Zoldberg -Origins of the Modern World System, A Missing Link

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Origins of the Modern World System: A Missing LinkThe Modern World System. Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century by Immanuel WallersteinReview by: Aristide R. ZolbergWorld Politics, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Jan., 1981), pp. 253-281

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Review Qairticles

ORIGINS OF THE MODERN WORLD

SYSTEM:A MissingLink

By ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG*

ImmanuelWallerstein, he ModernWorld System.CapitalistAgricultureand theOriginsof the European World-Economyn theSixteenth en-

tury.NewYork:Academic ress,974, 410 pp., $23.00; $6.50paper.**I

EVENsthe ocial ciencesegan o displace istoryt all levels feducational urricula, istorytself asre-emergedtthevery en-

terof social scientificoncerns y way of recent ontroversiesvermodernizationnd development. t first ight,t may appearsome-whatparadoxical o speak of a "re-emergencef history,"incethe

developmentalaradigm, roadlypeaking,was extrapolatedrom hepastexperience f the West, and fostered mongthemacroanalyticsegments fpolitical cience nd sociology markedly iachronicri-entation,ncontrast ith hesynchronicent f thebehavioral ersua-sion. Once the extrapolation ad been accomplished, owever, heWest'shistoryameto be viewed s anunproblematicatabankwhoseimperfectionsould be solvedbyupdated echniques f informationretrieval.t is the unruliness f thepresent-inthe West tself nd in

theexternalworld on which theparadigmwas hurriedlymposed-that ransformedhe storage acilityntoa Pandora'sboxfromwhichhistory,n all itscomplexity,as escapedto challenge s again.Pre-cisely ecausewidespread issatisfactionith heparadigmaticxtrapo-lationhasproduced growingnterestnre-examiningheontological

* An earlier ersion f thispaperwaspresentedt a panelof theConference roupon the Political conomy f Advanced ndustrial ocietiesheld in conjunction iththeAnnualMeeting f theAmerican olitical cienceAssociation, ashington, .C.,September979. I amespecially ratefulo Martin hefterorhis nvitation,s wellasto Ira Katznelson, damPrzeworski,eterGourevitch,nd Ron Rogowski ortheircommentsndcriticismsf earlier rafts.

** Readers hould be warnedthatthe paperedition mitsall footnoteeferences,which constituteerhapshalf of theoriginal ext.Manyof themcontain xtensivedevelopmentsftheauthor'srgumentss well as citationsn supportf them. heirimportances demonstratedythenumerouseferenceso themn thepresenteview.

? i98i by heTrusteesfPrincetonniversityWorldolitics043-887I/8I1/020253-29$0I-45/IFor copyinginformation, ee contributor age.







254 WORLD POLITICS

moldwithin hich t wasformed,he erm re-emergencefhistory"is an appropriateharacterizationfthepresentrend.

Given his eorientation,t s not urprisinghat ocial cientistsave

focused great ealof attentionn the pochal ransformationf theculturalutlookndofthe ocial, conomic,ndpoliticalrganizationofWesternuropenthe road eriod ingedround500, as it iscommonwisdom hat hese hanges enerallyonstitutehe matrixofwhatwe abelmodernity.lthoughveryones aware hat hiswasalsothe ge ofthegreat iscoveriesnd of European xpansion,nlya fewexceptionalistoriansuch s WilliamMcNeill nd FernandBraudel ave ddressedhemselveso the verall elationshipetweenthese henomena.n this espect,mmanuelWallersteinas renderedconsiderableerviceosocial cientistsydelineatingmore ystematicproblematique:hatwere he pecificrocessesinking he ransfor-mation f the West n the earlymodern ra with ts riseto para-mountcy,nd how did theresultingonfigurationenerate urtherprocesseshich n turn eterminativelyhaped ubsequenthangesnother artsftheworld?

Althoughheres reason o hope hat re-examinationf the arlymodern rafrom broader erspectiveillresultninnovativeheo-reticalreakthroughssince his ertileistoricalround pawnedle-mentsfourprincipal acroanalyticraditionsnthenineteenthen-tury),heres alsoa considerableisk hat ur effortsillresultnanothertalemateetweenheprincipalontenders.uch standoffslikelyooccurf,nsteadf onsideringhepast sa subjectntotself,wetransformt nto meremetaphorfthepresent.swe evaluate

historicalnalysesf thebeginningf themodern orld,we wouldthereforeowellto rememberarcBloch's dmonitionohistoriansconcerningthe doloforigins." nravelingheambiguityf theword origins,"hichmeans ot nly beginning"ut lso"causes,"Blochpoints ut that his eadstoa "cross-contamination"fmean-ings, fwhichheworsts"a beginninghich sa completexplana-tion" fthehistorian'swntime.By wayof this onfusion,e con-

cludes,inmany ases hedemon forigins asbeen, erhaps,nlythe ncarnationf that ther nemy f truehistory:hemaniaformakingudgments."'

Wallerstein'sndertakingsverymuch case npoint: issolutionto theproblemehasposeds foundedna conjurer'srickwherebypast ndpresentremade omirrorach ther,ndwhat ssaid bouteach ppearso substantiatehats said bout he ther. isdepiction

1Bloch,The Historian's raft New York:VintageBooks, 964), 29-3L.







ORIGINS OF THE MODERN WORLD SYSTEM 255

oftheworld fthe ixteenthenturyppearsredibleecauset bearsanuncannyesemblanceothe amiliarepresentationftheworld fthe atetwentiethenturyn the iteraturen dependency;ndthe

realism fthe atterortraits inturn ouchsafedy tsresemblanceto theancestor. hatevermessaget purportso disseminate ithrespectoour wn ime, owever,sa work f cholarshiphepresentbookmust eevaluatednrelationo theunit fanalysisowhich texplicitlyefers-themodern orld ystem";utthemodern orldsystem hen One oftherequirementsftheoreticallyriented is-torysthat,soutcomeseep hanging,heboundariesf theunit fanalysis ust e specifiedn time swellas in space. n thepresentreview,shall hereforeddressmyselfnly o thevalidityfWaller-stein'sropositionsoncerninghe long ixteenthentury,"hats, heperiodfrom bout 450 to i65o.

Whenconsideredrom hatvantagepoint,Wallerstein's haracteri-zationof themodernworld ystemndtheexplanation e givesof tsorigins renotmerelyncomplete,utdemonstrablyrong.The twoflaws re inextricablyelated ecause,byminimizingheimportance

ofone majorfeature fthesystem, egivesundueweight otheother-therebydistortinghewholeaccount o muchthat t becomes nac-curate.Concomitantly,heexplanation efits n outcomeother hantheonethatnfact ccurred.

These errorsnd distortionsre specificallyttributableo Waller-stein's ystematiceglect fpolitical tructuresnd processes. hat isnotto saythathe does notdiscuss hemat all. Rather,he variouslyexhibits reductionistendency,iewing olitical rocessess epiphe-nomenal n relation o economic ausation; functionalistendency,viewingparticularolitical onfigurationss arisingwhenneededbythesystem, ithout nyother xplanation; r merely tendencyoconsider olitical ariables s givens-a pell-mell eap akintoresidualerror n theregressionquations fconventionalocialscience.n thefirstnstance, is explanations reunpersuasivend often nvalid; nthesecond, e violates is owncorrectudgment-advanced s a criti-

cismofother cholars-that unctionalxplanationsrovide n inade-quateresolutionf "thegenetic roblem" p. I34, n. 8); and in thethird, e isinexcusably egligent. he neglectsflagranttthe evelofgeneralconceptualization,herecarefulscrutiny evealsa glaringtheoreticaloid withrespect opolitical ife;and theconsequences fthisvoid are repeatedlyvident t criticaluncturesn thehistoricalaccount tself.







256 WORLD POLITICS

II

Althoughthereviewersndcommentatorsave lreadyrawn t-tentionoWallerstein'sverall eaknessnthis espect,ess onsidera-tion asbeen iven othe roaderheoreticalmplicationsf his law.2It isnecessaryo considerhem t some ength efore iscussingisempiricalropositionsoncerninghe ong ixteenthenturytself,e-cause tis evident romhe ntroductoryssay, rom heconcluding"Theoreticaleprise,"ndfrom hequick nstitutionalizationftheauthor'srameworks the ntellectualoundationf a researchenterand ofa plethoraf publications,hat hegrandeurf his epistemo-

logicalmbitionxceedsven he mpirical agnitudefhisprojectedmultivolumeatural istoryfthemodern orld.3 s he himselfs-sertsn thentroduction,isultimateoal snothinghort fthe rea-tionof a comprehensiveunidisciplinary"pproachuitable orthestudy f"social ystems."e believeshat uch ntitiesan be distin-guished romess omprehensiveormsf ocial ife, uch sthefunc-tionally ifferentiatedgroups" nd "organizations"roundwhosestudy,easserts,onventionallyocial cientificisciplinesave rown;oreven romhe communities,"societies,"nd"nation-states"hatare oftenreateds self-containednits y holisticallyinded ocialscientistspp. 7, I, 348).

