Zhuangzi’s scepticism in light of Yangist ideas

Ranie Villaver

A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

School of Humanities

Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences

October 2012

Surname or Family name: VILLAVER

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Title: Zhuangzi's scepticism in light of Yangist ideas

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This thesis is about Zhuangzi's ~£-T scepticism. The argument is that Zhuangzi's scepticism about proposing solutions to the unrest of the Warring States period (481-221 BCE) is a manifestation of a Yangist concern about being involved in official life. The aim is to offer a new perspective of Zhuangzi's scepticism as scepticism about the solutions of the thinkers of the period.

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CONTENTS

Introduction I. Aim 1 II. Background 2 III. Methodology 3 IV. Outline 9

Chapter 1. The Phenomenon of Doctrinal Exchange 11

1.1 Evidence for the Doctrinal Exchange 11 1.2 The Warring States Period 20 1.3 Doctrinal Plurality 23

1.4 Doctrinal Exchange in the Neipian 26 Chapter 2. Yangist Ideas

2.1 In the Mencius 29 2.1.1 Was there a Yangist movement? 29 2.1.2 Weiwo (為我) 33 2.1.3 Yang Zhu’s Doctrine and Involvement in official life 37 2.1.4 Weiwo and Yangist concern for others 37

2.2 In the Lüshi chunqiu 39 2.2.1 Ji (己) 40

2.3 In the Huainanzi 42 2.3.1 Quanxing (全性) 42 2.3.2 Baozhen (保真) 47 2.3.3 Buyiwuleixing (不以物累形) 50 2.3.4 A possible generalisation 54 2.3.5 The Doctrines and scepticism about official life involvement 56

2.4 In the Liezi 57 2.4.1 On Weiwo 58

Chapter 3. Yangist Elements in the Neipian 64

3.1 In the “Xiaoyaoyou” 64 3.2 In the “Yangshengzhu” 67

3.2.1 Self-preservation: Zhuangzi’s approach 69 3.2.2 To Complete One’s Term of Life 72

3.3 In the “Renjianshi” 73 3.3.1 Xinzhai (心齋) 73 3.3.2 Be useless 77 3.3.3 “Renjianshi” as a Yangist chapter 80

3.4 In the “Dechongfu” 82 3.5 In the “Dazongshi” 86 3.6 In the “Yingdiwang” 91

Chapter 4. Zhuangzi’s Scepticism 97

4.1 What is Scepticism 97 4.2 Types of Scepticism 98

4.2.1 Object of Doubt 98 4.2.2 Purpose or Goal of Doubt 101

4.3 Zhuangzi’s Scepticism in the “Qiwulun” 102 4.3.1 Scepticism about Arbitrariness 102 4.3.2 Scepticism about Certainty 108 4.3.3 The Problem Compounded 109

4.3.4 Setting Standards: The Exclusivity of Each of the Solutions 110 4.3.5 Application of Standards and the Impoverishment of Life 111

4.4 Scepticism about Partial Knowledge 113

Chapter 5. Interpretations of Zhuangzi’s Scepticism 118 5.1 Zhuangzi’s Scepticism as Radical scepticism: Chad Hansen 118

5.1.1 Chinn’s Response: Perspectival Realism 121 5.1.2 Soles and Soles’ Response: Epistemological Nihilism 122 5.1.3 Nelson’s Response: Scepticism and Mysticism 123 5.1.4 Radical Interpretation and Scepticism about solutions 125

5.2 Zhuangzi’s Scepticism as Therapeutic scepticism 126 5.2.1 Paul Kjellberg 127 5.2.2 Philip J. Ivanhoe 129 5.2.3 Eric Schwitzgebel 129 5.2.4 Bryan Van Norden 131 5.2.5 A Response to the Interpretation: Hansen 132

5.3 Zhuangzi’s Scepticism as Methodology 133 5.3.1 Lisa Raphals: Zhuangzi’s Sceptical Strategies 133 5.3.2 Dan Lusthaus: Zhuangzi’s Aporetic Ethics 134

5.4 Zhuangzi’s Scepticism as a sort that questions 136 5.4.1 Lee Yearley 136 5.4.2 Christoph Harbsmeier 137 5.4.3 David Wong 139

5.5 Zhuangzi’s Scepticism as Domain-specific scepticism 141 5.5.1 Scepticism as directed at Language 141 5.5.2 Scepticism as directed at shi-fei Distinctions 143

Chapter 6. Conclusion 147

6.1 Summary 147 6.2 Significance 148

Appendix A: The Neipian: A Warring States Text? 150

I. Linguistic Evidence 151 II. Linguistic-Philosophical Evidence 153

Appendix B: Who was Zhuangzi? 155

I. Zhuangzi and Daojia 155 A. Daojia and the Six Doctrinal Groups 156 B. What is Daojia? 158

II. Who was Zhuangzi? 162 A. Zhuangzi in the Shiji 162 B. Zhuangzi’s Intellectual Background 166

1. Song Xing 167 2. Hui Shi 173 3. Yang Zhu 177

Bibliography 180

1

Introduction

I. Aim

This thesis is about Zhuangzi’s 莊子 scepticism. I argue in this thesis that

Zhuangzi’s scepticism about proposing solutions to the unrest of the Warring States

period (481-221 BCE) is a manifestation of a Yangist concern about being involved in

official life. The aim is to offer a new perspective of Zhuangzi’s scepticism as

scepticism about the solutions of the thinkers of the period.

That Zhuangzi (399?-295? BCE) is sceptical about the thinkers’ solutions is

seen, firstly, in Zhuangzi’s scepticism about the assumption of certainty of these

thinkers and, secondly, in his scepticism about 辯 (biandisputations:debates). As one that

challenges the solutions, this scepticism can be understood as Zhuangzi’s judgement

about the futility of the solutions. As Zhuangzi judges the solutions to be futile, his

scepticism is also scepticism about proposing any solutions. And because to propose a

solution in the Warring States period implies proposing to be involved in official life,

Zhuangzi’s scepticism about proposing solutions is scepticism about proposals to be

involved in official life.

The reason for this thesis’ argument is that Zhuangzi is also sceptical about

being involved in official life, which appears to have been influenced by the Yangist

view that being involved in official life is harmful to oneself. There are passages in the

Neipian 《內篇》 which suggest that its supposed author, Zhuangzi,1 is sceptical about

involvement in official life for the reason that it is perilous. The idea that being

engaged in official life leads to self-disintegration is a Yangist idea. It is one of the

ideas that Han scholars2 ascribed to Yang Zhu 楊朱 (c. 450 BCE).

It is hoped that the perspective this thesis offers shall contribute to continuing

debates in three areas: (1) nature of Warring States debates, (2) the nature or

composition of the Zhuangzi, and (3) understanding of scepticism in the Zhuangzi.

1 I am aware of one important implication that modern sinological developments have

regarding Warring States texts. It is that these texts ought to be now treated as not products of individual authors. Rather, they are to be regarded as accumulated layers of texts written and compiled by many authors or editors from different time periods (Geaney [2002]: p. 3.). However, given some research findings, notably by Liu Xiaogan (1994), the Neipian (most of it, that is) could be regarded to have been written by Zhuangzi.

2 These scholars are the writers of the Huainanzi (specifically of passage 13.9).

2

II. Background

This perspective on Zhuangzi’s scepticism is offered as a response to attempts

to understand the nature of Zhuangzi’s sceptical philosophy. A number of attempts

have been made to explicate the sceptical points in the Neipian, particularly in the

“Qiwulun” 《齊物論》. One particular attempt that has brought many scholars to deal

with the problem about the nature of Zhuangzi’s scepticism is Chad Hansen’s. In “A

Tao of Tao in Chuang-tzu”3 and his A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought,4 Hansen

argues that Zhuangzi is a radical sceptic. His interpretation started a series of inquiries

about whether Zhuangzi really holds radical scepticism, because if he does, there

would be a tension in the Neipian. A tension would appear in the text because

Zhuangzi also recommends specific ways of living in the text (his normative

recommendations). Zhuangzi cannot be both an extreme sceptic and a thinker with

normative recommendations at the same time. Thus, several scholars have tried to re-

examine Zhuangzi’s scepticism, with the goal of seeing how Zhuangzi’s prescriptions

could be accommodated.

Anthologies in the English language have been published that have the aim of

resolving the tension between Zhuangzi’s scepticism (as radical scepticism) and his

recommendations. These are Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the

Zhuangzi (1996), edited by Paul Kjellberg and Philip J. Ivanhoe, and Hiding the World

in the World: Uneven Discourses on the Zhuangzi (2003), edited by Scott Cook. A

number of journal articles in the English language have also dealt with the problem.

These papers include: “Competing Interpretations of the ‘Inner Chapters’ of the

Zhuangzi,” by Bryan Van Norden,5 “Listen with the Qi: Zhuangzi and Spontaneity,”

by Chinn Ewing,6 “Zhuangzi and the Obsession with Being Right,” by David Wong,7

and “Questioning Dao: Skepticism, Mysticism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi,” by Eric

Sean Nelson.8

The goal of this thesis is not to resolve the tension. The goal is to understand

the nature of Zhuangzi’s scepticism from an historical and socio-political point of

view. The perspective I offer here explores the possibility of seeing Zhuangzi as being

3 Hansen (1983b). 4 Hansen (1992). 5 Van Norden (1996). 6 Chinn (1999). 7 Wong (2005). 8 Nelson (2008).

3

sceptical about the thinkers’ solutions, and that such scepticism is linked to Zhuangzi’s

scepticism about being involved in official life.

III. Methodology

Since this thesis’ argument depends on having to prove that Zhuangzi was

influenced by the Yangist concern about involvement in official life, this thesis focuses

on studying Yangist ideas and on how it was possible for Zhuangzi to have been

influenced by Yangist thought. Because of this, this thesis deals primarily with the

Yangist texts, the Neipian, and other texts of the period which provide evidence that

Warring States thinkers exchanged ideas.

Here, I focus on discussing, firstly, the problems with the Yangist texts, and,

secondly, my treatment of the primary texts, namely, the Mencius 《孟子》, the Lüshi

chunqiu 《呂氏春秋》, the Huainanzi 《淮南子》, the Liezi 《列子》, the Zhuangzi Neipian

and Zapian 《雜篇》“Yangist” chapters.

A. Problems with the Yangist Texts

There are three problems that ought to be acknowledged. First is the paucity of

textual evidence. There are only very few relevant passages in the four Yangist texts.

Moreover, the relevant passages in these texts are brief and fragmentary.

The second problem concerns the dates of the majority of the texts. Given that

the earliest text that mentions Yang Zhu, the Mencius, is dated around 3rd to 2nd

century BCE,9 it could be supposed that Yang Zhu’s ideas were prevalent before the

establishment of the Qin dynasty (221-206 BCE). But most of the available texts for

the study of Yangist ideas were composed and compiled in the later part of the

Warring States period and several years after the Qin dynasty. The Lüshi chunqiu was

composed and compiled in the third century BCE; the Huainanzi in the Han dynasty

(206 BCE-220 CE); and the Liezi during the Western Jin dynasty (265-316 BCE) –

although it must be noted that, based on his view that the chapter’s ideas “fit

excellently into the intellectual spectrum of the Chinese axial age”, Heiner Roetz

believes that the “Yang Zhu” pian 《楊朱篇》 contains authentic Warring States

9 According to the Brooks, the chapters that specifically mention Yang Zhu (Mencius 3 and 7)

were written at around mid 3rd century BCE. Brooks and Brooks (2002): pp. 256-257, 273.

4

g

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material.10 The consensus of this widely accepted scholarship is that the bulk of what

is currently known about Yangist ideas comes from these post-Warring States texts.

This poses a serious challenge to the understanding of Yangist ideas because these

texts’ accounts of the ideas are therefore only retrospective. For that reason, it is

probable that elements of Qin and post-Qin thought were superimposed on the Warrin

States views

The third and final problem is the rejection of Yang Zhu’s doctrine by

Mencius. Passages 3B.9 and 7A.26 of the Mencius reveal the Confucian’s strong

animosity towards and outright condemnation of Yang Zhu and what was perceived as

his major doctrine, weiwo 為我. In light of the fact that there are no available writings

of Yang Zhu or his followers to compare these passages with,12 this rejection is a

problem as it implies that what is known about Yang Zhu’s philosophy in the pre-Qin

context comes from a hostile source.13 As such, the only Warring States information

about Yang Zhu’s philosophy may be biased. This, then, makes it seemingly

impossible to obtain an objective account of Yangist ideas.

B. Treatment of the Texts

With the Yangist texts (i.e. the specific passages in them), I examine these

texts, firstly, to extract the ideas or themes which are to be correctly understood as

ones that may be associated with Yang Zhu and, secondly, to further expound on these

ideas and themes. In extracting these ideas, I specifically pay close attention to the

Mencius, the Lüshi chunqiu, and the Huainanzi.

1. The Mencius

The Mencius is an important text, because it mentions Yang Zhu and his

philosophy. The text’s relevant passages are 3B.9 and 7A.26. The Mencius is also

important because it is the only mid-Warring States text which mentions Yang Zhu.

10 Roetz (1993): p. 247; see also note 68 on page 338 for an informative discussion on the

pian’s genuineness. 11 It is also possible that Yang Zhu’s philosophy underwent modifications as it reached the later

dynasties. It is possible that the form of hedonism in the Liezi is evidence of this change. Cf. Lau (1992): pp. 86-87.

12 Yang Zhu left no writings. None of the Yangist texts are considered written by Yang Zhu. The texts point out Yang Zhu’s ideas but it is uncertain whether these ideas are in fact his ideas.

13 This, however, is not true if Mencius’s assessment of Yang Zhu’s views conveys indeed the essence of Yangist philosophy.

5

The text is said to have been written during the Warring States period. As mentioned,

its chapters that specifically mention Yang Zhu, according to Bruce and Taeko Brooks’

findings, were written at around the middle of the third century BCE, that is, between

254-249 BCE.14

2. The Lüshi chunqiu

Book 17, chapter 7 “Bu er”, section 1A of the Lüshi chunqiu (compiled in late

3rd century BCE) is important because it mentions the possibly focal idea of Yang Zhu,

along with those of other thinkers such as Laozi 老子, Kongzi 孔子, and Mozi 墨子.

3. The Huainanzi

The Former Han dynasty (202 BCE- 9CE) text Huainanzi is also important,

because it provides a statement about what Yang Zhu thought. This statement is in the

“Fanlunxun” 《氾論訓》 (passage 13.9). The passage’s statements about the ideas of

Kongzi, Mozi and Yang Zhu are considered by some scholars to be unbiased.15 The

impartiality of the passage’s content can be understood, first, by analysing the context

of the passage. This way starts by noting that the intent of the passage is to exhibit to

the sage-ruler or trainee16 the idea of what is called in western thought “subjectivism”

or “relativism”. After the section where the three thinkers’ views are stated, the rest of

passage 13.9 says:

In accepting or rejecting (something), people differ, for each has a particular

understanding in mind. Thus, right and wrong are based on a particular

perspective.

Gain a particular perspective, and something is not “wrong”;

lose (a particular) perspective, and (the same) thing is not “right.”

As for the people of Danxue, Taimeng, Fanzhong, Kongtong, Daxia, Beihu,

Qihong, Xiugu: Each have their different rights and wrongs, (and) their

customs are mutually opposed.

Ruler and minister, superior and inferior,

14 Brooks and Brooks (2002): p. 273. 15 A.C. Graham is notable for this claim. However, he does not provide reasons for it. Graham

(1989): p. 54. 16 The Huainanzi is considered by scholars to be “a text that overall can be read as a

prescription for sage-rulership or a curriculum for a sage-ruler in training.” According to Sarah Queen and John Major, the “Fanlunxun” is one of the chapters that show that this is the nature of the text. They said that the “Fanlunxun” is “one of the most overtly political chapters”. Major et al (2010): p. 488.

6

Husband and wife, father and son:

each has its related service.

What is right for the one is not right for the other;

What is wrong for the one is not wrong for the other.17

Since this intention of the passage could be seen to make the perspective of the

author(s) fairly neutral towards the content of what Kongzi, Mozi, and Yang Zhu

prized,18 the testimony is viewed as detailing the differing views held by each thinker.

That is, the passage just says that the three figures have the right to hold those

particular views, which they believe are the correct views. This is so because the

intention of the author(s) is simply to show the presence of difference among the

opinions of individuals.

Another way to understand the impartiality of the passage’s content is to

compare the views or doctrines ascribed to the three figures in the passage. The

doctrines advocated by Kongzi and Mozi are some of their established core teachings.

According to the passage, Kongzi advocated concerns which are manifestations of lirites

(禮) and Mozi advocated jianaiuniversal concern (兼愛), among others. In light of this, it

could be concluded that the doctrines ascribed by the authors to Yang Zhu are most

likely some of Yang Zhu’s core (possibly original) views. A further reason for this is a

point mentioned in the first way: since the intention of the author(s) is simply to show

the presence of difference of opinions among individuals, it seems likely correct to

take the doctrines the author(s) ascribed to the three thinkers as some of their basic

convictions or themes.19

4. Other Lüshi chunqiu “Yangist” passages

In explaining the main ideas associated with Yang Zhu further, I examine the

other Lüshi chunqiu passages and “Yang Zhu” pian of the Liezi. Scholars believe that

17 Ibid., p. 501. 18 This is apart from the fact that the main purpose(s) of “Fanlunxun” also is to make the

author(s)’ take the inevitable changes or transformations that the sage-ruler or the apprentice ought to note, “to link up and discern timely and generational alterations and extend and adjust [the policies] in accordance with transformations.” Major et al (2010): p. 855.

19 It has been discussed though that the ideas and themes attributed to the thinkers may not be accurate, i.e. that they may be lopsided. See discussion on “Teaching Yang Zhu” (specifically Chris Fraser’s comment on 24 November 2009) at http://warpweftandway.wordpress.com/2009/11/23/teaching-yang-zhu/; accessed 3 March 2012

7

the other Lüshi chunqiu passages have themes similar to those identified in Huainanzi

13.9.20 I use these passages to help expound on themes identified in the Huainanzi.

5. The Liezi

The reason for including the Liezi’s “Yang Zhu” pian may seem obvious.

However, because it is found by scholars to have been written later in the 3rd to 4th

century CE and that it presents a different picture of Yang Zhu (which is a “hedonistic”

picture of the thinker), it may not be a proper text to use to expand on Yangist ideas.

Yet, I include it in this study for the reason that the chapter contains a section thought

to be from an earlier source and which may shed a different light on Yang Zhu’s

philosophy as portrayed in the Mencius and the Lüshi chunqiu passage (Book 17,

chapter 7, section 1A).

6. The Neipian

With the Neipian,21 because I consider it as a depository of Zhuangzi’s

thoughts, I examine the text and search specifically for messages or ideas which are

either:

(1) actually Yangist ideas (I base this on the use of significant characters of the

Yangist ideas in the Neipian),

(2) similar or akin to the Yangist ideas (I base this on my view that the specific

Neipian ideas are slight variations of the Yangist ideas sharing similar

qualities), or

(3) possible connotations of the Yangist ideas.

I elaborate on these ideas in the Neipian, focusing on explaining how they relate to

Yangist ideas. I consider the context of each of the passages to judge whether the

message conveyed by the passage is truly related to Yangist thought or part of that

passage could be isolated from the main passage to be able to say that it is evidence for

the possibility that Zhuangzi was influenced by Yangism.

In the explication of the view of Zhuangzi’s scepticism, I go through important

passages specifically in the “Qiwulun” and “Xiaoyaoyou” 《逍遙遊》. I explain how the

20 Feng (1952): pp. 137-140; Graham (1989): p. 55. 21 The 33-pian received Zhuangzi has three divisions: Neipian 《內篇》(chapters 1-7), Waipian

《外篇》(8-22), and Zapian 《雜篇》(23-33).

8

passages provide ideas that support that Zhuangzi’s scepticism is scepticism about the

proposed solutions.

7. The Zhuangzi Zapian “Yangist” chapters

About the Zhuangzi Zapian chapters (“Rangwang” 《讓王》, “Daozhi” 《盜跖》,

“Shuojian” 《說劍》 and “Yufu” 《漁父》) deemed by A.C. Graham to be “Yangist”,22 I

consider only one passage from one of these chapters, i.e. from the “Yufu”. I consider

it to try to see whether it would aid in disclosing the meaning of baozhen 保真, the

second doctrine ascribed to Yang Zhu in the Huainanzi. My hesitancy to use these

Zhuangzi chapters is based on the fact that there is no consensus among scholars

regarding the doctrinal alignments of these chapters. For example, these chapters are

classified differently by Liu Xiaogan as they are by Christopher Rand.23 Liu puts the

chapters in his Anarchist group.24 Though the Anarchist school has some relation with

Yangist thought, in that Yangism’s weiwo amounts to “having no sovereign” (wujun

無君), they are fundamentally different. This is shown in the following table:

Yangist (Graham) Anarchist (Liu)

Basis:

Yang Zhu

wujunlun 無君論 (theory of no sovereign) in the Baopuzi’s 《抱朴子》

“Jiebao”《詰鮑》

Doctrines:

Nurture of life, Yang Zhu’s doctrines of 1) quanxing 全性, 2) baozhen 保真, and 3) buyiwuleixing 不以物累形

1) inherited Zhuangzi’s criticism of reality, which was directed against rulers of the past and rulers who were the writers’ contemporaries25 2) in contrast to Zhuangzi’s teaching, wujun emphasized “the nature (ziran ) [that is the ‘being-so’] of human nature (renxing)”. The school “repeatedly discussed ‘being content with the state (qing) of nature and destiny (xingming),’ it was precisely this school’s main thesis of letting be the nature of human nature”.26

22 Graham (2001): pp. 221-253. 23 Rand (1983): pp. 5-58. 24 Liu (1994): pp. 134-143. 25 Liu (1991-1992): p. 49. 26 Ibid., p. 64.

9

According to this, the doctrines of wujunlun and Yang Zhu’s doctrines are different.

For Liu, the Zapian chapters, then, are connected more to Zhuangzi’s thought. That is

because if these chapters, being wujunlun chapters, inherited Zhuangzi’s “criticism of

reality”, then these chapters have been influenced in some way by Zhuangzi’s

philosophy rather than by Yang Zhu’s.

Other scholars believe that three of these Zapian chapters are not actually

related to Yangist thought. Harold Roth and Andrew de Meyer reckon that these

chapters (except the “Shuojian”) are more closely related to the Primitivist pattern of

thought.27 Primitivist thought is a form of thinking that projects the Laozian-like

philosophical outlook,28 characterized by a longing to revert to ancient, utopian ideals

and customs.

IV. Outline

In this thesis, I first discuss preliminary matters relating to the presence of

Yangist ideas in the Neipian. In Chapter 1, I discuss the phenomenon of doctrinal

exchange, a phenomenon in the Warring States period which explains how it is

possible that there are traces of Yangist ideas in the Neipian.29 In Chapter 2, I explore

the Yangist ideas in the text materials. I do this in order to understand these ideas,

which would help in understanding my reasons for regarding some thought elements in

the Neipian as akin to Yangist ideas or as resembling these ideas or as connotations of

these ideas.

Chapter 3 presents the Yangist elements in the Neipian. Chapter 4 elaborates on

Zhuangzi’s scepticism about the solutions. I include a brief discussion of scepticism as

it is dealt with in western philosophy. I do this to shed light on Zhuangzi’s scepticism

as understood here and to compare it with western versions.

Chapter 5 presents and reviews other interpretations of Zhuangzi’s scepticism

in the literature. I do this to help further understand the view of Zhuangzi’s scepticism

here. The discussion reviews the various interpretations and compares them with the

view here.

27 Roth (2003): pp. 209, 218 (n. 57). 28 That is, the outlook found in the Laozi Daodejing 《老子道德經》. 29 As it has been suggested by scholars that there are traces of ideas from other thinkers (other

than Yang Zhu’s) in the Neipian, the phenomenon would also explain how it is possible that there are traces of these ideas in the text.

10

The two appendices I include discuss the issues of the Neipian’s being a

Warring States text and of Zhuangzi’s background.

11

1. The Phenomenon of Doctrinal Exchange

The phenomenon of doctrinal exchange is the phenomenon which would

explain how it is possible for Zhuangzi to have been influenced by Yangist ideas.

Doctrinal exchange is the exchange or borrowing or fusion of ideas among the thinkers

that occurred during the Warring States period. There is a number of evidence for the

occurrence of this phenomenon. One of these is the mention in some texts of other

thinkers’ ideas and stating how these ideas are useful. Another is the presence of

uncharacteristic concepts in a number of Warring States texts thought to be canons of

specific persuasions. These texts use elements of other doctrines that are in texts

considered to be from specific doctrinal groups, indicating that the phenomenon

occurred.

In this chapter, I present some of the evidence for the doctrinal exchange. I also

discuss here “doctrinal plurality” and the historical background to the period’s unrest. I

discuss doctrinal plurality because one of the factors that led to the doctrinal exchange

is the baijia 百家 or “doctrinal plurality”. I discuss the historical background because

the ultimate reason for why the doctrinal exchange occurred is the need to quell the

unrest of the Warring States period. The discussions of doctrinal plurality and the

background to the necessity of resolving the socio-political unrest of the period will

help in understanding doctrinal exchange. Finally, I also discuss in this chapter some

evidence (other than the Yangist elements) that doctrinal exchange occurred in the

Neipian.

1.1 Evidence for the Doctrinal Exchange

The early Chinese thinkers had the tendency to cite and borrow ideas from

other thinkers,1 even if the proponents of these ideas were their rivals. If their

opponents had useful ideas, they did not deny them. They would cite and use them.

This is seen, for example, in Mozi. The Mozi 《墨子》 has a dialogue between Mozi and

his disciple Chengzi which shows that Mozi cited Kongzi and acknowledged the merit

of Kongzi’s ideas:

1 Feng (1948): pp. 183, 187.

12

Master Mo Zi and Cheng Zi were debating the issue of praise for Confucius.

Cheng Zi asked: “You are not a Confucian so why do you praise

Confucius?”

Master Mo Zi replied: “Because there is what is right and this cannot be

changed [是亦當而不可易者也]. Now when a bird becomes aware of the

problems of heat and drought, then it flies high. When a fish becomes aware

of the problems of heat and drought, then it dives deep. The appropriateness

of this is something even the stratagems of Yu and Tang certainly cannot

change. Birds and fish may be said to be unintelligent yet Yu and Tang

would, in some instances, still follow them. Now why should I never praise

Confucius?”2

According to this passage, the reason why Mozi cited Kongzi is that there is something

that is correct in Kongzi’s ideas. It is useful. Even though Kongzi is his opponent,

Mozi acknowledged that Kongzi has ideas that have a point which is right and cannot

be altered.3

This tendency is evident in later texts such as the Zhuangzi’s “Tianxia”

《天下》. The “Tianxia”, known to be a Daoist text, calls other thinkers by name,

attributes ideas to them, and acknowledges the merits of their ideas. According to the

text’s section of Mozi and Qin Guli (after surveying and criticising their ideas), “[a]s

far as the idea of [Mozi] and [Qin Guli] is concerned, they were right…”.4 According

to its section of Peng Meng, Tian Pian, and Shen Dao, the three thinkers “did not know

the Way [but] speaking broadly, they were all men who heard something about it”.5

That these thinkers had heard something about the “Way” suggests that aspects of their

ideas are correct.

Regarding the exchange and fusion of doctrines in Warring States texts, I

present here parts of two texts which suggest the occurrence of the exchange. These

two texts are the Xunzi 《荀子》 and the Hanfeizi 《韓非子》. I shall begin with the Xunzi.

2 Johnston (2010): p. 690. 3 A.C. Graham’s translation of “是亦當而不可易者也” is: “This is something of his which is

dead right and for which there is no substitute.” Graham (1978): p. 25. 4 Graham (2001): p. 277. 5 Ibid., p. 280.

13

Xunzi 荀子 (310?-219? BCE) has been characterised as a “defender of the

Confucian faith”6 and the Xunzi has been classified as a Confucian text. However, the

text embraces a term categorised by Han scholars (of the Hanshu 《漢書》)7 as

belonging to fajia 法家.8 This element, which is 法 (fastandard: penal law), appears used to

become part of Xunzi’s views. The thinkers who viewed fastandard: penal law as

fundamental include Guan Zhong 管仲 (d. 645 BCE), Shang Yang 商鞅 (d. 338 BCE),9

and Shen Dao 慎到 (350?-275? BCE).10 This does not include Hanfeizi 韓非子(280?-

233 BCE), because he was Xunzi’s student.

Fastandard: penal law in the Lunyu 《論語》 is considered inimical to cultivating the

people.11 According to Lunyu 2.3: “The Master said, ‘If you try to guide the common

people with coercive regulations and keep them in line with punishments [道之以政,

齊之以刑], the common people will become evasive and will have no sense of shame….

[G]uide them with Virtue, and keep them in line by means of ritual [道之以德,

齊之以禮], the people will have sense of shame and will rectify themselves.’”12 This

means that, to Kongzi, implementing 刑 (xingpunishment), which is closely associated

with fastandard: penal law or a component of it,13 is not the way to lead and regulate

people.14 To him, it is the use of 德 (devirtue) and 禮 (lirites) which achieves the goal of

leading and regulating people. To Kongzi, devirtue and lirites have a primacy in the task

of rectification or cultivation of people. Kongzi considers fapenal law as the last resort.

In the Xunzi, however, we find that fapenal law and lirites are understood as both

necessary in the rectification of the nature (性) of people. Both would contribute to

ordering people.15 This is seen in Xunzi 23.1b:

6 Schwartz (1985): pp. 290-320. 7 It must be noted, though, that their categorisations are now held suspect by scholars. Harper

(1999): pp. 821-822; Lai (2008b): pp. 3-4. 8 Hanshu chapter 30《藝文志》“Yiwenzhi”; Lai (2008b): p. 172. The term fajia, translated as

“Legalism”, is an invention of Sima Tan. Smith (2003): p. 141. For a discussion on the incorrectness of the translation and on the inadequacy of the translation as a heuristic device, see Goldin (2011): pp. 88-104.

9 With Shang Yang, it must be noted that fapenal laws is “only a portion of [his] more complete programme of socio-political change”. Lai (2008b): pp. 176-177.

10 Goldin (2011): p. 92. 11 Lai (2008b): p. 42. 12 Slingerland (2006): p. 4. 13 Cf. Schwartz (1985): pp. 322-323; Goldin (2011): p. 91. 14 Cf. James Legge, trans. (1893-5) vol. 5. Tso Chuan Chu-su, 53, 6b-7a: p. 732 cited in Lai

(2008b); p. 197 (note 6). 15 Lai (2008b): p. 42.

14

Now since human nature is evil, it must await the instructions of a teacher

and the model [法] before it can be put aright [正], and it must obtain ritual

principles and a sense of moral right [得禮義] before it can become orderly

….

In antiquity the sage kings took man’s nature to be evil …. For this reason

they invented ritual principles and precepts of moral duty. They instituted

the regulations that are contained in laws and standards. Through these

actions they intended to “straighten out” and develop man’s essential nature

and to set his inborn nature aright….16

This passage relates fastandard: penal law and lirites to Xunzi’s view that human nature is 惡

(eevil) and to an implication of this view, which is that human nature ought to be

corrected (正). According to this passage, the rectification of human nature, which is

eevil, depends on instructions of a teacher and fastandard: penal law. It also depends on human

nature’s or the people’s realisation of lirites and 義 (yirighteousness). In other words,

together with the other important concepts, fastandard: penal law and lirites are required to set

human nature aright. This is not like the argument of Lunyu 2.3. In this Xunzi passage,

fastandard: penal law is not treated as inimical to cultivation. Rather, it is regarded as one of

the necessities for rectification. The instructions of fastandard: penal law are needed for the

rectification of human nature. Fastandard: penal law goes together with lirites and the other

concepts.

Xunzi supports this view by alluding to the sage kings’ way in the second part

of the passage. He says that the sage kings invented (起) lirites and set up (制) fastandard:

penal law in order to correct (正) human nature, which the kings also understood to be

evil. Through this, Xunzi attempted to strengthen his view that fastandard: penal law and lirites

go together, a view which is unlike the view advanced by Kongzi in the Lunyu.

That fapenal law and lirites are needed in regulating a state is also proposed in the

Xunzi 9 (《王制》, “Regulations of a King”). The passage says:

Treat those who are good who come to you, according to [lirites]; treat those

who are not good who come to you, with punishment [刑]. When those two

kinds of people are distinguished, the worthy and the unworthy will not be

mixed, right and wrong will not be confused. When the worthy and the

16 Knoblock (1994): p. 151.

15

unworthy will not be mixed, then heroes will come to you; when right and

wrong are not confused, then the country will be well governed [則國家治].17

This passage is part of Xunzi’s response to the question on how to govern. In this

passage, Xunzi points out that the application of lirites to those who are good and the

application of 刑, xingpunishment, to those who are not good lead ultimately to a well

governed state (則國家治). According to the passage, the application of lirites and

xingpunishment to the appropriate kinds of people leads to distinguishing the worthy and

the unworthy and to clarity about what is right and wrong. The clarity of what is right

and wrong is that which leads to a well regulated state. But this all begins with the

application of lirites and xingpunishment. Accordingly, this means that lirites and xingpunishment

(thus fastandard: penal law) are the starting points of the process of achieving the goal of

having a well governed state. They are the means to governing well. And because they

are, both are regarded as necessary to the process.

Xunzi’s view here (9) and in 23.1b that fapenal law and lirites are required for the

regulation of people and the state suggests that Xunzi did not adhere to the Confucian

(Kongzi’s) view that fastandard: penal law does not go with lirites. Because of this, it could be

said that the Xunzi shows some evidence that it is a text that incorporated or adopted

some of the elements of doctrines from other thinkers of the period. The text adopted

their idea of fastandard: penal law as necessary to the regulation of society. In the text

passages we have considered, we see Xunzi has argued for the importance of fastandard:

penal law, not just of lirites and other Confucian concepts, in the rectification of people and

society.

The Hanfeizi is one of the texts categorised by Han scholars (of the Hanshu)

under fajia.18 (Hanfeizi is considered as “the last and greatest theorizer of the Legalist

school”.)19 But its commentaries on the Daodejing, found in Chapters 20 《解老》

“Jielao”, and 21 《喻老》 “Yulao”, suggest that it has used the Daoist text’s ideas to

elucidate Legalist views.20 In Chapter 20, for example, Hanfeizi comments on

Daodejing 60. His comment on the line 治大國若烹小鮮 (“Govern a big state as you

17 Dubs (1928): p. 122. 18 Again, it must be noted that these Han scholars’ categorisations are now held suspect by

modern scholars. Harper (1999): pp. 821-822; Lai (2008b): pp. 3-4. 19 Feng (1952): p. 158. 20 Cf. Lai (2008b): p. 185.

16

would cook a small fish”) is made to advance the view that fastandard: penal law are not to

be frequently altered by state rulers to avoid having their people suffer hardships. His

argument is:

The craftsman, if he frequently changes his work, will lose his

accomplishment. The workman, if he frequently shifts his occupation, will

lose his accomplishment too. If one man loses half-a-day’s accomplishment

every day, in ten days he will lose five men’s accomplishment. If ten

thousand men each lose half-a-day’s accomplishment every day, in ten days

they will lose fifty thousand men’s accomplishment. If so, the more

numerous those who frequently change their works are, the greater losses

they will incur. Likewise, if laws and decrees [法] are altered, advantages

and disadvantages [利害] will become different [易]. If advantages and

disadvantages are different, the duties of the people will change [變].

Change of duties is said to be change of works. Therefore by reasoning I

can see that if tasks are big and many and are frequently shifted, then few of

them can be accomplished; that if anybody keeps a great vessel and moves

it too often, it will incur many damages; that if, when frying small fish, you

poke them around too often, you will ruin the cooking; and that if when

governing a big country, you alter laws and decrees too often, the people

will suffer hardships. Therefore, the ruler who follows the proper course of

government, values emptiness and tranquillity and takes alteration of the

law seriously [不重變法].21

According to this, Hanfeizi thinks that, first, the country’s laws and decrees are what

are most essential to a country. Next, he believes that managing these laws makes

governing a big state a big task. It makes it a big task because changes to these laws

directly affect the well being of the country’s people. According to Hanfeizi, the line

治大國若烹小鮮 means that laws of a country ought not to be frequently changed. That

is because the situation is analogous to frying a small fish, wherein one ought not to

“poke them around too often”, otherwise it will be ruined. Thus, according to Hanfeizi,

“the ruler who follows the proper course of government” does not stress or give weight

to changing fastandard: penal law (不重變法).

21 Liao (1959): pp. 184-185.

17

Hanfeizi’s commentary on the chapter’s lines 非其神不傷人, 聖人亦不傷人 (“Not

only will its gods [spirits] not harm the people, but neither will its sages harm the

people”) is focussed on the relation of people, state’s laws, and the rulers. In it,

Hanfeizi assumes the idea that laws and decrees are fixed, and that the sages (聖人) in

the Daodejing line refer to the sovereign ruler. Hanfeizi writes:

If ghosts fall upon sick persons, it is then said that ghosts harm men. If

men drive ghosts away, it is then said that men harm ghosts. If the people

violate laws and decrees [法], it is then said that the people harm the

sovereign. If the sovereign punishes and chastises [刑] the people, it is then

said that the sovereign harms the people. If the people do not violate the

law, then the sovereign does not have to apply any penalty, either. If the

superior does not apply any penalty, it is then said that the sovereign does

not harm the people. Hence the saying: “Not only will its gods not harm the

people, but neither will its sages harm the people.”22

According to this, the only time the sovereign would harm the people is when the latter

violate the law. The sovereign ruler only implements penalties when the decrees are

violated. His role is only to implement penalties when the decrees, which are fixed, are

transgressed. To Hanfeizi, the sage (聖人) is the 上 (shangsuperior:sovereign), who does not

harm the people because the people do not violate fastandard: penal law. This could be

interpreted to mean that in order for the sage, the shangsuperior:sovereign , not to harm the

people, the people must themselves obey fastandard: penal law first. In other words,

compliance with fastandard: penal law is primary.

Hanfeizi’s interpretation of Daodejing 60 suggests that he attempted to show

the chapter’s connection to his ideas about fastandard: penal law. He links the chapter mainly

to his view regarding the primacy of fastandard: penal law to the welfare of the ruler and the

state. Hanfeizi believes that fastandard: penal law is necessary to ordering the state. In

Chapter 6 of the Hanfeizi, for example, Hanfeizi writes:

Thus, using the law to govern the state involves nothing more than

promoting that which accords with the law and abandoning that which does

not. The law does not make exceptions for those who are noble, just as the

22 Ibid., p. 186.

18

ink-line does not bend around that which is crooked. … Thus, when it

comes to straightening out the mistakes of superiors and punishing the

wickedness of inferiors, ordering the disorderly and untangling the tangled,

reducing covetousness, suppressing disobedience, and unifying the course

of the people, nothing is better than the law. For strictly regulating the

offices and overawing the people, thwarting licentiousness and idleness, and

stopping trickery and falsehood, nothing is better than punishments. … If

laws are well defined then those above will be respected and their power is

not encroached upon. When the superiors are respected and their power is

not encroached upon, then the ruler will be strong and have a hold on what

is essential. Therefore, the former kings valued the law and passed it down

to their successors. If a ruler abandons the law and relies on private

judgments, the positions of superior and inferior will not be properly

distinguished.23

Here, it is Hanfeizi’s view that fastandard: penal law orders society, because it does not make

exceptions and there is no alternative to it. According to the passage, fastandard: penal law is

used for “straightening out the mistakes of superiors and punishing the wickedness of

inferiors, ordering the disorderly and untangling the tangled, reducing covetousness,

suppressing disobedience, and unifying the course of the people” and there is nothing

better than fastandard: penal law to achieve these purposes. Penal codes, xingpunishment,

according to Hanfeizi, “regulate the offices and overawe the people, thwart

licentiousness and idleness, and stop trickery and falsehood”. Moreover, in the

passage, it is Hanfeizi’s view that a well defined fastandard: penal law is requisite for the

respect accorded to the shangsuperior: sovereign. This is how Hanfeizi regards fastandard: penal

law.

In Hanfeizi’s commentary on Daodejing 60, which is a chapter that suggests a

specific way of state rulership, Hanfeizi, as pointed out, puts forward that, first,

frequently altering fastandard: penal law would do no good to the people. Secondly, Hanfeizi

argues that compliance with fastandard: penal law is primary. These views included in his

commentary on the chapter suggest that Hanfeizi is using a (cryptic) Daoist view about

how to govern to clarify and advance his own. It seems that his use of the Daodejing

chapter here is only a means to support his fundamental view about fastandard: penal law.

23 Ivanhoe and Van Norden (2005): pp. 322-323.

19

Despite this reason for his use of the Daoist text, his use still suggests that Hanfeizi

attempted to summon and borrow other views to illuminate his own views, particularly

concerning fastandard: penal law.

That the Warring States thinkers learnt from and adopted some elements of

other thinkers’ proposals is due to the dire need of finding the right solution that would

quell the unrest. According to Feng Youlan, this syncretism and eclecticism or the

“eclectic spirit”24 of the time was due to the strong desire for political unification,25 a

unification which would lead to the quelling of the unrest. Feng says:

The people of the third century B.C., discouraged by centuries of inter-state

warfare, longed for a political unification; their philosophers, consequently,

also tried to bring about a unification in thought.26

The thinkers’ attempt to realise a unity in thought is what led them to adopt the views

of other doctrines.

It could be said that the thinkers took advantage of the presence of the sheer

number of proposed doctrines. They thought that the right solution would come from

any source or could be a hybrid or synthesis of the proposed doctrines. Karyn Lai

points out that the thinkers’ exposure to many a number of views might have made the

thinkers adopt elements of others’ views. She writes:

Perhaps, in being exposed to many different views, the early Chinese

thinkers also saw the merits in the views of other doctrines. The profusion

of views may have engendered in the Chinese thinkers a disposition toward

compromise and synthesis rather than analysis and definition.27

Lai is writing here about how the ancient Chinese thinkers have the tendency to

synthesise ideas. According to the passage, the reason is that the thinkers found

“merits in the views of other doctrines”. They were exposed to various views and they

saw that the views had elements beneficial for resolving the unrest.

24 Feng (1948): p. 183. 25 Ibid., p. 187. 26 Ibid., p. 187. 27 Lai (2008b): p. 275.

20

To further understand the phenomenon, it is then important to note that the

phenomenon occurred because that need to quell the unrest arose. The need,

furthermore, arose because of the nature of the period’s socio-political conditions. The

Warring States’ socio-political condition was extremely chaotic and disordered.

Because of this, it is necessary to understand the historical background that led to the

chaotic Warring States socio-political conditions.

1.2 Warring States (zhanguo 戰國) Period

In this section, I discuss, firstly, the events which led to the period of the

Warring States; and secondly, the period’s significant events and details.

The Warring States period is the period that saw the intensification of Zhou

dynasty’s disorder that began in the Spring and Autumn (chunqiu 春秋) period (771-

476 BCE), the period that preceded it.28 According to historians, the Spring and

Autumn period began when Zhou dynasty’s capital was moved to the east, to

Chengzhou (which is now Luoyang). This occurred in 771 BCE. There are several

reasons for the transfer of the capital.29 But the main reason is that Zongzhou, the

dynasty’s first capital, fell after the attack of the Quanrong barbarians. The barbarians

obliterated the city and killed the dynasty’s king, Youwang 幽王 (r. 781-771 BCE).

The transfer of the dynasty’s centre to the east is one of the two events that

conditioned the beginning of the discord in Zhou dynasty. The other event is the

stripping of the “mandate of heaven” (tianming 天命) from the dynasty’s king,

Huanwang 桓王(r. 719-697 BCE). King Huan’s mishap (he got himself wounded in a

battle) turned out to be not just a sign of his state’s and the royal throne’s weakness. It

meant that he was no longer the “son of Heaven” (tianzi 天子).30 These events

conditioned the beginning of the disorder because these initially made the royal vassals

realise the precarious situation they were in. From the perspective of these vassals, the

throne had clearly lost its command on the people.31 They soon took the royal

28 The two periods together comprise what historians call the “Eastern Zhou dynasty” (771-

221BCE). 29 Aside from other contributing factors such as natural calamities that hit Zongzhou, this

happened, according to a traditional version, because of King You’s irresponsibility and recklessness in the year 771 BCE. His ways of pleasing one of his wives (Bao Si), which scholars have described as “irrational and ridiculous”, gave opportunity to the barbarians to subdue their territories easily. Meskill (1973): p. 14; Hsu and Linduff (1988): pp. 258-287.

30 Hsu (1999): p. 552. 31 Creel (1970a): pp. 29-56.

21

authority lightly. As a consequence, they began to ignore their roles and to act

independently, gradually isolating their domains from those of others. This brought

about the collapse of “feudalism”, as these vassals’ territories (guo 國) later became

politically and economically (i.e. agriculturally) self-sufficient. According to the

Zuozhuan《左傳》, there were one hundred and forty-eight independent states during

this time.32 Regarding the “feudalism” practised in Zhou, it must be noted, however,

that it differs significantly from the European form. Chinese feudalism depended

largely on the zongfa 宗法 system, which was based on heredity, the kin-relation of the

vassals to the king. Thus, the collapse of feudalism here came with the crippling of

Zhou’s royal throne, leaving and forcing the vassals to deal with their own concerns.

The states’ insularity and isolation from each other bred mutual animosity. It

was this that began the internecine chaos and warfare in ancient China. The eventual

wars were also a manifestation of the rulers’ aggressive attempts to subdue the other

states and annex those lands to their own. Historians note that the reason for the rulers’

desire to conquer the rest was that they believed that the tianming had been given to

them.33 Each believed that he was the chosen one. The rulers also believed that there

ought to be only one Zhou sovereign, only one “son of Heaven”, just as in the revered

past. The system of the ba 霸 (hegemony), which helped unite the states for a time and

brought truce periods through peace conferences, even indicated the rulers’ desire to

have a single ruler in order to restore Western Zhou stability.34 However, despite the

efforts of the ba and the states to achieve harmony, intra- and most especially inter-

state disunity dragged on. The stronger states, fifteen of them, appropriated several of

the other ones, thereby increasing the violence, frequency, and scale of wars.

