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2004 by JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH, Inc. Vol. 31 June 2004All rights reserved. 0093-5301/2004/3101-0004$10.00

A Sound Idea: Phonetic Effects of BrandNames on Consumer JudgmentsERIC YORKSTONGEETA MENON*

In this article we examine a phenomenon known as sound symbolism, where thesound of a word conveys meanings. Specifically, brand names are composed ofindividual sounds called phonemes and we investigate how this phonetic structureof brand names affects a consumers evaluation of products and their underlyingattributes. We demonstrate that consumers use information they gather from pho-nemes in brand names to infer product attributes and to evaluate brands. We alsodemonstrate that the manner in which phonetic effects of brand names manifestis automatic in as much as it is uncontrollable, outside awareness and effortless.

Sound symbolism, the linguistic process in which thesounds of a word provide cues about the words mean-ing, is not a new phenomenon. Plato first described the effectin the dialogues of Cratylus, and authors throughout timehave used the sounds in words to describe people (e.g., theminiature Lilliputians and the giant Brobdingnagians inSwifts Gullivers Travels) and objects (e.g., the large, dan-gerous Bludgers, the big, round Quaffle, and the small, fastGolden Snitch in the Quidditch game in Rowlings HarryPotter and the Sorcerers Stone) represented by those words.When presented with fictitious or unfamiliar words, indi-viduals consistently use sound symbolism to interpret mean-ings from the name about the referenced object (Jacobsonand Waugh 1987; Sapir 1929). The effect is extremely welldocumented whether the tested individuals native languageis English (Klink 2000, 2001), Chinese (Klank, Huang, andJohnson 1971; Lapolla 1994), or even Navajo (Sapir 1929).In fact, sound symbolism has been observed to exist innative languages in North America, Latin America, Asia,Australia, and Africa, as well as more developed languagessuch as English, Finnish, French, German, Modern Greek,and Japanese (for a complete discussion of these examplessee Hinton, Nichols, and Ohala 1994).

*Eric Yorkston is assistant professor of marketing, University of South-ern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0443 (e-mail: yorkston@marshall.usc.edu). Geeta Menon is Harold MacDowell Faculty Fellow and associateprofessor of marketing, New York University, New York, NY 10012-1126(e-mail: gmenon@stern.nyu.edu). This article is based on the doctoral dis-sertation of the first author under the supervision of the second. The authorsthank members of the dissertation committee, Adamantios Gafos, EricGreenleaf, and Vicki Morwitz, for their helpful comments during the dif-ferent stages of this project. The authors acknowledge the data collectionassistance provided by Sucharita Chandran, Andrea Morales, and ManojThomas. In addition, the authors are especially grateful to the JCR editors,Dawn Iacobucci and David Mick, the associate editor, and three reviewersfor their constructive feedback during the review process.

Past research on sound symbolism has focused on twoaspects: the range of the effect (i.e., its universality; Huang,Pratoomaraj, and Johnson 1969) and the aspects of meaningit affects (Klink 2000, 2001; Ohala 1994). Less is knownabout the sound symbolism process itself. For instance, re-search has examined how linguistic classifiers affect cate-gorization schema (Schmitt and Zhang 1998), and how anindividuals formal writing system (i.e., logographic vs. pho-netic) affects processing (Schmitt, Pan, and Tavassoli 1994;Tavassoli and Han 2001). Yet we do not know how or whyindividuals use sound symbolism as a source of object mean-ing. Current research has neither revealed whether this is acontrolled strategy or an automatic process nor has it ex-amined conditions when sound symbolism is utilized. Theeffect is well established, but we still lack understanding ofthe process by which it occurs.

Sound symbolism has been recently recognized as an im-portant factor in how individuals infer specific meaning fromunfamiliar brand names (Klink 2000, 2001). A brand nameis composed of individual sounds called phonemes. Thesephonemes serve two purposes. First, they are the basic build-ing blocks of language and are combined to form syllablesand, in turn, words. These words and the syllables fromwhich they are composed supply what we traditionally thinkof as the meaningful units of a brand name. Second, pho-nemes can provide meaning themselves through sound sym-bolism. These sounds provide cues about how the brandmay perform on particular attribute dimensions. We theorizethat if a brand name has phonemes that represent attributesa consumer desires, consumers will hold more positive at-titudes and exhibit higher purchase intentions toward thatbrand. The current article provides a demonstration of theprocess by which sound symbolism manifests in consumerjudgments. We demonstrate that the process is uncontrol-lable, outside of awareness, and effortless, making it au-

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tomatic (Bargh 1989). By understanding the underlying, the-oretical processes of sound symbolism, we achieve greaterunderstanding of how consumers interpret brand names anduse them to evaluate brands.