There s no gainsayinghat n order o achieve he evel of validityto which taspires,macroanalyticallyrientedocial ciencemust easeviewing heworldas a setofself-contained,orphologicallydenticalsystemsr societiesdentifiedy place cardsat theUnitedNations,

amongwhomontogeny ecapitulateshylogenys the atest-bornro-ceedthroughuccessivetages f economicgrowth r lurchfrom n-fancy o maturityhrough series f crises fpoliticaldevelopment.Themost easonable lternativeovulgar evelopmentalismsa returnto theworld-historicalutlook, broad-spectrumntellectualraditionwhichencompassesuchdifferentheoristss Tocquevilleand Marx,

2 See in particular:heda Skocpol, Wallerstein's orldCapitalist ystem:A Theo-reticalndHistorical ritique," merican ournalfSociology, ol. 82 (March 977),

I075-90; PeterGourevitch,The Internationalystemnd Regime ormation: Criti-cal Review fAndersonndWallerstein,"omparativeolitics, (April1978), 4I9-38;

GeorgeModelski,TheLong Cycle fGlobalPoliticsnd theNation-State,"ompara-tiveStudiesn SocietyndHistory,x (April 978), 2I4-35; and WilliamMcNeill, nhisoralcontributiono a round-tableiscussionhairedbyImmanuelWallersteinttheConferencefEuropeanists, ashington,.C., March 979.

3Wallersteinasprovidedn overview f the arger roject f which his s thefirstvolume:see "The Rise and FutureDemiseof the WorldCapitalist ystem: onceptforComparative nalysis," omparativetudies n Society nd History, vi (Septem-ber 974), 387-415.








WeberndSchumpeter,s well s more clecticlobal istoriansuchas McNeill nd Braudel, obert . Palmernd Geoffreyarraclough.The fundamentalroblem ithWallerstein,owever,s that isver-

sionof theworld-historicalutlook onsistsfa largedose of anti-quated etty aterialismombined ith small oseof conventionalsystemsnalysiso as to formnimpossibleybrid aradigm.

His positionsfoundedn thenotionhat, n thebasis f twocri-teria,t spossibleo dentify"real" r "total" ocial ystem:a) "lifewithint s largelyelf-contained";nd, oncomitantly,b) "thedy-namics f itsdevelopmentre argelynternal"p. 347). Sincetheconceptself-containedife" s admittedlyhevery oundationf theoverall ramework,t is surprisinghatWallersteinowhere othersto xplicatet.We can nferromhe ontexthat trelatesoeconomicactivity;utwhy hould hat spect fthe otalityfhuman xistencebe singled ut as thenecessarynd sufficientefininglementfa"real" ocial ystem?ettinghis ravematterside or econsiderationin therelevant istoricalontext, e encounterurtheronceptualproblems ithin heboundariesf Wallerstein'swn framework.n

hisview, ocial ystemsarynthefirstnstances a functionf thegeographicalcale ftheirconomicrganization,nd nthe econdas a functionf the caleof political rganizationnrelationo theeconomicp. 348). With especto thefirstariation,he ypologicalelaborationsabrupt:here retwomajor orms,he small" nd the"large"-i.e., highlyutonomousubsistenceommunitiesotpart fsome egular ribute-demandingystem,"nd"world ystems."hatnothingmores said about hepoliticaltructurefsmall ocial ys-

temss notmportantor hepresenturpose. sfor he arge,Waller-stein onsidersnly wopossibilities:ither he scaleofpoliticalr-ganizationoincides ith heeconomic,r it is smaller.n the firstcase,we obtain wo furtherypes: ne,historicallyealized,s the"worldmpire";he ther, hich xistsnly t the evel ftheoreticalpossibility,s a "world ocialistovernment"nwhich,fter lengthyhistoricaliatus,he economic umptynd thepolitical umpty

wouldeput

backogethergain.

n the econdase,however,

hereis only nepossibility:"world conomy"ontaining pluralityf"states."

Attainmentfthe ocial cientificromisedand restsn theper-suasivenessf Wallerstein'semonstrationhat all the importantchangeshat ccurrednthe ixteenthenturyan besubsumednderthe ppearancef a single henomenon,a kindofsocial ystemheworldhas notreallyknownbefore," hich s properlyermed







258 WORLD POLITICS

"'world-economy'ecausehebasic inkage etweenheparts f thesystemseconomic.. ." Although e immediatelyrantshat thiswas reinforcedo some xtentyculturalinks ndeventually,swe

shall ee,by politicalrrangementsnd evenconfederaltructures"(p. I5), thetheorylearly ests n thepropositionhateconomicprocesseslone eterminedhe enesisf hemodern orldystemndgovernedtsoperationsftert came ntobeing.

If we reassemblehe ooseendsrelegatedo theheapofresidualerror,owever,hework eveals,ontraryo Wallerstein'sheoreticalintention,hat he basic inkage etweenheparts fthe ystem"asatnotimemerelyconomic.rom hevery eginning,notherdenti-fiabletructures nteractingith he tructuralinkage e shows s-a structureedoesnot eeorwillnot ee, nd to which he missinglink" f he itle efers.t s the ystemfmoderntates hich ecamemore learlyrticulatedn westernuropen the ourse fthe ongsixteenthentury,utwhose riginsan be traced omuch arliertimes. Systemf moderntates,"atherhanmerelythemodernstate" s a form fpoliticalrganization,r "moderntates"n the

plural, ryet internationalolitical ystem,"ecause he structurallinkage have n mind ncompassessetofpolitico-strategicctors,the nternaltructuresn which heirapabilitys actors epends,swell as theexternalnteractionshich ormwhat s conventionallycalled, lbeit omewhatnachronistically,he "internationaloliticalsystem"fEurope.The systemfmodern tatesnteractedotonlywith he "basic

linkage"ingledutbyWallersteintthe evel fwesternurope ut

-even more mportant-lsowith olitico-strategicctors utsideheregion, o as to shaperelationshipsmongwestern uropean oun-tries,s well sbetweenhem ndthe xternal orld.fthemodernworldystemf he ixteenthenturys betteronceptualizeds a com-plex ntity ith nidentifiableoliticaltructureowhich etermina-tive ffectsanbeascribed,hen t wasnot world conomynly, ndits verallrganizationasperhapsot s entirelyistinctives Wal-lersteinsserts. oreover,f t can be shownhat omemportantea-turesf theEuropeanonfigurationere haped ythe nteractionsof its economicndpoliticaltructuresithpolitico-strategicctorsoutsidehe egion,hen hemodern orld ystemas not s self-con-tained ither.t wouldfollowhat he ntityWallersteinas singledoutas uniquelyuitableorcomprehensiveocial cientificnalysissuffersromhe amedefects the onventionalnits erejects,ndwewouldneedyet nothernidisciplinaryocial cienceo analyze








themore omprehensiveystemfwhicht sonly component.erea unidisciplinarypproachobe devisedor ach ype f"real" r"to-tal"human ystemonceivable,ewould oonface social cientific

babel eminiscentfthe newe arebeing rged o eavebehind.History esistsuickfixes.n whatfollows, shallreconstructhemissingink nd demonstratetseffects,rawing mpiricalvidencefrom ithinWallerstein'swnworkwheneverossible.his pproachwill servehedouble urpose f completinghenegativeriticalaskalreadydumbratedndofprovidingfoundationormore dequatetheoryonstructionn this phere.

IIIDirect nd ndirectracesf effectsttributableothemissingink,

and hence videncen behalf f the nadequacy f an economisticconceptualizationf world-historicalrocessesn the ongsixteenthcentury,anbe adducedwith espectothefollowingeyfeaturesfWallerstein'sistoricalccount:i) descriptionfEuropeanocial r-ganizationn themedieval eriod; 2) overall haracteristicsf the

entity esultingrom uropean xpansion;3) determinationf itsexternaloundaries;4) determinantsfthe ocation f specificoun-triesnthe core,"semi-periphery,"r"periphery";nd 5) variationof tate tructuresn theEuropean egiontself.

Withrespectothemedieval eriod,Wallersteinuns nto roublebecause uropeanocial rganization,uringhe entiremillenniumbetweenhe reakupf heRoman mpirendthe ise fthemodernworld ystem,oesnotfitnto ny fthe ypologicalellshehaspro-

vided. tthe utsetf he hapterntitledTheMedieval relude,"eassertsorcefully:We must e clearwhat eudalism asnot. twasnot 'natural conomy,'hat s,an economyfself-subsistence"p.I7). Onthe ther and, estates ith qualconfidencehat twas nota "world-system"pp. i8, 36). As he sees t, Europe onsistedf apluralityf ocial ystems,or hemost art relativelymall, elativelyself-sufficientconomicodules,"ased nthe xploitationf limited

agriculturalurplusynobles,nd inkedoa certainxtentytrade,

togetherith at east wo maller orld-economies"oundn North-ern taly nd nnorthwesternuropeGermanyndFlanders), utinwhosenetworksmost fEuropewas notdirectlynvolved(p. 37). He describesurope,n the ve of the xpansionfthefif-teenthentury,s "a nascent orld-economy,omposedfsmall m-pires, ation-states,ndcity-states"p. 57). Yet, ince nWallerstein'sownviewEurope onstitutedore han mere eographicalxpres-







260 WORLD POLITICS

sion, hose isparate iecesformed wholewith omedegree f coher-ence.On whatwas this oherence ounded?