The event which scholars use to mark the beginning of “the Warring States

period” is the formation of the seven major zhanwarring (戰) states, from the fifteen that

survived at the later part of the Spring and Autumn.35 These states were Yan 燕, Qi 齊,

Wei 魏, Zhao 趙, Hann 韓, Qin 秦 and Chu 楚. These states were “organised for

32 Cited in Hsu (1999): p. 547. 33 Hsu (1999): p. 555. The installation of the ba 霸 (hegemony) system indicated this.

According to Hsu, it later became clear that the mission of the ba “was by no means intended to be sheer hegemony through military might, but rather to restore the authority of the Son of Heaven. In other words, the Ba was supposed to serve the function of guardian of the Zhou feudal system.” Hsu (1999): p. 555.

34 Cf. Hsu (1990): pp. 565-566. 35 Cf. Ivanhoe and Van Norden (2005): p. 385.

22

warfare”.36 They fought heavily against each other and thus intensified the competition

and infighting that started in the Spring and Autumn. One of the chief reasons for this

was that by then the state lords, who had eventually made themselves the centre of

their polities, had become exceedingly determined upon their quest for the kingship of

all of China.37 Each of the lords of the states started to call himself “king” (wang 王).38

And to earn and prove this title, each of them, among other things, used and capitalised

on the use of military force, which made the more frequent Warring States’ battles

bloodier and longer-lasting, compared to the fewer Spring and Autumn encounters.

The Warring States encounters were fewer, since only the seven major states were

involved. This accounts for the greater number of conflicts in the Spring and Autumn

period. But because the Warring States’ states had larger armies, more men were

involved.39

The warfare ended when Qin defeated Qi in 221 BCE. According to scholars,

Qin’s final triumph was caused by a number of events and factors. These include the

following:

a) a series of more brutal encounters among the states. They were more

brutal because military technology advanced quickly in the Warring States

period, by contrast with the Spring and Autumn. In addition, this was

especially because iron was discovered and started to be used during this

time. 40

b) the rise of Wei as a superpower before Qin superseded it, and the

formation of the vertical and horizontal alliances which were arranged with

Qin as the basis. In the middle of the third century BCE, Qin had indeed

become powerful. The alliances were mostly created basically to oppose

Qin, although one of these was pro-Qin.41

c) Qin had advantages that the other states lacked, including its strategic

geo-political position and the (savage-like) skills in warfare its men learned

through constant encounters with the non-Zhou barbaric tribes in the west,

along the state’s borders.

36 Lewis (1999a): p. 620. 37 Nivison (1999): p. 771. 38 Nivison (1999): pp. 669-770. 39 Hsu (1965): pp. 53-55, 62-68; Hsu (1999): pp. 545, 586. 40 Lewis (1999a): p. 622. 41 Ibid., pp. 632-634.

23

The year of Qin’s triumph over Qi is what historians mark as the end of the Warring

States period. Soon after the toppling of the other contending states, Qin unified the

fragmented Zhou and created the first but short-lived Chinese empire (221-206 BCE).

1.3 The Phenomenon of Doctrinal Plurality42

One of the factors which led to the phenomenon of doctrinal exchange is

period’s phenomenon of “doctrinal plurality”. The phenomenon of “doctrinal

plurality” is the plurality and diversity of proposed solutions to the unrest. Doctrinal

plurality contributed to the occurrence of the phenomenon of doctrinal exchange,

because it provided many sources for thinkers for their concoction of ideas. As

mentioned, the thinkers sought for the right solution to the socio-political unrest and

they believed that this solution could come from anywhere, that is, it could also be a

combination of various elements of proposed doctrines. In this section, to furthermore

understand the phenomenon of doctrinal exchange I elaborate on the phenomenon of

“doctrinal plurality”.

The unrest in the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States periods brought

about a number of social and philosophical phenomena which modern scholars deem

distinctive about ancient China. One of these is the formation of the baijia (hundred

schools of thought) mentioned in the Zhuangzi’s “Tianxia”.43 This phenomenon of the

baijia can be called the phenomenon of “doctrinal plurality”. The unrest specifically

brought this phenomenon about because people (the members of the shi 士 in

particular) were troubled by the seemingly intractable chaos that plagued society. The

shi were scholar-officials, sometimes called “knights”. In terms of membership, during

the Western Zhou, the shi were aristocratic people. With freer social mobility in the

Spring and Autumn and Warring States eras, the shi could come from virtually any of

the social classes, since the determining factor was no longer pedigree but ability.44

The shi were desperate to end the chaos and they desired to restore stability,

specifically the stability of the Western Zhou dynasty (1050-770 BCE). The thinkers

42 The phrase “doctrinal plurality” is adopted from Lai (2006b): pp. 365-374. 43天下大亂，賢聖不明，道德不一，天下多得一察焉以自好。譬如耳目鼻口，皆有所明，不能相

通。猶百家眾技也，皆有所長，時有所用。雖然，不該不遍，一曲之士也。判天地之美，析萬物之理，察

古人之全，寡能備於天地之美，稱神明之容。是故內聖外王之道，闇而不明，鬱而不發，天下之人各為其

所欲焉以自為方。悲夫！百家往而不反，必不合矣。後世之學者，不幸不見天地之純，古人之大體，道術

將為天下裂。(Harvard-Yenching Zhuangzi Yinde: 91/33/12-16); Graham (2001): p. 275. 44 Hsu (1965): p. 34; see also Chan (2004): pp. 92, 189-190; 59-116.

24

of the day searched for the proper set of doctrines that would reform the state. Their

question, according to A.C. Graham, was: “Where is the Way?, the way to order the

state and conduct personal life [?]”.45

That the phenomenon of doctrinal plurality occurred in early China is indicated

by the presence of various competing texts that have survived. From these texts, it is

known that three of the sets of doctrines were proposed by the Confucians, Mohists

and fajia. The phenomenon’s occurrence is also indicated in the contents of some of

the texts. Some of these texts note the phenomenon, indicating that the phenomenon

happened. These texts are the Zhuangzi, the Lüshi chunqiu, the Hanfeizi, and the

Xunzi. The phenomenon is noted through these texts’ survey or inventory sections of

the Warring States intellectual groups or lineages. The specific sections or passages of

the three texts are the following: Zhuangzi chapter 33 《天下》 (“Tianxia”); Lüshi

chunqiu section (lan) 5, chap. 7 《不二》 (“Bu er”); Hanfeizi chapter 50 《顯學》

(“Xianxue”); Xunzi chapter 6, 《非十二子》 (“Fei shier zi”).

The “Tianxia” (chapter 33) of the Zhuangzi is regarded as the best survey of

pre-Qin ideas.46 Its survey of the ideas of Warring States’ intellectual groups or

lineages indicates the phenomenon of doctrinal plurality. Its introductory section also

states the nature of the phenomenon. A section of it says:

The empire is in utter confusion [天下大亂], sagehood and excellence are not

clarified, we do not have the one Way and Power [道德不一]; below in the

empire there are many who find a single point to scrutinise and delight in as

their own. There is an analogy in the ears, eyes, nose and mouth; all have

something they illuminate but they cannot exchange their functions, just as

the various specialities of the Hundred Schools [百家] all have their strong

points and at times turn out useful. However, they are not inclusive, not

comprehensive; these are men each of whom has his own little corner.47

This clearly notes the “utter confusion” (大亂) in the empire (天下) which is due to the

presence of competing views. There is no one Way and Power [道德不一]. The passage

also states baijia (hundred schools), indicating its awareness of the phenomenon

45 Graham (1989): p. 3. 46 Mair (1994b): p. 333. 47 Graham (2001): p. 275.

25

occurring at that time. Although the chapter is believed by some scholars to have been

written in the Han dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE),48 it is clear that this section of the

chapter refers to the “doctrinal plurality” phenomenon of the period.

Of the four texts, the Xunzi’s “Fei shier zi” is the only text which shows that

the doctrines of the other thinkers were clearly attempts to resolve the unrest of the

period. This is because “Fei shier zi” provides critical evaluation of the thinkers’

doctrines. According to Xunzi, the other thinkers’ doctrines, couched in beautiful

language, bring disorder to the empire.49 The inventory shows that the thinkers’

doctrines were not the proper solutions to the unrest, according to Xunzi, because they

bring anarchy. This hints that the doctrines offered by the other thinkers were proposed

solutions to the chaos of the period. According to Xunzi, the thinkers “spread through

the whole world their confused ignorance of wherein lies the distinction between right

and wrong and between order and anarchy”.50

The Hanfeizi’s “Xianxue” is more like a genealogical account of rujia 儒家

(Confucianism) and mojia 墨家 (Mohism) and a discussion of the schools’ members.

This is seen in the chapter’s introduction. The introduction says:

The prominent teachings of this generation are those of the Ru and Mo. The

Ru go back to Kong Qiu [Confucius), the Mo to Mo Di. Since the death of

Master Kong there have been the Zizhang Ru, the Zisi Ru, the Yan Ru, the

Meng [Mencius] Ru, the Qidiao Ru, the Zhongliang Ru, the Sun [Xunzi] Ru

and the Yuezheng Ru. Since the death of Master Mo there have been the

Xiangli Mo, the Xiangfu Mo, and the Dengling Mo.51

The rest of the chapter moreover discusses the question about who would determine

whether the Confucians or the Mohists were right and elaborates on the practices and

features of the two groups of thinkers.52 Consequently, this also makes the Hanfeizi

survey a survey of only two schools, Ruism53 and Mohism54.

48 Cf. Nivison (1999): p. 784. 49 Knoblock (1988): p. 222. 50 Ibid., p. 223. 51 Smith (2003): p. 133. 52 Ivanhoe and van Norden (2005): pp. 352-359. 53 Eno (1984); Eno (1990); Eno (2003): pp. 1-43; Pfister (2004): pp. 615-638. 54 Van Norden (2007): pp. 139-198; Fraser (2010).

26

The Lüshi chunqiu’s “Bu er” (section 5) does not quite resemble a survey. This

is because it contains a list of thinkers with their corresponding ideas, which are

deemed by the author(s) as the thinkers’ main ideas. It is a list with a biased intention.

According to Scott Cook, it is a list to show the prominence of Laozi, as Laozi is first

on the list.55 Nevertheless, both Hanfeizi’s “Xianxue” and the Lüshi chunqiu’s “Buer”

(section 5) provide truth to the phenomenon of doctrinal plurality. They state that there

were a number of thinkers with various ideas, which are to be presumed, according to

their historical context, as proposals to resolve the unrest of the period.

1.4 Doctrinal Exchange in the Neipian

That the phenomenon of doctrinal exchange is evidenced in the Neipian has

been noted by scholars. According to scholars, there are traces of thought elements

from other thinkers or schools of thought of the period, other than Yangist ideas. It has

been observed by a few scholars that Zhuangzi, being the author of the Neipian, had

probably been influenced by a number of thinkers.56 According to A.C. Graham, for

example, Zhuangzi had been influenced by Song Xing 宋銒, Hui Shi 惠施 (Huizi 惠子)

and Yang Zhu.57 Graham also states in his biography of Zhuangzi that Zhuangzi must

have also been influenced by Confucian thought:58

His upbringing was probably Confucian, but he studied under a Yangist,

and in due course became a qualified Yangist teacher with his own

disciples. After a crisis which may be reflected in the [D]iaoling story he

went his own way, as the irreverent drop-out of the more characteristic tales.

He visited Hui Shi, and heard him use the paradoxes of space and time to

prove that all things are one….59

According to this, Zhuangzi was a student of Yangism, was a follower of Hui Shi, and

received Confucian instructions as he grew up. Here, I present some of some scholars’

55 Cook (2002): p. 319. 56 Graham (2001): p. 5; Nivison (1999): p. 767; Schwartz (1985): p. 216. 57 Graham (2001): p. 5. 58 The possibility that Zhuangzi was influenced by Confucian thought is also stated by Guo

Moruo (1892-1978). Guo’s conjecture is that Zhuangzi was a student of the Yan Hui branch of Ruism (Guo, “Zhuangzi de pipan,” in Guo Moruo quanji, Lishi bian, vol. 2 (Beijing: Renmin, 1982), pp. 188-212 cited in Cook [1997]: p. 521).

59 Graham (2001): p. 118.

27

observations about the thought elements that Zhuangzi adopted from other thinkers or

schools, specifically from Huizi.

Huizi’s influence on Zhuangzi is evidenced by presence of ideas in the Neipian

which are Huizi’s ideas or are akin to his ideas. Feng Youlan, who considers Huizi to

be the thinker who greatly influenced Zhuangzi, has identified parts in the Neipian that

show Zhuangzi had been influenced by Huizi. According to Feng, these sections are in

the “Qiwulun”. The sections are similar to some of Huizi’s paradoxes cited in the

Zhuangzi’s “Tianxia”. The table below shows “Qiwulun” sections that correspond to

Huizi’s paradoxes.60

“Qiwulun” section

Huizi’s paradox

“Simultaneously with being alive one dies, and simultaneously with dying one is being alive” [方生方死，方死方生]61

“Simultaneously with being at noon the sun declines, simultaneously with being alive a thing dies.” [日方中方睨，物方生方死]62

“Nothing in the world is bigger than the tip of an autumn hair” [天下莫大於秋毫之末]63

“The sky is as low as the earth, the mountains are level with the marshes” [天與地卑，山與澤平]64

“Heaven and earth were born together with me, and the myriad things and I are one” [天地與我並生，而萬物與我為

一]65

“Let your love spread to all myriad things; heaven and earth count as one unit” [氾愛萬物，天地一體也]66

According to Feng, the presence of the sections in the Neipian indicates that Zhuangzi

adopted the corresponding “paradoxical” views of Huizi. If this is correct, it could be

said that the Neipian shows some proof for the occurrence of doctrinal exchange.

It must, however, be noted that in Zhuangzi, the case of doctrinal exchange or

adoption of ideas is not about resolving the period’s unrest. Zhuangzi’s reason for

adopting other thinkers’ views seems to be to express his concern about the solutions

proposed by the thinkers and the debates about the solutions between the thinkers.

60 Feng (1952): p. 196. 61 Graham (2001): p. 52. 62 Ibid., p. 283. 63 Ibid., p. 56. 64 Ibid., p. 283. 65 Ibid., p. 56. 66 Ibid., p. 284.

28

1.5 Conclusion

I have presented some evidence for the phenomenon of doctrinal exchange that

occurred during the Warring States period in this chapter. I have also elaborated on the

reason for the occurrence of the phenomenon and one factor which contributed to

doctrinal plurality. It is hoped that these discussions provide support for the view that

Zhuangzi had been influenced by Yangist ideas. It is my observation that the Neipian

contains elements which are actually Yangist or are akin to Yangist ideas. As

mentioned, scholars have observed that Zhuangzi, according to the Neipian, had been

influenced not just by Yangist ideas but also by other thinkers’ ideas of the period.

That is, this means that Zhuangzi is one of those Warring States’ thinkers who

borrowed and adopted ideas from other thinkers. In this thesis, I focus on the Yangist

ideas which Zhuangzi borrowed and adopted in his philosophy.

29

2. Yangist Ideas

Introduction

In this chapter, I explore the ideas attributed to Yang Zhu in the available text

materials. In each of the following sections, I present the background of the text that is

relevant to this study and then proceed to present the themes or ideas. I discuss the

texts in chronological order in terms of the accepted dates of their composition.

Therefore, I discuss the Mencius first, followed by the Lüshi chunqiu, the Huainanzi,

and then the Liezi.

2.1 In the Mencius

Although the fact that the Mencius is a Warring States text is an important

feature, two already mentioned problems concerning it must be again noted. These are:

(1) that the relevant passages are only three short passages (3B.9, 7A.26 and 7B.26),1

and (2) that the account provided is hostile to Yang Zhu’s philosophy. These problems

entail that the information is partial and, with the passages’ account being hostile to

Yang Zhu’s doctrine, they make the Mencius account unreliable. Despite these

problems, however, the Mencius passages are still considered informative.2 They

provide a view on Yang Zhu’s philosophy that must be taken into account by anyone

who studies Yangist ideas.

In this section, before exploring the Mencius’ account of Yang Zhu’s

philosophy, I discuss evidence from the Mencius that proves the existence of a Yangist

movement. The scantiness of text materials for the study of Yangist ideas suggests that

the movement thought to be initiated by Yang Zhu3 may not have existed at all. It is

only the Mencius that provides the evidence that there was very likely a movement.

2.1.1 Was there a Yangist movement?: Evidence from the Mencius

The possibility that Yang Zhu’s movement may not have existed at all is made

more likely if it is true that Yang Zhu was only a peripheral thinker, without the

1 3B.9 is a long passage but its reference to Yang Zhu is concentrated in one brief portion. 2 7B.26 though seems to not provide much information about Yang Zhu’s philosophy. It only

seems to indicate the existence of the Yangist movement and the movement’s influence in the Warring States period.

3 Cf. Graham (1989): p. 54.

30

dynamism and following to initiate a group or movement. The Chinese scholar Qian

Mu 錢穆 is known to advocate the view that Yang Zhu was not a well-known

contemporary of Mencius. He speculated that Mencius brought up the obscure Yang

Zhu only to show the insignificance of Mozi’s position during his time.4 Paul Goldin

has recently proffered the view that “passage of time, and with it the proliferation of

unfounded speculations regarding Yang [Z]hu, has only made [Mu’s] suggestion more

compelling.”5

However, Mu’s suggestion is doubtful. This is because if it is the case that

Yang Zhu was an insignificant thinker, then it would have been indicated, in one way

or another, in the text that Yang Zhu’s ideas were not worth considering. But textual

evidence indicates the contrary. The Mencius indicates that Yang Zhu’s ideas were

worth considering because Mencius was sufficiently bothered about Yang Zhu’s

philosophy to mention it. In Mencius 3B.9, Mencius explains why he became “fond of

disputation” and says that it was due to his apprehension that chaos, in which people

devoured other people, might occur. He considered such chaos as caused by the

teachings of Mozi and Yang Zhu. In the passage, Mencius says:

No sage kings have appeared since then. Feudal lords do as they please; people lacking in official position are uninhibited in the expression of their views, and the words of Yang Chu [Yang Zhu] and Mo Ti [Modi 墨翟] fill the empire. The teachings current in the empire are those of the school of Yang or of the school of Mo. … If the way of Yang and Mo does not subside and the way of Confucius does not shine forth, the people will be deceived by heresies and the path of morality will be blocked. When the path of morality is blocked, then we show animals the way to devour men, and sooner or later it will come to men devouring men. Therefore, I am apprehensive. I wish to safeguard the way of the former sages against the onslaughts of Yang and Mo and to banish excessive views. Then there will be no way for advocates of heresies to arise. For what arises in the mind will interfere with policy, and what shows itself in policy will interfere with practice. Were a sage to rise again, he will surely agree with what I have said.6

4 Qian Mu, Xian-Qin zhuzi xinian [Dating of the pre-Qin philosophers], 2nd ed. (Hong Kong:

Hong Kong University Press, 1956), §80 cited in Goldin (2003b): p. 205; also cited in Schwartz (1985): pp. 259-260.

5 Goldin (2003b): p. 205. 6 Lau (2003): pp. 142-143.

31

It is clear that Yang Zhu and his philosophy are not just mentioned in passing here.

The passage indicates that Yang Zhu, together with Mozi, had been viewed as a

potential great hurdle to the “the way of the former sages”. According to Mencius,

Mozi’s philosophy and Yang Zhu’s philosophy “fill[ed] the empire” (ying tianxia

盈天下) and needed to “subside” (xi 息).7 Unless Mencius is an inaccurate observer of

society or is exaggerating, it can be granted that Yangist views were popular in those

days (and thus worth considering). In the passage, he is also suggesting the need to

defend the ways of the ancient sages against “the onslaughts of Yang and Mo”. Such a

statement suggests that Yang Zhu’s ideas were influential.

There is also a passage in the Mencius which very clearly indicates that Yang

Zhu’s group was one of the three prevalent groups in Mencius’s time, and that Yang

Zhu was famous and that his movement existed. The passage is 7B.26:

Mencius said, “Those who desert the Mohist school are sure to turn to that

of Yang; those who desert the Yang school are sure to turn to the

Confucianist. When they turn to us we simply accept them. Nowadays,

those who debate with the followers of Yang and Mo behave as if they were

chasing strayed pigs. They are not content to return the pigs to the sty, but

go on to tie their feet up.”8

The Confucians and the Mohists were the two dominant “established traditions of

thought”9 in the Warring States period. If a group competed with them, that group

would be a rival of some considerable influence.10 Thus, it can be said that there was a

Yangist movement, specifically during Mencius’s time or, at least, in Mencius’s

view.11 In conclusion, although it would appear that what has been proven is only that

7 Xi 息 in this passage is also translated as “to cease”, which further suggests the grave extent and intensity of both Mohist and Yangist philosophies during Mencius’s time.

8 Lau (2003): p. 321. An important question raised by this passage is, Why would a Yangist convert to Confucianism? Based on Mencius 3B.9, Yang Zhu is said to be denying a state king’s rule over him. Would this mean a return to the fold of the state court? Another question relates to “Daoist” philosophy: Where are the “Daoists” in this picture? Could this be a proof that Daoism really began with “Yangism”?

9 Schwartz (1985): p. 255. 10 The translation of the statement in 3B.9 as: “If a doctrine does not lean toward Yang Zhu,

then it leans toward Mozi” (Van Norden [2008]: p. 85) may be recalled to prove this point further. 11 The Confucians, the Mohists and Yang Zhu’s followers, according to Feng Youlan, were the

“three legs of a tripod.” Feng (1952): p. 135.

32

Yangist ideas prevailed in the period of the Warring States, the prevalence of such

ideas can be thought of as suggesting the existence of a Yangist movement. The

problem is just that there is, regrettably, not much available textual material for its

study.

Before concluding this section, there is an observation by A.C. Graham which

is relevant to the discussion here. This observation shows that there was a Yangist

movement. According to Graham, despite the limited evidence, there was such a

movement but its “founder” might not be Yang Zhu. Yang Zhu’s name came up and

was used only to “label the teaching” that the thinkers criticised. Graham’s view is

based on his examination of the passages considered to be Yangist, specifically the

ones where Yang Zhu is mentioned.12 Graham writes:

A suspicion arises that… it is not so much that Mencius and the rest of them

wanted to tell us what Yang [Z]hu taught as that they needed a name to

label the teaching, it being the convention to call each school after a

supposed founder. No writings of Yang [Z]hu are listed in the Han

bibliography; perhaps one should not think of an organized school with a

book and a founder but rather of a movement with various teachers, among

whom Yang [Z]hu attracted the most attention outside but not necessarily

within the group.13

Given that the “Yangist” chapters in the Lüshi chunqiu do not refer to Yang Zhu, it

seems that Graham’s view is likely true. These Lüshi chunqiu chapters in question lend

weight to the existence of the movement. The ideas they present are closely related or

perhaps identical to Yang Zhu’s views which were prevalent during that period. Thus

his view suggests the existence of a movement that Mencius and other thinkers

attacked.

12 I note, however, that although the Lüshi chunqiu passage that mentions Yang Zhu (Book 17,

chapter 7 “Bu er”, section 1A) does seem to contrast his philosophy with other thinkers, it is not the kind of contrast made in the Mencius and in the Huainanzi. The Lüshi chunqiu passage lists virtually no one outside the famous thinkers of the time and mentions the ideas that each of them advocated.

13 Graham (1985): pp. 73-74.

33

2.1.2 Weiwo 為我

The passages 3B.9 and 7A.26 mention that 為我 is the core doctrine of Yang

Zhu’s thought. They state this in the following specific sections:

[3B.9] The maxim of the Yangists is ‘Each for himself,’ a world of men

without rulers [楊氏為我, 是無君也]; the maxim of the Mohists is ‘Universal

love,’ a world of men without fathers. To know no father and no ruler – this

is to be nothing but a beast.14

[7A.26] Mencius said, “Yang Tzu [Yangzi] chooses egoism [楊子取為我].

Even if he could benefit the Empire by pulling out one hair he would not do

it [拔一毛而利天下，不為也].”15

Weiwo (weideeming or doing (for) woI: self) in the passages is understood by D.C. Lau,

the translator, as “egoism”.16 In 3B.9, according to Mencius, Yang Zhu’s adoption of

weiwo is equivalent to the denial of one’s prince or having no prince (wujun 無君), and

having no prince is to be like beasts. The reason why Mencius thinks that weiwo

amounts to wujun, and wujun is to be like beasts, is understood through Mencius’s

reference to Gongming Yi’s statement which follows the quoted passage above.

Gongming Yi’s statement is: “In your kitchen there is fat meat, and in your stables

there are fat horses. Your people look gaunt, and in the wilds are the bodies of those

dead of starvation. This is to lead animals to devour people”. This statement

specifically helps to explain why weiwo amounts to wujun. According to Gongming

Yi’s statement, which is addressed to a junprince (a ruler), the junprince is only nourishing

himself and is concerned with strengthening his army (‘In your kitchen there is fat

meat, and in your stables there are fat horses’), and he is not feeding his people (that is

why they look gaunt and are dying of starvation). By mentioning this statement of

Gongming Yi, Mencius is saying that, first, with what the junprince is doing, the junprince

is weiwo. Secondly, Mencius is saying that because the junprince is weiwo, the people

are living like they do not have a junprince (wujun), because they do not have one

14 Eno (2010): p. 2. 15 Lau (2003): p. 299. 16 In Yuet Keung Lo’s philological analysis of terms in the Lunyu that relate to the self, 我 (wo)

is seen as the best candidate for “personal identity,” constituted by the inner core and the outer (i.e. physical) core. Lo (2003): pp. 256-257.

34

looking after them. The reason why weiwo amounts to wujun, then, is that a prince

who is weiwo (who only looks after himself) does not look after his people. To have a

prince who does not look after his people is like having no prince (wujun).

About wujun (“to know no prince”) as “to be nothing but beasts”, it could then

be explained that wujun is “to be nothing but beasts” because the people do not have

anyone looking after them. They live like beasts.

In 7A.26, Mencius gives the essence of Yang Zhu’s position. His pithy

elaboration of his description of Yang Zhu – that Yang Zhu practised egoism since he

would not offer a single hair for “the Empire’s advantage” (li tianxia 利天下) – seems

to make clear that weiwo certainly means “egoism”. That is, a person who would not

offer a morsel of help to the promotion of her society would definitely be judged as

egoistic. She would be judged as someone who does not care. She could help, but

chooses not to.

Despite this, there is still a problem about how to interpret Mencius’s view of

Yang Zhu in the passages. This is because scholars have wondered whether Mencius

misrepresented Yang Zhu. By virtue of the fact that Yang Zhu and Mencius were

adversaries, it might be said that he most probably did. It could also be said that

Mencius’s presentation of Yang Zhu’s view is a straw person argument,

misrepresenting Yang Zhu’s philosophy.

Before discussing some scholars’ views about Mencius’ representation of Yang

Zhu, it is important to note that the problem is also due to the ambiguity of the phrase

li tianxia 利天下. 利 (li) in the phrase is indeterminate: li tianxia could mean ‘providing

libenefit/profit for the empire’ or it could also mean ‘liprofiting/benefiting from the empire for

oneself’.17 One possible reason for the difficulty is that what is being studied is the

written formulation of the principle. According to A.C. Graham, it is possible that the

written form has rendered the original teaching of Yang Zhu ambiguous. Graham’s

explanation about this is the following:

If Yangism began like Confucianism and Mohism as oral teaching, it is conceivable that slogans about refusing to use the world for one’s profit might be unambiguous in speech and yet seem to reverse their meaning as soon as they are written down.18

17 See more discussion on this in Defoort (2008): pp. 172-174. 18 Graham (1985): pp. 81-82 (n. 25).

35

Although according to Graham here, Yang Zhu’s philosophy is really not egoism, the

point that the written formulation changes the meaning is noteworthy. It is noteworthy

because what is available is the written formulation, which is ambiguous.

There are two camps of scholars who responded to this issue. There are those

who say that that Mencius misrepresented Yang Zhu; and there are those who say he

did not. Those who say that Mencius did misrepresent Yang Zhu believe that Yang

Zhu’s concern was on valuing and protecting one’s life, which essentially means not

harming it, and that this concern ought to be others’ concern as well. Declaring that

Mencius is “certainly guilty of misrepresentation,” D.C. Lau notes that the point of

Yang Zhu’s weiwo is that it teaches that human beings’ most valuable possession is

their life.19 Gu Jiegang also believes that Mencius misrepresented Yang Zhu, because

what Yang Zhu really meant is that even if he (Yang Zhu) would enjoy the benefit of

being able to rule by offering a strand of hair, he still would not do it.20 He still would

not do it because Yang Zhu knew that ruling an empire would ultimately lead to

harming himself, i.e. harming his life. The followers of Yang Zhu then would not see

their master’s choice as a selfish act, because they would realise that choosing to not

contribute is “better for them too”.21 If Gu is right, it could be said that Yang Zhu

indeed simply followed a philosophy of valuing and protecting one’s life, one that

others as well could benefit from.

Those who say that Mencius rightly characterised Yang Zhu see Yang Zhu as

an egoist. An egoist is one who believes that there is nothing more important than

one’s self. Holding that belief, an egoist then further believes that any action one does

ought to be done only for the benefit of one’s self. An egoist who believes that human

actions are motivated only by self-interest is a psychological egoist. An egoist who

highlights the egoistic imperative22 is an ethical egoist.23 From the point of view of an

ethical egoist, promoting one’s own welfare is always right.24 The scholars who see

Yang Zhu as an egoist see him either as (1) a psychological egoist or (2) an ethical

egoist. Bryan Van Norden believes that Yang Zhu’s egoism is likely a version of

19 Lau (2003): p. xxxii. 20 Gu Jiegang, “Cong Lushi chun qiu tuice Laozi zhi cheng shu niandai,” in Gushi bian 4

(Taipei: Landeng wenhua, 1987), pp. 493-494 cited in Defoort (2008): p. 173. 21 Defoort (2008): p. 173. This is expounded on in Defoort (2008): p. 173. 22 This imperative says that humans have the obligation to do only what is of interest to them. 23 Ivanhoe and Van Norden (2005): p. 369. 24 Wong (2008). Cf. Chong (2003): p. 241.

36

ethical egoism.25 He also says that Yang Zhu, if he is as an ethical egoist, would be

more philosophically interesting, in that ethical egoism is an option that is there for

people. Psychological egoism has been definitively refuted through cases of “altruistic

motivations and self-destructive motivations”.26 Ethical egoism, on the other hand, is a

“live philosophical option”.27 That is, there is no reason why a person cannot become

an ethical egoist.

If Van Norden’s view that Yang Zhu held ethical egoism is correct, Yang

Zhu’s ethical egoism would be considered as universal ethical egoism. A universal

ethical egoist is one who says that others ought to act in their own self-interest as she

does.28 However, it seems that, on the basis of Yang Zhu’s historical context, A.C.

Graham is right in stating that “[r]ather than misrepresenting Yang [Z]hu’s philosophy,

Mencius may be exposing what he sees as the doctrine’s selfish implications, which

Yang [Z]hu is trying to hide”.29 Perhaps from the point of view of the Yangists, weiwo

is just the basic concern for one’s well-being, which for them is true to the mandate of

Heaven.30 If it is, it might be asked what caused Yang Zhu and his followers to

practice weiwo, an answer to which would shed light on whether the practice of weiwo

is truly egoistic or not at all. For if the cause is that their rulers had abandoned them

and had left them unfed or uncared for, then perhaps their practice of weiwo ought not

to be judged as egoistic. Weiwo was a justified practice. It would be seen by others as

not egoistic at all. From Mencius’s point of view, however, even though to others’ eyes

Yang Zhu’s principle might have looked not egoistic and is a justified personal

conviction, and to the Yangists themselves a plain concern for the self, it is impossible

for anyone who practices weiwo not to be or become an egoist. To Mencius, Yangism

is definitely, at its core, egoism.

25 Van Norden (2007): p. 206. On the possibility of ethical egoism as a moral principle (i.e. specifically on contexts where a

principle of egoism is possible), see Chong (1992): pp. 23-36; Chong (1996): pp. 12-30. 26 Van Norden (2007): p. 206. 27 Ibid. 28 It must be noted, however, that although universal ethical egoism may not be like individual

ethical egoism (one that disregards anything else), it is in the final analysis promoting the latter. See Hinman (2008): pp. 114-115.

29 Graham (1985): p. 76. 30 That self-concern is true to tianming will be clear in the discussion of the “metaphysical

crisis” brought about by Yang Zhu’s conception of 性 (xingnature).

37

2.1.3 Yang Zhu’s Doctrine and scepticism about involvement in official life

Based on the view that Mencius misrepresented Yang Zhu and that Yang Zhu’s

doctrine is really about valuing and protecting one’s life, a view on what Yang Zhu

thought about involvement in official life might be inferred. As the focus of Yang Zhu

is the protection of one’s life, it could be said that he deemed involvement in official

life as antithetical to his doctrine. Participating in official life would be antithetical to

Yang Zhu’s doctrine of valuing and protecting life, because serving as an official in the

government entails being in a situation which would ultimately lead to harming

oneself, one’s life.31 If Yang Zhu regarded involving in official life as a path to

harming one’s self, he would be sceptical about and be opposed to such involvement.

There seems to be evidence that proves that this view that Yang Zhu was

sceptical about involvement as an official in government is incorrect. The evidence,

which will also be mentioned in the following section, is the Lüshi chunqiu “Yangist”

chapters that demonstrate that later “Yangists” had ideas about the ideal purpose of

government, implying an imperative for a Yangist, which is to be involved in

government. These chapters point out that quanxing or quansheng is the reason for the

state’s existence.32 However, the possibility that Yang Zhu’s philosophy underwent

modification with the later Yangists must be noted. The passages come from the Lüshi

chunqiu, which is a late Warring States text whose compilation was completed in 239

BCE. Because the passages come from a later text, the Yangist ideas they expound

could be a modified (and became a variant) version of Yang Zhu’s philosophy.

2.1.4 Weiwo and Yangist concern for others

Is there any evidence that Yangists cared about the well-being of others? The

evidence, pointed out by Kwong-loi Shun, consists of passages in the Lüshi chunqiu,

particularly in Books 2/2 “Gui sheng” 《貴生》 and 21/4 “Shen Wei” 《審為》. These

passages indicate that the Yangists were concerned about other people because they

show that the Yangists proposed nourishing of xing 性/sheng 生33 as a way of life

people should adopt,34 which is an interpretation that makes the Yangist conception of

31 Defoort (2008): p. 173. 32 Shun (1997): p. 46. 33 Xing 性 and sheng 生 are closely related concepts, as will be discussed. 34 Shun (1997): p. 46.

38

xing closer to Mencius’s conception of it, namely, that it is innately benevolent.35

Through these passages, the “Yangist concern with [xing/sheng] was not necessarily

linked to an indifference to others.”36 According to Shun, the passages seem to prove

that Yangism was also other-regarding or that this was a trend of it in the movement.37

He says that Yangists cared about others since in the Lüshi chunqiu chapters, one of

Yang Zhu’s doctrines, quanxing (quancompletion of xing/sheng), is viewed as the reason

for the existence of a state.38

Assuming that the Yangists portrayed in the Lüshi chunqiu are immediate

followers of Yang Zhu,39 one response is that it is not “egoism” that Yang Zhu held.

That is, perhaps the idea of “egoism” is not apt to capture his view. Perhaps Yang

Zhu’s view is a form of individualism or, according to John Emerson, “privatism”. By

“privatism”, Emerson means Yang Zhu’s position about how others ought to be

regarded. It is the “elevation” of one’s concern for things related to herself and to her

immediate significant others.40 According to this, it is not that relations with the public

are totally abandoned; it is only that the affairs directly related to oneself and to people

close to the self are given priority. According to Emerson, because the Chinese terms

used by Yangism (namely, 生, 性 and 身) to explain its doctrines evoke and are related

35 William Boltz makes this point. Boltz (2000): p. 225. 36 Shun (1997): p. 47. 37 Ibid., p. 46. 38 Ibid. If this is the case, why do the Yangist chapters idealise “Yangist” individuals who

scorned participating in government? In Shun’s response to this he points out that the source of the problem is critical. He writes:

A possible answer is suggested by passages containing a negative assessment of current officeholders. Although the purpose of government is to complete sheng, the deluded lords of the time harmed sheng and could not avoid the destruction of their state. Similar judgments of contemporary rulers can be found elsewhere. The point seems to be that those currently in office were concerned primarily with possessions, including political power, and as a result brought disorder to society. If this was the source of the problem, then the remedy would be to have those who did not care about possessions rule. And this idea is present in the Yangist chapters. (Shun [1997]: p. 46)

Thus, there is a reason why the Yangist chapters do so. It is that the Yangists actually had believed that these individuals would solve the problem of disorder, because they did not care about possessions.

39 An answer that could be given concerns the date of the evidence, that is, the dates of the passages’ text. Since they come from a late Warring States text Lüshi chunqiu, whose compilation was completed in 239 BCE, it could mean that the Yangist thought expounded on in the compendium could be a later development of the philosophy. It is possible that it is a later version of Yangism which is one that has a Daoist-Syncretic tincture, that is, with an emphasis on rulership and political order. Therefore, Yang Zhu’s view may have been modified by his later followers.

40 Emerson (1996): pp. 534, 549-550.

39

to concepts of family attachment, the Yangist position encompassed a familial

teaching.41 That is, that it is privatist but not individualist.42 “Yang [Zhu] did not

liberate the ‘individual’ from his obligations”.43 To the Yangists, thus, the state in

which they belong is an extension of their own family.

In concluding this section on Yangist ideas in the Mencius, if one adopts

Mencius’s perspective, Yang Zhu would certainly look like an ethical egoist. Even if

Yang Zhu and his followers hold that it is a philosophy of valuing and protecting life

they are advocating, for Mencius, such philosophy is ethical egoism in disguise. It

could also be said that the ulterior motive of the philosophy of valuing and protecting

life which Yang Zhu held, is selfishness.

2.2 In the Lüshi chunqiu

Completed around 239 BCE through the patronage of the then Qin prime

minister Lü Buwei (ca. 290-235 BCE),44 the Lüshi chunqiu is a compendium that

aimed at creating a “unified and comprehensive body of wisdom out of the diversity

[of philosophical positions] that characterized [the Warring States] philosophical

world”.45 The purpose of the compendium was to serve as a guide “for the rulership of

the empire”.46

Although scholars note that there are chapters of the Lüshi chunqiu that have

similar themes to those attributed to Yang Zhu in the Huainanzi, what is important in

this subsection is only one passage in the text. This passage is Section 1A of Book 17,

chapter 7 “Bu er”:

If you heed the arguments of a multitude of individuals as a means of

ordering the state, it will be endangered in no time. How does one know that

this is so? Lao Dan esteemed softness [老耽貴柔], Confucius benevolence,

41 Ibid., p. 550. 42 Ibid., pp. 534, 549-550. 43 Ibid., p. 550. 44 According to its Postface, the “Almanacs” was completed around this year. Knoblock and

Riegel (2000): pp. 19-20, 27. 45 Cook (2002): pp. 307-308. 46 Ibid., pp. 311-312. According to Cook, this explanation “goes back to at least the Yuan

Dynasty” (1271-1368 CE). See also p. 312 (note 10).

40

Mo Di [concern for all], Master Guanyin purity, Master Lie Yukou

emptiness, Tian Pian equanimity, Yang Zhu (Sheng) the self [楊朱(生)貴己],

Sun Bin strategic position, Wang Liao going first, and Ni Liang going last.47

This passage is important here because it contains a presentation of an idea that Yang

Zhu prized. It says that 楊朱(生)貴己 (Yang Zhu valued jiself).48 It is possible that this

idea is Yang Zhu’s main or focal idea due to the nature of the passage. The passage is

one in which the author(s) is saying to the ruler or would-be ruler to not listen to many

ideas. The author seems to suggest that the ruler heeds only one idea. The author’s

reason why he thinks the state will be endangered if the ruler adopts a multitude of

ideas is that, first, the thinkers valued different ideas or doctrines and consequently, it

would be presumed that neither of them will agree with any other; and secondly, some

of the ideas the thinkers valued contradict, namely what Wang Liao and Ni Liang

valued. According to the author, if the ruler adopts all the views, his state would surely

be unstable and be endangered. Because this is the objective of the passage, the

assigned ideas or themes, then, are only what the author believes the thinkers valued

(貴).

2.2.1 Ji 己: “self”

If the author of the passage believes that it is 己 (jiself) which is central to Yang

Zhu’s thought, what does 己 (jiself) mean? The Shuowen jiezi 《說文解字》 notes that 己

(jiself) is the opposite of 人 (renothers) and that it refers to the idea that self is the centre

(from the idea that a person views from her own perspective).49 The definition of jiself

as the opposite of renothers is clear in the use of 己 in some pre-Qin texts. In the Lunyu,

for example, we have 1.8 and 5.16 which show that 己 is contrasted to others. In 1.8,

part of what the Master says is: “無友不如己者” [“Do not have as a friend anyone who

is not as good as you are”].50 This injunction marks out a person (jiself) from others.

47 Knoblock and Riegel (2000): p. 433. According to John Knoblock, the ten thinkers in the

passage are “knights of outstanding talent”. Knoblock and Riegel (2000): p. 405. 48 There is, however, an important note about this, which is that there is doubt whether the

“Yang Sheng” mentioned here really refers to Yang Zhu. D.C. Lau believes it refers to Yang Zhu. Lau (1992): p. 85.

49 Shuowen jiezi《說文解字》四部叢刊初編 volumes 66~69. 景日本岩崎氏靜嘉堂藏北宋刊本

本書一五卷, compiled by Xu Shen （漢）許慎撰（宋）徐鉉等奉敕校定, 卷十五, 己部, 9699. 50 Ames and Rosemont (1998): p. 73.

41

5.16 says: “子謂子產, ‘有君子之道四焉: 行己也恭, 其事上也敬, 其養民也惠, 其使民也義.’

[The Master remarked that Zichan accorded with the way of the exemplary person in

four respects: he was gracious in deporting himself, he was deferential in serving his

superiors, he was generous in attending to needs of the common people, and he was

appropriate in employing their services].”51 In this passage, 己 is used to signify what

the person is like in private, as opposed to his other projects in nourishing (養) the

people.

Given that jiself is the opposite of renothers, it could be said that jiself refers to the

individual person. If jiself refers to the individual person and if jiself is indeed the focal

theme of Yang Zhu’s philosophy, it can be said then that the author(s) of the above

passage thinks that Yang Zhu’s philosophy is all about the individual person (hence, of

one’s self). This point of the author is not different from Mencius’ statement about

Yang Zhu, namely, that Yang Zhu advocated 為我 (everyone for himself). That is

because if Yang Zhu advocated “everyone for himself”, then it can be said that his

philosophy was all about jiself. A thinker who believes that weidoing for: catering to womyself is

paramount could be said as one who values jiself and as one whose philosophy is about

jiself.

Moreover, given that Yang Zhu’s philosophy focussed on jiself, it can be said

that Yang Zhu valued the self’s capacity to desire (欲, yu) and to will (志, zhi). This is

because of the idea that jiself, as seeming to signify the non-physical self, is constituted

by the power of wanting and willing. This idea on jiself derives from Yeut Keung Lo’s

analysis of the character jiself in the Lunyu.52 An analysis that elaborates on Herbert

Fingarette’s observation,53 Lo’s analysis reveals that the character 己 appears to signify

the inner psychic self. As the inner core (though not restricted to it), jiself “controls how

and what we desire and will to do”.54 With such conception of jiself, important insights

about Yang Zhu’s philosophy are brought to light.

51 Ibid., p. 99. 52 Lo (2003): pp. 257-261. The idea seems connected to the meaning of the character’s ancient

form (graph), which, according to Livia Kohn, shows “an organized structure, something one can see on the outside, something that can be made and controlled.” Knaul (Kohn) (1992): p. 127.

53 Fingarette (2003): pp. 285-288. 54 Lo (2003): pp. 258, 260-261.

42

2.3 In the Huainanzi

The Huainanzi is a Former Han dynasty (202 BCE- 9CE) compendium. It was

composed under the patronage of Liu An (179-122 BCE), who also edited and co-

authored it. Most of the Huainanzi was written during the reign of Emperor Jing (157-

141 BCE),55 but it was presented in the time of Emperor Wu (156-87 BCE) in 139

BCE. As a political compendium, the work’s main preoccupation is the attempt to

provide the necessary set of conditions that would bring about the ideal socio-political

order.56

The passage which identifies three doctrines of Yang Zhu is in the thirteenth

chapter, “Boundless Discourses” (Fanlunxun).57 It begins passage 13.9:

Singing to the strings and dancing to the drum to make music, deferential

bows and turns to train one in ceremony, elaborate funerals and prolonged

mourning to send of the dead –

these Confucius advocated but Mo-tzu [Mozi] condemned.

Concern for everyone, elevation of worth, service to the ghosts, rejection of

Destiny –

these Mo-tzu [Mozi] advocated but Yang-tzu [Yangzi] condemned.

Keeping one’s nature intact, protecting one’s genuineness, and not letting

the body be tied by other things [全性 保真，不以物累形] –

these Yang-tzu [Yangzi] advocated but Mencius condemned.58

The authors ascribed three doctrines to Yang Zhu: quanxing, baozhen and

buyiwuleixing. I discuss these doctrines below.

2.3.1 Quanxing 全性

Quanxing is translated as “keeping one’s xingnature intact”. Following A.C.

Graham, an analysis of the character 性 in light of some contemporary scholarship will

reveal the doctrine’s essential connotations and its possible relation to the related

55 Major et al (2010): p. 2. 56 LeBlanc (1993): p. 189. The political nature of the text is also clearly expressed in the work’s

“Yaolue”. See Murray (2004): pp. 45-46. 57 Chapter title translation is from Major et al (2010): p. 483. The alternative title given and

discussed by the translators is “Far-Reaching Assessments”. Ibid., p. 484. 58 A.C. Graham’s translation in (1989): p. 54.