Like Klink (2000, 2001), we examine the effects ofsounds symbolism on attribute perceptions, but in addition,in our research we examine their effects on brand evalua-tions as well, using a more subtle between-subjects design.Unlike Klink (2000, 2001), our primary objective is to de-lineate the automaticity of the underlying process by whichphonetic effects occur.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKSounds, and the resulting aural frequencies, are based

upon the position and curvature of the tongue in the mouth,ranging from a high-front to low-back position (see Klink2000 for a review). The affective meanings generated bysound symbolism follow a similar pattern. These vowelsounds roughly form an ordered sound-symbolic list: [e],[i], [e], [a], [a], [o], [o], [a], [u], and [u] (e.g., beat, bit, bet,bait, bat, boat, bought, posh, but, put, and boot). The ex-istence of this hierarchy is fairly consistent across languages(Makino, Nakada, and Ohso 1999). Sound symbolism con-veys information such that high-front vowels (e.g., ee inflea and i in fly) represent associations with smaller size andless power than low-back vowels (e.g., the ow in bout andoo in boot), which, in turn, connote greater size, and morepower (Hinton et al. 1994; Makino et al. 1999). In an em-pirical demonstration, Klink (2000) showed that the use offront vowels (as opposed to the back vowels) in brand namesconveys attribute qualities of smallness, lightness, mildness,thinness, fastness, coldness, bitterness, femininity, weak-ness, lightness, and prettiness. Furthermore, Klink (2001)demonstrated the interactive effects of sound symbolismwith semantic meaning in affecting consumers evaluationsof various brands.

Consistent with Klink (2000, 2001), we expect that whenconsumers encounter a brand name, they infer attributemeaning. In testing our theory, we used the longer, broader[a] sound (as in bother and chop) from the middle of thephonetic vowel scale and contrasted it against the shorter,tighter [i] sound (as in kiss and nymph) from the lighter,sharper, smaller, end of the sound-symbolism scale. Thederivation of the pair of sounds that we use in our experi-ments is a function of the theory associated with the positionof the tongue in the mouth (OGrady, Dobrovolsky, andKatumba 1997). The chosen pair of vowel sounds we test([i] and [a]) are not the extremes on either end of this scale.For example, the sounds ee and oo lie nearer the two re-spective endpoints of the phonetic-symbolic spectrum. Thus,the vowel pairing we use (i.e., [i] and [a]) may be considereda more conservative test of the sound symbolism hypothesis.An additional consideration in our decision to test only onesound pair was our strong desire to control for latent se-mantic associations that could interfere with our studies (adiscussion of how we controlled for semantic associationsis below). Since the goal of our research was not merely to

provide further support for the phenomenon of sound sym-bolism but to understand the process by which sound sym-bolism affects meaning, we decided that the advantagesgained by ruling out this alternative hypothesis outweighedthe costs of limiting the range of tested vowels. Formally,our baseline hypothesis is

H1: Consumers will evaluate the individual attributesof brand names with the phonetic [a] sound heav-ier than attributes of brand names with the pho-netic [i] sound.

Stated simply, sound symbolism affects attribute percep-tions. This raises the possibility that consumers use the brandname as a phonetic cue regardless of perceived value of thisinformation. We are now left with the question of whenexactly consumers are affected by the phonetics of brandnames. We posit that consumers attempt to strategically usethe brand name as information when they perceive it tosupply diagnostic information. Alternately, consumers willattempt to ignore, and adjust for, the phonetic meaning insituations where the brand name is perceived as less diag-nostic. Thus,

H2: The effects of brand names on attribute percep-tions will be moderated by the perceived diag-nosticity of the brand name, such that, the pho-netic effects of brand names will manifest onlywhen the brand name is described as the true ver-sus the test name.

It has been documented recently that a large number ofconsumer decisions are nonconscious (see Bargh 2002 fora review). Bargh (1989) asserts that a process may have oneor more of the four automatic criteria to be differentiatedfrom a conscious or controlled process; that is, a process isautomatic if it is effortless, unintentional, used outside ofawareness, or uncontrollable. We investigate the automatic-ity of sound symbolism effects in this article.

