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Preferred Citation: Caws, Peter. Yorick's World: Science and the Knowing Subject. Berkeley: University of California Press,c1993 1993. http://ark.cdlib.or/ark:/13!3!/ft!d"n99#!/

Yorick's World

Science and the Knowing Subject

Peter Caws

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

Berkeley Los Angeles Oxford

!!" T#e Re$e%ts o& t#e U%iersit( o& Cali&or%ia

$or %ancy and &lisabeth

Preferred Citation: Caws, Peter. Yorick's World: Science and the Knowing Subject. Berkeley: University of California Press,c1993 1993. http://ark.cdlib.or/ark:/13!3!/ft!d"n99#!/

$or %ancy and &lisabeth

PREFACE

'orick appears in the title of this book beca(se of his head)or #ore e*actly, his sk(ll. +e stands,however, #ore for the #ateriality of h(#ans than for their #ortality. he point is that he had a world,once, and he had it by virt(e of what was in his sk(ll. +a#let was no ne(roloist b(t he ot the#ateriality riht: -hy #ay not i#aination trace the noble d(st of le*ander, till he find it stoppin ab(nhole0- have #ore to say abo(t 'orick later on 2and in chapter 45. $or the #o#ent he serves

tr(th in advertisin: the reader #ay know fro# the start that in #y view if have a world, and if havescience)which is a second6order aspect of that world)it is thanks to #y individ(al e#bodi#ent aspart of a #aterial (niverse, a part that en7oys the stat(s of s(b7ect in relation to its world as ob7ect.

8cience is not in the #aterial (niverse e*cept by way of the e#bodi#ent of the knowin s(b7ect.8cience is the s(b7ects way of havin the str(ct(re of its world)the theoretical part of that world)#atch what it takes to be the str(ct(re of the (niverse. 2-atch- covers a #(ltit(de of possibilities; it isnot necessarily an e*act f(nction.5 he reality of the (niverse is hypothetical, b(t that obvio(sly doesnot #ean that the hypothesi


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earlier work, Structuralism: The Art of the Intelligible219==5, especially chapter 1, and the interestedreader #ay p(rs(e it f(rther there.

his book asse#bles in one place #ost of the #ore or less finished prod(cts of that part of #yprofessional activity over the last three

> *ii >decades which has been devoted to the philosophy of science, e*cl(din however 2with one e*ception5#aterial already p(blished in book for# in The hiloso!h" of Science: A S"stematic Account2194"5and Science and the Theor" of #alue2194?5. s the dates of those works s(est, #y #ainconcentration on this field was early in #y career; and as is clear fro# the title of the second, #yattention soon wandered fro# #ainstrea# philosophy of science to the relevance of scientific practiceto other parts of philosophy and c(lt(re. say -#ainstrea#- beca(se this is how part of the disciplinehas rearded itself, tho(h the ter# is relative. s will beco#e clear, it has not always see#ed to #e astrea# (sef(lly naviable for caroes of the reatest philosophical i#port. his is beca(se it hassyste#atically failed to pay s(fficiently serio(s attention to a precondition of its own possibility,na#ely 2as s(ested above5, the dependence of science itself, and a fortioriof any reflective analysisof science, on the enae#ent of a knowin s(b7ect)and in every case an idiosyncratic one at that.

his @(estion of the s(b7ect is one that have p(rs(ed in other do#ains. B(t #y oriinal attach#ent toscience and the philosophy of science, if te#porarily bracketed, has re#ained)to borrow ane*pression of +(sserls)-as the bracketed in the bracket,- e#erin fro# ti#e to ti#e as occasions,proble#atic or professional, have de#anded. here is a sense in which, even when enaed in so6called continental philosophy, or in the philosophical aspects of literat(re or psychoanalysis or politics, have never abandoned the realist and e#piricist stance bred into #e by physics and the philosophy ofscience. B(t instead of declinin to entertain possible ob7ects of e*perience o(tside the scientific, orref(sin the# a place in the realist sche#e of thins)as #any of #y collea(es in those do#ains tendto do) have taken it as a philosophical challene to distin(ish between different ob7ects of

e*perience, and to show how those that lie o(tside the p(rview of nat(ral science have their own clai#to reality.

n the end these lines of in@(iry have convered. do take it to be possible to draw a radical distinctionbetween the nat(ral sciences on the one hand and the social, or as now prefer to say the h(#an,sciences on the other. y way of doin this is to assin as ob7ects to the h(#an sciences 2(nder acoverin realist hypothesis5 7(st those events and processes that have, a#on their ca(sal antecedents,episodes of conscio(s h(#an intentionality, and to assin as ob7ects to the nat(ral sciences events andprocesses that have no s(ch episode a#on their ca(sal antecedents. his has in the first instancenothin to do with the #ethodoloies of the respective sciences. t is an ontoloical #ove: it has theeffect of dividin the world of #y attention into a

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nat(ral part and a h(#an part. he division is a h(#an, not a nat(ral, one)there is a sense in which weand all o(r works are a part of nat(re. B(t it is pla(sible and effective: a si#ple b(t ill(#inatine*ercise is to classify fa#iliar ob7ects in its ter#s 2assinin as ob7ects of in@(iry, to ive a @(icke*a#ple, the #echanis#s of into*ication and the principles of the prod(ction of into*icants to thenat(ral sciences, b(t the desire for these s(bstances, their distrib(tion and cons(#ption, and what isdone or #ade (nder their infl(ence, to the h(#an sciences5.


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n principle it looks as tho(h the h(#an #iht be red(cible to the nat(ral. B(t the very idea of anat(ral6scientific e*planation of h(#an action involves a circ(larity, beca(se the e*planation of nat(re,even in its own ter#s, is already a h(#an enterprise. f therefore we consider the# in the#selves, apartfro# any distinction in ter#s of their ob7ects, the nat(ral sciences and the h(#an sciences are entirelythe prod(cts of conscio(s h(#an intentionality; the theories that constit(te the# are 2as their na#es(ests5 o(tlooks on the worlds of their practitioners, e*planatory stances adopted for the p(rpose of

brinin the co#ple*ity of e*perience into intelliible order. nd the relations that hold betweenthesciences and their ob7ects, nat(ral or h(#an, #(st the#selves be ani#ated and s(stained by knowins(b7ects.

hese s(b7ects have the additional property of bein free 2a point clai# here witho(t ar(#ent,tho(h have provided plenty of that elsewhere5, and as s(ch en7oy reat latit(de in the choice andfor#(lation of proble#s. he idiosyncrasy of one s(ch s(b7ect and of his choices is reflectedpractically in the heteroeneity of the work collected here. B(t the (nderlyin the#e)the pri#acy ofthe knowin s(b7ect)is rec(rrent, if so#eti#es only i#plicit. he tone and level are variable, fro# thepop(lar to the scholarly, and have #ade no atte#pt to i#pose (nifor#ity in these respects. heprevio(sly p(blished chapters are essentially (nchaned e*cept in one sinificant way, na#ely, that have conscio(sly so(ht o(t and corrected the se*ist (se of prono(ns, which was once transparent to

everyone b(t sho(ld now, iven the fe#inist!rise de conscience$be (nacceptable to anyone.n the case of #aterial presented orally b(t not previo(sly p(blished have allowed #yself reaterfreedo# to adapt, b(t even here the individ(al chapters 2tho(h not arraned chronoloically5 bear the#arks of their continent oriins and have not been #ade to speak in one voice. s#all b(t tellinpoint: as a theoretician preocc(pied with the e#bodi#ent of the s(b7ect, have tended to stress fro#ti#e to ti#e the obvio(s b(t cr(cial i#portance of brains, and partic(larly of their co#ple*ity, onepri#itive #eas(re of which is the n(#ber of ne(rons they contain. n the co(rse of #y professionalcareer ne(roloists have contin(o(sly revised (pward their esti#ates of this n(#ber,

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so that in different chapters the reader #ay find cas(al all(sion to anythin fro# five billion to ah(ndred billion ne(rons. B(t have not one back to chane the earlier n(#bers; it is instr(ctive, think, to leave the# where they lie, as testi#ony)if any be needed)to the always provisionalcharacter of scientific knowlede.

