Abstract of a thesis entitled

'Suspension of Judgement: Agrippa and

submitted by

Yung Yeuk Yu

for the degree of Master of Philosophy at the University of Hong Kong

in February 2001

It is believed that Agrippa (c.100 B.C. 100 A.D.) formulates or

assembles five general patterns of argument forms, known as the Five Modes,

to induce epochs (i.e., suspension of judgement), in which people neither posit

nor reject anything. Since then the Five Modes and the notion of epoche have

remained the core legacy of Pyrrhonian scepticism (or Pyrrhonism for short).

By pursuing the Five Modes and epoche, I attempt to set Pyrrhonism against its

background and indicate its importance and relevance to philosophical

enterprise and approach.

I incorporate in Chapter Two a textual study of the Five Modes from

two ancient sources, namely Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laertius. I also

argue that the Pyrrhonist can induce epoche on the strength of the Five Modes

without the necessity of committing to the notion of akatalepsia (i.e., inability

to comprehend).

In Chapter Three I discuss the Agrippan problem posed by the Five

Modes. The Agrippan problem is a lively issue in philosophy. The Pyrrhonian

attack on the Dogmatic account of criterion found in Sextus' Outlines of

Pyrrhonism (PH) demonstrates how the Five Modes constrain theories of

epistemic justification and block every way out of the epistemic predicament of

belief justification. I go through Barnes's modern version of the Agrippan

problem and address various contemporary responses to the problem, including

Fogelin's remark that 'If the Agrippa problem cannot be resolved, there is no

reason to suppose that knowledge of the kind sought by justificationalist

philosophers exists', and Chisholm's contention that the problem could be

resolved only by begging the question.

In Chapter Four I review the philosophical debate between Frede,

Burnyeat and Barnes over the nature and scope of Pyrrhonian scepticism. The

disagreement centres on the scope of epochs and the interpretation of PH113,

the passage in which Sextus mentions two senses of dogma and explains in

what sense the sceptic does not dogmatize. The debate proceeds as if PH 113

specifies the scope of epochs and then in turn defines the scope of Pyrrhonian

scepticism until Barnes points out that PH I 13 is silent on the status of

ordinary beliefs and so 'epoche may be broad or narrow'. After assessing each

interpretation and examining the arguments put forward, I conclude that

Barnes's interpretation is more plausible.

Finally, I offer some concluding remarks in Chapter Five by discussing

the insight and assets bequeathed to us by the Pyrrhonist. The discussion

focuses on the nature of philosophy and the philosophical approach. I draw on

the different views of Sextus, Wittgenstein, Strawson and Husserl on the nature

of philosophy and the philosophical approach.

Suspension of Judgement: Agrippa and

by

Yung Yeuk Yu

B.A. H.K.U.

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Philosophy

at the University of Hong Kong

February 2001

Declaration

I declare that this thesis represents my own work, except where due

acknowledgement is made, and that it has not been previously included in a

thesis, dissertation or report submitted to this University or to any other

institution for a degree, diploma or other qualification.

Signed Yung Yeuk Yu

i

ii

Acknowledgements

This thesis is an attempt to explore deep into the heart of Pyrrhonian

scepticism. The process of researching and writing is painstaking. But it is

worthwhile. Intellectual achievement gives satisfaction. I am indebted to

increasing amount of scholarly works on the subject. My greatest gratitude

goes to Prof. F. C. T. Moore, my supervisor, without his inspiration and

support after his retirement from the department nothing would have been

possible.

iii

Contents

Declaration

Acknowledgements ii

Table of Contents iii

Foreword iv

Chapter One

Overview 1

Chapter Two

Agrippa and the Five Modes 4

Chapter Three

The Agrippan Problem: A Pyrrhonian Challenge to Epistemic Justification... 37

Chapter Four

61

Chapter Five

Concluding Remarks on Pyrrhonian Scepticism and Philosophy 118

Glossary 133

Bibliography 135

iv

Foreword

There is a controversy over the interpretation of Pyrrhonian scepticism,

the protagonists being Frede, Bumyeat and Barnes. This controversy is

exemplary for its high level of scholarship, but also because of the way in

which the participants, while debating detailed points about the texts of Sextus

Empiricus (and others), explicitly look to the broadest questions about

philosophy, its nature and its history. At the heart of this thesis is a critical

review of the debate (which comes down on the side of Barnes). I attempt to

situate the Pyrrhonist in the conclusion, showing how he may lead us to rethink

scepticism and philosophy as well.

In this thesis, Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism, a work

frequently referred to, is abbreviated as PH (according to the Latin title), and

similarly his Against the Mathematicians is abbreviated as M. Though there are

several translations of the PH into English, the main one used is Annas and

Barnes [1994]. Mates [1996] and Sextus Empiricus [1933-49] are also

consulted. (For full bibliographic details please see the bibliography.)

References to Greek words are normally given, where necessary, in the

conventional transcription system into the Roman alphabet, including macrons

to mark long vowels, to avoid ambiguity. For the reader's convenience, a short

glossary of these words is given at the end of the thesis, with the relevant

definitions as given in a standard Greek-English dictionary. In some cases, such

as the word dogma, there is a scholarly controversy about the appropriate

definitions. These are indicated and sometimes discussed and documented in

the body of the text.

I have adopted the spelling 'Pyrrhonian' in this thesis. Some writers

prefer 'Pyrrhonean', a spelling that is retained in this thesis only within

quotations. 'Pyrrhonian scepticism' and 'Pyrrhonism' are used interchangeably;

'Pyrrhonian sceptic' and 'Pyrrhonist' are also used in the same manner.

CHAPTER ONE

Overview

YRRHONIAN SCEPTICISM (or Pyrrhonism for short) is an ancient

form of scepticism which originated in Hellenistic philosophy in the

4th century B.C.. Pyrrho of Elis (c.365-270 B.C.) is thought to be the

founder. This thesis focuses on the Five Modes of Agrippa, a set of arguments

which has been described as the soul of Pyrrhonian scepticism.l The Five

Modes and the notion of epoche (suspension of judgement) are the point of

departure.

The Five Modes are patterns of inducing epoche. There is a review of the

controversy between Frede, Burnyeat and Barnes on how we should give

content to the Pyrrhonian epoche in Chapter Four. The review is philosophical.

It evaluates conflicting interpretations of epoche and arguments are examined in

detail.

This thesis aims at a critical evaluation of Pyrrhonian scepticism and its

relevance to philosophy. I do touch upon some historical matters related to the

Five Modes and Pyrrhonian scepticism in Chapter Two. The discussion of

historical matters is preparatory and it helps give a comprehensive treatment of

the subject. It should be made clear in the discussion that this is not a historical

1 Barnes [1990] p.ix

1

reconstruction of Pyrrhonian scepticism and I offer no novel interpretation of

it.2

Chapter Two provides a broad basis for discussion. It opens with a

preliminary treatment of some background issues about the Five Modes, for

instance, Agrippa's authorship and the role of his Five Modes in Pyrrhonian

scepticism. Four points are considered:

1. There are two accounts of the Five Modes separately compiled by Sextus

and Diogenes. Sextus produces our principal texts of Pyrrhonian scepticism

but he is rather more obscure than Diogenes on the authorship of the Five

Modes. As far as we can tell, only Diogenes ascribes the Five Modes to

Agrippa.

2. By comparing the two accounts of the Five Modes, I find that there are some

deviations between them worth mentioning though they are more or less the

same in many places.

3. I maintain that even though the Five Modes of Agrippa are superior to the

Ten Modes of Aenesidemus, they do not necessarily replace the Ten Modes

in the Pyrrhonian framework.

4. I argue that the Pyrrhonist can induce epoche on the strength of the Five

Modes without the necessity of committing to the notion of akatalepsia

(inability to comprehend).

Chapter Three addresses the Agrippan problem posed by the Five Modes.

The Agrippan problem brings the foundation of belief under severe scrutiny to

the effect that belief is rendered groundless. In this regard no belief is preferable

to its contrary; people could neither posit nor reject anything. The Agrippan

2 For historical reconstruction of Pyrrhonism, see Annas and Bames [1985], Brunschwig [1994],

Mates [1996] and Algra, Bames, Mansfeld, & Schofield [1999].

2

Roger E. Eichorn

Roger E. Eichorn

Roger E. Eichorn

Roger E. Eichorn

Roger E. Eichorn

Roger E. Eichorn

Roger E. Eichorn

problem is a problem of epistemic justification. Barnes [1990] argues that the

Five Modes have raised the fundamental issue concerning the status of

epistemic extemalism. We shall see how the Five Modes are capable of

constraining theories of justification rigorously and the issue of epistemic

extemalism in Chapter Three.