If sound symbolism manifests automatically and is usedin an uncontrollable fashion, then participants who are toldthat the phonetic information is nondiagnostic after theyhave experienced the brand name information should notbe able to completely discount the phonetic information.This is because if the process is partly automatic, peopleare either unaware of or unable to control for the incor-poration of phonetic effects in their judgments (Bargh 1989,2002). On the other hand, if the experienced effects of soundsymbolism are discounted at the time it is felt, then it shouldnot enter into the judgment. Specifically,

H3: The timing of information about the diagnosticityof brand names will moderate the effects of soundsymbolism on attribute perceptions, such that:a) When this information is provided at the same

time as the brand name information (i.e., soundsymbolism can be discounted while being ex-perienced), the phonetic effects will be erasedin the low diagnosticity condition, and willmanifest in the high diagnosticity condition (as

PHONETIC EFFECTS OF BRAND NAMES ON JUDGMENTS 45

predicted in hypothesis 2).b) When this information is provided after the

brand name information (i.e., sound symbolismhas been experienced), the basic phonetic effectswill manifest in both the low and high diag-nosticity conditions (as predicted in hypothesis1).

It is also possible that phonetic effects manifest effort-lessly. Gilbert (1989) suggests that the automatic process injudgment formation is a two-stage process comprising ofthe initial anchor based on an automatic input, and the sub-sequent correction (e.g., incorporating ignored inputs, orcorrecting weights) performed in a more controlled manner.For example, in experiments on stereotype activation anduse, Gilbert and Hixon (1991) found that the application ofan activated stereotype was moderated by the availabilityof cognitive resources. Those with capacity constraints wereless likely to engage in corrective adjustments to the au-tomatically activated stereotypes.

If an automatic source of information is used (i.e., thesound symbolism of the brand name) together with a con-trolled input (i.e., information about the diagnosticity of thebrand name), then the automatic input will have a greatereffect when cognitive resources are constrained than whenthey are abundantly available (Bargh and Thein 1985; Gil-bert, Pelham, and Krull 1988). With increased cognitiveload, information that is automatically processed will havea proportionately greater impact on judgments as many ofthe conscious, effort-requiring adjustments will not be pos-sible (Bargh and Thein 1985; Gilbert 1989). In the currentstudy, we use Gilberts load paradigm to reverse the mod-erating effect of diagnosticity and replicate the basic pho-netic effect when cognitive constraints are imposed. Thus,

H4: Cognitive capacity will moderate the effects ofsound symbolism on attribute perceptions, suchthat:a) Under conditions of normal cognitive capacity,

the phonetic effects will be erased in the lowdiagnosticity condition, and will manifest inthe high diagnosticity condition (as predictedin hypothesis 2).

b) Under conditions of impaired cognitive capac-ity, the diagnosticity of the brand name willnot have an effect and the basic phonetic ef-fects will manifest (as predicted in hypothesis1).

We now present two studies that were designed to testthese hypotheses.

STUDY 1Method

Choice of Stimuli. We chose ice cream as the productcategory for the studies reported in this article, as it producedhigh interest and involvement among the student population,was likely to be purchased in the near future, and elicitedproduct evaluations that incorporated a small number ofattributes. An initial pretest ( ) established that icenp 48cream attributes consisted of three main factors: taste, cost,and calorie content. Since taste was reported as the mostprimary attribute and is a fairly ambiguous one, we furtherexplored the underlying factors of taste. When participantswere asked to elaborate upon taste, the attributes of smooth-ness, creaminess, richness, and sweetness emerged. Ourfindings were corroborated by a Consumer Reports (1994)article on ice cream that discussed taste in their overall brandcomments using the terms creamy, rich, smooth, andsweet. Our pretest, however, indicated that although peo-ple, in general, preferred creamier, richer, and smoother icecreams, preference for sweetness was more divided. There-fore, the final attributes we used were smoothness, cream-iness, and richness, three attributes that consumers prefermore of, and that may be communicated by the sound sym-bolism of the brand name.

The first goal in designing the brand names for the studieswas to develop two names that were fictitious and eitheravoided or controlled for other linguistic complexities. Sincewe were examining the symbolic differences between the[a] and [i] sounds, we held all consonants in the wordsconstant, avoiding hard consonants, since their rough soundsymbolizes attributes that contradict those desired in ourproduct category of ice cream (Schloss 1981; Vanden Berghet al. 1984).

