Youth Violence Prevention and Intervention: An overview
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Transcript of Youth Violence Prevention and Intervention: An overview
Youth Violence Prevention and Intervention: An overview
Chris Melde, Ph.D.School of Criminal JusticeMichigan State University
Violence in Perspective
The Long View of Crime National versus State and Local Trends Distribution of Risk
Not random Perceptual Indicators and Resulting Behaviors
Fear and Avoidance What makes youth violence unique?
Overall Violent Crime Rate (per 100,000): 1960 to 2010 UCR
19601962
19641966
19681970
19721974
19761978
19801982
19841986
19881990
19921994
19961998
20002002
20042006
20082010
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
Violent Crime Rate 1960 to 2010
Rate
per
100
,000
Murder Rate (per 100,000): 1960 to 2010 UCR
19601962
19641966
19681970
19721974
19761978
19801982
19841986
19881990
19921994
19961998
20002002
20042006
20082010
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Murder Rate: 1960 to 2010
Rate
per
100
,000
Overall Violent Crime in Illinois:
2001 to 2010 UCR Data20
01
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
Overall Violent Crime in Illinois
State of Illinois City ACity BCity CCity D
Rate
per
100
,000
Overall Violent Crime in Select Illinois Cities (not named Chicago)
2006 2007 2008 2009 20100
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
Overall Violent Crime in Illinois by City: 2006 to 2010 UCR
Rate
per
100
,000
Crime in the MediaMilwaukee posts 4th largest drop in crime
12% decline in violence near top for big cities
From the June 8, 2005 editions of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel
By CHASE DAVIS [email protected]
Violent crime in Milwaukee plunged 12.3% last year, the fourth largest drop among the country's 33 largest cities, according to a new FBI report.
More than 4,600 violent crimes - homicides, aggravated assaults, rapes and robberies - were reported in Milwaukee in 2004, down from nearly 5,300 in 2003, the FBI said.
Crime in the Media: One year later
Sunday, Dec. 03, 2006
Middle America�s Crime Wave By Kathleen Kingsbury
It's as if Milwaukee, Wis., had reverted to a state of lethal chaos. A Special Olympian is
killed for his wallet as he waits for a bus. An 11-year-old girl is gang-raped by as many as 19
men. A woman is strangled, her body found burning in a city-owned garbage cart. Twenty-
eight people are shot, four fatally, over a holiday weekend.
These are the kinds of crimes American cities expected never to see in high numbers again.
In the 1990s police departments nationwide began applying the so-called broken-windows
theory: arrest the bad guys for minor offenses, and they wouldn't be around to commit more
serious ones. This zero-tolerance approach--combined with more cops on the street to
enforce it, a strong economy and a fortuitous demographic change that reduced the
population of young men who typically cause the most trouble--lowered the rates of murder,
robbery and rape for 10 consecutive years. Until last year. Not only did crime suddenly
begin to rise in 2005, but the most violent crimes led the trend. Homicides shot up 3.4%.
Robberies, 3.9%. Aggravated assaults, 1.8%. Hardest hit were not metropolises like New
York City and Los Angeles but cities with populations between 400,000 and 1 million--such
as Baltimore, Md.; Charlotte, N.C.; St. Louis, Mo.; and Oakland, Calif.--and this year looks
to see similar rates of increase, if not worse.
Few places have suffered more than Milwaukee. The homicide count for the city of 590,000 fell from 130 in 1996 to just 88 in 2004. But last year, according to FBI figures, Milwaukee saw the country's largest jump in homicides--up 40%, to 121.
The Reality: Back to the 10-year average (20.1)
Distribution of Risk
The non-random nature of the distribution of violence risk.
Pin map of all homicides in Newark, New Jersey, 1982-2008
The spread of homicide risk in Newark, New Jersey, 1982-2008
Percent Black by Census Tract in Newark, New Jersey
Violent Victimization by Sex
Male Female10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Overall Violent Victimization Rate (per 1,000) by Sex: NCVS 2009
MaleFemale
Violent Victimization by Race
White Black Other Multi-Racial0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Overall Violent Victimization Rate (per 1,000) by Race: NCVS 2009
Total Violent Victimization
Violent Victimization by Ethnicity
Hispanic Non-Hispanic10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Overall Violent Victimization Rate (per 1,000) by Ethnicity: NCVS 2009
HispanicNon-Hispanic
Violent Victimization by Age-Group
12-15 16-19 20-24 25-34 35-49 50-64 65 and over
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Total Violent Victimization rate (per 1,000) by Age: NCVS 2009
Total Violent Victimization
Focusing on Youth Violence Why?