he arrane#ent of the #aterial is ro(hly the#atic, which helps clarify what proble#s are bein dealtwith b(t has the disadvantae that chapters of varyin technical diffic(lty are l(#ped toether. t #aybe helpf(l, therefore, to identify a few chapters, written in a #ore collo@(ial style and oriinallyintended for a wider a(dience than so#e of the others, as ro(tes of access for nonprofessionals. $orreaders whose #ain interests are historical and social a ood startin point wo(ld be chapters 3 and A.hose with interests in practice and technoloy #iht first try chapters 1, 13, and 14. Chapters 1= and

19 deal with iss(es in the theory of knowlede, and chapters " and 4 with #etaphysical iss(es, in#ore or less self6contained and, hope, approachable ways. B(t do not #ean that these chapterscontain nothin of interest to the professional, nor that the others are o(t of reach to everyone else.

here is, no do(bt, so#ethin arbitrary and whi#sical in havin p(t all this (nder the sin of 'orick)-alas, poor 'orick- as +a#let says)and it certainly isnt the #ort(ary aspect of his sk(ll that wantto invoke, tho(h 8hakespeare wont allow that to beco#e too depressin: his ravedier is, after all, aclown. bo(t 'orick when alive the play doesnt tell (s a reat deal: he was the kins 7ester; he (sed tocarry the child +a#let on his back; he once po(red a flaon of henish on the ravediers head; he


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died when +a#let was abo(t seven. B(t +a#let says of hi# that he was -a fellow of infinite 7est, of#ost e*cellent fancy,- whose -flashes of #erri#ent . . . were wont to set the table on a roar-)anareeable chap, in short, and not at all a bad patron for a book, even a serio(s book. %ot that want toinvoke the 7est or the #erri#ent either 2tho(h wo(ld certainly alin #yself on the side ofDe#ocrit(s as aainst +eraclit(s, the la(hin philosopher aainst the weepin one5, b(t there isso#ethin s(estive in the fancy. $or -fancy- has its oriins in -fantasy- 2or -phantasy-5, which p(ts it

in the sa#e lin(istic fa#ily as -pheno#enoloy-)it is a #atter of appearances, which constit(te thelife6world of the knowin s(b7ect. 8cience is creative, it is i#ainative, and as &d#(nd +(sserl pointso(t it is 7(st one of the thins that occ(py the life6world;E1F if that world is in the end 2and 8hakespearewo(ld certainly be of this opinion5 a play of fancies, science wo(ld s(rely co(nt a#on the #oste*cellent.

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AC)NOWLE*+,ENTS

he body of work collected here owes so #(ch to so #any people)fro# teachers to fellow6st(dents tofriends and professional collea(es, not o#ittin readers for 7o(rnals, lect(re a(diences, and #y ownst(dents over decades of (niversity teachin)that even constr(ctin an e*ha(stive list, let alonespecifyin what was d(e to the individ(als na#ed in it, wo(ld ta* #e#ory and self6knowlede beyondtheir present reso(rces. #ention so#e na#es fro# the earlier staes of #y intellect(al develop#ent inthe ntrod(ction; later on, as n(#bers row, specific infl(ences beco#e harder to isolate.

he (s(al acknowled#ents are in order to editors and p(blishers who have allowed #e to reprint whatappeared in their books or 7o(rnals, a listin of which will be fo(nd on pae 3=1. edo(bled thanks ared(e in those cases where the contrib(tion in @(estion was solicited by the#, rather than s(b#itted by#e, since that often ind(ced #e to attend to iss(es #iht otherwise never have tackled. think in thisconnection especially of Gon oreno, whose lon6standin invitation to write abo(t @(ality and

@(antity inspired the e*c(rsion into the philosophy of #athe#atics that appears as chapter 19.n a so#ewhat si#ilar vein sho(ld perhaps record #y ratit(de)not that felt it at the ti#e)to thea(thorities of rinity Collee, +artford, who after had accepted it withdrew, on b(detary ro(nds,the position the philosophy depart#ent had offered #e for #y first year o(t of rad(ate school, th(sens(rin that sho(ld bein #y career not by teachin philosophy in the &ast b(t by teachin sciencein the iddle est. he one year spent lect(rin (nderrad(ates on basic science

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forced #e to et (p to speed in the bioloical and earth sciences, an inval(able co#ple#ent to the

physics in which had spent #y (nderrad(ate years. o this day re#ain ratef(l to ichian 8tatefor resc(in #e fro# (ne#ploy#ent, and to the University of Hansas for callin #e back tophilosophy the followin year.

o collea(es and instit(tions who have entr(sted #e with lect(reships and with offices that re@(iredthe deliverin of addresses also owe debts of ratit(de: a* ilson for chapter A, (ss +anson forchapter 4, Irover a*well for chapter 9 2and posth(#o(sly for chapter ?5, and Ieore B(liarello forchapter 13. n other cases the connection is less direct; owe to el Hran


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co##entators have been #any; a# especially indebted to ar* artofsky and an anony#o(s readerfor the University of California Press for reactions to the book as a whole, and #ost recently to 8teve$(ller for a helpf(l critical readin of the final chapter.

itho(t the enterprise and enco(rae#ent of &d Di#endber at the Press, #(ch of this work #ihtnever have appeared in book for#. Kisa Chishol#s reso(rcef(l and nonintr(sive copyeditin #ade thelast staes of prod(ction a pleas(re instead of the ordeal they often can be. y secretary, Haren

Ireis#an, cheerf(lly perfor#ed prodiies of retypin, and #y rad(ate assistant, Keslie Ba*ter, helpedi##ensely at every stae, asse#blin the constit(ent #aterials and brinin her sharp eye and #ind tobear on co(ntless details.

y wife, Dr. %ancy Breslin, and #y da(hter, &lisabeth Breslin Caws, to who# this book is dedicated,filled and contin(e to fill the life6world of this partic(lar knowin s(b7ect with a happiness no lesspri 1 >

I%trod-ctio%.

Fro/ P#(sics to t#e 0-/a% Scie%ces1T#e Iti%erar( o& a%

Attit-de

aken in itself, each of the chapters that follow #akes a #ore or less circ(#scribed point in its ownway. hey were not oriinally conceived in relation to one another, b(t their p(blication toether offersan opport(nity to rethink the# as a coherent body of work, or at least as one facet of s(ch a body ofwork. he best way of doin this is to say so#ethin of the pro7ect, in the 8artrean sense, o(t of whichthey arose.

Scie%ti&ic Roots

y enae#ent with the philosophy of science oes back to readins of 8ir Ga#es Geans, 8ir rth(r&ddinton, and lfred %orth hitehead while was still in school. he Geans and &ddinton were #yfathers; he wanted to (nderstand the #ysterio(s (niverse beca(se it lorified Iod)or rather, s(spect

2he was a h(#ble #an5, he 7(st wanted to feel how #ysterio(s it was, th(s savorin at once Iodsreatness and his own insinificance. +e was i#pressionable, and contin(ally awed by the di#ensionsof the ato# 2the n(cle(s as a pea in 8t. Pa(ls Cathedral5 or the distance of the ala*ies.

he effect of his sharin all this was that it beca#e fa#iliar to #e and not very #ysterio(s at all. tookphysics in school, bein initiated 2which is, after all, the old sense of #ystery5 at the hands of a cr(styand acerbic teacher whose na#e was 8. M. 8hinler. wo #e#ories of r. 8hinler stand o(t: first, hisdaily tirades in class abo(t the hopeless st(pidity of his p(pils, and second, a #ore personal reb(ke. nworkin


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(p so#e notes on fl(id press(re)one of the very first assin#ents in the fo(rth for# perhaps 2 #(sthave been abo(t thirteen5) ended with a flo(rish, writin the basic for#(la -p N f/a- in lare letters inthe #iddle of the notebook pae and drawin a little bo* aro(nd it. t was a neat bit of work and waspro(d of it. r. 8hinler str(ck the for#(la thro(h with his red pencil and #ade #e redo the pae. %ophysical e*pression, he said, was #ore or less i#portant than any other; wo(ld please #ake the# all