The second goal was to have two names that were con-sidered similar. Besides balancing the names phonetically,we pretested five pairs of names that met the above phoneticrequirements. Forty-four undergraduate participants rankedthe 10 names, with one being the name most likely to bean ice cream name and 10 being the name least likely tobe an ice cream. Frosh and Frish best met the criterion ofbeing equally likely to be an ice cream name (Msp

and 3.55, respectively, NS). These were also the most3.33preferred mean rankings among all the product names.

Based on this pretest and our research goals, we chosethe names Frosh and Frish differing only on the phoneticsounds [a] and [i]. In general, the [a] sound is associatedwith perceptions of objects being bigger, heavier, slower,and duller. The [i] sound, on the other hand, is associatedwith perceptions of the object being smaller, lighter, livelier,and sharper. Therefore, in the context of ice creams, weexpect the [a] sound in Frosh to communicate a smoother,creamier, and richer ice cream than the [i] sound in Frish.

To ensure that a phonetic distinction manifesting throughaffective meaning drove the evaluations of the two brandnames, we examined the denotative meaning evoked bythese names through another pretest. We asked 56 partici-

46 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH

pants to list the first three words that came to their mindwhen they thought of the ice cream name. A content analysiswas performed to ensure that there were no common wordassociations that could be moderating the brand name eval-uations. Two independent coders blind to the hypothesesclassified the resulting 167 words as positive, negative, orneutral when describing an ice cream. Coders classificationsmatched in 84.4% of the cases. Disagreement between cod-ers was settled through discussion. Frosh and Frish gener-ated equivalent numbers of positive (30 vs. 28), negative(10 vs. 13), and neutral (43 vs. 43) semantic associations( , NS). Therefore, as desired, the two names were2x ! 1well matched in terms of semantic associations. In general,of all the semantic associations the names generated, 34.7%were positive (e.g., frosty and fresh), 51.5% were neutral(e.g., name and Irish), and 13.8% were negative (e.g., frogand fish).

Design. We used a 2 (sound symbolism of brand name)# 2 (diagnosticity of brand name) # 2 (timing of diag-nosticity information) between-subjects design. Sound sym-bolism was manipulated using Frish and Frosh. We manip-ulated the diagnosticity of the brand name by informingparticipants that the brand name was either a true name(high diagnosticity) or a test name (low diagnosticity) atthe time they first encountered the brand name. Participantsin the true name (i.e., high diagnosticity) condition wereinformed that the brand name in the press release was thename that would eventually be used once the product cameto market. Participants in the test name (i.e., low diagnos-ticity) condition were informed that the brand name in thepress release was only for testing purposes and would notbe the name of the ice cream when it was released to thepublic. Further, in order to manipulate the timing of thediagnosticity information, this information was provided ei-ther simultaneously with the names of the ice cream orafterward.

Procedure. One hundred and twenty-six undergraduatestudents in a large northeastern university participated in thestudy for partial course credit. Participants read a paragraphstating that a new ice cream was to be introduced into thearea and were asked to read a press release (containing ourmanipulations) describing the planned promotional activitiesthat were to accompany the ice cream debut. After readingthe press release, participants evaluated the ice cream on itsrichness, smoothness, and creaminess. They then reportedtheir overall evaluation of the ice cream, and their intentionsto purchase it. At the end of the questionnaire, participantsreported how much the brand name reminded them of anice cream, listed their ice cream consumption, and assessedthe difficulty of the brand evaluation task. Finally, they wereasked how involved they were in the study and whether theywere aware of using the information gathered from the brandname. The participants were then debriefed and dismissed.

Results

Manipulation and Confound Checks. In order to con-firm that our manipulation of the diagnosticity of the icecream name worked as intended, we conducted 2 (brandname) # 2 (diagnosticity) # 2 (timing) ANOVA on thelikelihood that the ice cream name revealed to participantswould be used as the brand name when ice cream was finallylaunched. This ANOVA indicated a main effect of diag-nosticity such that participants who were told that the nameof the ice cream was a test name believed that the brandname in the press release was less likely to be an ice creamname than individuals in the true name condition (Msp

vs. 4.10; , ). No other effect2.60 F(1, 117)p 17.56 p ! .01was significant ( ).p 1 .05

A similar analysis on ratings of involvement revealed thatparticipants reported equal involvement in the study irre-spective of condition (overall , all contrastmeanp 4.39

), indicating that our manipulation of the diagnosticityF ! 1of the brand name was not confounded with consumer in-volvement. Finally, the reported frequency of ice cream con-sumption did not vary across experimental conditions.

