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After the White House: The Politics of the Post-PresidencyNicholas F. JacobsUniversity of Virginia
As independent, elder statesmen, former presidents command a unique authority. This
essay focuses on the post-presidencies of Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Despite
their divergent personal backgrounds, both remained active and consequential in the politics of
their era and were forced to speak out on issues they might otherwise try to ignore.
Furthermore, both Truman and Eisenhower remained active, loyal partisans. They were just as
adamant in condemning their presidential successors on policy, and as senior party officials,
both helped to “build” their party organizations by mobilizing voters, recruiting candidates,
fundraising, and promoting structural reforms after leaving office.
Barack Obama’s decision to remain in Washington, D.C. after his presidency ended
produced the predictable split in partisan reactions. Supporters greeted the president’s decision as
confirmation of Obama’s long-stated plan to remain politically active after he left the White
House.1 Opponents were less than pleased. Suggesting that the former president was setting up
an “Obama Embassy” in the former first family’s new neighborhood of Kalomara, the journalist
Ed Klein adamantly declared that Obama choose the location to be close to other foreign
embassies so as to undermine Trump’s administration.2 Pennsylvania Representative Mike Kelly
(R) argued that the Obama’s are remaining in D.C. for “one purpose only…to run the shadow
government that is going to totally upset the new agenda.”3 And commentator Ben Stein saw the
decision as just more confirmation that Obama is, “essentially a super narcissist.”4
Political hyperbole aside, Obama’s physical residence in D.C. remains a potent symbol of
how he is defining his post-presidency, and there remains a legitimate question over what change
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a former president can effect.1 Already, Obama’s actions have contributed to President Trump’s
concern about the “deep state” – or the lingering, entrenched political interests in place that
might stifle conservative reform. But is Obama’s stated desire to remain active in American
politics anything new? In this essay, I argue that ex-presidents have continued to be moral
statesmen, party builders, and vocal leaders of the partisan opposition long after they leave the
White House. When compared to his previous eight successors, Obama can uniquely claim a
significant amount of post-presidential political capital. The last time this was true was after
Dwight D. Eisenhower and Harry S. Truman left office. As the most recent historical example of
this “institution,” they place the politics of the post-presidency in greater historical relief and
suggest that Obama, as a former president, is likely to behave much like he did as an actual
president.
Historical Precedent or Unique Ambition?
Consulting the historical record cannot, on its own, tell us whether former President
Obama should remain active after he leaves the White House. In American political history,
there is plenty of recourse to tradition and myth, which would suggest that the country benefits
from the president’s gracious departure. George Washington’s decision to leave after two terms
remained a deeply cherished norm for subsequent presidents. Coupled with the first president’s
decision to leave the Continental Army after the Revolution, his retirement as Commander-in-
Chief further solidified the romanticization of him as the American Cincinnatus.5 The
ratification of the 22nd Amendment in 1951 was further confirmation of this impulse - that no
single person should remain an active force in American politics for too long. 1 And, given that the last president to remain in Washington, D.C. after his presidency was the conservative anathema Woodrow Wilson, the condemnation of Obama’s decision was greater proof of the former president’s decision to fundamentally disrupt American politics as we know it. Wilson remained in the capital city to recuperate from a stroke that left him incapacitated during the final months of his administration. See: John Milton Cooper, Jr. 2011. Woodrow Wilson: A Biography. New York, NY: Vintage Books.
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The idea of a post-presidency, however, is not a modern convention, and despite
Washington’s virtuous return to Mount Vernon, his precedent of political retirement is
apocryphal, even by “pre-modern” standards. Washington himself accepted a commission in the
U.S. army from John Adams to help plan for war with France. His former aide-de-camp,
Alexander Hamilton, took over the lion’s share of the planning, but the former president,
however, soon died 33 months after “retiring.” Thomas Jefferson spent most of his post-
presidency engaged with his University of Virginia, but having groomed his two immediate
successors, Madison and Monroe, he continued to provide advice on how to deal with foreign
policy (Meacham 2012). Madison, in addition to “straightening out” many parts of the historical
record to more favorably portray his legacy in the American experiment, re-entered his practice
of “Constitution-making” at age 78 to settle a disruptive apportionment problem in the 1829
Virginia Constitutional Convention (Keysaar 2009). Famously, John Quincy Adams is the only
president to return to either chamber of Congress. As a member of the House of Representatives,
Adams chaired several important committees over his 18-year term; he also ran for
Massachusetts Governor, but dropped out after 29% of voters thought the former president had
what it took to run the state. John Tyler fathered 7 children after he left office and then served in
the Confederate Congress as a representative from Virginia. And, fulfilling his lifelong desire to
serve on the Supreme Court, Chief Justice William Howard Taft capitalized on his political
experience to fundamentally reshape the court and enhance its institutional capacity (Crowe
2007).
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
In the modern era, we have come to think of presidential retirement as unexciting and
apolitical. Jimmy Carter and his near 30-long dedication to Habitat for Humanity stands out as
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the modern exemplar of former presidents turned civic missionary. George W. Bush, and his
work with the Wounded Warriors Project follows in this vein (Bush 2017). Yet, while America’s
most recent presidents have made a conscience decision to remain out of the political limelight –
appearing briefly for a personal or celebratory cause – their collective political situation is a
fairly distinct one (Kaufman 2012). As Table 1 shows, President Obama will stand out as one of
the few presidents who will have left office with a claim to substantial political capital. Harry
Truman, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and George W. Bush all left office with below-
majority support in the last presidential approval poll taken while in office; Nixon, of course
resigned, and Johnson chose not to seek re-election in 1968. Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and
H.W. Bush left the White House because they lost an election, the most important “approval”
poll. Clinton and Reagan stand out as exceptions, but Reagan suffered from Alzheimer’s disease
for at least the last 10 years of his life, and Bill Clinton, while remaining politically active, was
most concerned with advancing Hillary Clinton’s political career; both of these are unusual
circumstances, which should not set the pattern for thinking about post-presidential politics.
The post-presidencies of Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower do, however, offer a
revealing comparison of what opportunities and constraints befall presidents after they leave the
White House. Truman departed with abysmal approval rankings, after a career of working for the
Democratic party, and after a repudiating election that put the GOP in its best political position
in over three decades. Eisenhower, on the other hand, was admired by both Republicans and
Democrats, left the presidency after less than a decade of holding elected office, and narrowly
lost his “third” term in the closest election in modern politics. Yet, despite their dissimilar
circumstances, both diligently tried to maintain an active political agenda, which included a host
of non-partisan issues (Eisenhower is partially responsible for the preservation of the Gettysburg
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battlefield, on which his 500-acre farm abutted) and writing their memoirs (Truman wrote three
and was working on a history of the U.S. Senate). More significantly for American political
development, Truman and Eisenhower remained embroiled in some of the most dramatic and
consequential political episodes of their era. As independent, elder statesmen, former presidents
command an authority as unique as the office they once served, and they are forced to speak out
on issues they might otherwise try to ignore. Truman was thrust into a dramatic confrontation
with Senator Joseph McCarthy and helped precipitate his demise; Eisenhower defended the
presidency as an institution and remained a non-partisan, stoic leader in the face of global crises.
Most remarkably, given their divergent political backgrounds, both Truman and Eisenhower
remained loyal partisans. They were adamant in condemning their presidential successors on
policy and as senior party officials, helped to “build” their party organizations by mobilizing
voters, recruiting candidates, fundraising, and promoting structural reforms (Galvin 2010). While
not exhaustive of their entire post presidencies (a collective 28 years), these moments help show
that like any political actor – including acting presidents – neither Eisenhower nor Truman were
always successful in affecting their desired outcome. Their behavior and intentions nevertheless
reveal that despite lacking the constitutional office, their post-presidencies were deeply
consequential.
Harry S. Truman (1953-1972)
While the Democratic party’s misfortunes in 1952 are not all attributable to Truman,
certainly no president seeking to capitalize on his partisan or personal leadership could have
found themselves in a worse position. Returning to his beloved Missouri and his pre-presidency
home in Independence, the ex-president set up a small office in the Kansas City Federal Reserve
building. Some former White House assistants joined him to assist in organizing the building of
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the Truman library, and in helping the president write his memoirs (his personal goal was 10,000
words per day). As Truman would later quip, two years after moving in, he put his name on the
door only after so many people were getting lost – looking for the restroom.6
Party Builder Truman soon returned to Washington less than six months after leaving, but went
to great lengths to avoid taking any political stand on the new Eisenhower administration. In the
first interview of his post-presidency, he was surprised that anyone cared to read about “an old
has been,” and when asked if he was surprised that Eisenhower had not invited him to the White
House, again Truman joked that, “He’s too busy to see every Tom, Dick, and Harry that comes
to town.”7 Such careful presentation, however, belied Truman’s post-presidential ambitions.