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b(t re7ected not #erely as (nnecessary b(t also as (nworthy any co##it#ent to an e*planatory

acco(nt of the oriin or #eanin of that world #ade si#ply for the sake of havin so#ethin tobelieve, or for that #atter any (nwarranted e*trapolation of the scientific acco(nt itself. s ca#e tosee it, %ewtons reco##endation in his third (le of easonin in Philosophy that locally enco(ntered@(alities sho(ld -be esteemedEe#phasis addedF the (niversal @(alities of all bodies whatsoever,-s(b7ect always to the @(alification in the fo(rth (le 2-till s(ch ti#e as other phaeno#ena occ(r-5,EFonly #ade sense, while on the other hand Kaplaces post(lation of -an intellience . . . able to e#bracein a sinle for#(la the #ove#ents of the larest bodies in the (niverse and those of the lihtestato#-E3F was 7(st a bit of (nwarranted #elodra#a.

t the sa#e ti#e science didnt see#, locally, to be #ore than a part of the story; it coe*isted happily


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with the rest of life. &ven if everythin t(rned o(t to be e*plainable, that wo(ld not necessarily spoil its@(ality as e*perience. &ddinton had been @(ite ood on this point; @(ote one of the relevant passaesin chapter . 8o aain, one of the thins fre@(ently held aainst science, one of the thins thathitehead hi#self had held aainst it)that it red(ces reality to the #ere h(rryin of #aterial,endlessly and #eaninlessly, or words to that effect)str(ck #e as based on a #is(nderstandin. o dohitehead 7(stice, what he was critici A >

drocarbon ro(p. n the case of the alcohols this wo(ld clearly be +.L+. B(t that is water)so a caseco(ld be #ade for reardin water as an alcohol.

his was s(rely not oriinal with #e, tho(h it was #y own at the ti#e. lso the ar(#ent had a fatalflaw: as Dr. 8t(bbs patiently pointed o(t, yo( cant have an oranic co#po(nd witho(t carbon. ta#(sed #e anyway, b(t #(st think have been after provocation as well)for e*a#ple, people wo(ldhave to redefine te#perance. ith #y fa#ily ac@(ired a rep(tation for frivolity. his was no la(hin#atter, b(t then they took al#ost everythin with deadly serio(sness, whereas tho(ht 2and still do5that there were very few thins in life, with the possible e*ceptions of love and 7(stice, worth takinaltoether serio(sly. races of this perverse rethinkin of the fa#iliar are to be fo(nd here and there inthis book.

S(ste/atic P#iloso2#( o& Scie%ce

o a first deree in physics added, after a transatlantic fliht fro# reliio(s s(ffocation, a doctorate inphilosophy, for which it was nat(ral to write a dissertation in the philosophy of science. he task of this

discipline took to be the (nderstandin of what science was doin conce!tuall"$not historically oranecdotally, which e*plains a lack of sy#pathy for s(bse@(ent efforts to #ake it -a #ore acc(ratereflection of act(al scientific practice,- as so#e revisionist philosophers of science p(t it. he str(ct(reof science as envisaed it at this ti#e involved a lowest level of conce!tsthat corresponded toreconi


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considerations, as a #atter of inference or of Iestalt co#pletion. his ter#inoloy, larely adaptedfro# that of #y sponsor +enry arena(, was not destined for wide acceptance, tho(h still think itlends itself to an interestin variant treat#ent of the observational6theoretical dichoto#y 2abo(t which shall have #ore to say5. had already abandoned it)at least the part abo(t the isolates)by the ti#e of#y atte#pt at a syste#atic acco(nt of the philosophy of science in 194". B(t did not abandon then orlater the realist concl(sion of the dissertation nor #y

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reasons for reachin it; they are dealt with briefly in chapter 1 of the present book, which wasoriinally written as a contrib(tion to a%estschriftfor arena(.

y realis# was what wo(ld now be called a str(ct(ral realis#, in that did not necessarily e*pect theseparateness and identity of -thins- in the percept(al world to be faithf(lly #irrored in the real one,even tho(h all their properties corresponded tosomethingin the real, (nderstandin by this ter# a(niverse independent of and ontoloically prior to #y knowlede of it. Lne co(ld reasonably post(latean iso#orphis#, (nder so#e transfor#ation, between the percept(al/concept(al and the real, b(t to askwhat so#ethin is like when we arent attendin to it was to ask a silly @(estion, since thins are only-like- anythin when we areattendin to the#. his did not #ean a fall into idealis#: attendin tothe# didnt constit(te the world in which the thins were ro(nded, it only fi*ed how they wo(ldappear in #y world. ain, #y realis# itself was hypothetical, and entertained by individ(als, whoseconcept(al sche#es were idiosyncratic and only partially iso#orphic to one another. t #ade no senseto ob7ect that beca(se so#ethin was hypothetical, it co(ldnt be real)that #issed the whole point of#akin the hypothesis in the first place. hat it wasreal wasthe hypothesis. had not yet enco(nteredpheno#enoloy)one co(ld et a doctorate in philosophy at 'ale witho(t ever hearin of it, anastonishin testi#ony to parochialis# when one thinks of it, and a devastatin indict#ent of placeswhere it #ay still be tr(e)and co(ld therefore not see the hypothetical str(ct(re of the real asintentional. 2t #ay be worth re#arkin that concept(al sche#es as constr(ed the#, #eanin theconcept(al f(rnit(re of individ(al thinkers, do not fall (nder Donald Davidsons later strict(res in -heMery dea of a Concept(al 8che#e.-5E"F

The hiloso!h" of Science: A S"stematic Account,E4F written after a n(#ber of years of teachin in thisarea, set o(t to orani 4 >

approachable. s so#e sharp6eyed reviewers pointed o(t, it was flawed by errors of scholarship, note*c(sable)as a# @(ite ready to ad#it)even on the ro(nds that was paintin in broad strokes on alare canvas. B(t as look back a# str(ck by so#ethin that, now that it occ(rs to #e, #ay berelevant to so#e of the #aterial in the present book. he reviewers co#plaints were not at all that had


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ot it wron abo(t science, nor indeed that any of #y #ain clai#s were off taret, b(t rather that had#isrepresented so#e details abo(t the work of other philosophers of science)that had attrib(ted toCarnap a view he had once e*plicitly disavowed, that had i#plicitly conflated the positions ofPoincar and D(he# on a point where they had in fact divered. think the tro(ble was that for #escholarship wasnt the #ain point, that lacked the appetite for detail and the talent for perseverancethat #arked #any of #y collea(es. 2Perhaps this plays o(t yet f(rther the re7ection of the kind of

reverence for the ord was s(rfeited with in yo(th.5 t all events #y attit(de has always been that thefact that J said ' isnt really i#portant, philosophically speakin, even if J is Plato or Hant; what#atters is what reasons he or she ave for sayin ' and whether they sho(ld co#pel o(r assent. Lfco(rse if J didnt say ' nothin e*c(ses the #isattrib(tion, which is why #y!ost factocontrition isen(ine, and why apoloi


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interests were beinnin to t(rn away fro# the definin proble#s of the field. hose proble#s, so#e ofwhich are noticed occasionally in what follows, ca#e to incl(de paradi#s, research prora#s, therealis#6pra#atis# debate, anthropic spec(lations, and eli#inative #aterialis#. s will beco#e clearin the later parts of this book, a kind of reconverence has taken place, especially in the do#ain ofartificial intellience 2see for e*a#ple chapter A5, now that the hardwired loc(s of the knowin s(b7ectis beinnin to be taken #ore serio(sly.

decisive event at the ti#e of which a# speakin was a re@(est fro# so#e briht and insistentst(dents at the University of Hansas, who wanted to read e*istentialis# with #e. was the yo(nest#e#ber of the depart#ent and the others had already ref(sed. y 7ob was to teach loic and thephilosophy of science, b(t on the one hand was c(rio(s abo(t Hierkeaard, who# had enco(nteredin a backhanded way at 'ale 2where he had been introd(ced as a prel(de to an e*e#plary dis#issal5,and on the other liked the st(dents. e read Hierkeaard, Gaspers, +eideer, and 8artre; later added+(sserl on #y own. t

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a#a


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find #yself hedin here, however, by takin care to say -nat(ral