Hypotheses Tests. We created an Attribute PerceptionIndex using the attribute evaluations of creaminess, richness,and smoothness evaluations (Cronbachs ) and aap .86Brand Evaluation Index using an average of the overallevaluation and purchase intention (Cronbachs ).ap .81We used a 2 (sound symbolism of brand name: Frish vs.Frosh) # 2 (diagnosticity of brand name: test vs. true) #2 (timing: simultaneous vs. after) ANCOVA (with the levelof involvement in purchase decisions in the product categoryas a covariate) to test the hypotheses. For our hypothesesto be supported, we should obtain a significant three-wayinteraction (hypothesis 3), made up of a two-way interactionbetween brand name and diagnosticity in the simultaneouscondition (hypothesis 3a), and a main effect of brand namein the after condition (hypothesis 3b). Note that support forhypothesis 3a is also support for hypothesis 2, and supportfor hypothesis 3b is support for our baseline hypothesis.

(i) Attribute Perception Index. We conducted a 2#ANCOVA on the Attribute Perception Index that re-2# 2

vealed the predicted three-way interaction (F(1, 117)p, ). In addition, the main effect of brand name3.84 p ! .05

was significant ( , ). Means areF(1, 117)p 9.51 p ! .01graphically presented in figure 1.

In order to investigate the significant three-way interac-tion, we first examined the simple effects of the 2 (soundsymbolism) # 2 (diagnosticity of the brand name) effectsfor the condition when the diagnostic information was si-multaneously provided with the brand names. ThisANCOVA revealed a significant two-way interaction( , ), accompanied by a significantF(1, 121)p 4.34 p ! .05main effect of brand name ( , ).F(1, 121)p 10.07 p ! .01When the name was described as true, participants utilizedthe sound symbolism and evaluated the associated attributesfor Frosh higher than Frish ( vs. 4.25; contrastMsp 5.06

PHONETIC EFFECTS OF BRAND NAMES ON JUDGMENTS 47

FIGURE 1

STUDY 1 RESULTS

NOTE.Attribute ratings as a function of timing of diagnostic information (Attribute Perception Index).

, ). Individuals presented with a testF(1, 122)p 4.43 p ! .05brand name discounted the diagnosticity of the name andevaluated Frish equivalent to Frosh on the attributes (Frish

vs. Frosh ; contrast ). These re-Mp 4.36 Mp 4.08 F ! 1sults support hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3a.

Next, we conducted a similar analysis of the simple2# 2effects when diagnostic information was provided after thesound symbolism was encountered. Consistent with hy-pothesis 3b, analysis revealed only a main effect of soundsymbolism ( , ). Frosh ( )F(1, 118)p 9.94 p ! .01 Mp 5.00was rated higher than Frish ( ) on the AttributeMp 4.09Perception Index regardless of whether the name was de-scribed as a true or test name. The results support hypothesis3a. Hypothesis 1 is also further supported as the baselinesound symbolism effect again manifests.

(ii) Brand Evaluation Index. We predicted a similarset of results using brand evaluations as the dependent mea-sure. A ANCOVA on the Brand Evaluation In-2# 2# 2dex revealed the predicted three-way interaction( , ). As with the Attribute Percep-F(1, 118)p 4.78 p ! .05tion Index, the main effect of brand name was significant( , ); no other effect was significant.F(1, 118)p 9.39 p ! .01

Given the significant three-way interaction, we examinedthe simple effects of the 2 (sound symbolism) # 2 (diag-nosticity of the brand name) design separately by the timingof the diagnostic information. In the condition where thediagnostic information was provided after the sound sym-bolism was encountered, analysis revealed a significant in-teraction ( , ), accompanied by a sig-F(1, 121)p 7.77 p ! .01nificant main effect of brand name ( ,F(1, 121)p 10.83

). When the name was described as true, participantsp ! .01used the sound symbolism and evaluated the associated at-tributes for Frosh higher than Frish ( vs. 3.97;Msp 5.12contrast , ). Individuals presentedF(1, 122)p 8.14 p ! .01with a test brand name discounted the diagnosticity of the

name and evaluated Frish equivalent to Frosh on the attrib-utes (Frish vs. Frosh ; contrast ).Mp 4.50 Mp 4.16 F ! 1These results support hypotheses 2 and 3a.