Risk - Power Few Because the public is especially concerned
• Cycle of Juvenile Justice Malleability/Potential for Change
Focus on ages 12 to 24 While we often think of “youth” from a
legalistic standpoint (i.e., under age 18), that is not a realistic representation.
Adolescence
The Cycle of Juvenile Justice
The primary philosophy guiding the creation of the juvenile justice system was rehabilitation and reintegration. Juveniles are not wholly responsible for their
actions due to their maturity level. There is time to reform their behavior, and
create productive citizens.
This philosophy is easy to convey when juvenile crime is not in the spotlight.
The Cycle of Juvenile Justice
What happens when juvenile crime is perceived to be extraordinarily high?◦ A large contingent of people lobby for harsher
treatment of juvenile delinquents.
◦ The common sentiment: leniency “encourages juveniles to laugh at the system, to believe they will not be punished no matter what they do, and to feel free to commit more frequent and serious crimes” (Bernard, 1992, p. 37).
The Cycle of Juvenile Justice
The Result Lawmakers impose harsher penalties, including
mandatory transfer to adult court for serious crimes, and extended sentences; a ‘get tough’ on crime agenda.
What typically happens to the perceived juvenile crime rate in the face of ‘get tough’ policies?
The Cycle of Juvenile Justice Chasing our tails
Because our juvenile crime rate is, and always has been, relatively high compared with adults (with the exception of young adults 18-24), we change the system once again.
The juvenile justice philosophy returns to its’ roots, by focusing on rehabilitation and reintegration.
The question isn’t whether we’ll have another moral panic, according to Bernard (1992), but rather when.
Significant Supreme Court Rulings
Roper v. Simmons (2005) No Juvenile Death Penalty Juveniles fundamentally different than adults
Graham v. Florida (2010) Holding: Sentencing a juvenile to life in prison
without parole for crimes other than murder violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.�
Supreme Court: No more life sentences for juvenile killers
Monday, June 25, 2012 The Supreme Court says it's unconstitutional to
sentence juveniles to life in prison without parole for murder, siding with the petitioner in case of Miller v. Alabama.
The high court on Monday threw out Americans' ability to send children to prison for the rest of their lives with no chance of ever getting out. The 5-4 decision is in line with others the court has made, including ruling out the death penalty for juveniles and life without parole for young people whose crimes did not involve killing.
The Cycle of Juvenile Justice Back to Prevention and Intervention Prevention programs have a long, but not
so glorious, history. Most prevention programs do not “work.”
• “But if it helps just one child”• Difficult for any single program to produce change.
On average, schools provide roughly 14 different delinquency prevention programs in any given year. Schools provide ready access to youth Progression: Didactic models to skill
development
Why Get Involved in School-Based Prevention?
The Risks and Rewards of School-Based Programs
NCVS Youth Violence Data (ages 12-18): 1992 to 2010
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Youth Violence at School vs. Away from School (per 1,000)
Non-School Serious Non-school totalSchool SeriousSchool total
Rate
per
1,0
00
Adolescent Fear of Crime by Location: 1995-2009
1995 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 20090
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Percentage of students age 12-18 who reported being afraid of attack or harm, by location, 1995-2009
Total At SchoolTotal Away from School
Perc
ent o
f stu
dent
s
Student Avoidance Behaviors
1995 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 20090
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Avoidance Behaviors by Students at School (percent of students): NCVS
TotalAvoided School activitiesAny activitiesAny classStayed home from schoolAvoided one or more places in school
Perc
ent o
f stu
dent
s
Popular School-Based Programs Olweus Bully Prevention
Blueprints Program http://www.stopbullying.gov/laws/index.html
• Page with information on Illinois State Laws on Bullying
Gang Resistance Education and Training (G.R.E.A.T.) National Evaluation (2006-2012) Slight reduction in gang membership Improved attitudes about the police More negative views about gangs
Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) Has not worked
• possible negative effects for low risk, positive effects for high risk youth.
New iteration of the program
Risks of School-Based Programs
Iatrogenic Effects Mixing high and low risk youth in programs has
been associated with more anti-social behavior on the part of youth considered to be at low-risk.