43

textual materials. Xing 性 is commonly rendered as “nature”. According to Christoph

Harbsmeier, this translation points out the fact about each entity having only one

xing.59 In early China, in the pre-Yangist period, the conception of xing has dwelled on

the idea that each thing has only one “nature” but it was rather more related to the

physiological or physical, biological aspect of the term, specifically to health,

longevity, and livelihood.60 According to A.C. Graham, it is with the Yangists that

xing came to mean “nature” and be understood as the capacity to complete the term of

life destined for humans by tian 天.61

Semantically, xing 性 (noun) is related to sheng 生, a verb which means “to be

born, to be alive”.62 Aside from Graham’s position that the noun is derived from the

verb, a relation stressed by the Shuowen jiezi,63 sinologist William Boltz mentions that

their closer pronunciations (together with 情, qingemotion) reveal how closely related the

concepts are. According to Boltz:

All other things being equal, the closer the pronunciations (typically, but not

necessarily, when coupled with a compound graphic element), the likelier

the possibility of a semantic, i.e., a cognate or etymological, relation among

the words in question.64

The close affinity of xing to sheng is relevant here. This is because this makes the

meaning of xing to be closely related to the idea of “nature from birth” and this relates

it to xing as something being endowed to humans and present from birth. This is even

59 He says that “nature” as xing’s translation captures well the fact that “every thing only has

one [xing], whereas we would say it has many properties”. Harbsmeier (1998): p. 236. 60 Graham (1986): pp. 9-10. 61 Graham (1989): p. 56. According to Graham, xing 性 only came to enter philosophy with the

Yangists dealing with it. Graham (1986): p. 15. Regarding the translation of xing as human nature, Roger Ames has expressed qualms about

this. See Ames (1991): pp. 143-175. 62 Graham (1989): p. 56. 63 Graham (1989): p. 56. Shuowen Jiezi Zhu/Xu Shen zhuan; Duan Yucai zhu (Shuowen Lexicon

[1815], comp. Duan Yucai [1735–1815], China: Jing yun lou); Shanghai: Shanghai gu ji chu bon she: Xin hua shu dian (reprinted from the original 1981): p. 502 cited in Lai (2006a): p. 21. See also Boltz (2000): p. 226, for a morphological explanation of how the verb sheng might have been made into a noun xing.

64 Boltz (2000): p. 226; cf. Graham (1986): p. 9.

44

supported by a conclusion based on the phonetic relation specifically between xing and

sheng. According to Boltz:

The close relation between the graphs 生 and 性 is paralleled by a close

phonetic relation between the words that they write, viz., *sréng and *sèngs,

respectively. Apart from the -r- infix in *sréng and the difference between

the “acute” (é) and “grave” (è) finals, about which we can say little at this

stage in our knowledge of Old Chinese morphology or morphophonemics,

the principal difference between the two words is the presence of the final -s

suffix in shinq < *sèngs. Such an -s suffix has been recognized for some

time as functioning as a morphological formative, making concrete words

out of abstract ones. In the commonest instances, this means making nouns

out of verbs. And this seems like a reasonable possibility here: sheng <

*sréng ‘to be born, to engender, to be alive’ (VERB) and derivatively shinq

< *sèng-s ‘the innate, inborn; what is engendered’ > ‘natural, inborn

property’, ‘nature’ (NOUN).65

That xing (noun) is most probably derived from sheng (verb) shows how closely

related the two concepts are. The relation emphasizes the Yangist conception that tian

(heaven) is the source of xing, thus bringing about the Yangist definition of xing as

“primarily the capacity… to live out the term of life which heaven has destined for

man.”66 This also gives a general meaning of quankeep intact:make whole xingnature: it is the

completion of this xing. That is, the doctrine is an injunction to make certain that the

term of life allotted to humans be completed. In addition, the relation also points out

the conception of xing as dynamic (rather than static). This is because it emphasizes

not just a ‘natural’ or initial condition but how xing develops to attain fruition (its end).

It is with the Yangist definition of xing as the capacity to live out the term of

existence that certain Lüshi chunqiu passages thought to be related to Yangist thought

can be used to explain further the doctrine of quanxing. Quanxing entails that every

human life (生, sheng) has been allotted some specific years and it is the duty of human

beings to do everything within their capacity to ensure that their own endowments

65 Boltz (2000): p. 226.

66 Graham (1989): p. 56. Regarding the translation of xing as “human nature”, Roger Ames has expressed qualms about this. See his Ames (1991): pp. 143-175.

45

attain their completion, that is, attain their natural end. The Lüshi chunqiu’s Book 1,

chapter 2 “Ben Sheng” 《本生》, section 1 highlights this. This section states:

Heaven is what first engenders life in things; Man is what fulfills that life by

nurturing it. The person who is capable of nurturing the life that Heaven has

created without doing violence to it is called the Son of Heaven [天子]. The

purpose of all the Son of Heaven’s activity is to keep intact the life [全生]

Heaven originally engendered. This is the origin of the offices of

government. The purpose of establishing them was to keep life intact.67

According to this, the person who nurtures life is called 天子 (tianzi) and his activities

are geared towards 全生 (quansheng), “keeping life intact”. In the passage, it is even

stated that the existence of the state depends primarily on its purpose of quansheng

(thus, derivatively, also quanxing). In other words, “keeping life or one’s nature intact”

is not only every person’s duty, it is also the duty of the ruler to implement it in behalf

of the people. Perhaps the reason why quanxing here is viewed too as a concern of the

state is because this is a passage from the Lüshi chunqiu. As noted, the Lüshi chunqiu

is a guide “for the rulership of the empire”.68 Perhaps the authors of the guide believe

that it is important for the ruler to realise quansheng, as it is important for the people’s

welfare.

An important topic that should be explored here is the significance of xing 性 in

quanxing in early Chinese thought. This exploration also provides insights on the

nature of the doctrine. According to A.C. Graham, the focus on xing through the

doctrine ignited a philosophically-significant metaphysical crisis. He says that the

“crisis” forced the Confucians and the Mohists to reconsider the connections between

天 (tianheaven) and xing. If the fundamental desires and inclinations of human nature

essentially have been endowed by tian,69 then the Confucians and the Mohists had no

option but to consider seriously the inevitable conclusion that tian also mainly favours

all the tendencies, desires, and needs of xing. Graham explains thus:

67 Knoblock and Riegel (2000): p. 64. 68 Cook (2002): pp. 311-312. 69 Cf. Lüshi chunqiu 1/2.1.

46

It had never been questioned that Heaven, the power responsible for all

things being as they are, for the uncontrollable accidents of fortune and

misfortune, for whatever in man is innate and independent of his will, has

also ordained the principle by which we should live. How can the supreme

power not be on the side of all that by human standards is the best? Now for

the first time a metaphysical doubt enters Chinese thought, and a rift opens

between Heaven and man, between what is and what should be. If Heaven is

on the side of Yang Chu [Yang Zhu], on what is the morality of Confucians

and Mohists to rest?70

A significant point the Yangists raised (and thus brought about the “metaphysical

crisis”) is the question about the true nature of xing and tian, and the relationship

between them. According to Graham, the Yangist definition of xing as that which is

endowed by tian indicated that tian must concede to whatever human nature has been

naturally designed to perform, namely, the “nurturing and harmonising [of] the vital

tendencies and spontaneous inclinations”.71 This, in turn, is due to the very close

relation between xing and tian that the Yangists had conceived. As Karyn Lai writes,

“If Graham is correct, Yang Zhu’s doctrine espouses a much closer connection

between heaven and humanity than we see in the early Confucian theories”.72

Graham’s claim that the Yangist view on xing created a metaphysical crisis has

been seen as an exaggerated one. Attilio Andreini believes this is so because there is

not sufficient textual evidence to support that such crisis ever occurred. That is,

specifically, “the hypothesis [of the metaphysical crisis] relying on the fact that Yang

Zhu and other Yangist exponents decisively contributed to the debate on xing requests

more evidence”.73 Contrary to this view, however, the available evidence shows that it

is Yang Zhu who brought the question about the nature of xing to centre stage for

Mencius and other thinkers to debate. The Yangist conception of xing made it a bone

of contention for the early thinkers.

It could be that the crisis seen by Graham was not what started the disputation

on xing. This is because it is too much to say that xing, i.e. as the capacity and

70 Graham (1978): p. 17. 71 Ibid. 72 Lai (2008b): p. 46. 73 Andreini (2000): p. 79. I thank Francesco Paradiso for the translation.

47

propensity to quancomplete what tian endowed, began the series of discussions on human

nature. However, the crisis might still have occurred, except that it was not so much

about dealing with the nature of xing, as about the shift of attention and focus. The

shift was from the will of Heaven to human nature. Such shift is an idea expressive of

and in line with the focus of the Yangist project, which is the self and/or life.

2.3.2 Baozhen 保真: “protecting what is genuine”

In Disputers of the Tao, A.C. Graham quotes the Old Fisherman’s replies to

Kongzi’s question about what is genuine (zhen 真) in the Zhuangzi’s Zapian chapter

“Yufu” (“Old Fisherman”) to explain this doctrine.74 I examine them to aid in

disclosing the meaning of baozhen:

Confucius said solemnly

‘Let me ask what you mean by “genuine”.’

‘The genuine is the most quintessential, the most sincere. What fails to be

quintessential and sincere cannot move others. …. The man who is inwardly

genuine moves the external daemonically. This is why we value the

genuine.75

“Rites are something created by the vulgar men of the world; the Truth

[genuine, 真] is that which is received from Heaven. By nature it is the way it

is and cannot be changed. Therefore the sage patterns himself on Heaven,

prizes the Truth [genuine], and does not allow himself to be cramped by the

vulgar. The stupid man does the opposite of this. He is unable to pattern

himself on Heaven and instead frets over human concerns. He does not know

enough to prize the Truth [genuine] but instead, plodding along with the

crowd, he allows himself to be changed by vulgar ways, and so is never

content. Alas, that you fell into the slough of human hypocrisy at such an

early age, and have been so late in hearing of the Great Way!76

74 Graham (1989): p. 57.

75 Graham (2001): pp. 251-252; Graham (1989): p. 57. 76 Watson (1968): p. 350.

48

Before I present an analysis of this passage, I note that what prompted Confucius to

ask about zhen in the passage is the Fisherman’s prior statement or advice:

Earnestly cultivate your own person,

Carefully guard the genuine in you,

Turn back and leave other things to other people,

And then you will no longer be tied by involvements....77

It seems that the passages used by Graham, however, suggest nothing about the

“protection of genuineness”. What is clear in them are the ideas that “genuineness”

(zhen 真) is an inner quality and that “genuineness”, being something derived from

Heaven (於天), is to be valued and not to be constricted by customary rites (禮). If the

meaning of zhen (genuineness) here is taken as the Yangist meaning, that it is in one

way decreed by Heaven, it would appear that the doctrine of baozhen is likely to be

closely related to the first doctrine, quanxing 全性. This is because both xing and zhen

are related as they are thought to be endowed by Heaven.

If baozhen and quanxing are related ideas, then an explanation for the former

could be that the purity of one’s xing entrusted by tian contains what is genuine, and

thus must be preserved and made to manifest. But as quanxing relates more to the

preservation of the self in order to live out the self’s allotted term, both the doctrines of

quanxing and baozhen concern the protection of the “self’s or individual’s

authenticity”, which would include the authenticity of the physical body. One reason

why the “self’s authenticity” would include the authenticity of one’s physical body is

that scholars have pointed out that quanxing basically means looking after health and

life, which entails looking after the body.78 Another would be the tendency in some

pre-Qin texts (notably, the Lunyu) to see no dichotomy between the physical and non-

physical aspects of the self.79

That quanxing and baozhen could mean concern with the authenticity of the

physical body implies that both doctrines also deal with the preservation of shenbody,

77 Graham (2001): p. 251. 78 Graham (1985): p. 75. 79 Lo (2003): p. 256.

49

specifically not doing any harm or injury to it. The character 身, according to the

Shuowen jiezi, shows the physical form of a person.80 That the two doctrines deal with

shenbody is supported, first, by Yang Zhu’s refusal to sacrifice a part of his body (a

strand of hair) to li tianxia, which indicates Yang Zhu’s view of the need to preserve

the body.81 It is also supported by a tendency in a few Han texts to juxtapose or bring

the three concepts together: quanxing baozhen bukuiqishen 全性保真, 不虧其身, where

bukuiqishen means “do not harm shen” in the Huainanzi and the Wenzi 《精誠》. The

passages in question are:

Huainanzi 6.1: Now if you keep intact your nature and guard your

authenticity and do not do damage to your person, (when you) meet with

emergencies or are oppressed by difficulties, your essence will penetrate

(upward) to Heaven [夫全性保真，不虧其身，遭急迫難，精通於天]; You will be

like one who has not begun to emerge from his Ancestor – how can you not

succeed?82

Wenzi 2.3: Laozi says: “The master is a daozhe, he pursues completeness of

xing and protects what is genuine, does not harm his body, undergoes great

difficulty urgently to serve heaven [全性保真，不虧其身，遭急迫難，精通乎天],

as if he has not begun to match his ancestors ….83

This section from Huainanzi 6.1 is the introductory portion of a series of lessons or

morals set out in the passage. The passage starts with a retelling of some stories and

ends with the lessons. In stating this first lesson (about the importance of 全性保真,

不虧其身), it can be said that the juxtaposition of the three means is important, making

the relation of 全性, 保真 to 不虧其身 significant. Although the Wenzi 2.3 passage

contains the same characters from the Huainanzi passage (it is probable that one

copied from the other), the passages show that preservation of shenbody is a related

concept to quanxing and baozhen.

80 Shuowen jiezi《說文解字》四部叢刊初編 volumes 66~69. 景日本岩崎氏靜嘉堂藏北宋刊本

本書一五卷, compiled by Xu Shen （漢）許慎撰（宋）徐鉉等奉敕校定, 卷九, 身部, 5224. 81 Lewis (2006): p. 18. 82 Major et al (2010): p. 215. 83 The Wenzi 《精誠》 2.3

50

Furthermore, a passage from the Lüshi chunqiu (Book 1/ Chapter 3 “Zhong ji”

《重己》, section 2) appears to echo the pattern of thought about honoring what comes

from one’s genuineness, leading to the honoring of life, including the aspect of the

body. The passage says:

Were the strongman Wuhuo to pull the tail of an ox hard that the tail broke

off and he exhausted all his strength, he would not be able to move the ox

because he would be contravening the natural direction of the ox. But were

a lad a mere five cubits tall to pull the ox by its nose ring, the ox would

follow where he led because he would be according with the natural

direction of the ox. The rulers and eminent men of the present age, whether

worthy or not, all desire to prolong life and to see many days, yet each day

they contravene the natural course of their lives; how will what they do

increase what they desire? As a general principle, the prolongation of life

results from one’s following its natural course and what causes one not to

follow the natural course of life is desire. Thus, the sage is certain to give

priority to making his desires suitable.84

There seems to be an imperative to identify and acknowledge what is genuine in one’s

being (which includes one’s proclivities), which, in the passage, is defined as one’s

natural course. That is, that which is “given” or allotted be recognized and taken into

consideration; and one’s actions ought to be in accordance with what is there, with

what is “genuine”. But since these proclivities are embodied in one’s xing and body,

protecting genuineness would still necessarily involve the protection of the body.

Consequently, it would seem that though this doctrine of baozhen 保真 derives from

quanxing, it as well depends on it.

2.3.3 Buyiwuleixing 不以物累形: “not letting the body be weighed down by

things”

To understand this doctrine, it is important first to note the meaning of 物 (wu).

The term 物 refers to “things”, whether they be physical or non-physical. A passage in

84 Knoblock and Riegel (2000): pp. 68-69.

51

the Lüshi chunqiu (Book 16/ Chapter 8 “Zhengming” 《正名》, section 1) mentions 物

to mean “things”, without specifying physical things. The passage says:

If names are correct, there is order. If names are allowed to become

confused, there is disorder. What causes the confusion of names are

explanations that involve an excess of elegance and subtlety. If explanations

involve such excesses, then the not-acceptable is called acceptable, the not-

so is called so, the incorrect is called correct, and the not-wrong is called

wrong.

Thus, the explanations of the gentleman are sufficient to discuss the truth

of the worthy and the reality of the unworthy, but stop with that [that is all].

They are sufficient to illustrate the factors that cause disruption of order and

the causes from which disorder arises, but stop with that. They are sufficient

to know the essential nature of things [物] and what man must catch in order

to live, but stop with that.85

Although this is about 正名 (zhengrectification (of) mingnames) and the idea it conveys is that

there are limitations in language, there is no mention of ‘physical’ 物, nor is there

explicit mention of physical 物. This indicates that 物 just means “things”.

This doctrine, buyiwuleixing, ascribed to Yang Zhu has been generally

interpreted by scholars to mean non-involvement in the affairs of the state. A.C.

Graham, for example, points out in his discussion of the doctrine that “the extreme

example of endangering oneself by involvement with another thing is possession of a

state or the Empire itself.”86 This interpretation seems to be an offshoot of another

interpretation of buyiwuleixing. This other interpretation says that the doctrine is about

devaluating external things (物, wu). This interpretation is seen in Thomasine

Kushner’s view of Yang Zhu’s three doctrines. Kushner relates the doctrines,

specifically buyiwuleixing, to how Yang Zhu valued life and offers the interpretation

of it as principally the disregard for things external to life. According to Kushner,

[全性 保真，不以物累形，楊子之所立也] suggests that an understanding of the

importance of life entails the valuing of things internal to the self and the

85 Knoblock and Riegel (2000): pp. 400-401. 86 Graham (1989): p. 57.

52

disvaluing of those things which are external. Here the idea being stressed is

that the world is external to the self and only those things which lead to the

completion of life and the preservation of life concern the interior of the

person.... Thus, for Yang [Z]hu, all that is exterior [to the self] is of no value

and is fundamentally only a threat to life.87

Thus, if this interpretation is correct, it could explain why the doctrine is linked to

indifference toward and total disengagement from political affairs. According to it,

other things are viewed by the Yangists as worthless, in comparison with the self.

However, such interpretation presupposes a separation of the self and “the world”,

which is the dualist distinction between ‘self’ and ‘world’ derived from metaphysics in

western philosophy. It is unlikely to be the view of the early Chinese as they were

generally thought to be this-worldly, practical, people.88 They were engaged in the

world. That is, majority of their questions are concerned about how to run society and

how to live. Such questions made them regard the world as inseparable from their daily

life. Thus, it is perhaps more correct to view buyiwuleixing as the Yangist way of

asserting that one’s life is more valuable than other things [物] and that it is imperative

not to allow one’s self to be burdened or weighed down by them. The value that the

Yangists give to the self is clearly seen in the Yangist refusal to sacrifice or exchange a

single hair to li tianxia. On the assumption that the body is an essential component of

the self or even that the body could also refer to the self,89 the refusal also indicates

that a single part of one’s body is more valuable than any external object.90

A passage in the Lüshi chunqiu expresses the importance of the third doctrine

to the Yangist project of quanxing, which would provide another insight about

buyiwuleixing. It is in Book 1, chapter 2 (“Ben sheng”), section 2:

Although the true nature of water is to be clear [夫水之性清], dirt will disturb

this nature, and this is why it does not stay clear. Although it is the true

nature of man to live to an old age, [wuthings, 物] disturb this nature, and this

87 Kushner (1980): p. 321 88 Cf. Slingerland (2003): pp. 3-4; Feng (1947): pp. 2-3. 89 The modern meaning of shen 身 includes “the person, to oneself”. 90 Cf. Lewis (2006): p. 18.

53

taking part

ng,

is why people do not achieve longevity [壽]. [Wuthings, 物] should be used to

nurture our natures; we should not use our natures to nurture them....91

The characters 不以物累形 do not appear in the passage, but the idea of the doctrine is

conveyed through its statement on how things (wu 物) disturb the nature of humans so

that they do not gain longevity (shou 壽). The passage as a whole conveys the message

of non-attachment, specifically to wuthings. Wuthings are likened to dirt that disrupts

water’s real nature which is qing 清, clearness. The injunction “[wuthings, 物] should be

used to nurture [yang 養] our natures; we should not use our natures to nurture them”

suggests that human involvement with wuthings is to be limited only to treating them as

a source of nourishment. The reason for this is probably the Yangist ultimate goal of

living out the years allotted to humans (quan xing/sheng). That is, that human

engagement with wuthings requires having the objective of prolonging or completing 性,

that is, what they have been endowed with.

The doctrine of buyiwuleixing recalls the reason given by the recluses

mentioned in the Lunyu for dropping out from engaging in political affairs, namely,

that danger awaits those who choose to take government posts.92 In the eyes of the

pre-Qin Yangists, taking social and political responsibilities ultimately complicate

one’s existence. The Yangists were most probably cognizant of the anxiety-ridden

position of the rulers and their burdensome duties to their states and people. As A.C.

Graham pointed out, the Yangists would have come from a higher class than their

Mohist counterparts, a class who assumed that they (and any person) have an

important choice to make: that is “whether or not to benefit the empire by

in its government”.93 Thus, a common consequence of putting the Yangist teaching

into action is the act of renunciation or abdication. As pointed out by Aloysius Cha

Yangist disciples seem to be after the liberation of the inner self of the individual

which is only attainable if one renounces commitments and their extraneous desires.94

This liberation of the inner self, it must be noted, seems to contradict the view of the

91 Knoblock and Riegel (2000): pp. 64-65. 92 The Analects (Lunyu) 18.5. 93 Graham (1985): p. 79. 94 Chang (1971): pp. 65-67. This doctrine resembles that of Song Xing’s inner teaching

discussed in this thesis’ Appendix B.

54

early Chinese as “this-wordly” earlier mentioned. However, perhaps in the case of the

Yangists, they are liberated inwardly and yet are still involved with the world.

One other consequence would be becoming obscure and inconspicuous and be

reticent about political affairs, just as what the Yangists did. This act would certainly

show that social commitments are no longer their concern. According to Graham’s

summary of the Yang Zhu’s (earlier) philosophy conveyed in the Liezi “Yang Zhu”

pian, Yang Zhu “seems to have held that, since external possessions are replaceable

while the body is not, we should never permit the least injury to the body, even the

loss of a hair, for the sake of any external benefit, even the throne of the Empire.”95

This means that the Yangists denigrated involvement in social and political affairs. For

them, protecting the body is primary.

2.3.4 A possible generalisation of the three doctrines

Having explored the three doctrines and knowing that they are ideas ascribed

to Yang Zhu by Han scholars who wrote the Huainanzi, there seems to be a central

message being conveyed by quanxing, baozhen, and buyiwuleixing. This central

message is useful in assigning a general theme to Yang Zhu’s philosophy. I suggest

that although the doctrines seem to recommend “keeping to yourself”, they together

proffer self-preservation. That is, the preservation of one’s nature and also of the

physical body, which primarily involves doing no injury to the self (wo) and the body

(as mentioned 身 appears to also mean “self”). This was suggested by Feng Youlan

when he wrote that the Huainanzi passage about Yang Zhu’s doctrines is analogous to

the Lüshi chunqiu’s statement that “Yang Zhu valued jiself”. Feng states:

… Mencius’s account of Yang [Z]hu’s doctrine as ‘every one for himself’ is

obviously analogous to the [Lüshi chunqiu]’s statement that Yang Sheng

‘valued self’. So, too, is the [Huainanzi], when it speaks of [quanxing,

baozhen, and buyiwuleixing].96

In Mark Edward Lewis’s discussion on the body as aspect of early Chinese ideas on

spaces, Lewis also writes about this. He says that in Yangist thought, “[t]he clearest

95 Graham (1960): pp. 135-136. 96 Feng (1952): p. 134.

55

t for

e says:

demonstrations of the central role of the body … are assertions of the absurdity of

exchanging bodily parts for external objects.”97 What is indicated by Yangist refusal

to exchange bodily parts for the empire is the value they give to the body. The

Yangists give the body value but only to the extent that they desist exchanging i

the Empire’s benefit. Finally, one of the Lüshi chunqiu’s “Yangist” chapters, “Shen

Wei” contains a passage (section 1) which is about valuing 身. This passage also

shows a connection between 身 and another Yangist term, 生. The passag

The body is one what does things for [身者所為也]; the things of the world

are what one uses for that purpose. If you are attentive to what you use, then

what is unimportant and what is important will be treated suitably. Now,

suppose there was a man who cut off his head to change hats or killed

himself to change clothes; the world would surely think him mad. Why?

Because a hat decorates the head, and clothes the body. If you eliminate

what you want to decorate and concentrate on the adornment, it shows that

you do not understand what one does things for. Those of our age who

pursue profit resemble this. In the pursuit of profit, they endanger their

persons, harm their lives [危身傷生], cut their throats, and chop off their own

heads; they, too, do not understand what they do things for.98

The passage puts valuing 身 in the context of “what is the point of seeking profit (利)

to the extent of losing one’s life?”. It is the phrase 危身傷生 (endanger body, hurt life)

in the passage which shows the link between 身 and 生. The phrase first marks out that

身 and 生 are not the same thing. If they are the same, the two terms would not be used

in the same phrase. The terms are connected in that body or life could be lost in the

pursuit of profit. It also seems that this is saying that the relation of 身 to 生 is that the

latter is tied to the former. That is if 身 is endangered, so is 生. From this and from

Feng Youlan’s and Mark Edward Lewis’ views, I suggest that the Yangist doctrines

together are about self-preservation.

This particular message or value of self-preservation also is supported by a

tendency in a few Han texts to juxtapose or bring specifically the concepts of quanxing

97 Lewis (2006): p. 18. 98 Knoblock and Riegel (2000): pp. 556-557.

56

ut it.

and baozhen together with bukuiqishen 不虧其身, “do not the harm the body.” There is

also a view about the Yangist conception of li 利 (benefit or profit) that supports the

contention that it is the value of self-preservation that is put forward by the doctrines

of Yang Zhu. The li being referred to is the li in the phrase li tianxia 利天下. According

to Carine Defoort, “Yangist discourse in li concerns not ‘the world’ but the integrity

and preservation of one’s body”.99 That is, the representation of Yangism as a

movement that dealt with li (benefit) in terms similar to that of the Mohists is

mistaken. Mencius (and perhaps other rivals of Yang Zhu) “transpos[ed] … Yangist

themes into a Mohist mode”.100 By doing so, they obscured what li actually meant to

the Yangists. This is evidenced by the fact that by seeing Yangist li as related more to

profit, this does not capture the basic Yangist idea(s) expressed by the doctrine of

buyiwuleixing 不以物累形. If this is right, then Yangism was concerned for the most

part with self-preservation, as li pertains to benefit for the self and body.

2.3.5 The three doctrines and scepticism about involvement in official life

If Yang Zhu’s doctrines are about self-preservation, his view about

involvement in official life might be discerned. Yang Zhu would be sceptical about

such involvement because it is a path towards self-destruction. It has been pointed out

that involvement in the empire (specifically ruling it) would lead to harming one’s

life.101 If such is the case, Yang Zhu would regard participation in official life as a

path away from that which leads to the protection of one’s life. He would be sceptical

abo

Of the three doctrines, buyiwuleixing is that doctrine that specifically presents

Yang Zhu’s position about participation in official life. As mentioned, the doctrine

conveys that one’s life is more valuable than other things [物] and that it is imperative

not to allow one’s self to be burdened or weighed down by them. To be involved in the

government as an official is one particular thing (物) that would weigh down one’s life.

Because of that, accordingly, Yang Zhu would treat involvement in official life with

scepticism. He would not recommend it to anyone.

99 Defoort (2004): p. 56. 100 Ibid. 101 Graham (1989): p. 57; Defoort (2008): p. 173.

57

2.4 In the Liezi

The Liezi is said to have been compiled in 300 CE. According to A.C. Graham,

the “Yang Zhu” pian, the text’s seventh chapter and the important chapter for the

present study, was composed in the 3rd or 4th century CE.102 Regarding the authenticity

of the “Yang Zhu”, some Chinese scholars consider it to be genuine, believing,

however, that it was not written by Yang Zhu but by later “Yangists” of the Zhou

dynasty.103

Scholars’ generalisations about the “Yang Zhu” include the fact that it is unlike

the rest of the chapters of the text. According to Graham, this is for two reasons:

firstly, it is generally regarded as having been written by a different author; and,

secondly, its content is thought not to be Daoist-inspired.104 These reasons explain why

the chapter’s theme, thought, and mood are different from the other chapters.105

It must be stated first that the “Yang Zhu” does not have passages like those of

the Mencius, Huainanzi, and the Lüshi chunqiu, in which ideas or themes are attributed

to Yang Zhu. In most of the passages in the “Yang Zhu”, Yang Zhu pronounces ideas,

making the reader think that these ideas are those of the pre-Qin Yang Zhu. These

passages are much like the many parts of the Mencius, where it is Mencius who speaks

his views.

According to these passages, Yang Zhu holds a view which might be called in

western terminology “hedonistic”. In the passages, Yang Zhu is portrayed to believe

that happiness is attained in the engagement of sensual pleasures.106 This is seen, for

example, in the following passage:

102 Graham (1960): p. 135; Bodde (1981): pp. 409-415; Roetz (1993): pp. 247 and 338. 103 Hu Shi, Zhongguo zhexueshi dagang (Shanghai: Shangwu, 1920), p. 176; Xu Fuguan,

Zhongguo renxinglun shi: Xian Qin pian (Taipei: Sili Donghaidaxue, 1963), pp. 427-30; Qu Wanli, Xian Qin wenshi zilao kaobian (Taipei: Lianjing, 1983), p. 497, all cited in Roetz (1993): p. 338 (note 68); Chang (1972a): pp. 71-81; Barrett (1993): pp. 298-301.

104 Graham (1960-61): p. 193. An explanation for the un-Daoist character of the chapter could be Zhen Dan’s suggestion that it was written by somebody “deeply influenced by Indian thought, combined with the teaching of [Laozi], while assimilated much from Hinayana Buddhism”. Cited in Yang Bojun, Liezi jishi (Hong Kong: Taiping Book Company, 1965), p. 209 in Chang (1972a): p. 80.

105 Graham (1960-61): p. 193. 106 Cf. Van Norden (2007): p. 204.

58

Yang Chu [Yang Zhu] said:

‘A grand house, fine clothes, good food, beautiful women – if you have

these four, what more do you need from outside yourself. One who has

them yet seeks more from outside himself has an insatiable nature. An

insatiable nature is a grub eating away one’s vital forces.’107

Yang Zhu’s message in this passage is straightforward: a (male) person’s only needs

are “a grand house, fine clothes, good food, and beautiful women”. That these are the

only needs of a man suggests that a (male) person’s good life consists in satisfying or

pleasing his senses. This appears to be a hedonistic view applicable only to men. Being

such, one would be hesitant here to ascribe to Yang Zhu “hedonism”. Perhaps it is

enough to say that Yang Zhu suggested the satisfaction of sensual pleasures

specifically to men.

The above view that writers of the passages want Yang Zhu to speak for,

however, cannot be regarded as among Yang Zhu’s views at the time when his views

were prevalent. The “hedonism” that is made to be Yang Zhu’s view in the chapter

could be regarded as a product of the evolution of the views identified in earlier texts.

Some scholars believe that Yang Zhu’s views evolved along the course of history.

D.C. Lau (writing about how guisheng in the Lüshi chunqiu is related to weiwo, Yang

Zhu’s doctrine according to the Mencius) says that “we cannot expect the teachings of

Yang [Z]hu not to have undergone modifications with the changing philosophical

climate.”108 Although Lau’s claim is about how guisheng is related to weiwo, his

statement can be taken to explain how Yang Zhu’s views might have evolved in a later

period.

2.4.1 On Weiwo

There are two passages in the “Yang Zhu” which appear to express an earlier

view of Yang Zhu. We know they are earlier because these passages express and

explain Yang Zhu’s weiwo, the doctrine Mencius states as Yang Zhu’s. This section is

the only one in the chapter that deals with Yang Zhu’s basic teachings as described in

107 Graham (1960): pp. 139-140. 108 Lau (1992): pp. 86-87; Cf. Feng (1948): p. 61; Brooks and Brooks (2002): p. 278 (note 27).

59

the Mencius.109 In addition, according to A.C. Graham, these two passages are two of

the three sections which are from “older sources and concern the historical Yang

[Z]hu.”110 The passages are the following:

Yang Chu [Yang Zhu] said: ‘Po-ch’eng Tzŭ-kao [Bocheng Zigao] would not benefit others at the cost

of one hair; he renounced his state and retired to plough the fields. The Great Yü [Yu] did not keep even his body for his own benefit; he worked to drain the Flood until one side of him was paralysed. A man of ancient times, if he could have benefited the Empire by the loss of one hair, would not have given it; and if everything in the Empire had been offered to him alone, would not have taken it. When no one would lose a hair, and no one would benefit the Empire, the Empire was in good order.’111

Ch’in Ku-li [Qin Guli] asked Yang Chu [Yang Zhu]: ‘If you could help the whole world by sacrificing one hair of your body,

would you do it?’ ‘The world certainly will not be helped by one hair.’ ‘But supposing it did help, would you do it?’ Yang Chu [Yang Zhu] did not answer him. When [Qin Guli] came out he told Meng Sun-yang, who said: ‘You do not understand what is in my Master’s mind. Let me explain. If you could win ten thousand pieces of gold by injuring your skin and

flesh, would you do it? ‘I would.’ ‘If you could gain a kingdom by cutting off one limb at the joint, would

you do it?’ [Qin Guli] was silent for a while. Meng Sunyang continued: ‘It is clear that one hair is a trifle compared with skin and flesh, and skin

and flesh compared with one joint. However, enough hairs are worth as much as skin and flesh, enough skin and flesh as much as one joint. You cannot deny that one hair has its place among the myriad parts of the body; how can one treat it lightly?’112

109 Chang (1972a): p. 48. 110 Graham (1960): pp. 136, 149 (note 1). 111 Ibid., p. 148. 112 Ibid., pp. 148-149.

60

Although the passages do not explicitly state the phrase weiwo 為我, they express Yang

Zhu’s weiwo because they allude to a statement in the Mencius (7A.26) which says:

“even if [Yang Zhu] could benefit the Empire by pulling out one hair he would not do

it [拔一毛而利天下, 不為也].”113 This statement is Mencius’ elaboration on his

pronouncement that “楊子取為我” (Yang Zhu chose weiwo). Concerning the meaning of

the two passages, first, it must be said that the former passage is linked to the latter and

is explained by it. It is Yang Zhu’s disciple Meng Sunyang’s explanation about Yang

Zhu’s silence (when asked if he would still sacrifice one hair if that one hair would

benefit the empire) that sheds light on refusing to sacrifice one hair.

First, it must be said that perhaps the reason why Yang Zhu did not answer Qin

Guli’s thought experiment is that Yang Zhu thinks that he already answered the

question. His answer is probably that one cannot suppose that sacrificing a hair would

help. He thinks that in reality it would not. Yang Zhu is being practical. To elucidate

Meng Sunyang’s attempt to explain his master’s point that the empire could not be

helped by one hair, Graham thinks this part of the passage argues that “since

possessions can be replaced while the body can not, we ought never to sacrifice as

much as a hair of the body even to gain the whole empire.”114 Based on the passage

itself, it could be furthermore said that the reason for not sacrificing a single hair or

any part of the body is because that single hair is still a part of the body which should

be kept whole no matter what.115 There is a presumption that anything that is part of

the body should be preserved, which reminds one of Yang Zhu’s doctrines of quanxing

and baozhen identified in the Huainanzi.

In relation to participation in official life, the passage can be understood as

expressing scepticism about it. Yang Zhu said that the world could not be rectified by a

single hair. His statement implies that, for him, any participation in government is

futile. Meng Sunyang’s explanation of Yang Zhu’s point says that Yang Zhu did not

answer Qin Guli’s hypothetical question because the question assumes that a single

hair is insignificant. Meng Sunyang’s point is that one single hair, even if it is minute,

is a significant part and ought not to be treated lightly. That is, for Yang Zhu, a hair is

minute but it is significant enough to possibly effect some reform in the world. For

113 Lau (2003): p. 299. 114 Graham (1960-61): p. 189. 115 Cf. Lewis (2006): p. 18.

61

Yang Zhu, any little contribution to helping the empire is substantial and must not be

dismissed. Accordingly, because a minute contribution is in fact significant and

because Yang Zhu thinks that any contribution of whatever size is futile, it can be said

that, based on the passage, participation in government and politics, for Yang Zhu,

ought to be avoided. No contribution while in official life would be successful in the

ultimate rectification of the world.

2.5 Conclusion: Yangist concern about involvement in official life

Despite the obscurity of the textual materials for the study of Yangist ideas,

some of the important teachings of Yang Zhu have been identified in the relevant

passages of the texts. In the Mencius, Yang Zhu is depicted as advocating weiwo. In

the Lüshi chunqiu, based on a passage about him, Yang Zhu is a famous thinker who

valued the self (ji). One of the most significant findings perhaps is the possibility that

the doctrines of Yang Zhu cited in the Huainanzi are the core essential teachings of the

thinker. Quanxing, baozhen and buyiwuleixing, which in my view convey the general

message of self-preservation, sheds light on the passages of the Zhuangzi Neipian for

the purposes of the present study. In the Liezi, on the other hand, Yang Zhu is made to

pronounce hedonist views, although there are also sections shedding a different light

onto his earlier philosophy by emphasizing Yang Zhu’s fundamental doctrine of

weiwo.

Moreover, from the discussions above it is clear that Yang Zhu did value the

self and body. And although Mencius took that to be exclusivist – that is, that valuing

the self/body necessarily implies detachment from political participation – some of the

text materials (in the Lüshi chunqiu in particular) disprove Mencius’s perspective.

These texts show that Yang Zhu’s valuing of the self/body is consistent with caring

about others, or about political society in general. However, it must be noted that the

Lüshi chunqiu is a late Warring States text. Being such, the text’s passages that relate

to Yangist thought might be taken to propound a modified version of Yangist thinking.

It could also be that the cluster of ideas they present is a separate group yet are akin to

Yang Zhu’s ideas in one particular way. The cluster of ideas and Yang Zhu’s ideas are

akin in the way that these ideas’ concern is about life (sheng).

On the connections of 為我 (weiwo), 己 (ji), 全性 (quanxing), 保真 (baozhen), and

不以物累形 (buyiwuleixing), first, I have explained that the doctrine of 為我 can be

62

understood as ultimately one about 己. Perhaps 全性, 保真 and 不以物累形 could also be

understood in terms of the preservation of 己. However, for the reason that one’s xing

性 and sheng 生 are more important, 全性, 保真 and 不以物累形 could be more about the

preservation of 己 in order to avoid being involved in political affairs. I expound on

this further in the remaining paragraphs.

Given these basic doctrines of Yangist thought, the Yangist concern about

being involved in official life could be discerned. This is expressed in the Yangist

attitude toward involvement in it. The brief discussion that follows relies on a single

Mencius passage that elucidates Yang Zhu’s attitude towards politics and political

participation. It also relies on the three doctrines of Yang Zhu identified in the

Huainanzi and on interpretations of these doctrines, mainly my own. The thought of

Yang Zhu mentioned and assessed by the authors of the Mencius and Huainanzi gives

clues about the probable Yangist view about life in politics and the state and society in

general.

Mencius 3B.9 is the passage:

… Yang advocates everyone for himself [weiwo 為我], which amounts to a

denial of one’s prince [楊氏為我，是無君也]; Mo advocates love without

discrimination [jianai 兼愛], which amounts to a denial of one’s father. To

ignore one’s father on the one hand, and one’s prince on the other, is to be

no different from beasts.116

From Mencius’s perspective, Yang Zhu’s practice of weiwo is a denial of authority of

the state. It may be correct to view individuals who are concerned only with

themselves as people who live as if there is no authority. But it seems that the type of

self-concern they practise would matter in seeing whether it is indeed a “denial of

one’s prince”. It seems that Mencius, in this passage, interprets Yang Zhu’s weiwo as

extreme or exclusive self-concern, just as he is taking Mozi’s impartial caring (jianai)

as of the extreme (all-inclusive) kind. But it should be asked whether Yang Zhu’s

advocacy of weiwo was as exclusive and Mozi’s advocacy of jianai was as extreme as

Mencius conceived them to be. If they were not, Mencius is mistaken: the principles

advocated by these thinkers did not necessarily lead to the neglect of one’s ruler or

116 Lau (2003): pp. 142-143.

63

father. And if that is the case, the attitude of Yang Zhu towards the state as described

by Mencius, as being one of denial, is inaccurate.

The Yangist attitude is disengagement from state’s affairs. By being concerned

only with benefiting the self, they seemed to be ignoring the authority of the state ruler.

Given the doctrines of Yang Zhu mentioned in the Huainanzi (namely, quanxing,

baozhen and buyiwuleixing), Yang Zhu and his followers were primarily concerned

with self-preservation. As such, it would seem that Yangism, by choosing to cater for

the self first and foremost, expressed an outright refusal to participate in the affairs of

the state and society. The third doctrine of “not letting the body be weighed down by

things” (buyiwuleixing) strongly suggests this, as already discussed. The doctrine is a

statement indicating restraint of desire to be involved at all in anything, including

political matters. But for lack of sufficient textual evidence to support the

interpretation of Yangist ideas as expression of rejection of an official career, it is more

plausible to say that the Yangists, by focusing their attention on self-preservation, were

passive about affairs of the state. They did not have anything to say about which is the

correct solution and they did not desire to get involved in official life.

3. Yangist Elements in the Neipian

Introduction

In this chapter, I present the sections in the Neipian which suggest that

Zhuangzi was influenced by Yang Zhu’s ideas. These sections convey ideas that

resemble the Yangist ideas or are connotations of the ideas. In this chapter, I highlight

the sections which exhibit that Zhuangzi was particularly influenced by the Yangist

view on participation in official life.

3.1 In the “Xiaoyaoyou” 《逍遙遊》

Yangist thought in this chapter comes in the form of a recommendation. This

recommendation is to “become useless”. The point of becoming useless resembles

Yang Zhu’s doctrine of quanxing. Presented in the final passage, the

recommendation’s purpose seems to be to protect oneself from harm and preserve

life:1

Said Hui Shih [Hui Shi] to Chuang-tzu [Zhuangzi] ‘I have a great tree, people call it the tree-of-heaven. Its trunk is too knobbly and bumpy to measure with the inked line, its branches are too curly and crooked to fit compasses or L-square. Stand it up in the road and a carpenter wouldn’t give it a glance. Now this talk of yours is big but useless, dismissed by everyone alike.’ ‘Haven’t you ever seen a wild cat or a weasel? It lurks crouching low in wait for strays, makes a pounce east and west as nimble uphill or down, and drops plumb into the snare and dies in the net. But the yak now, which is as big as a cloud hanging from the sky, this by being able to be so big is unable to catch as much as a mouse. Now if you have a great tree and think it’s a pity it’s so useless, why not plant it in the realm of Nothingwhatever, in the wilds which spread out into nowhere, and go roaming away to do nothing at its side, ramble around and fall asleep in its shade?

Spared by the axe No thing will harm it. If you’re no use at all. Who’ll come to bother you?’2

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1 Feng Youlan has stated that uselessness is the way to self-preservation and therefore is in line

with Yang Zhu’s thought. Rune Svarverud has directly related the recommendation to the Yangist doctrine of preserving life. Svarverud’s reason for this is Zhuangzi’s affinity with Yang Zhu. Feng (1948): p. 64; Svarverud (2006): pp. 158-159.

2 Graham (2001): p. 47.

The last four lines of this passage, 不夭斤斧 物無害者 無所可用 安所困苦哉, seem to

convey the recommendation to become useless.3 With these four lines as concluding

the passage, what seems to be conveyed by the passage is that being huge and

grotesque or possessing deformed structures, through exploiting 無用

(wuabsence(of)yonguse) also has another use: it is that a thing (in this case, a tree) by being

such would preserve its life and would not be harmed. The translation of Burton

Watson of the last four lines as: “Axes will never shorten its life, nothing can ever

harm it. If there’s no use for it, how can it come to grief or pain?”,4 makes the passage

suggest that hugeness is not what makes the tree useless. It is its enormity together

with the crookedness and twisted structure of its trunk and branches that has made it

effectively useless. The benefit of being useless is that it makes a useless entity able to

safeguard itself from being harmed and is able to fulfil the years allotted to it.5

Given that “be useless” is suggested because it would protect oneself from

harm and live out the years of existence allotted to it, it is in line with the goal of self-

preservation (quanxing) in Yangist thought. Feng Youlan’s translation of the lines

不夭斤斧 物無害者 無所可用 安所困苦哉 emphasizes the Yangist purpose of this

recommendation. Feng translates it as: “Neither bill or ax would shorten its term of

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3 Because these lines seem to suggest a different point, Dan Robins has suggested that these

lines should be taken as a separate passage (Robins [2011]: p. 106). According to A. Taeko Brooks, the whole of the final passage of the “Xiaoyaoyou” could even be a section not really related to the passage that precedes it. To Brooks, it seems to be retrograde and “may have been added as a final editorial effort, to homogenize [the first passage] with the ‘uselessness’ tradition which was still a viable idea in certain strands of the [Zhuangzi] material ...”. Brooks in Robins (2011): p. 108.

If they are treated as deliberately appended, perhaps the compilers of the text appended these lines to the passage in order to put forward the uselessness theme, thereby linking it to the “Renjianshi”.

4 Watson (1968): p. 35. 5 This conjecture regarding the recommendation of the passage may be seen to be seemingly

supported by an emphasis given to the final group of characters, 不夭斤斧物無害者無所可用安所困苦哉. They are deemed by A.C. Graham and Arthur Waley (1889-1966), in their translations, as prose. As Graham and Waley provided no explanation or theory, it is not clear why this part is in prose to express this. But it may be guessed that perhaps the writer intended this section to be emphasized, as if to say that it is the central message of the passage. See Graham (2001): pp. 31-32 for an explanation of what Graham used in identifying which parts are prose and the difficulty of identifying such. Arthur Waley’s translation of the section is the following:

What does not invite the axe No creature will harm. What cannot be used No troubles will befall. (1939): p. 4. Cf. Graham (2001): pp. 46-47.

existence. Being of no use to others, it itself would be free from harm.”6 This

translation of the phrase buyao 不夭 as “[to] shorten its term of existence” suggests the

idea of completion of the term of existence, an idea included in the meaning of

xingnature. As already discussed, xingnature includes this meaning: the capacity to

complete the term of life of an entity. Thus, by emphasizing the completion of the term

of existence, the recommendation to be useless seems to be directly related to

quanxing and appears to be one of its expressions or connotations.

This view that the recommendation “be useless” is Yangist is also supported by

some scholars’ view about uselessness. John Major relates it to the preservation of the

self, of the individual whose life is dictated by prescriptions and expectations. John

Major, who is commenting on Zhuangzi’s view about the Warring States political

condition, proffers:

... Unlike his rivals in the Confucian school, however, Chuang-tzu

[Zhuangzi] saw no hope for a restoration of the golden age through

adherence to a civil code of morality. ... Chuang-tzu’s [Zhuangzi’s] concern

was not for government, but for individuals; he felt that any program of

government was doomed simply because it was a program, for harmony

could not be regained by prescription or government fiat. He mocked the

efforts of Confucius and Mo-tzu [Mozi] toward that end....