The former president was in D.C. to lunch with Democratic Senators, a meeting, which
inflamed rumors that the former-president was gearing up for a Congressional campaign. Even
though Truman would only flirt with running for office, he grew increasingly active as the
Democrats set their eyes on retaking seats in the midterm elections. Truman headlined a 2,000-
person conference in Chicago as the “distinguished leader of the party” according to Democratic
National Committee (DNC) Chair Stephen Mitchell. Now a part of the “Big Four,” as Mitchell
described it, Truman spearhead the party’s strategy over their ill-fated “loyalty oath” – a policy
in response to Strum Thurmond’s run as a Dixiecrat in 1948, but which nearly split the party
again when instituted in 1952. Truman, undeterred by threats of another party schism,
nevertheless had harsh words for his partisan brethren, telling reporters that, “if the governors of
the south are worried about [the loyalty oath], that’s their problem.” Working with the rest of the
Democratic Congressional leadership and Virginia Governor John Battle, Truman brokered a
deal that would sideline the issue for at least another three years. But, with his party in disarray,
“Give ‘em Hell” Truman continued to publicly rally Democrats. Speaking at the first major
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fundraising dinner since the 1952 election, the former president lambasted the current
administration without remorse. Under Eisenhower’s leadership Truman avowed, “the wrecking
crew is at work, undermining and tearing down…if a Democratic Congress is not elected next
year, the country and the world will go down to ruin!”8
An emergency gall bladder and appendix operation in June kept Truman largely off the
1954 campaign trail (a year in which Senate Democrats eked out a majority 49-47). Yet,
Truman’s Chicago debut as the Democrat’s chief cheerleader comprised just one part of the ex-
president’s goal of building up a weakened Democratic party. The hustle and bustle of campaign
season behind them, Truman and his fellow Democrats focused their energies on the
reorganizing the DNC and the nomination process for the next presidential nominee. At DNC
planning meetings in April, 1955, Democrats retooled their campaign strategy, and decided to
make an all-out effort to focus their message on President Eisenhower. Joining the DNC
executive meeting was the former president, who at their Jackson-Jefferson Dinner fundraiser,
kicked off the party’s new strategy with full vigor. In the most anti-Eisenhower remarks of the
evening, Truman lambasted the administration’s China policy as a “bare-faced political fraud;”
continued on to say that Ike’s own behavior was scaring “the daylights” out of America’s allies
abroad; and to the audience’s chant to “pour it on,” the former president gleamed that, “They
may have struck the clock, but they can’t turn it back!” Several weeks later, the attacks on
Eisenhower continued, as Truman tried to hammer home a story about the administration’s inept,
“bungled” management of the newly released polio vaccine.9 The next month, the target of
Truman’s “give ‘em hell talks” was the current president’s “domination” by business interests –
the extent to which was largely unknown because of the “protective curtain which most of the
press throws around its Republican protégés.”10
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Truman’s independent voice on the speaking circuit became disruptive within the
Democratic party itself. In 1952, Truman had helped secure Adlai Stevenson’s nomination for
the presidency, but increasingly, reports leaked that the former president had begun to change his
mind (the first indication being his opposition to Paul Butler’s election as DNC chair in 1952).
Finally, Truman’s impromptu, post-presidency confidant, Drew Pearson, reported in October that
the former president thought Stevenson “jinxed” because of his previous loss to Eisenhower.
Having just recently met with his unwavering ally, New York Governor Averell Harriman, at the
Governor’s Mansion in Albany, Truman wanted to push an open nominating contest, with
Harriman having his full support.11 The next day, sitting alongside Harriman in the Governor’s
office, Truman extolled his executive skills, saying that Harriman “has all the qualifications to
make a good President,” and slyly adding that if he were allowed to vote in New York, “I know
who I’d be for.” At the end of 1955, Truman began to solidify the basic contours of a campaign
strategy for Harriman. Criticizing Eisenhower’s foreign policy, he praised Harriman’s diplomatic
experience – labeling it the most important qualification to consider in the next campaign.12
Truman even declined several offers from national newspapers and television studios to report
on the convention because it would impede his ability to “do what I hope to do and at the same
time write about it.”13
Truman traveled to Chicago at the beginning of August, 1954 to set up his private office
for the national convention. As Harriman himself acknowledged, the big question was whether
the former president would “take his coat all the way off, or only half way off,” to push his
nomination. Harriman, grew nervous as Truman privately confessed that he did not think it
appropriate for an ex-President to openly endorse candidates prior to the convention.14 The next
day, however, Truman joined Harriman at a press-conference on the eve of the convention, and
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proudly pinning his lapel with an “Honest Ave” for President button, threw his support entirely
for his former Secretary of Commerce.15 The formidable anti-Stevenson contingent – of multiple
varieties – was elated with this “opening night bomb,” none more so than the Tammany Hall
New Yorkers. As their leader Carmine G. De Sapio told reporters, Truman’s endorsement was
“inspiring, heartening news. President Truman is, in every sense, the leader of our party...”16
Truman not only threw his public endorsement behind Harriman, he commanded his
operatives in Chicago to direct their all out “blitz” to nominate the New York Governor. Old
allies from the White House including former DNC chairs William Boyle, Jr. and Frank
McKinney, worked on uncommitted state chairman to flip delegate pledges. Ironically, it was the
same set of political wranglers that Truman relied on to nominate Stevenson in 1952. The
eleventh-hour excitement quickly gave way to more realistic assessments of Harriman’s support,
however, as the mad rush of delegates never materialized. Rather than converting delegates to
Harriman, most Stevenson-leaning groups announced their second or third choice in case
Stevenson couldn’t pick up the first ballot; Harriman was not their choice.17 As a last-ditch effort,
Truman worked to drive the wedge on the race issue, hoping that the push for a stronger civil
rights platform would convince Northeastern liberals to switch their support to Harriman, or
drive enough Southerners from the convention. In pushing the civil rights issue (endorsing the
Supreme Court’s recent Brown decision, for example), Truman was willing to sacrifice the unity
of the party in order to get his man at the top of the ticket.2 Stevenson, had star power to match,
however. Eleanor Roosevelt arrived in Chicago with her full support already thrown to
2 After Harriman’s chances all but ended, Truman ultimately endorsed the “moderate” civil rights plank, saying that it would be something that would “contribute harmony” to the party enable Democrats to “go out and give the Republicans the licking they’re entitled to.” See, “Floor Fight on Rights Fizzles,” Chicago Defender, 16 August, 1956. On the 1956 Democratic National Convention and the fight for a moderating civil rights plank, see: John Martin. 1979. Civil Rights and the Crisis of Liberalism: The Democratic Party, 1945-1976. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
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Stevenson. When Truman accused the presumptive nominee of betraying the New Deal and Fair
Deal backbone of the party, Roosevelt responded forcefully. Implying that Stevenson would
have more experience than Truman did when he unexpectedly took office, the former First Lady
continued to push against the ex-president’s continued influence in the party. “We cannot meet
the problems of today, or of the future with traditions of the past alone,” she concluded.18
Stevenson got the nomination. Truman, however, stuck with Harriman all the way to the
balloting, seconding his nomination on the convention floor, and citing his “experience in this
line.”19 Although “very, very surprised” that Stevenson won on the first ballot, Truman left
Chicago gracefully, telling the delegates on the final night that, “it is reliably reported that some
fellow whom I will not name has said that Adlai Stevenson will have trouble winning in
November. Now I want to tell you something. Don’t let that worry you.” And, in a line that
brought down the House, the ex-president reminded them, “That’s what they said about me in
1948.”20
Truman returned to Independence and continued his attacks on the Eisenhower
“racketeers.” Despite his convention chaos, the DNC requested that “give ‘em hell” Truman stay
on to give two to three speeches a week on behalf of Stevenson and other Democratic candidates.
However, Truman’s presence on the campaign trail was hardly felt. Few of his remarks garnered
any press coverage, and, given the Missourian’s penchant for news-making remarks, it is clear
that Truman confined himself to the sidelines.21 Eisenhower won by even larger margins than he
did in 1952; ironically, he picked up only one state, Truman’s own Missouri. In a very real way,
Stevenson’s dismal showing vindicated Truman’s claims made at the DNC, although,
Republicans capitalized on Truman’s DNC remarks more than Democrats chose to use the
former president as a campaigner. While Stevenson’s poor showing was not just attributable to
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Truman, the former president, dismissed so readily for his actions, quickly found himself in the
center of the party action. This time, Democrats were willing to embrace his fierce oppositional
style – a strategy that deeply wounded the GOP’s margins in 1958, and finally in 1960 with
Kennedy’s election.