• Evidence of this in community and correctional setting as well (Hennigan and Maxson, 2012; Dodge et al., 2006).
Priorities of the School Education versus Prevention
• Especially in high risk schools Long-term commitments are difficult
Module 2: Community InterventionsBackground on Research Partnerships
Evidence of Impact
32
Continuum of Promising Practices for Comprehensive Gang Intervention
SUPPRESSIONDETERRENCE
Boston Ceasefire“Pulling Levers”
CAGI “Spergel Model”
SOCIAL SERVICEINFORMAL
Chicago Ceasefire “Violence Interrupters”
34
Traditional Research Model
Researchers were outsiders in problem-solving process Not involved in problem identification Observers, not participants, in program
development and implementation Involved only as independent evaluators of
impact• What went wrong? (i.e., the complainers)
– You should have done x, y, and z.
35
Action Research Model
Active, ongoing partnership between researchers and practitioner agencies
Use research process to help solve local problems Data collection to identify and understand
problems Strategic analysis to develop targeted
interventions Program monitoring and feedback for
refinement Assessment of impact
36
Data-Driven Problem Analysis
Gather data on the selected crime problem, including its sources, victims, offenders, and settings
Analyze the data to identify specific aspects and components of the problem
37
Focused Interventions andLinking to Evidence-Based Practice
Research facilitates: Developing focused interventions aimed
at reducing the specific sources and components of the crime problem
Implementing these focused intervention strategies utilizing the resources and expertise of the working group partners
Basing interventions on “best” practices and “promising” strategies
38
Monitor the implementation of the interventions
Provide constant assessment and feedback on the conduct and effects of the interventions
Modify and refine the interventions based on feedback assessments
Evaluate the impacts of the interventions on the service delivery system and on the targeted crime problem
Monitoring, Feedback, and Evaluation
39
Background on Research Partnerships
Evolution from Boston Ceasefire (The Boston Miracle) Strategic Approaches to Community Safety
Initiative (SACSI) Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) Drug Market Initiative (DMI) Smart Policing and Intelligence Led Policing
40
Boston Ceasefire Foundation
Two Aspects to Boston Ceasefire Focused deterrence, “pulling levers”
strategy Systematic problem solving process
Multi-agency working group Problem solving model Police-researcher partnership
41
Boston Ceasefire: Focus on Youth Violence
Problem AnalysisSmall Proportion
YouthsInvolved street gangs
and crews
Strategies focused on those at
highest risk for violence
42
Intelligence Led Problem Solving
Violence Problem
Problem Analysis
Strategy
Implemen-tation
Assessment and Feedback
43
Evidence of Impact: Boston Ceasefire
Two one-half years without youth homicide Homicides decreased 63% Calls for Service decreased 32% Gun assaults decreased 25%
44
Evidence of Impact: SACSI
Ten city initiative SACSI cities experience a significant
decline in violent crime when compared to non-SACSI cities
Indianapolis showed a decrease in homicide and gun assaults of 35-40%
45
Reducing Homicide Risk: Indianapolis
All 15-24 year old victims
Young white female victims
Young white male victims
Young black female victims
Young black male victims
Young black male victims in five
hotspots
All other victims0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
26.1
5.114.9 18.2
112.9
152.1
3.514.8
2.2 4.511.5
66.4
45.6
2.6
Homicide victimization risk by Groupper 10,000 residents
Pre-IVRP Post-IVRP
46
Boston and Indianapolis as Examples Research identified the highest risk individuals,
groups, and contexts
Hard work by task force partners (criminal justice officials, social services, community groups) then focused strategies on highest risk
47
Findings from Boston and SACSISuccesses resulted in development and incorporation of
strategic problem solving model in a series of major DOJ initiatives since 2001
Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative (CAGI) Drug Market Initiative (DMI) Smart Policing Initiative (SPI)
48
Project Safe Neighborhoods
Nation-wide DOJ program intended to reduce gun crime in America
94 separate programs, one for each US Attorney Office in the 50 states and territories
Based on the Action Research/Strategic Problem-Solving Model