The aspect hatmmediatelyomes omind s thebond provided y

Christianity.lthough e acknowledgeshatmedieval uropewas in-deeda "civilization"pp. i8, 36), Wallersteineemsunaware hat heuse ofa concept voking ulturaldentitynd cohesion ontradicts isown theoreticalssertions ecause tsuggests hevalidity f criteria f"self-containedife"other hanthe one he has singled ut. f so, whyshould ntities elineatedn thebasisof economic xchanges lone beprivileged bjects n the analysis f world-historicalrocesses?'Butthat s not ll. More mportantor hepresent urpose s that, lthoughhe devotes fewpagesto "the slow rise of the centralized tatebu-reaucracy," allersteinllowsthese udimentarytates o float n a po-litical vacuum becausehe does not attribute political tructureofeudalism ua systempp. 28-33). Sucha denial,however, liesn theface of commonplace istoricalvidence oncerninghepluralityfmedieval uthoritytructures,ncluding ot onlykingdomsnd lesserterritorialrganizationsf thesameilk, together iththeir onstitu-

tions nd estates, ut also Papacy and Empire, s well as the complexpatterns f politico-strategicnteractionsmong thesevarious ctors.5Simultaneouslyomplementarynd competitive,hese uthoritytruc-turesmight e considered s disparate lements f political rganiza-tion, rticulatedo as to form field f relationshipsncompassingheeconomic its ndpieces, ndtherebyontributingo thecoherencefEuropeas a whole. t is thus onceivablehatmedievalEurope consti-tuted socialentityn which hedomainofthepolitical tructureas

morecomprehensivehanthe economic.Although, iventhe state favailablehistoricalnformation,he precise haracter f medievalEu-rope'soverallpolitical tructure emains ndeterminateorthe timebeing, nough s known to suggest hatthepossibilityf identifying

4Althoughheconcept civilization"s thekeystonef ArnoldToynbee'sdealistictheoryfhistory,t is also used as a unit of analysiswitha cultural eferenty theself-admittedmaterialist"ernandBraudel,who includes civilizations"longwiththeeconomicystems,tates,nd societies s appropriatebjects or"socialhistory"-

a historywith low butperceptiblehythms"hat s distinguishablerom hehistoryofman'srelationshipo theenvironmentlonguedure'e) ndfrom'histoire'venemen-tielle, onceived on the scale not ofman,but of individualmen." See Braudel,TheMediterraneannd theMediterraneanWorld n theAge of Philip11 (New York:Harper ColophonBooks,1976), 20-2i, 824-25. WilliamMcNeill refers o the largerwholeconstitutedy nteractingurasian ivilizationss "ecumene"; ee his The Riseof theWest:A History f the Human CommunityNew York: American ibrary,I963), throughout.

5 See,for xample, oseph . Strayer,n theMedievalOrigins ftheModern tate(Princeton: rinceton niversityress, 970), and BernardGuenee,L'Occident uxXlVe et XVe siicles.Les Etats Paris:PressesUniversitairese France,970).








such structurehould otbe ruled utontheoreticalrounds;Wal-lersteins edtodo ust hat ecause heverydea s ncompatibleithhispropositionhat conomicrocessesrethenecessarynd sufficient

constitutivelementsfsocial ystems.n anycase,he cannot voidattributingo medieval olitical tructureselativelyndependentf-fectsnshapinghe utcome ithwhich e sconcerned.

Thatacquisitivenessastheprominent otivef European xpan-sionat the beginningf the ong sixteenthenturys self-evident.What sdebatables the xtento which his xpansioneflectedroc-esses hat anbe subsumednder he erm'capitalism,"nd whetherthetermworld conomy"ppropriatelyescribesheentityonsti-tuted y European ountriesnd theregionshey ominatedytheend oftheperiod. he question f abels s no smallmatter ecausethey acilitateheperformancefthe onjurer'srick eferredo n thediscussionf"origins." hathasmadethemodern orld ystemodifferent,nWallerstein'siew,sthat uropeanxpansionesultedna world conomy hich,nlike tspredecessors,asnot ubsequentlytransformednto world mpire. e attributeshis utcome o"the

techniquesf modernapitalismnd thetechnologyf modernci-ence, he wobeing omewhatinked . ." (p. i6). Moreover,uro-peans adthe political isdom orealize" hat apitalistrganizationwould nable heirworld conomytothrive,roduce,ndexpandwithouthe mergencef unifiedoliticaltructure"p. i6,text ndn. ).6 Althoughhese emarksppeart the utsetf a work evotedtotheperiod450-i650, it is evident hat hey pply o an outcomerealized nlymuch ater n,perhaps nly n the atter artof the

twentiethentury,henwhat scommonlynown s neocolonialismreplacedolonialismout ourt.

With especto theperiod overedythis ook,however,he erm"world conomy"s surelynachronistic.allersteinimselfrantsthat ithassporadicallyeemed s though"heEuropean orld con-omywould o n the irectionf mpirep. i6). "Seemedsthough"?In facttdid.With hismuchheagrees:fEurope's ominationid

nottake heclassic orm fempire,t was notfor ack of effortobring bout uchan outcome. he Emperor harlesV, he writes,"soughto create world-empire,ot a core-stateithin world-economy"p. 355).Elsewhere,ewrites,Wepresentedhe oliticsfthefirst'ixteenthenturysrevolvinground he ttemptsySpain

6Wallerstein'sverallpositions ambiguous:he attributesheoutcome venmoreexplicitlyo thewill ofcapitalistsn thepassagebeginningThe various dvantagesmerchantsad . . ." (p. 127), butqualifies hison p. i6o.







262 WORLD POLITICS

and France otransformheEuropean orld-economynto world-empire" p. 265); and "from hesixteenthenturyn, the nation-states f westernurope oughto create elativelyomogeneousa-

tional ocietiest the ore fempires. ." (p. 20). Standard istoricalaccountsuggesthat hese ffortsere argelyuccessful,nd Waller-stein imselfresentso empiricalvidenceo the ontrary.hat, naddition o buildingmpires,uropeanslso exploitedertainoneswithoutncorporatinghem nto heir olities as certainlyot un-usual, s world mpiresf the raditionalarietyid much he amething.

Contraryohis

owntheoreticalrgument, allersteinhehistorian

thus ppearso agreewithmy wncontentionhat t thevery utset,"the asic inkageetweenhe artsf he ystem"asnotmerelyco-nomic ut also argely olitico-strategic.he systemouldnot havegottenff heground ithoutheforce uropeansouldmusters aconsequenceftheir chievementf a mode f politicalrganizationthat ntedatedheformationfa capitalist orld conomy.n the"first"ixteenthenturyi.e., 450-I550), Spanishverseasxpansion

owed a great eal indeed o thefinancialupportf"international"capitalistntrepreneurs;ut hese ntrepreneursnvestednSpainpre-cisely ecause hat tatehad the power o carry ut undertakingswhich romisedreat eturns.he Hapsburgs idbuild n overseasempire,ndsubsequentlysed he dvantageshey eaped rom t toconsolidatedministrativendmilitaryinks mong heir uropeanimperial ossessionss well as tobring heirmperialmight obearover ther uropeansna bid for otal egemony.heyfailedn thelatter,ndthe ailureuicklyriggeredmportanthangesverseas.

Whatwasspecial boutEurope, hen,was not that xpansione-sultedn a world conomyhichwasnot ransformednto nempire,but atherhatheworld mpire hichwasestablishedirstoongavewayto several. he analysisftheHapsburgs'ailure hereforero-vides crucial est or hevalidityfcontendingxplanationsf theoverall ransformation.allersteiniewshis accountn thechapter

entitledSeville oAmsterdam:ailure fEmpire"s a demonstrationof the tructuraldvantagesftheworld-economys a systemverworld-empires a system"pp. 178-79).Althoughe falls hort fthis oal,heinadvertentlyrovidesonsiderableupportor he lter-nativeropositionhatmpireuildingnEurope ouldnot vercomethe onstraintsmposed ythe ncipientystemfmoderntates,ndthat ome fthe lementsfa world conomy ere bletotake ootbecausef he ntersticesrovidedy hat ystem.








The lightningrowthfIberian ransatlanticradewas accompa-nied y he pectacularoliticalxpansionfSpainnEurope.Waller-steinnvokeseveral istorians,ncludingraudel,osupport issug-

gestionhat heHapsburgmpire ltimatelyollapsedecause twas"toovast"p. i79). Thisvastnessequiredhediversionfthe urplusextractedromtsdominionsntocostly ureaucraticnd militarymanagement,detrimentalrocessompoundedy he ffectsf nfla-tion. utBraudel, ho scited rincipallyobackupa point oncern-ingthe mpact f nflation,rges s in that itationobear nmindespeciallythe normousxpensesfwarfareor his oovast mpire"(p. i79, n.73).7 Whatever aybe thefate fempiresngeneral,hisoneultimatelyollapsed ecause fFrance'sbilityoresist. n thatparticularoint, here s no dispute. s thechapterhows, rancelacked he esourcesorealizets wnprojectfterritorialxpansion;but twaslocated t theheart f theHapsburg mpire nd strongenough o nterfereith heHapsburgrojecthroughouthe rucialhalf-century.inanciallyxhaustedn 557, the wocontenders adepeace n 559, a date onventionallyiewed smarkinghebeginning

of an "European quilibrium"p. I7I; also notes 0 and31).The theoreticalssue,then, eads us towardan explanationof

France's"strength."t is evident hat thisstrength as not derivedfrom rimacynthe ncipient orld conomy,ince arlier renchde-velopment ad "led to an economic tructure hichwas less able tomaneuver" ithint, nd since tthis imeFrance lackedthebackingof nternationalapital" equired or verseasxpansionp. i82). Wal-lerstein's xplanation or Frenchstrengths that in the preceding

period, rancehad put tseggs nthe"state" ather han n the"econ-omy"basket; his nalysis ighlightshecontributionsfEurope'spre-modern olitical tructureo theshaping f the modern ystemnd,moregenerally,uggestsherelativendependencefpolitical ndeco-nomicdevelopment.o theextent hatWallersteinrovidesn expla-nation,tsupportsmy general ontention.