Opposition Leader The bulk of Harry Truman’s post-presidency is best seen through his actions
as an opposition leader. Truman quickly recovered from his lost gamble at the 1956 Democratic
National Convention. By December, with Democrats reeling from their historic electoral loss,
DNC Chair Paul Butler was making progress towards fulfilling a long-awaited promise to party
liberals – the establishment of a “Party Advisory Council.”3 Spearheading this new committee,
which would attempt to wrest agenda control from more moderate leaders in the House and
Senate – Sam Rayburn and Lyndon Johnson – was Harry Truman and his co-leader Adlai
Stevenson.22
Truman did not just confine his partisan role to the policy-making function of this new
advisory council. Without a doubt, the former president had already proved to be a vocal,
persistent critic of the Eisenhower administration. When speaking in the western plains, Truman
railed against the administration’s natural resources and land-use policy; talking to organized
labor leaders he implied that Ike opposed full employment because it helps “keep labor in its
place;” and, despite the platitude, Truman’s critique did not “stop at the water’s edge” - he
routinely upbraided Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, for a foreign
policy that allowed “the unity of the free nations to disintegrate.” Speaking at Yale as a guest
3 For a discussion of the Democratic Advisory Council’s origins, see: Daniel DiSalvo. 2010. “The Politics of a Party Faction: The Liberal Labor Alliance in the Democratic Party, 1948-1972,” Journal of Policy History 22 (3): 269-299; Eric Schickler. 2016. Racial Realignment: The Transformation of American Liberalism, 1932-1965. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
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lecturer during an economic contraction, Truman remarked that if he were still President, “I’d do
something! I wouldn’t be sitting still and playing golf. I’ll tell you that!”23
The former president’s most substantive role as opposition leader related to the pitched
budgetary battles that engulfed the Democratic Congress and the Eisenhower administration. As
president, Truman had suffered severe criticism from fiscal conservatives on both sides of the
aisle over the size of his budget proposals. Now, Truman led the charge against Eisenhower as
the administration struggled to cut desirable programs, maintain a low tax rate, and keep the
budget balanced. Calling Eisenhower’s FY 1959 budget a “political trap” that was intended to
make Democrats look either as “wasteful spenders” or “heartless reactionaries,” Truman publicly
urged Democratic members of Congress to hold firm against the administration’s proposed
budget.24
Truman’s public advice to the Democrats in response the 1957 recession was coupled
with a political first – the sworn testimony of a former U.S. President before the Congress to
advise on a legislation. With the Eisenhower administration adamant that the federal government
should maintain a balanced budget, even as unemployment rose, Congressional Democrats
sponsored their own series of public works packages to revitalize areas of chronic
unemployment. Representative Brent Spence announced that the House Committee on Banking
and Currency would hold 27 days of hearings from state-governors, economists, and labor union
heads on the causes of the unemployment crisis – the first major economic shock since the end of
WWII. Kicking off the hearings was former president Truman.25
Truman not only critiqued the current President for underestimating the underlying problems of
the nation’s economy, but suggested that Eisenhower had somehow brought it upon the country
for his refusal to spend money to overcome structural impediments to economic growth. “The
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needs of the American people have increased,” Truman argued, “…but the present government
of the United States is not aware of these things and has not advanced with the times. And in
spite of the Republican recession, the Republicans manage to keep prices going upward. This is
quite a feat, to have price inflation and recession at the same time. We had a hard time getting a
satellite off the ground but it was not trick at all for them to shoot the cost of living into outer
space!” 26 Sitting before the Congressional committee, Truman’s speech was broadcasted live
across the country and helped to solidify the Democratic alternative to Eisenhower’s balanced
budget fiscal policy.4 Eisenhower ultimately vetoed the public works bill, but it would reemerge
as a potent symbol of the Democrat’s Neo-Keynesian commitment when Kennedy came into
office two years later.
Elder Statesman Around the same time that Truman was solidifying his role as one of the
Democrat’s “Big Four,” the former president emerged center stage in battle over McCarthyism.
While Joseph McCarthy (R-WI) directed the Senate’s permanent investigations subcommittee on
communist infiltration, Rep. Harold H. Velde (R-IL) competed for publicity while chairing the
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). After months of investigating the
communist ties of academia’s prestigious Rhodes scholarship trust, Velde pounced on reports
that Truman, when president, appointed a suspected communist to head the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1946. Inflaming matters more, the news came from Eisenhower’s own
Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, who in mid-November announced that Truman appointed
Harry Dexter White to lead the IMF, despite holding a widely-circulated FBI dossier on White’s
spying activities for communist organizations.
4 On how the two parties defined their fiscal policy alternatives during this period, see: James Savage. 1988. Balanced Budget and American Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, chapters 5-6.
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Velde quickly scheduled two-days’ worth of hearings that would expose the Democrat’s
“coddling of Communists.” No sooner had Harry Truman denied ever seeing such a report than a
subpoena for him to testify before Velde arrived at his hotel in New York.27 Velde’s release of
several documents, reportedly in White’s own handwriting from Whitaker Chamber’s pumpkin-
dossier, further entangled Truman. The former president, remained silent and stuck to his 7 a.m.
walking constitutional. The press hounded him the morning after he received the subpoena.
Truman, however, demurred, remarking instead on the “good simple rule” of obeying traffic
lights, and openly contemplating why so many pigeons were able to survive in New York City.28
Truman’s nonchalance – rare given the former president’s known tendency to swear and
berate political opponents – was a calculated maneuver to undermine Velde and McCarthyism
more generally. Within days of receiving his subpoena, Truman had composed a letter with the
help of his former White House aides.5 Addressed to Velde, Truman schooled the committee
chairman in the finer points of constitutional law. Citing “a long line of precedents, commencing
with George Washington himself in 1796” Truman argued that presidents and former presidents
should not submit to Congressional investigations of the executive: “If the doctrine of separation
of powers and the independence of the Presidency is to have any validity at all, it must be
equally applicable to a President after his term of office has expired…The doctrine would be
shattered and the President, contrary to our fundamental theory of constitutional government,
would become a mere arm of the legislative branch of the government if he would feeling during
5 Samuel I. Rosenman and Charles S. Murphy both visited Truman at his Waldorf-Astoria suite over the two days between receiving the subpoena and releasing his letter. Their involvement indicates what a sensitive situation the Velde subpoena really was for Truman, politically. Rosenman was a close confident and speech writer to both Franklin D. Roosevelt and Truman; most agree that Rosenman helped write Truman’s 1948 acceptance speech before the DNC. Murphy took over from Rosenman as special counsel to the president, “A Smiling Truman Accepts Subpoena,” New York Times, 11 November, 1953.
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his term of office that his every act might be subject to official inquiry and possible distortion for
political purposes.”29
In handling the Velde subpoena with a contradictory style of levity and astute
constitutional reasoning, Truman destabilized the attack on his character and the conduct of his
administration.6 Velde’s enthusiasm and Truman’s coy response embarrassed GOP leaders, who
pressed hard on the HUAC chairman to temper his investigation.30 But McCarthyism transcended
the political posturing of any single committee chairman. The response to Velde was enough to
placate constitutional lawyers, but most would agree that the public still had a right to know what
Truman then knew about White. The day before Brownell’s testimony before HUAC, Truman
announced through his spokesman that he would respond to the charges in an “all-out
broadcast.”31
On Monday, November 17 - less than 10 months after his presidency ended, Truman sat
behind a large wooden desk and spoke to an estimated 50 million Americans (1/3rd of the
population) during the three-major network’s prime-time broadcast.32 Truman began his speech
by relaying what he understood to be the major issue – a “personal attack” made by the “former
chairman of Republican National Committee,” which was “without parallel, I believe, in the
history of our country.” He then repeated his argument from his published letter to Velde about
the “constitutional principle” threatened by his subpoena. Truman then turned to the facts of the
case and acknowledged that he was well aware of the FBI’s secret investigation; he then further
conceded the basic facts of Brownell’s accusation – that he allowed White’s appointment to the
IMF to proceed, even though he knew about the accusations. According to Truman, however, he 6 Truman was careful to limit his critique of the Congressional investigation in two important ways, according to contemporaneous editorials by lawyers and presidential historians. First, he did not deny Congress the authority to investigate other branches, as did Jackson and Buchannan. Second, he did not deny that the president or a former president was immune from judicial proceedings that might require personal testimony of the executive. See: “In the Nation,” New York Times, 13 November, 1953.
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ordered the investigation to continue, fearful that any other course of action would stifle the
FBI’s investigation of White.
The matter-of-fact presentation of events then turned into something grander. Doubling
down on his interpretation of the facts that were before him, Truman argued that the accusation
was “shameful demagoguery [and] cheap political trickery.” The former president continued,
describing the political motivations for Brownell’s accusation: “It is now evident that the present
Administration has fully embraced, for political advantage, McCarthyism…the corruption of
truth, the abandonment of our historical devotion to fairplay…the abandonment of “due process”
of law…the use of the big lie and the unfounded accusation against any citizen in the name of
Americanism and security…the rise to power of the demagogue who lives on untruth…the
spread of fear and destruction of faith in every level of our society.” In invoking Eisenhower’s
administration, Truman likely knew that he could (and would) fall victim to the same critique he
himself was leveling. But in closing, the former president told the country that McCarthyism, “is
not a partisan matter. This horrible cancer is eating at the vitals of America and it can destroy the
great edifice of freedom. If this sordid, deliberate, and unprecedented attack on the loyalty of a
former President of the United States will serve to alert the people to the terrible danger that our
nation and each citizen faces, then it will have been a blessing in disguise. I hope this will arouse
you to fight this evil at every level in our national life. I hope that this may serve to stir the
conscience of the present Administration itself.”33
The former president’s condemnation of McCarthyism was framed in partisan terms and
contemporaneous reactions to his speech fell along the partisan divide. On the facts of the case,
Truman appeared to overplay his hand as the next day FBI head J. Edgar Hoover told Congress
that the president’s decision made it more difficult to investigate White. Yet, those looking
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beyond Truman’s presentation of the facts and into the heart of the case lauded the former
President’s denouncement of McCarthyism. Responding to the Washington Post’s own critical
posture to Truman’s speech, Michael Straight, the editor of the New Republic, argued that the
editorial board “has collapsed. It has concentrated on details, failing to see the broad sweep of
dangerous precedents and tragic events – tragic to those who wonder how many nations may fall
under Communist enslavement while Americans, at Mr. Brownell’s instigation, are fighting
among themselves.”34
Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-WI), who had until this point only be implicated in all of
this, recognized how advantageous a moment it was. In his own prime-time address one week
after Truman’s speech, McCarthy took aim at the former president. Almost immediately, the
Senator lashed out and claimed that Truman’s use of the word “McCarthyism” was definitive
proof that the former president sympathized with communists. For, as McCarthy told his
audience, the definition Truman used was, “identical word for word, comma for comma, with the
definition used by the Communist Daily Worker.” Not only was Truman’s definition tainted red,
but the real issue, according to the Senator, was not about McCarthyism, but the more dangerous
and debilitating, “Trumanism.” “Trumanism,” the Senator defined is, “the placing of your
political party above the interest of the country.” Trumanism, he added, “is the theory that no
matter how great the wrong, it is right if it helps your political party.” Trumanism, the Senator
continued, “in effect says to the head of a household if you catch a criminal looting your safe,
kidnapping your children, and attacking your wife, do not dare turn the spotlight on him, do not
get rough with him, do not call the police...”35 McCarthy did what Brownell, Eisenhower, and the
rest of the GOP leadership had actively sought to avoid in raising the White issue – claim that the
18
former President of the United States actively and willingly sympathized with communists
working inside the government.
