Zones of Conflict_ Exploring the Ethics of Anthropology in Dang

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"Zones of Conflict":Exploring the Ethics ofAnthropology in

Dangerous SpacesAlex KhasnabishMcMaster University

AbstractIn recent years. anthropologists have become increasingly

involved in work surrounding issues of human rights. democracy. socialjustice. and conflic!. In doing so, ethical questions concerning theauthority. obligations. and, most broadly. the role of anthropologistsworking in areas and with populations experiencing circumstances ofviolence. suffering. and oppression have come to the fore, The centraltheme of this paper is to engage the ethics of not only doing fieldworkin such places and with people experiencing these social reali ties , but toalso consider whether it might be considercd an '"ethical imperative" onthe pat1 of anthropologists to conduct such work. Ult imately. I intend toaddress the conflicted ethics of anthropology conducted in dangerousspaces and to confront the concept of an "anthropology ofliberation" and what it signifies for the discipline and its practitionersboth as an academic endeavour and as a lIeld of practice \\'hich isprofoundly and intimately enmeshed in the often harsh realities ofhuman existence.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of theBerlin Wall, the decade of the 1990s was proclaimed by many toherald the "end of history" and the triumph of the regime ofdemocracy and the free market on a global scale. However, in theyears since this invocation, rather than witnessing theascendancy of a ne,v world order based upon peace andprosperity, the world has experienced a proliferation of insecurityand conflict. In this context, anthropologists have becomeincreasingly involved in work surrounding issues of humanrights, democracy, social justice, and conflict. In doing so, ethicalquestions concerning the authority, obligations, and, mostbroadly, the role of anthropologists working in areas and withpopulations experiencing circumstances of violence, suffering,

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64 "Zones of Conflict"and oppress ion have come to the fore. In this paper, it is myintention to engage the highly conflicted ethical zone ofanthropological work in places where circumstances of life aresuch that endemic violence, poverty, disease, and pol itical andsocial oppression, to name but a few characteristics, are present.My inquiry is s ituated in places where human suffering is notmerely apparent, but profoundly so. The central theme of thispaper is to engage the ethics of not only doing fieldwork in suchplaces and with people experiencing these social realit ies, but toalso consider whether it might be considered an "ethicalimperative" on the part of anthropologists to conduct such work.In pursuing these questions Lwill engage the positions ofanthropologists such as Lynn Stephen, Philippe Bourgois, FayeHarrison, Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Edmund Gordon, and LindaGreen, all of whom work in highly pol iticized field sites withindividuals whose l ives are characterized by circumstances ofprofound conflict. Ult imately, I will address the conflicted ethicsof anthropology conducted in dangerous spaces and confront theconcept of an "anthropology of liberation" and what it signifiesfor the discipline and its practitioners both as an academicendeavour and as a field of practice which is profoundly andintimately enmeshed in the often harsh realities of humanexistence.

In order to effectively examine the notion of an"anthropology of l iberation", it is first necessary to examinesome of the principles upon which such a concept might befounded. In order to achieve this, I will first i lluminate some ofthe most salient ethical arguments marshalled by anthropologistswho advocate for the discipline and its practit ioners to beposit ioned preferentially on the side of the "powerless" beforeproceeding to a more developed critique of aspects of this"ethical imperative". In her paper entitled "Living in a State ofFear" (1995), Linda Green asserts that while anthropology as adiscipline has celtainly not shied away from studies of socialconflict, the "anthropological gaze" in such studies has moreoften than not been a "divelted" one (Green 1995: 107). Inexplaining this notion of a "diverted gaze", Green states:



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Khasnabish 65[a]nthropologists ...have traditionally approached the study ofconflict, war, and human aggression from a distance, ignoringthe harsh realities of people's lives ...What is at stake, it seems,are the struggles between the powerful and the powerless andwhat is at issue for anthropologists is with whom to cast their lot(Green 1995: 106-107).

Thus, for Green, the ethical issue is not that anthropology or itspractitioners have avoided difficult circumstances or, what Iwould term, "dangerous spaces", rather, it is that this engagementhas occurred at a level which has not meaningfully challengedrelations of power and thus offer no possibility for theamelioration of human suffering. In opposition to this position,Green offers the notion of the anthropologist as "scribe", a rolewhich entails documenting "what the people themselves narrateas their own histories, that which they have seen, smelled,touched, felt, interpreted, and thought" (Green 1995: 108).Furthermore, anthropological monographs may themselvesbecome "'sites of resistance', 'acts of solidarity', a way to 'writeagainst terror"', a practice which allows "[a]nthropology itself[to be] employed as an agent for social change" (Green 1995:108). In her vision of anthropology, Green constructs a disciplinewhich takes as its first ethical priority the obligation to givevoice to the experiences of the powerless, the oppressed, thevictimized, and to serve as a vehicle for realizing social change,not simply one which articulates social critique. For Green, therecan be no meaningful anthropology of human suffering if itspractitioners do not choose to actively "cast their lot" on the sideof the powerless in opposition to the powerful.

While Linda Green alticulates the basis of the ethicalimperative of anthropology practised in dangerous spaces, NancyScheper-Hughes takes many of these notions much fUlther inexpressing her own vision of anthropology in her alticle "ThePrimacy of the Ethical: Propositions for a MilitantAnthropology" (1995). In her alticle, Scheper-Hughes outlinesthe moral and ethical framework upon which she builds her ownnotion of a "politically committed and morally engaged



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66 "Zones of Confl ict"anthropology" in the following manner:

I suggest that cul tural relat ivism, read as moral relativism, is nolonger appropriate to the world in which we live and thatanthropology, if it is to be worth anything at all, must beethically grounded: "If we cannot begin to think about socialinstitutions and practices in moral or ethical terms, thenanthropology strikes me as quite weak and useless" (ScheperHughes 1995:410).