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science,- -e*act science,- and so on. he philosophy of science is the philosophy of what, e*actly0 ndhow can (se -e*actly- in this challenin way when have 7(st been #akin e*c(ses for

ine*actit(de0 n the period of #y professional for#ation -science- nearly always #eant -physicalscience- and -e*actit(de- nearly always #eant -for#al 2or @(antitative5 e*actit(de.- here were ofco(rse the bioloical and the social sciences, b(t these, when they were #entioned at all, tended to beco#pared to the physical sciences as ideals; their special proble#s were probabilistic or statistical b(two(ld beco#e straihtforwardly ca(sal if only we knew eno(h. t was possible to e*po(nd thephilosophy of the social sciences witho(t once #entionin the feedback effect of knowlede of atheory on the pop(lation whose behavior it set o(t to e*plain. s to e*actit(de, the oriins of the ter#certainly s(ested so#ethin de#andin)in the special and rather sinister case of -e*action- ofteneno(h a @(antitative de#and: the (tter#ost farthin, the po(nd of flesh. B(t e(actusis the pastparticiple of e(igo$and it see#ed possible to be e*ient philosophically, to re@(ire reflective thinkin6thro(h, witho(t insistin on a*io#atic for#ali


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that happens, within #y e*perience or within the reach of #y learnin, that wo(ld have happened evenif there had been no h(#an intentions 2or intentionalities5. Decidin 7(st which thins fall (nder thatdescription is easy to a first appro*i#ation b(t beco#es harder, as is (s(ally the case at concept(albo(ndaries, the #ore -h(#an- the nat(ral beco#es: hat abo(t lan(ae0 hat abo(t the incestprohibition0 B(t these contested cases do not vitiate the basic distinction. he life6world incl(destho(ht, and the distinction between nat(ral and h(#an is partic(larly interestin here: tho(hts that

occ(r to people (nwanted, especially those that occ(r when they are very #(ch not wanted, have to betreated as nat(ral patholoies.

do not wish to develop these ideas at #(ch reater lenth here, since they for# the ob7ect of severalchapters in part M of the book, b(t a co(ple of s(pple#entary points #ay be in order. $irst)to ret(rnto a controversial iss(e)what #ay call #y scientific world is itself a co#ple* do#ain in the life6world, by no #eans coter#ino(s with the nat(ral world; it will incl(de parts of the nat(ral world thatfall (nder scientific e*planation, and parts of the tho(ht world that are involved in the e*planatoryactivity. his bein the case, however, it can readily be divided into an observational part and atheoretical part, once aain no do(bt with a#bi(ities at the bo(ndary that, once aain, do not vitiatethe distinction itself. 8econd, all this talk of -worlds- invites a distinction, hinted at above, between-world- and -(niverse.- ,ni-ersewo(ld stand for the totality of what there is, incl(din (s b(t also

incl(din the vastly reater sphere of what (nderlies and s(rro(nds and precedes and will follow (s;worldwo(ld stand, in effect, for the reach of the h(#an)which the very ter# see#s oriinally to have#eant, a weraldor -ae of #an,- -ae- bein (nderstood as an epoch or a life. %ote once aainhowever that the ideaof the (niverse will be an ite# in #y world.

Philosophers of science all too readily hypostati 11 >

which they speak)the propositions, the proble#s, the laws, the theories, the research prora#s, therevol(tions, the sciences the#selves)as if there were a do#ain in which they e*isted independently,

waitin to be tho(ht abo(t, a do#ain whose internal str(ct(re wo(ld perhaps e#body so#e tr(thabo(t the# all, and provide a ro(nd for the settlin of disp(tes. Harl Popper even invented s(ch ado#ain, which he called the hird orld, or 2in order to avoid conf(sion with eopolitics5 orld .E1F n this he see#ed to be echoin Iaston Bachelards call for a -biblio#enon- to s(pple#entno(#ena and pheno#ena,E13F tho(h when s(ested this to hi# privately he re7ected the ideaindinantly, clai#in oriinality for all his ideas. t all events orld see#s to #e a perfectcandidate for Lckha#s ra


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worlds, na#ely, those of their practitioners. he last chapter of this book is devoted to the#. hat hope to have shown here is how a conception of science that learned as a yo(n physicist, a#on the-hard sciences,- has evolved thro(h a lon practice of philosophical reflection into so#ethin #oreincl(sive, to which the hard sciences are interal b(t which they do not bein to e*ha(st. he hardsciences take their data fro# e*peri#entation and their str(ct(re fro# #athe#atics)b(te*peri#entation and #athe#atics are the#selves only h(#an strateies for findin intelliibility in, or

lendin it to, an otherwise (nintelliible world, and as s(ch take their place in t(rn a#on the ob7ects ofthe h(#an sciences.

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PART I1

E4PLANATION

> 1" >

Pre&ace to Part I.

E52la%atio%

he the#atic (nity of this so#ewhat heteroeneo(s first part co(ld be e*pressed ro(hly as: whatscience can do)and what it cant be e*pected to do. he first chapter is a est(re, in two senses. wasfort(nate to find #yself at 'ale d(rin Peter +e#pels last year there; in #y first year he was at+arvard visitin and in #y third he went to Princeton for ood, b(t in that cr(cial second year 2as

thins o in #erican rad(ate ed(cation5 there he was, and took both his co(rses in the philosophyof science. +e was an e*e#plary teacher, fro# who# learned #ore, perhaps, than fro# any othersinle person, and #y p(ttin his chapter first is an acknowled#ent of that fact. B(t it also #akes ani#plicit clai# abo(t the book as a whole. +e#pel was and is a philosopher of sciences philosopher ofscience, and wo(ld like what have to say to be rearded as belonin to the conversation that he hasani#ated over his lon career.

he first chapter defends +e#pels view of the central task of science as e*planation and of thephilosophy of science as the analysis of the str(ct(re of e*planation. he second chapter, however,places so#e li#itations on how that str(ct(re is to be instantiated. n the late fifties had beco#einterested in the eneral syste#s theory of von Bertalanffy, which see#ed to pro#ise a syste#atice*tension of the network of e*planation fro# physics to bioloy witho(t co#pro#isin the specificity

of the latter)and to do so (nder the r(bric of cybernetics and infor#ation theory, so#ethin ofa(to#atic interest to an e*physicist beca(se of its affinity with ther#odyna#ics, the #ostphilosophically intri(in branch of physics (ntil the arrival of relativity and @(an6

> 14 >

t(# theory. n 1944 fo(nd #yself in the presidency of the 8ociety for Ieneral 8yste#s esearch and(nder the necessity of addressin the ann(al #eetin. #on so#e of #y collea(es in the 8ociety had detected a ra#pant tendency to s(ppose, so#ewhat after the #anner of +eel, that ontoloy co(ld


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be read off fro# loic)that if one co(ld b(ild hierarchically layered theoretical syste#s the world#(st contain, so#ewhere, their real co(nterparts. he ar(#ent of the chapter serves as a entle reb(keto these pansyste#atists.

Chapter 3 is a chane of pace and has an earlier oriin, b(t it fits in beca(se it de#onstrates in adra#atic conte*t so#e li#its of theoretical e*planation. he conte*t was of partic(lar interest to #ebeca(se Philip +enry Iosse had been a #e#ber of the sect to which #y parents beloned and in which

rew (p. +e provides a splendid test case of the scientist who wants to believe an acco(nt that is atodds with the best c(rrent hypotheses in his or her field: it t(rns o(t to be possible, beca(se of thefallacy of affir#in the conse@(ent, to re7ect any set of hypotheses and replace the# with a #aicalacco(nt, and nothin in the philosophy of science can stand definitively in the way. 2he fallacy ofaffir#in the conse@(ent occ(rs when so#eone tries to infer the tr(th of the antecedent, !, of aconditional -if!then /- fro# the tr(th of the conse@(ent, /.5 he hypotheses of a theory have nostat(s)e*cept a hypothetical one. hat needs to be added, however, is that the #aical alternative has,si#ilarly, only a #aical stat(s, and the fact that scientists are #odest eno(h not to 7(#p to a pla(sibleconcl(sion is no e*c(se for other people to 7(#p to i#pla(sible ones. Iosse no do(bt believed he hadood reasons for his reliio(s belief, b(t it is not clear that he had e*a#ined the# responsibly)tho(hnone of (s is in a position to render a final 7(d#ent on that point.

he fo(rth chapter co#es fro# very #(ch later, and takes (p the sa#e iss(e in a #ore didactic way.he distinction between event and process that draw in contrastin creationis# to evol(tion overlooksthe possibility that creation itself #iht be an onoin process 2indeed one scientific theory, celebratedin its ti#e, #aintained that it is) #ean $red +oyles cos#oloical theory of contin(o(s creation5. B(t#y point in the chapter is to e*a#ine the reliio(s position that Iosse and others have held, and in thatposition creation is an event by #y definition.

