacertaindegreeisevenequalwithfactionalismand
ultimately chaos and disorder from the perspective of Chinese government,
collectiveaction,especiallyintheformofprotestsarepreventedonallcostsby
governments in different levels in China (King, Pan, andRoberts, 2013). These
findingshavereappearedininterviewstookinmycase.Accordingtointerviews
28
withDivisionofComplaintsandAppealdepartment,streetlevelbureaucrats,as
well as other governmental institutions, governments on different levels have
showedastrongintentionofcontrollingcollectiveaction,throughfollowingand
monitoring‘dangerouscitizens’.Inthiscase,‘dangerouscitizens’referstothose
residents/citizenswhohavethepossibilitytocomplainandappeal(whichmeans
theyhaveencounteredsomeproblemsordifficultiesthathaven’tbeenresolved)
orthosewhofrequentlygopetitioning.Fromwhatgovernmentalofficersshared
in interviews, it is fair to say that petitioning that bypasses the immediate
leadership is prevented from happening, via the joint efforts of street level
bureaucrats, community, and governments on district andmunicipal levels, as
showedinfollowingquotationfromaninterviewwithgovernmentofficialworks
inChangshalocalgovernment.
Government official: the community, the neighbourhood
committee…maintainingstability,they(staffworkincommunitycommittee
andneighbourhoodcommunity)havenootherchoices…theyaretiredtoo,
theyneedtowatchoverthesedangerouscitizens(meansthosepeoplewho
trytopetition)andnotletthemslipaway,whenthereisNPC&CPPCCor
whenthereisimportanteventgoingoninthecountry…maintainingstability,
(they)havetokeeptheireyesuponthesepetitionpeople,sendstaffandtake
turnstowatchover…Ifthereisshortofstaff(tohelpwithwatchover),then
the neighbourhood committee coordinate the job, if the neighbourhood
committeecouldn’t coordinate thisout,district (respectiveadministrative
institution)helpcoordinate(todothisjob).
.
Trackingandmonitoringpetitioningofcitizensnormallyhappenswhenthereis
importanteventorduringnationalconferencetime.Forexample,staffthathave
been sent out to domonitoring or following ‘dangerous citizens’would follow
29
theirdesignated‘dangerouscitizen’.Therearemanycaseswheretwostaffwork
ingovernmentsareresponsible foroneparticular ‘dangerouscitizen’andtheir
goalisavoidlettingpetitionersgotoBeijingtoappeal.Iftherewerestillcitizens
managed to petition in Beijing, especially during national conference time, it
wouldbeconsideredthattheleaderofrespectivedistricthasfailedhis/herjob,
therefore the prevalence of collective action is officially a part of the formal
evaluationcriteriaforlocalofficialsinChina.
5.4StreetBureaucratsinCommunity
Asanactorthatdirectlydealswithcitizens,migrants,thestreet-levelbureaucrat
plays an important role in interpreting and implementing policies from
governments. According to interviews with them, street-level bureaucrats in
communityontheonehandconsidertheirmaintasktoserveresidents’needs,on
theotherhand,theyfeelunwillinglyforcedtodoso,whenencounteringpressure
from upper level governmental institutions. They act as an intermediate role
betweenlocalgovernmentandcitizens.Itisimportanttomentionthatwhenthere
isconflictbetweentheinterestsofcitizensandgovernments,theydonotexercise
theiradministrativediscretionforthebenefitofcitizens,includingbothmigrants
andlocalresidentsintheircommunities.Exceptdealingwithinspectionoflocal
governments in termsof community appearance, sanitation situationetc., they
haveputgreatefforts topreventpetitioningofcitizensandpotentialcollective
action.
5.5WorldofMigrantsandTheirIntegrationProcess
MigrantparentsgroupconcentratedinYuHuaDistrictinChangsha,whereithas
themost complex urban construction and poorer facilities compared to other
districtsinChangsha.ThelivingcircumstancesofruralmigrantsinYuHuaDistrict
isknownforitscrowdedstreetsandpoorfacilities.Itisadistrictwhichshares
borderwithcountrysidearea.Logisticsindustrywaslocatedinthatdistrict,and
30
resulted in severe traffic jam. High-speed rail way station of Changsha is also
located in that district that makes population flow around that area quite
complicated. Most of migrant parents rent small apartments (normally one
bedroomonelivingroomtype)astheirhomeinsteadofpurchasingpropertiesin
Changsha directly. The public rental housing and low-rent housing is not
accessibletomigrantswithoutlocalhukouaccordingtolocalpolicies.