Funding provided for a local research partner to work with each PSN task force
49
PSN Impact – Stage One
Series of site specific case studies Ten tests of impact on gun crime
Case studies Reductions in gun crime in all ten sites
Impact in two of these studies was equivocal
50
Summary of Case StudiesProject Exile• Montgomery• Mobile
Strategic Problem Solving• Lowell• Omaha• Greensboro• Winston-Salem• Chicago (Papachristos et al.)• Stockton (Braga)• St. Louis
– (significant but also drop in comparison sites)
• Raleigh – (reduction but not significant)
51
Summary of Case Studies
Sites chosen because of evidence that PSN was implemented in rigorous fashion
Thus, results not generalizable but suggest that PSN may have an impact where effectively implemented
52
PSN Impact – Stage Two
Assess impact of PSN in all U.S. cities with populations of 100,000+
Trend in violent crime 2000-01 compared to 2002-06 Compare PSN target cities with non-target cities Compare cities by level of PSN implementation
dosage
53
Measuring Implementation
Step One – composite measure Research integration Partnerships Federal prosecution
Step Two – focus on level of federal prosecution per capita and level increase
54
Step One
PSN target cities in high implementation districts experienced significant declines in violent crime in comparison to cities in low implementation districts and non-target cities
55
Step Two -Violent Crime Trends in PSN Target Cities by Federal Prosecution Level
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006850
900
950
1000
1050
1100
1150
High prosecution sites (n = 26) Medium prosecution sites (n = 29) Low prosecution sites (n = 27)
Viol
ent C
rime
Rate
per
100
,000
Pop
ulati
on
Low Prosecution
Medium Prosecution
High Prosecution
56
Violent Crime Trends in Non-PSN Sites by Federal Prosecution Level
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006400
450
500
550
600
650
700
750
800
High prosecution sites (n = 90) Medium prosecution sites (n = 42) Low prosecution sites (n = 38)
Viol
ent C
rime
Rate
per
100
,000
Pop
ulati
on
High Prosecution
Medium Prosecution
Low Prosecution
57
PSN ImpactLevel of PSN Dosage
PSN Target Cities Non-target Cities
Low -5.3% +7.8%
Medium -3.1% <-1.0%
High -13.1% -4.9%
-8.89% -0.25%
58
What’s in a Name?
Being a target city and having a higher level of dosage was significantly related to a reduction in violent crime controlling for:
Concentrated disadvantage Population density Police resources Correctional population
Source: Journal of Quantitative Criminology (2010) 26:165-190.
Drug Market Intervention (DMI)
The problem of open air drug markets
60
Drug Market Intervention (DMI)
Same principles and strategies applied to open, overt drug markets
Four Goals Eliminate the open-air drug market Return the neighborhood to the residents Reduce crime and disorder Improve the public’s safety as well as their quality of life
61
Drug Market Intervention Sites
Early “Adopter” Cities BJA DMI Training Cities
High Point, NC Baltimore, MD Memphis, TN
Winston-Salem, NC Chicago, IL Middletown, OH
Raleigh, NC Cook County, IL Milwaukee, WI
Providence, RI Durham, NC Montgomery County, MD
Rockford, IL Flint, MI New Haven, CTHempstead, NY Gary, IN New Orleans, LA
Nashville, TN Guntersville, AL Peoria, IL
Berlin, MD Indianapolis, IN Roanoke, VA
Jacksonville, FL Ocala, FL
Jefferson Parish, LA Seattle, WA
Lansing, MI
62
Offense Type Offenses Per Month - Pre
Offenses Per Month – Post
Percent Change
ARIMA Models (significance)
Violent 1.83 1.27 -30.6% <.10
Property 9.24 8.54 -7.5% NS
Nuisance/Drug 2.67 1.81 -32.2% <.10
High PointImpact on crime in the target area
63
Rockford, IL
Source: Corsaro, Brunson, and McGarrell. Forthcoming. Crime and Delinquency.
Target Area 12 month comparison pre- and post-DMI
HGLM Comparison to Trend in Remainder of City
Non-violent crime -24% <.10
Violent crime -14% NS
Jun-06Jul-0
6
Aug-06
Sep-06
Oct-06
Nov-06
Dec-06
Jan-07
Feb-07
Mar-07
Apr-07
May-07
Jun-07Jul-0
7
Aug-07
Sep-07
Oct-07
Nov-07
Dec-07
Jan-08
Feb-08
Mar-08
Apr-08
May-08
Jun-0802468
101214161820
Non-Violent Crime RatePer 1,000 Residents
Target Area Remainder of City
64
Nashville, TNTargetArea
Surrounding Area
City Wide ARIMA Models
Drug Equipment -39.5% -52.1% -9.3% <.05
Narcotics Violations -49.7% -51.0% 5.5% <.05
Violent Crimes -23.6% -24.0% -7.4% <.15
Property Crimes -28.4% -25.6% -7.0% <.05
Call for Police Service -26.1% -6.2% -5.9% <.15
The remainder of city either experienced no decline or an increase in these offenses.