Scheper-Hughes names this position which she sees as morallyand ethically responsible as that of the "companheira", onewhich was fashioned out of her own experiences and encounterswith politically and socially engaged and committed researchpal1ners in the field in Brazil and South Africa. The questionwhich infoll11s her own position as anthropologist and"companion" and which Scheper-Hughes asks of all of us is"[w]hat makes anthropology and anthropologists exempt fromthe human responsibil ity to take an ethical (and even a political)stand on the working out of historical events as we are privilegedto witness them?" (Scheper-Hughes 1995: 411). In essence,Scheper-H ughes questions the fundamental value of doing workin highly conflict-ridden spaces if the anthropology produced asa result of such work does nothing to bring about an end toconditions of misery and suffering (Scheper-Hughes 1995: 416).In fact, in marshalling this critique against a more "objective" or"neutral" anthropology, Scheper-Hughes takes direct aim at thepost-modem "crisis of representation", asserting that "[n]ot tolook, not to touch, not to record can be the hostile act, and act ofindifference and of turning away" (Scheper-Hughes 1995: 416).Thus, the ethical imperative here is once again one whichdemands more than engagement, it demands interaction andaffiliation; furthermore, it requires anthropologists to commit topolitical and moral stances rather than to explanatory modelswhen confronting situations of human suffering.

In articulating her vision of a "militant" anthropology,Scheper-Hughes asserts the potential for anthropology to notonly operates as a tool "for critical reflection" but, much more



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powerfully, for "human liberation" as well (Scheper-Hughes1995: 418). In expressing this potential and the "primacy of theethical" which infotms it, Scheper-Hughes outlines her vision ofthe anthropological project in the following manner:

[a]nthropologists who are privileged to witness human eventsclose up and over time, who are privy to community secrets thatare generally hidden from the view of outsiders or fromhistorical scrutiny until much later...have, I believe, an ethicalobligation to identify the ills in a spirit of solidarity and tofollow...a "womanly" ethic of care and responsibility. Ifanthropologists deny themselves the power (because it implies aprivileged position) to identify an ill or a wrong and choose toignore (because it is not pretty) the extent to which dominatedpeople sometimes play the role of their own executioners, theycollaborate with the relations of power and si lence that allow thedestruction to continue (Scheper-Hughes 1995: 418-419).

Thus, for Scheper-Hughes, anthropologists who do not takeexplicit moral and political positions with regard to situationscharacterized by contlict are not only guilty of not working toachieve human emancipation but are in fact guilty ofperpetuating the very violence to which they bear witness. Infact, Scheper-Hughes goes so far as to assert that the "ethical" is"precultural" insofar as "in presupposing all meaning, ethicsmakes culture possible", a position which allows one to becomea companion of people whose lives are enmeshed incircumstances of violence and suffering by virtue of the notionthat "we are thrown into existence at all presupposes a given,implicit moral relationship to an original (m)other and she to me"(Scheper-Hughes 1995: 419). Our very existence thereforebecomes the basis and entails the obligation of a fundamentalmoral debt to one another, one which exists prior to culture andwhich must be seen as transcending all difference. It is in thissense that Scheper-Hughes insists that anthropologists cease tobe "observers" and instead embrace the role of "witnesses";professionals who are bound to act in a politically and morallyengaged fashion as companions to the people we work with inorder to help achieve their emancipation from systems of



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68 "Zones of Conflict"violence.

In the work of both Green and Scheper-Hughes, thethread of an ethical obligation to assis t in the emancipation of thepeople with whom we work runs quite powerfully. In"Anthropology and Liberation" (1991), Edmund Gordon focusesupon many of the same concerns and questions that bothScheper-Hughes and Green engage, however, he proceeds furtherin an attempt to define an "anthropology of liberation" and theethics which inform it. Much like Scheper-Hughes' asseliion thatany anthropologist who does not participate actively in speakingout and acting against violence and oppression is in fact guilt ofperpetuating it, Gordon asserts that anthropology as a disciplinehas a certain ethical and moral debt to pay. This ethical andmoral debt cannot, according to Gordon, be repaid solely throughthe production of "anti-colonial critiques" or even "liberatingknowledge" (Gordon 1991: 149). Rather, anthropologistsinterested in "decolonising our discipline" and creating an"anthropology of liberation" must move from simply"intellectualizing" problems to praxis (Gordon 1991: 149).Significantly, such a move would need to occur in conjunctionwith "the creation of counter hegemonic world views andpractices, and the construction of institutions for theirpropagation and dissemination" (Gordon 1991: 149). 1nGordon's view, an "anthropology of liberation" is thus adiscipline which is not only ethically committed to the peoplewith whom anthropologists work, but is in fact bound to thecreation and dissemination of "counter hegemonic world viewsand practices" in cooperation with larger popular projectsdedicated to the same ends. Gordon advances his vision evenfurther by posit ing that anthropological knowledge "empowersWestern elites...whether utilized in specific instances ofoppression, or as a contribution to their general knowledge [andtherefore] reinforces the power differential between these elitesand the Third World" (Gordon 1991: 151). The only response tothis situation, argues Gordon, is to formulate and practice ananthropology which "no longer serves the interests of theoppressors", opting instead to "actively [serve the interests] of



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the oppressed" (Gordon 1991: 153). The fundamental basis foran "anthropology of liberation" for Gordon thus embraces theviews expressed by both Scheper-Hughes and Green, but whichalso exceeds them. In Gordon's formulation, notions of theanthropologist as "scribe" or "witness" are conspicuously absent,replaced instead with a vocabulary focusing on participation as amember of a larger counter-hegemonic struggle between theoppressed and their oppressors.