Chuang-tzu [Zhuangzi] saw little chance for the return of a golden age,

but he held out the promise of an escape from the degenerate world of his

own time through enlightenment, preserving one’s life apart from the world

through absolute uselessness. From the point of view of society, deliberate

uselessness would be seen as unproductively “dragging one’s tail in the

mud,” but for the individual that course was not only not harmful, but of the

greatest benefit.7

Major here has related Zhuangzi’s emphasis on uselessness to Zhuangzi’s view that all

of the existing proposals for rectifying society was futile and that it was useless to

direct all efforts to fixing the government. For Zhuangzi, it was the individual that

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6 Feng (1964): p. 40. 7 Major (1975): p. 275.

needed the attention. Consequently, Zhuangzi proposed “absolute uselessness”8 in

order for the individual to survive in the “degenerate world” of the Warring States era.

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3.2 In the “Yangshengzhu” 《養生主》

The “Yangshengzhu” could be as a whole deemed a Yangist pian. There are

three reasons for this view. These are: (1) the title of the chapter, (2) the chapter’s

themes (as possibly indicated in the opening passage), and (3) the normative

recommendations in the chapter.

The chapter’s title9 contains the characters yang 養 and sheng 生. Yang 養

means “to nourish, to rear, to care for or to support or maintain”, while sheng 生 means

“life”. Yangsheng 養生, then, means “nurturing or nourishing life”. Because “nurturing

life” is a way or process of preserving self, yangsheng could be regarded as a Yangist

process. A piece of linguistic-conceptual evidence to support the suggestion that

yangsheng is Yangist is quanxing’s possible inclusion of yangsheng. Quanxing would

involve yangsheng because xingnature and shenglife, as noted in Chapter 2, are closely

related. Because yangsheng could be regarded as a Yangist process, the title

“Yangshengzhu” is a reason to regard the chapter Yangist.10

The second reason is based on Zhou Cezong’s view about the main themes of

the “Yangshengzhu”. According to Zhou, these themes are presented in its opening

passage:

Your life has a limit but knowledge has none. If you use what is limited to

pursue what has no limit, you will be in danger. If you understand this and

still strive for knowledge, you will be in danger for certain! If you do good,

stay away from fame. If you do evil, stay away from punishments. Follow

8 Ibid., pp. 272-273. Major distinguishes two kinds of uselessness: absolute and contingent. Absolute uselessness is the state of totally being devoid of any use; while contingent uselessness is the state of a thing’s being useless but the thing still has some useful features in it. According to Major, the gnarled tree “exhibits absolute uselessness. Having no useful qualities at all, it is in no danger (p. 272).” Contingent uselessness is exhibited by the goose in “Shanmu” (Chapter 20) tale (Graham [2001]: p. 121). The goose, thought to be useless by Zhuangzi’s disciples (because it could not cackle), could not preserve its life or live out its term of existence. That is because its uselessness is contingent; “its uselessness in one respect does not preclude its having other useful features, and so it is doomed” (Major [1975]: p. 272).

9 Scholars, like Liu Xiaogan and A.C. Graham, have stated that the titles of the chapters were given by the compiler-editors.

10 Cf. Fox (1995): p. 26.

the middle [du 督, central meridian]; go by what is constant, and you can

stay in one piece [keyibaoshen 可以保身], keep yourself alive [keyiquansheng 可以全生], look after your parents [keyiyangqin 可以養親], and live out your

years [keyijiannian 可以盡年].11

This passage, which, according to Feng Youlan, “follows Yang [Z]hu’s line of

thought”,12 has the four themes:

1) keyibaoshen 可以保身 (being able to “stay in one piece”);

2) keyiquansheng 可以全生 (being able to “keep yourself alive”);

3) keyiyangqin 可以養親 (being able to “look after your parents”);

4) keyijinnian 可以盡年 (being able to “live out your years”).

Zhou notes that these are the chapter’s themes because they are the results of

yangsheng, which are in turn elaborated on in the next four passages of the chapter.13 I

see three of the four main themes to be related to Yangist doctrines. These are:

baoshen 保身, quansheng 全生, and jinnian 盡年.

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of

) in

ee

Although it is only baoprotecting shenthe body that is directly related to Yangist

thought (because I think it is a manifestation of baozhen),14 quansheng, and jinnian

seem to have some relation too.15 A number of scholars have suggested that

quansheng is related, if not equivalent, to quanxing.16 According to W. Allyn Rickett,

in his study of the late Warring States composition, the Guanzi 《管子》, the mention

“talk of quansheng” (as one of the “nine ways to failure” [jiubai 九敗] for rulership

the “Lizheng” 《立政》 is basically Yang Zhu’s.17 According to Rickett, the first thr

positions mentioned in the “Jiubai” 《九敗》 section of the “Lizheng”, namely, qinbing

寢兵, jianai 兼愛, and quansheng 全生 are Song Xing and Yin Wen’s, Mozi’s, and Yang

Zhu’s. The names of these thinkers are not mentioned in the text passage, but Rickett,

11 Watson (1968): p. 50. 12 Feng (1948): p. 64. 13 Zhou (1992): pp. 49-50. 14 Cf. Discussion on baozhen 保真 and quanxing baozhen bukuiqishen 全性保真，不虧其身,

where bukuiqishen means “do not harm the body.” 15 It has been stated that jinnian, like the concept zhong qi tian nian in the “Renjianshi”, could

show Yang Zhu’s influence on Zhuangzi’s philosophy. Berkson (2011): p. 220 (note 28). 16 Rickett (1985): p. 110 (n. 50); cf. Kushner (1980): p. 321. 17 It must be mentioned though that the section that states quansheng (although it leads to

“taking special care of oneself”) equates it to hedonism. Rickett (1985): pp. 99-100, 110-111.

providing no reason, assigns the views to these thinkers.18 A.C. Graham is also notable

for equating quansheng to quanxing. He thinks they are equivalent concepts because

he links Yang Zhu with Zi Huazi, a thinker whose main view is quansheng.19 To

Graham and also to David Nivison,20 Zi Huazi’s concern with quansheng is identical

to Yang Zhu’s preoccupation with quanxing. The probable reason for this is that

completion of one’s life (sheng) is completing or keeping one’s nature (xing) intact.

Jinnian (live out one’s years), on the other hand, expresses quanxing’s stress

on the completion of one’s term of life. This is because, as noted, xing essentially

includes the capacity to live out the tian-endowed term of existence in its connotation.

The final reason is the nature of the prescriptions in the chapter. These

prescriptions seem to have essentially Yangist intentions, that is, their point seems to

be about self-preservation.21 An examination of the passages reveals that two

recommendations made in two passages seem to be clearly Yangist. These

recommendations are: (1) (from the passage on Cook Ding) that one ought to find a

way to protect oneself from the chaotic world, to preserve one’s life, and the ideal way

is akin to Cook Ding’s way; and (2) (from the chapter’s final passage, the passage

about the death of Lao Dan) that one must complete one’s term of existence. I

elaborate on these two recommendations below.

3.2.1 Self-preservation: Zhuangzi’s Approach

Several scholars regard the story of Cook Ding to be about skills and their

cultivation or about spontaneity,22 while others view it as a story about yangsheng.23

Scholars who interpret the story to be about skills suggest that it is to be read as related

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18 Rickett (1985): pp. 110-111. 19 Book 2, chapter 2 《貴生》 “Gui sheng”, section 7 of the Lüshi chunqiu; Knoblock and

Riegel (2000): p. 83. 20 Nivison regards Zi Huazi as one of the philosophers of “the Yangist persuasion”. Nivison

(1999): p. 773. 21 That they ought to be Yangist would seem to be presumed since the chapter’s title itself

indicates that the nature of the chapter’s recommendations would be Yangist. 22 According to A.C. Graham, for example, (presumably through the story of Cook Ding) the

theme of the “Yangshengzhu” is “the recovery of the spontaneity of vital process when we abandon analytic knowledge and trust to the daemonic insight and aptitude which enters us from beyond, from Heaven.” Graham (2001): p. 62.

23 Fox (2003): pp. 211-213.

to the skills passages in Chapter 19, “Dasheng” 《達生》.24 While such an interpretation

seems to provide important insight, I, however, see the story as demonstrating how to

find one’s way in the difficult conditions of the period of the Warring States.25 The

reason is that the story is in the chapter which is about yangmaintaining shenglife and which

is a chapter which includes baoshen as one of its themes.26 The project depicted

through the story is a specific tactic to preserve the self, specifically to protect it from

harm. This seems clearly suggested in Cook Ding’s explanation to Lord Wenhui:

‘What your servant cares about is the Way, I have left skill behind me.

When I first began to carve oxen, I saw nothing but oxen wherever I looked.

Three years more and I never saw an ox as a whole. Nowadays, I am in

touch through the daemonic in me, and do not look with the eye. With the

senses I know where to stop, the daemonic I desire to run its course. I rely

on Heaven’s structuring, cleave along the main seams, let myself be guided

by the main cavities, go by what is inherently so. A ligament or tendon I

never touch, not to mention solid bone. A good cook changes his chopper

once a year, because he hacks. A common cook changes it once a month,

because he smashes. Now I have this chopper for nineteen years, and have

taken apart several thousand oxen, but the edge is as though it were fresh

from the grindstone. At that joint there is an interval, and the chopper’s edge

has no thickness; if you insert what has no thickness where there is an

interval, then, what more could you ask, of course there is ample room to

move the edge about. That’s why after nineteen years the edge of my

chopper is as though it were fresh from the grindstone.

‘However, whenever I come to something intricate, I see where it will be

hard to handle and cautiously prepare myself, my gaze settles on it, action

slows down for it, you scarcely see the flick of the chopper – and at one

stroke the tangle has been unravelled, as a clod crumbles to the ground. I

stand chopper in hand, look proudly round at everyone, dawdle to enjoy the

triumph until I’m quite satisfied, then clean the chopper and put it away.’27

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24 Needham (1956) Vol. 2: pp. 121-124; Lai (2008b): pp. 157-158; Yong (2010): p. 1051. 25 Li (2003): p. 265. 26 According to Zhou Cezong, this is the passage that elaborates on the first of the four themes:

keyibaoshen 可以保身 (being able to “stay in one piece”). Zhou (1992): pp. 49-50. 27 Graham (2001): pp. 63-64.

To acquaint oneself with the world and move one’s way out of it and be unharmed

seems to be the message of Cook Ding’s explanation. Perhaps this is the kind of

yangsheng that this story talks about. For after hearing this, Lord Wenhui applauds the

Cook and exclaims that through listening to the Cook’s words, he has learned how to

nurture life. It is in relation to this that the story conveys a Yangist message. According

to Alan Fox, “[t]his concern with preserving one’s well-being through conservation of

one’s natural resources can also be found in the Yangist tradition ... and suggests a

significant influence on the text”. 28

To explain the point of Cook Ding’s story further, it could be said that how his

knife was able to look still newly sharpened after nineteen years of use demonstrates

the process of avoiding harm in order to preserve oneself. Cook Ding says that the

reason for why the knife still looks newly sharpened is because he inserts it into the

interval, into the space where it could move unobstructed by any bone. By carrying out

such a strategy, no bone has dulled his knife. Cook Ding’s words could be interpreted

thus as suggesting that for one to live out her allotted years, the individual must find

that interval, that space where she is “safe”. His words also seem to imply that there is

that space in the world, like there is in oxen. His words further seem to mean that in

order for one to preserve one’s life, she must find this space.29 It could be said that this

is Zhuangzi’s chosen “approach” to deal with the difficult conditions of the Warring

States period.

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28 Fox (1995): p. 23. 29 The Yangist nature of Cook Ding’s explanation is reinforced by Zhuangzi’s specific use here

of “nineteen years” (shijiunian 十九年). According to Philip J. Ivanhoe, 十九年 were “thought to define a significant period of time, something akin to a generation”. He writes:

A span of nineteen years marked a specific astronomical and calendrical period called a zhang 章. Unaware of the precession of the equinoxes, ancient Chinese astronomers believed that every nineteen years the winter solstice was the first day of the first month of the year and that on that day the sun would appear at exactly the same place in the zodiac. Ivanhoe and Van Norden (2005): p. 97 (note 60).

It could be supposed, then, that Cook Ding is referring to the knife’s “lifespan” when he said that the knife is “as though fresh from the grindstone” after nineteen years.

3.2.2 To Complete One’s Term of Life

The final passage of the chapter is about the principle of “living out one’s

years”.30 It is a principle and a recommendation that is emphasized in the passage. The

main message is Qin Shi’s explanation of why his way of mourning is justified:

In coming when [Lao Dan] did, the Master was on time; in departing when

he did, the Master was on course. Be content with the time and settled on

the course, and sadness and joy cannot find a way in.31

What is expressed here seems to be: (1) that human beings have allotted years, and (2)

that one ought to “be content with the time” allotted. These points seem to clearly

express the Yangist doctrine of quanxing. To recall, quanxing includes the idea of

lasting out one’s term of life. To “be content with the time” is a connotation of this

idea.

In conclusion, the “Yangshengzhu” is the first of the two Neipian chapters that

suggest that Zhuangzi’s philosophy is basically a philosophy of life. To be more

precise, it is a philosophy of how to maintain (yang 養) life. According to Scott Cook,

based on some of the other aspects of the Neipian and the “Yangshengzhu”,

Zhuangzi’s philosophy specifically is:

… of how to live life: how to enjoy it, how to get the most out of it, how to

live it freely and without dependence, how to avoid pitfalls, how to nurture

and preserve it, and how to accept and embrace its inevitable return into the

great unity from which it first sprang.32

This generalization is based on Cook’s reading that the Zhuangzi, like the Daodejing,

is about longevity and his analysis of certain themes and parts of the Neipian,

including the usefulness of the useless and the opening paragraph of “Yangshengzhu”.

This helps to establish that there is some direct relation of Zhuangzi’s philosophy to

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30 Cf. Zhou (1992): pp. 49-50. 31 Graham (2001): p. 65. 32 Cook (1997): pp. 533-534.

the Yangist tradition, which, as already discussed, is fundamentally about preservation

of life and self.

3.3 In the “Renjianshi” 《人間世》

The “Renjianshi” is the second of the two Neipian chapters that could be

considered Yangist. This is because of its two normative recommendations, namely,

the practice of xinzhai, and to be useless.

3.3.1 Xinzhai 心齋

73

lth

after

Xinzhai, zhaifast the xinheart-mind, is a recommendation made in the first

passage.33 In this passage, Yan Hui deliberates what he could do to “restore” the hea

of the king of Wei’s state. Xinzhai is Kongzi’s suggestion on how to achieve this,

having explained to the disciple that his own plans would not pan out. This fasting is

described by Confucius as the practice of the following:

Unify your attention. Rather than listen with the ear, listen with the heart.

Rather than listen with the heart, listen with the energies. Listening stops at

the ear, the heart at what tallies with the thought. As for ‘energy’, it is the

tenuous which waits to be roused by other things. Only the Way

accumulates the tenuous. The attenuating is the fasting of the heart.34

It is not clear what Kongzi is trying to do by suggesting the practice of xinzhai to Yan

Hui. It seems that Kongzi’s point is that by practising xinzhai Yan Hui would be able

to help him persuade the prince of Wei. This seems the case since the help that Kongzi

seems to offer to his disciple is a way to avoid “making the mind [as one’s] teacher”.35

This suggests that success in persuasion depends first on what the individual does

33 It must be noted that according to some scholars, the first three sections of the “Renjianshi”

were not written by Zhuangzi and therefore do not really belong to the Neipian. However, Liu Xiaogan believes that they are Zhuangzi’s work and thus are part of the Neipian. Liu believes this, as this is based on the similarities between these sections and the other chapters of the Neipian. See Liu’s discussion on this in Classifying the Zhuangzi Chapters, (1994): pp. 32-38.

34 Graham (2001): p. 68. 35 Watson (1968): p. 57.

within her. That is, the work towards becoming “empty” within is required principally

in any attempt to convince a ruler to change his ways.36

The above reading could be supported by one understanding of xinzhai. This

understanding is offered by Chris Fraser. His view is essentially that the passage

suggests an emptying of the standards to fix the world or make shi-fei distinctions or

human-made distinctions that are formed in the xinheart-mind. He writes:

Listening with the heart goes further [than what listening with the ear does],

but only as far as the ‘tally’. ... Normally, according to ancient Chinese

theories of mind and language, cognitive processes rely on discriminating

things as shi (this) or fei (not) with respect to thoughts or names that, like

tallies, pair up with their objects or referents. ... When we ‘take the heart as

our master’, it guides action through the system of tallies it employs. ... In

fasting the heart, we empty it of these tallies, removing the fixed standards

by which it normally guides us.37

Xinzhai, then, according to Fraser, is the process of eradicating the tallies the heart has

learnt. It is by doing so that people become guided by “things themselves”.38 That is, it

is letting the world be one’s guide rather than what the heart has set up to be the world.

Perhaps what is gained from the exercise of xinzhai, then, is a sort of perception

or knowledge of the world that sees the world as pure and undivided. Therefore, it is

knowledge that could be viewed akin to the kind of knowledge that the Sage

(represented by the monkey keeper in the “Qiwulun”) possesses. This knowledge is

about an undivided world. Such knowledge which is free from distinctions, free from

the tallies, is probably one that would allow the disciple Yan Hui to be able to concoct

new and better or more effective means to persuade the ruler of Wei and achieve his

mission.

However, another possible way of interpreting the suggestion is to consider

Kongzi’s objective in making the suggestion. First, it could be said that Kongzi is

trying to dissuade his disciple from initiating his pursuit. By suggesting the exercise of

xinzhai, Kongzi then seems to lead Yan Hui to abandon his mission and make him not

74

36 Graham (2001): pp. 68-69, 71. 37 Fraser (2008): pp. 127-128. 38 Ibid., p. 128.

go into service. Perhaps it is Kongzi’s view that Yan Hui’s intended mission is a

manifestation of having “the mind as teacher” (猶師心者). Xinzhai would prevent Yan

Hui from pursuing his mission. Kongzi’s goal for dissuading his disciple from going

into service, then seems to be a Yangist one. It is all the more Yangist because in the

passage, Kongzi seems to emphasize to Yan Hui that a consequence of being involved

in office is harm and destruction to his self. In the exchange between the master and

disciple, Kongzi says the following where he emphasises that pursuit of a good name

leads to one’s destruction:

‘Hmm. I am afraid that you are simply going to your execution. …

I am afraid that he will lose faith in your fulsome words, and so you’ll be

sure to die at the tyrant’s hands.

One more point. Formerly [Guanlong Feng] was executed by [Jie] and

[Wangzi Bian] by [Zhou]. Both were men meticulous in their personal

conduct who as ministers offended emperors by sympathising with their

subjects. Consequently their lords found their meticulousness a reason to get

rid of them. These were men who desire a good name. And formerly Yao

attacked [Cong Zhi and Xun Ao], [Yu] attacked [You Hu], the countries

were reduced to empty wastes and hungry ghosts, the rulers were executed.

There was no end to their calls to arms, no respite in their inspiration to

great deeds. All these men were seekers of the name or the deed, and don’t

tell me you haven’t heard of them! A good name, a great deed, tempt even

the sage, and do you think you’re any better?39

Kongzi’s story about the deaths of Guanlong Feng and Wangzi Bian and the

destruction and slaughter of the rulers of Cong Zhi (and its citizens, according to

Ziproyn’s translation),40 Xun Ao and You Hu, all in the name of making a good name,

suggests that he does not want his disciple to disintegrate like these men and states.

This concern of Kongzi could be understood as expressing the Yangist concern of self-

preservation. For, as noted, the Yangist doctrines of quanxing and baozhen stress self-

preservation.

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39 Graham (2001): pp. 66-67. 40 Ziporyn (2009): p. 25.

Another reason for interpreting this suggestion of xinzhai as Yangist is the

emphasis made by Kongzi on the retreat from engaging in government service. By

dissuading Yan Hui from carrying out his mission, which Kongzi appears to do

through suggesting the practice of xinzhai, it seems to be a suggestion akin to the

Yangist doctrine of buyiwuleixing. As a means to “expel” anything in the xin, xinzhai

seems to be a means to carry out the Yangist doctrine. The suggestion, as mentioned,

could be understood as Kongzi’s way in the story as a way to dissuade his disciple to

retract and not go into service, implying that a follower of his does not let himself be

tied by other things (buyiwuleixing). As previously mentioned, scholars have also

linked buyiwuleixing principally to withdrawal from politics.

There is another section in the “Renjianshi” which may exhibit that Zhuangzi

was specifically influenced by Yangist concerns about participation in government.

The passage is about a student Yan He 顏闔 who asked Qu Boyu 蘧伯玉 about

appropriate means for dealing with a tyrant ruler.41 Yan He describes the tyrant ruler

as someone whose “Power in him Heaven has been made murderous”. Qu Boyu

responds to the student follower:

A good question indeed! Be alert, on guard! Get your own person rightly

adjusted! In your demeanour what matters is to get close, in your heart what

matters is to be at peace. However, there are difficulties on both points. In

getting close you don’t want to be drawn in, and you don’t want the peace in

your heart to escape outside. If by your demeanour getting too close you are

drawn in, it will be downfall, ruin, collapse, trampling. If the peace in your

heart escapes outside, it will become repute, fame, a disaster, a curse.42

First, the fact that Yan He likened his royal tutee to a “tyrant ruler”, whose 德 (de) has

been made murderous by tian 天, implies that serving in government may be

dangerous. According to Yan He, if he behaves in a particular way, i.e. decently, “in

[the ruler’s] company it will endanger [his] life”. This first part of Qu Boyu’s answer

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41 According to the passage, Yan He threw this query to Qu Boyu when he was assigned a tutor

to the son of Duke Ling. It may be supposed that through his inquiry, Yan He must have wanted advice from Qu Boyu on how to deal with the heir apparent as he would teach him, which is a way to be involved in government.

42 Graham (2001): p. 72.

suggests that dealing with the tyrant ruler is indeed perilous. He suggests Yan He

ought to be really careful: “Be alert, on guard!”. He must not get too close or else it

would result to (his) “downfall, ruin, collapse, trampling”.

The perilous nature of government service is further seen in Qu Boyu’s analogy

of dealing with the ruler as how a keeper of tigers would deal with his animals. Qu

Boyu says:

Be alert, on guard! If you confront him with something accumulating in you

which takes pride in your nobility, you won’t last long. And don’t you know

what a keeper of tigers does? He daren’t give them a live animal because

they will get into a rage killing it, or a whole animal either, because they

will get into a rage tearing it apart. He keeps track of the times when they

will be hungry or full, and has the secret of their angry hearts. Tigers are a

different breed from men, but when they fawn on the man who feeds them it

is because he goes along with their dispositions; and so if they get

murderous it is because he thwarts their dispositions.43

The reason Yan He has to be careful is in order to avoid harm and untimely death. Yan

He is being warned by Qu Boyu that if he is not careful, serving will lead to his

disadvantage. He would perish, if the ruler is “confronted with something

accumulating in you which takes pride in your nobility”. He would perish, if he

thwarts his dispositions, just as a tiger would kill its keeper if its nature is not

considered and acknowledged.

3.3.2 Be Useless

The recommendation “be useless” is made in the second set of passages of the

“Renjianshi”.44 As mentioned, the recommendation of uselessness is Yangist.

Uselessness is valuable. This is because when an individual is useless, it is able to

preserve its self, thus completing its term (quanxing).45 This use is particularly seen in

the motivation of the characters in the stories for electing to “be useless”. The

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43 Graham (2001): p. 72. 44 The second set of passages, according to Graham (2001: p. 66), “proclaims the advantages of

being useless, unemployable, so that the government leaves you alone.” 45 Feng Youlan also states this view in Feng (1948): p. 64.

motivation is to zhong qi tian nian 終其天年, which means “to last out the years Heaven

decreed”.46

The first passage of the second series of the “Renjianshi” is about Carpenter

Shi. In the story, Carpenter Shi realised a “worthless” tree’s (sanmuye 散木也) high

regard for being useless. The tree which Carpenter Shi considered to be good-for-

nothing appeared in his dream saying:

With what do you propose to compare me with? Would it be with the fine-

grained woods? As for the sort that bear fruits or berries, the cherry-apple,

pear, orange, pumelo, when the fruit ripens they are stripped, and in being

stripped they are disgracefully abused, their branches broken, their twigs

snapped off. These are trees which by their own abilities make life

miserable for themselves; and so they die in mid-path without lasting out

the years assigned to them by Heaven, trees which have let themselves

victims of worldly vulgarity. Such are the consequences with all things. I

would add that this quest of mine to become of no possible use to anyone

has been going on for a long time: only now, on the verge of death, have I

achieved it, and to me it is supremely useful. Supposing that I have been

useful too, would I have the opportunity to grow so big?47

To Carpenter Shi, the tree is worthless because of its nature. In the passage, Carpenter

Shi says: “make a boat from it and it will sink, make a coffin and it will rot at once,

make a bowl and it will break at once, make a gate or door and it will ooze sap, make a

pillar and it will be worm-holed”.48 The tree’s complaint seems to be based on the fact

that Carpenter Shi does not understand its choice of becoming useless. The tree’s

reason for this was that it intended to complete the years allotted to it and to grow

large. The tree’s explanation in Carpenter Shi’s dream emphasises the idea that it has

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46 It is for this reason that the final lines of the “Xiaoyaoyou” are to be regarded as expressing

the point of uselessness of the “Renjianshi” passages. The lines buyaojinfu wuwuhaizhe wusuokeyong ansuokunkuzai 不夭斤斧 物無害者 無所可用 安所困苦哉, translated by Burton Watson as:

“Axes will never shorten its life, nothing can ever harm it. If there’s no use for it, how can it come to grief or pain?” (Watson [1968]: p. 35)

seems to express the idea of term completion through being useless. 47 Graham (2001): p.73. 48 Ibid.

elected itself to become useless. The motive of the choice is first and foremost to

zhong qi tian nian and also to become really big.49

In the next two passages, the phrase zhong qi tian nian likewise appears.50 This

seems to indicate the emphasis on motivation in the “Renjianshi”.

There is a place in Sung [Song], Ching-shih [Chingshi], where catalpas, cypresses and mulberries thrive. But a tree an arm-length or two round will be chopped down by someone who wants a post to tether his monkey, a tree of three or four spans by someone seeking a ridge-pole for an imposing roof, a tree of seven or eight spans by a family of a noble or rich merchant looking for a sideplank for his coffin. So they do not last out the years Heaven assigned them [終其天年], but die in mid-journey under the axe. That is the trouble with being stuff which is good for something. Similarly in the sacrifice of the god of the river it is forbidden to cast into the waters an ox with a white forehead, a pig with a turned-up snout or a man with piles. These are all known to be exempt by shamans and priests, being things they deem bearers of ill-luck. They are the very things which the daemonic man will deem supremely lucky [大祥].51 Cripple Shu – his chin is buried down in his navel, his shoulders are higher than his crown, the knobbly bone at the base of his neck points at the sky, the five pipes to the spine are right up on top, his two thighbones make another pair of ribs. By plying the needle and doing laundry he makes enough to feed himself, and when he rattles the sticks telling fortunes for a handful of grain he is making enough to feed ten. If the authorities are press-ganging soldiers the cripple strolls in the middle of them flipping back his sleeves; if they are conscripting work parties he is excused as a chronic invalid: if they are doling out grain to the sick he gets three measures, and ten bundles of firewood besides. Even someone crippled in body manages to support himself and last out the years assigned him by Heaven [終其天年]. If you make a cripple of the Power in you, you can do better still!52

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49 This motive, what the tree is “preserving [in the words of Carpenter Shi] is different from

[that of] the masses of other trees.” Mair (1994b): p. 38. 50 Perhaps the presence of the phrase indicates this is an important idea (i.e. the idea of life term

completion) being conveyed in this chapter. 51 Graham (2001): p. 74. 52 Ibid.

The injunction of these passages seems to be: take note of uselessness; it will aid you

to “last out the years that Heaven has assigned”. In the first passage, what is being

shown is the problem with being useful. The problem with being useful is that it does

not guarantee the completion of one’s years. That is, because you are useful, your life

may be cut short. The other explanation reveals that what is important is the daemonic

man’s assessment about those rejected in the sacrifice, because they are inauspicious.

It could be supposed that the daemonic person considers those rejected as auspicious

(祥, xiang) because their being rejected would allow them to last out the years given

them. In the second passage, the crippled or deformed body of Shu seems to be a way

to show that being useless has the advantage of specifically being able to support

oneself in physical and material terms and live out the years that Heaven has allotted.

3.3.3 The “Renjianshi” as a Yangist Chapter

The main reason for suggesting that the “Renjianshi” is Yangist is the nature of

the above recommendations. Both xinzhai and “be useless” express and embody

Yangist objectives. Xinzhai expresses the Yangist doctrine of buyiwuleixing; while “be

useless” expresses the doctrine of quanxing. Because these recommendations are the

essential points of the chapter and their nature is Yangist, it could be concluded that

the “Renjianshi” is Yangist.

There is another reason for suggesting that the “Renjianshi” is Yangist. This

reason is the general theme of the chapter, as proposed by scholars, Wang Bo and A.C.

Graham. Given the chapter’s main recommendations, the theme of the chapter is that

one ought to be wise in taking care of oneself in the “world of humans” (renjianshi), a

theme expressive of Yangist thinking. But Wang Bo’s and Graham’s suggestions

about the theme of “Renjianshi” specifically seem to lead to the conclusion that the

chapter presents views similar to those of Yangist ideas.

The first suggestion, by A.C. Graham, is that the chapter is about “living in the

world without compromising with it”.53 This theme suggests a Yangist point, which is

the unwillingness to be involved in the socio-political world. According to this theme,

the reader of the chapter is invited to be unengaging, to not involve herself in any

80

53 Graham (2001): p. 29. This theme is informed by the topics of the passages and the title

“Renjianshi”, which Graham translates as “Worldly business among men”. The topics of the two series of passages according to Graham are stated in Graham (2001), on p. 66. Graham (2001): pp. 66, 29.

affair in society, including politics. This attitude of unwillingness to be involved is

akin to the Yangist tenet of buyiwuleixing. As noted and discussed, buyiwuleixing is

non-involvement with 物 (wuthings) in the world.

The other suggestion about the chapter’s theme, by Wang Bo, is that the

chapter is about a philosophy of life based on the period’s “human world”.54 The

elements of this philosophy of life suggest the Yangist nature of the “Renjianshi”.

According to Wang Bo, the philosophy of life in the chapter (which to Wang is

Zhuangzi’s principal philosophy) is first and foremost concerned with human life in

“the human world” (renjianshi).55 Because of the tumultuous conditions of the human

world, this philosophy of life is fundamentally a philosophy of survival. As Wang

writes:

In a world of cruelty and chaos, survival replaces saving the world as man’s

highest ideal. This, of course, is very different from times in which the world

is in order, when aspirations can be put into action and fame can be

achieved. “And when the world is in chaos, sages only live their lives”—this

short pronouncement is filled with the futility of survival during times when

sages have no choice but to make preserving their own lives their principal

concern.56

With this view that it is survival or self-preservation that characterises the philosophy

of life presented in the “Renjianshi”, it can be said that the chapter is Yangist.

The presence of the phrase zhong qi tian nian in the passages of the second

series also supports this. This is because its use of 天 (tianheaven) expresses the Yangist

conception of it. As noted, the Yangist understanding and definition of xing carries

with it a view of tianheaven as the giver of the years allotted to xingnature. This use

supports the suggestion that the theme of uselessness in the Zhuangzi has Yangist

connections.

81

54 His justification for it is as follows: “My own impression is that these three words – ren,

jian, shi – form a general topic within which each word can be taken and considered separately, one at a time – these humans (ren), this world (shijie), and these humans within this world (shijie zhi jian)”. Wang (2006-7): p. 38.

55 Wang (2006-7): p. 44. 56 Ibid., pp.43-44.

In the Zhuangzi’s Chapter 20, “Shanmu” 《山木》, there is a tale in which

Zhuangzi specifically mentions the direct relation of uselessness to zhong qi tian nian:

When [Zhuangzi] was travelling in the mountains he saw a great tree with

flourishing leaves and branches. A woodcutter stopped at its side but did not

choose it. He asked him why, and was told

‘There’s nothing you can use it for [無所可用].’

‘This tree,’ said [Zhuangzi], ‘by its timber being good for nothing, will get

to last out Heaven’s term for it, wouldn’t you say? [此木以不材得終其天年]’57

By virtue of the possibility that this passage was written by later disciples of

Zhuangzi,58 it can be said that the close relation between uselessness and zhong qi tian

nian must be one that Zhuangzi’s disciples thought to be one of their master’s

prominent ideas. This is because it is Zhuangzi himself who is made to utter the link

between them. If it is one of Zhuangzi’s ideas, it means that Zhuangzi was influenced

by Yangist thought, since zhong qi tian nian, as we have said, is basically an

expression of a Yangist idea.

3.4 In the “Dechongfu” 《德充符》

Although this chapter does not seem to contain ideas related to Yangist

thought, the “Dechongfu” could still be viewed as also Yangist. This is because the

point of this chapter’s passages on mutilated individuals is that it is devirtue or power that

essentially defines an individual. In addition, a further interpretation of quanxing

relates to keeping whole or intact of one’s depower, a concept with a similar meaning as

xingnature.59

Eske Møllgaard offers an interpretation on the mutilated characters that

provides a further reason why this chapter could be regarded as related to Yangist

thought. In order to understand Møllgaard’s interpretation and the morale conveyed by

the stories, it is necessary first to investigate the theme of the “Dechongfu”. The

chapter’s theme is “evaluating the Power in a man without regard for conventional

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57 Graham (2001): p. 121. 58 Roth (2001). 59 It has even been supposed that the Confucian conception of xing (as nature) has been

replaced by the Daoist concept of de. Shen (2003): p. 358.

opinion.”60 The chapter’s overall normative recommendation is to recognise the

“power” of individuals – even those who are deformed – which allows them to

confront adversity without being perturbed. A.C. Graham, for example, says that this

chapter’s stories specifically depict this. As he writes in his introduction to his

translation of the “Dechongfu”:

The test that a man lives by the Power in himself, and is wholly independent

of everything outside of him, is his indifference to the great irreparable

disasters, death and bodily deformity, an indifference which makes others

too ignore even such an obtrusive sign of mutilation and social

condemnation as a foot chopped off for a crime.61

According to this, when a person is indifferent towards life’s misfortunes, she is

showing that she is living by depower in herself. Wang Tai, the man with a chopped foot

and who gained a following equalling that of Kongzi in number, is such a person,

according to Kongzi.62 According to the chapter’s first passage:

‘Death and life are mighty indeed, but he [Wang Tai] refuses to alter with

them; though heaven were to collapse and earth subside he would not be

lost with them. He is aware of the Flawless and is not displaced with other

things; he does his own naming of the transformations of things and holds

fast to their Ancestor.’

…. Such a man cannot even tell apart the functions of eyes and ears, and

lets the heart go roaming in the peace which is from the Power. As for other

things, he looks into that in which they are one, and does not see what each

of them has lost; he regards losing his own foot as he would shaking off

mud.’63

These passages pay tribute to these individuals who have reconciled themselves with

the misfortunes. Their calm deportment, shown in how they carry themselves amidst

83

60 Graham (2001): p. 29. 61 Graham (2001): p. 76. 62 Here, Confucius is used by Zhuangzi as his spokesperson. 63 Graham (2001): pp. 76-77.

the difficult events they undergo, is to be emulated. Wang Tai’s attitude toward the

losing of his foot is an example. He regards it as like “shaking off mud”. That is, he

thinks of the losing of his foot as of no consequence. According to the passage, Wang

Tai is also unaffected by “death and life”.

Møllgaard’s interpretation relates the mutilated characters to Zhuangzi’s view

that the success or completion of an ethical framework set up by the Traditionalists

(the Confucians)64 or traditional moralists “violates ‘life’ (sheng)”.65 For Zhuangzi,

according to Møllgaard, the traditional ethical system violates shenglife because its

purpose is to weaken the individual’s depower:

Concretely this violated life shows up in the Zhuangzi in the form of

mutilated persons: the mutilated criminals, punished by the state, return as

exemplary characters to haunt the moralizers. ... Accordingly, the mutilated

takes on the characteristics of Zhuangzi’s perfected person: he is unaffected

by the praise and blame of others; he does not cling to life or fear death; and

the moralists are not able to shame him – in short, he has become a “man of

Heaven” (tianren). Far from being weakened by the punishment, the

mutilated takes on a new “fullness of power” (dechong), namely, the power

that pertains to everything that is heterogeneous in relation to the realm of

man.66

Although Møllgaard understands de here to mean “power” related to the diversity of

things in the world, what is significant is the connection between this de and sheng. To

Møllgaard, according to Zhuangzi the traditionalists have violated sheng because of

their framework that has effected a dissipation of one’s de. The mutilated persons’

attainment of devirtue:power shows the traditionalists that their proposed framework is

defective. It is defective because it does not and could not determine anybody’s fate.

This is also shown by the fact that even though the de and sheng of the mutilated have

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64 Møllgaard uses ‘Traditionalists’ rather than ‘Confucians’. He says this is “because the latter

term is invested with confusing and dubious connotations. The original meaning of the term ru, which was used for the followers of Confucius, is uncertain, and in later periods it is perhaps best rendered with ‘scholar’.” Møllgaard (2003): p. 349 (n. 2).

65 It is, for Zhuangzi, the Traditionalist (Confucian) concern with “achieving an ordered state and a particular cultural formation [that] presents the greatest threat to humanity”. Møllgaard (2003): pp. 350-353, 354. Møllgaard regards the system to have been set up also by “Legalist statecraft”.

66 Møllgaard (2003): p. 354.

been violated through the traditionalist framework, the mutilated are able to become

“perfected persons” (天人 tianren).

If Møllgaard’s view is right, then the “Dechongfu” can be viewed as Yangist.

This is because through the chapter, Zhuangzi is defending the value that Yang Zhu

gives to sheng, as in quan xing/sheng. Zhuangzi is saying through this chapter that

“traditional” ethics defiles life. An essential part of quanxing is also keeping one’s

power intact, for de and sheng are fundamentally connected.

Before concluding this section, I must deal with the seeming tension between

the Yangist view of the body and the passages in the “Dechongfu” that seem to show

Zhuangzi’s apparent lack of concern with bodily mutilation. I begin by stating that that

such passages appear in the pian does not mean that Zhuangzi is advocating bodily

mutilation. There seems to be an explanation as to why these passages are in the

“Dechongfu”. This explanation is one of the pian’s possible main themes. The

“Dechongfu”, as mentioned, is about devirtue or power. More particularly, the chapter

presents Zhuangzi’s response to one prevalent view of the period. It is the view that

values physical beauty and perfection and one that is directly related to physiognomy,

the practice of determining a person’s character and future destiny through her

physical characteristics.67 The “Dechongfu” is trying to say that people with imperfect

bodies or beautiful bodies may still have a lesson to teach. The mutilated and the

deformed individuals in the stories teach the idea that a human being ought to be

conceived as a whole, rather than as a being whose xinheart-mind and character ought to

be separated from her physical body. This teaching is alluded to in the concluding

passage of the chapter. The passage alludes to the view that human beings must be

viewed as a whole. The view is specifically alluded to when Huizi states to Zhuangzi

that beings who are called ‘humans’ cannot have no essence.68

Because of this, the assertion that the passages which have mutilated

individuals as characters show that Zhuangzi lacks concern with bodily mutilation is

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67 Knoblock (1988): pp. 196-198. Physiognomy is discussed in the Xunzi. Its chapter “Fei

xiang” 《非相》 (Against Physiognomy) presents Xunzi’s opposition towards physiognomy. To Xunzi, such practice disregards the true value of xinheart-mind. Xunzi believes that evaluating the xinheart-mind is more important than physiognomising the physical form. That Xunzi dealt with physiognomy indicates that people of the period tended to depend on physiognomising the external form for determining one’s destiny. The tendency is also indicated by the existence of a number of books on the subject. According to John Knoblock, interest in physiognomy of the period is testified by 24 books on the doctrine in the Han Imperial Library catalogue. Knoblock (1988): p. 198.

68 Graham (2001): p. 82.

weakened. It seems that Zhuangzi used them and the deformed individuals as examples

only to challenge the view about physical beauty and perfection. Having the mutilated

as examples, furthermore, does not mean that Zhuangzi agrees with what the

individuals have done to themselves and that he approves of their conditions.

3.5 In the “Dazongshi” 《大宗師》69

The Yangist element in this chapter is seen in the view that one ought to resign

oneself to the idea that the transformations in the world and on oneself are beyond

human comprehension. To be reconciled with the dissolution of self in death,70 a

manifestation of this theme, is what expresses Yangist ideas.

Reconciliation with death is akin to quanxing and zhong qi tian nian, because it

is an expression of the acceptance of the term of life that Heaven has assigned.

Reconciliation with death is expressed in the following passage:

Death and life are destined; that they have the constancy of morning and

evening is of Heaven.... That hugest of clumps of soil loads me with a body,

has me toiling through a life eases me with old age, rests me with death;

therefore that I find it good to live is the very reason why I find it good to

die. .... Therefore the sage will roam where things cannot escape him and all

are present. That he finds it good to die young and good to grow old, good

to begin and good to end is enough for men take him as their model....71

Through pronouncing that death is a natural process, Zhuangzi expresses that every

human being has a natural term of life. With the statement that they have the

constancy of morning and evening dictated by tianheaven, Zhuangzi is expressing a

meaning included in xingnature which is the capacity to live out the term of life that

Heaven has assigned. This implies that the way of reconciling with death is an

acknowledgement of zhong qi tian nian.

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69 A brief note on the authorship of this chapter is that some have doubted whether it comes

from Zhuangzi’s hands. Qian Mu expressed that the chapter’s discussion on dao seems uncharacteristic of Zhuangzi’s main thought. Zhuangzi zuanjian 莊子纂箋 (Taipei: Dongda, 1993), p. 52 cited in Kim (2010): pp. 70-71.

70 Graham (2001): p. 29. 71 Ibid. p. 93.

Furthermore, although reconciliation with death might seem to mean “yes” to

any sort of death (that is, natural or unnatural), which makes the idea anti-Yangist, the

quoted passage only refers to the natural kind of death. The passage’s mention of the

sage’s attitude towards death (which is that “he finds it good to die young and good to

grow old, good to begin and good to end”) as a model for human beings indicates that

what the text means about reconciliation with death is “yes” to death that is in

accordance to the allotted years assigned by Heaven. This meaning does not contradict

the Yangist views expressed in quanxing.

It is necessary to grasp the chapter’s theme to understand reconciliation with

death. As alluded to, the theme is that one must comprehend that certain

transformations are beyond the grasp of humans. It is clearly seen in expressions of not

knowing or not being able to know what will transpire and yet trusting the plans of a

“creator” of things (fuzaowu 夫造物) that abound in this chapter.72 This is apparent, for

example, in the passage where Master Yu and Master Lai are sick. Both masters were

asked about what they think of their affliction and the following are their replies:

[asked if he resents the transformation done by the “creator” (fuzaowu 夫造物), Master Yu replies]: “Why no, what would I resent? If the process continues, perhaps in time he’ll transform my left arm into a rooster. In that case I’ll keep watch on the night. Or perhaps in time he’ll transform my right arm into a crossbow pellet and I’ll shoot down an owl for roasting. Or perhaps in time he’ll transform my buttocks into cartwheels. Then, with my spirit for a horse, I’ll climb up and go for a ride. What need will I ever have for a carriage again?

“I received life because the time had come; I will lose it because the order of things passes on. Be content with this time and dwell in this order and then neither sorrow nor joy can touch you. In ancient times this was called the ‘freeing of the bound.’ There are those who cannot free themselves, because they are bound by things. But nothing can ever win against Heaven – that’s the way it’s always been. What would I have to resent?’73

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72 It is because of this not knowing about transformations that Paul Goldin has related the

“Dazongshi” to certain passages in Chapter 18 (“Zhile”), which are passages that articulate the theme of “transformation”, that is, “all matter is in constant flux, changing from form to form constantly and inexorably”. See Goldin (2003a): pp. 226-229.

73 Watson (1968): pp. 81-82. See translations of Mair (1994b): p. 59; Graham (2001): pp. 88-89.

[asked to comment about the possible transformations the process will do and the direction the process will lead him to, Master Lai says] “... Thus, that which makes my life good is also that which makes my death good. Now, the Great Smelter casts his metal. If the metal were to jump up and say, ‘You must make into Excalibur!’ the Great Smelter would certainly think that it was inauspicious metal. Now if I, who have chanced to take on human form, were to say, ‘Man! I must remain a man!’ the Great Transforming Creator would certainly think that I am an inauspicious man. Now, once I accept heaven and earth as the Great Forge, and the Transforming Creator as the Great Smelter, I’m willing to go wherever they send me.”74

The two masters insisted that the transformations should not be interfered with. There

is thus the proposal of acceptance, of reconciling oneself with the flux which fuzaowu

has brought about. It is even by being equanimous that one becomes “free of the

bound” (xianjie 縣解). As Ziyu says: “Be content with this time and dwell in this order

and then neither sorrow nor joy can touch you (安時而處順，哀樂不能入也). In ancient

times this was called the ‘freeing of the bound’ (此古之所謂縣解也).” What Ziyu means

is that acceptance of the way or order of things, specifically the beginning and end of

one’s life, is what leads to not being held by things in the world. The suggestion to

accept the changes being made is ultimately made manifest in obedience to whatever

direction or destiny fuzao has for a person. Zilai says: “Now, once I accept heaven and

earth as the Great Forge, and the Transforming Creator as the Great Smelter, I’m

willing to go wherever they send me”. What Zilai is saying is that his acceptance of

“heaven and earth” and the “transforming creator” as maker of things (fuzao) has made

him willing to follow wherever they would want him to go. Burton Watson translates

wuhuwangerbukezai 惡乎往而不可哉 as “Where could he send me that would not be all

right?”,75 which links the idea of acceptance to obedience.

Therefore, extreme fatalism seems to be suggested by the chapter. While the

passages that convey this view of fatalism usher a message of (non-philosophical)

scepticism, of “not knowing”, they ultimately are about acceptance of the inevitable.

The chapter’s final passage clearly conveys this. It is about Master Sang, who realised

his poverty after ten days of rain and who asked about the reason for his misfortune

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74 Mair (1994b): p. 59. See translations of Graham (2001): pp. 88-89, and; Watson (1968): pp.

81-82. 75 Watson (1968): p. 85.

through singing. He was asked by his friend Master Yu to explain the meaning of his

song which went:

‘Was it father? – Was it mother? – Heaven? – Man?’76

Sang’s reply tells of the attitude of fatalism that Zhuangzi seems to recommend:

‘I was imagining who it might be that brought me so low, and can’t find an

answer. How could my father and mother have wanted me to be poor?