Source: Corsaro, Brunson, McGarrell, (2010) Evaluation Review, 34, 6:513-548.
65
Summary
Strongest evidence in terms of reducing drug related crime
Interviews with residents in three sites indicate: Neighborhood perceived as much safer and better place to
live Appreciation for police
66
Implications
Appears to be promising approach to addressing open-air drug markets
Change in trajectory of neighborhood Neighborhood begins to look like “normal neighborhood”
67
Promising Practices
Some combination of… focused deterrence communication data-driven problem solving and linkage to opportunities,
…appears promising in reducing gun crime
68
“There is strong research evidence that the more focused and specific the strategies of the police, the more they are tailored to the problems they seek to address, the more effective the police will be in controlling crime and disorder.”
Source: National Academy of Sciences, Fairness & Effectiveness in Policing (2004: 5)
69
15 Years of Suggestive Evidence on Reducing Gun Crime
Directed Police Patrol
Project Exile Strategic Problem Solving
Equivocal Evidence
Kansas City Richmond Boston St. Louis
Indianapolis Montgomery Indianapolis Durham
Pittsburgh Mobile Los Angeles
Stockton
Lowell
Omaha
Greensboro
Winston-Salem
Chicago
Mixed Model (Combination of Above Strategies)
PSN National Assessment (all cities over 100,000 population)
Pre-PSN
70
Common Ingredients
Focused enforcement, focused deterrence Systematic problem solving process
Multi-agency working group Problem solving model Police-researcher partnership
An Evaluation of the Comprehensive Anti-Gang
Initiative (CAGI)
Edmund McGarrell, Ph.D.Michigan State University
Chris Melde, Ph.D. Timothy Bynum, Ph.D.Michigan State University Michigan State University
Nicholas Corsaro, Ph.D.University of Cincinnati
Disclaimer
This project was supported by Award #2007-IJ-CX-0035 awarded by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions, findings and conclusions are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Justice.
Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative
What is the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative? Project Safe Neighborhoods(94 US Attorney’s Offices) Spergel/OJJDP Comprehensive Model
A lesson in paradigm shifts and paradigm clashes. Successes and failures of CAGI
WWTJDILTP41? (Klein or Maxson, ? through Davidson (MSU), ?)
Painful lessons learned from Ignaz Semmelweis and Dan Ariely
Stopping the Cycle of Gang Violence
Youth Exposed to Incarceration/ Violence Re-
entry
Involvement with Getting into Guns, Violence,
Gangs Drugs
Continuum of Promising Practices for Comprehensive Gang Intervention
SUPPRESSIONDETERRENCE
Boston Ceasefire“Pulling Levers”
CAGI “Spergel Model”
SOCIAL SERVICEINFORMAL
Chicago Ceasefire “Violence Interrupters”
Components of the Spergel Model The Comprehensive Community-Wide
Gang Program Model 1) Community Mobilization
• Development of a community-wide working group 2) Social Intervention
• Street workers that mentor youth. Bridge to institutions.
3) Opportunity Provision• Employment, education, service
4) Organizational Change• Policies and practices routinely fail “at-risk” youth
5) Suppression• Specialized gang units, intensive probation,
prosecution
CAGI Details: Funding Areas
1) Enforcement and Prosecution ($1 million) Collaboration of local and federal law
enforcement• Intelligence sharing and case coordination
Collaboration of local and federal prosecution 2) Prevention and Intervention ($1
million) The prevention and intervention strategy
provides gang focused programming to youth at high risk for gang involvement
3) Prisoner Reentry ($500,000) The prisoner reentry strategy provides
mentoring, social services, and treatment to gang-involved offenders returning to “the” community from prison.