The vision forwarded by Gordon of the anthropologistas a counter-hegemonic agent entails several significant ethicaldimensions with respect to its articulation. Firstly, in order toconduct an "anthropology of liberation", it is of primary ethicalimpoltance that the anthropologist "involve him/herself with acommunity or people who s/he believes will be empowered byknowledge and ideas developed in interaction with them. Theanthropologist must identify in an organic way with thecommunity with which s/he works" (Gordon 1991: 154). Thenotion of organic identification with a community, within thescope of Gordon's theorization, involved being an "insider" withrespect to the community itself. thus eliminating the possibilityof anthropologists doing work with groups or communities withwhom they have no capacity to personally identify. The choice ofresearch topic, also a point of significant ethical concern, is one,which Gordon asserts must "contribute to a people's effort tounderstand the nature of their own oppression and to conquer it"(Gordon 1991: 154). It should be a topic, which emerges bothfrom the anthropologist's assessment of what is "the nature andsource of oppression" as well as from what the peoplethemselves believe lie at the core of their own problems (Gordon1991: 154). Following this, Gordon's "anthropology ofliberation" draws its impetus from the ethical imperative to movebeyond "intellectualizing" these issues and towards activism(Gordon 1991: 162). The anthropologist-as-activist "mustpatticipate in breaking down the web of hegemonic ideas whichis blocking the acceptance of liberating knowledge so that thelatter may be instrumentalized" (Gordon 1991: 162). In Gordon'sview, this struggle can be accomplished only by the



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70 "Zones of Conflict"anthropologist becoming involved in "creating and consolidatinga counter-hegemonic movement through active politicalstruggle" (Gordon 1991: 162). Anything less, according toGordon, merely reproduces already existing systems ofdomination and exploitation and reinforces the pre-eminence ofthe West over the Third World.

The concept of an "anthropology of liberation" and theethical principles, which inform it is further, advanced by FayeHarrison in her work "Ethnography as Politics" (1991). In herarticle, HaITison argues for the "construction of an 'anthropologyof liberation' to subvelt the established discipline and lay thefoundation for a new field of inquiry...based on consciouspolitical choices about standing on the side of struggle andtransformation" (Huizer cited in Harrison 1991: 88). Inarticulating this vision of anthropology and the ethicalimperatives which underlie it, Harrison reflects upon herexperience conducting fieldwork in the highly politicized andconflicted environment of Kingston, Jamaica in the 1970s; a timeduring which the government was striving toward democraticsocialism in the face of staunch internal and internationalopposition and a social and economic climate dominated byviolence and crime. As Harrison explains, her choice is one,which was itself informed by her own identity:

as a child growing up in the South in the midst of the CivilRights Movement; as a university student involved in thecampaign to exonerate and free politica1prisoners such asAngela Davis, a Black scholar/activist framed for kidnapping,murder, and conspiracy; as a fledgling ethnographer exploringthe politicization of adolescents in a poor, working-class WestIndian neighbourhood in London, England; as an activistconcerned with providing grassroots political education,building alternative organizations, and mobilizing support forSouthern African liberation struggles; and, finally, as a graduatestudent stimulated by the debates among social scientistsregarding uneven capitalist development, class formation inperipheral formations, and the rocky road to socialism (Harrison1991: 91).



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Khasnabish 71This statement of personal affinity reflects Gordon's asseltionthat anthropologists practising an "anthropology of liberation"must be able to organically identify with the communities theyinvolve themselves with. As Harrison herself notes:

[m]y social identity as a Black American rather than as a racialand cultural derivative of Euro-America enhanced my abilityand my commitment to engage in a critical dialogue withJamaican blacks as well as \vith brown and white progressiveswho identified politically an culturally with the Afro-Jamaicanmajority...1recognized the organic responsibility andrelationship that I had to oppressed peoples, especially topeoples ofAfrica and African descent (Harrison 1991: 101).

Thus, categories of identity and subjectivity form the basis forthe ethical imperative to engage in struggles for the liberation ofoppressed peoples through anthropological work. By virtue ofthis "organic responsibility", Harrison insists that anthropologistscommitted to human emancipation "must f01111 pacts with theiroppressed 'brethren and sistren"', pacts which "must takeprecedence over many conventional professional expectationsand requirements, which, as presently constituted, serve toreproduce (neo)colonial domination" (Harrison 1991: 104). An"anthropology of liberation" as characterized by both Gordonand Harrison is therefore one which takes as axiomatic theidentification of the anthropologist with oppressed peoples andinsists upon a commitment to active political pmticipation inlarger struggles which seek to subvelt hegemonic constructions,dominating systems, and oppressive institutions.