A similar analysis of the simple effects completes2# 2the replication of our attribute perception findings for overallbrand evaluations. When the diagnostic information wasprovided simultaneously with the sound symbolism of thebrand names, the main effect of sound symbolism was sig-nificant ( , ), such that FroshF(1, 121)p 9.29 p ! .01( ) was rated higher than Frish ( ) on theMp 4.84 Mp 4.00Brand Evaluation Index regardless of whether the name wasdescribed as true or test, supporting hypothesis 1 and hy-pothesis 3b.

Awareness of Influence of Phonetic Effects. We alsoexamined participants ratings of whether the brand nameaffected their evaluations by conducting a 2# 2# 2ANOVA. These ratings were elicited on a seven-point, se-mantic differential scale anchored at Brand names did notinfluence my evaluations at all and Brand names influ-enced my evaluations a lot. This analysis revealed no sig-nificant effect, with the mean for the sample at a 2.68 on ascale of seven ( ), with a higher number in-midpointp 4dicating a higher level of awareness. We then computed acorrelation between these ratings and the Attribute Percep-tion Index (see Wegener, Petty, and Dunn 1998). The cor-relation was nonsignificant ( ), indicating unawarenessp 1 .6on the part of the participants of the influence of brand nameson judgments.

DiscussionThe results of this study provide evidence that sound

symbolism influences attribute perceptions (hypothesis 1).However, the phonetic effects of brand names can be un-dercut by alternate information at the time at which brand

48 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH

names are encountered that discredits the effects of soundsymbolism. Our findings suggest that when information re-garding the diagnosticity of the brand name is provided atthe time the name is encountered, consumers can controlwhether or not to process the underlying sound symbolism(hypothesis 2). However, the use of sound symbolism inbrand perceptions is not completely in the individuals con-trol. The individuals inability to discount a brand name thatis demonstrated to be nondiagnostic after their initial en-counter with the name attests to the uncontrollable mannerin which phonetic effects manifest (hypothesis 3). This studyalso provides initial evidence that participants are unawareof using sound symbolism as an input in judgments. Ournext study tests whether the use of sound symbolism iseffortless, a third element of an automatic process.

STUDY 2

Method

Design. To test hypothesis 4, we used a 2 (sound sym-bolism of brand name) # 2 (diagnosticity of brand name)# 2 (cognitive capacity) between-subjects design. Soundsymbolism was again manipulated using Frish and Frosh.The diagnosticity of the brand name was manipulated asbefore by informing participants that the name was a trueversus a test name at the time the brand name informationwas encountered (i.e., the simultaneous condition in study1). Finally, participants were read a list of numbers and hadto count the number of times the experimenter said the wordfive in the condition in which cognitive capacity was im-paired. Participants in the normal cognitive capacity con-dition did not undertake this task.

Procedure. One hundred and eleven undergraduate stu-dents in a large West Coast university participated in thestudy for partial course credit. Unlike the previous study,this study was administered on computer. As before, par-ticipants read a paragraph stating that a new ice cream wasto be introduced in the area and were asked to read a pressrelease describing the planned promotional activities thatwere to accompany the ice cream debut. Again, participantsin the true name condition were informed that the brandname in the press release was the name that would eventuallybe used once the product came to market, while the partic-ipants in the test name condition were informed that thebrand name in the press release was only for testing purposesand would not be the name of the ice cream when it wasreleased to the public. Unbeknownst to participants, the timetaken to read this initial press release was monitored. Afterreading the press release, participants evaluated the icecream overall, rated the ice cream on its richness, smooth-ness, and creaminess and stated their purchase intention.Finally, attribute importance ratings were collected. All eval-uations were elicited on 100-point sliding rule scales. Par-ticipants were then debriefed and dismissed.

Results

Manipulation Checks. To test the success of the ma-nipulation impairing cognitive capacity, we used the timetaken to read the article about the ice cream as an indicationof task difficulty. A ANOVA on the reading time2# 2# 2indicated a significant main effect of the cognitive capacitymanipulation ( , ) with participantsF(1, 103)p 7.09 p ! .01in the normal cognitive capacity condition taking less time( sec.) than those in the cognitive capacity im-Mp 30.33paired condition ( sec.).1 Thus, our manipulationMp 37.45to impair cognitive capacity was successful.