Yet this xplanations ncomplete.ecause fhis nattentiono nter-

national trategy, allersteinompletelygnores hewell-establishedhistorical iewthatFrance'ssurvivalwas vastly acilitatedy its al-liancewithTurkey;thisunprecedentedoalition etween Christiannation nd Christianity'sistorical oedrasticallyltered hestrategicconfigurationf Europe.As G. R. Elton has shown,Francis hadopenednegotiations ith he Ottoman ultan s early s I525,

7 See also thequotation romTawney (p. i84), and the referenceo H. Hauser(p. i85).







264 WORLD POLITICS

andhisenvoys ncouragedheTurkish dvancewhich erminatedtViennan 529. The beginnings ere hus aid for hat nderstandingbetweenheMostChristian ing and theOttomannfidel hich ttimesamenear oformallliance nd always nsuredomemeasure fcooperationetweenhese wo hief nemies f theHapsburgs.8

Ludwig Dehio, elaborating n Ranke, ransformshis tartling evel-opmentnto a theoreticaluildingblock and interpretst as a majorstep n thegenesis f the earlymodern ystem f states: t is thefirstinstance ftheappearance fa "counterweight"o an attempto con-solidate uropean tates ntoone unit.9 n his view, inceat thistimeEnglandwas "not yet" eady o playwhatwould become tshistorical

rolein this respect, it was thereforell the more important hat anation-Turkey, n this instance-existed n the Continentwhichcould functions a spring.'10We need not endorse ehio's somewhatteleological unctionalism,evised n behalf f a plea for continuedU.S. presencen WesternEuropeafterWorldWar II, to accepthishistorical rgument. he introductionf Turkey nto the Europeanarenanotonly showedup the weakenednature f theuniversal eli-giousoutlook n a particularlyrightening anner," ut also "playeda mostsignificant art n preservinghe freedom f the system fstates. harlesV,whose andsthreatenedhose f his French dversaryon twofronts, as now himself aughtup in a two-front ar thatlastedfordecades."' In this ight, he stalemate etween heHaps-burgs nd theValois,whichWallersteinegards s "the defeat f anattempto recreateolitical mpireshatwould match conomic reas"(p. i84), must econsideredmore han mere vent: t s theoutcome

ofa process enerated ya structurehatwas itself otepiphenomenaltothe formationfthe worldeconomy.The outcometself ontributedothefurtherrystallizationf a sys-

temofstates,ndtherebyeduced o an extremelyowleveltheproba-bility hatEurope'sdomination ould taketheform f a singleworldempire. cannotputthis better handoesWallerstein imself,whostates hat hemid-centurytalematemarked theestablishmentf abalance fpower nEuropewhichwouldpermittateswhich imed t

beingnations let us call themnation-states)o comeintotheir wnand to batten n the stillflourishing orld-economy"p. i84). Hefurtherndicates hat lthough histrendwas notrealizedovernight,itwasconfirmedr actualized n the course f the nexthalf-century,

8Elton, Reformation urope 1517-1559 (New York:HarperTorchbooks,963), II9.

9Dehio, The Precarious alance: Four Centuries f theEuropeanPowerStruggle(New York: Vintage Books, i962), 42.

10Ibid., 38. 11bid., 40.








with he ollapsefSpanishuthorityn theNetherlandsbeginningI576), he efeatf he panish rmadaaunchedoconquerngland(i588), and thePeace of Vervinsmarkingheendof renewed ar

with rance1598). From hevantageoint have uggested,hefirsttwodates ignaledheemergencef twonewstrategicctorswhosepresencentheEuropeancene roughthenumberfplayerslmostto the evel hat nternationalheoristsonsidersufficient"or he s-tablishmentf balance-of-powerystem;he hird-towhichwemayaddthepeacewith nglandndthe rmisticeith heUnited rov-incesnegotiatedn thesubsequentecade-notonlyconfirmedhesurvivalfFrance ut lsomarkedhe eductionf Spanish ower oa level hat nabled ther uropeansoencroach ith elativempu-nity pon tsAmericanmperialreserve.

It isnotnecessaryo retracehese evelopmentst lengthn orderto makemypoint.With espectothe hift fthe conomicenterfgravityoward msterdam,allersteinasno alternativeut ogivegreatweighto thepoliticalonfiguration.lthoughheuprisingftheNetherlandsndthe ubsequentonflictith painremainsne

of the eastwellstudiedmajor urningointsn thedevelopmentfEurope,heres no doubt hat hecontributionsf externalctors-otheruropeansirectlyndtheOttomanurks hroughheir ctivi-ties na secondront-contributedignificantlyothefinal utcome."2Basing imselfolelynthenowdated ccountfPeterGeyl,Waller-stein cknowledgeshat,becausefter559, Spain, rance nd Eng-land balanced achother ff, heNetherlandersadthe ocial paceto assertheirdentityndthrowff heSpanish oke. hiswaspar-

ticularlyrue fterhe efeatf he panish rmadan1588"pp. 210,

217-I9). Bysurviving,heNetherlandsprovided vitalfluid" hatkept he ystempenuntil nglandndFrancemovednand consoli-dated tafter6oo;andtheeconomicuccess f theDutchwasde-pendentn the act hat eitherngland orFrance hadyet ushedtheirmercantilistendencies"p. 214)-i.e., the strategicapacityomake oom or heir conomicntrepreneurs-tohe ointwhere hey

could ut n.One might dd thatWallersteinnderestimateshecontributions

12 The complexitiesf the internationalonfigurationt this timeare skillfullywoven nto coherentccount y J.H. Elliott nEuropeDivided, 559-1I5 (London:Collins, The FontanaHistory fEurope," 968). See also thepathbreakingtudy fthemilitaryspectof the Netherlands ituationn Geoffreyarker,The ArmyolFlandersand the SpanishRoad, I567-i659 (London: CambridgeUniversity ress,i972), and thesame author's uperb ccount f theuprising nd its outcome n aglobal ontext,heDutchRevoltHammondsworth:enguinBooks,979).







266 WORLD POLITICS

that heprecocious asteryf the rtofnavalwarfaremadetothesurvivalftheDutch ebels nd totheriseoftheDutch apitalists;he s soblinded ythe onceptfworld conomyhat eignoreshe

fact hat heUnited rovincesadalsoestablishedheir olitical o-minion vervarious arts f theworld, ndwere ble to backtheactivitiesf heir conomicntrepreneursith hemost owerfulavyafloat. ttheend of theperiod overedn thisbook,England ndFrance adalreadyaunchedffortso displaceheDutch-a complexstrugglenvolvinghiftingoalitions-fromhich ngland ltimatelyemerged ith he argesthare f the spoilsbecause, mong therthings,ts tatenvestednthedevelopmentf a superior aval apa-bility hereas rance eliedmore eavilyna costlytrategyfconti-nentalonquest.

I say"among ther hings,"ecause urtheronsiderationfthesubject ould ake sbeyondhe imits fthis ssaynto discussionof he elationshipsetween aval rcontinentalrientation,ariationsin social tructure,egree fentrepreneurialctivity,ictatesfsecu-rity,nd formsfpolitical rganization.hatmattersor hetime

being s that,whereasheSpanish mpirewas reduced o a muchsmallerize hanthadoriginallychieved ecauset couldnotmusterthe trategicapacityodefendt over he ong ermgainst uropeanpredators,hiswas equally rue ater n of theundertakingf theDutch, hichWallersteinonsidershe rchetypicalworld-economy,"but which ooksmore ike a seabornempire. he innovativeco-nomic rocesseshat lourishednseventeenth-centurymsterdamanwell be subsumed nder he abel"capitalism";his ransformation

wasreflectednthe rganizationfDutch verseasctivities,nd theseactivitiesnturn ontributedgreat ealto thefurtherevelopmentof apitalismntheNetherlandsnd herebynEuropemore enerally.

Toward he ndoftheperiod nderonsideration,rance nd Eng-land,musteringifferentombinationsf trategicorce ndeconomicdynamism,ad become ehemothndLeviathan,bletoassert hem-selves orcefullygainstesser easts n Europe nd abroad.Waller-

stein'sccount ftheir ise oparamountcys foundn thechapterentitledStrongoreStates."tmust e examinednthe ight f hiskey heoreticalontentionhat hepositionfcountriesntheworldeconomyetermineshe haracterf their oliticalegimesnd, on-comitantly,hat heworld conomyequires,or tsmaintenances asystem,trongtates t thecore s wellas weakpoliticaltructuresintheperipheralreas pp. 354-56,34). He maintainsurtherhattheir ositionn theworld conomyot nly eterminedhe imilar-








itybetween rance ndEngland-i.e., heirstrength"-butlsothedifferencesetween hem. ytheend of the ong sixteenthentury,Englandwasbetterquipped or conomicevelopment;hereas he

membersf the English ristocracyad lost n theshort unandgainedn the ongbytransforminghemselvesnto ourgeoisapital-ists, heFrench adgained n the short un-absolutism as morethorough-butost nthe ongbyforcinghebourgeoisieoabandonitsfunctionp. 284).

Although allerstein'sistoricalccountsgenerallyalid ndgivesdueweight o exogenousactors-factorsther han nternalocialstructuralonfigurationsuch s are mphasizedyBarringtonooreandothers-he astlyxaggerateshe xtentowhich hese actorsanbeattributedoprocesseseneratedytheworld conomyshecon-ceptualizedt.He characterizesritishevelopmenteforehe risis fi620 as follows:In short,t was a questionf optimal osition:ela-tive oliticalnsulationhilehavinghe conomicdvantagesftheworld-economy,relativealance f forcesnternallyhichmaxi-mizednternaleace, utminimizedhe rrorsfanoverbearingtate

machinery"p. 257). He introduceshis onfigurationy statinghat"England's ositionntheworld-economyrecisely ade his alanc-inggamepossible"p. 256).

Thefirsttep p thedevelopmentaladderwas therelocationftheEuropeanenterf ndustrialroduction,articularlyextiles,oEng-land n thecourse fthe"firstixteenthentury"i.e.,after 450).