In his alticle "Confronting the Ethics of Ethnography:Lessons from Fieldwork in Central America" (1991), PhilippeBourgois argues powerfully for an anthropology which is notonly intellectually rigorous, but which is unabashedly sociallyand politically engaged as well. Bourgois takes specific aim atthe "limited dimension of ethical dilemmas" in anthropology, acriticism that is wOlth quoting at length:

[w]e wOIl'y about whether or not our research subjects ha vetruly consented in an "infoIl11ed" manner to our study; weponder over the honesty of our presentation of self; we condemn



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72 "Zones of Conflict"the distortion in the local economy caused by the resources weinject into it in the form of "informants" gifts or wages; we arewary of the social disapproval foisted on our primary informantswhen they become the objects of envy or ridicule from the restof the community because of the resources, prestige, or shamewe bring them; we no longer steal ceremonial secretsunapologetically; we examine our emotions introspectively tocontrol our ethnocentrism; we uphold cultural relativism andavoid unconsciously conveying disrespect for traditionalinstitutions and values through our lifestyle; we preserve theanonymity of our research subjects and host communities; wefeel guilty for violating the privacy of our informants and theirculture; we worry about "scientific colonialism" and our"responsibility to the host community" (so we send extra copiesof our publications to our research site); we do not takephotographs indiscriminately and we do not tape record withoutobtaining prior permission; we discuss the pros and cons ofconsulting forbidden archives or quoting from personal diariesand letters; we question the ethics of accepting financial supportfrom governments and politically biased institutions; we worryabout the potential misuse of our research material once it hasbeen published in the public domain; and finally we take carenot to jeopardize the access of future colleagues to ourfieldwork site by our actions and publications (Bourgois 1991:111-112).

The thrust of Bourgois ' summary of contemporary ethicalconcerns in anthropology is that nowhere in this list is there amention of "the larger moral and human dimensions of thepolitical and economic structures ravaging most of the peoplesthat anthropologists have studied historical ly" (Bourgois 1991:III) . In fact, Bourgois goes so fa r as to asser t tha t many of theethical considerations characteristic of contemporaryanthropological practice in fact serve to undermine anysignificant attempt made on the part of anthropologists toconfront these structures of violence and domination as he asks"[h]ow does one investigate power relations and fulfill theresearcher's obligation to obtain informed consent from thepowerful?" (Bourgois 1991: I l l ) . Thus, fo r Bourgois, the



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problem with ethical debate in anthropology is not that it has notoccurred but rather that it has avoided addressing issues ofhuman rights, power, domination, and conflict in any substantivemanner.

In constructing a vision of a politically engaged andcommitted anthropology, Bourgois notes that the ethicalconsiderations of human suffering rarely occupy a place ofprimacy within anthropological discussions of disciplinaryethics. What are the ethical imperatives that anthropologistsworking in highly conflicted spaces need to consider? Bourgoisarticulates what he perceives as the fundamental ethicalchallenge to anthropologists in the following manner:

[w]e have chosen to study the wretched of the earth. These arethe individuals too often condemned to periodic famines, tobelow subsistence-level incorporation in flooded labourmarkets, to relocation, dislocation, or more simplyextermination. Many of our disciplines former researchsubjects are fighting back in organized political movements; butas the Central American experience demonstrates, theirstruggles are prolonged, bloody, and often unsuccessful.Although as uninvited outsiders it might be naive and arrogantfor us to think we have anything definitive to offer, we can stillrecognize the ethical challenge. Why do we avoid it? (Bourgois1991: 113-114).

Thus, Bourgois considers the question of the "right" ofanthropologists to involve themselves in circumstances and withpeoples who are living realities which "outsiders" will probablynever be able to fully comprehend: however, his response to thisis not to withdraw from this problematic, but to engage it. Inillustrating this ethical challenge. Bourgois relates his ownexperiences conducting fieldwork in highly conflict-ridden fieldsites in Honduras and EI Salvador where his primary ethicalchallenge and obligation became the exposure of the tremendoushuman rights violations occurring at the direction of theSal vadoran government, despite the fact that such a commitmentnearly resulted in his termination as a graduate student due to hisserious violation of several academic disciplinary standards

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74 "Zones of Conflict"(Bourgois 1991: 116-119). In responding to the ethical concernsof fieldwork in highly conflicted spaces, Bourgois raises severalpoints, which are at once compelling and profoundlycomplicated:

[a]re we supposed to abandon controversial research? Mostpolitical economy studies can be defined as potentiallyunethical. A fieldworker cannot obtain important information onunequal power relations by strictly obeying the powerstructure's rules and laws...What are the limits to "infomledconsent" in settings of highly unequal power relations?... Howdoes one decide whether a host country government issufficiently repressive to waITant breaking its laws?....Mostdramatically, the ethics of informed consent as it is interpretedby human subjects review boards at North American universit iesimplici tly reinforces the polit ical status quo (Bourgois 1991:120).

What Bourgois draws from this ethical challenge is the assertionthat anthropological ethics need to be refollnulated in a manner,which contributes to the empowerment of the "poor andpowerless" (Bourgois 1991: 122). While he acknowledges thefact that such studies are certainly fraught with more"traditional" ethical concerns and that there is no guarantee thatanthropologists will have "something concrete to offer" people intheir struggles, Bourgois reinforces the notion that the world is apolitically polarized place and that if we choose not to activelyengage it on behalf of the people we work with, these very samepeople will "continue to be crucified" (Bourgois 1991: 122-123).Thus, much as Green, Scheper-Hughes, Gordon, and Hall'isonhave argued, non-involvement in political struggle is not merelya passive act of indifference, it is in fact a hostile act, whichsupports conditions of violence and oppression. It is therefore theprimary ethical principle of an "anthropology of liberation" thatits practitioners be activists in the contexts within which theywork, operating at the direction of the people they work with andin cooperation with larger struggles which aim to subvertsystems of domination and oppression.