Presumably, the Five Modes are capable of undermining theories of

epistemic justification, resulting in a full-scale epochs. It is one thing for the

Five Modes to be capable of yielding this full-scale epoche. It is another thing

for Sextus or the Pyrrhonist of the PH to really eschew all sorts of beliefs. The

Five Modes can stand on their own. But the Pyrrhonist is not bound to align with

them. To find out if Sextus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism (PH) has spelled out the

scope of epoche, the review in Chapter Four examines how various conflicting

accounts by Frede, Burnyeat and Barnes interpret the meaning of PH 113 and its

exact bearing on the scope of epoche.

Finally, I offer some concluding remarks in Chapter Five by discussing the

insight and assets bequeathed to us by the Pyrrhonist. The discussion focuses on

the nature of philosophy and philosophical approach. I draw on the different

views of Sextus, Wittgenstein, Strawson and Husserl on the nature of

philosophy and the philosophical approach.

3

Roger E. Eichorn

4

CHAPTER TWO

Agrippa and the Five Modes

Historical background

SCEPTICISM ABOUT KNOWLEDGE seems peculiar in the

philosophical scenery. On the one hand, sceptical arguments seem to

undermine all belief and knowledge claims. On the other hand they are

feeble and idle in the sense that they leave everything as it is. People may feel

intellectually uneasy about scepticism. But this is all it can do. Philosophical

scepticism about knowledge rarely carries any practical implication in real life.

It dwells in the reflective plane. There are several attempts to deal with this

scepticism. Some people, like Barry Stroud in The Significance of Scepticism,

suggest that we should defuse it, making it philosophically impotent while

others, like G. E. Moore with his Proof of an External World and A Defence of

Common Sense, want to refute it, eliminating the habitat of scepticism.

Regardless of how many arguments people put forward to establish that we do

know the things that the sceptic denies we know for certain, scepticism is a

persistent item on the philosophical agenda. The 'struggle' between the sceptic

and his rival is a never-ending story. Its origin can be traced to ancient Greece.

Pyrrhonian scepticism was named after Pyrrho, who left no writings. But

the works of his student Timon of Philius (c.320-230 B.C.) provide us with

scattered pieces of information about his life and teachings. Other ancient

Roger E. Eichorn

Roger E. EichornPerhaps. But not true of Pyrrhonism.

Roger E. Eichorn

Roger E. EichornFalse dichotomy between practical and reflective.

sources, for instance Lives of the Philosophers by Diogenes Laertius and

Preparation for the Gospel by Aristocles of Messene, also give us bits of

information about Pyrrho. Despite that, Pyrrho remains a shadowy figure for

us. It is generally believed that Aenesidemus of Cnossus, a Hellenistic

philosopher unhappy with the Middle or New Academy in the first century B.C.,

revived Pyrrhonism with his formulation of the Ten Modes and some other

modes, through which epoche would be induced. The Academy was another

sceptical force in Greek philosophy. Under the headship of Arcesilaus of Pitane

(315-240 B.C.) the Academy became sceptical and remained so for more than

two hundred years. Sextus reports that the sceptical Academics argued that we

could have no knowledge of any sort while the Pyrrhonian sceptic suspended

judgement.4

The key figure for our acquaintance with Pyrrhonism is Sextus, whose PH

and M, written in the second century A.D., were rediscovered and published in

Latin in Medieval Europe in the sixteen century A.D., on the eve of the birth of

early modern philosophy.

The PH consists of three books. Book I is a general exposition of

Pyrrhonism while Book II and III are collections of arguments against dogmatic

enterprises in logic, physics and ethics, which make up philosophy for most

Hellenistic philosophers. M, in eleven books, is Sextus' other preserved work.

In it we find sceptical arguments against linguistics, rhetoric, geometry,

arithmetic, astrology, musical theory, and arguments against dogmatic

enterprises in logic, physics and ethics.

Hellenistic philosophers experienced different philosophical approaches.

The Socratic Method or the elenchus proceeds from tentative definition given

3 For Pyrrho and his legacy, see Bert [2000]. 4 For a brief but useful introduction to philosophy in the Hellenistic age, see Sedley [1980].

5

by the interlocutor to the rejection of the definition. Euthyphro, for instance,

offered an account of piety. Socrates then proceeded from Euthyphro's account

of piety and his other beliefs related to piety to a conclusion that contradicted

the tentative account of piety offered in the first place. Euthyphro was required

to make substantial modification to his account of piety or to confess that he did

not know piety at all. The Socratic Method or the elenchus is ad hominem; it

undermines Euthyphro's tentative account of piety by exposing its inherent

contradictions.

While Socrates is renowned for his Socratic method of elenctic testing,

Agrippa is credited with reviving interest in his Five Modes. As we shall see in

Chapter Three the Agrippan modes of argumentation work in a different manner;

they render a belief claim groundless by constraining the justification process.

Agrippa is a shadowy figure, to whom the Five Modes are attributed.

Besides the Five Modes (PHI 164-177), the Pyrrhonian sceptic of the PH was

equipped with the Two Modes (PHI 178-9)5, the Eight Modes against dogmatic

causal explanations (PH I 180-6)6 and the Ten Modes (PH I 35-163). Among

these sets of modes, the Five Modes by Agrippa, with which we are mainly

concerned, are the most powerful and tactical way of inducing epochs. Sextus

was so confident in the Five Modes that after introducing the Five Modes he

claimed 'every object of investigation can be referred to these modes'. (PH I

169) The Pyrrhonian modes (tropoi) are sometimes called the modes of

5 Sextus seems to suggest at the passage that the Two Modes are also offered by 'the more recent

sceptics' who 'handed down' the Five Modes. In other words, the Two Modes were another set

of modes by Agrippa. But neither Sextus nor anybody else explicitly acknowledged the

relationship between Agrippa and the Two Modes.

6 At M VII 345 Sextus reports that Aenesidemus produced both the Eight Modes and the Ten

Modes.

6

Roger E. Eichorn

Roger E. Eichorn

suspension of judgement, as they are formulated to induce epoche, which was

characterised as 'a standstill of the intellect, owing to which we neither reject

nor posit anything'. (PH110) Sextus suggested that this epoche would give rise

to the ultimate aim of Pyrrhonian scepticism i.e., 'tranquillity in matters of

opinion (ataraxia) and moderation of feeling in matters forced upon us.' (PHI

25)

Agrippa and his Five Modes pose important and profound problems in the

history of philosophy and the development of Pyrrhonian scepticism. Though

Diogenes ascribed the Five Modes to Agrippa, we are still unable to decide the

extent to which Agrippa should be credited with novelty in putting forward the

Five Modes. Barnes, for instance, is impressed by 'the close thematic similarity',

and 'linguistic parallels between Aristotle's text (Posterior Analytics) and

Sextus' exposition of Agrippa's modes.'7 He conjectures that the philosophical

core of Agrippa's Five Modes might be derived historically from some ideas

discussed in the Posterior Analytics. In the light of insufficient evidence Barnes

is reserved about this 'historical tale'. There is, indeed, philosophical continuity

between Pyrrhonian scepticism and the prior development of ancient Greek

Philosophy. For instance, the revival of Pyrrhonian scepticism by Aenesidemus

was actually the result of his reaction to the Sceptical Academy. I shall not here

offer an account of the development of Pyrrhonian scepticism from the

perspective of philosophical continuity.

The objective of the following discussions in this chapter is to explore

different aspects of the Five Modes. Textually, I shall compare and contrast two

accounts of the Five Modes from Sextus and Diogenes. Then I shall discuss the

uncertain relationship between the Five Modes and the Ten Modes within the

7 Barnes [1990] p.121

7

framework of PH. Finally, with regard to the philosophical merit of the Five

Modes, I shall argue that the Pyrrhonist can induce epoche on the strength of the

Five Modes without invoking akatalepsia or closing off possible paths of further

enquiry. My discussions take off with the problem of authorship of the Five

Modes and Agrippa.

Agrippa

AHOUGH AGRIPPA is credited with increasing concern for his Five Modes, there is very little else that can be said about him. Even his date is open to conjecture. He probably flourished during the period between Aenesidemus and Sextus. Roughly speaking, his time would

range from the second half of 1st century B.C. to 1st century A.D. We possess

none of his written works. In fact, we do not even know if he ever produced any

written works. The only textual evidence in favour of his authorship of the Five

Modes is found in the Lives of Eminent Philosophers written by Diogenes in the

3rd century A.D.8 Otherwise Agrippa is rarely mentioned by any ancient authors.

The time gap between Agrippa and Diogenes could be as large as three and a

half centuries. In Sextus' works, we find an earlier account of the Five Modes.

The two accounts by Sextus and Diogenes are the only source of our

acquaintance with the Five Modes. Unlike Diogenes, Sextus does not ascribe

8 Book IX 88 'But Agrippa and his school add to them [the Ten Modes by Aenesidemus] five

more other modes, resulting respectively from disagreement, extension ad infinitum, relativity,

hypothesis and reciprocal inference.