Heaven is impartial to everything it covers, earth to everything it carries;

why would heaven and earth discriminate to make me poor? I can’t find out

who it is that did it. That nonetheless I have sunk so low – shall we say it’s

destiny?77

Before explaining this passage further, it is worth noting that Master Sang mentions

four persons who might have caused his situation: father, mother, heaven, and human

being (ren 人). But why does he not give a further question about ren 人 in his reply to

Ziyu?

Master Sang regards it his destiny (ming 命) to have gone so low in poverty

since he could not know who did it. The attribution of Master Sang’s condition to

destiny makes the passage one that advocates fatalism. The mention of the True men

of old (古之真人) of the chapter’s beginning passage seems to explain why this passage

on Master Sang and all the other passages are on the acceptance of the inevitable. The

beginning passage suggests that the attitudes of the True men of old must be

emulated.78 This passage reads:

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76 Graham (2001): p. 92. 77 Ibid. p. 93. 78 As Mair explains:

If one wants to practice and attain [the Dao], nothing is better than to model oneself after the perfected of old who were its embodiment. The chief qualities of these perfected persons are that they were unmindful of moral strictures and unconstrained by knowledge, had few desires, were unconcerned about life and death, and merged with nature. Mair (2000): p. 43.

‘The True Men of old did not know how to be pleased that they were alive,

did not know how to hate death, were neither glad to come forth nor

reluctant to go in; they were content to leave as briskly as they came. They

did not forget the source where they began, did not seek out the destination

where they would end. They were pleased with the gift that they received,

but forgot it as they gave it back. It is this that is called ‘not allowing the

thinking of the heart to damage the Way, not using what is of man to do the

work of Heaven’.79

The passage explicitly states the connection of the accepting attitude to the letting be

of Heaven’s (dao’s) way, which is deemed in the “Dazongshi” as behaving or moving

in a way that no one knows and yet ought to be trusted in.80

In concluding this section, I note that the interpretation of reconciliation with

one’s death as a Yangist idea is supported by the presence of the phrase zhong qi tian

nian in the opening passage of the chapter. This passage reads:

‘To know what is Heaven’s doing and what is man’s is the utmost in

knowledge. Whoever knows what Heaven does lives the life generated by

Heaven. Whoever knows what man does uses what his wits know about to

nurture what they do not know about. To last out the years assigned you by

Heaven [終其天年] and not be cut off in mid-course [不中道夭者], this is

perfection of knowledge.81

Although the passage seems at first glance to be about acquisition of knowledge about

tian’s and ren’s actions, the mention of zhong qi tian nian and bu zhong dao yao zhe

(不中道夭者), and identifying them as “perfection of knowledge” state the chapter’s

relation to the Yangist doctrine of quanxing. Bu zhong dao yao zhe is an idea

synonymous with zhong qi tian nian. It means “not to die in mid path (dao)”, implying

“lasting out one’s term of life assigned by Heaven” (zhong qi tian nian). Being

synonymous with zhong qi tian nian and with zhong qi tian nian as expressing the

Yangist doctrine of quanxing, bu zhong dao yao zhe is also an expression of quanxing.

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79 Graham (2001): p. 85. 80 Ibid., p. 86. 81 Ibid., p. 84.

Two points can be said here to summarise this section. Firstly, the

preoccupation with death in this chapter is like the Yangist preoccupation with life and

extinction, in its doctrine of quanxing. And secondly, that the attitude of acceptance of

the inevitability of death, in the “Dazongshi”, does not contradict with the Yangist

doctrine of quanxing. The completion or keeping intact of a being’s xingnature implies

the acceptance of its allotted years, the limit assigned by Heaven to it.

3.6 In the “Yingdiwang” 《應帝王》

In this chapter, deemed by scholars to be the work of the Syncretist editor,82 it

is doubtful whether it has Yangist recommendations or Yangist thought elements. This

is because its recommendations all pertain to rulership. Overall, the passages of the

“Yingdiwang” suggest the importance of being able to “wander in nonexistence

(youyuwuyou 遊於無有)”83 and to adopt an attitude of non-interference in the

governance of the state. The attitude of non-intervention is an attitude most probably

related to the Syncretist conception of wuwei 無為.

Despite the fact that the chapter does not have Yangist elements, it must be

mentioned that, according to some scholars, Yangist ideas contributed to the

development of the concept of wuwei. According to Liu Xiaogan, Yang Zhu’s ba yi

mao er li tianxia (拔一毛而利天下) is an extreme interpretation of wuwei. Liu writes:

“The essential meaning of Yang Zhu’s philosophy, in the final analysis, is ‘taking no

action’ (wuwei) so that one may keep his body and life in perfect wholeness”.84 Yang

Zhu’s philosophy of stressing the individual self and protecting one’s body can be

interpreted as an expression of non-intervention (wuwei).

3.7 Conclusion

I have set out elements in the Neipian that resemble Yangist thought. These

elements suggest that the supposed author of the Neipian, Zhuangzi, may have been

influenced by Yangist ideas or perhaps that he shared the views of the Yangists. Some

general observations include the fact that as the Yangist ideas mentioned in the

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82 Graham (2001): pp. 29, 94. It is important to note that it has been suggested that the

“Yingdiwang” is “appendix or late addition” to the Neipian, providing support to the suggestion that the chapter is not the work of Zhuangzi. Eno (1996): p. 140.

83 Mair (1994b): p. 66. 84 Liu (1991): p. 46.

Huainanzi are about self-preservation, the elements in the Neipian that resemble

Yangist ideas are also about self-preservation. The recommendation “be useless” is

prominent. As discussed, the recommendation conveys the idea that if one is useless,

she might have the opportunity to, or be able to, preserve her life and complete her

term of existence.

Another observation is about the relation of some of the elements in the

Neipian to the Yangist concern about and attitude toward involvement in official life.

First, it can be said that although uselessness has the ultimate goal of zhong qi tian

nian, uselessness is a way to avoid being involved in official life. It is a way of being

not beneficial to political life. Next, through two passages in the “Renjianshi”, it can be

said that Zhuangzi’s reason for worrying about involvement in official life is his belief

that such participation leads to harm and self-destruction. Although the passage on Yan

He and Qu Boyu seems to be only a presentation of Zhuangzi’s strategy for dealing

with any ruler, it nevertheless portrays Zhuangzi’s worry and scepticism about being in

official life. He worries about it because it is a perilous state to be in. It is because of

this that these passages are regarded as evidence that Zhuangzi was influenced

specifically by the Yangist view about participation in official life.

There is evidence outside the Neipian which would seem to prove that

Zhuangzi may have been influenced specifically by this Yangist view. The evidence is

stories about Zhuangzi in the Waipian (chapter 17) and Zapian (chapter 32). These

stories portray Zhuangzi’s rejection of an invitation to serve in government.

Zhuangzi’s reason for his rejection is the basis for regarding these stories as evidence

for Zhuangzi’s being influenced by Yangist concerns about participation in official life

in government. In the stories, Zhuangzi’s decision involves (1) survival (to just be

alive), and (2) freedom. By freedom, according to the stories, Zhuangzi means his

freedom from ties of the government that restrain him from doing what he naturally

desires to do.85

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85 Although this is the idea of freedom that seems expressed in the stories I mention here, it must be noted that parts of the Neipian suggest that Zhuangzi holds an idea of freedom that involves the idea of “roaming”. This is mainly expressed in the “Xiaoyaoyou”. Furthermore, there is also another idea of freedom that Zhuangzi in the Neipian describes through the zhenren 真人. In the “Dazongshi”, the zhenren is described as an extraordinary individual, who seems to be unharmed by anything and who seems to be not bothered by anything. The freedom she has is evidenced by the fact that she is unharmed and that she is unbothered. The chapter says that the zhenren “slept without dreaming and woke without cares” (Graham [2001]: p. 84). According to Kim-chong Chong, that the zhenren “slept without

Before examining the tales in question in the “Qiushui” (chapter 17) and “Lie

Yukou” 《列御寇》 (chapter 32), it is important to note that these stories have been

generally regarded as fictional. Even if they are most probably fictional, however, they

are stories that depict a certain spirit or attitude of Zhuangzi himself which must have

seemed to later writers86 to define the Zhuangzi. It seems that these stories have been

preserved because of the sort of response Zhuangzi gives to messengers of rulers.

Zhuangzi’s response is both humorous and witty. The story in the “Qiushui” is the

following:

Once, when Chuang Tzu [Zhuangzi] was fishing in the P’u [Pu] River, the

king of Ch’u [Chu] sent two officials to go and announce to him: “I would

like to trouble you with the administration of my realm.”

Chuang Tzu [Zhuangzi] held on to the fishing pole and, without turning

his head, said, “I have heard that there is a sacred tortoise in Ch’u [Chu] that

has been dead for three thousand years. The king keeps it wrapped in cloth

and boxed, and stores it in the ancestral temple. Now would this tortoise

rather be dead and have its bones left behind and honored? Or would it

rather be alive and dragging its tail in the mud?”

“It would rather be alive and dragging its tail in the mud,” said the two

officials.

Chuang Tzu [Zhuangzi] said, “Go away! I’ll drag my tail in the mud!”87

There are probably many issues that could be brought up through this story.

One is Zhuangzi’s bravery in adopting an insulting attitude and posture. He did not

turn his head around to respond to the messengers. This seems to show Zhuangzi’s

mockery towards involvement in official life in general and may not be related to the

idea of self-preservation. However, one important issue this story illustrates is

pronounced by the content of Zhuangzi’s words of reply to the invitation. It would

seem that the content of his response is more significant, as it is preserved in the other

stories found in two different sources I discuss below.

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dreaming” connotes that she is free from whatever anxiety there is (Chong [2011]: p. 334). That the zhenren does not have cares of any kind seems to mean that her freedom is equivalent to being carefree and, as the zhenren is described in the chapter, being focussed on the essentials of life.

86 They were most probably Zhuangzi’s followers. 87 Watson (1968): pp. 187-188.

Zhuangzi’s reason for rejecting the offer to serve in this story is “being alive”

(thus survival) and being free. He is saying that, just like the tortoise, he would rather

be alive. Survival is one of the reasons for Zhuangzi to reject the offer because,

through Zhuangzi’s response, the story seems to also stress the tortoise’s being “dead

for three thousand years”. It mentions that the tortoise would rather be alive and do

what it naturally would do.88 An interesting point about the emphasis of the tortoise’s

being “dead for three thousand years” is that it suggests that Zhuangzi equates being in

office as a route to untimely extinction, pointing to the Yangist idea of quanxing.

By alluding to the tortoise’s desire to be rather alive and doing what it does

naturally in the mud,89 it can be said that what Zhuangzi is saying through the story is

that he wishes to be treated as an ordinary member of society, that is, a member

without rank or noble title. That is, he wants to be left alone as an ordinary man

without a role in government administration. Zhuangzi hypothesizes that if he were the

tortoise, he would rather be free than be required to participate in government affairs.

The freedom that Zhuangzi seems to express and desires to exercise here is the

freedom from being involved in official life. It seems also that it is a kind of freedom

that would allow him to use his talents the way he wants to use them. He has talents

that would make him effective in administration. The invitation to serve in his court

indicates that the king recognised Zhuangzi’s talents.90 The freedom from being in

administration that Zhuangzi desires is linked to his idea of survival. This suggests that

freedom from being involved in official life entails being alive.

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88 This would be viewed as contradicting the view that Zhuangzi seems to exhibit when his

wife died. But perhaps the kind of death seems to matter to Zhuangzi. Zhuangzi seems to be against death that is not in line with the theme of zhong qi tian nian (i.e. unnatural death). His wife’s death, it is presumed in the story, was destined, in the sense of lasting out the natural term of life (i.e. natural). The tortoise’s (in the other stories, ox’s) death is untimely (unnatural).

89 The tortoise, in Zhuangzi’s view, ought not to be treated as a courtly emblem and ought to be seen as an ordinary animal. About whether the tortoise was treated as a religious item or not, it is most probable that the tortoise is treated as a religious or ritual or worship item, since according to the passage it is “sacred”, “wrapped in cloth and boxed, and stored it in the ancestral temple.”

90 This seems related to the “Renjianshi” theme of uselessness. It is to be recalled that two of the stories that express the theme are about a worthless (不材) tree. Perhaps, then, another point of these stories is to show that by possessing no talent (材) a person will not be considered for involvement in the affairs of government. The reason for this is that possession of talent (材) leads to one’s untimely end. Is it possible that these stories about Zhuangzi are told to highlight Zhuangzi’s view on possessing talents?

The story about Zhuangzi’s rejection of offer to serve government in the “Lie

Yukou” is in essence like that of the “Qiushui”. It is, however, shorter and it involves

an ox:

Someone sent gifts to Chuang Tzu [Zhuangzi] with an invitation to office.

Chuang Tzu [Zhuangzi] replied to the messenger in these words: “Have you

ever seen a sacrificial ox? They deck him out in embroidery and trimmings,

gorge him on grass and beanstalks. But when at last they lead him off into the

great ancestral temple, then, although he might wish he could become a lonely

calf once more, is it possible?”91

According to A.C. Graham, the passage is mutilated and one that has been

restored from the Shiji.92 It is included in its memoir of Zhuangzi, in Liezhuan 列傳 63.

The story takes half of the length of the memoir, indicating a significance accorded by

the Han authors (the Simas) of this account of Zhuangzi’s life:

King Wei of Ch’u [Chu] (r. 339-329 BC) heard that Chuang Chou [Zhuang

Zhou] was a worthy man. He sent a messenger with lavish gifts to induce him

to come and promise him the position of prime minister. Chuang Chou smiled

and told Ch’u’s messenger, “A thousand chin [jin] is great profit, and

ministership an exalted position, but can it be that you have not seen the

sacrificial cow used in the suburban sacrifices? After feeding it for several

years, it is dressed in figured brocade and sent into the Great Temple. When

things have reached this point, though it might wish to become an untended

pig, how could I attain this? Go quickly, sir, do not pollute me. I would rather

romp at my own pleasure in a slimy ditch than be held in captivity by the ruler

of a state. I won’t take office for as long as I live, for that is what pleases my

fancy most.”93

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91 Watson (1968): pp. 360-361. 92 Graham (2001): p. 119. 93 Nienhauser (1994): pp. 23-24.

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It is possible that the account in the “Lie Yukou” is a synopsis of this full Shiji

account, as the latter contains more detail.94 It states the name of the official who sent

the gifts and the position being offered to Zhuangzi, and it has a more elaborate

description of Zhuangzi’s story about the cow. Despite that, it ought to be said that

both stories display Zhuangzi’s attitude toward taking government office. According to

the accounts, Zhuangzi likens being in office to being a sacrificial cow. This cow,

when it was about to be sacrificed, desired to be free. But unfortunately, it was already

impossible for it to be free. Its end is about to come. Zhuangzi’s wish is to be not in the

cow’s predicament. He said he would rather play in the ditch than be the ruler’s

captive.

By stating that he desires not to be in the sacrificial cow’s state, Zhuangzi

implies the perilous nature of being in office, suggesting that taking up office will

ultimately lead to being sacrificed. Accordingly, he also emphasises the idea of

survival. He does not want to be sacrificed. He says that there is great profit and

honour in being in office, but these are not precious to him. His survival and freedom

from captivity by any ruler are what is precious to him.

Because of Zhuangzi’s emphasis on the value of survival in these stories about

serving in government administration, these stories can be understood (if they define

the historical Zhuangzi’s attitude towards being involved in official life in the

government) as, first, showing that Zhuangzi had a similar concern about serving in

government as that of the Yangists, and, secondly, as suggesting that he was

influenced by the Yangist concern about involvement in official life. Zhuangzi’s worry

about being in official life because he believes that such participation leads to harm

and self-destruction revealed in the “Renjianshi” is made more obvious in these later

stories about Zhuangzi.

In the next chapter, I explore the details of Zhuangzi’s scepticism as about the

solutions and the debates on these solutions.

94 It is only likely, because something is different in the Shiji account. Although the same

message is conveyed, i.e. the message of being free from ritual captivity, the Shiji account has the cow wishing to be an “untended pig” [gutun 孤豚] rather than “lonely calf once more” [gudu 孤犢]. Furthermore, it is only likely because it also possible that the Shiji account is an embellishment, a concocted elaboration of the former.

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4. Zhuangzi’s Scepticism

Introduction

In order to understand Zhuangzi’s scepticism, we first need to provide a sketch

of scepticism and some of its forms dealt with in philosophy. The presentation of

categories and frameworks of scepticism is important because many contemporary

scholars have drawn on them to inform their analysis of Zhuangzi’s philosophy as

‘sceptical’. That will be the topic of investigation in the following chapter. In this

chapter, after a brief exploration of scepticism, I analyse passages in the Neipian,

particularly in the “Qiwulun” and the “Xiaoyaoyou”, that express scepticism. The

analysis here aims to demonstrate that Zhuangzi’s scepticism is one about the solutions

offered by the different thinkers.

4.1 What is Scepticism

Scepticism is doubt. Scepticism or doubt can be aimed at anything. For

example, it can be directed at news reports or anything aired on the media, something

that might have been misheard, or predictions of future events. These kinds of doubt

are not the kinds dealt with in philosophy, however; philosophers concern themselves

with scepticism that is not directed at ordinary aspects of life. They reflect on

philosophically interesting scepticism. Philosophically interesting scepticism is doubt

directed at general statements (that is, beliefs or claims) that are commonly deemed

true or certain. Such doubt is philosophically interesting because it seems absurd to

doubt them. It makes us wonder about the sceptic’s grounds for the doubt.

For example, doubt about the belief that humans have knowledge is

philosophically interesting because it seems unreasonable to doubt this belief. How is

doubt that we have knowledge reasonable? A view related to this is doubt about how

knowledge is defined. According to a view that was dominant prior to 1963,

knowledge is justified true belief (JTB). A.J. Ayer states that the necessary and

sufficient conditions for someone (S) to know p are: (1) that p is true; (2) that S is sure

p is true; and (3) that S has the right to be sure that p is true.1 Edmund Gettier, in his

1 A. J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge (London: Macmillan, 1956): p. 34 cited in Gettier (1963): p. 121. Gettier reduces the views of A.J. Ayer and Roderick M. Chisholm in the following form: the necessary and sufficient conditions for someone to know a proposition p are: (1) p is true, (2) that

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1963 paper “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?,” argues that the view about

necessary and sufficient conditions for someone to know p is false. In the paper,

Gettier shows two cases which show that, in some cases, one might be justified in

believing that p; yet, we are not happy to grant that she knows p.2

4.2 Types of Scepticism

Here, I categorise the different kinds of scepticism dealt with in philosophy

according to (1) object of doubt, and (2) purpose or goal of doubt.

4.2.1 Object of Doubt

The objects of philosophically interesting scepticism are general statements that

we commonly deem true or certain. Since there are a number of these statements, there

is also a number of kinds of scepticism. I will discuss some of them here.

Epistemological scepticism is scepticism aimed at statements relating to or

claims about knowledge. One such form of scepticism is held, for example, by those

who believe that all we know is contained within our experience and that there is no

world ‘out there’ as such. According to this view, whether we experience the real

countryside, or a simulated picture, smells, feeling of travelling through the

countryside, is no different. Effectively, this means that what we experience might just

as well be supplied by a computer or computers. This is known as the “brain-in-a-vat”

hypothesis.3

Ontological scepticism is scepticism directed at statements about the existence

of certain entities. An example of this form is the scepticism about the belief that God

exists. This scepticism about the claim of God’s existence is held by atheists and

agnostics. The atheist’s doubt consists in denying the claim, while the agnostic’s

consists in suspension of judgement about it. Doubtful about the attribution of essential

that someone believes p, and (3) that that someone is justified in believing p. According to Roderick M. Chisholm, the necessary and sufficient conditions for someone (S) to know p are: a) that S accepts p; b) that S has adequate evidence for p; and c) that p is true. Roderick M. Chisholm, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 16 cited in Gettier (1963): p. 121.

2 Gettier (1963): pp. 121-123. 3 Prichard (2004).

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qualities to God (which is thick theism), David Hume has been considered an atheist or

an agnostic.4

Although the objects of ontological scepticism are “supposedly problematic,

such as the self or God”,5 the question about whether a tree that falls in the forest exist

when nobody notices it is also an example of ontological scepticism.6 This question is

one prompted by the views of George Berkeley, who believes that “to be is to be

perceived” (esse est percipi).7 The question is framed in the following way: If for

something to exist one must perceive it, then does the falling tree in the forest

somewhere in the world exist if there is at that point no perceiver perceiving it?

Ethical or moral scepticism is doubt whose object relates to ethics or morality.

Doubt about the general claim that humans have access to moral knowledge is an

example of ethical scepticism. A.J. Ayer’s moral theory known as “emotivism” could

be viewed as a scepticism of this form. Emotivism is the view that regards moral or

value judgments as only expressions of emotions.8 Treating the judgements as having

no objective validity, the theory implies rejection of moral facts. That is, whenever one

judges an act to be undesirable, e.g. murder, she is only expressing her disgust towards

or disapproval of such action; and whenever one judges an action to be desirable, e.g. a

generous act, she is only expressing her approval of the action. This means, in other

words, that people do not have access to moral truths and that they cannot have moral

knowledge. According to emotivism, there are no moral truths in the first place.9

Another example of ethical scepticism is the doubt that there are objective

moral standards. Those who hold this doubt may be moral relativists. They believe that

because peoples or societies do not share similar ethical standards or values, therefore

there are no objective moral standards.10

4 Russell (2011). 5 Prichard (2004). 6 The question is now commonly phrased: “If a tree falls in the forest with no one around, does

it make a sound?”. 7 George Berkeley mentions imagined trees in Of the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710)

in David M. Armstrong (ed.) Berkeley’s Philosophical Writings (London: Collier, 1965): pp. 69-70 (paragraph 23).

8 Ayer (1946): pp.110-113. 9 Rachels (1993): pp. 35-40. 10 Ibid., pp. 15-29.

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Another form of moral scepticism is one defended by J.L. Mackie. Mackie’s

moral scepticism is constituted by the thesis that “there are no objective values”.11 But

his is not the view that objective standards do not exist. Holding a second order view,

which is about “the status of moral values… about how and why they fit into the

world”,12 Mackie does not see that objective moral values hold any ontological status.

He claims that values are “not part of the fabric of the world”.13

The final form of scepticism I discuss here is language scepticism. It is doubt

directed at claims about language. A form of language scepticism is doubt about the

claim that language adequately conveys truth or meaning about the world. This doubt

is about the ability of the spoken or written forms of language to adequately express

truth or meaning. This doubt is one that the Daodejing also seems to express. In the

Daodejing’s first chapter, it is stated that “[the dao] that can be followed [told] is not

the constant [dao]; [A] name that can be named is not [a] constant name” [道可道,

非常道。名可名, 非常名].14 This means that dao, which has been understood as ‘reality’,

when expressed is not ‘reality’. If what has been expressed is not ‘reality’, then

language or speech fails to express ‘reality’. The second part of the passage further

makes the point that a ‘name’ that can be said is not the unchanging ‘name’. There is

an unchanging ‘name’ (commonly understood as dao’s name), which one can try to

say. But once it is said, what is said is not and could not be the unchanging ‘name’. In

other words, it is inexpressible. This further points out that language is not an effective

medium for expressing ‘reality’ (dao).

Aside from the authors of the Daodejing, the Chan Buddhists are said to have

also held this doubt about the ability of language to adequately express truth or

meaning. Their common motto says:

The [Chan] teaching is such that the truth is transmitted outside the

scriptures; there is no setting up of words and letters; point directly at a

person’s mind; one attains Buddhahood by seeing his self-nature.15

11 Mackie (1977): p. 15. 12 Ibid. p. 16. 13 Ibid. p. 15. 14 Ivanhoe and Van Norden (2005): p. 163. 15 Cited in Cheng (1977): p. 146.

101

According to this, the Chan Buddhists believe that the scriptures (thus language) do

not lead to truth (in enlightenment). No words are needed to attain enlightenment or

Buddhahood. Thus, it could be said that they are sceptical about the ability of language

to express truth. Although the Chan Buddhists still use language (in their scriptures) to

express their Buddhist teachings, their doubt ultimately devalues language as a means

for transmitting the real truth of their teachings.16

4.2.2 Purpose or Goal of Doubt

Scepticism can either be one that has the sole purpose of challenging claims or

one that has a different goal. In the latter case, one might challenge prevailing views,

for example, to demonstrate one’s particular notion of truth, or a claim about the

world. In this case, sceptical challenges are a means to an end. Cartesian scepticism is

a good example of scepticism that has a purpose other than challenging beliefs and

claims. Its ultimate goal is the attainment of indubitable facts. Descartes’ scepticism is

understood to be methodological scepticism. First, it doubts everything we perceive

through the senses. It then considers the possibility that our experience is but a dream.

And finally considers the possibility that we are being deceived by an evil demon.

These steps led Descartes to ascertain the indubitable fact, the one thing he could not

doubt: that he is a thinking being.17

All of the types of scepticism discussed in section 4.2.1 may be proposed either

as goals themselves, or as means to another end. There is, however, one type of

scepticism that does not have a goal, either as an end in itself or to prove another,

ultimate, point, or truth. It is the ancient form of scepticism known as Pyrrhonian

scepticism. Pyrrhonian scepticism is doubt that is not constituted by theses about

knowledge or ontological entities. Rather, its goal is epoche or suspension of

judgement. Its basis for epoche is the “equipollence” of contradictory positions, which

means that “to every account an equal account is opposed.”18 Sextus Empiricus,

propagator of Pyrrhonian scepticism, defines scepticism as “an ability to set out

oppositions among things which appear and are thought of in any way at all, an ability

16 Cheng (1977): pp. 145-146. 17 Descartes (1641): p. 15-20. 18 Annas and Barnes (1994): p. 6.

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by which, because of the equipollence in the opposed objects and accounts, we come

first to suspension of judgement and afterwards to tranquility”.19

The above types of scepticism are helpful in understanding the interpretations

of Zhuangzi’s philosophy as ‘sceptical’ and seeing how Zhuangzi is sceptical as

depicted in the Neipian. Specifically, the object of Zhuangzi’s scepticism is the

solutions proposed by his contemporaries. The goal of his scepticism appears to be to

challenge his contemporaries’ assumption of certainty and comprehensiveness.

4.3 Zhuangzi’s Scepticism in the “Qiwulun”20

Zhuangzi’s scepticism concerns the assumption of the other thinkers that each

of their proposed solutions was the best for rectifying the unrest. Zhuangzi’s

scepticism about the thinkers’ assumption of certainty is evident in the passages I will

analyse. There are passages in the “Qiwulun” that seem to directly express this

scepticism. This scepticism will also be evident in the passages that discuss Zhuangzi’s

scepticism about arbitrariness, because these forms or expressions of Zhuangzi’s

scepticism are connected to his scepticism about certainty. The discussion of

Zhuangzi’s scepticism about arbitrariness leads to the discussion of his doubt about

certainty.

4.3.1 Scepticism about Arbitrariness

Some of the “Qiwulun” passages are concerned that language is arbitrary.

Because it is arbitrary, language cannot be the basis of fixing ‘actuality’ (shi 實), and,

thereby, of resolving the unrest.

To understand this concern, it is important to understand its background. The

concern is linked to the preoccupation of the Mingjia thinkers. It is a response to the

Mingjia thinkers’ belief that fixing language (名, mingnames) is the key to resolving the

unrest of the period.

19 Ibid., p. 4. It is in this sense that Pyrrhonian scepticism is also regarded as a practical form of

scepticism, as opposed to the theoretical (epistemological) forms. 20 Because the passages of the “Qiwulun” express scepticism and relativism most prominently,

it is regarded by many scholars to be the most philosophically-rich chapter in the Neipian. A controversy exists, however, regarding its authorship. It has been speculated that it may not be Zhuang Zhou who wrote it but Shen Dao. See Fu (1936): pp. 557-567.

103

According to Han dynasty scholars, the solution of the group of thinkers they

dubbed “Mingjia” 名家 essentially involved ‘language’. The Mingjia thinkers were

“names [or words] specialists”.21 According to the Shiji 《史記》, they were thinkers

who “decide[d] matters on the basis of words [名]”.22 Specifically, the Mingjia thinkers

were thinkers preoccupied with the project of rectifying or standardising mingnames

(正名, zhengto fix:correct ming names). They believed that the standardisation of mingnames

and the resolution of 辯 (biandisagreements) through zhengming would ultimately lead to

the rectification of society. This belief is implied in the first section of the

“Mingshilun” 《名實論》 of the Gongsun Longzi 《公孫龍子》, regarded as the work of

the Mingjia thinker Gongsun Longzi 公孫龍子. The section says:

Heaven and earth, together with their products, are things. If things

assume the role of things without exceeding it, there is reality. If reality

fulfills all the expectations of reality without lacking any, there is order. To

deviate from order is to fall into disorder; to observe order is to obtain

correctness.

What is correct is to be used to rectify what is incorrect. What is

incorrect is to be used to check what is correct.

Rectification is rectification of reality; rectification of reality is

rectification of the name [正其所實者, 正其名也].23

According to this, the goal of zhengming 正名 is zhengshi 正實, the rectification of

things in the world or shiactuality or “reality” (in Mei’s translation). According to the

passage, rectified shiactuality is when shiactuality is in order. It is the view of the Mingjia

thinkers that as society consists of shi and depends on shi, the rectification and reform

of shi would lead to the rectification of society. The Mingjia thinkers believed that

their work of zhengming, 辯 (biandisputation), and therefore zhengshi would “get to the

roots of socio-political issues by clarifying the status of names and their connection

with the actual world”.24

21 Petersen (1995): p. 35. 22 Shiji 130: 3291 cited in Smith (2003): p. 142. 23 Mei (1953): p. 434. 24 Lai (2008b): p. 112.

104

But what is involved in the Mingjia thinkers’ zhengming, the standardisation of

mingnames? The Mingjia thinkers’ zhengming involved matching names (ming 名) with

things in the world or actuality (shi 實). It involved making certain that mingnames

would clearly and objectively correspond to actuality or things in the world (shi 實).

This is done by limiting the referents or scopes of mingnames. The final sections of the

Gongsun Longzi’s “Mingshilun” elaborate on this:

When the name is rectified, then the “this” and the “that” are delimited.

…To call that, and that only, “that”; and to call this, and this only, “this”;–

this is right. To call this, “that,” and have this become also that, and to call

that, “this,” and have that become also this– this is wrong.

… name is to designate reality [夫名, 實謂也]. Knowing that this is not

this and that this is not in this, one will not make the designation. Knowing

that that is not that and that that is not in that, one will not make the

designation either.25

Standardisation of mingnames involved the exercise of 辨 (biandistinguishing) between

alternatives: between this (ci 此) and that (bi 彼), or ran 然 (what is allowable or

acceptable) and buran 不然 (what is not allowable or unacceptable). This exercise is

also what is involved in biandisputation. The later Mohists, who adopted similar

preoccupations with the Mingjia thinkers, defined biandisputation particularly in relation

to the elucidation of mingnames, that is, to the establishment of referents to names. This

is seen in the Mohist Canons.26

In essence, the Mingjia thinkers’ solution to the unrest is the clarification of

names and language in order to reform matters that people and society deal with. It is

with emphasis on fixing language which Zhuangzi had qualms about. His scepticism is

25 Mei (1953): pp. 434-435. 26 Mohist Canons A 74 says:

“C. Fan [仮] (being the converse of each other) is if inadmissible then on both sides inadmissible. E. All oxen, and non-oxen marked off as a group, are the two sides. To lack what distinguishes an ox is to be a non-ox. C. [辯 (biandisputation)] is contending over claims which are the converse of each other. Winning in disputation is fitting the fact.” Graham (1978): p. 318.

105

based on his view that names are not fixed. They could not be fixed, because they are

arbitrary.

Zhuangzi’s view that language is arbitrary is seen in three passages. The first

passage is about the conventionality of naming and language, and about the

arbitrariness of convention:

What is acceptable we call acceptable; what is unacceptable we call

unacceptable. A road is made by people walking on it; things are so because

they are called so [物謂之而然]. What makes them so? Making them so

makes them so. What makes them not so? Making them not so makes them

not so. Things all must have that which is so; things all must have that

which is acceptable. There is nothing that is not so, nothing that is not

acceptable.27

If naming or language depends on convention, then it means that there exists no fixed

standard for names and language. If there is no fixed standard, it means that names and

language happen to be based on the fact that names do not correspond to or pick out

things in the world in any regular way. In this passage, that the way something

becomes conventional is through people regarding it as such. The views of the Warring

States thinkers seem to be the subject of Zhuangzi here. He talks about how things

have become so through convention, through the standardising ideals of the thinkers:

“What makes them so? Making them so makes them so. What makes them not so?

Making them not so makes them not so.”28 The sentence, “Things are so because they

are called so [物謂之而然]”, in the passage specifically indicates that convention

dictates how things are so (ran 然). The presence of the verb 謂, weideem:call, a

significant character which will be further discussed below, means that names of things

depend on how they are weideemed:called.

The second passage indirectly mentions the arbitrariness of naming. This

passage is one involving Wang Ni and Gaptooth:

27 Watson (1964): pp. 35-36. 28 Cf. the Xunzi, “Zhengming”

106

Nieh Ch’üeh [Gaptooth] asked Wang Ni, “Do you know what all things

agree in calling right?”

“How would I know that?” said Wang Ni.

“Do you know that you don’t know it?”

“How would I know that?”

“Then do things know nothing?”

“How would I know that? However, suppose I try saying something. What

way do I have of knowing that if I say I know something I don’t really not

know it? Or what way do I have of knowing that if I say I don’t know

something I don’t really in fact know it?....”29

The way this passage indirectly mentions naming and arbitrariness is through stating

the following rhetorical questions:

“What way do I have of knowing that if I say [wei 謂] I know something I

don’t really not know it? Or what way do I have of knowing that if I say

[wei 謂] I don’t know something I don’t really in fact know it?....”

These questions of Wang Ni are not only epistemological but are about naming.30 This

means that what is emphasised is the verb 謂 (wei), meaning ‘to call’ or ‘to deem’.31 In

the passage, where the verb wei is stressed, it means that Zhuangzi is questioning

whether what is called ‘having knowing’ is ‘not knowing’ and what is called ‘not

knowing’ is really ‘having knowing’. In other words, he is wondering whether one-to-

one correspondence between names and things in the world is correct. Zhuangzi

doubts it. By doubting the supposed correspondence between names and things,

Zhuangzi expresses his view about the arbitrariness of names.

The third passage is the passage about biandisputation. More specifically, this is

the passage about the irresolvability of biandisputation:

You and I having been made to argue over alternatives [辯], if it is you not I

that wins, is it really you who are on to it, I who am not? If it is I not you

29 Watson (1964): pp. 40-41. 30 Lai (2008a): pp. 148-149. 31 Ibid.

107

that wins, is it really I who am on to it, you who are not? Is one of us on to it

and the other of us not? Or are both of us on to it and both of us not? If you

and I are unable to know where we stand, others will surely be in the dark

because of us. Whom shall I call in to decide it? If I get someone of your

party to decide it, being already of your party how can he decide it? If I get

someone of my party to decide it, being already of my party how can he

decide it? If I get someone of a party different from either of us how can he

decide it? If I get someone of the same party as both of us to decide it, being

already of the same party as both of us how can he decide it? Consequently

you and I and he are all unable to know where we stand, and shall we find

someone else to depend on?32

This passage on the nature of biandisputation will help us see that it relates to Zhuangzi’s

view about the arbitrary nature of language. This discussion about the irresolvability of

biandisputation is also understood as Zhuangzi’s scepticism about the method the thinkers

employed to determine the winner, the one who has the best solution. But because

biandisputation involves the use of language which as a tool to resolve the unrest,

according to Zhuangzi, is not effective since it is arbitrary, this passage is linked to

Zhuangzi’s view about language.

The debates, biandisputations, are irresolvable because there are no objective

criteria for judging the winner. The passage asks: “… shall we find someone else to

depend on?”, which suggests that there might be another party to consider but it would

still be undependable. Ultimately, the plurality of perspectives provides other possible

valid criteria. There are many other parties to deal with. The question is, Which of

them should be used? The existence of these parties and the difficulty of knowing

which among them actually holds the proper criteria make it difficult, even impossible,

to decide who the winner is. As a passage about biandisputation, it is one about language.

The activity of biandisputation essentially involves the use of language. The character for

biandisputation, 辯, even indicates this. The character contains 言 (yanwords:language), placed

in between the radical 辛 (xintoilsome: laborious). For Zhuangzi, the use of language in

resolving biandisputation would be ineffective, as it is his view that language is arbitrary.

32 Graham (2001): p. 60.

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The use of that which is arbitrary would just complicate matters, leaving the

biandisputation most likely unresolved.

4.3.2 Scepticism about Certainty

Zhuangzi’s scepticism about the standardisation of mingnames and biandisputation

leads to a discussion of his scepticism about the certainty that his contemporaries

assumed in regard to their proposals:

Our intercourse with others then leads to various activity, and daily there is

the striving of mind with mind. There are hesitancies; deep difficulties;

reservations; small apprehensions causing restless distress, and great

apprehensions producing endless fears. Where their utterances are like

arrows from a bow, we have those who feel it their charge to pronounce

what is right and what is wrong; where they are given out like the conditions

of a covenant, we have those who maintain their views, determined to

overcome. ... Then their ideas seem as if fast bound with cords, showing that

the mind is become like an old and dry moat, and that it is nigh to death, and

cannot be restored to vigour and brightness.33

This passage indicates the assumption of certainty or objectivity that thinkers of the

period attributed to their views. That this is the case is seen in the section: “Where their

utterances are like arrows from a bow, we have those who feel it their charge to

pronounce what is right and what is wrong…”. Zhuangzi describes the utterances of

the thinkers as “like arrows from a bow”. This description points out the fact about the

thinkers’ determination to hit the target of being able to find the right fit for shi 實, by

“pronouncing what is right and what is wrong”. We have noted that each of the

thinkers seemed to believe that their views are the correct views that would quell the

unrest. This is pictured by Zhuangzi through the image of arrows from a bow.

Another section in the passage says: “where they are given out like the

conditions of a covenant, we have those who maintain their views, determined to

overcome”. That the thinkers were “determined to overcome” or, in Watson’s

translation, “sure that they are holding on to victory”, indicates Zhuangzi’s reflection

33 Legge (1962): pp. 178-179.

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of the certainty the thinkers had on their views. It also indicates that, according to

Zhuangzi, the thinkers were emotionally caught up in the whole process of arguing for

rightness – they were “obsessed with being right”.34 Their determination involved

negative emotions generated by the wrong-headed pursuit of certainty and rightness.

4.3.3 The Problem Compounded: Certainty in the Face of Arbitrariness

Zhuangzi’s scepticism about the thinkers’ assumption of certainty is seen in his

reference to the thinkers’ preoccupation with fixing names with shiactuality. In the

following passage, while referring also to arbitrariness of language, Zhuangzi alludes

to the attempt of thinkers to fix names:

Words are not just wind. Words have something to say. But if what they

have to say is not fixed [定], then do they really say something? Or do they

say nothing? People suppose that words are different from the peeps of baby

birds, but is there any difference, or isn’t there?35

Zhuangzi is sceptical about the view that words can have established referents. In the

passage, he seems first to be agreeing with the Mingjia thinkers that “words have

something to say”, which means that words refer to things in the world. Then,

Zhuangzi seems to put forward the view that what words refer to are not fixed. His

questions, “… then do they really say something? Or do they say nothing?”, are asked

to challenge the Mingjia view that words do refer to particular things in the world.

Zhuangzi’s view that what words refer to are not fixed appears to be supported by his

view that there are other perspectives (specifically nonhuman) that ought to be

considered. In this passage, Zhuangzi’s mention of the baby birds could be understood

as a way to allude to the nonhuman perspectives. It is also Zhuangzi’s way to highlight

the folly of human presuppositions.

Moreover, the passage mentions Zhuangzi’s idea that thinkers of the Mingjia

were insistent about their project, exhibiting their attribution of certainty to their

solutions. In the passage, Zhuangzi says: “But if what they have to say is not fixed [定],

34 Wong (2005): pp. 91-107. 35 Watson (1964): p. 34.

夫言非吹也。言者有言，其所言者特未定也。果有言邪？其未嘗有言邪？其以為異於鷇音，亦有辨乎，其

無辨乎？ (Harvard-Yenching Zhuangzi Yinde: 4/2/23-25)

110

then do they really say something? Or do they say nothing?”36 Through this, Zhuangzi

highlights language’s arbitrariness, which is a challenge he poses to them. The focal

point of the passage that expresses Zhuangzi’s view of words is the term 定 (ding),

which Watson has translated as “fixed”. To dingfix:settle words is to match them to

things in the world (shiactualities), thus ascribing meanings to them. These meanings

would in turn be the words’ established or fixed meanings. Zhuangzi was at least in

part looking at how the Mingjia thinkers regarded their project of standardising names.

He believed that the Mingjia thinkers were fixed on their belief that zhengming is the

way to resolve the unrest.

In this way, they have compounded the problem. It is absurd and unhelpful to

think that something unfixed, which is language, is the certain way to rectify society.

4.3.4 Setting Standards: The Exclusivity of Each of the Solutions

The Gaptooth and Wang Ni passage cited above may also be about arbitrariness

of language and the thinkers’ assumption of certainty. Zhuangzi’s worry about the

preoccupation with standardising names is that the thinkers’ proposals exclude all

other perspectives. The plurality of other human and non-human perspectives is left

out in names and language:

If a man sleeps in a damp place, his back aches and he ends up half

paralyzed, but is this true of a loach? If he lives in a tree, he is terrified and

shakes with fright, but is this true of a monkey? Of these three creatures,

then, which one knows the proper place to live? Men eat the flesh of

grassfed and grainfed animals, deer eat grass, centipedes find snakes tasty,

and hawks and falcons relish mice. Of these four, which knows how food

ought to taste? Monkeys pair with monkeys, deer go out with deer, and fish

play around with fish. Men claim that [Mao Qiang] and Lady Li were

beautiful, but if fish saw them they would dive to the bottom of the stream,

if birds saw them they would fly away, and if deer saw them they would

break into a run. Of these four, which knows how to fix the standard of

beauty for the world? [四者孰知天下之正色哉] The way I see it, the rules of

benevolence and righteousness and the paths of right and wrong are all

36 Watson (1964): p. 34.

111

hopelessly snarled and jumbled. How could I know anything about such

discriminations?” 37

Here, there is a question about who knows the right standard for habitat and taste. The

questions in the passage point out that there other perspectives that ought to be

considered. As such, the questions relate to the use of naming by other thinkers. Does

the thinkers’ use of names indicate that they are open to these other perspectives?

More importantly, there is the question of whether what one weideems is what another

one would weideem. The passage highlights that due to plurality of perspectives,

language is bound to be arbitrary.

Moreover, as a passage that is also about certainty, the question “…which

knows how to fix the standard of beauty for the world?” indicates this. The question is

about 正, zhengto fix:correct a standard. To zhengto fix:correct such a standard involves setting

criteria for fixing. In the case of the standard of beauty, according to the passage,

because people and animals see things differently – which consequently means that

they have different standards – it is impossible to zhengto fix:correct. Because of this, it

seems it is Zhuangzi’s view that the certainty that thinkers assumed in regard to their

views is trumped by the idea that there is not one criterion for zhengfixing standards.

4.3.5 Application of Standards and the Impoverishment of Life

Zhuangzi also saw that names and language have been used as a tool to

standardise life and to regulate people and society. The Confucians’ preoccupation

with zhengming (rectification of names) and li (rites) and the Mohists’ with fa

(standards) show this manipulation of names and language to order society.38 These

ways of using names and language are incorporated in the general proposals or

solutions of the thinkers to quell the unrest and rectify society.

Such application of standards is criticised by Zhuangzi as impoverishing life.

That is, for Zhuangzi, life is varied and plural, but the application and imposition of

these standards on the people comes at a cost to plurality.39

37 Watson (1964): pp. 40-41. 38 Lai (2008b): p. 111. 39 Cf. Daodejing 57.

112

This criticism of Zhuangzi is evident in the two passages (stories) on 無用

(wuyong) in the “Xiaoyaoyou”.40 These passages show Zhuangzi’s advice to go

beyond yongconventional uses. The point of the stories seems to be that conventional ways

of thinking about utility ought to be abandoned and replaced with unconventional

ways. The first passage seems to talk about how narrow-mindedness or narrow

thinking that is not unbounded constrains people from seeing other important features

or uses of things. In the passage, Zhuangzi seems to be saying that things that look

useless, like Hui Shi’s gourds, in reality have uses, if only one thinks beyond what

they think these things could do or be useful for. In the story, it is not that Hui Shi’s

gourds (or gourds in general) do not have possible initial uses and that Hui Shi ought,

through Zhuangzi’s suggestion, to find uses for them. The gourds could be used as

containers and ladles. Hui Shi tried to use them as those, but there were problems:

when filled with any liquid “they weren’t solid enough to stay upright” and when

made into ladles “they sagged and spilled over”.41 As such, he declared them useless.

Hui Shi ceased thinking about other uses for those gourds. It seems he limited his

thinking by relying on conventional thinking about (the uses of) objects, specifically

about those huge gourds. Huizi’s thinking was bounded by convention and it is

Zhuangzi’s recommendation here to go beyond the limitation, the bounds convention

has created.

In the second passage, Zhuangzi also reminds Huizi that conventional

judgements about the uses of something big and deformed (the tree and therefore

Zhuangzi’s teachings) cannot be relied upon. He seems to be implying in his response

to Huizi, by talking about the weasel and the yak, that when it comes to figuring out

the usefulness of a thing, size does not matter. No matter what size a thing is, its size

will have uses and no uses. By stating that the great tree could be “plant[ed] in the

realm of Nothingwhatever, in the wilds which spread out into nowhere, and go

roaming away to do nothing at its side, ramble around and fall asleep in its shade”,42

Zhuangzi seems to be saying that the tree Huizi talked about (and therefore his words)

has uses.

40 This is besides sections in the Zhuangzi about acknowledgement of various perspectives. A

passage in the “Qiushui” assumes that other creatures, i.e. frog and summer insect, have perspectives. See Watson (1968): pp. 175-176.