While many of the ethical issues surrounding



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anthropology in highly conflicted and even "dangerous" spacesdiscussed thus far have revolved around rather abstracted notionsof "organic identification" and struggles against oppression, thework of Lynn Stephen (2002) provides an excellent example ofthe practice of what might be termed an "anthropology ofliberation". In describing her fieldwork experience over the pastdecade in southern Mexico and paliicularly her work conductedin the state of Chiapas since the Zapatista uprising of January I,1994, Stephen illustrates the ethical and methodological issues,which confront anthropologists conducting research in zones ofconflict. Given the continuing political and social oppressionoccurring in Chiapas against indigenous communities supportiveof the Zapatista movement, Stephen draws from her ownexperience and argues that "'the field' is all inclusive", aproposition which she fLlliher develops by stating that"[a]nthropologists are a part of the field, responsible for theirplace in the moral economy and political economy of the broaderrelations encompassing them and those they work with" (Stephen2002: 21). In situations such as those involving low-intensity\ovarfare Stephen asselis that the notion of "neutral pmiicipantobservation is not credible" and that researchers must beprepared "to paliicipate more than observe and to takeresponsibility for using their access to the media and otherresources to report on what they see and participate in" (Stephen2002: 22). Stephen clearly indicates here the unique ethical andmethodological challenges posed by situations of profoundconflict for the discipline of anthropology and its practitioners.Situations characterized by circumstances of violence andoppression such as those present in low-intensity warfare poseunique challenges to the anthropologist and also entail celiainobligations to the people suffering under such conditions.

In situations of profound conflict, such as those presentin the southeast of Mexico, Stephen asserts that are-evaluationof the role of the anthropologist needs to occur. As she statesfrom her own experience, "I did not see myself as being an'investigator' seeking to unearth all mysteries and answer allquestions, but more as what Liisa Malkki calls a witness"

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76 "Zones of Conflict"(Stephen 2002: 22). Th e notion o f the anthropologist as witness,a category also invoked by Nancy Scheper-Hughes. signifies forStephen "trying to be an attentive listener, recognizing thesituatedness o f one's intellectual work, and affirming one's ownconnections to the ideas, processes, and people one is studying"(Malkki cited in Stephen 2002: 22). fmpOliantly, Stephen notesthat while one role the anthropologist can play is that o f"witness" to situations involving conditions such as low-intensitywar, it is not the only role (Stephen 2002: 23). Thus,"witnessing" can b ec om e p at i o f a larger anthropological project,a role within which the "tools an d resources o f ananthropologist" can be mobilized to report effectively on thesesituations (Stephen 2002: 23). The demands o f working withinhighly conflicted contexts, however, pose unique ethical andmethodological challenges to the practice o f anthropology.Obstacles to conducting classical long-term fieldwork insi tuations such as those described by Stephen include: thedangers involved in working in communities that have been"displaced, divided, and militarized"; govemments activelyworking to prevent the witnessing o f situations which they wishto hide; and, finally, the da nge rs pose d to communities beinglabelled "suspicious" due to the long-tellll presence o f foreignersas well as the dangers such a situation would imply forresearchers themselves (Stephen 2002: 23). Thus, more flexiblemethodologies involving such issues as fieldwork duration, agreater emphasis on patiicipation rather than observation, awillingness to serve in capacit ies such as human rightsobservation in order to work in situations o f extreme conflict,and a commitment to engaging power structures preferentially onthe side of those who are suffering within them are but a few ofthe aspects o f the ethical and methodological problematicsinvolved in the role o f the anthropologist as witness.

In discussing the potentia ls and perhaps even the moralimperative to engage in an "anthropology of liberation" whichwould seem to include the role o f the anthropologist as"witness", it is necessary to consider the foundation upon whichsuch notions ultimately rest. As Stephen indicates, the discourse



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of human rights is one which is intimately tied to "witnessing"and which is most certainly implied by an "anthropology ofliberation". Within anthropological theory and practice, adiscourse of universal human rights can be certainly seen as aproblematic foundation upon which to build a disciplinaryproject. By attempting to universalize human rights, do we notrun the risk of imposing specific cultural values and historicallycontingent ideologies upon other peoples? What are the ethics ofattempting to "liberate" people based upon a set of assumptionswhich, many would argue, are culturally and historically specificand which posit a particular kind of subject? Stephen respondsspecifically to the criticism that a discourse of universal humanrights is one which has emerged from the Enlightenment and"specifically to the production of a palticular document, at apmticular time, tied to particular ideological interests: theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights, written in 1948 in theaftermath of World War II and tied to a political philosophyseeking to unify Europe" (Stephen 2002: 29-30).

While Stephen notes that the traditional anthropologicalresponse to understanding conditions of violence, oppression,and conflict rests upon the foundation of cultural relativism, shealso asselts that this approach is "no longer acceptable or evenviable" for anthropologists, for the very reason that the discourseof human rights is no longer one bound exclusively to theWestern world as "[h]uman rights discourses now exist in aglobal ized context and have been deployed and debated by awide range of states and by indigenous communities andmovements [and a great range of social movements] from avariety of perspectives" (Stephen 2002: 30). Thus, while thediscourse of universal human rights has indeed emerged from aspecific cultural and historical moment, it has since beenrefashioned and employed by a multitude of diverse groupsglobally in pursuing their own claims. lt is in this sense that an"anthropology of liberation" and the role of the anthropologist as"witness" can be seen as operating in accordance with alreadyexisting political agendas of people challenging thecircumstances of their own oppression and marginalization.