8

'

the Five Modes to Agrippa. When he introduces the Five Modes, he just vaguely

notes that 'The more recent sceptics offer the following five modes of

suspension of judgement'. (PH I 164) Prior to the Five Modes, when Sextus

introduces the Ten Modes, he writes,

The older sceptics normally offer ten modes in number through which we

are thought to conclude to suspension of judgement. (PHI 36)

The Ten Modes by Aenesidemus are earlier than the Five Modes. In

Sextus' line, 'the older sceptics' who passed down the Ten Modes are

contrasted with 'the more recent sceptics' who added the Five Modes. In book

VII of M, Sextus identifies Aenesidemus as one of 'the older sceptics' and

ascribes the Ten Modes to him.9 But interestingly, the identity of 'the more

recent sceptics' remains an unresolved riddle in Sextus' pages. Curiously, for no

reasons that we can discern, Sextus does not mention the name of Agrippa at all

in his exposition of the Five Modes and Pyrrhonian scepticism. Hence,

Diogenes' line about Agrippa in the Lives of Eminent Philosophers is the only

testimony on the authorship of the Five Modes made in an extant work.

There are some obscurities about the authorship of the Five Modes. It is

suggested that 'Agrippa and his school' added the Five Modes to Pyrrhonian

scepticism. However, who was 'his school'? Does the phrase imply that there

were a number of co-authors? The name of Agrippa is given but 'his school' is

curiously nameless. Are the Five Modes a piece of individual work solely by

Agrippa? Are they the result of collective effort by Agrippa and some unknown

co-authors? We do not know. It could also be the case that Agrippa in fact

leaves no writings and it is his apostles, unknown to us, who compile the Five

9 See M VII 345

9

Modes, in a way similar to what happens with Pyrrho and Timon. Unless new

materials are found we can never know how things happened and the obscurities

of authorship would remain. At any rate, it is still appropriate to accept

Agrippa's authorship over the Five Modes until conflicting evidence comes up.

This is all I want to say about Agrippa. With that, I proceed to a comparison of

the two accounts of the Five Modes.

10

Two Accounts of the Five Modes

AS I HAVE noted, Sextus' account of the Five Modes is closer to the

date of Agrippa. Nevertheless, it is Diogenes, rather than Sextus,

who ascribes the Five Modes to Agrippa. This suggests that

Diogenes does not rely solely on Sextus' works when he compiles the Five

Modes. However, as to what the other materials are and how Diogenes comes to

recognize Agrippa as the author of the Five Modes, we do not know. Obviously,

it is rather futile to speculate on these historical obscurities when we possess so

few textual resources about the issues. The two accounts appear more or less the

same in many places. However, there are some deviations between them worth

mentioning. I will discuss the similarities as well as the differences between

them. For comparison, I shall first lay out Diogenes' account:

The mode arising from disagreement proves, with regard to any inquiry

whether in philosophy or in everyday life, that it is full of the utmost

contentiousness and confusion.

The mode which involves extension ad infinitum refuses to admit that

what is sought to be proved is firmly established, because one thing

furnishes the ground for belief in another, and so on ad infinitum.

The mode derived from relativity declares that a thing can never be

apprehended in and by itself, but only in connexion with something else.

Hence all things are unknowable.

The mode resulting from hypothesis arises when people suppose that you

must take the most elementary of things as of themselves entitled to

credence, instead of postulating them: which is useless, because some one

else will adopt the contrary hypothesis.

11

The mode arising from reciprocal inference is found whenever that which should be

confirmatory of the thing requiring to be proved itself has to borrow credit from the

latter, as for example, if anyone seeking the existence of pores on the ground that

emanations take place should take this (the existence of pores) as proof that there

are emanation. (Lives of Eminent Philosophers book IX 88-90)

The following is Sextus' account.

According to the mode deriving from dispute, we find that undecidable

dissension about the matter proposed has come about both in ordinary life

and among philosophers. Because of this we are not able either to choose

or to rule out anything, and we end up with suspension of judgement.

In the mode deriving from infinite regress, we say that what is brought

forward as a source of conviction for the matter proposed itself needs

another such source, which itself needs another, and so ad infinitum, so

that we have no point from which begin to establish anything, and

suspension of judgement follows.

In the mode deriving from relativity, as we said above, the existing object

appears to be such-and-such relative to the subject judging and to the

things observed together with it, but we suspend judgement on what it is

like in its nature.

We have the mode from hypothesis when the Dogmatists, being thrown

back ad infinitum, begin from something which they do not establish but

claim to assume simply and without proof in virtue of a concession.

The reciprocal mode occurs when what ought to be confirmatory of the

object under investigation needs to be made convincing by the object

under investigation; then, being unable to take either in order to establish

the other, we suspend judgement about both. (PHI 165-169)

12

Some general points first. Sextus and Diogenes put the modes under the

same headings and in the same order: Disagreement, Infinite Regression,

Relativity, Hypothetical and Reciprocal. My discussion shall also follow this

order. Sextus mentioned the Dogmatists being confronted with the mode of

Infinite Regression, and getting into trouble with the Hypothetical mode.

Diogenes made no reference to the Dogmatists. To illustrate the Reciprocal

mode, Diogenes gave an example of circular argument arguing for the existence

of pores. Sextus gave no example at all in his account. After introducing the

Five Modes, Sextus went on to demonstrate briefly how the Modes, working in

collaboration, are capable of inducing epoche in every object of investigation.

Diogenes, on his part, rehearsed sceptical arguments against demonstration,

criterion, sign, cause, motion, the process of learning, and coming into being. In

his rehearsal, he made explicit reference to the Five Modes at some points.

Sextus concluded with epoche four times. The only mode that he did not

finish with a conclusion is Infinite Regression. Diogenes drew one conclusion

only and so his presentation is a little bit shorter than that of Sextus. It is worth

notice that the only conclusion that Diogenes drew is not epoche. He finished

the Relativity mode with 'Hence all things are unknowable'. I shall go into more

detail when I discuss the Relativity mode. Now I move on to the mode of

Disagreement.

10 For examples, see Book IX 90-92, 92-94,94-96.

13

The Mode of Disagreement

BOTH SEXTUS AND DIOGENES mentioned disagreement arising in philosophy and ordinary life. In Diogenes' account, the mode of Disagreement was said to establish the presence of 'the utmost contentiousness and confusion' in philosophy or everyday life. Diogenes had

nothing more to say on the purpose or function of disagreement with regard to

epoche. Sextus explained how the presence of disagreement results in epoche. In

the light of disagreement, Sextus concluded for us that 'we end up with epoche.

For 'we are not able either to choose or to rule out anything'. In general, epoche

is brought by 'the equipollence in the opposed objects and accounts' (PHI 8).

For example, after examing both sides of the disagreement on whether time has

a beginning, one cannot decide what to accept and what to reject and so one ends

up with epoche. Put it in schematic terms, we suspend judgement about the

proposition that p because after taking the disagreement about p into account we

cannot decide whether to believe that p or disbelieve that p. In that case, the

equipollence is the result of unresolved disagreement. One point to note is that

Sextus described the 'dissension about the matter proposed' as anepikritos (not

decided, indeterminate) and this anepikritos dissension forced us to suspend

judgement when we fail to choose or rule out anything. The notion of

anepikritos invites the connotation of akatalepsia (inapprehensibility or

unknowability). It could be argued that the unresolved disagreement about p is

not decided because p is in fact inapprehensible or unknowable. Therefore the

sceptic who is either aware of this fact or supposes that it is so recommends

epoche. I think this is a mistaken interpretation. I shall postpone my discussion

of this issue to the end of this chapter. For the time being, I simply want to

14

suggest that the sceptic would not induce epoche by appealing to the notion of

akatalepsia.

The Mode of Infinite Regression

THE MODE OF INFINITE REGRESSION is concerned with the structural regression of reasoning. Sextus argued, 'what is brought forward as a source of conviction for the matter proposed itself needs another such source'. To prove one thing you need a proof. However, to support

this proof you need another proof. Another proof needs a further proof, and so

on ad infinitum. The result is that 'we have no point from which to begin to

establish anything'. Of course, what follows is epoche. This argument assumes

that a proof needs another proof to support it, if it is to be credited as trustworthy.

Otherwise, it is subject to epoche. The mode of Infinite Regression dismisses

any reasoning conducted in infinite regressive manner.

Diogenes, on his part, argued 'what is sought to be proved'. Obviously,

'what is sought to be proved' is not a proof. In fact, 'what is sought to be

proved' is in need of a proof or 'something brought forward as a source of

conviction'. Therefore, while Sextus mentioned the proof, Diogenes talked of

things sought to be proved. The objects of their presentations are different. But

this does not alter the structure of the mode of Infinite Regression in Diogenes'

account.