Since his own speech, Truman had issued no comment on Brownell’s testimony and J.
Edgar Hoover’s explication of events.36 Following McCarthy’s tirade against “Trumanism,”
however, the ex-president headlined a 22-thousand-person rally at Chicago stadium and
denounced those who advocated “thought-control and book-burning, and the irresponsible
smearing of personal reputations.” Joined by film stars Cary Grant, Charlton Heston, and Gladys
Swarthought, Truman never mentioned McCarthy by name. Nevertheless, the message was clear.
“If we do not take a stand against these things,” Truman told the crowd, “then, no matter how
great our military strength, we shall surely lose the battle for world peace and justice in which we
are now joined.” Continuing, he added,
The struggle for truth and decency is first of all the struggle for freedom. By freedom I mean, of course,
responsible freedom – freedom in obedience to the laws of human reason and the moral code…I will not
say we are losing the struggle for freedom in America. But I will say that our freedoms are under attack –
and that these attacks are all the more serious because they are often indiscreet, indirect, and dishonest.37
On March 9, 1954 – three months after Truman’s prime-time address, Edward R. Murrow
took to the airwaves. It spelled the end for McCarthy and the worst excesses of McCarthyism in
that generation, but it was just one line in a chorus of denouncement (Fried 1990). McCarthyism
receded throughout the previous year, sapped of energy and support, in part, because it took on
the former President of the United States. While McCarthy and Velde both won re-election a
year after, fellow Republicans had had enough. By the end of 1953, leaks from the senior GOP
leadership spread throughout the major dailies that the Republican Policy Committee was
actively considering a proposal to change committee hearing procedures that allow for “one-man
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investigations.” Even the Vice President Richard Nixon, who had emerged as a national star
because of his work on HUAC as a fearsome “red hunter” took to the podium to take down
McCarthy; Nixon’s denouncement, while never defending Truman, spelled the end of McCarthy,
his “reckless talk and questionable methods.”38
Dwight D. Eisenhower (1961-1969)
Like his own predecessor, Harry Truman, President Eisenhower left Washington in
January, 1960 with every hope of a quiet retirement of writing memoirs. Now 70 years old, the
former General of the Army and president was newsworthy not for his military exploits or as
leader of the free world, but for learning how to drive again. Promising to wait at least five to six
months before saying anything noteworthy, the former president emphasized how much he was
looking forward to finally becoming just another private citizen.39 And golf; plenty and plenty of
golf.
Party Builder Despite begrudgingly entering into political life a year before he was elected
president, Eisenhower remained an active leader in the Republican party after leaving the White
House. While much of his political energy was spent helping his former administration officials
run for office –often unsuccessfully – Eisenhower also dedicated himself to reshaping and
expanding the entire GOP.
Just one week after meeting with Kennedy at Camp David to discuss the Bay of Pigs,
Everett Dirksen and Charles Halleck (R-IN) traveled up to Eisenhower’s Gettysburg office to
chart out a strategy for the 1962 midterms.40 Eisenhower, who suffered tremendous
Congressional losses while president, wanted the party to focus on the midterms before opening
up old foreseeable divisions that would come in nominating a presidential candidate. In
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Washington that June, less than five months out of office, Eisenhower spoke to over 6,000
Republicans at a fundraising dinner. “I come as a recent graduate of as tough a political cram
course as anyone could devise – six years with an opposition Congress,” Eisenhower cautioned
them, and “those who run too fast into the future sometimes trip over the present.” As a potential
message for the midterms, Eisenhower then introduced his stock critiques, which would define
the GOP line for the next eight years; the Democrats were the party of “big brother;” “immoral”
deficit spending; consolidation and federal overreach; and “rampant public power.”41
Throughout the year, as states and major cities held elections, Eisenhower crisscrossed
the country campaigning in James Mitchell’s New Jersey gubernatorial race, consulting Nelson
Rockefeller in New York, and actively promoting Louis J. Lefkowitz’s mayoral race against
Democratic incumbent Robert F. Wagner.42 Nixon flew into Gettysburg to meet with his former
boss who, as Roscoe Drummond wrote, had been “writing to him, telephoning him, and talking
to him in Gettysburg, that it was Nixon’s ‘duty’ to run and that no other decision was
tolerable.”43 In September, the 38 freshman GOP members of the House of Representatives all
traveled to Eisenhower’s farm to get briefed on the history of the Berlin and Cuba crisis, as well
as a simple message to carry with them into the midterms: “stop spending so blamed much
money.”44
All of this was a part of Eisenhower’s eager attempt to reconstruct the Republican party’s
image. The former president often stepped behind younger, less experienced candidates for local
and state races, with the hope of making the GOP a party no longer dominated by, in his words,
“gray-haired old men.” In addition to encouraging Richard Nixon to run for California’s
governorship, Eisenhower also took credit for motivating his former Interior Secretary, Fred
Seaton, to run for Governor of Nebraska, and for persuading George Romney, president of
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American motors, to run for Governor in Michigan.45 Helping to recruit and promote candidates
was just one component of Eisenhower’s attempt to bring “more young, sensitive people” into
the GOP. Once again inviting young Republicans to his farm in September, 1962, the former
president told them that it was up to them to provide the “enthusiasm, vitality, and vigor to keep
the federal government in its own place.” Speaking as a refined tactician, and often referring to
“the force” of the Republican party, Eisenhower told Republicans at fundraisers that the surest
way to revitalize the GOP was to reach out to the youth. “The Republican welcome mat,” he
said, “should be always out for potential allies – all kinds of citizens who want to help promote
sound and progressive government…This kind of organization, political but not blatantly and
publicly partisan, is especially appealing to younger citizens, particularly when they are not yet
fully committed to membership in either party. Indeed, youth, with its vitality, energy, and
idealism, seems often skeptical of the value and virtue of established party systems…”46 In a
lengthy cover story for the Saturday Evening Post, the former president declared that the
“Republican Party is now in something of an emergency situation and that, consequently, we
should give far less emphasis to seniority. It is more important than formerly to select new
candidates for office from the able and relatively young…we should seize the opportunity to
focus attention on the abilities and personalities of these vital leaders…”47
Dominated by Congressional leaders in Washington, D.C., Eisenhower also believed that
the party would be more effective if it brought more stakeholders into the party leadership.
Working with William Miller, chairman of the RNC, the two built a corollary organization to the
Democratic Advisory Council, known as the “All Republican Conference” or “Citizen’s
Council.” The first meeting, held in a large tent on Eisenhower’s Gettysburg farm, brought
together governors, state legislators, Eisenhower’s former Cabinet, and a small number of
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Congressional Republicans to talk policy and strategy for the 1964 election. Tagged as a “base-
broadening” move, the new organization drew the ire of nationally elected officials, none more
so than Barry Goldwater: “These are the same people who caused most of our present Party
troubles…It is unthinkable that they should be given another opportunity to lead us down the
path to political destruction.”48 Yet, Eisenhower defended the new organization, writing to Miller
that it would help attract “that new breed, the mobile American” who are “crucial to the
Republican Party’s resurgence.” “Our new national citizen’s organization,” he added, “which
will devote much attention to organizational activities in the big cities and metropolitan areas,
could well be the secret of Republican success...”49
As the 1964 Convention approached, the schism between the “amateurs” in the
Republican Citizens Committee and elected officials in Washington took on greater significance.
Eisenhower often couched his dislike of Goldwater, even though he, in principle, remained open
to any eventual GOP nominee.50 But, the Citizen’s Council took the lead in drafting the 1964
GOP platform by enacting another one of the former president’s proposals - a series of “party to
people forums.” Most prominently, it was to be from the Citizen’s Council where the party
would take its messaging cues and a subcommittee led by the former president’s brother, Milton
Eisenhower, was tasked with gauging public opinion on prominent GOP issues.51 The policy
positions that emerged mirrored the former president’s positions and openly diverged from most
of Goldwater’s most provocative statements – privatizing the TVA, building up America’s
nuclear arsenal, weakening federal civil rights protection, and a general isolationist stance.
Eisenhower’s role in the 1964 Republican National Convention belied the years-long effort to
wrest party control away from Goldwater and more conservative factions of the Republican
party. While there was rampant speculation that Eisenhower was advising Pennsylvania’s
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favorite-son, and close confidant of the former President, William Scranton, to fight it out in a
brokered convention, Eisenhower himself never publicly endorsed any candidate. Milton
Eisenhower, however led the convention team that pushed for Scranton in a last-minute effort to
block Goldwater’s nomination. Despite these deep connections to the anti-Goldwater faction, the
former president was adamant in suggesting that it would be inappropriate “try to run a political
organization or give orders or pull strings” in helping to choose the party’s next nominee. At the
convention, Eisenhower met with both candidates, as Scranton tried to persuade Goldwater to a
last minute, publicized debate over the meaning of “Goldwaerism.” Nevertheless, in the only
major public statement the former president gave before the nomination, Eisenhower tried to
temper the significance of the Arizona Republican’s likely candidacy: “I do not believe this
convention marks a great historic turning point…”52
After Goldwater’s now-historic speech lauding “extremism in the defense of liberty,”
however, Eisenhower was openly disappointed with the convention result. Despite his careful
posture prior to the nomination, the former president quickly distanced himself from the new
face of the party. Described as “dispirited” and increasingly unwilling to support Goldwater after
the address, news of Eisenhower’s dissatisfaction forced Goldwater to meet with the former
president the morning after the speech. After meeting with Goldwater for almost an hour, the
former president felt satisfied with the explanation of Goldwater’s choice of words, but publicly
expressed the Senator’s need to “speak about this during the campaign so as to clarify exactly
what he meant.” The issue, however, did not go away, as Eisenhower had given a taped TV
interview prior to their private meeting. Aired after the day after Eisenhower’s initial remarks,
the former president authoritatively undermined the Republican nominee’s rallying cry.