> 1? >

1As2ects o& 0e/2el's P#iloso2#( o& Scie%ce

E%ote: $or the p(rpose of readin this chapter the reader is asked to #ake an effort of te#poraltranslocation)to adopt, in i#aination, the standpoint of the late si*ties rather than that of the nineties.he year is 194?: the philosophy of science is by now an established acade#ic discipline, whosec(rrent e*cite#ent centers on new concepts like paradi#s and research prora#s. have been askedby ichard Bernstein, editor of the0e-iew of 1eta!h"sics, to assess the work of one of the pioneers, ateacher we had in co##on a decade ao, whose collected essays have 7(st been p(blished.F

I

he eneration which separates +e#pels latest #a7or p(blication 2hiloso!h" of &atural Science,19445E1F fro# his first 22er T"!usbegriff im +ichte der &euen +ogik, 1934, written 7ointly with Pa(lLppenhei#5EF has seen the philosophy of science co#e into its own as one of the chief s(bdivisions ofphilosophy, with a reconi


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of 1odern h"sics,E3F2er

> 1= >

+ogische Aufbau der Welt,EAF and+ogik der %orschung.E"F he point which these facts ill(strate issi#ply that +e#pels professional career spans a period of intense activity 2a ood deal of it sti#(lated

by the three books 7(st #entioned5 d(rin which the philosophical discipline to which he has #ade hisreatest contrib(tion arrived at an evident #at(rity and a(tono#y. he ai# of this essay is to e*a#inehis contrib(tion to that activity, and to deal with so#e recent ar(#ents to the effect that the process ofdevelop#ent has carried the philosophy of science away fro# science itself, on which in so#e sense orother it clearly depends for its intellect(al relevance and honesty.

f a newco#er to philosophy were to ask what sinle concept characteristically preocc(piesphilosophers of science 2as the concept of being, for e*a#ple, preocc(pies #etaphysicians5 theappropriate answer co(ld only be e(!lanation. f we look for a leadin motifin the work of +e#pel,we et the sa#e answer. %ow it is a re#arkable fact that the book which, at the beinnin of +e#pelscareer, s(##ed (p the pedaoical content of the philosophy of science) #ean of co(rse Cohen and%aelsAn Introduction to +ogic and Scientific 1ethod2193A5E4F )contains no reference toe*planation in the table of contents, and has no entry for it in the inde*. hether or not the concept ofthe philosophy of science as the analysis of scientific e*planations is an ade@(ate one 2which need notbe insisted on for the p(rpose at hand5, there can be no do(bt that the central i#portance of s(chanalyses at the present ti#e is d(e in no s#all deree to +e#pels own work. +e has now provided (s,inhiloso!h" of &atural Science2referred to here as3&S5, with his own pedaoical introd(ction tothe s(b7ect, which is, as #iht have been e*pected, a l(cid distillation of the #a7or the#es to which hehas rec(rred aain and aain in other writins.

Beinnin with a concrete ill(stration of scientific in@(iry)the classic investiations of 8e##elweisinto the ca(ses of childbed fever)3&Sleads the st(dent thro(h a disc(ssion of the testin ofhypotheses to a set of criteria for confir#ation and acceptability. here follows a standard acco(nt of

ded(ctive6no#oloical e*planation 2that it can be called -standard- is d(e entirely to the fact that thereisa standard, na#ely the one set earlier by +e#pel hi#self5,E?F an analysis of the difference betweenthis and e*planation by statistical laws, and finally three chapters on theories, concept for#ation, andtheoretical red(ction respectively. ive this o(tline not only in order to reco##end the book forinstr(ctional p(rposes, which it serves ad#irably and with rare a(thority, b(t also beca(se3&Spresents with (na#bi(o(s clarity a n(#ber of characteristic theses which see# fre@(ently to be#is(nderstood by +e#pels critics. hese theses have also, as we shall see, been presented clearlyeno(h elsewhere, b(t the settin

> 19 >

in3&Sis si#ple and didactic and brins the# into relief. $or the p(rposes of the present disc(ssiontwo of the# are worth statin, one havin to do with the nat(re of e*planation and the other with thelan(ae of scientific theory.

&*planation, for +e#pel, is a loical relation between sentences. he pre#ises toether constit(te thee(!lanans, the concl(sion is the e(!lanandum. 8trictly speakin, of co(rse, we sho(ld say e(!lananssentencesand e(!lanandum sentence2p. "!5, b(t the fa#iliar shortened for#s o(ht not to lead todiffic(lty. hat the e*planand(# sentence refers to is the e(!lanandum !henomenon. he point to bedrawn attention to here is that what is to be e*plained is in the first instance a !articular occurrence,


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not a class of occ(rrences or a law overnin s(ch a class, altho(h by e*tension the e*planation oflaws can at once be s(bs(#ed (nder the sa#e pattern. +e#pel indeed says 2p. 15 that the e#piricalsciences -seek to e*plore, to describe, to e*plain, and to predict the occurrencesin the world we livein- 2e#phasis added5. clear (nderstandin of this point wo(ld have averted a n(#ber of diffic(ltiessprinin fro# the belief that the e*planand(# is typically a theory. $eyerabend, to ive only onee*a#ple, is able to dis#iss the e#piricist theory of e*planation 2whose chief e*ponents have been

+e#pel and %ael5 as -an elaboration of so#e si#ple and very pla(sible ideas first proposed byPopper,-E=F which however concern the ded(ctive relations between different theories; he then oes onto i#p(te to the e#piricist theory all sorts of repressive infl(ences on the proress of science whichco(ld not possibly be e*erted by the analysis of e*planation p(t forward by +e#pel. a# notconcerned at this 7(nct(re to defend the ade@(acy of that analysis, b(t in order to co##ent on itsade@(acy one #(st at least be clear abo(t what it says. 2 shall have #ore to say later abo(t the analysisitself and abo(t $eyerabends criticis# of it.5

he second the#e wish to to(ch on in this preli#inary review of3&Sis that of the distinctionbetween the lan(ae in which a theory is co(ched and the lan(ae which describes what the theorysets o(t to e*plain. 8ince a ood part of what follows will deal with this distinction will save thepole#ics for later, and li#it #y re#arks here to an e*position of +e#pels point of view. s a #atter of

fact the acco(nt in3&Srepresents a rather #(ted stand as co#pared with so#e earlier treat#ents ofthe sa#e topic; do not think that +e#pel has chaned his #ind, b(t he see#s to have fo(nd a lessv(lnerable way of sayin what was in it. he proress of science consists, a#on other thins, in anenrich#ent of the vocab(lary by #eans of which scientists describe the world as they (nderstand it.Pheno#ena described in fa#iliar ter#s 2e.., alternate rins of brihtness and darkness between a lens

> ! >

and a lass plate5 are e*plained by the post(lation of (nfa#iliar properties 2fits of easy trans#issionand easy reflection, to (se a classical b(t now abandoned for#(la5.E9F he pheno#ena to be e*plainedare by definition obser-able, and they are described in obser-ation terms2-rins,- -darkness,- -lens,-etc.5; the e*planation involves unobser-able, i.e., p(rely theoretical, entities or processes, and these areindicated by theoretical terms2-fits-5. he connection between the observable and the theoretical isprovided by so6called bride laws or r(les of correspondence. his is the standard version of theobservational6theoretical distinction, and it has recently been (nder heavy fire fro# the antifor#alistriht. n3&S+e#pel #akes the point as follows:

hile the internal principles of a theory are co(ched in its characteristic theoretical terms2n(cle(s, orbital electron, enery level, electron 7(#p5, the test i#plications #(st befor#(lated in ter#s 2s(ch as hydroen vapor, e#ission spectr(#, wavelenth associatedwith a spectral line5 which are -antecedently (nderstood,- as we #iht say, ter#s whichhave been introd(ced prior to the theory and can be (sed independently of it. Ket (s refer to

the# as antecedentl" a-ailable or !retheoretical terms. 2p. ?"5n this way the observational6theoretical distinction is e*plicitly relativi