In Diogenes' account, the mode of Infinite Regression 'refuses to admit

that what is sought to be proved is firmly established'. For 'one thing furnishes

the ground for belief in another, and so on ad infinitum1. Diogenes implicitly

suggested that the target of the mode of Infinite Regression is 'belief. Suppose

15

a whole set of beliefs is structured in such a way that every single belief is

dependent on a prior belief while this prior belief is founded on a further prior

belief. The mode of Infinite Regression exerts pressure on the ground of any

belief claim if that belief claim is justified by a prior belief.

It is worth notice that Diogenes was more reserved about the power of the

mode of Infinite Regression. While Sextus argued, 'we have no point from

which to begin to establish anything', Diogenes limited the mode of Infinite

Regression to the denial that what is sought to be proved in regressive manner is

firmly established. He did not argue that it should be rejected. There would be

room for people who operated with less demanding epistemological criteria to

accept belief grounded on structural regressive reasoning.

16

Relativity Mode

THE TWO ACCOUNTS differ from each other about the conclusion of the Relativity mode. After making the claim that things are apprehensible only in connection with other things but not in and by themselves, Diogenes finished the Relativity mode with the conclusion: 'Hence

all things are unknowable'. Curiously, this was the first time but also the last

time that Diogenes drew a conclusion in his articulation of the Five Modes. This

conclusion was very different from the Pyrrhonian conclusion, i.e. epoche,

which Sextus drew in his presentation of the Relativity mode and other modes

as well. Diogenes' conclusion incorporated akatalepsia. I shall argue that the

intrusion of akatalepsia was a substantial deviation from the usual Pyrrhonian

epoche. We do not know whether Diogenes himself added akatalepsia to the

Relativity mode or he followed his source. At any rate, this addition gave the

impression that the Relativity mode here made a categorical assertion about

unknowability of things. But as I shall argue, the Pyrrhonist does not

incorporate akatalepsia.

In the meantime, this impression could be explained away with reference

to Sextus' reminder that the Pyrrhonist uses 'is' and 'are' not in the categorical

senses of 'really is' and 'really are' but in the non-categorical and loose senses

of 'appear(s) to be'.11 So even if a Pyrrhonist happens to say something like 'all

things are unknowable', what he means would be simply that 'all things appear

to him to be unknowable'. He is just reporting his state of mind. It seems to him

that all things are unknowable. But as to whether or not all things are really

unknowable, the Pyrrhonist would suspend judgement. It seems very unlikely

11 See PH1135 and M XI18-9

17

that the Pyrrhonist would have more than this in his mind when he makes the

seemingly categorical statement that all things are unknowable. Likewise,

'everything is relative' would be taken as 'everything appears relative'.

Sextus' presentation of the Relativity mode does not give the impression

that the mode admitted of akatalepsia. He simply dwelled on the fact that an

object of perception or of thought, 'appears to be such-and-such relative to the

subject judging and to the things observed together with it'. Therefore, the

sceptic recommended epoche on the real nature of things. This argument looks

similar to the discussion of colour in modern epistemology in which people

argue that the sky is not blue in itself; it just appears to be blue to us. In general

things are colourless, but when they reflect light in different wavelengths, they

appear to have various colours. But what appears blue to a human being does

not appear to be so to a dog. Hence, colour is relative to the perceiving subjects.

Despite different formulations of the mode, the content is the same. For the

notion of 'an existing object' in Sextus' account can be taken in its fullest sense

to cover objects of perception and objects of thought. Hence, to say that things

are unknowable in and by themselves and we can only apprehend them in

connection with something else is more or less the same as saying that objects

are (or appear to be) relative to the subject judging and to the things observed

together with them. Epoche follows.

18

The Hypothetical Mode

IN SEXTUS' account of the Hypothetical mode, the 'Dogmatists, being thrown back ad infinitum, begin from something which they do not establish but claim to assume simply and without proof. There are two points to note. First, he introduced it with the mode of Infinite Regression. This

is the first example of how the Five Modes can work in collaboration with each

other to induce epoche. The second point is about the dogmatists who were

challenged by the mode of Infinite Regression and the Hypothetical mode. It

implicitly suggested that the dogmatists were the targets of Pyrrhonian sceptic.

The 'Dogmatists' were those who claimed that they had found the truth. In PHI

3 Sextus gave a short list of the Dogmatists. They were 'the schools of Aristotle

and Epicurus and the Stoics, and some others.' Their philosophy was called

'Dogmatic philosophy'. There was also 'Academic philosophy'. Dogmatic and

Academic philosophies are contrasted with Sceptical philosophy in Sextus'

exposition of Pyrrhonian Scepticism.

The Hypothetical mode is opposed to the idea of an axiomatized model in

epistemic justification. According to this model, there are two types of beliefs:

derived beliefs and beliefs that are the most elementary and entitled to credence

by themselves. Like the relationship between theorems and axioms, derived

beliefs are logically generated from a set of elementary beliefs. The idea of an

axiomatised system attracted various Greek philosophers like Plato and

Aristotle. But the Hypothetical mode rejects the presupposition that we must

take the most elementary of things as of themselves entitled to credence when

they are not postulated.

19

The quality of being unsupported is a defining characteristic of hypothesis.

To hypothesize that p we assume p is the case without any proof. Otherwise, it

could be anything else but not a hypothesis. According to Diogenes, hypothesis

is 'useless, because some one else will adopt the contrary hypothesis'. If it were

acceptable to hypothesize that/?, then there would be no reason that the opposite

of p could not be hypothesized with the same degree of credibility. For

obviously, there was nothing put forward to support/? when it was hypothesized.

What could restrain the opposite of p from being hypothesized, provided that

the opposite of p did not appear to be unreasonable or unintelligible at all? For

example, a creationist may assume the existence of God to account for the orgin

of human beings. But an evolutionist may equally assume the non-existence of

God and explain the emergence of human beings in terms of evolution. An

unsupported assumption by itself can never rule out its opposite. Unless the

assumption appeals to some other propositions to rule out its opposite, the

assumption is vulnerable to the Hypothetical mode (so is the presupposition of

the axiomatized model). But if the assumption draws on other propositions, the

sceptic can resort to the rest of the Five Modes. In a word, the Hypothetical

mode represents the Pyrrhonian sceptic's uncompromising and demanding

attitude to the fundamental presupposition of hypothesizing. I shall touch upon

the Hypothetical mode again in Chapter Four.

20

The Reciprocal Mode

SEXTUS AND DIOGENES were complementary to each other in their

articulations of the Reciprocal mode, the last of the Five Modes.

Suppose someone puts forward the proposition that p as a source of

conviction and purports to support it with q, which in turn draws on p for

credibility. This is an example of circular inference with which the Reciprocal

mode is concerned. Diogenes offered an example of circular inference in which

emanations were put forward as a proof of the existence of pores. Sextus drew

the conclusion for us. Given the fallacious proof of p with reference to q, we are

'unable to take either in order to establish the other, we suspend judgement

about both'.

One argues reciprocally when the conclusion of his first argument is a

premise in his second argument which itself establishes a premise of his first

argument. Reciprocal arguments are circular arguments with just two pairs of

arguments. But not all circular arguments are reciprocal arguments. Circular

arguments can have more than two components.

21

Relationship between the Five Modes and the Ten Modes

SEXTUS FINISHED his articulation of the Five Modes with the following remark. 'Such are the Five Modes which have been handed down by the more recent Sceptics. They put them forward not as rejecting the Ten Modes but in order to refute the rashness of the Dogmatists in

a more varied way by using both sets together.' (PH I 177) This is the only

statement that Sextus made about the relationship between the two sets of

modes. He stressed that the Five Modes are 'handed down' by the more recent

sceptics to work with the earlier Ten Modes of Aenesidemus 'in order to refute

the rashness of the Dogmatists in a more varied way'. Why did Sextus stress that

the Five Modes did not reject the Ten Modes? Was it because some people or

even some sceptics at Sextus' time were confused about the relationship

between the two sets of modes and some of them even attempted to replace the

Ten Modes with the Five Modes? These are speculations. The relationship

between the two sets of modes is confusing.

The Ten Modes of Aenesidemus induce epoche by appealing to

dissimilarity mphantasia (appearance).12 The underlying argument of the Ten

Modes is that p appears x but also y, where x and v are incompatible. We could

not decide ifp is really x or v. Hence, epoche follows. To produce dissimilarity

in appearance, the Ten Modes compare humans and other animals, human

variations, the senses, circumstances, places and positions, mixtures, quantities,

relativity, the common and the rare, and finally customs and persuasions.