Goldwater’s phrasing, according to Eisenhower, “would seem to say that the end always justifies
24
the means…[but] the whole American system refutes that idea and that concept.” He then openly
questioned his own role, or lack thereof, at the convention. “I will say this,” the former president
concluded, “I don’t think that my efforts had any great apparent success…I did what I thought
my conscience dictated and what I thought to be a proper role for a former President in the
councils of his party and I think I would probably assume the same role again, but probably I
would try to do it better.”53
Eisenhower’s interview weighed down the post-convention momentum usually enjoyed
by the out-party. It also prompted Goldwater to expend significant amounts of energy and time in
bringing his party back together through a series of “unity sessions’ that August. Held in
Hershey, PA, the summit meeting concluded with a comprehensive, if tepid endorsement from
Eisenhower. The former president, reflective of what was most likely discussed at the meeting,
emphasized the Senator’s promise to adopt a more pragmatic foreign policy stance and support
federal civil rights legislation. Goldwater, standing next to Eisenhower, responded that he
promised not to appoint any Cabinet official in the State Department or Department of Defense
without first consulting the former president.54 Goldwater even suggested that, if elected, one of
his first acts would be to send the former WWII General to Vietnam to assess and advise on the
military situation – a suggestion that brought quick denial from Eisenhower himself. As the
campaign wore on, the former president was noticeably absent from the campaign trail and
fundraising dinners that marked his behavior in the 1962 midterm elections. His support
extended primarily to filming a set of half-hour sit-down interviews with the GOP candidate to
discuss campaign issues titled, “A Conversation at Gettysburg.”55
After Goldwater’s defeat, though, the president threw himself back into the fight for the
soul of the Republican party. Attending planning meetings for the upcoming January RNC
25
meetings that would likely oust party chairman Dean Burch, the former president pushed again
to keep the GOP’s tent big. As he told Republican leaders, reeling over their historic loss, “In
later years, we have been more than Republicans. We have been liberal Republicans, moderate
Republicans, middle-of-the-road Republicans, and conservative Republicans... Now I want to
plead with you, let’s become again just Republicans!” Beyond rhetoric, the former president
took with him a set of sweeping organizational proposals to help revamp the GOP and limit the
control of Congressional Republicans, including a plan to dismantle the House and Senate
Congressional campaign committees. Fortunately for Eisenhower, the interim meeting of the
RNC elected Ray Bliss to revamp the GOP in preparation for the 1966 midterms. Eisenhower
deferred to Bliss’ reform efforts, often encouraging fellow partisans at fundraising dinners to
back Bliss “as he seeks to fulfil his pledge of reorganizing, of reunifying, of re-energizing the
Party from the bottom to the top.” The former president also cautioned against splintering
organizations that would “compete with us in the soliciting of Republican funds.”56
Bliss did not push the reorganization plans as full heartedly as he indicated in the
aftermath of the 1964 election, but the Republican Party turned towards Eisenhower’s strategy
nevertheless. A young, Republican-convert in California, Ronald Reagan, won the Governorship
on Eisenhower’s line of “common-sense” government, and the former president quickly
acknowledged him as a great choice for the party come 1968.57 By 1968, Republicans rebuilt at
the state level, controlled a majority of the nation’s governorships, and retained a formidable
bloc of moderate partisans as it began to draft its 1968 platform.7 Eisenhower’s ultimate
7 Robert Novak and Rowland Evans recognized that by 1968, largely due to Eisenhower’s political maneuvering, moderate Republican governors like Raymond Shafer and George Romney had successfully coalesced to counter-act the power of national, Congressional leaders. In writing the 1968 platform, Bliss maintained near universal control over selecting convention officers, a compromise position between moderates and conservatives – one strikingly different than the outcome four years earlier. See, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “Governors Fail to Enlist Eisenhower,” Washington Post, 22 February, 1968.
26
endorsement of his former Vice-President helped Nixon cement his nomination and secured his
vision for the Republican party into the next decade.
Opposition Leader The splintering of the GOP in the early 1960s meant that every policy
statement offered by the former president was also an attempt to move the GOP in a particular
ideological direction. However, Eisenhower crafted and directed a unifying partisan line of
attack, highly critical of Kennedy and Johnson’s budgetary politics.
Eisenhower during his presidency was immensely skeptical of Neo-Keynesian, pump-
priming fiscal policy, which defined elements of the New Frontier. As Kennedy was attempting
to pass a massive public works bill in 1962 (a bill based on the one Truman testified on in 1958),
Eisenhower increasingly used his public reputation to denounce the Democratic party’s budget
philosophy. At a GOP fundraising dinner in 1962, at the height of the administration’s efforts to
pass the bill, Eisenhower’s denouncement was greeted with “cheers, whistles, and hurrahs,” as
he lambasted Kennedy’s plans. Suggesting that the president had been “floundering aimlessly
and desperately” behind a front of “sophistication,” he told crows that “it is always necessary to
examine critically those appropriating and to stop assuming that mere spending means increased
strength.” Despite their growing animosity, Goldwater followed and capitalized on Eisenhower’s
critique of the New Economics, calling on Republican voters to send a message to Kennedy to
replace his “brain trusters” with “hard-headed business men” who actually understood the
economy. Dirksen and Halleck in their weekly press conference said that only a GOP Congress
could successfully declare a moratorium on Kennedy’s “economic novelties,” return to “fiscal
sanity,” and abandon this “old scheme to cover up extravagant government spending.” And, in
providing the alternative, Eisenhower continued to tour the country claiming that Republicans
27
are those who “see dedication to balanced budgets as one measure of responsibility in political
leadership!58
Even on some of the least technocratic elements of the New Frontier, Eisenhower struck
a hard line on the Kennedy administration’s spending priorities, often earning front-page
newspaper attention. On increased money for space exploration, the former president declared
that, “at the very least we might not defer buying tickets for a trip to the moon until we can pay
cash for the ride!” Campaigning for Maryland candidates in 1962, the former president told
cheering crowds pinning “We miss Ike buttons” that, “In my day we called people who would
not pay their way deadbeats. I think they, the Democrats, are asking us to be deadbeats!”
Speaking in Illinois, Eisenhower declared that Republicans of any stripe were united because
they were “the kind of people who will eliminate the Alice-in-Wonderland thinking” that
embodied Democratic Party orthodoxy. In Minneapolis, the former president lambasted the
“little clique of professors” who were advising the president to make “an unconscionable grab
for power” with the Executive’s budgetary discretion over public works. Speaking to an
estimated 25,000 people in Hartford, Connecticut, the ex-president continued his attack on the
technocratic underpinnings of the New Frontier – “They want a Washington…where the
executive gets its goals and purposes from a clique of theorists who specialize in experimental
tampering and tinkering and talk…timidity in everything, except in spending money!” Holding a
news conference at the Capitol building, Eisenhower treated over 170 reporters to a White-House
style press conference on the Kennedy budget. He focused on the growing set of obligations that
comprised Kennedy’s domestic agenda, as well as the young presidents attempt “to vest more
power in the Executive.” Increased federal concentration, he added, was “the real threat to liberty
in this republic.” Eisenhower’s press conference followed from a set of day-long meetings with
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senior GOP officials on Capitol Hill, in which he forewarned the impending danger of the
Democratic party’s “Leviathan State.”59
Eisenhower further made headlines when, in in a surprising move of ideological
consistency, the former president lambasted the Kennedy administration’s budget increases for
military spending. “I must record by personal belief,” Eisenhower remarked at a GOP
fundraising dinner, “that substantial amounts in our current defense budgets reflect unjustified
fears, plus a reluctance in some quarters to relinquish outmoded concepts.”60 The spat portended
a deep division over the direction of the GOP heading into the presidential nomination contests,
but few could must the same degree of authority as the former General. He continued this
critique in 1963, writing in the Saturday Evening Post about the need to cut down on troops in
NATO, primarily because of the financial stress put on the federal budget – now the largest
peacetime budget in American history. Eisenhower’s fiscal conservatism and balanced budget
mentality only grew as President Johnson’s “nutty” Great Society took hold. Eisenhower was
never alone in his condemnation of big government spending, but as former president, his
opinions carried unmatched authority, and never ceased to be newsworthy. 61
Elder Statesman It was President Kennedy who first drew Eisenhower back into political life as
an elder statesman in support of America’s foreign interests and the presidency’s role in securing
them.
As soon as Kennedy took office, a mammoth international crisis threatened to erupt in
Laos. Under Eisenhower, the U.S. government had aided the anti-communist general Nosavan
Phoumi. The Eisenhower-established SEATO treaty proved ineffective, and neither of America’s
two strong allies in the region – Britain and France – were unwilling to support the military
leader. As this crisis threatened to further destabilize the region, the Kennedy administration
29
reached out directly to former president Eisenhower for consultation. During the transition
period, Eisenhower and Kennedy worked closely to keep the transitioning administration
apprised of developments.8 Kennedy had handled the Laos crisis delicately upon entering the
White House, but the minor interventions had made the possibility of a military invasion more
likely. By mid-March, Kennedy announced that the U.S. would no longer unconditionally
support Phoumi; rather, they would support a concerted effort to broker a cease-fire and make
Laos a neutral state.