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been appearin steadily since the early 19A!s. nd it is of co(rse on these p(blications that +e#pelsphilosophical rep(tation rests. ith the e*ception of the #onoraph%undamentals of *once!t%ormation in m!irical Science219"5E1!F they have all been papers in learned 7o(rnals or othercollections of articles by vario(s a(thors. he #a7or ones have beco#e land#arks in the literat(re ofthe philosophy of science: -he $(nction of Ieneral Kaws in +istory- 219A5, -8t(dies in the Koic ofConfir#ation- 219A"5, -8t(dies in the Koic of &*planation- 219A=5, -Proble#s and Chanes in the

piricist Criterion of eanin- 219"!5, - Koical ppraisal of Lperationis#- 219"A5, -heheoreticians Dile##a- 219"=5, -n6

> 1 >

d(ctive nconsistencies- 2194!5. ll seven of these papers, and a few #ore, have now been reprinted inthe collectionAs!ects of Scientific (!lanation2194"5,E11F in which is also printed for the first ti#e alon essay which ives its title to the book. t is this book, rather than3&S, which occasions thepresent review, and now t(rn to it.

he reprinted papers are ro(ped into fo(r cateories, dealin respectively with proble#s ofconfir#ation, proble#s of conitive sinificance, proble#s of the str(ct(re and f(nction of theories,and proble#s of e*planation, the last occ(pyin #ore than half of the book. oether they constit(te adoc(#entary reso(rce of the first i#portance, brinin toether in one place the focal ar(#ents of#ost of the #a7or post6war develop#ents in the philosophy of science. he articles are reprinted -withso#e chanes- 2 have not (ndertaken the task of locatin the#5, so that history #ay have beenta#pered with in #inor respects. t wo(ld have been of reat interest to be told #ore abo(t thecirc(#stances (nder which they ca#e to be written, especially since so#e of the# have appeared inseveral places on different occasions and in slihtly different versions. +e#pel refers in the preface to-the ppendi* on their oriins,- b(t at least in #y copy of the book no s(ch appendi* is to be fo(nd.

n spite of the diversity of their oriins the papers as a whole display a re#arkable consistency. heyare characteri


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si#plistic. he case of little Gohnny and the #easles 2p. 1??5, as an ill(stration of statisticale*planation, is followed by the case of little o##y and the #easles 2p. 3?5, so that one is ratef(l forthe variety provided 2p. 3!15 by little +enry and the #(#ps. 2n 3&Sit is little Gi# and the #easlesaain, p. "=.5 t wo(ld nevertheless, think, be a reat #istake to ar(e fro# si#plicity in e*a#ples tosi#plicity in (nderstandin, altho(h the te#ptation to do so is certainly e*c(sable. o(l#in, in hisreview ofAs!ects,E1F says,

+e#pels for#al sche#ati


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hi#self. Ln this point one is bo(nd to sy#pathi A >

a !riori. n analoo(s diffic(lty occ(rs, however, with the fa#iliar definition of e#pirical law as tr(eenerali


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sciences in handlin so#e kinds of knowlede of the world, and the attendant proble# as to the

> " >

stat(s of that knowlede, especially in the liht of twentieth cent(ry develop#ents s(ch as relativityand @(ant(# theory. o anybody trained in physics, as +e#pel hi#self was, one of the #ost strikin

thins abo(t it is its heavy reliance on for#al #ethods, #ostly of co(rse #athe#atical ones. Physics isan e#pirical science, b(t its best res(lts are obtained by switchin over as rapidly as possible to afor#al #ode of proced(re, ret(rnin to the e#pirical only at the last #in(te in order to confrontobservation with a prediction, for e*a#ple. %ot that e#pirical relevance is really iven (p at any staeof the proceedins; the point is that the e#pirical ob7ectives served by physics, and the e#piricalcontrol to which its concl(sions are s(b7ected, provide a fra#ework within which physicists are free toe#ploy whatever #ethods they like, and the #ethods which lend the reatest clarity and econo#y totheir work t(rn o(t to be for#al ones. his looks like a lesson for the p(rs(it of knowlede in eneral,and it was taken as s(ch by the loical positivists. &verybody now arees that they went too far intryin to e*cl(de as nonsensical state#ents whose e#pirical warrant was less clear than that ofstate#ents in the physical sciences, b(t that does not #ean that their insistence on the paradi#atic

virt(es of the physical sciences was #istaken. 2s a #atter of fact +e#pel never, as far as know,contrib(ted #(ch to the anti#etaphysical pole#ic, whose chief spokes#an was always Carnap.5

ost of +e#pels work, however, was done after loical positivis#, as a #ove#ent, had ceased toe*ist. n so#e respects he contin(ed to derive inspiration fro# its s(rvivors, notably Carnap; a ooddeal of his work on confir#ation, for e*a#ple, takes the for# of an el(cidation or elaboration orcorrection of so#ethin of Carnaps. B(t for the #ost part he has followed an independent line, neverabandonin the old proble#s set by positivis#, b(t arrivin rad(ally at fir# and often oriinalconcl(sions abo(t the#. he oriinality is not sweepin)that co(ld hardly be e*pected in a disciplinedin@(iry of restricted scope. B(t by co#parison with so#e sweepinly oriinal hypotheses which haverecently co##anded attention in the field, +e#pels (npretentio(s b(t solid achieve#ents have areass(rin a(thenticity. nd his contrib(tion has not been witho(t its own dra#a, the best e*a#ple ofwhich is his parado* of confir#ation, a startlin res(lt whose p(blication in 19A" introd(ced a thorninto the side of confir#ation theorists 2incl(din +e#pel hi#self5 which has still not lost its power toirritate. he parado* is, of co(rse, that by the s(bstit(tion of the contrapositive for# -ll non6blackob7ects are non6ravens,- -any red pencil, any reen leaf, any yellow cow, etc., beco#es confir#inevidence for the hypothesis that all ravens are black- 2As!ects, p. 1"5. t is this parado*

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with which, for #any people, +e#pels na#e is principally associated, altho(h in itself it is a #inorby6prod(ct of the philosophical prora# to which he has devoted hi#self.

hat prora# has been devoted to clarifyin o(r (nderstandin of the way in which science constit(tesknowlede of its ob7ects. +e#pel is not (ninterested in the develop#ent and the practical (sef(lness ofscience, b(t these have not been at the foc(s of his attention. 8cience hasdeveloped, and it is(sef(l;the interestin philosophical @(estions concern its str(ct(re and its validation. he sa#e @(estions#iht have arisen, and the sa#e answers been iven the#, if the develop#ent had followed differentlines and if the (sef(lness had been #(ch less obvio(s, altho(h as pointed o(t above the continentsti#(l(s for the #ove#ent of in@(iry to which +e#pel belons was, a#on other thins, the i#pact ofa partic(lar develop#ent. t the beinnin of the title essay ofAs!ects+e#pel rephrases his oftenreiterated concerns as follows: -hat is the nat(re of the e*planations e#pirical science can provide0


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hat (nderstandin of e#pirical pheno#ena do they convey0- 2p. 3335. he rest of the enterprisefollows fro# these @(estions. hat is wanted of an e*planation0 hat kind of @(estion is it an answerto0 +e#pel distin(ishes between -e*planation6seekin- and -reason6seekin- @(estions, the f(nctionof the for#er bein to render e#pirical state#ents intelligible, that of the latter to render the# credible2p. A==5. +e is #ainly preocc(pied with intelliibility.

c(rsory inspection of what scientists act(ally say shows that, at least for the nonprofessional 2a

cateory that, for any partic(lar science, incl(des #ost scientists, since any one of the# only professeshis or her own speciality5 the intelliibility of science is not to be fo(nd on its s(rface. n order torender it intelliible a prora# of -for#al reconstr(ction of the lan(ae of e#pirical science- 2p. 1315is e#barked (pon. By this so#ethin different fro# the for#ali ? >

beca(se as science is practiced the relations between its state#ents are often concealed by for#(lationsdeveloped historically for p(rposes of efficiency rather than intelliibility. he for#ally reconstr(ctedscience #ay be no #ore efficient than the (nreconstr(cted one, in fact it will probably be less so. B(t,as +e#pel p(ts it in another connection, -the p(rpose of those who s(est this conception is not, ofco(rse, to facilitate the work of the scientist b(t rather to clarify the i#port of his for#(lations- 2p.15.