12 For a comprehensive discussion of the Ten Modes, see Annas and Barnes [1985]. My later

discussion on Aenesidemus Relativity mode and Agrippa's Relativity mode is based on their

hypothesis.

22

'

Although Sextus explicitly stated that the Ten Modes and the Five Modes

were complementary, there is textual evidence leading people to think

otherwise. Sextus' formulation of Agrippa's Relativity mode (PH I 167)

contains an extra phrase, which is 'as we said above'. This seemingly

unimportant phrase is worth looking into. Annas and Barnes [1985] have

investigated the phrase and they found that it refers to Sextus' earlier

presentation of Aenesidemus' Relativity mode (PH I 135-40), which came

eighth in the Ten Modes. In Agrippa's Relativity mode, an existing object is

'relative to the subject judging and to the things observed together with it'. In

Aenesidemus' Relativity mode, relativity is broken down into two senses:

'relative to the subject judging' and 'relative to the things observed together

with the object'. Agrippa's Relativity mode appears almost completely identical

to Aenesidemus' Relativity mode. The same conception of relativity appeared

in two supposedly separate modes of relativity in Sextus' exposition. The phase

'as we said above' is intended to remind the readers about the earlier

presentation of Aenesidemus' Relativity mode does it imply that Agrippa's

Relativity mode mainly draws on Aenesidemus' Relativity mode for content

and substance?

On introducing the Ten Modes, Sextus arranged them at PH I 38-9 under

the headings of three 'superordinate' modes, namely 'that deriving from the

subject judging', 'that deriving from the object judged' and 'that combined

from both'. While the superordinate modes were said to be more 'specific', the

Ten Modes were labelled as 'subordinate'. The ten subordinate modes were put

under the three specific superordinate modes according to the context to which

they appeal. The first four of the Ten Modes shared the same context as 'what

judges is either an animal or a human or a sense, and is in some circumstance'

and thus they fell under the first superordinate mode deriving from the subject

23

judging. The seventh and tenth were put under the second superordinate mode

deriving from the object judged. The fifth, sixth, eighth and ninth belonged to

the third superordinate mode combined from both.

The superordinate modes were in turn subsumed under the Relativity mode.

The Relativity Mode was thus made a more outstanding mode than the other

nine modes. It was one of the Ten Modes but at the same time, it was made

superior to the other nine modes. The Relativity Mode argues that everything

appears relative to the subject judging and/or to the things judged. We find no

better reason to prefer this than that or vice versa, so we have to suspend

judgement. The Relativity mode is so broad that it virtually covers the other

nine modes. It is the 'most generic' or the most comprehensive, summing up the

structure of the other nine modes.

It seems problematic for the same Relativity mode to be one of the ten

subordinate modes on the one hand and the most generic on the other hand at the

same time. Moreover, the taxonomy is inconsistent. When Aenesidemus'

Relativity mode was made the most generic at PHI 38-9 it consisted of three

components. But when it was put together with the other nine modes at PH I

135-40, the third component 'that deriving from both' was omitted; only the

subject judging and the things observed together with the object were preserved.

In Agrippa's Relativity mode, the concept of relativity also involves the subject

judging and the things observed together with the object. The omission of the

third component is puzzling if we try to match the first taxonomy with the

second taxonomy.

The Ten Modes are found in three ancient sources. The earliest record is

found in Philo's work, On Drunkenness (c.20 B.C. to 45 A.D.). Sextus' account is

the second source. Diogenes' Lives of Eminent Philosophers contains the third

account. Annas and Barnes have conducted a detailed survey of the Ten Modes

24

exhausting the three accounts. According to them, Sextus' articulation of

Aenesidemus' Relativity mode is corrupt; he possibly not only 'ejects'

Aenesidemus' original Relativity mode but also replaces it by Agrippa's

Relativity mode. Therefore, the distinction between Aenesidemus' Relativity

mode and that of Agrippa is blurred or even disappears in Sextus' presentation.

If Annas and Barnes are right, then Agrippa's Relativity mode does not draw on

that of Aenesidemus. On the contrary, Agrippa's Relativity mode is the source

of Sextus' articulation of Aenesidemus' Relativity mode. As a result, what we

have in the PH is a distorted account of the Ten Modes in which Agrippa's

Relativity mode is made the most generic, embodying Aenesidemus' other

modes. It encourages the speculation that Agrippa intends to replace the Ten

Modes by his Five Modes.13

On the one hand, Sextus remarked that the Five Modes and the Ten Modes

were used together to refute the rashness of the Dogmatists. However, on the

other hand, as Annas and Barnes have suggested, he ejected Aenesidemus'

Relativity mode and replaced it with Agrippa's Relativity mode. To make

things worse, he went further to subsume Aenesidemus' other nine modes under

Agrippa's Relativity mode. Given the apparent superiority of Agrippa's

Relativity Mode (and the Five Modes in general), what else can the Ten Modes

do for the sceptic?

To induce epoche, the Ten Modes appeal to the appearance of dissimilarity

in different contexts. Yet, they all conform to the same structure as laid down by

Agrippa's Relativity mode. Annas and Barnes have argued that presumably

Sextus' identification of the Agrippa's Relativity mode as the most generic

13 See Hicks' note on Diogenes [1950] p.500. The phase he quoted does not support his claim

that Agrippa intends to 'replace the ten modes by his five'.

25

suggests that he was aware of the common structure of the Ten Modes.

However, as his version of Aenesidemus' Relativity mode draws on Agrippa's

Relativity mode, it follows that Agrippa must have recognized the common

structure of the Ten Modes when he introduces his Relativity mode. It could be

the case that after studying the Ten Modes thoroughly, Agrippa came to realize

that all the modes conform to the same structure. By capturing the most

essential elements of the common structure, he thus came up with his version of

Relativity mode. If this speculation were right, then Agrippa's Relativity mode,

being the refinement of the Ten Modes, would apparently be superior to the Ten

Modes.14

The development from Aenesidemus' Ten Modes to Agrippa's Five

Modes can be put under the perspective of evolution of the Pyrrhonian modes.

To begin with, Pyrrho 'attached himself to Scepticism more systematically and

more conspicuously than anyone before him' (PH I 7). About some two

hundred years later, Aenesidemus, as a reaction to the Sceptical Academy,

produced the Ten Modes to revive Pyrrhonian scepticism. Then with his Five

Modes, Agrippa skilfully refined the way the Pyrrhonist induces epoche. The

Ten Modes are rather narrow in scope as they are confined to oppositions of

appearances. The Five Modes are more wide-ranging. They are virtually

capable of rendering any belief claim rationally groundless.

Philosophically, the Five Modes exhibit a much deeper and a much more

theoretical understanding of the nature of justification. All sorts of oppositions

fall under the mode of Disagreement. The Relativity mode captures the most

essential technique of how the Ten Modes bring about epoche. The mode of

14 What about Aenesidemus himself? Did he notice the common structure of his modes? This is

a crucial question about which I do not want to speculate.

26

Infinite Regression, the Hypothetical mode and the Reciprocal mode focus on

the structure of justification by which a belief claim is established as a source of

conviction. The Five Modes could be regarded as masterly regimented tropoi

combating the rashness of the Dogmatists in highly skilful and varied ways. The

'regiments' can fight against the Dogmatists individually or in a group. When

they work in a group, they are more powerful. For instance, as we shall see in

the next chapter, the mode of Infinite Regression, the Hypothetical mode and

the Reciprocal mode can work together to make seemingly unbearable demands

for rational justification. If a Dogmatist does not want to be caught up in circular

reasoning, then he may be forced to find himself becoming entangled with the

endless urge to give infinite reasons to justify his belief claim. He may

otherwise stop giving proof. But then the belief claim is left unsupported. The

Five Modes do not replace the Ten Modes. In an analogy, the Five Modes are

highly competent all-round regiments while the Ten Modes are specialized in

combating the Dogmatists with oppositions of appearances. They may overlap

in one or two aspects but the Five Modes need not replace the Ten Modes in the

sceptical force. There could be division of labour between the Five Modes and

the Ten Modes.

27

Akatalepsia

NOW I WANT to finish this chapter with an attempt to challenge what I take to be a misconception about Pyrrhonian scepticism. Akatalepsia eliminates all hope of bringing an enquiry to a fruitful end. Continuing the enquiry would not bring people any closer to the answer.

There is actually no answer to be discovered. So, to make his conclusion or

recommendation of epoche compelling if not irresistible, it seems strategically

desirable for the sceptic to appeal to akatalepsia. 'Things are unknowable! So

why bother to insist on pursuing the enquiry? Better suspend judgement if you

want peace of mind.' Obviously the sceptic could not have asserted that things

are unknowable without being dogmatic about akatalepsia. But this line of

thought captures the general appeal of Paula Gottlieb's arguments. Her

arguments challenged Barnes [1990] on disagreement which is anepicritos

(mentioned in the mode of Disagreement). She criticized Barnes for

underestimating 'the sceptic's ingenuity' when he argued that anepikritos

disagreement is undecided disagreement instead of undecidable disagreement.