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78 "Zones of Conflict"Stephen summarizes her vision o f the anthropologist as witnessin the following manner:

[t]he human rights discourse is a political tool thatmarginalized communities and organizations are nowusing to make their voices heard and to gain access topolitical and social systems - and to nations - fromwhich they have long been excluded. If weanthropologists possess skills, tools, resources, andaccess useful in carrying out human rights work, an d areexpected and requested to do so by the people workwith, then we must ser iously consider the relationbetween such work and anthropologicalfieldwork ...People in communities living under thecircumstances oflow-intensity war often requestassistance in publicizing their situation and dare not waitfor several years while an anthropologist collects,analyses, and publishes data. They may askanthropologists to take responsibility for their privilegedaccess to the media, other intellectuals, governmentofficials, and policy makers, and to disseminateinformation to as m an y p eo pl e as soon as possiblethrough public presentations, teaching, writing inpopular forums, and, last, perhaps, in such traditionalacademic products as mticles in refereed journals orbooks published by university presses (Stephen 2002:31 ).

Thus, according to Stephen, in choosing to work in areascharacterized by conflict and violence, as anthropologists we areimplicitly involving ourselves in a scenario, which does no tallow for positions o f "neutr ality" or careful academic distances.In this case, our first ethical imperative is to serve thecommunities and people we work with in order to advance theirow n political agendas. As Stephen argues, given our access toresources and venues b ey on d t he circumstances, whichcharacterize the lives o f people suffering within these zones o fconflict, as anthropologists we must be committed to offering



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Khasnabish 79something beyond production of knowledge for the academy; wemust be committed to advancing the struggle of peoples strivingtoward their own liberation.

From the work of Green, Scheper-Hughes, Harrison,Gordon, and Stephen, the contours of what could be labelled an"anthropology of liberation" can be traced. While the vision isone, which is certainly compelling and undoubtedly informed bya fervour to aid in the elimination of injustice, oppression, andmarginalization of peoples globally. beneath the rhetoric thereexist certain fundamental problematics, which need to beconfronted. Firstly, it needs to be noted that there is a cleardifference between the role of the anthropologist as "witness"and the larger project of an "anthropology of liberation". Foranthropologists such as Gordon and Harrison, the goal ofanthropology is nothing less than the emancipation of peoplessuffering under conditions of profound oppression and violence.Flllthermore, within their shared vision of anthropology, Gordonand Harrison posit that this work can only be done by individualswho identify in what they term an "organic" manner with thepeople and communities with whom they are involved '. Inaddition to this, the primary ethic of this kind of anthropologybecomes participation in counter-hegemonic political struggle, astruggle that is a part of larger political movements. Whi Ie therhetoric used to support this vision is powerful and persuasive, itis also loaded with assumptions of morality and righteousness,which are somewhat discomfiting. In essence, this "liberationstruggle" becomes reducible to whether one chooses to side withthe powerful or the powerless, the oppressors or the oppressed.The argument becomes one, which already posits a celtainpreconceived and dichotomous social and political reality, onethat establishes a prefabricated path for anthropologists to followin striving toward liberation.

This sense of moral righteousness is also powerfullyinvoked by Nancy Scheper-Hughes in her call foranthropologists to become "witnesses" and "companheiras/companheiros" as she reduces the argument to one whichinvolves the anthropologist in essence choosing a "side" in the



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80 "Zones of Conflict"battle of "life and death, good and evil" (Scheper-Hughes1995 :411). This type of polarization serves the purpose of clearlydelineating positions within a larger struggle, but it is apolarization, which serves to obscure rather than illuminate thecomplexity of lived reality. Ifanthropology as a discipline is onewhich aims to provide "thickness" in conveying the multiple andtremendously varied realities of the lives of those people withwhom we work, how does such a facile and reductionist moralposition assist in helping others to understand situations ofviolence and conflict? Moreover, the assertion made by ScheperHughes that ethics are in fact "precultural" illuminates theprecise problem with this "anthropology of liberation", namelythat in asselting the obligation of the anthropologist to operate asan agent of emancipation and social transformation, the veryissues of how ethics and morality are constituted and howrelations of power are constructed recede from debate. All thatone need worry about is "being on the right side" and strugglingagainst monolithic forces bent on perpetuating cycles of violenceand oppression.

After reviewing the arguments for and adoption of an"anthropology of liberation", J will now attempt to address thequestion of whether the practice of this type of anthropologyshould be considered a "moral imperative". Clearly, this questionis one, which depends heavily upon the context in whi.chdifferent anthropologists work. For those who conduct researchoutside of these "zones of conflict", this notion of an"anthropology of liberation" could in fact imply a hierarchy ofvalue depending upon the area in which one chooses to work.Will work conducted in areas outside of highly conflicted areascome to be seen as "less than" work done within them? Ifso, thediscipline of anthropology risks closing itselfoff to areas ofinquiry and to the deepening of human knowledge in the serviceof a unitary political agenda. More than this, seeing an"anthropology of liberation" as a moral and ethical imperativeevokes notions of submitting intellectual curiosity, freedom, andcreativity to a political agenda. which determines the ultimatetrajectory and goal of anthropological work. Within these "zones



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of conflict", an "anthropology of liberation" can, in fact, limit theability of anthropologists to understand the complexity of anygiven social reality.