WhatmadeEngland ttractiveo textilentrepreneursrom heLowCountriesndnorthernermany? ne of thecontributingactors,

accordingoWallerstein,as thatEnglandpossessedthepoliticaladvantages"fearly nification.ollowing osephtrayer,e attrib-utes his n turnotheparticularitiesfEnglishmedievalocial truc-ture ndto factorsfnatural eographyhat osteredheprecociousdevelopmentf a strong onarchyp. 231). Furtherconomic evel-opmentfter5oowasfacilitatedy heHenriciandministrativeevo-lution,he reationf a strongapital ity,he bilityomaintainn-

ternal eace withoutn expensivetandingrmy,nd (except orIreland) he ack f umbersomeossessionspp. 31-32). Mostmpor-tantmong he atter adbeen he rea laimed ytheEnglishmon-archynFrance;Wallersteinoesnotdiscuss ow, fter our enturiesofcostly ffort,ngland adfinallyelinquishedtscontinentalos-sessionssa consequencefthebelated utultimatelyuccessfulroc-ess ofmonarchicalonsolidationn FranceunderLouis XI. Albeitlargely eterminedy nternalnteractionsmong ocialforces,his







268 WORLD POLITICS

developmenthen ontributedo the rystallizationfa Europeanys-tem f tates ith dynamicf ts wn; ndthe onstraintshis ystemgeneratedosteredngland's atefulurningnward tthehistorically

appropriateoment.Wallersteinoesrecognizehat he nternationalolitico-strategicconfigurationubsequentlyacilitatedngland's scent.Until 559,

England wasshelteredrom oo muchoutsidenterferenceythestrugglef he wogreatmilitaryowers: pain ndFrance"p. 276).Similarly,hen he nternalbalance"was eopardizedround6oo(as England ecamemore ependentn theworldmarketn conse-quence f tsprecociousndustrialization),twasredressedycolonialexpansion. allersteincknowledgeshatwhatmadeexpansion os-sible tthis riticalime, atherhan arlier, asspecificallyhedeclineof Spain'smilitarytrengthp. 28i). Indeed, hechangingtrategicbalancewasdeterminative:twasin the astdecade fthe ixteenthcenturyhatheDutch nd English invaded"hePortuguese-SpanishmonopolynAsia, ndtheDutch attack"n Brazil n i624 inaugu-rated he hift f theAtlanticrade o thenorthernowers p. 272).

To Wallerstein,owever,ll ofthis s a merehappenstancegiven."We shall ee, owever,hat nglandwas not llthatheltered.n theonehand, he onflictetween rance ndSpaingeneratedepeatedpoliticalnterventionsyboth f these iantsntoEngland'snternalaffairs,swell s strategichreatsn land i.e.,Scotland) nd atsea;onthe ther,ts esistanceoPhilipI owed great eal othe ebellionin theLow Countries,hichwasin turn upportedytheEnglish.In short,he urvivalf Englandwas argelyttributableo the low

evolutionfthe nternationalonfigurationnthedirectionf a sys-tem f tates-a evelopmenthatwasonlymarginallyavorableromtheEnglish oint f view, ut hat ouldbe exploitedytheruthlessexercisef statecraft.n thismanner, nglandtselfcceleratedhisevolutionnd subsequentlyenefitedrom t as theformationf asystemf statesmade tsown overseasxpansion ossible.ts nitialpositionn theworld conomy asonly ne ofthe lementshat c-

countsor he verall utcome.Curiously,n the course fdemonstratinghy-incontrast ithEngland-the ppropriatebalance" asnot chievednFrance,Wal-lersteineems o abandon isworld-economyrameworkltogetheron behalf fgeographicaleterminism.hereas e states hat heir"natural eographicdvantages"nabledEngland nd the UnitedProvinceso develop imultaneouslystrong olitynd a nationaleconomy,e maintainshat, orFrance, because f itsgeography,








these ptionswere omewhat ontradictory"p. 266). In a manner emi-niscent f the ingenious nalysis resented y Edward WhitingFox(butnot citedby Wallerstein), e suggests hatthe tension etween

France's continental nd maritime rientationsontributedo bringabout protractedivil war, in the courseof which the countrywasvulnerable o foreignntrusion.13rance's ntegrity as maintained ymeans f bureaucraticentralism,n adaptationhatwould prove o bedysfunctional: hen the world economy ontracted fter 6io, theFrench tatewas strong nough o nterfereith apitalistsp. 29I). Inshort, e areasked to believe hat, lthough rance did acceed to thecore," tfailed o achieve aramountcyithin t because he statewas

too strong,nd that his cromegaly asdetermined y ocation n anunhealthy eographical nvironment.

Whatemerges rom his ccount, s from heanalysis f the failureof theHapsburgEmpire,s notmerely he mportance f geography.Geographical onfigurationshemselvescquirednew significanceur-ing theperiodunder onsiderations a consequence ftheconcurrentformation f a world economy nd of a system f states. ngland's

location nthe outhernart fan island, nd its nsularitynrelationto thecontinent-but ot n relationo Scotland, nother ctor n theinternationalystem-could e a liabilityr an asset, epending poncircumstancesndwithrespect o differentolicies. imilar ssertionscan be made abouttherespective eographicalonfigurationsf thenorthern etherlandsnd of France.

Asfor hemoregeneral oint oncerninghe strength"f the statestructures ithin he incipient core," t is difficulto take very e-

riously nytheoreticalropositionnvolvingn attributehatdoes notdifferentiatelearly etween heregimes f Spain, France, England,and the UnitedProvinces uring hisperiodor, alternatively,erelydenotes ongruencer lack of t withthepreferencesnd interestsfcapitalists."4f all that s beingsaid is thatthestates n the northern

13 See Fox, History n Geographic erspective: he OtherFrance (New York:Norton,971). Fox'swork s generallyelevanto the ssuesdiscussedn this ssay.

14 Wallersteincknowledges,orexample, hatthe UnitedProvinces onsisted f

a "looseconfederationithout headministrativepparatus fmostother tates," utthen citesJ.W. Smitto the effecthattheRepublic functioned uch better ndpermittedhe achievementf a higher degreeof economic ntegrationhan anyof the monarchies f Europe" becausethe bourgeoisie had carriedthrough heexact degreeof reformt neededto promote conomic xpansion nd yetfeel freefrom vercentralization"Wallerstein,09). In the workcited,however,mit ntro-ducesthepassagewith a quote fromBraudel to the effecthat"around 6oo themiddle-sizedtatewas themostviable."His general rguments compatible iththehypothesishat this was the case preciselyecause uch a statedid not have to be"strong"n theappropriatelyistoricalenseof that erm,.e.,on the scale ofcentrali-







270 WORLD POLITICS

triadmanaged oretainheir oliticalndependenceuring his eriodand to perfectheir ureaucraticnd militarypparatus,e are stillfacedwith heproblemfrelatinghis o the perationsf theworld

economy.t is evident hat,whereas tate uilders enefitedreatlyfrom heeconomic ains heir ountrieserivedrom xpansion,nthe wo ases xamined ere twas"strength"hat nabled hose oun-tries o expandn thefirstlace.Moreover,n theDutch ase, reco-cious conomicuccessailedogenerateufficientstrength"o enablethat ountryoremaintthe op f heheapformore han moment.Wallerstein'seneral ropositiononcerninghedeterminativef-

fects ftheworld conomyponpoliticaltructureoesnot tand panybetter ithrespecto theexperiencef countriesocatedn itsouter egments.etus rememberhatn hisview, heworld conomyalsorequireshat oliticaltructuresftheperipheralreas e"weak,"andthat t is the ocation f countriesn thedependentegments-semi-peripheryndperiphery-whicheterminesheirweaknessp.349).5 YetWallerstein'shapterevoted othe ubjectndicateshatthe re-existingoliticaltructuresfcountrieseyond esternurope

infact argelyccountedor he nitial hape f theEuropeanworldsystem,nd that hese olitical tructuresanbe understoods ele-ments f n nternationalolitico-strategicystem.nce gain,Waller-stein imselfcknowledgeshefacts nd evendraws ome nalyticconclusionsromhem,ut topshort ftakinghemnto ccounttthemore eneralheoreticalevel.

The ast ubstantivehapteroncludes ith he bservationhat hegeographicaloundariesfa world conomyare matterfequilib-

rium":texpandsntil he oss sgreaterhan hegain.One determi-native actors thatof "distance"-i.e.,hecosts f transportation,broadlypeaking,nderxistingechnologicalonditions.he othersthe resistancef stablisheduthority"p. 339).These onclusionsrebasedon probinghefollowingutcomes:i) why asternurope

zation nd the size ofbureaucraticpparatus oundn Europeat that ime.The Smitquotationsrefromhis contributiono Robert orster nd Jack . Greene, ds.,Pre-conditionsof Revolutions in Early Modern Europe (Baltimore:The JohnsHopkinsUniversityress, 970), 52. The case of theNetherlands, hich cannotpursue ndetailhere, inpointsheproblemfascertainingheflow f causation etween egimeform ndcapitalistntrepreneurship.s DouglassC. North nd Robert aul Thomasput t in The Rise of the WesternWorld. A New Economic History, "It was in thisarea that fortunateonjunctionccurred etween he nterestsf thestate nd theinterestsf the progressiveectorof society" Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,973), I32.

15 The passagereads: "World economies . . are divided into core-statesndperipheralreas. do not ayperipheraltatesbecause necharacteristicf a peripheralarea s that he ndigenoustate s weak...."