She sketched his position as follows:

Barnes argues that the sceptic thought that suspension of belief (epoche)

follows from undecided {anepikritos) disagreement. Barnes takes issue

with those who would translate anepikritos as 'undecidable'. He argues

that Pyrrhonian sceptics such as Sextus, unlike the Academics, did not

take epoche to be the same as akatalepsia (unknowability). The

Pyrrhonian sceptics, he argues, were in principle tolerant of future

progress, although they did not undertake research themselves. Barnes

admits that often Sextus says, or at least appears to say, that Pyrrhonism

28

embraces unknowability. He says, 'These passages are admittedly

puzzling. But most of them can, I think, be explained away (Sextus does

not actually mean what he appears to say); and the rest may be put down

to carelessness.' (p. 10)

Gottlieb also stated that 'Agrippa's most important and exciting

innovation in the sceptical tradition [via the Five Modes] was his closing off of

any possible avenues of further inquiry'.1 Therefore she complained that

Barnes had made the sceptic's conclusion of epochs too weak to be accepted by

other people, as it was supported by undecided disagreement only.

The Pyrrhonian sceptic's goal was ataraxia, a peaceful state of mind, a

state undisturbed by needless worries. It is not clear why the sceptic

should expect to induce this state in his hearers if his conclusion was as

weak as Barnes suggests. To be sure, the sceptic could not say that any

question is unknowable without entering the dogmatists' camp.

Nevertheless, the sceptic would surely want his listener to assume that

there is no good reason to continue the search. It is not clear how the

sceptic's weaker conclusion will prompt the listener to stop worrying

about finding an answer.

Gottlieb appeared to argue that people would stop worrying about finding

the answer only when they believe in akatalepsia. And it was the sceptic's job to

make people see that things are unknowable and there is no good reason to

continue the search. Otherwise, it would be difficult for the sceptic to induce

15 Gottlieb [1992] reported that this had been an argument made by Victor Brochard in Les

Sceptiques Grecs, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1887, book iii ch. 6, especially page 304.

29

ataraxia in his hearers if they still believed that things were knowable and thus

that it was worthwhile to continue the search.

I shall argue that this line of argument is wrong-headed. It is founded on a

few mistaken assumptions about epoche: (1) epoche is the result of akatalepsia,

(2) epoche entails cessation of enquiry and (3) epoche is compatible with the

conviction of akatalepsia. The argument also fails to understand ataraxia. It

could be granted that akatalepsia would better prompt people to stop worrying

about finding an answer. But I shall argue that it is only in a very restricted sense

that the Pyrrhonist would tolerate this intrusion of akatalepsia to bridge the gap

between epoche and ataraxia.

According to Sextus, ' [Pyrrhonian] Scepticism is an ability (dunamis

antithetikos) to set out oppositions among things which appear and are thought

of in any way at all, an ability by which, because of the equipollence in the

opposed objects and accounts, we come first to epoche and afterwards to

ataraxia.' (PH I 8) When confronted with the equipollence in the opposed

accounts, people will naturally find 'none of the conflicting accounts takes

precedence over any other as being more convincing'. Epoche follows; the

intellect comes to a standstill, neither rejecting nor positing anything. It is not

clear why 'the sceptic', as Gottlieb argued, 'would surely want his listener to

assume that there is no good reason to continue the search'. Actually, we cannot

find Sextus urging people to be pessimistic about their enquiry so as to induce

epoche. In Sextus' account, epoche is the natural result of equipollence in the

opposed objects and accounts; one does not need to call upon akatalepsia in

order to induce epoche. The sceptic's job is not to make people see that things

are unknowable. His job is to set out oppositions among things to bring about

equipollence, so that people will then come to epoche.

30

After all epoche is only a standstill of the intellect in which one neither

rejects nor posits anything. In other words, one just does not know which

propositions deserve assent and which do not. There is no reason why epoche

should bar one from continuing the search. On the contrary, it is precisely the

fact that one does not know which propositions deserve assent and which do not

that motivates one to set off and continue the search. In addition, Mates [1996]

also argued 'certainly some searching is required to bring the Skeptic into a state

of aporia and from there to epoche, but there seems to be no reason why, just

because he is withholding assent, he must close his mind to all further

consideration of the matter in question.'(p.226)

In reality, it is very common for people to suspend judgement while

pursuing an enquiry. For instance, when confronted with extremely puzzling

and difficult issues such as the origin of human beings or the coming into being

of the universe, or the nature of consciousness some people may find it difficult

to make up their mind and so they should suspend judgement. Some people are

optimistic and they do not think that the issues are unknowable. Among them,

some may take sides with a certain theory. The rest may find none of the

existing theories compelling and so they suspend judgement and hope for

discovery in the future. They may engage in the search for discovery or they

may leave it to other people. Some other people may be pessimistic about

finding the answers. They may think that these issues are undecidable in

principle. But then they are not suspending judgement. Their intellect is not in a

standstill. When they think that some issues are undecidable in principle, they

are actually positing something. An epoche founded on the conviction of

akatalepsia is unorthodox and the very conviction of akatalepsia is actually

incompatible with epoche. Gottlieb's argument is seriously mistaken.

31

Gottlieb advanced a further argument in which the anepikritos

disagreement mentioned in the mode of Disagreement could be made

undecidable if other modes are involved:

although only suspension of judgment is warranted by the fact of

undecided disagreement alone, unknowability would be warranted if the

other sceptical arguments, that attack any possible standards of

justification for accepting one side of a dispute over another, were

successful. Ataraxia would therefore be the outcome of all the

arguments together, rather than just the argument from disagreement.

Whether Sextus is claiming (or can justifiably claim) that a dispute is

merely undecided or whether it is undecidable may depend on how

much of the sceptic's extra machinery he is wheeling into the argument

from disagreement.

Gottlieb's argument jumps to the conclusion of akatalepsia. Strictly

speaking, even if the sceptic happens to attack possible standards of justification

for accepting one side of a dispute over another with all the Five Modes, what

would be yielded is not akatalepsia. The attack, if successful, should only force

one to concede that one does not know which propositions deserve assent and

which do not and epoche follows. One may suspend judgement and continue the

search. But if one is convinced by the attack that the disagreement is

undecidable in principle, one has already made his judgement. Epoche, as I have

argued, is incompatible with the conviction of akatalepsia.

Now I shall expose a fundamental problem with Gottlieb's line of

argument. The intrusion oi akatalepsia suggests a Pyrrhonian scepticism which

is foreign to Sextus's accout. When Sextus introduced Pyrrhonian scepticism in

32

the first place, he explicitly stated, 'the sceptics are still investigating'. (PHI 3)

I do not see why we should ignore this written 'declaration'. In fact, it would be

very difficult to set aside this statement. After all, The Greek adjective skeptikos

originally derives from a verb meaning 'to inquire' or 'to consider'.16 One may

argue that the word need not be taken so strongly as to reject the interpretation

in which epoche entails cessation of enquiry. It might also be the case that the

sceptic pays only lip service to the cause of enquiry and they do not undertake

research themselves. Nevertheless due weight should be given to the recurring

emphasis that the sceptic wants to be associated with the pursuit of enquiry. In

addition, Sextus differentiated Pyrrhonian scepticism from the New Academy

precisely on the basis that the Pyrrhonists 'are still investigating' hoping that it

is 'possible for some things actually to be apprehended' while 'the school of

Clitomachus and Cameades, and other Academics, have asserted that things

cannot be apprehended.'17 Even so, Sextus' account of the New Academy may

not be historically accurate. At any rate, the repeated contrast between the

sceptics who were described as still investigating and the New Academy that

was said to be committed to akatalepsia demonstrated the fact that Sextus was

keen on keeping the notion of akatalepsia away from Pyrrhonian scepticism.

There is no reason why we should overlook his effort. Therefore, I suppose

Pyrrhonian scepticism should not be associated with akatalepsia.

Moreover as I have argued in the earlier discussion of the Relativity mode,

if a sceptic happens to say something like 'all things are unknowable', what he

means should be simply that 'all things appear to him to be unknowable'. He

uses 'are' in a non-epistemic sense. He does not assert that things are

16 Annas and Barnes [1985] p.l.

17PH11-3 and 226

33

unknowable. He is just reporting his state of mind. It seems to him that all things

are unknowable. It is only in this restricted sense that the sceptic would entertain

the impression of akatalepsia. Actually things are unknowable for certain

dogmatists, but not for the sceptic. The sceptic takes the positions of the

Dogmatist to conclude that things are unknowable for the Dogmatist. But as to

whether or not all things are really unknowable, the sceptic should suspend

judgement.