41 Graham (2001): p. 47. 42 Ibid.

113

Using reference to 用 (yonguse) to explain the second passage, Huizi is shown to

be thinking only of the tree’s yongconventional uses. His mind is confined by any good

tree’s yongconventional uses. Zhuangzi, by suggesting to plant the tree in a place where it

could grow wild and become a sanctuary for play and repose, is saying that Huizi must

go beyond yongconventional uses. This suggestion to go beyond yongconventional uses is what

relates to Zhuangzi’s criticism of the application of standards. To Zhuangzi, the

application of standards and the adoption of conventions prevent one from seeing and

realising the variety and plurality of life. That is why Zhuangzi urges Huizi that he

must go beyond yongconventional uses, that he must go beyond conventional ways of

thinking about utility.

4.4 Scepticism about partial knowledge

Not only was Zhuangzi sceptical about his contemporary thinkers’ assumption

of certainty about their theories, he was also sceptical about the way the thinkers view

their theories. The thinkers viewed their own solutions as holding the comprehensive

or whole view. Zhuangzi’s scepticism about this thinkers’ claim of comprehensiveness

is perhaps seen in Zhuangzi’s tale about Peng and the cicada and the dove in the

“Xiaoyaoyou”. That is, Zhuangzi likens the thinkers who hold that their theory is what

would best fit things in the world to the cicada and the little dove. In the tale, the little

creatures comment about the flight of the Peng:

“When we make an effort and fly up, we can get as far as the elm or the

sapanwood tree, but sometimes we don’t make it and just fall down on the

ground. Now how is anyone going to go ninety thousand li to the south!”43

The cicada and the little dove do not believe that what Peng is doing is realistic or

practicable. By saying “… how is anyone going to go ninety thousand li to the

south![?]”, they think that what is practicable only involves the realisation of the extent

of their abilities. That the little creatures believe that the proper standard for judging

what is real or practical is their standard only shows the partiality of their thinking. The

problem is that even though their view is partial, they believe that it is shared by all

others.

43 Watson (1968): p. 30.

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This view that the little creatures’ perspective is only a partial view is

supported by the interpretation that the Peng represents dazhi 大知, while the cicada

and the little dove together represent xiaozhi 小知. According to Lian Xinda, a modern

commentator who holds this view, the interpreters who advance this interpretation

refer to a section or some sections of the “Xiaoyaoyou” that come after the Kun/Peng

passage to support the view. For example, Lian says that the passage that follows the

statement “Such is the difference between big and little” [ci xiao da zhi bian ye

此小大之辨也],44 which begins with gufu 故夫 (“therefore”), explains a hierarchy

wherein Peng is at the topmost.45 Lian writes:

The gradation of values is arranged in a climax. At the bottom of the

hierarchy is the perspective that is confined to mediocre and the unfamiliar,

and yet ignorantly complacent, while at the top is the perspective beyond all

perspectives, represented by the Daoist Sage (or the Perfect Man, or the

Holy Man) who does not depend on anything. …. The cicada, the quail, and

the dove should be at the lowest level, as Zhuangzi states unambiguously

that the petty character at the lowest rung “has the same kind of self-pride as

these little creatures.”46

Thus, according to the interpretation, because Peng represents dazhi (“perfect

knowledge”) or the knowledge of the Sage, the tale suggests that Peng’s view is to be

44 Watson (1968): p. 31. 45 The passage is the following:

Therefore a man who has wisdom enough to fill one office effectively, good conduct enough to impress one community, virtue enough to please one ruler, or talent enough to be called into service in one state, has the same kind of self-pride as these little creatures. [Song Rongzi] would certainly burst out laughing at such a man. The whole world could praise [Song Rongzi] and it wouldn’t make him exert himself; the whole world could condemn him and it wouldn’t make him mope. He drew a clear line between the internal and the external, and recognized the boundaries of true glory and disgrace. But that was all. As far as the world went, he didn’t fret and worry, but there was still ground he left unturned.

[Liezi] could ride the wind and go soaring around with cool and breezy skill, but after fifteen days he came back to earth. As far as the search for good fortune went, he didn’t fret and worry. He escaped the trouble of walking, but he still had to depend on something to get around. If he had only mounted on the truth of Heaven and Earth, ridden the changes of the six breaths, and thus wandered through the boundless, then what would he have had to depend on? Therefore I say, the Perfect Man has no self; the Holy Man has no merit; the Sage has no fame. (Watson [1968]: pp. 31-32)

46 Lian (2009): p. 238.

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preferred. The little creatures’ views are not to be preferred, since they represent

xiaozhi (“little knowledge”) or imperfect or partial understanding.

Two short tales in the Waipian could be regarded as elaborating on the theme

of partial knowledge standing for comprehensive knowledge or perspective. In these

tales, it is not so much the idea that one’s theory is the comprehensive view as the idea

that one’s view is representative of all the views. One tale is about the Marquis of Lu

and a sea bird in the “Zhile”《至樂》:

Once a sea bird alighted in the suburbs of the Lu capital. The marquis of Lu

escorted it to the ancestral temple, where he entertained it, performing the

Nine Shao music for it to listen to and presenting it with the meat of the Tai-

lao sacrifice to feast on. But the bird only looked dazed and forlorn, refusing

to eat a single slice of meat or drink a cup of wine, and in three days it was

dead. This is to try to nourish a bird with what would nourish you instead of

what would nourish a bird.47

This story can be taken to suggest that it is dangerous to deem one’s view or

understanding as representative of all the other existing views. It seems that the

marquis considered his view about entertaining and nourishment of his kind as the

standard for any creature. That is, he saw his view as representing all the other ways or

views about nourishing creatures.

It seems that the marquis’ thinking that his view represents all views is

grounded in his assumption that he and the bird are no different. It is because of this

that he treats the bird like he would treat himself. Consequently, this seems to mean

that the marquis thinks his view is correct and representative.48

The cicada and the dove in “Xiaoyaoyou” and the marquis could be likened to

the well frog, the summer insect and cramped scholar mentioned in the Waipian

chapter “Qiushui” 《秋水》. The view of each of these characters is partial as well. The

“Qiushui” passage says,

47 Watson (1968): pp. 194-195. 48 Lai (2006a): pp. 366-367.

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“You can’t discuss the ocean with a well frog – he’s limited by the space he

lives in. You can’t discuss ice with a summer insect – he’s bound to a single

season. You can’t discuss the Way with a cramped scholar – he’s shackled

by his doctrines….”49

According to this, the well frog, the summer insect and the scholar have limited

perspectives. Perhaps it is unfortunate that their perspectives are limited because of

their situation and condition. This seems to be the same with the cramped scholar.

Perhaps because he believes that his doctrines are correct and comprehensive, he

would indeed not be open to any other doctrines.

4.5 Conclusion

From the discussions above, it could be said that Zhuangzi’s scepticism is

doubt about the solutions proposed by the other thinkers. Specifically, it is doubt about

the assumption of these thinkers that their solutions are the right or correct one. His

scepticism challenges their assumption. Zhuangzi expressed this scepticism in the

different parts of the “Qiwulun” and the “Xiaoyaoyou”. Zhuangzi’s scepticism about

the solutions is a statement about the futility of the attempts or solutions.

Furthermore, based on the framework of scepticism I set out here, the object of

Zhuangzi’s scepticism then is the solutions. Zhuangzi is sceptical about the thinkers’

assumption of certainty and the purpose of his scepticism is to challenge this

assumption.

Before finally concluding this chapter, I address briefly the issue that passages

in the Neipian expressing different forms of scepticism run contrary to my view here.

It must be said first that the other forms of scepticisms (about language and

knowledge) that the other passages convey are different from scepticism about the

thinkers’ solutions. However, it must be said that they are not unrelated to it. They are

closely related to doubt about the solutions. They are related, in that issues in language

and knowledge have connections and repercussions to the conduct of society in general

and the political world. Regarding the relation of language to the thinkers’ solutions, I

have shown in this chapter that the arbitrariness of language (thus Zhuangzi’s

scepticism about it) directly relates to the assumption of certainty that the thinkers have

49 Watson (1968): pp. 175-176.

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t is, if

towards their solutions. Regarding knowledge, let me take Zhuangzi’s question of

whether he knows if “the dead do not wonder why they ever longed for life” in the

Lady Li story as the example.50 Zhuangzi’s scepticism here as ‘not being able to

know’ is related to Zhuangzi’s scepticism about being involved in official life. It could

be said that since for Zhuangzi one is not able to know if she knows or if she does not

know, one ought not to propose solutions and involve oneself in official life. Tha

knowledge about the world is the basis for solutions and if one could not know, then

she cannot concoct any solution. One ought not to propose solutions since she does not

have any. If she has, one would wonder the basis of her solutions. Thus, although

scepticism in the Lady Li story is about knowledge, it is not unrelated to society and

politics.

To help further understand scepticism about the solutions, the different views

about what sort of scepticism Zhuangzi holds and how they relate to the view I propose

here are discussed in the next chapter.

50 Watson (1968): p. 47.

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5. Interpretations of Zhuangzi’s Scepticism

Introduction

To further understand the view of Zhuangzi’s scepticism in this thesis, I

compare it with other existing interpretations of Zhuangzi’s scepticism. In this chapter,

I present these other interpretations and discuss how they stand in relation to my view.

Since most of these interpretations are responses to the view that Zhuangzi holds a

radical sort of scepticism, I first expound on this interpretation. Afterwards, I proceed

to the other interpretations.

5.1 Zhuangzi’s scepticism as Radical scepticism: Chad Hansen

Chad Hansen attributes to Zhuangzi the extreme or radical form of scepticism,

which is the view that access to truth and to objective knowledge is impossible.1 His

view is predicated on his theory that the dao 道 of Zhuangzi is a linguistic dao and not

a metaphysical one.2 Zhuangzi’s dao is linguistic since it is about and is based on a

system of “naming”, on making distinctions for guiding human behaviour. That is,

there is a system of names that forms a dao and it is this system that purportedly guides

actions. A dao is a framework made through language that a society makes use of. As

Hansen writes,

Society uses language [as a mechanism] to guide our behavior. Elders teach

us to conform to conventional ways of making distinctions among thing

kinds in choosing and rejecting courses of action. We do not learn language

in isolation from other ritual practices. Language guides behavior because

learning the community’s language induces us to adopt a socially shared

way of reacting differentially to the world.3

According to Hansen, Zhuangzi does not mean dao to be the ultimate metaphysical

reality. The meaning of dao remained unchanged in Zhuangzi; it retained its meaning

that the thinkers before him (the Confucians and Mohists) understood it to have, which

1 Hansen (1992): p. 5; Hansen (2003a): p. 129. 2 Hansen (1983b): pp. 24-25. 3 Hansen (1992): pp. 51-52.

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is that it has the function of regulation.4 Zhuangzi’s view of dao, just as how it was

conceived by the Chinese thinkers before him and his contemporaries, is a “guiding

discourse”. Hansen writes that Zhuangzi’s “perspectivalism focuses on the awareness

that we have many different, incommensurable guiding daos”.5

According to this view, a dao guides behaviour and there are many daos.

Because there are a variety of daos, with their own sets of names, for Hansen, all these

daos are equally right and valid. The passage in the “Qiwulun” that says: “What is It is

also Other, what is Other is also it. Here they say ‘That’s it, that’s not’ from one point

of view, here we say ‘That’s it, that’s not’ from another point of view”,6 indicates that

because a truth is context-bound, it is true and valid in that particular context.

According to Hansen, Zhuangzi’s scepticism stems from this conception of

relativism in the “Qiwulun”. He believes it is relativism in the text that supports its

scepticism. This is seen in the fact that the Mohists and the Confucians have equally

ineffective frameworks, since Zhuangzi’s relativism means that the groups have their

own daos or sets of guiding discourse. However, as these thinkers debated as to which

dao is the single, true, and constant dao and since they believed their own dao to be

that constant dao, Zhuangzi is sceptical about which dao is that dao. In his more recent

essay, Hansen thus says: “Relativism illustrates how our confidence in our know-how

depends on a regress of norms and context. Zhuangzi reminds us that others have equal

confidence in their different contexts. The dependency relativism fuels skepticism.”7

The basis of Hansen’s conception of Zhuangzi’s scepticism is ultimately the

linguistic origin, nature, and mechanism of daos. Thus, for Zhuangzi, there is no

absolute and constant dao. This is because language is fluid and naming is not constant

– the created distinctions essentially depend on contexts.

In “Guru or Skeptic? Relativistic Skepticism in the Zhuangzi,” Hansen replies

to those who offer explanations that deflate the substantive scepticism he ascribes to

Zhuangzi. These interpreters, according to Hansen, wish to reinstate the view of

Zhuangzi as a monistic mystic, that is, that Zhuangzi, like Laozi, referred to dao as the

objective ultimate metaphysical primordial entity and prescribed that people ought to

4 Cf. Hansen (1983a): p. 59. 5 Hansen (1992): p. 268. 6 Graham (2001): p. 53. 7 Hansen (2003a): p. 150.

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seek union with it. Hansen believes that the move by other interpreters towards

interpreting Zhuangzi only as a “mystical guru” is a way towards abandoning the

interpretation that Zhuangzi is an extreme sceptic. It is a route towards interpreting that

Zhuangzi only provided indispensable insights for living life well. In response to this

move, Hansen’s recent view about the scepticism in the text is that it leads one to be

open-minded and tolerant. He believes that from the relativistic and sceptical formulae

of Zhuangzi, Zhuangzi implied these values.8 Hansen writes:

[The Zhuangzi] does contain political and personal wisdom via its relativist

theory of language and skeptical epistemology.9

[There is a value to the relativistic sceptical insights in the Zhuangzi.]

Common-sense practical implications abound, including tolerance,

flexibility, and open-mindedness about other daos and their possible value

in adopting our own.10

While this seems to alter the view of Zhuangzi as a radical sceptic, this still leaves

Zhuangzi to be viewed as an extreme sceptic.

In terms of object of doubt, according to Hansen’s interpretation, the object of

Zhuangzi’s scepticism is the daoguiding discourses of the prevalent thinkers of the time and

their presumption that their dao is the one constant dao. In terms of purpose, Hansen’s

view of Zhuangzi’s scepticism sees Zhuangzi’s scepticism to have the goal of

acknowledging plurality. According to Hansen’s interpretation, the basis of Zhuangzi’s

scepticism is the view that all the “guiding discourses” are ineffective and defective.

Thus, it would seem that Zhuangzi’s scepticism is a statement about plurality: there are

all these “guiding discourses” and Zhuangzi’s scepticism says that none of them is that

constant dao. Secondly, Hansen’s view of Zhuangzi’s scepticism points out that the

other thinkers are wrong. In Hansen’s interpretation, Zhuangzi judges each daoguiding

discourse to be defective. To him, each of the daoguiding discourses does not represent the

8 Chris Fraser, in “Skepticism and Value in the Zhuangzi,” writes that he agrees with Hansen that the Zhuangzi uncontroversially proposes open-mindedness, adaptability, and tolerance. He, however, disagrees with him that they are brought about by the text’s sceptical thesis. Fraser holds this view because he reckons there exists the need to take into account plurality and heterogeneity of value. See Fraser (2009): pp. 439-457.

9 Hansen (2003a): p. 129. 10 Hansen (2003a): pp. 149-150.

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a

n writes:

constant dao, even though each one purports to be the constant dao. According to

Hansen’s view, there is no constant dao for Zhuangzi.

It might be said, though, that perhaps for Zhuangzi, it is not that there is no

constant dao, but that there is – yet it is not one among the many daoguiding discourses.

After detailing Hansen’s view on Zhuangzi’s scepticism, it is appropriate here

to mention some direct responses to this view. There are three recent rebuttals to

Hansen’s view.

5.1.1 Ewing Chinn’s Response: Perspectival Realism

Chinn agrees with Hansen that the “Qiwulun” ought to be read as one written

by a relativistic sceptic rather than by a mystic.11 Chinn agrees with Hansen’s view

that Zhuangzi is a ‘perspectivist’. However, he takes issue with Hansen in taking

Zhuangzi as a relativistic sceptic, believing Zhuangzi is a “perspectival realist”,12 not

sceptic nor a perspectival relativist. Commenting on Hansen’s interpretation of the

Butterfly Dream passage and explaining his view, Chin

The point is that if what is real is perspective bound, if there is no such thing

as ‘objective reality’ or reality in itself, then Chuang Chou [Zhuang Zhou]

may imagine that there are alternative perspectives. But the perspective of

the butterfly or any other possible perspectives are beyond his

comprehension. Thus he cannot sensibly conceive of any reality other than

his own. We might call this metaphysical position perspectival realism….13

Chinn is saying that because Zhuangzi can only view the reality that he has in his

perspective, to Zhuangzi there is no other reality other than the one he sees. In other

words, Zhuangzi could only acknowledge the things that is in his perspective and

nothing more. For Zhuangzi, reality is within the confines of one’s perspective. There

is no reality beyond that perspective. Beyond one’s perspective could be part of the

reality of another’s perspective.

11 Chinn (1997): p. 209. 12 Chinn acknowledges that this position is similar to Putnam’s internal realism. Chinn (1997):

p. 220. Cf. Liu (2003), where Liu discusses Zhuangzi’s relativism in relation to Putnam’s internal realism.

13 Chinn (1997): p. 217.

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To Chinn, his view that Zhuangzi is a perspectival realist is not like Hansen’s

view of Zhuangzi as a relativist, specifically as a perspectival relativist. According to

Chinn, whereas the perspectival relativist understands that there will be many

conceptual frameworks, which individuals use to know and handle ‘independent

reality’, the perspectival realist, on the other hand, does not understand the ideas of

conceptual frameworks and absolute reality. That is because for her there is no other

reality other than the one within her grasp. The term “absolute reality”, for the

perspectival realist, would stand for “whatever it is that we find in our day to day

living”.14

However, a problem that I see in Chinn’s view is that, even though Chinn states

that Zhuangzi is not a perspectival relativist, I cannot see how this account of

perspectival realism is not effectively relativism.

5.1.2 Deborah and David Soles’ Response: Epistemological Nihilism

Soles and Soles believe that it is a mistake to attribute to Zhuangzi relativism or

perspectivalism and scepticism. They think that Zhuangzi is better thought of as an

“epistemological nihilist”. According to the Soles, Zhuangzi does not hold any regard

for any perspective and his scepticism is extreme that he even struggles with the

accusation of self-refutation: “[Zhuangzi] denies the very legitimacy, the

meaningfulness, of our talk about knowledge.”15 In “Fish Traps and Rabbit Snares:

Zhuangzi on Judgement, Truth and Knowledge,” they explain that Zhuangzi’s

examination of relativism points out that discussions about “extramental or

extralinguistic reality” to which our judgements correspond are not justified and

incoherent.16 For there is no such thing as “extramental or extralinguistic reality”, the

basis of knowledge. Truth and reality are bound by perspectives.17 And because it is

unreasonable to talk about independent reality, discussions then about knowledge is

unreasonable. The problem of correspondence impedes one from relying on any of her

beliefs or judgements. To Zhuangzi, it is the reason for regarding any epistemological

discussion as “meaningless”. Because of this, Zhuangzi is an epistemological nihilist.18

14 Ibid., p. 218. 15 Soles and Soles (1998): p. 161. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid.

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According to the Soles, Zhuangzi, as an epistemological nihilist, is a “sceptic”

of a different sort. According to them, Zhuangzi is not a moderate sceptic because his

scepticism is more extreme than global scepticism.19 Because of this, they think the

term “sceptic” would not apply to Zhuangzi. Zhuangzi’s “scepticism” is to be aptly

called “epistemological nihilism”.

Accordingly, the object of Zhuangzi’s “scepticism” in this interpretation is the

concepts of knowledge and truth (and therefore all knowledge-claims), and Zhuangzi’s

“scepticism” itself. The goal of his scepticism is to efface all discussions about

knowledge and knowledge itself. That is to render them as nonsensical.

It may be that Hansen’s reply to these first two interpretations is his

clarification of his views on the nature of Zhuangzi’s relativism in “Guru or Skeptic?

Relativistic Skepticism in the Zhuangzi”. Hansen writes in the chapter that Zhuangzi’s

relativism should not be understood as one about truth or meaning. He says that it is

about “indexical perspective (the way reference is indexed), value perspective that

arises from being raised in or committed to one scheme of shi-fei 是非 (one dao) rather

than another”.20 This means that Zhuangzi’s relativism is about ‘perspectivism’ that

comes out from being cultivated in or adhering to a set of shi-fei distinctions. The shi-

fei distinctions are not about truth and meaning. They are directly about ethics.

Accordingly, with the points of Chinn’s and the Soles’ responses, the talk of

truth and meaning in their interpretations does not in fact refer to the relativism of

Zhuangzi that Hansen discusses. This is because, to Hansen, Zhuangzi’s relativism is

basically in the ordinary and the pragmatic. He says that its theme is “the relativity of

the obviousness of our action-guiding distinctions”.21 To Hansen, Zhuangzi’s

relativism is not about truth and meaning. Chinn and the Soles have understood

Hansen’s view of Zhuangzi’s relativism as basically and only about truth and meaning.

5.1.3 Eric Sean Nelson’s Response: Scepticism in relation to mysticism

Nelson’s response is based mainly on his view that Hansen’s interpretation

neglects an aspect of the early Chinese context. This aspect is the proto-Daoist

19 Ibid., pp. 150, 161. Michael (1995). 20 Hansen (2003a): pp. 150-151. 21 Ibid., p. 151.

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religious context that must have informed the text.22 For Nelson, this “religious”

context ought to be used in the interpretation of the Zhuangzi, “given that the text is

littered with references (ironic and otherwise) to the sages who cultivate reality, riding

the wind and living on mist, proper breathing and longevity, as well as to emptying the

self and freely responding in accordance with dao”.23

Seeing Harold Roth’s interpretation of the Zhuangzi, which invokes bimodal

mysticism, as correct, Nelson then interprets Zhuangzi’s scepticism as interlinked with

the mysticism in the text. According to Nelson, “Zhuangzi did not emphasize

conceptual or linguistic constructions, doubt or intuition, but the incessant

transformation of things and perspectives, such that we can transform ourselves in

accordance with the transformative character of language and things themselves”.24 In

other words, Zhuangzi’s scepticism is a kind of openness to ever-changing situations

and constant transformation of entities. It is tolerance toward situations and

phenomenological transformations of daoreality. It is less about concepts and language,

and epistemological doubt. According to Nelson, there is no doctrinal scepticism in

Zhuangzi, but only ‘critical strategies’ whose ultimate purpose is to be adopted so one

will become a sage.25 As he writes: “…. Zhuangzi has no doctrinal skepticism, but his

critical strategies are not merely a methodological undermining of propositional and

conceptual fixity – they constitute the very disposition to be adopted”.26 That is,

Zhuangzi’s critical strategies in the text are rather means for people to carry out in life

to become a (Daoist) sage.

In terms of object of doubt, therefore, according to Nelson’s view, Zhuangzi’s

scepticism is not directed towards anything. It is because Zhuangzi’s scepticism is

about openness to the dynamism or organic nature of the world and things. In regards

to its purpose, Zhuangzi’s scepticism and critical strategies are prescribed means to

become a sage, an ideal way of life.

22 Nelson (2008): p. 8. On this, Nelson adds that the “multiple tendencies of the Zhuangzi text

and its context” suggests that “Hansen is incorrect in limiting the text to the milieu of a philosophical community, as if it had no relation to other contemporary literary, religious, medical, military, political, and cosmological discourses” (p. 15).

23 Nelson (2008): p. 8. 24 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 25 Ibid., pp. 5, 9-10. 26 Ibid., pp. 9-10.

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According to Nelson’s view, that Zhuangzi’s scepticism and his critical

methods lead to an ideal way of life makes Zhuangzi’s scepticism as similar to the

view in this thesis that Zhuangzi is sceptical about involvement in official life. This is

because Zhuangzi’s scepticism about having an official career, like Nelson’s account

of Zhuangzi’s sceptical philosophy, has the goal of achieving an ideal way of life. This

ideal way of life is life away from public service. As depicted in stories about

Zhuangzi in the Waipian, this is Zhuangzi’s ideal way of life. Although the ideal way

of life as a (Daoist) sage and the ideal way of life away from public service are

different, however, both views of Zhuangzi’s scepticism see his scepticism as leading

to an ideal way of life. In other words, both views emphasise that Zhuangzi’s

scepticism has outcomes for ideal ways of living.

Perhaps to Hansen, this combination of scepticism and mysticism is untenable.

In Hansen’s view, Zhuangzi’s scepticism is about the thinkers’ proposed daosguiding

discourses. It seems it is not a kind of tolerance toward situations and phenomenological

transformations in the universe or ultimate reality (dao).

5.1.4 Radical Scepticism Interpretation and Scepticism about the solutions

Hansen’s view of Zhuangzi as a relativistic sceptic is not incompatible with the

view that Zhuangzi’s scepticism concerns the thinkers’ assumption of certainty. This is

because Hansen’s interpretation is that each of the proposed solutions as daoguiding

discourses is assumed by its thinker as the best or correct dao. Hansen’s interpretation

could be said as not contradicting the view of Zhuangzi’s scepticism here. However,

the thesis here does not share Hansen’s view that it is relativism which fuels

Zhuangzi’s scepticism. According to the argument of this thesis, what influenced

Zhuangzi’s scepticism is the Yangist concern about involvement in official life.

Furthermore, Hansen’s view is also different from the thesis here in that his

interpretation is explicitly ethico-linguistic. This thesis proposes a view that is socio-

political. This socio-political view does not state anything about relativism. Hansen’s

ethico-linguistic view stresses relativism. It might be said that there is in the socio-

political view more recognition of the nature of the debates among the Warring States

thinkers. Despite this, it must be said that although the views are different, they are not

unrelated, in that the ethico-linguistic and the socio-political aspects of life and society

ultimately cannot be divorced. Moreover, they are also connected, in that any

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perturbations or changes to the socio-political aspects affect the ethico-linguistic

dimensions.

Even though Hansen’s interpretation of Zhuangzi’s scepticism as radical

scepticism appears supported by parts of the text, it seems, however, that pertinent

passages in the “Qiwulun” seem to convey therapeutic scepticism. Several scholars

have pointed this out. I discuss these scholars’ views in the next section.

5.2 Zhuangzi’s scepticism as Therapeutic (Iatric) scepticism27

Many of the interpretations discussed here are attempts to re-view Zhuangzi’s

scepticism to resolve the tension which Hansen’s view creates. In these attempts, it is

proposed that Zhuangzi’s scepticism is of a therapeutic kind. This interpretation is

viewed as a strategy to defuse the substantive scepticism that Hansen thinks Zhuangzi

holds.28 With such a move Zhuangzi’s normative recommendations are accommodated

in his overall philosophical project. Therapeutic scepticism is scepticism used as a

means. It is scepticism with the end of “jolt[ing] the reader into a certain kind of

everyday skepticism, a kind of open-mindedness that consists in putting somewhat less

faith than is standard on one’s own and others’ beliefs”.29 Here, the possession of a

cramped mind caused and tempered by intolerance and thereby not being receptive to

real knowledge is regarded a malady. Furthermore, scepticism used as a tool for

therapy is essentially “the use of skeptical arguments to clear away previous

convictions in order to make one more receptive to different convictions.”30 Paul

Kjellberg, Philip J. Ivanhoe, Eric Schwitzgebel, and Bryan Van Norden have stated

explicitly that Zhuangzi’s scepticism is ultimately by nature therapeutic.31

27 John Trowbridge cautions that one takes care to use the term “therapeutic scepticism” when referring to ancient scepticism such as Pyrrhonism (and Zhuangzi’s). He suggests using instead “iatric” (which in Greek means “healer”), as the term highlights the common relation between aporetic or non-dogmatic scepticism and medicine. Trowbridge (2004): pp. 86-90.

28 Fraser (2009): pp. 440-41. 29 Schwitzgebel (1996): p. 91. Schwitzgebel also thinks that Zhuangzi considered scepticism as

a form of therapy as an end in itself. 30 Van Norden (1996): p. 258. 31 There seems to have been modern scholars who are precursors of this view. They, however,

did not elaborate on this aspect. See Schwitzgebel (1996): pp. 69-70.

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5.2.1 Paul Kjellberg

Kjellberg thinks that the goal or motivation of Zhuangzi’s scepticism is to bring

one back to a state where they experience the natural (“nature” as raw), not as human

representation.32 Kjellberg relates this to the obvious scepticism that Zhuangzi holds

for language. Since language in a way represents human rationality, by undermining

language, Zhuangzi also then distrusts the powers of human rationality.33 And as

language is a product of human rationality, by undermining language, Zhuangzi is also

able to show the primacy of the natural over the artificial.

Kjellberg believes that Zhuangzi presents sceptical arguments in order to

induce “a feeling of uncertainty.”34 According to him, Zhuangzi is like Sextus

Empiricus, who uses scepticism not to disprove knowledge but to suspend judgement

(epoche) to attain peace of mind (ataraxia).35

In his paper “Dao and Skepticism,” Kjellberg relates Zhuangzi’s scepticism to

aporetic scepticism. He says that Zhuangzi’s arguments are made more with the

intention of questioning knowledge rather than denying it. This is because Zhuangzi’s

scepticism is aporetic rather than dogmatic. That is to say:

[w]hile dogmatic skepticism asserts a position (the denial of some kind of

knowledge), aporetic skepticism asserts nothing but results instead in

uncertainty, a mental state that … is characterized not by the presence of

beliefs but by their absence.36

This means that Zhuangzi’s scepticism is not an epistemological sort of scepticism

which negates knowledge-claims (e.g. knowledge about the external world).

Zhuangzi’s scepticism does not make a claim or a thesis. It questions knowledge-

claims only to bring about uncertainty. As an aporetic sort of scepticism, Zhuangzi’s

does not bring about conclusions. It does not prove the impossibility of knowledge; it

only leads to doubt, to the elimination of beliefs, a result considered to be

32 See Kjellberg (2007): pp. 281-299; Kjellberg (1996): pp. 281-299. 33 Cf. Ivanhoe (1993): p 649. 34 Kjellberg (1996): pp. 7, 16; Kjellberg (2007): pp. 281-299. 35 Kjellberg (1996): pp. 6-7. 36 Kjellberg (2007): p. 282.

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therapeutic.37 In “Sextus Empiricus, Zhuangzi, and Xunzi on ‘Why Be Skeptical?’”,

Kjellberg asserts that “skepticism is not theoretical but therapeutic” and that its

purpose is “not to establish a truth but to bring about a change of mind in the reader

from a state of belief to one of suspense.”38

Against Kjellberg’s thesis that Zhuangzi is the ancient (western) sceptics such

as Sextus Empiricus, Steve Coutinho, in Zhuangzi and Early Chinese Philosophy

argues that the differences between their philosophies outweigh the similarities. He

says that it is better to think of Zhuangzi as a fallibilist, rather than a sceptic. Coutinho

thinks that this is because Zhuangzi believes that the claims he makes are yet subject to

revision.39

In terms of object of doubt, Kjellberg’s interpretation regards Zhuangzi’s

scepticism as one with knowledge-claims as its object. The goal of Zhuangzi’s

scepticism, according to this view, is not to negate these knowledge-claims. Its purpose

is rather to question them in order to elicit uncertainty.

This ultimate aim of inducing uncertainty of Zhuangzi’s scepticism in

Kjellberg’s interpretation could be seen as a parallel view to the idea that Zhuangzi

was sceptical about the thinkers’ assumption of certainty. Perhaps Zhuangzi’s

questioning of doctrines was made to make the thinkers realise that they cannot be

certain about their views. The thinkers are too emotionally caught up in the whole

process of arguing for rightness, which for Zhuangzi is harmful to the debates.

Plurality is valued by Zhuangzi, rather than oneness, rigidity, and certainty.

Zhuangzi’s scepticism as therapeutic scepticism can be said as not

incompatible with Zhuangzi’s scepticism about the thinkers’ assumption of certainty.

The uncertainty which therapeutic scepticism produces is not unrelated to Zhuangzi’s

scepticism about the solutions. That is, if one of the goals of therapeutic scepticism is

to induce a feeling of uncertainty, this seems to be also the goal of Zhuangzi’s

scepticism about the thinkers’ assumption of certainty. Zhuangzi points out and

criticizes the thinkers’ assumption and his scepticism suggests that he is

recommending that the thinkers must realize the folly of their assumption and they

therefore must abandon this assumption.

37 Ibid., p. 284. 38 Kjellberg (1996: p. 7. 39 Coutinho (2004): p. 66.

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5.2.2 Philip J. Ivanhoe

Ivanhoe only briefly mentions the therapeutic nature of Zhuangzi’s scepticism

and only in relation to Zhuangzi’s scepticism as directed at language. He writes in

“Was Zhuangzi a Relativist?”:

Zhuangzi’s view of things, when put forth as a proposal for how to go

about the business of life, must constantly self-destruct. Zhuangzi

embraces this method of philosophizing wholeheartedly and consistently.

His proposals are purely therapeutic: their purpose is simply to undermine

our confidence in proposals, the products of our scheming human minds.40

According to this, even though Zhuangzi’s views about the world can be relayed as

prescriptions for living life, these views ultimately cannot be regarded as his final

judgements about things. His views do not become fixed and final. His views always

self-disintegrate and therefore must not be seen as fixed. It is this self-destruction that

is therapeutic. Since there cannot be final proposals, human minds are unable to settle

and prescribe proposals to others. One does not and cannot have security in any of her

proposals. There is no rest or certainty. Rather, there is movement. Ivanhoe seems to

mean here that being so certain about the proposals is what should undergo therapy.

This is different from Kjellberg’s viewpoint in that Ivanhoe’s is more about not

trusting one’s proposals rather than elimination of proposals.

In terms of object of doubt, in this view, Zhuangzi’s scepticism is directed at

all views or understandings of the world. In terms of goal, Zhuangzi’s direct aim is to

regard all views or proposals as uncertain. Human minds seem to want finality. But in

Zhuangzi’s scepticism, the view is that nothing is certain and final. It is this that makes

it therapeutic. It is therapeutic in the sense that it “cures” the malady of having

possessed a cramped mind. Caused and tempered by intolerance, a cramped mind is

one that pronounces certainty and finality.

5.2.3 Eric Schwitzgebel

In “Zhuangzi’s Attitude toward Language and His Skepticism,” Schwitzgebel

presents a view of Zhuangzi’s scepticism as therapeutic scepticism. He says that

40 Ivanhoe (1993): pp. 648-649.

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because Zhuangzi invites us to not take his words seriously, Zhuangzi does not believe

in the radical scepticism he argues for.41 In other words, Zhuangzi argues for radical

scepticism but he in actuality does not mean what he says. Consequently, Zhuangzi

endorses scepticism “more with the desire to evoke particular reactions in the reader

than as an expression of his heartfelt beliefs.”42

The reason why Zhuangzi advises to make light of his words is his attitude

toward language – he has disrespect for language. According to Schwitzgebel, this is

because of Zhuangzi’s three main beliefs:

(1) that human assertion does not capture the essential matters or aspects in life

and the world, and skills (of Zhuangzi’s craftsmen) are ineffable, that is, “there is a

knack that cannot be summed up in words”;43

(2) that human judgement is limited. Concerning this, Schwitzgebel says that

Zhuangzi believes this is shown in the fact that he is able to challenge what guarantees

people’s beliefs and from there, Zhuangzi gives permission “to take with a grain of

salt” claims issued from those beliefs.44

And finally, (3) that the referents and meanings of words are not stable.

Schwitzgebel believes that Zhuangzi therefore favours more the adoption of

everyday scepticism. This is simply that sort of scepticism which urges one to loosen

one’s faith in his or her beliefs and those of others. It is furthermore a kind of open-

mindedness, which according to Schwitzgebel, may be a “boon both epistemologically

and morally”, “leading not only to new evidence but also to a tolerance of people with

different beliefs.”45 The Zhuangzi’s sceptical passages thus were written by Zhuangzi

with a therapeutic intent.

That language is the basis why Zhuangzi thinks his views are not to be taken

seriously makes Zhuangzi a realist about language. Language is only a tool. It is not

able to represent the world as such. Besides, as Schwitzgebel mentions, what language

refers to is not fixed. This means that language ultimately cannot represent meaning.

There is meaning but language cannot represent it in the end. Because of this,

Zhuangzi thinks that the extreme scepticism he argues ought not to be taken seriously.

41 Schwitzgebel (1996): p. 69. 42 Ibid., p. 69. 43 Ibid., p. 76. 44 Ibid., p. 77. 45 Ibid., p. 91.

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If it stirs up in readers the feeling that her beliefs are questioned and undermined, that

is good, for that is the ultimate goal: to loosen one’s confidence in one’s convictions.

In terms of object of doubt, because according to this view Zhuangzi argues for

radical scepticism, the object of his scepticism is all knowledge-claims. The objective

of this radical scepticism, however, for Zhuangzi, is to provoke reactions in people to

challenge their faith in their beliefs.

5.2.4 Bryan Van Norden

Finally, in arguing that Zhuangzi is a moral particularist in his article,

“Competing Interpretations in the ‘Inner Chapters’ of the Zhuangzi,” Van Norden

concurs with the view that Zhuangzi’s sceptical arguments carry a therapeutic purpose.

He writes:

[Zhuangzi] uses skeptical arguments to make us doubt many of our

commonsense beliefs. But his goal is not merely to leave us in a state of

doubt; his goal is to use doubt to make us more receptive to different

convictions [emphasis added]. He disorients us so that he can reorient us.

Zhuangzi employs therapeutic skepticism as a way of making the heart

“empty,” so that one can successfully “listen with the qi.”46

Because the ultimate goal of Zhuangzi’s scepticism is not to elicit the condition of

doubt in people but to make people be open and tolerant to alien belief-systems, Van

Norden’s view is different from the other therapeutic interpretations. According to this

view, Zhuangzi scepticism is therapeutic scepticism because it puts people in the

condition of doubt. According to Van Norden, Zhuangzi makes use of sceptical

arguments to make people question their beliefs. Zhuangzi’s therapeutic scepticism

ends there. According to Van Norden, this therapeutic use of Zhuangzi’s scepticism

has an ultimate purpose. This purpose is to use this state to make people realise that

there are other belief-systems. According to Van Norden, this process is like

eradicating what xinheart-mind has acquired (which are the norms, the distinctions), which

46 Van Norden (1996): p. 258.

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me

is Zhuangzi’s goal. Once this eradication or “emptying” is done, one becomes tolerant

and open to formerly alien beliefs.47

In this interpretation, the object of Zhuangzi’s scepticism is people’s

commonsense beliefs. In terms of goal, the immediate goal is the state of doubt in

people and its ultimate goal is the openness to alien beliefs.

5.2.5 A Response to the therapeutic interpretation

According to Hansen, the interpreters who propose this view of Zhuangzi’s

scepticism as therapeutic48 also propose this view in order to avoid the inconsistency

of radical scepticism.49 To Hansen, radical scepticism, the form which concludes that

“no one knows anything”, is not inconsistent. He explains that it will only beco

inconsistent “if we combine it with a norm of asserting that licenses the familiar

challenge ‘how do I know that?’”.50 To him, it is this therapeutic interpretation that is

inconsistent. He says:

The “irony” is that the “therapeutic” strategy starts with a bogus accusation

of the incoherence of ordinary philosophical skepticism and then accepts an

alternative that is blatantly incoherent. The content of the recommendation

is the judgment “we should not make any judgment.” The recommendation

condemns itself!51

Hansen sees the therapeutic strategy as condemning itself. That is, if the strategy says

that one should not judge, it should be consistent. It is, however, inconsistent, since by

saying “one should not judge” it is itself making a judgment: that ‘one should not

judge’.

Hansen’s response is an interesting take on the therapeutic interpretation.

However, one perhaps would wonder whether the purpose of the therapeutic strategy is

that one should not make any judgment. As described by Kjellberg, the strategy is

suspension of judgment in order to induce a feeling of uncertainty. The

47 Cf. Yearley (1996): pp. 162-163. 48 He refers specifically to Kjellberg (1996, 2007) and Raphals (1996). Raphals’ view is

discussed in the next section. 49 Hansen (2003a): p. 141. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid., p. 142.

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recommendation “suspend judgement” is one that only obliges the suspension of

certain kinds of judgment, in order to achieve its end (ataraxia or peace of mind). In

Zhuangzi’s case, it seems the kind of judgment that ought to be suspended is belief or

judgment that we know things for certain.

5.3 Zhuangzi’s scepticism as Methodology

That Zhuangzi’s scepticism is not a position but rather a strategy for a

particular purpose has also been suggested by scholars. This view shows that

Zhuangzi’s scepticism has a purpose. I discuss two scholars’ views on what this

purpose is.

5.3.1 Lisa Raphals: Zhuangzi’s Sceptical Strategies

In “Skeptical Strategies in the Zhuangzi and Theaetetus,” Raphals argues that

the “Qiwulun” does not actually present the sceptical doctrine, that is, the doctrine that

“one cannot know anything” or that “nothing can be known”.52 It only recommends

scepticism and for the most part proffers sceptical strategies. Raphals’ view involves a

distinction among the three kinds of scepticism. These kinds are: scepticism as a thesis,

as a recommendation, and as a strategy.

Scepticism as a thesis is the idea that nothing can be known, which is

ineluctably self-refuting. Scepticism as a recommendation is where scepticism is

proposed to suspend judgement in order to reach the level of ataraxia or peace of

mind. And scepticism as a method is scepticism as inquiry or questioning in order to

bring about doubt.53

Raphals states that in the “Qiwulun,” scepticism is definitely recommended,

but it is the sceptical methods that are principally proposed. The strategies of

scepticism in the “Qiwulun”, like the ones present in the Theaetetus, produce the state

of uncertainty.54 From her analysis of the “Qiwulun” sceptical passages, she identifies

these methods to be:

52 Raphals (1996): pp. 26-49. 53 This is similar to Sextus Empiricus’ and Kjellberg’s conception of aporetic scepticism. 54 Raphals does not state that Zhuangzi’s is therapeutic scepticism, but I think that her view

may be seen as explaining that Zhuangzi employs such scepticism. This is because she reasons that Zhuangzi recommends scepticism (in order to achieve ataraxia) and she ascribes to Zhuangzi sceptical

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(1) the use of reductio ad absurdum arguments,

(2) humour,

(3) complex narrative structures, and

(4) complex irony (in Zhuangzi, the use of the double rhetorical question).55

According to Raphals’ view, Zhuangzi’s scepticism as a thesis has ‘all

knowledge-claims’ as its object. The goal of such scepticism is to deny all these

claims. Zhuangzi’s scepticism as a recommendation, like Kjellberg’s view, also has

knowledge-claims as its object. But its goal is not to deny these claims but to withhold

assertions to elicit the state of uncertainty and attain ‘peace of mind’. Zhuangzi’s

scepticism as strategy has all claims as its object as well, because this view seems to be

connected to Zhuangzi’s scepticism as a recommendation. That is, Zhuangzi

recommends scepticism to attain ataraxia but the way to attain it is through the

questioning strategies he makes. The aim of these methods is to elicit the condition of

uncertainty.

Comparing this understanding of Zhuangzi’s scepticism with Zhuangzi’s

scepticism about the thinkers’ assumption of certainty, the uncertainty which,

according to Raphals, Zhuangzi’s scepticism produces is not unrelated to Zhuangzi’s

scepticism about the solutions. It seems that if Zhuangzi’s scepticism was used as a

method, the goal was likewise presumably to make the thinkers of the proposals

abandon their assumption of objectivity or certainty that they seem to have in regard to

their proposals.

5.3.2 Dan Lusthaus: Zhuangzi’s Aporetic Ethics

In “Aporetics Ethics in the Zhuangzi”, Lusthaus offers another perspective on

Zhuangzi’s treatment of scepticism as a method. He thinks Zhuangzi uses scepticism in

the following two ways.

Firstly, Zhuangzi uses sceptical elements to help in prescribing certain

dispositions or different outlooks for readers. Zhuangzi includes ‘sceptical moments’,

“which are either framed in irony or they mark transitional phases that are invariably

superseded by either fresh logical arguments or, most often, exhortations to adopt

methods meant to create doubt in the reader, so she seems to be agreeing with the other “therapeutic scepticism” interpreters.

55 Raphals (1996): pp. 39-41.

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certain attitudes or orientations”.56 According to this, the sceptical phase is not

Zhuangzi’s final point. It is only a stage of “a critical exploration of the foundations of

‘evaluative distinctions’”.57 That is, the sceptical moments are there to examine the

systems, the ‘evaluative distinctions’, we have and the bases of these systems.

Secondly, Zhuangzi uses scepticism to promote aporetic ethics, wherein an

individual proceeds from a sceptical state, uncertainty, and ‘invariant standards’. As

Lusthaus writes:

While [Zhuangzi] rejects the sort of norms and invariant criteria that his

contemporaries – such as Mohists and Confucians – adopted as stable

foundations for their ethical and political systems, in their place Zhuangzi

offers an aporetic stance that (1) relativizes extremes (preventing them from

becoming invariant standards) and (2) then locates the limits of

epistemological aporia in order to develop an ethical orientation using these

aporetic limits as its foundation. One acts on the basis of what one does not

know, what one cannot control, what one cannot contain, rather than

according to fixed rules, determinate principles, or clear alternatives.58

This view derives partly from Lusthaus’ first view, together with his view that

Zhuangzi is not a sceptic but a critical thinker, that is, a critical thinker who uses

“skeptical rhetoric” as a stage in his arguments.59 Zhuangzi is a critical thinker, for

Lusthaus, because he rejects only certain claims. That Zhuangzi admits an individual’s

epistemological bounds does not make Zhuangzi a sceptic. Zhuangzi is not a sceptic

even if he makes use of sceptical arguments akin to ones made by ancient and modern

sceptics.60 Zhuangzi’s aporetic ethics develops from an acknowledgement of

“transformation” (in the Butterfly dream story) which seems expressed in the idea of

“temporality of knowledge”,61 an idea not unrelated to Zhuangzi’s sceptical (critical

thinking) elements.

56 Lusthaus (2003): p. 163. According to Lusthaus, these exhortations are always ethical, “since

they recommend how one should look and act henceforth”. 57 Ibid., p. 166. 58 Ibid., p. 164. 59 Ibid., p. 166. 60 Ibid., p. 165. 61 Ibid., pp. 178-196.

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One merit of Lusthaus’ view is that it stresses the impermanence of knowledge.

Another is that it highlights uncertainty, by saying that Zhuangzi’s aporetic ethics is

understood to be rooted in uncertainty. Both the impermanence of knowledge and the

value of uncertainty in Zhuangzi are features of the text and ought to be acknowledged,

if not stressed. One worry I have with this view is that if one’s actions are to be based

on “what one does not know”, how could a person act? Human agents are attributed

knowledge to any action they do. It is presupposed that agents possess knowledge of

some sort which is the basis of their actions. If this is so, how is one to understand a

person whose actions are founded on what she does not know?