Participating CAGI Sites
Original Six (2006) Cleveland (OH-ND) Dallas/Fort Worth (TX-ND) Los Angeles (CA-CD) Milwaukee (WI-ED) Pennsylvania Corridor (PA-ED) Tampa (FL-MD)
Subsequent Four (2007) Indianapolis (IN-SD) Oklahoma City (OK-ED) Rochester (NY-WD) Raleigh/Durham (NC-ED and NC-MD)
Final Two (2008) Chicago (IL-ND) Detroit (MI-ED)
Average Violent Crime Trends between 2002-2009 (Violent Crime Rate per 100,000)
Law Enforcement Results
Process Evaluation Results suggest that law enforcement was quick to implement, and included 5 sites that engaged in policing strategies highly consistent with the model. Data Driven Targeted Solid Cases
No usable gang data in 10 of 12 sites. No overall program effect on violent crime.
Coefficient in the right direction, not significant
Law Enforcement Implementation Ranking and Changes in Violent Crime (High Imp. = 15% reduction in violent crime)
Reentry? The reentry component of the intervention
was not suitable for an outcome analysis. Poor planning led to the inability to identify
and serve the intended population.• Six sites did not become “operational” until 2009 or
after.• Only 5 sites met targeted number of clients.
Program assumed inmates would return to original neighborhood, which was not realized. No data driven planning; based on perception
A common complaint was that the program did not always deliver on promises. Economic collapse and job market in 2008.
Prevention and Intervention Weed and Seed Philosophy Identifying those most at-risk for gang
membership and violence. Gang members, while a small fraction of the
population, account for roughly 50 to 75 percent of violent crime in some U.S. locations.
Just target the bad apples (simple right?) How do we identify them? Who do we ask? Where do we get our information?
Extant research suggested problems in targeting the correct population.
• African American Male School Dropout Rate = 75%• Overall graduation rate = 43%• School District wanted to know the needs of students.
• Cleveland awarded grant to implement CAGI• Wanted a standardized instrument to help identify youth
most at-risk for gang membership.
• The Global Risk Assessment Device (GRAD) (Gavazzi et al., 2003)– 1) Those targeted as part of the CAGI (n = 146)– 2) A general sample of African American males
attending public high school (n = 1,438)
A Unique Opportunity: Cleveland, OH
Risk Domains• Four Risk Domains were evaluated across the two
samples:– Disrupted Family Processes (17 items)
– Sub-Domains: Conflict; Parental Tiptoeing; Hardship– Mental Health (26 items)
– Sub-Domains: Internalizing; Externalizing; ADHD– Educational Risks (12 items)
– Sub-Domains: Disruptive Classroom Behavior; Threats to Educational Progress; Learning Difficulties
– Delinquent Peers (sub-scale) (3 items)• Associate with Gangs, Involved with Gangs, Delinquent Friends
Hypothesis• Those targeted as part of the CAGI will report
more risk than the non-targeted general school-based sample in each domain.– The targeted sample was suppose to represent the
youth most at-risk of gang membership from high gang areas.
– The non-targeted sample represents African American males attending public high schools across the city.
Sample Description CAGI Sample
146 African American males Ages 14 to 17 (mean = 15.9, s.d. = .9)
General School-Based Sample 1,438 African American males Ages 14 to 17 (mean = 15.5, s.d. = .8)
Results Red = CAGI Blue = School
Education Family Mental Health Peer Group
5.615.12
10.83
2.03
5.25
6.66*
13.56*
2.33*
Level of Risk by Domain and Target Group
WWTJDILTP41? (Klein or Maxson, ?)Common Hurdles to Program Fidelity
1) The idea that “something is better than nothing.” Reality: Half-hearted implementation of
programs designed for high-risk youth fair no better than no implementation at all (Kovaleski et. al., 1999).
2) Insufficient “buy in” on the part of program providers. Effect: Program providers deviate from the
plan; implementation slippage leads to little dosage (Ruiz-Primo, 2005).
Painful Lesson from Ignaz and Ariely 3) “Buy in” is
simply not enough. Many people bought in
to CAGI Ignaz Semmelweis,
M.D. (1818 – 1865) A simple solution
4) Must be easily integrated into routine! “What about us?” Working with high risk
youth is difficult. Dan Ariely, Ph.D.
(Duke University)
Paradigm Shifts and Paradigm Clashes
RISK Law enforcement
have an easier time implementing risk focused interventions. It is how they view
the world; it is what they do.
Implementation of data driven programs is now commonplace.
NEED Social service
providers view the world differently. Identify subjects in
need, and do their best to remedy those needs.