Even if a disagreement strikes the sceptic as undecidable at the moment, he

might assent to his impression but this does not admit of akatalepsia. The

sceptic would only suspend his judgement. When the sceptic cannot refute a

present argument propounded to him, he will reply by appealing to the future.

Before the founder of the school to which you adhere was born, the

argument of the school, which is no doubt sound, was not yet apparent,

although it was really there in nature. In the same way, it is possible that

the argument opposing the one you have just propounded is really there in

nature but is not yet apparent to us; so we should not yet assent to what is

now thought to be a powerful argument. (PHI 34)

The Pyrrhonists 'are still investigating' hoping that it is 'possible for some

things actually to be apprehended'. So they will leave it open that the seemingly

undecidable disagreement might become decidable in the future.

The motivation behind Gottlieb's line of argument is to make the

Pyrrhonian conclusion or recommendation of epoche compelling. It is assumed

that a compelling epoche founded on the conviction of akatalepsia will prompt

people to stop worrying about finding an answer and thus achieve ataraxia

more effectively. There is substance in this line of thought. In the first place, the

34

Five Modes, as we shall see in Chapter Three, do give one all the resources one

needs to undermine all claims to justified belief. And akatalepsia seems follow

naturally. In addition, if, as we have seen in the passage, it is always possible to

come up with counter-arguments in the future, it seems things are undecided in

principle.

The problem I have been discussing concerns epoche, ataraxia and

akatalepsia. I have argued that an epoche founded on the conviction of

akatalepsia is unorthodox and actually the very conviction of akatalepsia is

incompatible with epoche, not to see this is not to understand what Pyrrhonian

scepticism is all about. It is assumed that akatalepsia would better prompt

people to stop worrying about finding an answer. But consider this:

For Sceptics began to do philosophy in order to decide among appearances

and to apprehend which are true and which false, so as to become tranquil;

but they came upon equipollent dispute, and being unable to decide this

they suspend judgement. And when they suspended judgement, ataraxia

in matters of opinion followed fortuitously. (PH I26)

Now the Sceptics were hoping to acquire tranquillity by deciding the

anomalies in what appears and is thought of, and being unable to do this

they suspended judgement. But when they suspended judgement,

tranquillity followed as a shadow follows a body. (PH I29)

In the first passage, the sceptic comes to epoche and then ataraxia follows

fortuitously. In the second passage, the sceptic comes to epoche and then

ataraxia follows as a shadow follows a body. There is inconsistency between

the image of a shadow following a body which suggests a natural and

inseparable connection between epoche and ataraxia and the passage, which

35

states that the coming of ataraxia in these circumstances is fortuitous. The

intrusion of akatalepsia is intended to bridge the gap between epoche and

ataraxia. But as I have argued, the intrusion risks not only minsunderstanding

the notion of epoche but also suggesting a Pyrrhonism which is foreign to

Sextus' account. The Pyrrhonian sceptic may not grapple for a solution with

determined effort. He may just pay lip service to the pursuit of enquiry. But one

thing is clear: the Pyrrhonist induces epoche on the strength of the Five Modes

and this should be done without invoking akatalepsia or closing off possible

paths of further enquiry.

The Five Modes appear capable of compelling people to concede that they

do not have the legitimate justification for accepting one side of a disagreement

over another. Epoche would prevail. But two questions need to be asked. How

can the Five Modes do this? Was the sceptic of the PH obligated by his

Pyrrhonian scepticism to destroy possible standards of justification in all fields

of study? I shall pursue these two questions in Chapter Three and Four

respectively. In addition, the sceptic is accustomed to the accusation that his

Pyrrhonian scepticism would make him inactive. However, the sceptic replies

that he lives by following the everyday observances that consist of 'guidance by

nature, necessitation by feelings, handling down of laws and customs, and

teachings of kinds of expertise'. (PH I 23) I shall also explore this issue with

reference to epoche in Chapter Four.

36

CHAPTER THREE

The Agrippan Problem:

A Pyrrhonian Challenge to Epistemic Justification

MOST PHILIOSPHERS AGREE that Agrippa's Five Modes pose profound problems for the theory of justification. According to Barnes, Agrippan argumentation, with its forms and structures, 'were among the most important aspects of Pyrrhonism, so that to study them is

to study the soul of ancient scepticism.'1 Historically, they 'had a unique

influence on the subsequent history of sceptical enquiry, and hence, more

generally, on the history of epistemology or the enquiry into the nature and

scope of human knowledge: the Agrippan forms lie at the heart of the western

philosophical tradition.' Philosophically, they 'remain today among the central

issues in the theory of knowledge; that every modem epistemologist must take

notice of them; and that they still provide the subject of epistemology with some

of its most cunning puzzles and most obdurate problems.' Fogelin shared a

similar opinion with regard to the Five Modes. He observed, 'there is an

uncanny resemblance between problems posed by Agrippa's Five Modes and

those that contemporary epistemologists address under the heading of the

theory of justification..'19 He was so impressed that he is prepared to 'define the

philosophical problem of justification as the attempt to take seriously and then

18 Barnes [1990] p.ix.

19 Fogelin [1994] p. 11

37

avoid the consequences of Agrippa's Five Modes' despite the fact that most

writers on the subject seem never to have heard of Agrippa and his Five Modes.

This chapter addresses the Five Modes inasmuch as they constrain theories

of justification. The attack on the criterion of truth (PH II 18-20) serves as an

excellent example to demonstrate how the Five Modes block every way out of

the sceptical predicament of justification. I mention different contemporary

formulations of the problem posed by the Five Modes. Much weight is given to

Barnes's system of three modes and his unparallelled appreciation of the

Hypothetical mode. However, I also give sufficient attention to Fogelin who

argued that the Agrippan problem poses epistemic challenges in an even-handed

way. Finally, I discuss how the Five Modes pose a seemingly unanswerable

problem for the justification of belief.

38

The Problem and The Attack on the Criterion

AGRIPPA'S FIVE MODES raise serious questions about the foundation of belief. The Modes can work individually or in varied groups of two to five, as Sextus has demonstrated elsewhere in PH. When the modes work in a group, they are more powerful. In such cases, they

make successive demands for justification. Epistemic justification runs three

risks: i.e., infinite regression, circularity, and unwarranted assumption. These

dangers seem insuperable. They may lead us to think that no belief claim is

justified. Suppose there is disagreement over the trustworthiness of a belief

claim. The belief claim is trustworthy only if it is justified. Intuitively, a

justified belief is more likely to be true than an unjustified belief. But if the

belief claim is to be justified, its justification needs to be grounded on a further

justification. For a justified justification would better establish the truth of the

belief claim. The further justification would also need to be justified. The

process goes on to form a need for a chain of justification. If the end of the chain

turns back to an earlier section of the chain, circular justification results. If the

chain of justification goes on and on, an infinite regress threatens. If it stops

somewhere, unwarranted assumption instead of justification results.

The attack on the criterion of truth (PH II 18-20) serves as an excellent

example of how the Five Modes constrain attempts to justify a belief claim.

Of those who have considered the matter, some, for example, the Stoics

and others, have asserted that there is a criterion; others, including the

Corinthian Xeniades and Xenophanes of Colophon,... have asserted that

there is not; while we have suspended judgment as to whether there is or

not.

39

This dispute, then, they will either declare to be decidable or to be

undecidable; if undecidable, they will be granting at once that judgement

should be suspended; but if decidable, let them say with what it is to be

decided, seeing that we do not have nay agreed-upon criterion and do not

know indeed, are inquiring whether one exists.

And anyhow, in order to decide the dispute that has arisen about the

criterion, we have need of an agreed-upon criterion by means of which

we shall decide it; and in order to have an agreed-upon criterion it is

necessary first to have decided the dispute about the criterion. Thus, with

the reasoning falling into the circularity mode, finding a criterion

becomes aporetic; for we do not allow them to adopt a criterion

hypothetically, and if they wish to decide about the criterion by means of

a criterion we force them tinto an infinite regress.

Further, since proof requires a criterion that has been proved, while the

criterion has need of what has been determined to be a proof, they land in

circularity. (PH II 18-20)

This example involves the modes of Disagreement, Reciprocal,

Hypothetical, and Infinite Regression. The task of the Disagreement mode is

twofold. It first induces epoche by showing that there are incompatible claims

concerning the criterion of truth and so epoche follows. It also calls for

justification from those who insist on a certain position instead of suspending

judgement in the light of the disagreement. The Relativity mode could serve the

same purpose. But it is not used in the example. The other three modes proceed

systematically to render different belief claims about the criterion of truth

unjustified by denying unwarranted assumption and justification that is circular

or regressive infinitely.

40

In schematic terms, suppose there is disagreement about the belief claim

that p. Either epoche follows or reasons will be given to support one side of the

disagreement. If p is asserted without any proof, the Hypothetical mode applies.