Reflecting upon this situation, Scheper-Hughes notesthat, "I had to accept that there were places where I was notwelcome ... that were irrevocably closed to me and consequentlyto anthropology" (Scheper-Hughes 1995: 411). Despite therhetoric of "good and evil, life and death", it is an unfortunatetruth that social reality and the individuals who operate within itare rarely as simple as this polarization would seem to suggest.How are we to understand the complexity of conflict andviolence conducted systematically within tremendously variedcontexts if we allow ourselves to close doors to a range ofvenues within these contexts? What service is being performed ifthere is no attempt to deepen our understandings of why thesesituations exist, how they are perpetuated, who they benefit, andwho they harm') If an "anthropology of liberation" by viltue ofits ethical and moral imperatives eliminates entire avenues ofinquiry before research has even begun, what is the ultimatevalue of such research and what liberating effects will it have?Clearly, there remain numerous unanswered ethical andmethodological questions that pose significant challenges to theviability of an "anthropology of liberation".

While the ethical primacy of anthropologists'obligations to the people with whom they work appearsaxiomatic to many practitioners, palticularly those who vvork inhighly politicized and conflicted contexts, the shape and natureof these obligations remains somewhat obscure. Of theanthropologists I have discussed in this paper, Stephen, Green,and Bourgois go the fUlthest in attempting to alticulate anexplicit position for anthropologists working with peoples insituations of extreme conflict. Conveyed explicitly through theirtheorizations on the purpose of anthropological inquiry in these"dangeroLis spaces" is the notion that it is the obligation of theanthropologist to serve as a "scribe" or "witness" for thesecommunities. While Scheper-Hughes also uses the concept of the"witness". her formulation tends to follow much more closely in



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the path of an "anthropology of liberation" rather than thevisions of Stephen, Green, and even Bourgois who advocate amuch more refined position. Each of these three anthropologistsnote that in situations of profound human suffer ing, it is theethical obligation of the anthropologist to serve as a witness tothese circumstances and to make themselves and their skills andresources as anthropologists available to the people andcommunities with whom they are involved. In this sense,witnessing entails a transformation of some of the moretraditional methodological standards of anthropology to allow foraccess to areas, which might be off-limits to more traditionalanthropological approaches. It also entails a shift toward anethical orientation, which obligates anthropologists to speak outagainst these conditions of violence and the human suffering itcauses in the most productive and public forums possible. Whatis significant with respect to the role of anthropologist aswitness, particularly within the work of Lynn Stephen, is thatthere is an explicit acknowledgement that this is not the only roleanthropologists could or should play.

FUlthermore, there is an emphasis in this discourse of"witnessing" not of closing doors to research but of openingthem more widely. While there is an acknowledgement that"what is at stake is with whom anthropologists choose to casttheir lot", this conceptualization lacks the revolutionary fervourof an "anthropology of liberation" and instead attempts to findpragmatic solutions to challenging situations of endemic violenceand profound human suffering through the use ofanthropological tools, rather than simply attempting to subjectanthropology as a discipline to a singular overriding ethical-political agenda. Moreover, ethical debate in the formulations ofanthropological inquiry as proposed by Stephen, Green, andBourgois does not recede from view, rather, it remains central tothe project of anthropology practised in "dangerous spaces".Rather than emphasising the impOltance of serving as an agentwithin a larger counter-hegemonic struggle against theoppressors, the role of "witness" challenges the anthropologist toreaffirm their obligations to the people with whom they work



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without presupposing a set of principles explicitly aimed at"liberation" and which could in fact only lead to greaterpolarization and simplification and ultimately reduce our abilityto comprehend some of these tremendously complex and variedcircumstances by representing them as a caricature of a battle of"good against evil".

Throughout this paper I have attempted to trace thecontours of what some have termed an "anthropology ofliberation", the ethical concems which infollll it, and thequestion of whether or not there exists an ethical imperative topractice it. In evaluating the work and writing of Green, ScheperHughes, Harrison, Gordon, Bourgois, and Stephen, the profoundcomplexity of conducting anthropological research in situationscharacterized by extreme violence and profound human sufferingcan be seen as giving rise to the asseliion that an activist,libratory anthropology is a moral and ethical imperative for thediscipl ine and its practitioners. However, as I have argued, whileanthropologists such as Harrison, Gordon, and Scheper-Hughesstrongly advocate for an "anthropology of liberation", otherssuch as Stephen, Green, and Bourgois provide a much morenuanced vision of what an ethical practice of anthropology inhighly conflicted spaces could look like.

While the debate over the ethical imperative to assist inending human suffering and confronting cycles of violence,conflict, and oppression is a profoundly important one, theproject embodied by an "anthropology of Iiberation" asexpressed in the work of some of these anthropologists remains aconcept riddled with internal problematics and contradiction. Byissuing the call for anthropologists to actively work toemancipate the people they 'oVork with, anthropologists such asGordon, Harrison, and Scheper-Hughes employ a line ofargumentation and an appeal to ethics and morality that is rootedin a faci Ie conception of power, oppression, and violence; onewhich reduces the world to victims and victimizers and thendemands that anthropology choose a side. While the objective isundeniably noble, the zeal and righteousness evoked in theseworks is as problematic and potentially dangerous as those