he si#plest reconstr(cted science wo(ld have two cateories of state#ent, na#ely, reports ofobservations and e*pressions of lawlike relations between entities. he nonloical ter#s occ(rrin inthese state#ents wo(ld be either observational 2pretheoretical, in the lan(ae of 3&S5 or theoretical.nd there wo(ld be two loical relations: a ded(ctive one oin fro# lawlike state#ents to observationreports and carryin the b(rden of e*planation, and an ind(ctive one oin in the other direction andcarryin the b(rden of confir#ation. his is the basic #odel, and while it #ay be e@(ipped withoptional e*tras for special p(rposes, it rec(rs essentially in all loical reconstr(ctions of scientifictheory. he reports of observation are clearly of critical i#portance, since they constit(te the e#piricalbasis of the science and the startin6point for its confir#ation. he loical positivists were at first rathernaive abo(t the stat(s of observation state#ents; they believed it possible to capt(re in lan(ae the

data of an (npre7(diced awareness, and th(s to place science on a co#pletely veridical fo(ndation. t isnow clear that no perception is (ncolored by theoretical (nderstandin, and that no p(re lan(ae ofdescription wo(ld be available even if it were. here is th(s no possibility of attachin the loicalstr(ct(re directly to the world, as it were; and in his analysis of confir#ation +e#pel has allowed forthis by s(rro(ndin the p(rely loical activities for which he takes responsibility with a pen(#bral areain which he ad#its that pra#atic 7(d#ents are necessary. Pra#atic considerations enter the pict(rebefore loical concerns take over, at the point where the theory confrontse*perience; and they re#ainafter loic has done its work, at the point where the theory had to be acce!tedor rejected. B(t aainthat does not #ean that the @(ality of the loical analysis which oes on in between has to be #odified


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by the pra#atic concerns which precede and follow it.

nother respect in which the positivists set o(t with revol(tionary = >

well. ed(ction sentences define theoretical ter#s only partially, b(t they preserve a f(nctionalseparation of s(ch ter#s fro# observation ones. he tro(ble is that the (se of theoretical ter#s oftendepends inti#ately on their association with observation ones, since -as a r(le, the presence of ahypothetical entity4 . . . will have observable sy#pto#s only if certain observational conditions, 31,

are satisfied- 2p. !=5. +e#pel therefore abandons the f(nctional separation of observation andtheoretical ter#s, and takes the (nit of sinificance to be a syste# of state#ents in which both typesocc(r. 8(ch a syste# he calls an -interpretative syste#.- ts sinificance still depends on the prior

sinificance of the ter#s of a ro(hly observational vocab(lary, b(t +e#pel no loner insists that theseter#s sho(ld refer to percept(al contents directly)he will even accept disposition ter#s into the basicvocab(lary if they are -well (nderstood in the sense that they are (sed with a hih deree of aree#entby co#petent observers- 2p. !95. ltho(h, however, the interpretative syste# contains observationter#s and theoretical ter#s toether, it is not s(ested that the distinction between the# sho(ld beiven (p; this point will be dealt with at reater lenth in the ne*t section.

t is not one of the f(nctions of this essay to e*hibit the prora# of for#al reconstr(ction in detail forany partic(lar science, which in any b(t the #ost trivial case wo(ld be a lon and technically intricatetask. hat wo(ld be best done, in any case, by so#eone professionally concerned with the science in@(estion, or perhaps by collaboration between s(ch a person and a professional philosopher of science.8(ch collaboration is all too infre@(ent. he point wish to reiterate at the end of this sketchy

presentation of the for#alist prora# is that the intention of the prora# is not to help science to bedone, it is to help it to be (nderstood; it is not itself a scientific prora# b(t a #etascientific one.&le#ents of the #etascientific str(ct(re do not have to resemblethe ele#ents of the scientific str(ct(reto which they correspond, any #ore than people have to rese#ble their addresses or social sec(rityn(#bers, so that so#e of the co#ple*ities of the daily b(siness of science are strictly irrelevant to the@(estion of the ade@(acy or inade@(acy of the for#al #odel. n one of the earlier papers +e#pel pointsthis o(t e*plicitly: -for the sake of theoretical co#prehensiveness and syste#ati

IV

he two respects in which +e#pels acco(nt has e*cited the liveliest controversy have already beenall(ded to. Lne is e*ternal to the syste#, and challenes its relevance to the activity of which itp(rports to be at least a partial philosophical analysis. he other is internal to it, and challenes a


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distinction on which part of the analysis rests. he latter is the #ore serio(s, and shall deal with itfirst.

he observational6theoretical distinction as it e*isted a#on the early positivists was, as pointed o(tabove, (ntenable. he challene to +e#pel and his collea(es, in essence, is: hy preserve thedistinction at all0 Powerf(l ar(#ents have been #arshalled to show that whenever it is insisted (ponin concrete cases it can be rendered virt(ally insinificant 2the best presentation of this view is probably

that of chinstein5.E1"F he position shall advocate here is that the distinction is i#portant and (sef(l,that recent attacks on it have overlooked one of its principal (ses, and that it o(ht not to be abandoned.

Distinctions of whatever kind are intended to distin(ish between classes which for so#e p(rpose orother are conveniently kept distinct. t #ay be, however, that between so#ethin that obvio(slybelons to one class and so#ethin that obvio(sly belons to another there occ(rs a series ofinter#ediate radations, and that with respect to so#ethin fallin ro(hly between the two a decisionabo(t its classification #ay be so diffic(lt that the distinction cannot be (sef(lly applied to it. hat wish to e#phasi


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obser-ations which had not "et been made. t this point the co##onplace that every scientificobservation is #ade with the establish#ent or ref(tation of so#e theory in #ind will be raised as anob7ection, b(t the inconsistency between that and the clai# 7(st advanced is only apparent. %ow, at theadvanced stae in which science finds itself, it is of co(rse (nthinkable to spend e*peri#ental ti#e and#oney on any other p(rs(it than the confir#ation or ref(tation of theories, e*cept as it is spent 2andthis acco(nts for #ost of it5 on followin o(t in detail the conse@(ences of a theory which is already

taken to be confir#ed. his was not always the case. lot of observation was in hand before the firstreally testable theory was for#(lated. 2+e#pel, inAs!ectsEp. 139F, refers to %orthrops -nat(ralhistory- stae of in@(iry, and speaks of -the shift toward theoretical syste#ati 31 >

tions are at first #erely observational. Lnce the new theory is for#(lated f(rther observations fall into

the old pattern, that is to say the lan(ae in which they are reported is colored by the new theory. B(tin the period between the detection of the ano#aly and the e#erence of the theory which acco(nts forit the observational6theoretical distinction is f(lly operative. nd since scientific ed(cation in anontheoretical world is a kind of ontoenetic recapit(lation of the phyloenetic advance#ent ofscience, the distinction re#ains fa#iliar even in periods when f(nda#ental discoveries are infre@(ent.

he observational6theoretical distinction, then, not only plays a part in clarifyin, for the individ(al, therelation between theory and the observation which s(pports it, it also plays a part in clarifyin thehistorical sit(ation attendant on the e#erence of new theories. B(t it is precisely on this second pointthat the other principal criticis# of the for#alist prora# hines. $or#al reconstr(ction, it is said,falsities the character of science, which in its real develop#ent does not follow a tidy dialectic ofobservation and theory b(t is to be (nderstood only thro(h intricate historical and socioloicalanalysis. %obody wo(ld deny that historical and socioloical analyses are of reat i#portance in theirown riht, b(t there is a daner of conf(sion in settin the# over aainst philosophical analyses of thereconstr(ctionist variety. Lne of the recent historical theses which has drawn #ost attention to itself isthat of H(hn,E14F accordin to which the develop#ent of science is fro# paradi# to paradi#, eachparadi# controllin a period of nor#al science, by a series of crises and revol(tions. his see#s to #ea hihly pla(sible view, and H(hn #akes an i#pressive case for it. +e s(ests, however, that he ca#eto it partly o(t of dissatisfaction with conte#porary philosophy of science, which represented scienceas bein so#ethin which, in his own practical e*perience of it, it clearly was not. he earlierdisc(ssion in this essay sho(ld #ake it clear eno(h how s(ch a #is(nderstandin of the intentions ofthe philosophy of science #iht arise. 2t #ay be added parenthetically that if every #is(nderstandinled to a contrib(tion of s(ch oriinality, #is(nderstandin #iht well beco#e one of the oals of

in@(iry.5 here is, as far as can see, no inco#patibility whatever between H(hns view of science and+e#pels, since each new paradi# 2in H(hns sense of the ter#5 #iht t(rn o(t to satisfy +e#pelscriteria for a developed science, 7(st as it was s(ested that all $eyerabends alternatives #iht. H(hn,in fact, has had so#e diffic(lty in characteri