Hypotheses Tests. We used a 2 (sound symbolism ofbrand name: Frish vs. Frosh) # 2 (diagnosticity of brandname: test vs. true) # 2 (cognitive capacity: normal vs.impaired) ANOVA to test hypothesis 4. As in study 1, wecreated an Attribute Perception Index using the attributeevaluations of creaminess, richness, and smoothness (Cron-bachs ). For hypothesis 4 to be supported, weap .82should obtain a significant three-way interaction, comprisingof a two-way interaction between brand name and diag-nosticity in the normal cognitive capacity condition (hy-pothesis 2), and a main effect of brand name in the lowcognitive capacity condition (hypothesis 1).

A ANOVA on the Attribute Perception Index2# 2# 2revealed the predicted three-way interaction (F(1, 103)p

, ; see fig. 2). In addition, the main effect of3.84 p ! .05brand name was significant ( , ). NoF(1, 103)p 8.03 p ! .01other effect was significant.

Given the significant three-way interaction, we investi-gated the simple effects separately in the two cognitive loadconditions. A 2 (sound symbolism) # 2 (diagnosticity ofthe brand name) analysis in the normal cognitive capacitycondition revealed a significant interaction (F(1, 107)p

, ) accompanied by a significant main effect of4.84 p ! .05brand name ( , ). An examination ofF(1, 107)p 7.68 p ! .01the means indicates that under normal cognitive capacityand when the name was described as true participants util-ized the sound symbolism and evaluated the associated at-tributes for Frosh higher than Frish ( vs. 49.2;Mp 63.3contrast , ). Individuals presentedF(1, 108)p 5.47 p ! .05with a test brand name discounted the diagnosticity of thename and evaluated Frish equivalent to Frosh on the attrib-utes (Frish vs. Frosh ; contrast ).Mp 54.9 Mp 50.3 F ! 1These results are consistent with hypothesis 2 and supporthypothesis 4a.

Analysis of the simple effects for the impaired2# 2cognitive capacity condition revealed only a significant maineffect of sound symbolism ( , ). Re-F(1, 107)p 7.81 p ! .01gardless of whether the name was described as true or test,when respondents were cognitively impaired, Frosh (Mp

) was rated higher than Frish ( ) on the At-62.4 Mp 50.01These results were replicated through a self-reported measure of task

difficulty.

PHONETIC EFFECTS OF BRAND NAMES ON JUDGMENTS 49

FIGURE 2

STUDY 2 RESULTS

NOTE.Attribute ratings as a function of cognitive capacity (Attribute Perception Index).

tribute Perception Index; this is consistent with hypothesis1 and supports hypothesis 4b.2

DiscussionThe results of this study indicate that participants were

unable to actively discount the brand name informationwhen they were cognitively impaired. We thus obtain evi-dence for the use of sound symbolism being effortless suchthat even when cognitively impaired, the effects filterthrough to judgments. The results of this study provide cor-roborative support to the prior studys findings that the in-ferences of attribute information from brand names and thesubsequent evaluations of the brand are automatic processes.

GENERAL DISCUSSIONIn this article, we provide support for the proposition that

consumers gather and process information from brandnames in an automatic manner. However, consumers cancontrol for this provided they process information that dis-credits the brand name at the time the name is encountered.An important aspect of sound symbolism established in thisarticle is how it affects consumers attitudes at the attributelevel (hypothesis 1). Consumers may knowingly control forthe process when they have access to information that creditsor discredits the brand name at the time at which they en-counter the brand name (hypothesis 2). Yet, consumers arenot fully aware of this process and cannot fully control forthe effect; we show evidence for the uncontrollability of theeffect unless the name is discredited at the time of encoding(hypothesis 3) and the consumer is not cognitively impaired

2A similar analysis using the Brand Evaluation Index (Cronbachs) revealed an identical pattern of results; we do not report theseap .75

results here due to space constraints.

(hypothesis 4). These results provide evidence for the au-tomatic processing of brand names and their phoneticeffects.