Eisenhower, who was heavily implicated in the success or failure of the region’s stability,
announced that he would pause his Palms Spring vacation and speak to reporters about
“international affairs” and Kennedy’s decision. Eisenhower was adamant – the young
administration, despite a worsening situation, was conducting itself admirably. Recalling his
phone conversation with the president earlier that morning, Eisenhower told reporters that “His
[Kennedy’s] idea seemed to conform exactly with what we had tried to do the last few years.” He
added that, “the present Administration seems dedicated to peace and is trying to be fair.”
Pressed on whether Eisenhower would have pursued a military option, the former president
strongly critiqued the question. “None of us can help by irresponsible suggestions,” he said, “I
would want exactly the same facts that the President has before I made any statement on that.
The man responsible for foreign affairs is the President.”62
Less than a month later, all attention turned from Laos towards Cuba. In late April, news
quickly rolled in about some Cuban rebels who were ambushed at the Bay of Pigs. World leaders
and press reports quickly implicated the White House and the country’s CIA for the unsuccessful
8 As Arthur Schlesinger recounts, the last conversation among many conversations Kennedy had with Eisenhower during the transition concerned the possibility of military action in Laos. See, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. 1965. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 162-164; 320.
30
revolt, turning what would have been an isolated uprising into a global crisis. Kennedy moved
quickly to quell the unrest and stave off partisan attacks, meeting with Senators Goldwater and
Rockefeller, and conferring with Richard Nixon. The President also wanted to meet with
Eisenhower, under whose administration a version of the invasion was first conceived. Flying an
Air Force helicopter out to the former president’s farm in Pennsylvania, Kennedy and
Eisenhower met at Camp David on Saturday, April 22. As Kennedy’s press secretary, Pierre
Salinger, told reporters the day before the meeting, the president felt that Eisenhower, “as leader
of the Republican party and former President, should know what the situation is.”63
As Eisenhower later recounted in a 1964 oral history, the meeting with Kennedy was
more than just a partisan ploy to temper the blowback. Up to that point nobody had fully taken
responsibility for the invasion. Eisenhower recalled that, “he [Kennedy] was asking what to do
now and he wanted to know what I thought would be the Russian reaction…he was afraid…He
was more interested in what I thought he should do now, than what the Russians would like to
do.”64 Meeting alone in the Aspen Lodge, the president and former president met for almost two
hours. Speaking to reporters shortly after, Kennedy paid respect to his predecessor, saying that
he wanted to meet with Eisenhower to “get the benefit of his thoughts and experience.”
Eisenhower then told the press that he was “all in favor of the United States supporting the man
who is carrying the responsibility for our foreign affairs.”65
Eisenhower’s solidarity with the new president, coupled with Kennedy’s own humble acceptance
of blame, won praise in the mainstream press. The president’s “appeal to Mr. Eisenhower for
support,” The Washington Post read, “was a wise gesture of national unity; and the generous
response of the former President, who has known like strains and disappointments was
characteristically patriotic.” The columnist Roscoe Drummond – who Kennedy credited with
31
suggesting the initial pre-inaugural meetings concerning Laos66 - recognized the significance of
this relationship best, writing “That Mr. Eisenhower will not make political capital out of the
failure of the Cuban invasion and will strongly support the President in whatever decisive action
is needed to remove an unelected Communist state from our doorstep.”67
Despite the former president’s admonition, blame still trickled in from the other side of
the aisle. The following week, though, Eisenhower made another show of support, inviting 20 of
his former Cabinet secretaries and White House aides to his Gettysburg office to discuss the need
to further temper GOP critiques of Kennedy’s foreign policy. Later that summer, while standing
in front of 6,000 Republicans at a fundraising dinner at the National Armory, Eisenhower
pressed his unifying commitments further saying, “As the President attempts to preserve our
freedoms, as he seeks to strengthen peace as he confers with foreign leaders, whether friendly or
hostile, he has the hopeful and sympathetic good will of all loyal Americans, regardless of
party.” He added that he had “pride” in those Republicans who “did not attempt to criticize,
condemn, or belittle those in authority.” Eisenhower continued this massive display of
presidential support into the Kennedy administration’s next crisis – Berlin – later that summer.
Standing alongside Nelson Rockefeller, at his office at Gettysburg College, Eisenhower again
asked that Americans unite around their President and support the administration’s foreign aid
and defense policies. As the situation worsened, press routinely pushed Eisenhower into
expressing his views on the administration’s response. Emphasizing that he was not “up on
things,” Eisenhower justified each of the current president’s decisions with a similar line – that
he must be “doing it for a good reason.”68
The White House recognized Eisenhower’s efforts to rally around the flag. Eisenhower,
in response to the Berlin crisis, penned a lengthy essay in the Saturday Evening Post. Kennedy
32
wrote to the former president, praising his essay as “constructive and helpful.” After Eisenhower
appeared on CBS to denounce extremism in America, coming most prominently from the John
Birch Society, Kennedy again penned his predecessor writing that, “I want you to know how
much I appreciated and admired your televised remarks about extremists. I don’t know of anyone
whose opinion on this matter will have greater weight; and your statement is another example of
your service and devotion to the country.”69
Eisenhower was not 100 percent consistent in his defense of Kennedy’s foreign policy.
As William Ewald, the president’s speechwriter, later recounted,
When Kennedy became the leader, he [Eisenhower] couldn’t care who it was, he’s going to support him,
especially on foreign policy, national security policy... Now he obviously had a great deal of bitterness and
resentment at the Kennedy attacks on him, on his record, his performance…In the ‟62 campaign,
somewhere along the line, something got off the rails. And Kennedy made a speech or part of a speech,
talking about how great his record was on foreign policy against Eisenhower’s. And this infuriated
Eisenhower…and he went up to Harrisburg and he made a blistering attack on the Kennedy record. And
then he said, “I think we ought to stop this. And I won’t say anymore, and I don’t think you should say
anymore.” I tell you neither side said any more...70
Ewald’s account mirrors the historical record quite accurately, and even while
Eisenhower continued to critique Kennedy’s domestic spending, he nevertheless urged the
country to stand behind the President “without regard to their political affiliation as he seeks to
lead us to a peaceful and honorable” place in world affairs. And throughout 1962 and 1963,
Kennedy routinely met with Eisenhower for brief meetings, often lasting longer than planned,
including after the death of civil rights activist Medgar Evans and Kennedy’s landmark civil
rights address. In 1963, the Kennedy administration actively sought and secured Eisenhower’s
support of their controversial nuclear test ban treaty - “the biggest battle since the Treaty of
33
Versailles,” according to the White House. As president, Eisenhower had tried to negotiate a
ban-treaty in 1958, but negotiations fell flat, in large part due to intra-party opposition.
Eisenhower’s prospective endorsement became all the more imperative in Kennedy’s fight to
pass the treaty when the former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Lewis Strauss,
criticized the agreement and Barry Goldwater ramped up his attack. Even the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee chair, James Fulbright (D-AK), requested Eisenhower’s perspective on the
matter.71 In response, Eisenhower traveled to Washington to meet with Senators to clarify his
position, and make clear his support of the administration’s goals. As Ewald later explained,
Eisenhower’s support of Kennedy actually went against the advice of his political advisors.
Strauss and Brownell both remained skeptical and encouraged Eisenhower to remain silent on
the matter. In the end, however, Eisenhower recognized that it “was one of those things where
there was no compromising, and it didn’t take him long; he did endorse it.”72
The Politics of the Post-Presidency
The post-presidencies of Truman and Eisenhower show that authority gained as President
of the United States does not quickly recede, but that the form it takes is predictable. Truman,
remained an active, polemical darling for the Democratic party, helped promote an alternative
fiscal policy to counter Eisenhower’s balanced budget approach, and, in retrospect, courageously
battled the politics of McCarthyism. Surprisingly, Eisenhower remained just as politically active
as Truman, and despite having less experience, was arguably more successful in directly
imprinting his legacy on his party. While never getting the reputation of “Give ‘em Hell”
Truman, Eisenhower turned out to be just as critical of subsequent administrations as Truman
was of his, but, as the elder statesman, he used his position to unify the country during multiple
foreign crises. However, this also included conferring with Johnson over the decision to send
34
more troops to Vietnam, and supporting the Vietnam War until his death in 1969.73 To this
extent, both Eisenhower and Truman’s claim to leadership as an elder statesman was never
value-neutral, nor was it intended to be.
To be sure, Obama’s decision to remain in Washington was an incredibly personal one;
the family wants daughter-Sasha to finish her two more years of high school. However, even if
he was not living in the nation’s capital, Obama’s presence in Washington’s political scene may
be just as domineering, as was Eisenhower and Truman’s. In late December, less than a month
before he left office, President Obama sat down with his former chief strategist, David Axelrod
for a lengthy interview on the president’s retirement plans. Obama responded with an ambitious,
open-ended list of priorities to “build that next generation of leadership” and “identify really
talented staff and organizers who are already out there and encouraging them to get involved
[with the Democratic Party].” 74 In the closing months of his presidency, more of his priorities
came into sharper relief. As an opposition leader, he and his first Attorney General, Eric Holder,
have already organized a 527-advocacy group to push redistricting reform, with the implicit goal
of helping Democrats recover some semblance of power in state government.75 Obama’s My
Brother’s Keeper has a unique private-public partnership design that will allow the president to
maintain direction over it, now that is no longer a White House priority; with former Obama-
official Broderick Johnson as its newly elected chair, this mentoring initiative will continue to
solidify the former president’s place as an elder statesman in national and local conversations on
racial equality.