At the same time, a large part ofmigrantsworks in unstable/low-salaries and
labour-requiringprecarious job, suchashelp sellinggoods inGrandMarketor
help with selling motor parts in Motor Parts Town (Factory that sells/makes
motor/car’sparts).Inaddition,manymigrantmothersgaveupjobbecauseofthe
needtolookafterchildren.Itisimportanttomentionthatmanymigrantworkers
findblendingintocitylifeinChangshadifficult.Notonlybecauseofthelimited
opportunity to interact with local urban residents, as residents living in their
communitiesaremainlymigrantworkers(notmanylocalresidents live inthat
district),butalsothediscriminationfromasmallpartoflocalpeopleasfollowing
quotation from interviewwith amigrant parent shows. Different lifestyle and
habitshavealsodecreasedtheirchancestointegrateintothecity.Forexample,
migrantsnormallyhavedifferenteatinghabitswithlocalpeopleintermsoffood
typestheychooseandwaysofeatingfood,whichisdifficulttochangecompletely.
Migrant:Anyway,thecontactwithlocalpeopleis…it’slikethereisadozens
ofhouses,andonlytwoofthemarelocalpeople.Howmanychancesdoyou
thinkwehavetomakecontactwiththem?Right?It’sthesameforthem,they
don’twantto…Somelocalpeoplewholivehereareok,butsomerichlocal
people are not willing to make contact with migrants. How do I put
this…hmm,maybetheyhaverelativelystrongerdefencemode,right?
31
Inthiscase,migrantworkersinthiscity,especiallyinYuHuaDistrict,havebeen
separatedandmarginalisedbothsociallyandspatially.Theyhave formedtheir
socialnetworksmainlywithmigrantgroupsinsteadoflocalresidents.According
toChenandWang(2015),socialnetworksareacrucialaspectthatinfluencesthe
chanceofmigrantstointegrateintocities,lackofinteractionbetweenmigrants
and local people in Changsha could impair the integration process ofmigrant
groupsinthiscity.
6Conclusion
From analysis in earlier discussion, it could be concluded that various actors
involved in the policy implementation process are grasping the limited
opportunitytocopewiththepolicyonnationallevelinanauthoritariancontext
inChina,butnotalloftheircopingstrategieshashelpedwithreducingeducational
inequalityexperiencedbymigrantchildren.Specifically,therearespacesleftfor
threemain types of deliberative activities during the process of implementing
New-TypeUrbanisationPlaninurbanChina.Categorizedbythesubjectofactivity,
the first type of deliberative activity is exercised by governments in different
levels.Inthiscase,localgovernmentsinChangshacityareallowedtoimplement
thenationalpolicythroughtheirownways(forexample,buildsharemechanism
of cost).Theyaregivencertaindegreeof autonomy tomake localpoliciesand
addresstheeducationalinequalityproblemonthebasisofpracticalsituationon
theground.ThistypeofdeliberationhasincreasedtheflexibilityoftheNew-Type
UrbanisationPlaninitsimplementationprocessinlocallevel.Thesecondtypeof
deliberativeactivityisexercisedbystreet-levelbureaucrats.Theyhaveacertain
degree of administrative discretion when interpreting policies on the ground,
putting policies into practice. However, their intermediate role between
governmentsandcitizenshasnotbeenusedto interpretpoliciestoprotectthe
rights of disadvantaged groups in society, includingmigrants, especiallywhen
thereisconflictbetweencitizens’needsandgovernments’interests.Hencetheir
32
deliberation does not play an effective role in reducing educational inequality
experienced by migrant children. The third type of deliberative activities is
exercised bymigrant groups. Under the poor living circumstances, they enjoy
limitedappealingandpetitionopportunity,littleavenuetomakingvoices,while
theyfacethepossibilityofbeingmarkedas‘dangerouscitizen’anddiscrimination
onbothinstitutionalandindividuallevel.Theirdeliberationtoacquiretheirrights
ascitizensandtheirchildren’seducationalrightsinurbanChinaseemshavelong
way to go in terms of reducing educational inequality experienced bymigrant
children.
33
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