Many youth are in need, but few youth are at risk.
Not Implemented As Intended
Law Enforcement
Prevention/Intervention
Re-entry
The State of the Spergel Model
When done with sufficient fidelity, the program appears to reduce violence.
The ability of jurisdictions to implement, let alone sustain, such a model is severely limited.
Chicago Ceasefire: Too Big to Fail?
Understanding the spread of a “popular” violence intervention
The Origins of Chicago Ceasefire
How it works Understanding Violence as a “Behavior”
How do we learn behavior? Unconscious imitation/modeling Social Pressure
Symbolic Interactionism (“Looking Glass Self”) “Fear of being called chicken is almost certainly the
leading cause of death and injury from youth violence in the United States” (Zimring, 1998: 80).
Shame vs. Guilt (Code of the Street, Made in America) Understanding Violence as an “Epidemic”
If violence acts like an epidemic, why not treat it as an epidemic?
Stopping Epidemics
Public Health Model of Intervention 1. Interrupt Transmission
• Limit Transmissibility 2. Who is most “at-risk” for infection?
• Target the risks and needs associated with high risk people.
– Clean needle program in emergency rooms.– Free condoms at health clinics.
3. Change group norms?• Much the same as smoking, condom use, seat belts etc.
– Every needle pack comes with literature on the effects of drugs on the body.
Violence Interrupters
“Carefully” chosen interventionists Why do they have to be “carefully” chosen? Potential Political Fallout
How did they find their clients? Past programs that have tried to target “at-risk”
youth have failed to garner the correct clientele. Why?
How did Chicago Ceasefire try to overcome this deficiency?
Outreach Workers
Behavior change in the long-term Violence interrupters and the outreach staff
were not one in the same. Modeling
Service referral
Ongoing guidance
Change Group Norms
Multiple Messengers; Same Message
How did Ceasefire Chicago deliver a unified message? What were their tactics?
Science Necessitates Replication
Wilson and Chermak (2011) Both professors at Michigan State University
Evaluation: One Vision One Life Program Pittsburgh, PA Community-based intervention in the mold of
Ceasefire Chicago• Utilized Violence Interrupters• Utilized Outreach Workers• DID NOT utilize police to the same extent as Chicago
– No legal deterrent message from police or prosecutors.
Results of the Evaluation
No impact on homicide in target neighborhoods, relative to comparison communities.
Aggravated assault and gun assault rates increased in the target neighborhoods relative to comparison neighborhoods.
There was evidence of a “spillover” effect of the program on adjacent neighborhoods. Neighborhoods around Southside experienced
increases in aggravated and gun assaults.
What does this mean?
Regression Effect in Chicago? How do we promote informal social
control? How can we coerce residents to take control of
their neighborhood? How can we document the “work” of the
violence interrupters? Needed for replication
Gang Cohesion and Violence External (real or perceived) pressure creates
cohesion.
Violence Interrupters are NOT NEW
Tita and Papachristos (2010) reviewed these efforts in Chicago, Boston, and LA in the 1960s, wherein they were found to have no, or even iatrogenic, effects. Sounds familiar
Other replications of Chicago Ceasefire have had mixed findings as well. Baltimore, MD- Mixed Newark, NJ- No effects
Is Chicago Ceasefire “Too Big to Fail?”
Science and Policy move at different speeds. Chicago Ceasefire started over a decade ago. Policymakers wanted results quickly
Without scientific outcome analyses, they based decisions on word of mouth “success” stories.
Breaking down the evaluation of Skogan. Network data suggested two (3?) of seven target
neighborhoods had evidence of success. Papachristos (2011)
Hot Spot analyses found three successful neighborhoods. Block and Block mapping analysis (Papachristos, 2011)
Is Chicago Ceasefire “Too Big to Fail?”
If we are treating homicide like an epidemic (i.e., a public health model), why not treat the results the same way? If HIV treatment was found to increase HIV
cases in some places, would we continue to fund such programs?
If cancer treatment was found to increase cancer cases in some places, would we continue to fund such programs?
Ceasefire is being replicated in numerous places, with more trainings being requested.
Resources for Identifying What Works, and What Does Not
Office of Justice Programs: Crime Solutions http://www.crimesolutions.gov/default.aspx
Blueprint Series: University of Colorado http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints/
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) http://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/Default.aspx