While Obama will carry with similar levels of media attention and personal loyalties
necessary to effect political change, in one important respect, however, he will be distinct from
the post-presidencies of Eisenhower or Truman. President Obama entered into office in large part
35
because of his independence from the formal Democratic party, using his personal campaign
organization (Obama for America, now titled Organizing for Action) to mobilize voters, solicit
campaign funds, and pronounce party doctrine. As Sidney Milkis and John York (2017) write,
“It remains to be seen, however, whether the presidential partisanship practiced by Obama’s
information-age, grassroots organization offers a novel and enduring form of party building or
marks, instead, a new stage of executive aggrandizement that subordinates collective party
responsibility to a cult of personality.” By most accounts, President Obama used his organization
to prioritize his own personal loyalties over his party’s collective position. Interestingly enough,
in the modern era, only Dwight Eisenhower suffered greater party-seat losses in the Congress
than President Obama (Jacobs and Ceaser 2016). Yet, Eisenhower redoubled his efforts to
reshape the Republican party after his term by actively working through its pre-existing
institutions. Obama has the option of forgoing the Democratic party and instead using his own
impressive institutional capacity to carry forward his post-presidential ambitions.
36
Table 1: Presidential Approval During Last Week in Office
Incumbent President Date Range Presidential
ApprovalApproval by
President’s PartyApproval by
Opposing PartyPresident’s Party in Two-Party Vote
H. Truman December 15, 1952 32% 50% 9% 44.55% (1952)
D. Eisenhower December 12, 1960 59 88 43 49.92 (1960)
J. Kennedy November 12, 1963 58 80 31 61.34 (1964)
L. Johnson January 5, 1969 49 63 32 49.96 (1968)
R. Nixon August 4, 1974 24 50 13 48.95 (1976)
G. Ford December 12, 1976 53 80 40 48.95 (1976)
J. Carter December 7, 1980 34 49 14 44.69 (1980)
R. Reagan December 28, 1988 63 93 38 53.90 (1988)
H.W. Bush January 10, 1993 56 86 33 46.55 (1992)
W. Clinton January 13, 2001 66 93 39 50.27 (2000)
W. Bush January 10, 2009 31 75 6 46.31 (2008)
B. Obama January 18, 2017 59 95 14 50.51 (2016)
Source: Gallup Polls, Presidential Job Approval Center. URL: http://www.gallup.com/interactives/185273/presidential-job-approval-center.aspx?g_source=PRESIDENTIAL_JOB_APPROVAL&g_medium=topic&g_campaign=tiles . Last Accessed, March 8, 2017. Presidential Vote Share of the Two-Party Vote calculated from data provided by: N. Jacobs and J. Ceaser, “The 2016 Presidential Election by the Numbers and in Historical Perspective,” The Forum 14 (2016): 361-385.
37
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1 Obama first hinted at remaining in Washington in November, 2013 during an interview with Barbara Walters, almost 2 and a half years before Donald Trump announced his candidacy. The Obama family confirmed their decision in late 2015. Video of the interview is available at: http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/11/obamas-might-stay-in-washington-after-presidency-ends-2/ . Last Accessed, April 7, 2017. 2 Fox & Friends, FOX News Chanel, December 28, 2016. URL: http://video.foxnews.com/v/5263549712001/?#sp=show-clips . Last Accessed, April 7, 2017. 3Associated Press, March 10, 2017, “GOP rep backs off claim Obama running ‘shadow government,’ URL: http://bigstory.ap.org/2e1752947b0543169c02b090b2e8bf36?utm_campaign=SocialFlow&utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=AP . Last Accessed, April 7, 2017. 4 Your World with Neil Cavuto, FOX News Chanel, May 26, 2016. URL: https://mediamatters.org/video/2016/05/26/ben-stein-calls-obama-super-narcissist-staying-dc-after-presidency/210605 . Last Accessed, April 7, 2017. 5 Philip Freneau’s ode and comparison to the great Roman general who saved the Republic is perhaps the most famous; “Verses, Occasioned by General Washington’s arrival in Philadelphia, on how way to his seat in Virginia,” December, 1783. The Poems of Philip Freneau: Poet of the American Revolution, vol. II. Fred Lewis Pattee, ed. 1903. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 228.6 Drew Pearson, “Truman Pays Tribute to Hoover,” 8 January, 1954, The Washington Post; Clarence A. Johnson, “Being Ex-President is Wearing.” The Washington Post, 30 January, 1955.. 7 “Happy Harry Truman’s Back,” Washington Post, 22 June, 1953. 8 “Truman Does Not Choose to Run for Congress,” Washington Post, 9 July 9, 1954; “Old Campaigners Meet as Democrats Rally in Chicago,” New York Times, 13 September, 1953; “Truman Comes Here for 2 Day Party Meeting,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 13 September, 1953; “Democratic Chiefs Meet for 3 Hours,” The Washington Post, 14 September, 1953; “Democrats Borrow Eisenhower Tactic,” Wall Street Journal, 15 September, 1953, . 9 Truman’s attempt to connect rumors of a polio vaccine shortage to decisions made up high in the Eisenhower administration never panned out. On his remarks, see: Los Angeles Times, 25 May, 1955; Washington Post, 26 May, 1955. 10 “Democrats Plan to Pin ‘GOP Confusion’ on Ike,” Washington Post, 16 April, 1955; “Rayburn Hits GOP Right Wing As ‘Disloyal Opposition’,” Washington Post, 17 April, 1955; “Few Listen to Truman, Hagerty Declares,” Washington Post, 30 August, 1955. 11 Drew Pearson, “Truman, Harriman to Hold Conference,” The Washington Post, 8 October, 1955. 12 “GOP Policy, Nixon Stir Truman Scorn,” Washington Post, 27 November, 1955,. 13 “Truman Praises Gov. Harriman,” Washington Post, 9 October, 1955; Washington Post, February 14, 1956, “3 Groups Putting Pressure on Ike,” 51. 14 Joseph Aslop and Stewart Aslop, “Matter of Fact…Harry Truman’s Role,” Washington Post, 10 August, 1956. 15 Truman’s full remarks are re-printed in, “Text of Statement by Ex-President,” Washington Post, 12 August, 1956. 16 “Harriman Elated By Endorsement,” New York Times, 12 August, 1956. 17 The first and second day delegate counts are most robustly reported in “Harriman Drive is Stopped,” Wall Street Journal, 14 August, 1956. 18 “FDR Widow Takes Issue with Truman,” Washington Post, 13 August, 1956. 19 “Truman Gives Seconding Talk for Harriman,” Los Angeles Times, 17 August, 1956,. 20 Not only did Stevenson win, he secured he nomination on the first ballot with 905 ½ votes; 219 more than need, which also happened to be 9 more votes than what Harriman eventually secured. “Truman Rallies to Stevenson as a Real Fighter,” Los Angeles Times, 18 August, 1956; “Text of Address by Truman, Kefauver, and Stevenson Before Democratic Convention,” New York Times, 18 August, 1956. 21 “Truman Returns to Independence,” New York Times, 19 August, 1956; “Truman Plans Trip to Australia,” Washington Post, August 25, 1956. 22 “Butler Says He’ll Form Committee as Ordered,” Washington Post, 14 December, 1956. By 1959 the council’s membership would grow to about 30-members and include such prominent members of the party as Sen. John F. Kennedy and Eleanor Roosevelt (as a “consultant”). The council was partially responsible for pushing a more liberal civil rights agenda, and criticizing Eisenhower on these grounds. See also, “Open Shop Bid Hit by Council of Democrats,” Washington Post, 6 May, 1957. 23 “GOP Answers Truman ‘Falsehood’,” Washington Post, 23 September, 1958; “Truman Hits Eisenhower Policies,” Washington Post, 11 September, 1956; “Truman Starts Lectures at Yale, Takes Dig at Ike,” Washington Post, 9 April, 1958,. 24 “Parties Switch Roles on Cutting the Budget,” Washington Post, 19 May, 1957,. 25 As the Republican House Whip told the press, Spence’s high-profile push for public works was “nothing more nor less than political dramatics for Democrat propaganda purposes.” “Partisan Battle on the Economy Seen,” New York Times, 10 April, 1958.