Our purpose in this article was to understand the processunderlying sound symbolism. The basic phenomenon ofsound symbolism has been demonstrated for a wide rangeof sounds across multiple dimensions (Klink 2000). In ourarticle, we focused on the internal validity of our studies inorder to build theory about the sound symbolism process.We therefore tested one set of brand names and used abetween-subjects test of sound symbolism. This strengthensthe existing case for sound symbolism since participants arenot aware that sounds are being manipulated or that onebrand name should provide different information than an-other. Further, we increase the internal validity of the ex-periments by testing for phonetic effects when the brandname is not the only information provided to the subject.Additionally, we show that this effect carries through at-tribute perceptions to the overall evaluation of the brand.Demonstrating these effects of sound symbolism increasesour confidence in the robustness of our theory.

Automatic processes in social cognition domains havebeen demonstrated empirically in various contexts (seeBargh 1989). This article adds to this literature by dem-onstrating the automatic use of sound symbolism. This isan important issue to examine, given that if phonetic effectsmanifest even partially automatically, then this automaticeffect will exert a more consistent influence over attitudesand behavior over time (see Bargh 2002). Since sound sym-bolism is a fairly common naming device (Begley 2002), itis possible that phonetic links are highly accessible. Atti-tudes relating to the phonetic aspects of the brand namewould be automatically activated. Considering the limitedcapacity consumers usually devote to product evaluation(Hoyer 1984), the results of studies 1 and 2 indicate that

50 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH

under this diminished cognitive capacity, the phonetic ef-fects of brand names may be activated and influence choice.If brand name phonetic cues are chronically accessible, con-gruency of brand name and product would be of even greaterimportance.

Our studies tested names in which only one phoneme wasmanipulated. In most categories, where multisyllabic wordsare the norm, sound symbolism may occur in different po-sitions and/or on multiple positions in the same word. Thisflexibility would not only increase the complexity of themessage conveyed by sound symbolism but also may in-crease the strength of the effect. This article has focusedprimarily on the sound symbolism provided by the vowelsof a brand name. The role consonants play in brand namesand their effects on product evaluations is an underresear-ched area. Past research has shown that brand names thatbegin with hard consonants (i.e., Kodak and Pepsi), elicithigher recognition (Vanden Bergh et al. 1984), and occurmore frequently than we would expect from the Englishlexicon (Schloss 1981). Although linguistic anthropologistshave noted phonetic patterns for consonants (i.e., hardersounding consonants tend to represent harder, sharper ob-jects than softer sounding consonants), these findings havenot been directly tested on brand names. A systematic studyof consonants and their interaction with multiple vowels isan avenue worthy of future research.

Our studies demonstrated that sound symbolism, althoughevaluated on the attribute level, affects overall evaluations.We demonstrated that sound symbolism affected the attrib-utes of creaminess, sweetness, and richness: three categoryspecific attributes. It appears that consumers will take thebroader dimensions that sound symbolism operates upon(e.g., smallness, lightness, mildness, fastness, etc.) and ex-trapolate these findings to the specific properties of icecream. Creating a successful brand name depends not onlyupon the creation of a name that is congruent with the prod-uct category, but one that phonetically fits the positioningof the brand within that product category. Future researchcould examine whether it is possible to phonetically ma-nipulate meaning over a wide range of attributes in a broadset of product categories.

The automatic nature of the sound symbolism leads toimportant implications of this research upon the use of per-sonal names as brand names. For example, if the ice creamwas named for its maker, Joseph Frish, then the brand nameshould be seen as less diagnostic, and the phonetic effectshould not appear. This assumes that the information as tothe names origin is known at the time of encoding and thatprocessing capabilities are not constrained. Telling the con-sumer that the ice cream was named for the maker after theice cream has been tasted should have little effect uponconsumers use of sound symbolism in accordance with ourfindings. An interesting further study would be where wemanipulate the diagnosticity of the name through the use ofa personal name versus a purely fictitious name.

Over 2,000 years ago, Plato supported the onomatopoetictheory of language by arguing that words were formed by

the imitation of ideas in sounds (Jowett 1953). The argumentstill holds. Sound symbolism shows that the sounds of wordsstill convey meaning. More important, consumers recognizethis phonetic meaning and will use it as a source of productinformation. The effects of time, the influence of foreignlanguages, the desire of euphony, and elements of chanceall distill and, at times, distort the effects of sound sym-bolism. Yet even with these caveats, attending to phoneticmeanings and leveraging the attribute associations when cre-ating a brand image is sound advice when creating a newbrand name.

[David Glen Mick and Dawn Iacobucci served as editorsand Punam Anand Keller served as associate editor for

this article.]

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