If p is supported by q, then q itself needs support too or else the Hypothetical

mode applies again. The mode of Infinite Regression rejects infinite sets of

reasons. The reciprocal mode does not allow circular reasoning. Therefore, if

we are to accept the belief claim that p, p must not be merely asserted nor, at the

same time, be supported by a set of circular or infinite reasons. Otherwise, p

could not be accepted. Thus, the key to the Agrippan problem, as it appears, is to

find a way to justify the belief claim that p in a non-hypothetical manner and

without invoking reasoning that is infinitely regressive or circular. But how

could this be done?

The System of Three Modes and The Hypothetical Mode

THERE ARE different formulations of the Agrippan problem. Chisholm discussed the formulation that Descartes had put forward in his reply to the VIIth set of objections and that which Coffey [1917] took up in his discussion of the problem of the criterion. This version of the

problem is concerned with 'the proper method for deciding which are the good

beliefs and which are the bad ones which beliefs are genuine cases of

knowledge and which beliefs are not'.20 Amico, following Chisholm, has

discussed the problem of the criterion; he described it as 'a metaepistemological

20Chisholm [1973] p.10

41

problem concerning the justification of first order knowledge claims among

disagreeing disputants'.21 Fogelin [1994] mentioned two 'modern restatements

of the Agrippa problem' made by Laurence Bonjour [1985] and Paul K. Moser

[1985]. Combining three of Agrippa's Five Modes, Barnes advances a tactical

Pyrrhonian mode of argumentation. He believes that his System of Three

Modes 'conveys what is epistemologically most important and most

challenging about this [Agrippan] aspect of ancient Pyrrhonism'.23 He claims

that the System of Three Modes is his own invention in a sense, although Sextus

exhibits a different system of three modes. Sextus' system consists of the modes

of Disagreement, Infinite Regression and Reciprocal whereas Barnes assembles

the modes of Hypothetical, Infinite Regression and Reciprocal to constrain

theories of epistemic justification. The mechanism of Barnes's system is given

as follows.

Suppose you are considering the claim that P. Then either (1) the claim is

merely asserted, or else (2) it is supported. If (1), then the hypothetical

mode applies.

If (2), then P rests on some reason or set of reasons, Rl. Either (2a) Rl is

an "old" item, i.e. (in this case) it is the same as P, or else (2b) it is a new

item. If (2a), then the reciprocal mode applies.

If (2b), then either the (2bi) Rl is merely asserted or (2bii) Rl is supported.

If (2bi), then the hypothetical mode applies. And so on ... until the

regressive mode is invoked. (P.l 19)

21 Amico[1993]p.l43

22 Fogelin [1994] p.l 17

23 Barnes [1990] p.l 19

42

Apparently, there is division of labour between the three modes in the

system. The Hypothetical mode first asks for justification. The Infinite

Regressive mode forces people to embark on an infinite series of justifications

and the Reciprocal mode does not allow circular justification. The Hypothetical

mode recurrently shuts the doors leading the way out of the predicament.

Whenever one attempts to assert p without any reason, however self-evident p

may appear to be, the Hypothetical mode does not allow it; it requires further

reasons for p. In Barnes's system, the challenge comes largely from the

Hypothetical mode. According to him, the Hypothetical mode 'is a mode of the

first importance to the Pyrrhonists'. It is so important that he observes

'numerous implicit references to hypotheses' in Sextus' exposition of

Pyrrhonian scepticism.24

Sextus briefly explained how the Five Modes lead to epoche when he

introduced them. But he did not explain how the Hypothetical mode induces

epoche. Because of anepikritos disagreement, we cannot choose what to believe

and what to disbelieve and hence 'we end up with epoche. Because of infinite

regression in our reasoning, we 'have no point from which to begin to establish

anything, and epoche follows'. Since things appear relatively different to people

who perceive them, 'we suspend judgement on what it is like in its nature'.

Finally we suspend judgement 'when what ought to be confirmatory of the

object under investigation needs to be made convincing by the object under

investigation'. However, it was not explained how the Hypothetical mode

would lead to epoche. Sextus simply revealed that the sceptic would bring in the

Hypothetical mode when the dogmatists 'begin from something which they do

not establish but claim to assume simply and without proof in virtue of a

24 Ibid, p.96

43

concession'. In my earlier discussion of the Hypothetical mode in Chapter Two,

I noted that the Hypothetical mode represents the Pyrrhonian sceptic's

uncompromising and demanding attitude to the fundamental presupposition of

hypothesizing, which suggests that we must take the most elementary of things

as of themselves entitled to credence when they are not postulated. Now I want

to finish my discussion of the Hypothetical mode to see how it gives rise to

epoche and what role it plays in the sceptical framework.

Sextus' repeated criticisms of hypothesizing reveal implicitly the

problematic feature of hypothesizing in the process of justifying a belief claim.

(1) If it is acceptable for a Dogmatist to hypothesize that p, i.e. to lay down

p, by a bare assertion, as a first principle, then it must be equally

acceptable for a sceptic or another Dogmatist to hypothesize that p*,

where p* is the "opposite" of p. But if p* is no less acceptable than/?, we

cannot accept p as a first principle just because the Dogmatist

hypothesizes it. (See PH I 173; MVIE 370; M III 8)

(2) What the Dogmatists hypothesize is either true or false. If it is true,

they should not hypothesize it (for hypothesis is "a matter full of

suspicion") but rather assume it straight off. If it is false, it can do them no

good for a false starting-point cannot ground a science or a branch of

knowledge. (SeePHI 173;M VIH 371; M III 9-10)

(3) If the Dogmatists hold that the consequences of any hypothesis are

acceptable, then all enquiry is subverted. For, given any absurd

proposition, we can find some hypothesis from which it follows; hence

any proposition whatsoever will be acceptable. And this is evidently silly.

(SeeM VIII 372-3; M III 11-12)

(4) If in order to establish that p 2 you first hypothesize thatpl and then

derive p2 from pl, why not establish p2 directly, by hypothesizing it, and

44

-

thus save yourself the labour of looking for arguments? (See PHI 174; M

Vm374;M III 13)

Barnes collected the arguments from various places in Sextus' works.25 He

suggested that the first argument is the most important one and Sextus had

frequently alluded to it in several places. The quality of being unsupported is a

defining characteristic of hypothesis and an unsupported assumption by itself

can never rule out its opposite unless it appeals to something external e.g., its

consequences and that of its opposite. If we can infer some true propositions

from p but we cannot do so with the opposite of p, then we could judge that we

should not hypothesize the opposite of p. But then we are actually grounding p

on some other true propositions; p would no longer be a hypothesis. And of

course, the sceptic could proceed with his other modes. Moreover, it is pointless

to establish other propositions first and then establish p based on the established

propositions. For other true propositions are obtained by hypothesizing p. We

will be subject to the Reciprocal mode if we obtain some true propositions by

hypothesizing p and, in return, justify p on the ground of those true propositions.

Therefore, 'If the only thing that can be said for or against p is that some

Dogmatist has hypothesized it, and if hypothesizing that p does not establish or

warrant belief in p, then we should suspend judgement over p". (p.99) This is

how the Hypothetical mode induces epoche.

Barnes argued that 'the hypothetical mode is more closely connected to

epoche than is either the regressive mode or the reciprocal mode', (p. 108) His

reason was that while the two modes induce epoche when there are bad

arguments, either regressive or circular, the Hypothetical mode induces epoche

25Ibid. p. 100

45

just because of the defining characteristic of hypothesizing. His account of the

Hypothetical mode is closely relevant to his argument that 'the deep and

fundamental issue raised by Agrippan scepticism' was 'the status of

epistemological externalism'. (p.141) I shall return to this point in the next

section.

Fogelin [1994] held a different view on the role played by individual

modes in the Pyrrhonian challenge to epistemic justification. Unlike Barnes,

who regarded the Hypothetical mode as the leading mode in constraining

epistemic justification, Fogelin argued that the sceptic posed the Agrippan

problem in an even-handed way. Therefore, he complained that the Agrippa

problem is often narrowly characterized as the infinite regress problem in

contemporary literature on epistemic justification. He pointed out that

the problem that presents itself is not simply that of avoiding a bad

infinite regress; the challenge is to avoid this regress without falling

into a bad form of circularity or a bad form of unjustified acceptance...

If we think the threat of an infinite regress of reasons as the central

challenge to justified belief, then theories, despite their own

difficulties, may lay claim to our acceptance just because they seem to

deal with this single aspect of the Agrippa problem. If, however, we

begin with an antecedent horror of circularity, an appeal to an infinite

regress might recommend itself as a way out. It is important, then, not

to grant unwarranted dialectical advantages, but to insist, instead, that

a phil