Lusthaus’ interpretation of Zhuangzi as using scepticism to promote aporetic

ethics is not incompatible with the view of scepticism that I propose here. The reason

for this is that Zhuangzi’s scepticism about the assumption of certainty implies that the

thinkers ought to realize that there is not one correct answer to the unrest. They must

start from knowing that diversity exists and that there are, according to Lusthaus,

“invariant standards”. This realization is what Lusthaus sees to be the starting point of

Zhuangzi’s aporetic ethics. According to Lusthaus, Zhuangzi’s aporetic ethics is one in

which a person proceeds from the limits of one’s knowledge and from the limits of

one’s power to control and muster things in the world. Because of this, it can be said

that there is a link between the two interpretations.

5.4 Zhuangzi’s scepticism as a sort that questions

Zhuangzi’s scepticism has been taken to mean a kind which asks questions.

Here, I discuss three scholars’ views.

5.4.1 Lee Yearley

In his discussion of his view of the “radical Zhuangzi”, Lee Yearley states that

what underlies his view is Zhuangzi’s scepticism. By Zhuangzi’s scepticism, Yearley

means the scepticism which says that ‘we do not know whether we know or we do not

know’.62 What makes Lee Yearley one of the scholars who propose that Zhuangzi’s

scepticism is a kind that asks questions is his further view that at the centre of

62 Yearley (1983): p. 127.

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do

”65

Zhuangzi’s scepticism is Zhuangzi’s “posing but not resolving of questions”.63

Yearley cites the story of Lady Li,64 to show that Zhuangzi asks questions but does not

resolve them. At the end of the story, Zhuangzi asks: “How do I know that the dead

not wonder why they ever longed for life?

Although it would seem that Zhuangzi poses questions to argue his scepticism,

it might be said that his questions have a different purpose other than arguing for

scepticism. Perhaps the questions are there as tools for philosophico-religious

reflection.

As ‘scepticism’ of not being able to know, the object of Zhuangzi’s scepticism

is our everyday assumptions. Its goal is for us to realise our ‘not being able to know’.

I suggest that Zhuangzi’s scepticism as ‘not being able to know’ is related to

Zhuangzi’s scepticism about being involved in official life. It seems that since for

Zhuangzi one is not able to know if she knows or if she does not know, one ought not

to propose solutions and involve oneself in official life. That is, if knowledge is the

basis for solutions and if one could not know, then she cannot concoct any solution.

One ought not to propose solutions since she does not have any. If she has, one would

wonder the basis of her solutions.

5.4.2 Christoph Harbsmeier

For Harbsmeier, the sceptical passages in the Zhuangzi only contain questions

that ask whether one does really know. Zhuangzi does not declare a sceptical thesis.

There are only questions about how people know. According to Harbsmeier, the basis

of Zhuangzi’s questions is that one cannot avoid uncertainty. As he writes,

Zhuangzi nowhere directly and dogmatically states that we cannot know. He

only persists in asking, ‘How do we know?’ He is not an adherent of the

dogma that we cannot know anything … Zhuangzi simply cannot see how

we can avoid uncertainty.66

63 Ibid. 64 Watson (1968): p. 47. 65 Ibid. 66 Harbsmeier (1993): p. 25.

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According to Harbsmeier, in the text Zhuangzi does not claim that humans cannot

know anything. Zhuangzi only asks the question of how people know what they claim

to know. Zhuangzi’s questions about how people know are epistemological questions

which relate back to philosophically interesting scepticism I discussed in the previous

chapter. Asking about the ways and means people know is philosophically interesting.

That is because it doubts the (seemingly) certain fact that people know how they

know. The questions make us wonder about the reason for asking them.

Harbsmeier says that the Gaptooth and Wang Ni passage in the “Qiwulun”

demonstrates that Zhuangzi asks questions about how we know.67 In the passage,

Wang Ni repeatedly answers Gaptooth’s questions back with the question: “How

would I know that?” The passage could be thought to express radical epistemological

scepticism, the view that access to truth and objective knowledge is impossible. This is

because of its point that someone is not able to know whether ignorance is knowing

and knowing is ignorance. In the passage, it says: “How would I know that what I call

knowing is not ignorance? How do I know that what I call ignorance is not

knowing?”68 This is radical scepticism, in that it suggests impossibility of knowledge,

meaning that it is impossible to attain true knowledge. With the possibility that what

people believe to be knowledge is actually not-knowledge and that what people

believe to be not-knowledge is knowledge, it is impossible to tell whether what one

has is knowledge. Because of the further questions in the passage which seem to

convey relativism, this point that knowledge is impossible becomes complicated.

In terms of object of doubt, the object of Zhuangzi’s questions, in Harbsmeier’s

view, is the seemingly certain fact that we know how we know. The purpose of

Zhuangzi’s questions is for us to realise that we cannot avoid uncertainty.

Because of Zhuangzi’s questions about how one knows, I suggest that

Zhuangzi’s scepticism could also be understood as scepticism about involvement in

official life. The scepticism about involvement I refer to here though is not the Yangist

motivated kind of scepticism. It is motivated by lack of knowledge. It seems that since

for Zhuangzi the answer to the questions is that one does not really know, one ought

67 Graham (2001): p. 58. 68 Ibid.

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not to involve oneself in official life, in the rectification of society.69 That is, if

knowledge about aspects of life and the world is the basis for the production of

solutions to the unrest, then that knowledge ought to be right. However, the problem is

not that one could not judge whether her solution is right but that whether one really

does have knowledge. Unless there is knowledge, there are no solutions. Thus,

Zhuangzi’s view about not knowing is that one ought not to participate in official life,

since there is no basis.

5.4.3 David Wong

David Wong argues in “Zhuangzi and the Obsession with Being Right,” that

Zhuangzi’s sceptical formula is not in any way declarative.70 Rather, it is interrogative

scepticism. Using the distinction between declarative scepticism and interrogative

scepticism made by Paul K. Moser,71 Wong distinguishes an interrogative sceptic from

a declarative sceptic. Whereas a declarative sceptic is one who “declares” a sceptical

thesis, which is either the extreme thesis (namely, that one cannot know anything) or

just the “everyday” sceptical view (namely, that some of our knowledge may be

wrong), an interrogative skeptic, on the other hand, is one who does not state a thesis.

Instead, she asks questions about how people come know what they claim to know.72

Zhuangzi’s questions in the sceptical passages in the “Qiwulun” show how he

is an interrogative sceptic. As Wong notes:

The most probing passages end with questions, not answers, not even

skeptical answers. … Absent is any sweeping declarative that we can know

nothing. …To reject all claims to knowledge definitively is perhaps

incoherent but in any case it is dogmatic and contrary to the sprit [sic] of

joyful and restless inquiry displayed by Zhuangzi.73

69 In this context, one would wonder whether the remark that Zhuangzi is “the greatest skeptic of all skeptics” is apt. Hu Shi 胡適 (1891–1962), author of the epochal Outlines of the History of Chinese Philosophy (1919), gives this remark. Hu (1963): p. 298.

70 Wong (2005): pp. 91-107. Wong still thinks that Zhuangzi’s is radical scepticism, because “it questions the veridicality of our most basic modes of access to the world” (p. 100); his is not, however, radical declarative scepticism.

71 Moser (1999): pp. 88-89. 72 Wong (2005): pp. 99-100. 73 Ibid., p. 100.

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Wong furthermore believes that it is Zhuangzi’s “restless spirit of inquiry, his

resolution always to pay attention to the richness of our present experience … [that]

feeds his interrogative scepticism because they jolt his previous framework of belief

about the world.”74 And for Zhuangzi, intense questions are needed because humans

ought to be reminded that their modes in understanding the world are not by

themselves fixed and final. What people learn from their experiences undermine these

modes of cognition. Intense questions are also needed because they also expand our

perspectives. There is no privileged point of view. Zhuangzi’s questions are meant to

shake those who see or know a privileged perspective. Wong says that Zhuangzi’s

interrogative scepticism is the process of putting into question the basis of an

individual’s assumption of validity of a perspective.75

Wong’s account of Zhuangzi’s scepticism appears akin to therapeutic

scepticism. That is because its goal seems to be to induce uncertainty. However, it is

not of the therapeutic kind. Wong views Zhuangzi’s scepticism as still radical, but not

a radical declarative kind.76 Wong still thinks that Zhuangzi’s is radical scepticism,

because it doubts the validity of the means by which we understand the world, but his

is not radical declarative scepticism. That is, it does not proffer any claim; it only

questions. Zhuangzi’s scepticism then, in Wong’s view, is an attempt to loosen the grip

of things and broaden one’s limited perspective, making his text one that does not

defend ‘sceptical conclusions’ but enacts ‘the skeptical virtue’.77 That is, Zhuangzi’s

text is an enactment of what seems to be the ultimate goal of scepticism, which is to

inquire and expand one’s knowledge and understanding, which in turn leads to more

scepticism.78

According to Wong’s view, the object of Zhuangzi’s scepticism is the

assumption of people about how they come know what they claim to know. The two

purposes are: (1) to remind us that the ways and modes we have to understand the

world are neither final nor fixed, and (2) to expand our perspectives.

In conclusion, Zhuangzi as an interrogative sceptic is a thinker who challenges

the assumption and insistence of the other thinkers that they have the correct doctrines

74 Ibid., p. 101. 75 Ibid., p. 103. 76 Ibid., p. 100. 77 Ibid., p. 103. 78 Ibid.

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(shi-fei distinctions). The thinkers were “obsessed with being right”, according to

Wong. Zhuangzi’s interrogative scepticism reminds the thinkers that the means by

which we come to know the world is not commensurate to the richness of the world.

As a view which points out the obsession of the thinkers with correctness, Wong’s

view is not incompatible with the view that in the “Qiwulun” Zhuangzi reflects the

thinkers’ assumption of certainty, suggesting his scepticism about this assumption.

This is because Zhuangzi’s view that the thinkers assumed certitude regarding their

solutions describes the thinkers’ “fanaticism” with being correct. Wong’s view,

however, differs from the view in this thesis because the thinkers’ obsession is

challenged by pointing out that their “modes of access” to the world are not final.

Zhuangzi’s way to challenge the assumption of certainty is by pointing out the

absurdity of some of their bases, in particular language.

5.5 Zhuangzi’s scepticism as Domain-specific scepticism79

The final interpretation of Zhuangzi’s scepticism is that it is limited scepticism.

That is, Zhuangzi’s scepticism is directed only at a particular domain. It has been

thought that Zhuangzi’s scepticism is specifically directed at language and ethical

norms.80

5.5.1 Scepticism directed at language

A few scholars have advanced that Zhuangzi’s scepticism is directed only at

language. Chad Hansen’s picture of Zhuangzi as a relativistic sceptic, for example, is

one that suggests that the object of Zhuangzi’s scepticism is language.81 This is

because Zhuangzi’s dao represents the social conventions constructed through

language.82 Daoist language scepticism, therefore, rests on the idea that because

79 This is also referred to as limited scepticism. Unlike categorical scepticism, which is the absolute denial of any knowledge, limited scepticism is scepticism about a specific type of knowledge, its object of scepticism. For a brief discussion of this, see Kjellberg (2007): p. 282.

80 Ivanhoe (1993). 81 As noted by scholars, the Laozi’s scepticism is specifically towards language and knowledge.

Chad Hansen believes that the early Daoists were sceptical towards language. Since his conception of language in the ancient Chinese tradition basically embodies knowledge (and action), Daoist language scepticism even implies for him the abandonment of knowledge.

82 The Daoist motif of wuwei 無為, according to this view, is in the last analysis a call to abandon knowledge and language. Wei 為, “deeming”, symbolizes human intervention or artifice

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language is socially constructed (for the regulation of behaviour), it does not

correspond to dao. Sharing a similar view, Lisa Raphals writes about language,

understood as a system of names, as something that puts up distinctions. Raphals says

that it is these “distinctions of language and practice [that] do not correspond to any

constant reality”.83

The early Daoists, including Zhuangzi, were sceptical about language because

it represents conventional knowledge. They were sceptical about the dominant

frameworks of the Confucians and the Mohists, because their frameworks are

constructed through language. Zhuangzi’s attitude towards language is that, because it

does not adequately capture dao, it ought to be not depended upon as the correct

picture of dao. What language does is indexing, that is, it only points to the world. It

cannot be the world. Thus relying on language gets in the way towards experiencing

the “raw” world. This is a view that is highlighted in Zhiming Bao’s view on Daoist,

particularly Zhuangzi’s, scepticism towards language. Bao sees such scepticism as one

that relies on the indescribability of Dao through language. That is, language cannot

fully describe Dao, since language is only isomorphic with the world, not with Dao.84

Ivanhoe believes that this linguistic scepticism of Zhuangzi is in line with that

particularly espoused in the Daodejing, a text replete with references to dao 道. That is,

dao as a concept referring to the origin and ultimate reality of the cosmos.85 Ivanhoe

writes:

Zhuangzi mistrusts any and every proposal about what is right and wrong.

He even disparages his own proposals, and in this he is consistent, for he is

skeptical about the ability of words to express the Dao. His form of

epistemological skepticism is distinctive. It is best thought of as …

language skepticism.86

crystallized through social mores and thus, for the Daoists, must be jettisoned, in favor of the natural. Hansen (2003d): pp. 784-786; cf. Fraser (2007): 97–106.

83 Raphals (1992): p. 73. 84 Bao (1990): p. 209. 85 The language scepticism here understood by Ivanhoe should, I think, be distinguished from

Hansen’s. For Hansen, the Daoists were language sceptics since language expresses and encompasses dao as guiding discourse and the early Daoist thinkers, particularly Laozi and Zhuangzi, were aberrant towards social, linguistic constructions. Ivanhoe understands dao to be the ultimate metaphysical reality, on the other hand.

86 Ivanhoe (1993): p. 648.

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is

s

Ivanhoe elaborates on the fact that this scepticism toward language is “part of

[Zhuangzi’s] greater distrust of the human intellect”87 and that while it seems that

there is complete distrust in language, Zhuangzi is unlikely to abandon it totally. Th

is because language helps in knowing the contours of the world. Language still ha

meaning behind it.88 In Zhuangzi’s language scepticism, then, language retains its

usefulness. What is acknowledged is language’s inadequacy to capture dao, but its use

is not denied.89

In terms of goal of doubt, according to those who view language as

representing conventional knowledge, the goal of Zhuangzi’s scepticism towards

language is to challenge the dominant traditions. The reason for the challenge is the

nature of language as inadequate to capture dao. According to the view that language

is unable to express daoultimate reality, the goal of Zhuangzi’s scepticism towards language

is partly to put less confidence in the human intellect.

The views put forward by the scholars here pertain to the fact that, according to

Zhuangzi, language cannot grasp dao. If this is indeed Zhuangzi’s view, this would

make Zhuangzi sceptical about thinkers who believe that the way to rectify the unrest

is through language. This is the reason why it can be said that the scholars’ views here

are not just not incompatible with the view here, but they also support it. One of

Zhuangzi’s reasons for his scepticism about the proposed solutions is his scepticism

about language. Zhuangzi’s view about language as arbitrary is his main reason why

he was sceptical about the solutions of some of the thinkers (specifically, the Mingjia

thinkers). According to Zhuangzi, language cannot be the solution to the unrest,

because language is fundamentally arbitrary and unfixed.

5.5.2 Scepticism directed at shi-fei distinctions:90

Ethical scepticism can mean the claim that there exist no moral truths.91

According to this, one cannot have access to and certainty about ethical truths. A form

87 Ivanhoe (1996): p. 199. 88 Ivanhoe (1993): p. 650. 89 Ibid., p. 648. 90 It should be noted that understanding this type of scepticism cannot be divorced from the

epistemological form, as language and morality in ancient Chinese philosophy are related – in fact, interlocked.

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of such ethical scepticism is the one discussed in Chapter 4. If this is the form of

ethical scepticism one takes as a guide to judge whether Zhuangzi is an ethical sceptic

or not, Zhuangzi is not an ethical sceptic. This is because stories in the Zhuangzi can

be taken to project Zhuangzi as admitting that there are individuals who know moral

truths. According to Ivanhoe, Zhuangzi thinks that there are “some people [who]

understand not only a better way but the Way.”92 That is, the craftsmen not only know

better means to attain a good life, they also know the right means.

But if ethical scepticism means scepticism about ethical rules and norms as

being correct guides for the conduct of life (that is, it is scepticism about shi-fei

distinctions), then Zhuangzi can be understood as an ethical sceptic. This is because

Zhuangzi’s stories can be viewed as claiming that the skilled individuals doubt and

reject the set shi-fei distinctions in society. Zhuangzi is sceptical about “conventional

ethical norms”.93 Zhuangzi’s scepticism extends to the employment of these norms in

society. Zhuangzi’s ethical scepticism is demonstrated by the skill stories, specifically

through the ways of the skilful craftsmen. The reason these stories demonstrate this is

because the craftsmen seem to dismiss prescribed ethical norms. They act as if they are

not bound by them. These men “respond spontaneously and are not constrained by

conventional standards of right and wrong”.94

In terms of object of doubt, the object of Zhuangzi’s ethical scepticism is the

norms and conventions (the shi-fei distinctions) in society. The goal of such scepticism

is perhaps to show that the shi-fei distinctions set up in society are not after all stable

and final. There are unexplored and probably better ways on how to live.

Zhuangzi’s scepticism about the thinkers’ assumption of certainty can be

viewed as Zhuangzi’s way to express the view that there are other ways things could

be. The thinkers view their proposals to be the one and only correct solution.

Zhuangzi’s scepticism is also grounded on the idea that there are sets of distinctions

beyond what the other thinkers know. As a way to direct the thinkers’ attention away

from their own doctrines to other sets of distinctions, this scepticism about shi-fei

91 To Philip J. Ivanhoe, ethical scepticism could mean either scepticism about the possibility of moral knowledge (thus is related to epistemological scepticism) or scepticism about the existence of moral truth. As in his view he means ethical scepticism to be the former, Ivanhoe thinks Zhuangzi is not an ethical sceptic.

92 Ivanhoe (1993): p. 644. 93 Lai (2008b): pp. 155-156. 94 Ibid., p. 156

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distinctions is an expression of Zhuangzi’s scepticism about the solutions. This is

because the solutions contain shi-fei distinctions.

5.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I dealt with a number of different interpretations of Zhuangzi’s

philosophy and scepticism. We have seen that Zhuangzi has been interpreted as a

radical sceptic, an epistemological nihilist, both a sceptic and a mystic, a therapeutic

sceptic, as one who offers sceptical strategies, a critical thinker, an interrogative

sceptic, and a sceptic specifically about language and about shi-fei distinctions. First, it

must be said that most of these interpretations of Zhuangzi’s scepticism are attempts to

understand Zhuangzi’s scepticism by classifying it according to categories dealt with

in western philosophy. By using these categories, the interpretations open up ways of

looking at Zhuangzi’s sceptical philosophy.

Secondly, we have seen that these different interpretations see Zhuangzi’s

scepticism as having varied objects and purposes. A reason that would explain this is

the nature of the text. The Zhuangzi Neipian is not a work with one underlying idea. Its

“unconnected” sections are open to various interpretations. Because of this, it would be

appropriate to declare that Zhuangzi’s scepticism in the text is multi-layered.

Thirdly, in relation to the view of Zhuangzi’s scepticism in this thesis, I have

discussed that some of the above interpretations are not incompatible with scepticism

about the solutions and scepticism about involvement in official life. Hansen’s view

differs from the socio-political view here because it is about the ethico-linguistic. But

because these (socio-political and ethico-linguistic) aspects of life and society are

connected, Hansen’s arguments support this thesis’ view that Zhuangzi is sceptical

about the solutions. Nelson’s account helps to understand Zhuangzi’s scepticism about

being involved in official life. It may be that the ideal ways of life that both

scepticisms lead to are aspects of Zhuangzi’s view about the ideal way of life. The

therapeutic interpretation of Kjellberg and of Raphals is also not incompatible with the

view here. It is because of the goal which the two views take Zhuangzi’s scepticism to

have: (feeling of) uncertainty. Lusthaus’ view is not incompatible with Zhuangzi’s

scepticism about the assumption of certainty, in that the latter implies that the thinkers

must realise diversity and plurality of solutions. Yearley’s and Harbsmeier’s account

could be understood as related to scepticism about being involved in official life.

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Wong’s account is also not incompatible with scepticism about assumption of certainty

because this thinkers’ assumption describes the thinkers’ “obsession with being right”.

The scholars’ view that Zhuangzi is sceptical about language because it is unable to

capture or represent dao supports scepticism about the solutions. This is because, as

discussed in Chapter 4, one of Zhuangzi’s grounds for doubting the solutions is

arbitrariness of language. Finally, Zhuangzi’s scepticism about shi-fei distinctions is

not incompatible with Zhuangzi’s scepticism about the solutions because the solutions

contain shi-fei distinctions.

Perhaps a distinctive feature of this thesis’ view is the focus on the doctrines of

Zhuangzi’s contemporaries. Zhuangzi is a sceptic about the doctrines not just for the

reason of futility but also for the reason that any proposal of doctrines entails a

proposal to be in public service, which is a dangerous, perilous ground.

6. Conclusion

I. Summary

In this thesis, I have argued that Zhuangzi’s scepticism about proposing

solutions is a manifestation of a Yangist concern about being involved in official life.

In Chapter 1, I discussed the phenomenon of doctrinal exchange, which I

believe is that phenomenon in the Warring States period which would help explain

why the Neipian has elements from doctrines of other thinkers or persuasions of the

period. This chapter not only showed that the phenomenon explains why in texts, such

as the Zhuangzi, there are views which are from other thinkers of the period, but also

showed an important feature of the debates of the Warring States thinkers, that of

fluidity.

In Chapter 2, I presented the ideas which have been associated with Yang Zhu.

I analysed the passages in the Yangist texts. I did this to aid me in judging which of the

elements in the Neipian are akin to Yangist ideas.

In Chapter 3, I presented the Yangist elements in the Neipian. In this chapter,

we have seen that the view that Zhuangzi was influenced by the Yangist concern about

involvement in official life is suggested in the “Renjianshi”.

In Chapter 4, I discussed the nature of Zhuangzi’s scepticism about the

solutions. I have used some western categories in understanding Zhuangzi’s

scepticism. We have known that Zhuangzi’s scepticism is philosophically interesting

because it doubts what would be the demanded activity for thinkers during that time.

The Warring States thinkers’ main task was to concoct and propose solutions to the

unrest. Zhuangzi’s scepticism about the solutions then is philosophically interesting,

because it makes us think about what reasons he might have for his doubt. In this

chapter, what is proposed as Zhuangzi’s reasons for his scepticism is his perspective

that the thinkers hold the assumption of certainty. He questions this assumption for

reasons that the basis of some of these thinkers’ solutions, which is language, is at base

questionable. Language is a questionable basis for any solution, because it is arbitrary.

It cannot be the basis, for Zhuangzi, at least. The fact that the means used by the

thinkers to determine the correct solution, biandisputation, which also involves language,

is also another of Zhuangzi’s reasons for his scepticism. The problem with bian is that

in the activity, there are no objective criteria for judging. Besides the two reasons, we

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have seen that Zhuangzi also sees the richness and diversity of life and things as also a

reason for his scepticism. It seemed to Zhuangzi that the debaters have obsessed

themselves too much with developing the right solution for quelling the unrest in

human society. To Zhuangzi, life in general is not all about humanity. Viewing life as

only about humanity for Zhuangzi is a way to impoverish society and the world.

In Chapter 5, I examined the different views about how Zhuangzi is sceptical. I

did this to further understand Zhuangzi’s scepticism as doubt about the solutions.

II. Significance

The perspective of Zhuangzi’s scepticism that I offer here shows that there are

elements in the Neipian which could shed light on other views of Zhuangzi. This is not

to say, however, that all the ideas in the text could be linked and understood to form a

coherent picture of Zhuangzi’s philosophy. Given the nature of the text, any attempt to

relate all elements in the Neipian to provide a picture of Zhuangzi’s philosophy ought

to be doubted. This thesis only attempts to argue that Zhuangzi’s scepticism, as

scepticism about proposing solutions, could be understood as linked to Zhuangzi’s

scepticism or concern about being involved in official life.

Understanding Zhuangzi’s scepticism about the thinkers’ assumption of

certainty and about bian is another way of looking at Zhuangzi’s scepticism. It views

Zhuangzi’s scepticism from an historical and socio-political point of view.

Specifically, the thesis contributes to three areas in the field: (1) nature of

Warring States debates, (2) the nature or composition of the Zhuangzi text, and (3)

understanding of scepticism in the Zhuangzi.

(1) Nature of Warring States debates

The Warring States thinkers and their texts are categorised according to

“schools” (jia) in the Han texts, the Shiji and the Hanshu. The adoption of these

classifications in modern scholarship has introduced the idea that these thinkers and

their ideas belong to rigid, clearly delineated, and intact “schools of thought”. This

idea, however, does not provide a picture of the nature of the interaction of the thinkers

during the Warring States period. There was fluidity of ideas, interaction, and cross-

pollination between the thinkers. According to Nathan Sivin, “we can read the writings

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149

of many [Warring States] individuals with a broad command of classical traditions”.1

That the thinkers’ texts show that they possessed knowledge of other traditions

suggests that there was more fluidity among the thinkers’ ideas. Aside from this, the

Hanshu categorisations of the texts are now questioned by scholars.2 Consequently, to

view the thinkers as belonging to the rigid categorisations does not show the fluidity of

ideas and lively interactions among the thinkers.

This thesis will contribute to continuing debates about interactions between

ideas during the Warring States period. This thesis shows that Zhuangzi was

influenced by Yangist ideas, which suggests that he interacted with other thinkers of

the period, specifically with Yang Zhu or his followers.

(2) Nature or composition of the Zhuangzi text

It is known that Guo Xiang 郭象 (c. 352-312 CE) is the compiler of the received

Zhuangzi. However, modern scholars have speculated that Guo Xiang did not just

compile the text. They believe that he actually created the Zhuangzi.3 Other scholars,

e.g. Liu Xiaogan and A.C. Graham, have also attempted to divide the texts according

to different ideas or persuasions (including Yangist thought),4 yet leaving the Neipian

as the group to be most likely written by Zhuangzi. This thesis questions these

scholars’ classifications, in that it shows that even in the Neipian, themes and ideas of

other persuasions (that is, Yangist) can be found. This thesis thus provides a

perspective on ways of conceiving the Zhuangzi, the Neipian in particular.

(3) Understanding of scepticism in the Zhuangzi

In this thesis, we have seen that scepticism in the Zhuangzi can be interpreted

in a variety of ways. Perhaps this is owing to the fact of the nature and difficulty of the

Neipian text. Despite that, it can be said that Zhuangzi’s scepticism is multi-layered,

because of the different interpretations.

This thesis offers another perspective to understand Zhuangzi’s scepticism. As

discussed, it is a perspective that links Yangist ideas in the Neipian to the sceptical

philosophy of Zhuangzi.

1 Sivin (1995): p. 28. 2 Harper (1999): p. 822. 3 See Appendix A for discussion. 4 Liu (1994); Graham (2003).

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Appendix A: The Neipian: A Warring States Text?

Although it is presumed here that the Neipian is a Warring States text, an issue

actually exists about whether it is a text of the period. The Neipian has long been

believed to be the work of Zhuangzi. Because Zhuangzi is a thinker of the Warring

States period, the Neipian has been presupposed to be a Warring States text. Modern

findings about how the Zhuangzi was composed and compiled, however, raise doubts

as to the level of certainty of the presumption. These findings suggest that it is not safe

to assume that the Neipian is Warring States.

One of these findings indicates that the Zhuangzi compiler and commentator

Guo Xiang (c. 352-312 CE) did not just reduce the text to 33 pian. In the process of

excising sections of it, he imposed his own views onto the text. According to scholars,

this is suggested by the arrangement and organisation of the received text. Basing her

findings on Guo’s preface to his Zhuangzi commentary, Livia Kohn writes:

[Guo] not only eliminated folkloristic parts and shortened the text, but he

also rearranged it and included sections that he considered explanatory in

his commentary rather than in the [Zhuangzi] proper. On the whole it

appears that [Guo] did not hesitate to impose his personal understanding and

philosophical preferences on the text.1

Because of this, Guo Xiang could even be regarded as the “actual creator” of the

received Zhuangzi.2

Another finding which suggests that the assumption that the Neipian is a

Warring States text is not safe an assumption is that the bundle was the last to be

brought together in the compilation process. According to Esther Klein,

[The Neipian] represent someone’s judgement about what was best in that

body of material [the Zhuangzi]. In other words, material for the inner

chapters was carefully selected, probably by Han dynasty editors. These

1 Knaul [Kohn] (1985): p. 430. See also Knaul [Kohn] (1982): pp. 54-55; Kirkland (2004): pp.

34, 223-224 (note 24); Roth (2001). 2 Kirkland (2004): p. 34.

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editors did not necessarily select material on the basis of its perceived

authenticity but rather for quality and probably philosophical content.3

Because the probable basis for the selection of what is now the Neipian is quality and

not necessarily authenticity, one cannot be certain that the included pieces were all

pre-Qin or post-Qin compositions. It is, however, possible that all of them are pre-Qin.

It is in light of these findings that attribution of the Neipian to Zhuangzi is to be

doubted. No one is certain if the Neipian is Zhuangzi’s work.4

The suggestion of the above findings, however, is contradicted by findings of

linguistic and philosophical researches on the Neipian. The findings of these

researches show that the text is a Warring States production and suggest that its author

is Zhuangzi. These researches are those of Liu Xiaogan and Jordan Paper. In this

appendix, I explore their findings.

I. Linguistic Evidence

In his Classifying the Zhuangzi Chapters, Liu Xiaogan claims that the Neipian

are a product of the mid-Warring States period, but the Waipian and the Zapian are

not.5 Liu’s claim first derives from his linguistic evidence in the Zhuangzi. The

evidence is summarised as follows:

Though the [Neipian] use words such as dao 道, de 德, ming 命, jing 精, and

shen 神, the compounds daode 道德, xingming 性命, and jingshen 精神 are

not used, while in the [Waipian] and [Zapian] daode, xingming, and

jingshen all appear repeatedly, 36 times in all.6

Liu then compared these data with evidence from pre-Warring States, other Warring

States and post-Warring States texts. From there, Liu concludes:

During the mid-Warring States period, or more specifically, during the time

of Mencius (372?-289? B.C.) and just prior to Mencius, no one employed

3 Klein (2011): p. 361. 4 Those sections that have Zhuangzi himself as the subject/character are certainly not

Zhuangzi’s. 5 Liu (1994): pp. 1-45. 6 Ibid., p. 4.

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the terms daode, xingming, and jingshen. It was only during the later

Warring States period, probably during Xunzi’s time (325?-235 B.C.), that

these compounds began to appear and circulate. From a logical point of

view, we certainly cannot deny the possibility that someone prior to Xunzi

used these three compounds. Yet, while that may be true, it is impossible

that they were employed frequently or that they were used very early.

Otherwise there would be traces in some pre-Xunzi texts. Thus, differences

in the use of compounds between the [Neipian] and [Waipian] and [Zapian]

in the Zhuangzi are, in fact, objective distinctions of the years left for us by

history. These lines of demarcation tell us that the [Waipian] and [Zapian]

cannot be the products of the mid-Warring States period. Only the [Neipian]

can be the literature of that period….7

According to Liu’s reasoning, because no one used the compound terms prior to

Xunzi’s time, it is safe to presume that the Waipian and Zapian are post-Xunzi (i.e.

later Warring States or post-Warring States) and the Neipian is pre-Xunzi (i.e. early

Warring States) text. The Neipian does not contain any of the post-Xunzi compounds.

Two objections to Liu’s claim must be mentioned, however. Liu mentions one

of these objections and responds to it in his book. The first objection is that since there

are chapters in the Waipian and Zapian that do not use the compound terms,8 it could

be concluded that these chapters are also mid-Warring states products. Liu responds

that these chapters should be regarded as directly related to their respective chapter

groups,9 as the analysis is based from “the totality of the structure”, 10 i.e. from the

totality of the Zhuangzi. Liu also responds to this by reasoning that it is possible that

these chapters may be compositions prior to the mid-Warring States period and not

necessarily the Neipian’s contemporary. This is because from the differences in the

use of the compound terms he has shown, one “cannot formulate specific conditions

under which these differences can be universally applied to determine the dating of

any chapter or any group of works. Since it is possible that in several later works the

content or style would preclude use of [the compounds], one cannot prove that these

7 Liu (1994): p. 14. 8 Based on Liu’s table (on page 9), the following chapters do not use any of the compounds:

Chapters 10, 12, 17, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 31. 9 Liu assigns these chapters to groups he has for the Waipian and Zapian. 10 Liu (1994): p. 15.

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are works that appeared prior to the mid-Warring States period.”11 The second

objection is that the absence of the compounds in some of the chapters and the

relatively high frequency of occurrence in certain groups of chapters (the Anarchist

and Huang-Lao groups) could be equally explained by content and style differences.12

Concerning the question about the Neipian’s author, Liu concludes from his

analysis that it must be Zhuangzi. He cites that since that the Waipian and the Zapian

are not Warring States texts and that only the Neipian is, and since Zhuangzi was a

figure of the mid-Warring States, thus, “if we are willing to assume that the contents of

the Zhuangzi include the writings of Zhuangzi himself, then we must believe that the

[Neipian] essentially were written by Zhuangzi”.13

II. Linguistic-Philosophical Evidence

In “Dating the Chuang-Tzu by Analysis of Philosophical Terms”, Jordan Paper

claims that the Neipian are a product of the Warring States period.14 Paper believes the

Neipian would be dated to the 4th century BCE. He bases his conclusion on the results

of his analysis of philosophical terms in the Zhuangzi. The terms he analysed are,

namely: yinyang 陰陽, xu 虛, wuwei 無為, de 德, and ziran 自然. In his analysis of the

occurrence and meanings of these terms in the Zhuangzi and in other early Chinese

texts, Paper finds that they have different senses in the first seven chapters, his first

group,15 which are the Neipian in the textus receptus. According to Paper, in the

Neipian, the meanings or senses of these terms are in their earliest or intermediate (or

transitional) meanings. Because these terms are not in their later, developed stages of

meaning, like they are used in the other chapters of the Zhuangzi, Paper concludes that

the Neipian “is later than the original parts of the [Lunyu 《論語》] and the [Mozi

《墨子》] and earlier than the [Daodejing] and [Xunzi]; that is, would date to the 4th

century BCE”.16

As to Paper’s conclusion that Zhuangzi is the author of the Neipian, he says

that “[s]ince this period [4th century BCE] coincides with the timespan for [Zhuangzi]

11 Liu (1994): pp. 15-16. 12 Chris Fraser mentions this in his review of Liu’s book. See Fraser (1997): p. 157. 13 Liu (1994): p. 14. 14 Paper (1977): pp. 33-40. 15 Paper has grouped the Zhuangzi chapters differently, based on his analysis. He has the

following three strata: chapters 1-7, chapter 8-27, and chapters 28-33. Paper (1977): pp. 38-39. 16 Paper (1977): pp. 38-39.

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(ca. 370-300) provided by [Sima Qian], this study merely adds confirmation to the

widely held view that [Zhuang Zhou] indeed is [Zhuangzi] and did write the

[Neipian]”.17

III. Conclusion

Liu’s and Paper’s findings suggest that despite some facts about the

Neipian which suggests that Zhuangzi’s authorship of it ought to be doubted, it

is reasonable to regard most of the sections of the Zhuangzi’s first seven

chapters as the work of Zhuangzi.

17 Ibid., pp. 38-39.

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Appendix B: Who Was Zhuangzi?

The thought elements in the Neipian that resemble Yangist doctrines and their

connotations, discussed in Chapter 3, show that Zhuangzi was influenced by Yangist

thought. In this appendix, based on scrutiny of the Shiji’s biography of Zhuangzi,

together with some scholars’ views about the author of the Neipian, I discuss why it is

reasonable to think of Zhuangzi as a thinker who had cross-influences, particularly that

he had Yangist influence.

First, I explore the common view that Zhuangzi is a Daoist, that he was a

proponent of daojia (Daoism), one of the six doctrinal groups mentioned in the Shiji.

In the discussion, I show that this common view is misleading and that it is more

useful to view Zhuangzi as a figure influenced by a range of other thinkers, especially

Yang Zhu. In the final section, I explore the intellectual influences of Zhuangzi that

scholars have discerned.

I. Zhuangzi and daojia1

There is a common view, held especially by practitioners of Daoist religion,

that Zhuangzi is the second great “Daoist” and is the major expounder of the ideas of

daojia.2 According to this view, Zhuangzi, moreover, inherited Daoism from its

putative founder, Laozi. He developed and enriched it with more insight and threaded

it with humour. This has given rise to the impression that daojia “owes more” to

Zhuangzi. In light of this, it is held by many that Zhuangzi’s philosophy is the mature

form of Daoism, while that of Laozi the primitive.3

It is because of this assumed progression in the early history of Daoism that

“daojia” seems to refer only to Laozi’s and Zhuangzi’s Daoism, or Lao-Zhuang

老莊道家.4 It is, in turn, because of this and of the view that Zhuangzi contributed

1 Although the term daojia 道家 refers to the philosophical, Lao-Zhuang strand of Daoism,

most scholars now avoid divorcing this from the tradition’s religious wing, daojiao 道敎. They believe that in order to fully understand the Daoist tradition in its entirety, each of these aspects ought to be given equal attention. Clarke (2000): pp. 16-23; Kirkland (2004): p. 2.

2 This is all by virtue of the admired and celebrated classic that bears his name. 3 See Hansen (2007). It is to be noted, however, that A.C. Graham viewed Zhuangzi to be the

“original” Daoist, that is, the first of the Daoists. Graham (2001): p. 5. 4 “Lao-Zhuang de sixiang” 老莊的思想 (Lao-Zhuang thought) or the link between the two texts

(Daodejing and Zhuangzi) and the philosophers, though, is first seen in the later Daoist text, the

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substantially to daojia that it now seems a must for anyone who wants to know more

about the philosophies of Laozi and Zhuangzi to study daojia. That is, to explore the

doctrines assigned to daojia by early scholars who applied the term. However, due to

recent findings on the Shiji, the text where ‘daojia’ was originally used, it appears that

such a study on daojia would not reveal substantial information about what Laozi and

Zhuangzi thought in relation to available texts assigned to them. In this section, I set

out two reasons why a study of daojia in the Shiji would not yield more information

about Zhuangzi and his thought.

A. Daojia and the Six Doctrinal Groups (liujia 六家)

The first reason why a study of daojia in the Shiji would not yield more

information about Zhuangzi and his thought is that daojia is one of the six

configurations (liujia) of the Shiji, configurations whose comprehensiveness and

accuracy are doubtful. Their accuracy is challenged by recent scholarship. The other

five jias that the Shiji’s “liujia zhi yaoshi” mentions are, namely: yinyang 陰陽,5 ru 儒

(the Confucians), mo 墨 (the Mohists), fajia 法家 (Legalists), and mingjia 名家

(Terminologists).6 There are three reasons for doubting the comprehensiveness and

accuracy of Sima Tan’s work, according to recent findings. These are:

1) Unlike the writers of inventories before him, Sima Tan did not apply

systematic criteria in his classification of the baijia. He identified three of them on

the basis of their doctrines (yinyangjia, fajia and daojia); rujia, based on the social

status of its members; mojia on the basis of its name, and finally mingjia

according to the group’s intellectual preoccupation.7 Without systematic criteria,

Huainanzi, in its “Yaolüe 要略”. Daoism, though, is now viewed to include the ideas of the text known as the Liezi.

5 This category, according to Feng Youlan, actually includes the practitioners of the Five Elements (or Phases), since the two schools were merged during the Han era. Feng (1952): p. 159 (footnote on page).

6 The Shiji was written by Sima Tan 司馬談 (165-110 BCE) and was continued and completed by his son Sima Qian 司馬遷 (145-ca. 86 BCE). The work has the section called “Liujia zhi yaoshi” 六家之要指. It is where liujia are mentioned.

7 Lai (2008b): p. 4. A different perspective is offered by Harold Roth. According to him, Sima Tan actually did not use the “doctrines” or (names of the) “teachers” of these doctrines as basis to categorise the schools/lineages. He instead considered the “techniques” of each. Because of this, Roth infers, one can now readily pinpoint the criteria that make a philosophical school (specifically Daoism, for Roth) a “school” (jia), since it is a way of categorising which is mid-way between the synchronic

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Tan drew on and syncretised what his predecessors did.8 According to Kidder

Smith, he “abstracted [intellectual] content from the [Zhanguo survey] texts and

refashioned it into six ideal types”.9

2) Sima Tan’s description of the jias, being the first and the only Han

writer to use jia to refer to an intellectual tendency rather than thinkers or

texts, leaves out many of the practices and essential tenets of each group or

lineage, except (probably) daojia,10 which makes one wonder about his real

intention in writing the section “Liujia zhi yaoshi”. Smith thinks that Sima

Tan’s “Yaoshi” was composed in order to convince the Han Emperor Wu to

rule in the Daoist way. This is since Sima Tan was an advocate of (Huang-

Lao) Daoism and because Tan’s description of the Ru, Daoism’s strongest

rival for officialdom,11 is critical of it and Tan’s sympathetic description of

Daoism includes an attack on the Ru. The “Yaoshi”, like the rest of

inventories of the early intellectual traditions, is therefore a polemical piece.

Consequently, like the pre-Qin survey texts, it should not be taken as

presenting historical facts.12

3) The Grand Historian excluded many pre-Han thinkers and groups in his

configurations, including: the egoists and/or hedonists (with Yang Zhu as

main representative), the agriculturalists, the thinkers who debated about the

nature of the human being, the Mohist/Yangist-like philosophers Yin Wen

and Song Keng, the military thinkers such as Sun Bin, and the advocates of

the Daoist doctrines of wuzhi 無知13 and self-abandonment such as the quasi-

Legalist Shen Dao.

Although the second reason would imply that daojia ought to be studied more since

the Simas favoured daojia and most probably must have provided more information

(which emphasizes the group’s present or existing – a given time’s – actual practices, doctrines) and the diachronic (whose basis is the consideration of the group’s history or lineage – teacher-disciple connection) senses of the term ‘school’. Roth (1999): pp. 175-181; Ryden (1996): pp. 5-9.

8 Cf. Feng (1952): p. 16. 9 Smith (2003): pp. 129-156. 10 (Han) Daoism’s syncretic nature is emphasized by Tan. 11 This “officialdom” basically meant “court and teaching prominence”. Queen (2001): pp. 53-

54. 12 Smith (2003): pp. 129-156; Queen (2001): pp. 53-54, 56-60. 13 Literally, wuabsence(of)zhiknowledge. Therefore, this doctrine implies “discarding knowledge”.

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about it, such investigation would have to be avoided, however. This is on the basis

that the Simas work is biased. Given the facts, it is clear that the Simas actually

tailored its deliberations to serve their own theories.

B. What is Daojia?

The second reason concerns the reference of the term ‘daojia’. Coined and first

used by Sima Tan and Sima Qian, it is now believed that it basically refers to “Huang-

Lao Daoism” 黃老道家.14 Huang-Lao Daoism, named after the teachings of Huangdi

(the Yellow Emperor) and Laozi, is thought to be the “syncretic” form of Daoism

which became a developed school of thought in the Han dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE).15

As an eclectic school of political thought, Huang-Lao may have appropriated

Zhuangzi’s philosophical points.16 Evidence for a possible link between Huang-Lao

and Zhuangzi’s philosophy would be the presence of “syncretic” chapters in the

Zhuangzi.17 But as evidence only for a possible connection, this does not indicate

Zhuangzi’s direct contribution to Huang-Lao thought, for, as several scholars have

argued, Lao-Zhuang Daoism is not related to Huang-Lao.18 Certain interactions might

have occurred but, as will be mentioned, Huang-Lao may not even have anything

14 The Simas themselves were professed members of Huang-Lao. 15 As to the precise nature of Huang-Lao Daoism, scholars do not seem to agree. What seems to

be agreed upon is its syncretism, that it took useful elements from its other contemporary schools of thought, particularly Legalism.

16 This is, however, doubtful, because the memoir or biography for Zhuang Zhou in the Shiji, it seems to me, was placed in the chapter in order to support Laozi, to make Laozi (and Hanfeizi) exemplars (of Huang-Lao thought) – the chapter is anyway titled “Lao Tzu and Han Fei”. Sima Qian’s biography says: “There was nothing on which [Zhuangzi’s] teachings did not touch, but in their essentials they went back to the words of Lao Tzu [emphasis added].” And later at the end of the chapter, after Han Fei’s biography, Qian writes: “…Chuang Tzu abandoned morality and let loose his opinions….”, and ends the chapter with “…but Lao Tzu was the most profound of them all.” Nienhauser (1994): pp. 23, 29.

17 This also suggests that when the text was compiled, its compilers must have seen a relation between the parts of the Neipian (specifically chapter 7, “Yingdiwang”) and the now appended syncretic, therefore Huang-Lao, sections (chapters 12-16, 33).Graham considers the later sections of chapter 11 to be likewise syncretic. Graham (2001): p. 257; Nienhauser (1994): pp. 23-24.

Certain (character) compounds are also found in some chapters in the Neipian and in the Syncretic chapters, suggesting that, while the compilers were the syncretists, the syncretists must have found an import in Zhuangzi’s core chapters. Hoffert (2001): p. 30.

18 Xiao Gongquan, Charles Le Blanc, John Major, and Harold Roth particularly hold this view (Queen [2001]: p. 52, note 4). I also note that, as Kidder Smith has argued, Sima Tan fashioned his “textual-doctrinal” configurations and descriptions, his “Yaoshi”, in order to make Daoism (daojia) appealing to the Han rulers and so that Daoism would gain state prominence (Smith [2003]: pp. 129-156). If such was the case, Sima Tan would never really count Zhuangzi’s ideas as important for the daojia he promoted, since Zhuangzi (or most of the ideas of the Neipian) was anti-political or mystical.