83



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84 "Zones of Conflict"anthropologists who continue to claim "neutrality" and"scientific objectivity" in their relations with people andcommunities2 The most basic and disturbing issue here is that inasserting an "anthropology of liberation" as the only ethicalcourse to take when working with people l iving in these"dangerous spaces", any meaningful discussion of ethics recedesfrom discussion as the "ethical imperative" of liberation takes aposition of primacy. If l iberation is the objective and it isperceived as the most ethical and moral goal, then it becomes theethical standard in and of itself. Considerations of what"liberation" is, whom it will benefit, how specifically it will beachieved are nowhere to be found in this discourse. In order toconfront systems of power and pri vilege and attempt to transformrelations of domination and oppression into relations ofempowerment and emancipation, as anthropologists we must firstwork toward a nuanced understanding of the complex andcomplicated lived realities experienced by people. In this vein,an anthropology which views the role of "witness" as one rolethe anthropologist can play is, I believe, a Illuch Illore powerfuland sophisticated tool. Rather than making calls for the l iberat ionof humanity, an anthropology which embraces the act of"witnessing" ethically requires anthropologists to be responsiblefor the events they view and to participate in the l ives of thepeople with whom they work, always at the direction of thosesame individuals and communities. In this sense, "witnessing"both exceeds and becomes part of a larger anthropologicalproject. While the tools of anthropology are brought to bear onsituations of extreme conflict, anthropologists must be preparedto engage in acts both to conduct research and to disseminate itthat fall outside of traditional disciplinary boundaries. Yet at thesame t ime, the notion that this act of "witnessing" is subject to asingle over-arching ethical-political paradigm of "liberation" isconspicuously absent.

Acting as "witness", the anthropologist working insituations of extreme conflict and human suffering is indeedresponding to what could be termed the "ethical imperative" toact preferentially on behalfofthose with whom we work and



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Khasnabish 85\-vho consent to share their experiences and lives with us. Thedifference between this response to the ethical obligation ofanthropologists to those they work with and the notion of the"ethical imperative" of an "anthropology of liberation" isnuanced but profound. Through witnessing, the anthropologistgives voice to circumstances of conflict, violence, andoppression thus utilizing the tools and resources of anthropologyto speak out against gross injustice in particular contexts andeven to inform a larger political struggle. In an "anthropology ofliberation" the political struggle itself becomes the guiding forcefor the discipline and its practitioners. Anthropology and theethical debates involved in its practice in essence disappearwithin a framework of "liberation", a framework which reliesupon starkly drawn lines between the powerful and the powerlessand which posits the ultimate goal of anthropology to be thearticulation, within the formation of larger political struggles, ofa counter-hegemonic front.

While it is tempting to believe social and politicalrealities are ultimately reducible to a struggle of "good againstevil", and that as human beings in the world we must placeourselves on one side or the other, the practice of anthropologyitself has taught us that lived human experience is rarely thissimple. In pursuing the work of an ethically committedanthropology, rather than committing ourselves to agendas andframeworks which cloak ethical and intellectual dilemmas in thelanguage of liberation and emancipation, we must insteadreaffirm our commitment to the people with whom we work, tothe challenge of conveying as effectively and widely as we canthe richness, the complexity, and sometimes even the harshnessand the horror of human experience. Anthropologists can bewitnesses, we can lend our voices and our access to those withwhom we work in an ethical and responsible manner. What weshould not do is allow ourselves to be seduced by a rhetoric of"liberation" and self-righteousness, which, while claiming theethical and moral high ground, serves instead to obscure the verycomplexity of the worlds, we, and the individuals andcommunities with whom we work, inhabit.



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ReferencesBourgois, Philippe1991 Confronting the Ethics of Ethnography: Lessons from

Fieldwork in Central America. In DecolonisingAnthropology: !vloving Further Toward an Anthropologyfor Liberation. Edited by Faye Hanison. Washington,D.C.: American Anthropological Association.

Gordon, Edmund1991 Anthropology and Liberation. In Decolonising

Anthropolog)l: Moving Further Toward an Anthropolog)lfor Liberation. Edited by Faye Harrison. Washington,D.C.: American Anthropological Association.

Green, Linda1995 Living in a State of Fear. In Fieldwork Under Fire:Contempor(//)' Studies of Violence and Survival. Editedby Carolyn Nordstrom and Antonius CG.lVI. Robben.Berkeley: University of California Press.

Harrison, Faye1991 Ethnography as Politics. In Decolonising Anthropology:

Moving Further Toward an Anthropology for Liberation.Edited by Faye Harrison. Washington, D.C: AmericanAnthropological Association.

Leslie, Helen and Regina Scheyvens2000 Gender, Ethics and Empowerment: Dilemmas of

Development Fieldwork. Women 5' Studies InternationalForum 23: 119-130.

Schensul, Jean and Donald Stull1987 Collaborative Research and Social Change: Applied

Anthropolog)l in Action. Boulder: Westview Press.



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Scheper-Hughes, Nancy1995 The Primacy of the Ethical: Towards a MilitantAnthropology. Current Anthropolog)l 36: 409-440.

Stephen, Lynn2002 Zapata Lives! Berkeley: University of California Press.Notes

I See "Gender, Ethics and Empowerment: Dilemmas ofDevelopment Fieldwork" (2000) by Helen Leslie and ReginaScheyvens for an overview of both the problems with this focuson organic identification as well as the potential benefits ofresearch conducted by those who are outsiders to communities.2 Jean Schensul and Donald Stull (1987) argue for the centrali tyof applied collaborative research to the product ion of scientificknowledge in Collaborative Research and Social Change:Applied Anthropology ill Action

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