(and particularlyoland) was incorporatedntothe"periphery,"whereas ussia emainednitiallyn "externalrea"and was ulti-matelyncludednto he semi-periphery"atherhan he periphery";

(2) why heAmericas ere ncorporatedrom hevery utsets a"periphery"hroughirectolonization,hereasheOttoman mpire,andAsiagenerally,ere ot. ogether,hese ifferentialutcomese-terminedhe pproximatexternaloundariesf theworld conomybyabout650, as well as themajor haracteristicsf ts nternaleg-mentation.

With espectothe irstoint,Wallersteinuggestshat he ixteenthcenturywas neraofdecline or tate owerneasternurope, othcause ndconsequencefthe atter'sconomicosition"n relationowesternurope p. 309). WeakstatesnPoland nd in theGermanregion acilitated esternconomicntrusion,ndsubsequentlyhiseconomicependencyccountedor urtherbstaclesostate uilding.This ppears obean llustrationfmutuallyeinforcingoliticalndeconomicausationithwhich havenoquarrel. ne exception,ow-ever, asSweden,a milddeviantase" p. 3I2). Here, hemagician

appears obepulling rabbitutofa hat.Because f mpedimentsothegrowthf commercialgriculture,henobilityad no choice uttoprey n tsneighbors,andfor hat hey eeded strong,ot weakstate" p. 3I3).

In fact, omagic s neededtoexplainwhytheSwedeswereabletoachievewhat othergreedy ristocratsould not.Wallerstein oes notmentionhewell-establishedact hat heforgingfthe Swedishham-mer"was argely upported yFrench ubsidies rom63I on, account-

ingfor pproximatelyne-fourthftheSwedish tate udget;neitherdoes he relate he ess well-knownact-emphasized ythe Soviethis-torianB. F. Porshnev n whoseaccounthe reliesforothermatters-that heSwedish tate enefitedt thesame timefrom n even argerhidden ubsidy ranted ythe Muscovites.16othFrance and Russiaacted nkeepingwith trategicnterestsictated ythethreat rom heAustrianHapsburgs.Sweden thus became a "deviantcase" in the

course fthe

Thirtyears'

War,much as

Brandenburg-Prussiaouldsubsequentlyenefit romBritishtrategyt thetime fMarlborough.In both ases, hecourse fdevelopmentf state tructuresas largelyindependentftheworld conomy's onstraints;nd it owed as much

16B. F. Porshnev,Les rapports olitiques e 1'Europe ccidentalet de 1'Europeorientate 1'epoque e la guerre e trentens," n InternationalommitteefHistori-calSciences, le Congresnternationales SciencesHistoriques. apports.V. HistoireModerneUppsala: Almqvist Wiksell,960), I50-5I.







272 WORLD POLITICS

to processes eneratedt the evelofthe nternationalolitical ystemas itdid tothe nteractionf ndigenousocialgroups nd classes.Thevalue ofthese tate tructuresas enhanced ythe moreequal distri-

bution fpower mong European tates; hesepoorly ndowed oun-tries hereby ained access to a more advantageous osition n theworldeconomy s well.Wallersteingreeswiththe result:Sweden"would be able in the seventeenthnd eighteenthenturies o usemercantilisms a lever f ndustrialdvance, ndhencebe spared hefate fPoland" (p. 3I3). Muchthesame can be said of Prussia.

Since Wallerstein imself cknowledgeshe manner n which"re-sistance f establisheduthority"imited he new world system's o-main, t s sufficientopoint ut, n addition,hat his apacityo resistmustbe understoods a relational ttribute;.e., t was a function fthesorts f systemic rocesses have repeatedlytressed.he attemptsbywestern uropeans o incorporate ussia ntotheincipientworldeconomyailed becauseEurope's echnologyndeconomywasnotyetsufficientlytrong"; ecauseRussiahaddeveloped strongtaten thecourse f tsownreconquista;ndfinally,ecause t couldtake advan-

tageofdivisionsfEuropeans which onstantlyiverted ussia's m-mediate nemies nto morepressing asks" p. 3I9). Thereis an ob-viousparallelbetween hat ituation nd theconditions hatfacilitatedthe survival f theDutch rebels, s well as thosethat nsulated hestate-buildingrocessnEnglandfrom xternalnterferenceomedec-adesearlier.All these ases can be understood ithin heframeworkofan emerging systemfstates," notion hat s veryprominentntheworkof Porshnev,hehistorian n whomWallersteinelieswith

respecto Russia.17OttomanTurkey,whichplayedan importantole in theerstwhile

survival fFrance, lso contributedo thatof Russiaduring his aterperiod. ndeed,Wallerstein greeswiththeestablisheduthoritiesnpointing ut thatthestrategicalance on land favored heOttomanEmpirefor nother entury.t is thereforenderstandablehatEuro-peanconquestsnwestern sia were imited o the akeover f theArab

maritimerade,n achievementased on thesuperiorityftheirnaval

artillery. ith respect o easternAsia,he relies n Donald Lach whohas pointed ut thatforsimilar easons-i.e.,thestrategic alance-Europe's elations ithAsian stateswereordinarilyonducted ithina frameworknd on terms stablishedyAsian nations" p. 330 andn. I37). Here as in eastern urope, heboundaries fthe worldecon-omywere hapedbyprocesses eneratedt the evelof a more ompre-

17For details n Russia's lliances,ee ibid.,pp. 138, i6i-62.








hensive orldystemonstitutedy trategicnteractionsmong va-rietyfpolitical nits.

In SpanishAmerica,heoutcomewas generallyheotherway

around. or reasons hat renot yetentirelylear, he highly r-ganizedAmerindiantatesapidly ollapsedn thefaceofa limitedEuropean orce.18hat sremarkablen that ase s not hat n the b-sence fpoliticalbstacleshe uropeansroceededobuildwhatmustbeacknowledgedobeempires,he arliestfwhichasted ver hreehundred ears, ut that trategiconsiderationsased on processesgeneratednternallythat s,by theEuropean ystemf statestself)overrode olicy referencesounded n narrowlyconomic alcula-tions. orexample,Wallersteinites hecaseof thePortuguesehomight avepreferredo exploit razil s an"entrepot,"ollowingheAsian attern,utwere nsteadforcedo colonizet as a pre-emptivemeasuresof 530" inorder opreventrance ndEngland rom s-tablishingoastal nclaves n what hePortugueseonsideredo betheirerritoryp. 335 ndn. 70). Such trategiconsiderationslayedanimportantole nthe ctivitiesf Europeansnnorthernmerica

and theCaribbeannce he crambleotunderwayaround 6oo, swellas a centurynd a half aterwhen, t theheight f industrialcapitalism,hey recipitatedurope'sastmperialenturenAfrica.19

It would ppear,n short,hatbyWallerstein'swnaccount,heboundariesftheEuropean orld ystemeremuchess ttributabletoaneconomicequilibrium"eterminedy ransportationostshantothe istributionforganizedorcenthe xistingorld. hisfactorshould otbeconsidereds a static iven as it s byWallerstein),ut

as a processubject o variationithintates, hose eploymentasalsoa functionf nteractionsetweentates ywayof theorganiza-tion fshiftingoalitions.ambynomeans rguinghat his istri-bution asthen, r would lways emain,otallyndependentfthelevel ftechnologicalndeconomic evelopment.nlike he nade-quate nidimensionalrameworket orthyWallerstein,he lterna-tive ne toward hich hese emarksavepointedsnotfoundedn

a monisticonceptualizationfpolitical ower rforce, ut on the18 It is possiblehat ecimatingiseasewas thedeterminativelement n themilitary

andpolitical ollapse f Amerindianesistance.ee WilliamH. McNeill,PlaguesandPeoples GardenCity,N.Y.: Anchor ooks, 976), 176-9i.

19For the Americas,ee J.H. Parry,The Establishmentf the European Hege-mony, 415-1715 New York:Harper Torchbooks, 966), especiallyhediscussionfthe activitiesf France ndEnglandwhichhe likens o "thetactical ountermovesfthechess-board"p. 107); andK. G. Davies,The NorthAtlanticWorld n theSeven-teenthCentury Minneapolis:Universityf Minnesota ress, 974), esp. pp. 25-31

and 34-45.







274 WORLD POLITICS

recognitionf hat lementsoneofthe onstitutingtructuresfanyworldystem.

Finally,oncerninghegeneralropositionhat hepoliticalrgani-

zation fcountriesaries s a functionftheirocationn thevarioussegmentsf theworld conomy,t is evident hat,more ften hannot,Wallersteinsespoliticalrganizations a sort findependentvariablein relationo theworld conomy,hat s) toaccount or helocationf tates ithin he everalegmentsftheworld conomyswellas inthe xternalrea.We have een hat strength"ccountedfor he scent fEngland ndFrance o"core" tatus, uch s lackofstrengthccountedor he nabilityf theNetherlandso preventt;at the ther xtreme,t wasPoland's re-existingweakness"hat e-terminedts ncorporationnto he periphery."he"semi-periphery"appearso havebeenpopulatedy tates hatwere bleto counterhetendenciesf theworld conomy. he existencef a strong tatenRussia ccountedot nly or ts nitialbilityowithstandncorpora-tion, ut lsofor ts ubsequentositionnthe emi-peripheryatherthan heperipheryhen ncorporationinally id occur; hesame

factorfpoliticalrganizationimitedhedeclinefSpain nthe ev-enteenthndeighteenthenturiesoa positiont the emi-peripheralratherhan t theperipheralevel; nd tenabledweden nd Prussiato oinSpainnthe emi-peripheryatherhan oland nthe eriphery(p. 3i8)."2Whois left, hen,whose lacewasclearly eterminednaccordance ith hedictatesfWallerstein'sheory?