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philosophical in it. Thus, since the Simas’s daojia is Huang-Lao, a study of its features

will prove to be ineffective in facilitating a full understanding of the thought of

Zhuangzi.19

Despite the obscure nature of Huang-Lao, some scholars of Daoist religion

(notably Anna Seidel) have suggested a serious examination of it, thinking that Huang-

Lao Daoism could be the “missing link” between religious Daoism (daojiao 道教) and

philosophical Daoism (daojia).20 They argue that Huang-Lao Daoism has both

philosophical and religious strains. They assume that if it has these elements, then the

doctrines of Huang-Lao may be examined to cast light on daojiao’s philosophical roots

and aspects. Here, it may be thought that if Huang-Lao has the elements Lao-Zhuang

thought, then Huang-Lao may also be analysed to help in understanding Zhuangzi’s

thinking. However, as Hans van Ess has pointed out:

… the evidence given by Sima Qian and Ban Gu is not sufficient to allow us

to say anything about a philosophical or even a religious meaning of the

term “Huang-Lao.” … [T]here are a few hints in the Shiji and in the

Hanshu as to what was important for Sima Qian and Ban Gu when they

used the term. These hints point towards a direction that is neither

philosophical nor religious.21

Thus, this regrettably means that studying Huang-Lao Daoism would not provide

meaningful explanations for the philosophy of Zhuangzi that is presented in the

Neipian.

What would further show that daojia will fail to work as a significant context

for the study of Zhuangzi’s philosophy is the fact that the Han historiographers,

particularly the Simas, might actually have disregarded Zhuangzi and the text

dedicated to him, as A. C. Graham says.22 This is most likely because of their political

19 Also, we must note that as A.C. Graham says, this school, the Daoist school, is the “most

confusing of all”. Graham (1989): p. 170. 20 See for example Anna Seidel, La divinisation de Lao Tseu dans le Taoïsme des Han (Paris,

École Française d’Extrême-Orient, 1969): p. 18ff, cited in van Ess (1993): p. 161. 21 van Ess (1993): pp. 161-162. According to van Ess, Sima Qian and Ban Gu’s identified

Huang-Lao personalities, themselves included, were people who opposed the state Xiongnu, who had affiliation with the affluent, independent families (who had a power-base away from the capital), and who were against depriving feudal kings their authority and power. van Ess (1993): p. 173.

22 Graham (1989): p. 171.

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bias. As discussed, the “Yaoshi” was concocted to favour daojia. Qian described it to

embody syncretic doctrines in order to make it palatable to the Han rulers. Since the

Zhuangzi, and therefore Zhuangzi, was seen as anti-political and as embodying

mystical doctrines, Sima Tan, his son Qian and possibly also the other later Han

historians who assumed the Simas’s political orientation, would most probably not be

interested in him. But it seemed they had to place Zhuangzi, i.e. his extant text, in one

of their categories. Probably because portions of the text do touch on dao, daojia

seemed to be the only place for the thinker.23

Aside from the fact that in the Zhuangzi24 Zhuangzi is indifferent towards

political affairs, Sima Qian probably did not think very highly of Zhuangzi. This is

because as the official Han historian, he was bound to provide moral examples in his

records. The then historians were teachers to rulers, but they were to teach only

lessons, i.e. good examples of the past. Those historians were therefore tasked to write

history for two purposes: 1) to impart tradition and 2) to cite moral examples

demonstrated by the lives of famous figures for their students to emulate.25 As Sima

Qian writes in the memoirs of “Laozi and Han Fei”, as this is where Zhuangzi’s

biography is interestingly found,26 Zhuangzi “abandoned morality and let loose his

opinions.”27 Such a comment strongly suggests that the Han scribe wanted his royal

pupils to disfavour Zhuangzi – and besides, because of the way Zhuangzi’s memoir is

framed, worded, and located in the Shiji, as will be seen and discussed below, Qian’s

protégés and other readers would probably not pay close attention to Zhuangzi’s life

story and follow his example.

If a study of daojia is pursued to grasp Zhuangzi’s philosophy, another

problem is that the presumed “maturity” of Zhuangzi’s Daoism begins to be

discredited once it is realised that the two thinkers were linked, i.e. placed together

23 Hansen (1992): p. 202; Graham (1989): p. 171. 24 Sima Qian probably had with him all the Zhuangzi chapters, not just the Neipian when he

wrote the Shiji. His biography of Zhuangzi ascribes to Zhuangzi three Waipian chapters of the text (“Yufu”, “Daozhi” and “Quqie” 《胠篋》), which were written by the Yangists and Primitivists, not by Zhuangzi, as Graham and Liu Xiaogan have shown. See Nienhauser (1994): pp. 23-24; Graham (1979); Liu (1994): pp. 83-156.

25 Watson (1999): p. 368. 26 See the section below on Zhuangzi, the thinker, for details of this biography. 27 Nienhauser (1994): p. 29. Qian also wrote in the memoir that Zhuangzi’s “words billowed

and swirled without restraint, to please himself, and so kings and dukes down, the great men could not utilize him”. This comment also would most probably make his protégés regard Zhuangzi’s ideas as useless.

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as

under one category, only during the Han dynasty.28 Based on available textual data,

the two names and their doctrines were never conjoined prior to the Han dynasty.29 It

was in fact only during the Wei-Jin period (220-240 CE), long after the Warring States

era, that a strong religious, daojiao association of the two thinkers was made.30 The

pre-Qin thinkers Laozi and Zhuangzi may be related thinkers, but their relation lies in

the fact that they, i.e. specifically the texts ascribed to them, both touched on dao

ultimate-reality.31 Yet, their relationship was never like that of a teacher and disciple.

They most probably thought about dao 道, among other “Daoist” motifs,

independently, that is, without contact and knowledge of what the other thought.

A related complication to this now dubious link and pairing of the two figures

is the fact that Laozi, if he was a real person, the alleged main representative and

founder of daojia, may not be the first Daoist. Thus, this also means that he may not

really be the father of Daoism, whether this Daoism is Huang-Lao or Lao-Zhuang,

although it should be noted that Daoism as a tradition has extremely dim origins.

There is a view that Zhuangzi may even be the first Daoist; and as such, it could even

be that it was Zhuangzi who was responsible for regarding Laozi a Daoist.32 Even

though Laozi and Zhuangzi share a particular insight that makes both of them

“Daoists”,33 this does not, once again, at all mean that the two thinkers are directly, or

even closely related. That is, there was no master-student relationship. And if that is

the case, then we therefore cannot fully count on and use the thinking of Laozi and

most possibly not the considered core ideas of daojia as well, which is the group that

mainly represents, together with Huangdi’s, the philosophy of the Laozi, to explain the

philosophy of the Zhuangzi.

In conclusion, it can be inferred that Laozi and Zhuangzi did not really belong

to a single, organised school – there never was a “Daoist school”. In pre-Qin times,

there were only two well-defined and well-organised doctrinal groups, which are now

28 Graham (1989): p. 171. Mark Edward Lewis (1999: p. 591) says that their respective texts were brought together during this time under the name Daoism.

29 The Shiji seems to be the first surviving text to link Zhuangzi to Laozi. See also Graham (1989): p. 170. Cf. Xunzi, “Fei shier”; Zhuangzi, “Tianxia”. These two text sections are pre-Qin if we take them to be, as some scholars have (Smith [2003]: p. 132, n. 9).

30 Smith (2003): p. 146. 31 Hansen (1992): p. 202. 32 Hansen (2003e): p. 911. 33 According to A.C. Graham, the insight is “that while other things move spontaneously on the

course proper to them, man has separated himself from the Way by reflecting, posing alternatives, and formulating the principles of action.” Graham (1989): p. 172.

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referred as “schools”, the ones of the Confucians (rujia) and the Mohists (mojia).34 It

cannot therefore be said that if one wants to know and understand more about the

philosophies of Laozi and Zhuangzi, that is, obtain a comprehensive and complete

grasp of their philosophies, then she ought to study daojia’s doctrines. Perhaps it can

be said that one must study the ideas and doctrines of rujia and the mojia in order to

understand certain important aspects of the philosophies of Kongzi, Mengzi, Xunzi,

Mozi, Huizi, Gongsun Long, etc. But, for reasons outlined above, one must refrain

from saying the same about Laozi, Zhuangzi and daojia. So, it can be presumed quite

confidently that the study of daojia is really not central to the task of understanding

Zhuangzi’s thinking.

II. Who was Zhuangzi?

A. Zhuangzi in the Shiji

The aim of this section is to argue that although the Shiji’s memoir of Zhuangzi

provides some useful information about Zhuangzi, the information it gives should be

treated with suspicion. Before presenting the reasons for thinking this, here is the

memoir in question:

Chuang Tzu [Zhuangzi] was a native of Meng. His praenomen was Chou

[Zhou]. Chou [Zhou] once served as a functionary of Chi-yüan [Qiyuan] in

Meng. He was a contemporary of King Hui of Liang [Huiwang] (370-335

BC) and King Hsuan [Xuanwang] (319-301 BC).35 There was nothing on

which his teachings did not touch, but in their essentials they went back to

the words of Lao Tzu. Thus his works, over 100,000 characters, all

consisted of allegories. He wrote “Yü-fu” [Yufu] (The Old Fisherman),

“Tao Chih” [Daozhi] (The Bandit Chih), and “Chü-ch’ieh” [Quqie]

(Ransacking Baggage), in which he mocked the likes of Confucius and

made clear the policies of Lao Tzu [Laozi]. Keng Sang Tzu (Master Keng

Sang) from wilderness of Wei-lei and others were all fictions without any

truth. Yet he was skilled in composing works and turning phrases, in veiled

34 As Mark Edward Lewis points out: “The Confucians and the Mohists are the only two

Warring States scholarly traditions maintained through the protracted interaction of masters with groups of disciples.” Lewis (1999a): p. 591, cf. p. 642.

35 Scholars now believe that the dates assigned by Sima Qian to the two kings are incorrect. They propose the following revised dates: 369-319 BCE and 319-301 respectively.

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reference and analogy, and with these he flayed the Confucians and

Mohists. Even the scholars of the age could not defend themselves. His

words billowed and swirled without restraint, to please himself, and so

kings and dukes down, the great men could not utilize him.

King Wei of Ch’u [Chu] (r. 339-329 BC) heard that Chuang Chou

[Zhuang Zhou] was a worthy man. He sent a messenger with lavish gifts to

induce him to come and promise him the position of prime minister. Chuang

Chou smiled and told Ch’u’s messenger, “A thousand chin [jin] is great

profit, and ministership an exalted position, but can it be that you have not

seen the sacrificial cow used in the suburban sacrifices? After feeding it for

several years, it is dressed in figured brocade and sent into the Great

Temple. When things have reached this point, though it might wish to

become an untended pig, how could I attain this? Go quickly, sir, do not

pollute me. I would rather romp at my own pleasure in a slimy ditch than be

held in captivity by the ruler of a state. I won’t take office for as long as I

live, for that is what pleases my fancy most.”36

The first reason why this biography ought to be treated with suspicion is that

the Shiji is a Han dynasty composition, written long after Zhuangzi’s death. Sima Qian

completed his father’s work between 104 and 90 BCE37 – approximately three

centuries after the Zhuangzi’s death. This means (it can be relatively safely inferred)

that when Qian composed the biographies of most of the pre-Qin thinkers, the ideas

about the masters’ lives available to him came from texts that were on hand and from

stories the followers presented to him, which were most likely already recorded in the

texts named after their masters. In light of that, it is not certain that Qian’s memoirs of

the famous figures of the past are accurate accounts. Given the passage of time, the

stories of the thinkers had been most probably twisted and their lives mythicised by

their disciples, or if there really was no original master, (the master’s life) invented by

the immediate and later followers. According to Mark Edward Lewis:

Once invented in the texts dedicated to him, the master became a ground on

which his followers inscribed their theories. This creation of masters in texts

meant that actual teachers were transformed over time, and that ancient or

36 Nienhauser (1994): pp. 23-24. 37 Nienhauser (1994): pp. x-xii.

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imaginary figures served as eponymous masters in the same manner as

historical founders of traditions. Consequently, the texts that bore the

masters’ names become more important than the men themselves. The

process of preserving, elaborating, or inventing the master in the act of

writing his canon also led to the creation of certain characteristics that

defined the master as a type.38

So, as Qian was a Han figure, he could not have met and known the thinkers

themselves in person. He could not and was not able to write “first-hand” biographies.

He had to rely on “second-hand” accounts. So, it is most likely then that his biography

of Zhuangzi is as imperfect, and could also be inaccurate and untrue, as perhaps his

biographies of some of the masters.

Secondly, the account is one with most details coming primarily from the

Waipian sections of the Zhuangzi, not from the Neipian.39 Since it takes the obscure

accounts of the Zhuangzi’s followers as its references, this suggests that Qian’s

biography of Zhuangzi is as unclear and unverifiable as its sources. The memoir is not

error-free and its information thus should ultimately be regarded with suspicion.

The third reason relates to Sima Qian’s intention in writing, or perhaps more

accurately, writing and insertion of, Zhuangzi’s biography in a real Han memoir

(zhuan 傳). If Zhuangzi’s memoir is treated as a whole in itself, forgetting its context,

it would be thought that it is a single zhuan or one of the Shiji’s great 70 zhuan and

that, when it was written, was really dedicated to Zhuang Zhou, composed to show

how famous and important a figure he was.40 But taking a step back to see where this

biography is located or placed in the Shiji, it is apparent that Zhuangzi’s piece in the

Shiji is only a section of a biography (a zhuan, a “parallel” zhuan) properly dedicated

to Laozi and Hanfeizi, as the title of the Liezhuan 列傳 (63) suggests.41 Zhuangzi’s

biography follows that of Laozi, and is followed by the ones of the Legalists, Shen

38 Lewis (1999b): p. 54. 39 There are five of these sections: “Yufu”, “Daozhi”, “Quqie” 《內篇》, “Gengsang Chu”

《庚桑楚》and “Weilei xu” 《畏累虛》. One of them, “Weilei xu”, however, is not anymore found in the extant version of the Zhuangzi. Hoffert (2001): p. 3, note 4.

40 The memoirs were actually written records of famous persons (such as military leaders, rulers, thinkers, etc.). Sima Qian wrote: “Upholding duty, masterful and sure, not allowing themselves to miss their opportunities, they made a name for themselves in the world: of such men I made the seventy Memoirs.” From the Shiji (BNB) 130: 8a-b, 30b-32a, translated by Watson (1999): p. 371.

41 The Grand Scribe’s Records Vol. VII translates the title of the zhuan as “Lao Tzu and Han Fei, Memoir 3”.

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Buhai and Hanfeizi. Furthermore, if the very last section is read, the last paragraph of

the entire zhuan, it is clear that the purpose of the zhuan is to demonstrate that Laozi,

of the four figures in this single zhuan, was the greatest thinker. This section reads:

His Honor the Grand Scribe says: “The Way that Lao Tzu [Laozi] valued

was devoid of all form and reacted to change with inaction, thus when he

wrote his work, his rhetoric and terminology were abstruse and difficult to

understand. Chuang Tzu [Zhuangzi] abandoned morality and let loose his

opinions, but his essence, too, lies mainly in spontaneity. Shen Tzu [Shen

Buhai] treated the lowly as befit the lowly, applying this (principle) to

relating (official) titles to the reality (of their duties). Han Tzu [Hanfeizi]

snapped his plumb line, cut through to the truth of things, and made clear

true from false, but carried cruelty and harshness to extremes, and was

lacking in kindness. All of these sprang from the idea of ‘the way and its

virtue,’ but Lao Tzu [Laozi] was the most profound of them all [emphasis

added].42

The objective of the zhuan indicates that the zhuan was therefore not for Zhuangzi, nor

was it for Shen Buhai or Hanfeizi. It is to be presumed that it was dedicated to Laozi

and the prominence of his philosophy, which further suggests the historian’s notorious

bias – that Sima Qian was, first, really an advocate of Huang-Lao and, second, was

doing his job as Grand Historian, obeying and accomplishing his father’s will to the

letter. It could be supposed that Sima Qian had to invent the glory of Laozi, just as his

father had to invent Daoism in order to promote, suggest, and impress upon Huang-

Lao thought to the Han emperors as the best political philosophy there was.43

Regarding Zhuangzi’s memoir, it is then to be viewed as an insignificant part

of the whole zhuan. It is used only as a support to Sima Qian’s objective. The memoir

is just a section included or inserted to buttress the political objective of the zhuan of

Laozi and Hanfeizi, which is a parallel biography. A parallel biography is one of the

official scribe’s biographical types where “two ‘basic biographies’ of persons (on

occasion there are one or two more subjects) are joined together in single a chapter.”44

According to William Nienhauser, the reader of a parallel biography, “aided by the

42 Nienhauser (1994): pp. 29. 43 Cf. Smith (2003). 44 Nienhauser (2003): pp. 100-101.

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historian’s comments, is expected to draw parallels from their lives.”45 In the parallel

biography of Laozi and Hanfeizi (liezhuan 63), however, based on the life accounts

and comments of Sima Qian, it is found that readers are expected to follow the

historian’s conclusion, written as the last statement of the zhuan just seen, that the

thought of Laozi is the “most profound of all.”46 Also, it is observed that this pairing

of Laozi and Hanfeizi in the biography is an unusual one, because in it the infamous

Legalist is placed together with the Daoist Laozi who was one of those so revered in

Huang-Lao thought.47 But because Huang-Lao seems to some scholars to be a

synthesis of Laozi’s philosophy and Legalism, the biography probably still makes

sense and perhaps ought to figure in the Shiji. Yet, nevertheless as the Simas were

staunch supporters and promoters of Huang-Laoism, they had to show Laozi’s pre-

eminence.

Given that a study about daojia would not yield substantial knowledge about

Zhuangzi and given that the memoir of Zhuangzi in the Shiji must be regarded with

suspicion, it seems that the best means to know Zhuangzi and his philosophy is the

analysis of ideas in the Neipian, the chapters considered by scholars to have been

written by Zhuangzi. In the next section, I discuss the thinkers who influenced the

Neipian’s author. Based on their analysis of the ideas of the Neipian, some scholars

believe that these main thinkers are Song Xing, Hui Shi and Yang Zhu.

B. Zhuangzi’s Intellectual Background

Here, the lives and views of Song Xing 宋銒, Hui Shi 惠施 and Yang Zhu 楊朱

are discussed. They are the thinkers deemed by scholars to have clearly influenced

Zhuangzi. In fact, Hui Shi and Yang Zhu are thought to be once Zhuangzi’s masters.

As A.C. Graham’s essayed biography of Zhuangzi states:

45 According to William H. Nienhauser, Jr., in the Shiji there are three types of normative

biographies or “memoirs” (zhuan): (1) basic biography, (2) parallel biography and (3) classified or categorised memoirs. A basic biography is basically a biography of a single individual, while a classified biography is a set of biographies but the purpose of which is to “reinforce an archetypal pattern.” Laozi’s and Hanfeizi’s liezhuan is not a “classified” one because a classified biography also ties the figures in the biography by using the link line to the effect that “so many years after X passed away, there was Y.” Nienhauser (2003): pp. 100-101.

46 Nienhauser (1994): p. 29. 47 This is noted in Nienhauser (1994): p. 29.

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His upbringing was probably Confucian, but he studied under a Yangist, and

in due course became a qualified Yangist teacher with his own disciples.

After a crisis which may be reflected in the [D]iaoling story he went his own

way, as the irreverent drop-out of the more characteristic tales. He visited

Hui Shi, and heard him use the paradoxes of space and time to prove that all

things are one…. 48

The conjecture that Hui Shi and Yang Zhu became his teachers makes it even more

imperative to have at least some grasp of the thoughts of these thinkers.49

1. Song Xing 宋銒 (360-290? BCE)

The Jixia50 稷下thinker Song Xing, also called Song Keng 宋牼 and Song Rong

宋榮, left no writings.51 However, extant writings of his contemporaries and later

thinkers provide rather sufficient information about his philosophical positions. Song

Xing is said to have held two main views. First is that it is never shameful to be

insulted; and the second, that frugality is fundamental and imperative since the desires

of human beings are few.52 (In the Zhuangzi’s “Tianxia”, Song Xing is mentioned with

Yin Wen 尹文 or Yin Wenzi 尹文子 [4th century BCE] as if they shared similar

views.)53 The first main view is not stated explicitly in the “Tianxia”’s introductory

passage for Song and Yin, which is supposed to mention the major doctrines of the two

thinkers, according to the way the taxonomy of the text is done.54 But it is considered

48 Graham (1985): p. 79; Graham (2001): p. 118; Nivison (1999): p. 767; Graham (2001): p.

118. 49 This would still be the case even if Zhuangzi did not adopt their views, if he reacted against

their views. 50 Contrary to the common conception about the Jixia “Academy”, Nathan Sivin believes that

there was no such institution. See Sivin (1995): pp. 19-28, 29. 51 Guo Moruo provided reasons for regarding the four “Xinshu” 心術 chapters of the Guanzi as

remnants of the writings of Song Xing and Yin Wen. Guo attributed the “Neiye”《內業》, “Xinshu xia”《心術下》, and “Xinshu shang”《心術上》to Song Xing and the “Baixin”《白心》to Yin Wen. His view, however, has been questioned by a number of scholars. Guo Moruo, “Song Xing Yin Wen yizhu kao,” in Guo Moruo wenji 16: pp. 224-266 cited in Rickett (1998): p. 32. For a discussion of the objections to Guo’s view, see Rickett (1998): pp. 33-39.

52 Knoblock (1988): pp. 59-60. Interestingly, according to Feng Youlan, these views show Yang Zhu’s influence on Song and Yin. This adds another idea that it is not only Mohism that affected these intellectuals’ views. Feng (1952): pp. 151-152.

53 As mentioned in the note above, a scholar, Guo Moruo attributed the “Baixin” chapter to Yin Wen. For Rickett’s refutation to this, see Rickett (1998): pp. 34-35.

54 One possible reason for this is that the “Tianxia”, though written by a Syncretist, could be ultimately a recap of the basic and essential doctrines of the thinkers included.

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one of their two major views. This is because it is the object of criticism of the other

thinkers of their time, specifically by Xunzi.55 Nevertheless, the “Tianxia” mentions

the reason behind the view and it is that it is given in order to keep peace among

individuals and among the contending states.56 The text says:

Not being tied to the custom – nor ostentatious with possessions – nor

oppressive towards the people – nor oppressive towards the crowd –

wishing for peace and security in the empire in order to revive the people –

others and oneself all having as much as and no more that they need to eat

– and by these attitudes laying bare what belongs to the heart … [emphasis

added]57

“By ‘To be insulted is not disgraceful’ they helped the people not to

quarrel…”58

To explore this view, according to A.C. Graham, “to be insulted is not disgraceful”

(jianwuburu 見侮不辱) implies that a person’s worth and esteem depend not on what

other people think of a person and his or her actions. The feeling of resentment, which

necessitates most often from feeling insulted through the disapproval of others, seems

to be regarded by Song Xing as the root of quarrel and war. Pacifism is achieved by

proactively choosing to believe that one’s value is independent of others’ views. A

fragment in the “Xiaoyaoyou” describes Song Xing and this particular view:

… [Song Rong] refused to be encouraged though the whole world blamed

him, he was unwavering about the division between inward and outward,

discriminating about the boundary between honour and disgrace [emphasis

added]….59

Here, it is clear that the discrimination between the inner and the outer and between

honour and disgrace is what made Song Xing well-known. According to Graham, as a

55 See, for example, the Xunzi, “Zhenglun” 18.8. 56 The Xunzi (“Zhenglun” 18.8). 57 Graham (2001): p. 278. 58 Graham (2001): p. 278. 59 Graham (2001): p. 44. It is to be noted that this is the only sympathetic note on Song’s views,

unlike the ones mentioned in the Mencius and the Xunzi.

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consequence of this view Song played a major role in turning attention in early

Chinese thought “inward”.60 But perhaps such attention to inner subjectivity was seen

by Song Xing as a means to achieve peace, as mentioned in the “Tianxia”. The

Mencius depicts this concern of Song Xing to maintain peace by avoiding war (his so-

called “external doctrine”61). In 6B.4, Song is found on the way to remonstrate this

position with the state ruler of Chu:

[Song Keng] was on his way to [Chu]. Mencius, meeting him at [Shi Qiu],

asked him, “Where are you going, sir?”

“I heard that hostilities had broken out between [Qin] and [Chu]. I am

going to see the king of [Chu] and try to persuade him to bring an end to

them. If I fail to find favour with the King of [Chu] I shall go to see the king

of [Qin] and try to persuade him instead. I hope I shall have success with

one or other of the two kings.”

“I do not wish to know the details, but may I ask about the gist of your

argument? How are you going to persuade the kings?”

“I shall explain to them the unprofitability of war.”

“Your purpose is lofty indeed, but your slogan is wrong. …”62

Although the Mencius clearly portrays Song here as a Mohist63 and this seems to be

the reason why Mencius disagrees with Song’s reason for his view, i.e. gaining nothing

through war,64 this still expresses Song’s external doctrine. But to return to Song’s first

view, it is pertinent to mention Xunzi’s rebuttal to this thesis. For Xunzi, who

characterised Song Xing as a thinker of Mohist persuasion,65 Song’s view esteemed by

his followers is defective. He believes that “the explanation of why men fight must be

60 Graham (1989): p. 96. 61 “[Song Xing and Yin Wen] treated ‘Forbid aggression and disband troops’ as the outside of

their doctrine, ‘The essential desires are few and shallow’ as the inside….” Graham (2001): p. 278. 62 Lau (2003): pp. 267-269. 63 The Mohist characterization though of some of Song’s views is noteworthy. This is because,

first, it helps contextualize Xunzi’s critique against his views – Xunzi even grouped Song with Modi – and, second, this explains the presence of an external doctrine in his philosophy. Graham mentions that the views Song shares with the Mohists are called the “outside” doctrines. Graham (1989): p. 96.

64 And Mencius’ further reason is that war is basically against humanity and humane government.

65 See the Xunzi, “Fei shier zi” 6.4.

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found in what they hate; the cause is not to be found in what they consider to be a

disgrace.”66 The Xunzi “Zhenglun” 《正論》18.8 explains Xunzi’s reason further:

Now consider this example: a man enters a place by way of the sewers and

pilfers another man’s pigs and hogs. The owner takes up arms to pursue him

at the risk of serious injury or death. Would this happen because he

considers the loss of his pigs to be a disgrace! Men do not shrink from a

fight in such cases because of what they hate. Although a man might

consider receiving an insult a disgrace, if he does not hate being disgraced,

then he will not fight. Although a man knows that to suffer insult is no

disgrace, if he hates the disgrace, then he will surely fight. That being the

case, then the reason he fights lies not in whether he is disgraced, but rather

in whether he hates it.67

Xunzi here seems to be saying that the cause of fighting is not that people feel

disgraced after being insulted; rather, it is that they are not at ease when they are. So,

they subsequently abhor being insulted. To try perhaps to defend Song’s view on a

basic cause of fighting, it may be said that “hate towards insults” could be one of the

reasons for retaliating but “feeling disgraced towards these insults,” for Song, seemed

deeper. For Song, probably, the deeper the hurt, the more intense and long-held the

pain and hence the increased motivation for causing harm to others. This is perhaps the

reason why the rejoinder of Song’s followers mentioned in the Xunzi says: “You may

hate insults, but you should not consider them a disgrace.”68

The second view, which concerns the imperative of frugality, is considered

Song Xing’s “core” or “internal” doctrine. Failing to understand the doctrine, the

Syncretist author(s) of the “Tianxia”69 criticized Song Xing and Yin Wen for being too

concerned about others, forgetting to care adequately for themselves. The “Tianxia”

says:

66 Knoblock (1994): p. 45. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 It has been regarded by scholars that these authors are of the “Syncretist” persuasion. That is,

these writers were later “Daoists” who held views oriented fundamentally to effective governance of the state through techniques derived from “Daoism” and “Legalism.”

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However, they cared too much for others, too little for themselves. ‘When

the desires which are essential are definitely located, five pints of rice are

enough,” they said. Even the teachers, I am afraid, didn’t get a good meal,

but the disciples hungry as they were would not forget the empire.

Unresting day and night they told everyone, ‘Life is sure to revive for us!’

Fellows with such proud hopes to save the world!70

This criticism of Song Xing shows a misunderstanding of his core doctrine. It

misunderstands the doctrine because Song Xing and Yin Wen believe that the reason

human beings should be content with satisfying only the basic necessities is the fact

that human essential needs and desires are in fact only limited.71 Nevertheless, the

Syncretists, thinkers who cared more about how to deal with the affairs of the state,

understood them to be saying that self-sacrifice is more essential than anything else.

They, therefore, judged this particular doctrine of Song as inimical to their political

and social objectives. The goals of the Syncretists are generally regarded as ones that

advised rulers to practise passive overseeing (or wuwei) yet continually basically

supported by their subordinates in all aspects.

The Xunzi presents an argument against Song’s second view as well.72 While

accusing Song of using rhetoric to make his followers adopt his view, Xunzi presents

an argument to the effect that the spectrum of desires is evidently not negligible.

“Zhenglun” 18.10 states:

Your Master Song says: “It is the essential nature of man that his desires are

few, yet everyone believes in his own case that the desires of his essential

nature are numerous. This is an error.” Accordingly, he leads his numerous

disciples, offers discriminations in defense of his contentions and theories,

and elucidates his examples and judgments that he might cause men to

realize that the desires inherent in their essential nature are but few.

In response to this I say: Given that assumption, then one must also consider

that it is the essential nature of man that the eye does not desire the full

70 Graham (2001): p. 44. 71 This reason, it must be noted, is also a seemingly Yangist-oriented reason. Feng Youlan

mentions that this explanation behind the internal doctrine provided a psychological motivation for Yang Zhu’s philosophy concerning the restraint or shunning of desires. Feng (1952): p. 152

72 The last three theses (lun 論) lambasted by Xunzi in the chapter are specifically Song’s. Knoblock (1994): pp. 45-47.

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range of colors, the ear does not desire the full range of sounds, the mouth

does not desire the full range of tastes, the nose does not desire the full

range of smells, and the body does not desire the full range of leisure. In

regard to these five “full sensory ranges” can it indeed be also considered

that the essential nature of man is such that they are not desired?….73

An illustration using tradition and an analogy is used then by Xunzi to defend his view

further:

The ancients thought otherwise: they considered that from his essential

nature man’s desires were numerous, not few. Accordingly, they rewarded

men with wealth and plenty and penalized them with reduction and

deprivation. In this respect the Hundred Kings have all been the same.

Accordingly, the supremely worthy man received the world as his

emolument, those next in worth received a single state, those of lesser worth

received fields and cities, and the attentive and diligent among the common

people had the full complement of clothing and food. Now your Master

Song considers man's essential nature to be that desires are few and not that

they are numerous. If this were so, then would it not be equivalent to the

ancient kings, employing what men do not desire as their reward and what

men do desire as their punishment? No confusion could be greater than

this!74

As noted in “Fei shier zi” 6.4, Xunzi was against the views of the Mohists and,

consequently, of Song Xing, because “they attacked the hierarchical principle of the

government and the natural inequality of men and things, which must be recognized in

society as in Nature.”75 Perhaps the reason why Xunzi criticized Song’s core doctrine

is motivated by his view of Song as a Mohist. It may be helpful to explain Song’s view

then as a basic Mohist assertion that in order to increase profit for the state, then the

paucity of human desires ought to be highlighted. Song and Yin possibly must have

thought that by “plac[ing] great stress on frugality and economy,”76 that is, through

encouraging the belief that human desires are few, the state would perhaps greatly

73 Knoblock (1994): pp. 47-48. 74 Knoblock (1994): pp. 47-48. 75 Knoblock (1988): p. 60. 76 The Xunzi, “Fei shier zi” 6.4.

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benefit. In other words, to minimize human consumption of state resources would

inevitably maximize the state’s profit.

Having known Song Xing’s doctrines, it would be easy perhaps to identify

some aspects in Zhuangzi’s philosophy that seem akin to that of Song’s, i.e. which

could be judged as being shared by Zhuangzi. Scholars have not been explicit,

however, about which specific textual passages show Zhuangzi’s views that seem

similar to Song’s or even to Hui Shi’s.77 What is relevant to note is that the views of

the thinkers presented here will perhaps help in the identification of which views in the

Zhuangzi are possibly shared by Zhuangzi with the Yangists.

2. Hui Shi 惠施 (370?-310? BCE)

Hui Shi or Huizi 惠子 was a minister of Wei 魏.78 Based on the stories in the

Zhuangzi, he was Zhuangzi’s younger friend and, according to some scholars, he was

possibly once Zhuangzi’s teacher.79 While later categorized as a School of Names

(mingjia) thinker, Huizi is known to hold Mohist oriented views.80 According to the

“Tianxia,” he had numerous views in his writings which could load up five carriages.

His known views are expressed through logic problems and paradoxes, a fact that links

him to the mingjia thinkers together with Gongsun Long 公孫龍.

It has been discerned by scholars, notably Feng Youlan, among others, that it is

Huizi who influenced Zhuangzi greatly. Based on a story in the Zhuangzi, where

Zhuangzi compares his relationship to Huizi with that of Carpenter Shi and a certain

man of Ying, it can be judged that they were closely linked partners.81 A further

77 If the idea that Song influenced Zhuangzi’s views is used to identify the passages that look expressive of this influence, it shall still prove to be a complex, if not impossible, task. This is because, according to A.C. Graham, Song’s influence is a very minor one, and also because, with the nature of the text itself – where metaphors and various sorts of parables abound – the text can be rendered to mean many things, making it difficult (or perhaps too easy) to point out passages possibly expressive of the influence.

78 This political position of Huizi has been seen by scholars to have influenced his philosophy. For example, according to Christoph Harbsmeier: “As a legislator Hui Shi … by all accounts … paid the sort of formal attention to the ‘letter’ of the law which struck his contemporaries as misplaced. This was the very same formal attention to words which … Hui Shi applied to philosophy, where it was felt to be no less unnatural and pedantic.” Harbsmeier (1998): p. 290.

79 Both A.C. Graham and Victor Mair have conjectured that Zhuangzi was at some time Hui Shi’s disciple. This supports the idea that Huizi’s philosophy, in ways that cannot be perhaps solidly known, significantly influenced Zhuangzi. Mair (1994a): p. xxvi; Graham (2001): p. 5.

80 That is, his ideas were related to the common Mohist ideals of jianai (roughly translated as “universal love”) and li, benefit, which modern interpreters have likened to utilitarianism.

81 Watson (1968): p. 269; Graham (2001): p. 124.

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evidence that would perhaps support this is the supposed existence and inclusion of a

“Huizi” pian in the earlier 52-pian version of the Zhuangzi.82 The chapter is regrettably

lost.

Lisa Raphals conjectures that the Huizi’s influence on Zhuangzi may be seen in

the existence of the “inner logic” in the Neipian pointed out by Lin Shuen-fu. Lin

believes that the Neipian are “not just a series of disjointed pieces and episodes”; there

is an “inner logic” that links the ideas of the each of the chapters. 83 Raphals, then,

opines that this “inner logic” “may help explain Hui Shi’s place of prominence at the

end of the text”, in the “Tianxia,”84 which is also an indication of the Mohist’s

seemingly respected place in Zhuangzi’s philosophy.

The “Tianxia” cites Hui Shi’s Ten Theses, which have been thought to be

paradoxes. The theses are listed here and it is to be acknowledged that some scholars

believe that they, along with the other so-called mingjia “paradoxes”, are not

paradoxes or, at least, it is not yet certain whether they are.

(1) 至大無外，謂之大一；至小無內，謂之小一。

“The ultimately great has nothing outside it, call it “the greatest One”.

The ultimately small has nothing inside it, call it “the smallest one”.

(2) 無厚不可積也，其大千里。

“The dimensionless cannot be accumulated, yet its girth is 1,000 miles.

(3) 天與地卑，山與澤平。

“The sky is as low as the earth, the mountains are level with the marshes.

(4) 日方中方睨，物方生方死。

“Simultaneously with being at noon the sun declines, simultaneously with

being alive a thing dies.

(5) 大同而與小同異，此之謂小同異；萬物畢同畢異，此之謂大同異。 “Being

similar on a large scale yet different from the similar on a small scale, it is

this that is meant by ‘similarity and difference on a small scale”. The

myriad things to the last one being similar, to the last one being different,

it is this that is meant by ‘similarity and difference on a large scale”.

(6) 南方無窮而有窮，

The south has no limit yet does have a limit.

82 Feng (1952); pp. 194-197. See also Schwartz (1985): p. 223. See Knaul (1982): pp. 57-58. 83 Lin (2003): p. 269. 84 Raphals (1998): p. 144.

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(7) 今日適越而昔來。

I go to Yueh today yet arrived yesterday.

(8) 連環可解也。

Linked rings can be disconnected.

(9) 我知天下之中央，燕之北，越之南是也。

I know the centre of the world; north of Yen up in the north, south of

Yueh down in the south, you are there.

(10) 氾愛萬物，天地一體也。

“Let your love spread to all myriad things; heaven and earth count as one

unit.”85

Yiu-ming Fung believes that unless there is access to the intention behind the ten

propositions, one ought to suspend judgment regarding their nature as “paradoxes”,

specifically as antinomies (in the Quineian sense).86 He believes that the intention of

the theses is the key to understanding them fully.87 However, it seems impossible to

know the theses’ intention. Despite that, scholars have tried to unpack the

philosophical meanings behind them.

There are interesting interpretations on the Ten Theses. One of them, by Chad

Hansen, holds that Thesis Ten, probably the culmination of the theses, expresses the

fundamental view of primitive Daoism.88 This view is the view of “absolute monism,”

that “all things are one.”89 According to Hansen, it is this that Zhuangzi basically

refutes in his thinking.90

Another take on the theses is by Keqian Xu. Xu identified three specific

features peculiar to Huizi. According to him, because the section on Huizi in the

“Tianxia” is called “li wu zhi yi” 歷物之意, the Ten Theses, contrary to the common

interpretation that they propound metaphysical tenets, deal with “things” (wu 物),

specifically with “physical things,” with matter. That is, each of these theses is a

85 Graham (2001): pp. 283-284. 86 Antinomy is the sort of paradox in which the truth-value of the paradoxical statement is

undeterminable (e.g. the statement “This sentence is false.”) 87 Fung (2009): p. 166. 88 Hansen (1992): pp. 262-263. 89 This is also Hu Shi’s view. Hu, though, in seeing that the first nine paradoxes are made to

support monism, believes that the paradoxes “constitute an attempt to establish a metaphysical basis for the Mohist doctrine of universal altruism.” Hu (1968): pp. 111-113. Cf. Feng (1948): p. 85.

90 Feng Youlan’s explanations of the Theses are all derived from the Zhuangzi, which according to him, by doing so, one would not go wrong. Feng (1952): p. 197.

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scientific and empirical premise. Unlike the proposals of the other pre-Qin thinkers,

they relate more to the manipulation of material entities and their calculations and

derivations rather than political affairs. This, Xu proffers, is the first unique

characteristic of Huizi’s thinking. He says:

The content of “li wu zhi yi”, as analysed by some scholars, did involve

certain knowledge that we should put under the catalogue of the so called

natural sciences, such as physics, astronomy, geography, geometry etc. …

[It does not] relate to the issues of politics, morality, social management,

human nature, self-cultivation, etc., which were discussed enthusiastically

by most other pre-Qin scholars.91

The second unique feature of Huizi’s thought, according to Xu, is that it

emphasized “diversity” rather than the assimilation of “the similar and the diverse”.

Contrary to the canonical view that Hui Shi emphasized “oneness” and harmony or the

view that “all things are one”,92 it is the difference and discreteness of things that he

actually valued. Hui Shi’s idea is that diversity of things, perspectives and opinions is

fact and is inevitable, so that the fifth thesis should be understood to actually mean

“[t]here is similarity in difference, and difference in similarity as well; there is neither

absolute similarity, nor absolute difference. What we should pay attention to is how

things in the world are related to each other.”93

The final unique feature of Hui Shi’s thought which Xu has identified is that in

the understanding of “what is useful”, Hui Shi had the “tendency to combine together

the aspect demonstrating truthfulness and the aspect of usefulness in knowledge.”94 As

a Mohist logician, his view on truth is that it parallels usefulness,95 making his then

contemporaries, whose views understood usefulness simply as the “pragmatic”,96 react

strongly against his views.

91 Xu (1997): p. 235. 92 Hansen (1992): pp. 262-263; Feng (1952): pp. 197-200. 93 Xu (1997): p. 240. 94 Ibid., p. 245. 95 Hui Shi pursued “a kind of knowledge that can be measured by ruler, and meet with the

standard. That is to say, the truthfulness and correctness of the knowledge should be provable, verifiable.” Xu (1997): p. 246.

96 It is to be recalled that majority of the scholars concur with the fact that the early Chinese thinkers primarily focused on the practical rather than on the theoretical.

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It is difficult to discern the right meanings of these Ten Theses. But following

Feng Youlan, it might be said that in order to understand them it is proper to compare

them with the views of Zhuangzi.97 This is especially since Zhuangzi considered these

theses, as evidenced in the Neipian. However, it could be said that one probable reason

why Zhuangzi pointed out these paradoxes of Huizi is that he aimed to state and prove

the futility of his sparring partner’s views. As a minister, Huizi was involved in

defending a state and protracting ways, basic strategies or tricks in order for his state to

win. Zhuangzi could have thought that the tricks Huizi was proposing would be soon

figured out and would only end up to his state’s dismay.

With regard to Huizi’s impact on Zhuangzi’s philosophy, scholars say that his

is strange. It is strange in that while Huizi is his close intellectual interlocutor friend,98

Zhuangzi seemed to have adopted a number of his sparring partner’s views and

assumptions but rejected others – most especially his answers.99 If this is right, then

with regard to the views that Zhuangzi shared with Huizi, it can perhaps be safely said

that Zhuangzi shared the same assumptions that Huizi had behind his “paradoxes”.

3. Yang Zhu 楊朱 (ca. 414-334 BCE)

Regarding Yang Zhu’s life and background, there is very little discussed in the

classical texts. Unlike some of the prominent early thinkers, no biography for Yang

Zhu and no book named after him are mentioned in the Shiji and the Hanshu. Yang

Zhu is said to be the same person as Yangzi 楊子, Yangzi 陽子, Yang Shi 楊氏, and

Yang Sheng 楊生. They are figures who are mentioned in other texts.100 With regards

to Yang Zhu’s dates and place of origin, based on his study of the classical texts and

considered conjectures of other Chinese scholars, Aloysius Chang places Yang Zhu

between the years 414 and 334 BCE, making him about 40 years older than Mengzi

孟子. He also agrees that Yang Zhu was a native of the state of Wei 魏. The Liezi

97 Feng (1952): p. 197. 98 In one of the stories about Zhuangzi, the Daoist laments the demise of Hui Shi, implying

through his anecdote that, since the Mohist’s death, he has been unable to do magnificent things. Such was the nature of their connection and friendship. Graham (2001): p. 124.

99 Ziporyn (2009): p. xvi. 100 These texts include the Mencius, the Zhuangzi, Lüshi chunqiu, the Hanfeizi, the Huainanzi,

and Shuoyuan.

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《列子》, which contains a chapter titled “Yang Zhu”,101 says he had a wife and a

concubine.102 He also had a brother whose name was Yang Bu.103

As to the controversy whether Yang Zhu and Zhuangzi are one and the same

person, Chang, again based on the works of others and his own textual study, gives a

negative answer.104 Yet, Chang believes that Yang Zi-ju 陽子居, who appears in the

Zhuangzi’s “Yingdiwang” 應帝王 and “Yuyan” 《寓言》 chapters,105 and Yang Zhu

are.106

As depicted in the writings of Mencius, Yang Zhu is a well-known figure

which brought Mencius to claim that, together with Mozi’s, Yang Zhu’s doctrines

“filled the world”.107 But together with his central doctrine, weiwo 為我, this is all what

is known about Yang Zhu’s life in the Mencius.

A scholarly speculation pertinent to the proposals of this thesis is the idea that

Yang Zhu once became Zhuangzi’s master.108 If true, this makes Yang Zhu occupy the

same prominent place as Hui Shi’s in the possible influence in Zhuangzi.109 Because

of the obscurity of the details of Yang Zhu’s life, it may be more important to discuss

101 A note about the authenticity and reliability of this classic ought to be mentioned. The Liezi, although regarded as an important Daoist philosophical text, is a forgery; it has borrowings from other pre-Han and post-Han works. The chapter “Yang Zhu” 《楊朱》is even the most problematic, as it is an apparent sidetrack of the collection’s supposedly main themes. With regards to the Liezi’s relation to the philosophical elements of the Laozi and the Zhuangzi, it seems not to resemble the thinking of the former and later chapters (wai and za) of the latter. Creel, interestingly, states that the Liezi, however, “in many ways … seems closest to the early Chuang-tzu [i.e., the Neipian].” Creel (1981): pp. 28-29. See also Yang Bojun, Liezi jishi 列子集释 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1980), appendix cited in Liu (1991): p. 46.

102 Graham (1960): pp. 152, 176-177. 103 Ibid., pp. 130, 176. 104 This is a controversy that, if rightly and finally resolved (perhaps through later

archaeological text findings), has consequences for the understanding of the whole philosophy of Zhuangzi. It has been mentioned that a few modern Chinese sinologists have conjectured that the two figures could be one and the same person. Eno (1984): pp. 370-71; Cai Yuanpei (1868-1940), Yan Fu (1853-1921), and the Japanese scholar Tenzui Kubo (1875-1934) also express the phonetic relation between Yang Zhu’s and Zhuangzi’s names - in Chiang Pai-ch’ien, Chu tzu t’ung k’ao (General Researches on the Chinese Philosophers) (Taipei: Cheng Chung Book Co., 1960), p. 183 cited in Chang (1972b): p. 168. Cf. Sun Kaitai, “Yang Zhu shi Zhuang Zhou ma? – Yang Zhu kao ji qi Buchong lunzheng zhiyi (楊朱是莊周嗎? 楊朱考及其 補充論),” Zhongguo Zhexue vol. 4: pp. 271-281; Zhu Lilan, “Zhuang Zhou shi Yang Zhu (莊周是楊朱?),” Dongfang Zazhi vol. 12, no. 2 (1916): pp. 37-46;

105 See Graham (2001): p. 96 and Watson (1968): p. 307. 106 Chang (1971): p. 61. 107 The Mencius (3B.9) 108 This is David Nivison’s surmise. He writes: “It is probable that the author of the original

parts of the Zhuangzi began as a disciple of Yang Zhu, or someone like him.” Nivison (1999): p. 767. 109 The presence of “Yangist” chapters (28-31) in the Zhuangzi textus receptus bespeaks the

possible pattern of thought in Zhuangzi.

179

he

the movement associated with Yang Zhu, rather than to focus more specifically on t

ideas of the person Yang Zhu. This movement may be called “Yangism”.110

110 Van Norden (2007): p. 200; Graham (2001): p. 221. Cf. Fox (2008): p. 359.

180

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