26 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Banking and Currency, Legislation to Relieve Unemployment: Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, 85th Cong, 2nd sess. 25-77. 27 Velde also issued summons for Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark, who was attorney general at the time of White’s appointment, and South Carolina Governor James Byrnes, who was then serving as secretary of state. Byrnes who had broken with Truman and the Democrats in 1952 had by that time added support to the allegations by confirming that Truman knew of White’s spying activities. “Truman, Clark Subpoenaed!” Chicago Daily Tribune, 11 November 11, 1953; “Truman, Byrnes Subpoenaed with Clark in White Case,” New York Times, 11 November, 1953. 28 “A Smiling Truman Accepts Subpoena,” New York Times, November 11, 1953. 29 Full text of Truman’s response is re-printed in several newspapers, including the Chicago Daily Tribune, 13 November, 1953; New York Times,13 November, 1953. 30 “Truman Subpoena Upsets GOP Chiefs,” Los Angeles Times, 14 November, 1953; “GOP Leaders Bar Citing of Truman,” New York Times, 13 November, 1953. 31 “Truman will Give White Case ‘Facts’ On Air Tomorrow,” New York Times, 15 November, 1953. 32 “Ex-President Blasts ‘Cheap Political Trickery,” Washington Post, 17 November, 1953; “Truman Accuses Brownell of Lying,” New York Times, 17 November, 1953. 33 Full remarks of Harry Truman’s speech re-printed in, Washington Post, 17 November, 1953. 34 Straight’s response to the Washington Post is re-printed in, “Interpreting Truman,” Washington Post, 27 November, 1953. For a review of positive and negative reactions to Truman’s speech, see: “Press Commentary on Truman Speech Varies,” Los Angeles Times, November 18, 1953. 35 Joseph R. McCarty, “A Speech Against Harry S. Truman,” WNYC archives id: 151018; Municipal archives id: LT2634. Contemporaneous reports of the nationally televised address can be found in Washington Post, 25 November, 1953. 36 Truman did give a small speech before a 500-person meeting of Young Democrats in Kansas City, but he primarily focused on the anti-Democratic bias in the media. “Truman Urges Party to Turn From Past,” New York Times, 20 November, 1953. 37 Excerpts of Truman’s address, printed nearly in full, are from “Truman Assails Fear Tactics of Politicians,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 29 November, 1953; See also, “Truman Says Freedoms are Now Under Attack,” Los Angeles Times, 29 November, 1953; “Truman Hits ‘Vigilantes of Intellect’,” Washington Post, 29 November, 1953. 38 “GOP Leaders in Congress Discuss Plans to End One-Man Probes by Subpoena and Hearing Curbs,” Washington Post, 29 December, 1953; “Nixon Says ‘Questionable Methods’ and ‘Reckless Talk’ of Red Hunters are Diversion from GOP Program,” New York Times, 14 March, 1954. 39 “Eisenhower Calls Soviet Insincere,” New York Times, 25 January, 1961; “Georgia Quail Hunter,” Washington Post, 25 January, 1961; “Eisenhower Finds New Life ‘Great’,” New York Times, 21 January, 1961. 40 “Ike and GOP Leaders Chart Course Today,” Washington Post, 1 May, 1961; “Witch-Hunt Opposed by Ike,” Washington Post, 2 May, 1961. 41 “Ike Urges GOP Fight Now for ’62, Not ’64,” Washington Post, 2 June, 1961. 42 “Ike to Campaign at Mitchell Rally,” Washington Post, 5 August, 1961; “Ike Urges Firm Stand on Berlin,” Washington Post, 12 July, 1961; “NY GOP Leaders Map Strategy with Ike,” Washington Post, 13 August, 1961. 43 Roscoe Drummond, “The Nixon Decision,” Washington Post, 30 September, 1961. 44 “38 Republican Freshmen in House Tour Gettysburg Battlefield with Ike,” Washington Post, 12 September, 1961. 45 “Ike, 71, Said to Bar his Aid to ‘Old Men’,” Washington Post, 10 February, 1962,. 46 Transcript of the address reprinted in New York Times, 2 February, 1962.47 Dwight Eisenhower, “Ike Takes a Look at the GOP,” Saturday Evening Post, 21 April, 1962, 15-19; Dwight Eisenhower, “Danger from Within,” Saturday Evening Post, 26 January, 1963, 14-19. 48 “Goldwater Blasts GOP Plan to Use Old Guard Chiefs,” Washington Post, 3 July, 1962,. 49 “Ike Joins Party Fight, Lines Up with Liberals,” Washington Post, 5 July, 1962. 50 In the Fall of 1963, Eisenhower remarked that he was “unclear” on Goldwater’s message. Less about the ideologically consistent position of the Arizona Senator, contemporaneous accounts understood Eisenhower’s message to be a veiled condemnation of the prospective presidential candidate. “Love and Marriage Complicate GOP Candidate Hunt,” Washington Post, 15 June, 1963; “Ike Said to Narrow GOP Choices to 4,” Washington Post, 7 July, 1963.51 “Eisenhower GOP Council to Study Key Issues,” Washington Post, 5 August, 1963. 52 “Ike and Scranton Talk Creates Stir in Ranks of GOP,” Washington Post, 7 June, 1964; “Last Thing I Want is to Run Party, Pull Strings, Ike Quoted as Saying,” Washington Post, 8 July, 1964; “Ike Says He’ll Support Barry if He is Nominee,” Washington Post, 14 July, 1964. 53 “Eisenhower Bids Arizonan Explain,” New York Times, 18 July, 1964; “Clarify Talk, Eisenhower Asks Senator,” Los Angeles Times, 19 July, 1964; “Eisenhower Hits at Idea ‘End Justifies Means’,” Los Angeles Times, 20 July, 1964; “Extremism Reaction of Ike Shown by Tape,” Washington Post, 20 July, 1964. 54 Roscoe Drummond, “Extremists vs. Goldwater,” Washington Post, 23 September, 1964.
55 “Goldwater Sets Series of GOP Unity Sessions,” Washington Post, July 28, 1964; Statement of Eisenhower is reprinted in full in Washington Post, 13 August, 1964. Statement of Goldwater is reprinted in full in Washington Post, 13 August, 1964; “Ike, at 74, Shies from Viet-Nam,” Washington Post, 15 October, 1964; “Barry Sees LBJ Afraid to Debate,” Washington Post, 22 September, 1964. 56 “Last Thing I Want is to Run Party, Pull Strings, Ike Quoted as Saying,” Washington Post, July 8, 1964; “Leaders Agree with Ike on Poor Image of GOP,” Washington Post, 22 January, 1965; “Ike, at Ohio Dinner, Asks GOP Unity Behind Bliss,” Washington Post, 10 June, 1965; “Ike Scores Splintering Amid GOP,” Washington Post, 29 June, 1965. 57 At the GOP post-mortum meeting in December 1964, Eisenhower closed his speech, remarking that, “ It doesn’t make too much difference what ways we will solve the major problems of the world as long as we popularize the term ‘common sense.’ We should make it the byword of the party, and, in this way, we can again become the majority party.” On Reagan, see: “Ike Likes Reagan as 1968 Possibility,” Washington Post, 16 June, 1966. 58 “Eisenhower’s Attack on Kennedy’s Policies Causes New Problems for Administration,” Wall Street Journal, 25 June, 1962. 59 “Ike Denounces Foreign Policy and Spending,” Washington Post, 17 September, 1961; “Democrats Make US ‘Nation of Deadbeats,’ Ike Says at GOP Rally,” ; Washington Post, 8 September, 1962; “Ike Attacks ‘Power Grab’ By Kennedy,” Washington Post, 11 October, 1962; “Ike Sees GOP Administrations Desperately Needed in States,” Washington Post, 16 October, 1962; “Ike Charges Kennedy Seeks Wider Powers,” Washington Post, 11 May, 1962; “GOP Chiefs Say Kennedy Tries to Build Up ‘Leviathan State’,” Washington Post, 14 May 1962. 60 “Big Spenders Sway Kennedy, Kike Says,” Washington Post, 30 June, 1962. 61 “Ike, 75 Today, Lets Mind Go to Past, Then to Future of Republican Party,” Washington Post, 14 October, 1965. 62 “Eisenhower Backs Kennedy’s Actions in Laos Crisis,” New York Times, 25 March, 1961; “Ike, Kennedy Express Same Views on Laos,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 25 March, 1961; “Ike Gets Call From Kennedy,” Washington Post, 25 March, 1961.63“Ike, Kennedy to Confer on Cuban Crisis,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 22 April, 1961. 64 Dwight D. Eisenhower's Post-Presidential Papers, 1965 Signature File, Box 7, PR-3 Public Relations-3 Interview 11-27-64; NAID #12023937, pages 15-1665 “Eisenhower Urges Nation to Back Kennedy on Cuba,” New York Times, 23 April, 1961; “And Another in Cuba,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 23 April, 1961. “Eisenhower Meets with Kennedy, Asks Nation to Back Him,” Los Angeles Times, 23 April, 1961,. 66 Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President's Office Files. Special Correspondence. Eisenhower, Dwight D., 1961: January-December; document 5. 67 “Aftermath of Cuba,” Washington Post, 24 April, 1961; “Ike and Kennedy,” Washington Post, 1 May, 1961. 68 “Ike Urges Firm Stand on Berlin,” Washington Post, 12 July, 1961; “Eisenhower Urges Calm in Facing World Crisis,” Washington Post, 23 July, 1961. 69 Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President’s Office Files. Special Correspondence. Eisenhower, Dwight D., 1961: January-December; 47 – 49. 70 William B. Ewald, Oral History Interview – JFK #1, July 15, 1983. Interviewer Sheldon Stern; and the John F. Kennedy Library, 13-14. 71 “Eisenhower for Test Ban,” New York Times, 27 August, 1963; “Ike Approves Test Ban,” Washington Post, 27 August, 1963. 72 William B. Ewald, Oral History Interview, 16. 73 “President Tells of Talk with General Eisenhower,” Washington Post, 8 October, 1965; Dwight D. Eisenhower, “America's Place in the World,” Reader's Digest 87:522 (October 1965), 76–8174 David Axelrod, “The Axe Files, Ep. 108: President Barack Obama,” The University of Chicago Institute of Politics & CNN. Audio and Interview transcript available at CNN.com. URL: http://podcast.cnn.com/the-axe-files-david-axelrod/episode/all/Yg1u54uYTmB7Mb/me1tyh.html . Last Accessed, March 28, 2017. 75 Edward-Isaac Dovere, “Obama, Holder to lead post-Trump redistricting campaign,” Politico, 17 October, 2016. URL: http://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/obama-holder-redistricting-gerrymandering-229868 . Last Accessed, April 7, 2017.
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