IV

AlthoughheparadigmmmanuelWallersteinasdevised o ac-count or he ransformationf heworld n the ong ixteenthenturyisunsatisfactory,considerationfwhy hatsthe ase eads o heuris-tic nsightsntohowthe ask ftheoryonstructionight ecarriedon.He hasmade notableontributiony rticulatinghenotion hattheprocessesf transformationada multilevelharacter,nvolvingnot nly lteredelationshipsetweenocial roups ithinach f ev-

eralEuropeanountries,ut lsobetweenachof them ndothersntheregion,swellas between esternurope s a whole ndother20 On p. 349 Wallersteinndicates hat the semi-peripheralreas are "in between

the core and theperiphery"n variousdimensions,ncluding strengthf the statemachinery"; e maintainswithout ccounting or theirdecline) that some "hadbeencore-areasf earlier ersionsf a givenworld-economy,"hereas thershad beenperipheralreas thatwere laterpromoted,o to speak, s a result f the changinggeopoliticsf an expandingworld-economy."y pointhereis simply hatan "or"shouldbe inserted fter geopolitics."








parts f heworld. owever,lthough eacknowledgeshat he rans-formationntailed pochal hangesnpoliticalndeconomicrgani-zation, e attemptsnvain odemonstrateausal recedencefthe ne

over he ther.Mycommentsn theprecedingectionndicatehat nalternativeramework,ositingnteractionsetween wostructurallinkages-withhepoliticals basic s theeconomic-wouldrovidea better it or he historicalccount nder onsideration.nceweviewpoliticaltructures an irreduciblend relativelyutonomoussystemiclement,t becomespparenthatWallerstein'sonceptuali-zation f the one of activityominatedy western urope roundi65o as a largely elf-containedorld conomymust e amendedswell. tsboundarieswed smuch opolitico-strategicnteractionse-tweenwesternuropeansndother rganizedoliticalctorss theydidtoendogenouslyeneratedrocesses;ts nternaltratificationasdeterminedypower ndforces well s by n emergingeographicaldivisionf abor; nd t couldbe described ore ccuratelys a poly-centricmpirehan s a capitalist orld conomy.21he benefitsfexploitationere istributedmong everalenterso as tofosterhe

emergencef capitalismn the form f competing ercantilisms,which nturn einforcedhe ystemf states.Lestmypositione misunderstood,mustnsisthat am by no

meansproposinghe reversef Wallerstein'srgument;ndeed,maintainhat conomic ransformationsuchas he has emphasizedcontributedo the mergencef thepoliticaltructureowhich ampointing.or s t a matterfopposingn"idealist"o a "materialist"approach. allerstein'snnecessarilyestrictiveaterialismppears o

combine hefundamentalistconomismfvulgarMarxism ith hemisconception,opularizedysomemembersf theAnnales chool,thatpoliticsonsistsfmere events." olitical rganizationas anirreducibleaterialimension,ndeconomicrganizationnequallyirreducibleulturalne; their volvingormsn Europeweredeter-mined ychanges ccurringtboth evels. n an analysisf globaltransformation,t depends erymuchon the nvestigator'starting

pointwhetherulturer social tructure,oliticsreconomics,s con-sideredausallyominant.hatstartingointtselfs dictatedytheinvestigator'snclinationoward neor the therntellectualradition,

21 The sharp ontrastWallersteinrawsbetween empire" nd the European-domi-nated ntitiesnder onsideration aystemfromhisimplicitmageof "empire" s acontinentalformation,hich s alsosuggested yhis citation f Eisenstadt's efinition(p. 15). This misconceptions unfortunate,s the empires f western urasia wereoftenn largepartmaritime.







276 WORLD POLITICS

byhispositionncontemporaryoliticalontroversies,rmerelyyhisfield facademicpecialization.

However aluables a corrective,he onceptualizationf theover-

all relationshipetweenoliticalndeconomictructuress an "inter-action" oesnot eadus very arunless hemodalitiesf thesenter-actionsrespecified oreprecisely.t is furthervident hat ittleprogress illbe made n thisdirectionnlesswe focus n politicallinkages a subjectn itsownright. cannot o morehere han osuggest,ywayof conclusion,ow wemight e-orientur effortsoelaborate theoreticallyroundedccount f theformationf themodern orldystem'soliticaltructuresa multilevelrocess,sug-gestionbviouslynspiredyWallerstein'sork.

Whetherrticulatedn aWeberianra Marxianmode,urrentheo-reticalnalysesf he ormationfmoderntatesn Europe re lmostentirelyounded nhistoricalccountsfthe xperiencef particularcountriesaken ingly;f they recomparative,hey end oattributesimilaritiesfpoliticalutcomeso commoneaturesf European iv-ilization,nddifferenceso variationsn the nternalocial onfigura-

tions fwhat re onsideredo be argelyelf-containedholes,llow-ing for omepossibilityf cultural iffusion.22et,furthereflectionon the ommonplacebservationhateveral einforcedingdomson-trollingarge erritoriesmergedimultaneouslyt thebeginningfthe ong ixteenthenturyuggestshehypothesishat his ccurrednot nly ecauseome fthe ulturalnd social rocesseshat ontrib-uted obring bout hese hangeswere hemselvesegion-wide,utalsoquite pecificallysa consequencefpolitico-strategicnteractions

22 Suchinterpretationsre largely ndependent f variationsn theoreticalutlook.See,for xample, arrington oore,TheSocialOrigins fDictatorshipnd Democracy(Boston:BeaconPress, 966); thecontributionso CharlesTilly,ed., The FormationofNationalStates n Western urope (Princeton: rinceton niversity ress, 975);

thecontributionso RaymondGrew,ed., Crisesof PoliticalDevelopmentn Europeand NorthAmerica Princeton: rinceton niversityress, 979); ReinhardBendix,KingsorPeople:Powerand the Mandate o Rule (Berkeley:UniversityfCaliforniaPress, 978); and Bertrand adie and PierreBirnbaum,ociologiede l'Etat (Paris:Grasset,979). Whatever heir ther trengthsr weaknesses,ll of theseworks llus-trate he nadequaciesf a "comparative"rameworkhatdoes not take ntoconsidera-

tion nteractionmongtheunits. becameawareof

theproblemn the

courseofpreparingmyown contributiono Grew'svolumea decadeago. Othershavebegunto dealwith t as well.See,for xample:Theda Skocpol, tates nd SocialRevolutions(Cambridge: ambridge niversityress, 979), and PerryAnderson, ineagesoftheAbsolutisttate London: New LeftBooks, 974). Andersonllowsthe nternationalpolitical ystemnto his frameworkhrough he Althusserianack door of "over-determination";ee in particular isn. 37,p. 37,whichrefers o theSoviethistorianPorshnevited n fn. 6 ofthepresent ssay,whoin turn nvokes enin as an author-ityfor onceptualizinghe"internationalystemf states" s a relativelyndependentfactor. harlesTillyhasalsobecome ware ofthe mportancef internationalolitico-strategicnteractionssee thework ited bove,pp.45-46 nd73-76).








among heir eaker redecessors.oreover,hepresencenthe ceneofseveraluch ctors eneratedurthernteractionsf the ame ortwhich, ogether ith hanges ttributableo other actors,ontinued

toshape hepoliticalransformationf eachof them.Withoutleshingutthese arebones t this ime,t can be sug-gested hat imilarrocessesrevisible s far s thehistoricalye ansee,backward r forwardrom heperiod nder onsideration.nyattempto trace heorigins f capitalismr of ndustrializationeadsusbackmuch arlierntime othe dentificationfrudimentarytruc-turesndprocesseshat ear familyesemblanceothe inal utcome,and that istinguishedheEuropean egion rom thersongbefore

capitalismr ndustrializationame nto eing n the ormenoted ysuch abels; o t s withhe ystemf tates. he politicalrganizationofEuropewascharacterizedy pluralityf overeigntiesearly alfamillenniumeforehe eginningfthe ong ixteenthentury.hatfeature as tselfnchoredn and an aspect f Europe'songstandingheterogeneityncomparisonith ther urasian ivilizations.23hatmust e recognizeds thathe luralitys a structurallementfEuro-

pean political rganizationather hanmerely n incidentalspectof t.Thetheoreticalhallengeosed ythis eaturefEuropeanolitics

was dentifieds ong goas 1902 byOttoHintze. etter nownodayas a sociologicalistorianf European olitical tructureslose toWeber, e wasthen Rankean orwhom ociologicalheoriesf stateformation eantMarx.Attackingocialdeterminism,utgrantingreluctantlyhat theres a germ f truth"n thecontentionthat

people'sonstitutions n effecthaped y ts ocial tructure,"intzeinsistedhat onepointsoverlooked-namely,hedevelopmentfthestatenrelationo tsneighbors."nspired yRanke's octrinef thePrimaterAussen-Politik,e elaborates:

Theformationnd he emarcationf he tate'serritoryithinhichthe ocial evelopmentsake lace-briefly,lterationsnthe xternalexistencef state-haveheirearingnits nternaltructure.asi-

cally,he xternalxistencef tatendpeoplesregardedsa fixedndimmutableuality.nterestastendedocentern the ocialhangesthat ccurwithinhis etframework,hangeshat re then eemedresponsibleor he lterationf he oliticalnstitutions.his s, nef-fect,o wrenchach ingletate romhecontextn which twasformed;he tates seenn solation,xclusiven tself,ithoutaising

23The "heterogeneity" f the West is a major theme in McNeill (fn. 4), as wellas in Moore (fn. 22), esp. p. 415. Anderson (fn. 22) similarlyemphasizes "detotaliza-tion of sovereignty" s one of its fundamentalfeatures pp. 23, 405, 409, 412, 423-24).







278 WORLD POLITICS

the uestion hethertspeculiarharacters co-determinedy tsrela-tion o itssurroundings.24

Conceding hat notheoryancover heevents fworldhistory,he

power trugglesf states ndnations," intze goes on to statehis ownproblematiques follows:

What sat stake s whether,nd towhat xtent,he xternalorm f astate, hichs conditionedyfactorsfforeignolicy, ashad an influ-ence lso on its nternaltructure,.e.,on its constitution.urther, emust stablish hetherhe ases f which his s true re solated ndexceptional,rwhetherhey anbe organizedn groupsnd presentedas evidencefa typicalegular attern.25

The bodyof Hintze's essay onsists f a demonstrationhat uchpat-terns an indeedbe identified. is principal oints oncern hechainof causationtemmingrom hesurvival f the Roman mperial radi-tion in dual form-Church and Empire-whose struggles roducedinterstices ithinwhicha European system f states ould develop.The existence f a number fstates djoining ach other nd on rela-tively qual termswas,forHintze,a sinequa nonforthe emergenceof Europe's singular ontributiono political rganization:medievalconstitutionalisms anchored n thesystem f estates. s for hemod-ernperiod,t was hisviewthat heexistence fa systemf states eter-mined bsolutist ureaucracys thenatural onstitutionalorm f tran-sition. rance ndtheHapsburgsed theway, ndtheothers ollowedin order opreserveheirndependence, ithsomevariations hatheascribeso specific trategiconfigurations.

Without ndorsing intze's nitialminimizationf socialstructure,or evenhisspecific ypothesesoncerninghepolitical evelopmentfEurope, believe that the orientation e adumbrated pens up anextremelyruitfulvenue for theoretical eflection. intze remainsoneofvery ew cholarswhoidentifyhe nteractionsetween ndoge-nous processes f variouskinds and exogenous olitical rocessess aproblematiquefor heanalysis fEuropeanpolitical evelopment. n-fortunately,e himself id notelaborate systematicrameworknd

appears o have returnedo thesubject nly ntermittently.his may24Hintze, The Formation f States nd Constitutionalevelopment:A Study n

History nd Politics,"n Felix Gilbert, d., The HistoricalEssaysof OttoHintze(New York: OxfordUniversity ress, 975), i59. I am gratefulo JohnBoyerforguidingme throughhe ineages f therelevant russian istoriography,nd particu-larly or ntroducing e toRanke.For the"primacyf external olitics,"ee particu-larlyGeorgG. Iggers ndKonradvonMoltke, ds.,LeopoldvonRanke:The Theoryand Practice f History Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill,973), I-liii, 70-73, and ii6-i9.

25Hintze fn. 24), i60.








havebeenbecause, hile uggestingtmight e possible o dentify"typicalegular attern" ith especto the mpactf externalventsonthe nternaltructuref the tate, edidnotbelievetwouldbe

possibleoconstructtheoryoncerningthe owertrugglesf tatesandnations" hich enerateuch vents.n somewhathe amevein,H. G.Koenigsberger,hohasrecentlydvanced numberfhypoth-eses nspired yHintze-whomhe views, ncidentally,s a "socialstructuralist"n the asis fhis aterwork-andbyNorbertliascon-cerninghedeterminantsfvariationmong uropeanegimesntheearlymoderneriod,epeatedlyllustrateshe ontributionsfexternalevents othese utcomes;utheconcludes ith especto thesocio-logical heoriesf Hintze nd Eliasmuch sHintzehimselfid withrespecto Marx:

The mosteriousifficultyn the onstructionf an overallheoryspresentedy he nterventionf utsideowersnthe trugglesetweenkingsnd heirarliaments.uchnterventionould lter he elativestrengthfthenternalorceso an extent hichs, believe,npre-dictable,ven fwewereousegame heoryra computer.26

Acknowledgmentftheundeniableealityf themissingink husappears o haveputus in a double ind:theorieshat o nottake tinto ccountrebound o remainnadequate,ut f t is takenntoaccount,heoryecomesmpossible. hat rewetodo?Koenigsber-ger,followingn his substantiveonclusions,dvises hatwhereastheoriesnd models re"valuableohistoricalnderstanding,"heyhave imitshat

arenherentnthe robleme et urselveso olve. nd o we re efttopursueot nlyheoriesut lso he raditionalasks f he istorian:to nalyzepecificventsnd hainsf vents,nd, oteast,otell hestoryfevents.27

Whereas isdismissalfthe xtremelaims fmodelerssreasonable,heexaggerateshecontrastetween he egitimatespirationsfhis-torynd oftheoretically-mindedocial cience.Withrespecto theparticularhallengeefores,Koenigsbergerritess ifa great eal

ofscholarlyffortadalready eenexpendedoconstruct frame-26Konigsberger,MonarchiesndParliamentsnEarlyModern urope:Dominium

RegaleorDominium oliticumtRegale,"Theory nd Society, (March 978), 214.

On the substantiveide,concerninghedevelopmentsn seventeenth-centuryngland,for xample, e assertshat GreatBritainwas partoftheEuropean tate ystemndsubject o foreignntervention,n spiteof the Channeland NorthSea," and thatthereforenone of these eventscan be understoodn a purelyEnglishcontext"(p. 2II).

27 Ibid., I5.







280 WORLD POLITICS

work. n fact, lmostnothing as beendone,becausetheappearanceof themodern tate s a political tructure ith wo faces, nternalndexternal, roduced n intellectualifurcationhat ed to the contem-

porary ivisionwithinhistorynd the social sciences nto sub-disci-plines oncerned xclusively ithoneortheother fthese spects.Al-though he end of the ong sixteenthenturys widelyrecognized sthetimewhenrelationshipsmong European tates rystallizedntoabalance-of-powerystem, nd considerable heoretical ttention asbeen paid to the subsequent perations f that system,much lessthought as been givento its nteractionsithexternal ctors, o therelationshipsetween hepolitico-strategicntityndits socioeconomicenvironment,nd especially o itsgenesis.28

Ifit snecessaryogo beyondWallersteinn the directionfworld-historicalheorieshatdeal moreadequatelywith hepolitical imen-sion, t is also necessaryo borrow leaf fromhisbook and adapttothe nalysis f thepolitical inkagehisconceptualizationftheforma-tion f theworld conomys a multilevelrocess.n short,o extricateourselves rom he doublebind,we havelittle hoicebut to takethe

nascent ystem f modern tates tself s theunitofanalysis.We mustconsider he political tructuresf the variouscountriesnvolved sinteractingarts fa largerwhole,of whichthe "internationaloliti-cal system"n theconventionalense s itself uta manifestationt onelevel.The emergencefa systemf modern tateswarrantss muchtheoreticalttentions theemergence f capitalism as longreceivedfromhistoriansnd social scientists f many persuasions; t is anequally originalfeature f the transformationhereby he changes

that riginatednoneregion, eginningn the ongsixteenthentury,eventuallyltered hefaceoftheworld.

We willprobably ever e able to construct theory ccountingorspecific olitical vents nd chainsof events, r, for thatmatter,theory ealingwithsingular ventsgenerated y othercultural ndsocialprocesses.Whatwe can aspire o more egitimatelys a theoryaccounting ortheappearancen Europe-when it did-of a unique

socialformationhatwas simultaneouslyloseto thewarof all againstall and founded n an acknowledgmentf theformal quality f its28 With especto the ystem'senesis, owever, e arefortunateohavetwo authors

whose eminalworks repoints fdeparture: udwig Dehio,theneo-Rankeanited nfn.9; andGarretMattingly,enaissanceDiplomacy (Baltimore: enguinBooks, 964).The issues aisedby Wallerstein's orkmayhavealready timulatedenewed nterestamong tudentsf nternationalolitics,s suggested y GeorgeModelski's The LongCycleof GlobalPolitics nd the Nation-State"fn. ). Butwhycycles?None of theseworks,however, ddressestself o the theoreticalnterfacingetween omestic ndinternationalolitics, ndbetween oliticsndother ocial tructuralrocesses.








collective ctors.Were we tomakesomeprogressoward herealiza-tionof thisvery ifficultask,we should lso be able to conceptualizemoreclearly he relationshipsetween hedynamic enerated ythis

political tructurend other ocial processes,ncluding heeconomic.We shouldkeep nmind,however,hat henature f such nteractionsundoubtedly aried vertime nd in differentlaces, o thatproposi-tions oncerninghemmustbe historicallypecificfthey reto be ofany ignificance.

Sometime go, arguing hatprematurearadigms onstitute hin-dranceto understanding,lbertHirschmanwarned social scientistsagainst alling rey o a ragede vouloir onclure.29 o this, nemightadd another itofFrench phoristic isdom: qui tropembrassemaletreint.hereare ndeedmanygood reasons oadopt skeptical tancetoward hepossibilityf everdevisingn elegant heoryncompassingtheorigins f the modernworldand its subsequent volution.Ourefforts ightmorefruitfullye directed oward the elaboration ftheoriesoncerningarious spects f thetransformation,nifiednotby a belief n thepossibilityf delineating systemmovedbya sin-

gulardynamic, ut rather y a shared enseof the fundamentalnter-connectednessmong the disparate trands f humanexperience ndhistory. owever acking n overall legance, uchdisparateffortsonot onstitutewaste f time:they an eadtomoreprecise nowledgeof some spects f the ransformationndtherebyesultn a somewhatmore oherentnderstandingf thewhole.

29 Hirschman,The Search orParadigmss a Hindrance oUnderstanding,"orldPolitics,xii (April 970), 335.

Zoldberg -Origins of the Modern World System, A Missing Link

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