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> 3 >

content; the proress of science #iht therefore be reinterpreted in ter#s of the distance fro# theparadi# 2in +e#pels sense5 at which the science of a iven epoch finds itself, crises occ(rrinwhenever the distance beco#es too reat, and revol(tions restorin the acceptable for# with newobservational and theoretical content.

do not wish to saddle +e#pel with the views p(t forward in this section of the essay; they owe theirinspiration to hi#, b(t he #iht wish to disown the#. +e does not, at least inAs!ects$take thehistorical sinificance of the for#al #odel as far as have done, and indeed he reconi


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applicable to all sorts of everyday sit(ations in which we ordinarily and naively (se the ter#-e*planation.- he analoy see#s to #e appropriate on two co(nts. $or#al #ethods in loic and#athe#atics are principally of interest to loicians and #athe#aticians; for Iod they are (seless,beca(se Iod sees the concl(sions in the pre#ises; the averae #an or wo#an in the street, who doesnot (nderstand the pre#ises and does not need the concl(sions, find the# (seless also. 8i#ilarly forscientific theories and their for#al reconstr(ction. Iod #ay be pres(#ed to (nderstand the world and

science too; the averae person takes little interest in either. $or those, however, whose intellect(alpowers are less than Iods b(t whose intellect(al c(riosity is #ore active than the averae, the #iddlereion between o#niscience and ordinary lan(ae has its attractions. t is with no intention ofdisrespect to philosophers who c(ltivate a sensitivity to the ordinary lan(ae of science that s(esta ree*a#ination of the virt(es of for#al reconstr(ction, childishly si#ple as the enterprise #ay appear.

8i#plicity, after all, is not necessarily achieved si#ply. -he central the#e of this essay,- says +e#pel,referrin to the title essay ofAs!ects2p. A==5, -has been, briefly, that all scientific e*planation involves,e*plicitly or by i#plication, a s(bs(#ption of its s(b7ect #atter (nder eneral re(larities; that it seeksto provide a syste#atic (nderstandin of e#pirical pheno#ena by showin that they fit into a no#icne*(s.- 8o#e people are te#pted to say, well, if that is all there is to it, we knew it all alon. B(t thepoint is we did not know it all alon; it see#s fa#iliar now only beca(se the work of the last thirty

years has #ade it so. hat this view of e*planation is now an obvio(s point of

> 3A >

depart(re for f(rther work in the philosophy of science is in lare #eas(re d(e to +e#pel. here is areat deal #ore to be done, and #(ch of it inevitably will consist in a#plifyin, correctin, andcontradictin prono(nce#ents of +e#pels. B(t the self6i#posed li#itations on the scope of hisachieve#ent, and the e*traordinarily close way in which it has been ar(ed to, s(est that it will be anele#ent to be reckoned with for a lon ti#e to co#e.

> 3" >

61

Scie%ce a%d S(ste/.

O% t#e U%it( a%d *iersit( o& Scie%ti&ic T#eor(

heories are ways of lookin at thins.A theorosin ancient Ireece was -a spectator, an observer, onewho travels to see #en and thins; an a#bassador sent by the state to cons(lt an oracle, or to observethe a#es.- B(t that ety#oloy #akes it clear that theories cannot be 7(st cas(al ways of lookin; thereis so#ethin cere#onial, al#ost official, abo(t any view of the world which @(alifies as a theory.itho(t pressin the point abo(t oracles 2or a#es5 we can reconi


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lookin at syste#s. Sustema, aain, #eans si#ply -that which is p(t toether, a co#posite whole,- sothat there is at first nothin partic(larly ill(#inatin abo(t itsety#oloy. B(t -syste#,- also, hasac@(ired connotations. n this case, (nfort(nately, there are two sets of connotations which p(ll inopposite directions. Ln the one hand, syste# has for #any people)especially philosophers b(t oftenscientists too)represented the hihest for# of knowlede, a perfect vision of the orani 34 >

the drawin of pre#at(re concl(sions and even for the s(ppression of evidence. he str(le whichacco#panied the overthrow of the ristotelian6ho#istic syste# in the enaissance has never @(itebeen forotten by #odern science. 'et that syste#, considered in relation to its proper s(b7ect6#atter,had been the so(rce of enlihten#ent and even proress. s hitehead p(ts it, -n its pri#e eachsyste# is a tri(#phant s(ccess; in its decay it is an obstr(ctive n(isance.-E1F t has been the #isfort(neof syste#s, especially philosophical ones, to be re#e#bered for the n(isance rather than the s(ccess:the s(ccess ratifies the conte#poraries of the syste#, b(t the n(isance #ay live on for cent(ries.

Before oin f(rther, a serio(s a#bi(ity which has already crept into the disc(ssion #(st be dealtwith. 8yste#s theory is a way of lookin at syste#s, b(t theories the#selves are also syste#s. hey areco#posite wholes whose parts are propositions, related to one another in co#ple* and dyna#ic ways.he chief difference between a theory and a physical syste# is that the parts of a theory are concept(al,and therefore in principle #ore fle*ible than the parts of a physical syste#. heories are si#pler toconstr(ct and, in principle, si#pler to discard, and this versatility is the secret of their (sef(lness andtheir i#portance. theory 2aain in principle5 can do anythin a physical syste# can do, #ore @(ickly,#ore efficiently, and with less fear of the conse@(ences. he chief f(nction of theories, therefore, is toanticipate the behavior of physical syste#s. f in theory the device blows (p, in practice it had betternot be b(ilt that way.

&ach theoretical syste# confronts the physical syste# of which it is the theory, and this confrontation is

not a bad i#ae of the h(#an activity we call science. s a paradi# we #ay take the classicalinvestiation of Ialileo. +ere the physical syste# consists of a ball, an inclined plane, a ti#in device,and a ravitational field. he inp(t to the syste# is the release of the ball fro# the top of the plane,with the ti#in device in so#e prearraned state; the o(tp(ts are a series of inter#ediate positions ofthe ball and a correspondin series of states of the ti#in device, endin with the ball at the botto#.he theoretical syste# confrontin it consists of an alebraic f(nction, i.e., of a set of relations betweenn(#bers. he inp(t to this syste# is a set of initial conditions, and the o(tp(t is a set of sol(tions forthe ball at vario(s staes of its descent. Physical syste#s of one sort and another have, of co(rse,always been with (s, and ele#entary theoretical syste#s had been developed by earlier thinkers thanIalileo. hat is novel in this develop#ent is that the two syste#s have the sa#e for#)they areisomor!hicwith one another and therefore behave in the sa#e way

> 3? >

within the li#its of the iso#orphis#. e now take this condition for ranted, b(t Ialileo tho(ht itworth #akin e*plicit:

t see#s desirable to find and e*plain a definition Eof nat(rally accelerated #otionF bestfittin nat(ral pheno#ena. $or anyone #ay invent an arbitrary type of #otion and disc(ssits properties . . . b(t we have decided to consider the pheno#ena of bodies fallin with an


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acceleration s(ch as act(ally occ(rs in nat(re and to #ake this definition of accelerated#otion e*hibit the essential feat(res of observed accelerated #otions. nd this, at last, afterrepeated efforts we tr(st we have s(cceeded in doin.EF

he -repeated efforts- s(est that ettin the iso#orphis# is not a partic(larly easy task, a point towhich shall have occasion to refer aain later on.

%ow, iso#orphis# is not so#ethin that belons to the theoretical syste# and the physical syste#separately; it appears only when they are taken toether, and this has to be done fro# a vantae6pointo(tside the# both. t is not the f(nction of theory to reflect on its ade@(acy to the world; its f(nction isto beade@(ate to the world. O(estions abo(t the ade@(acy of scientific theories, like @(estions abo(ttheir loical str(ct(re, their oriins, their (sef(lness, etc., are metascientific@(estions; and a n(#ber of#etascientific disciplines)the philosophy of science, the history of science, the socioloy of science)have rown (p to deal with the#. hese disciplines, however, are not si#ply descriptive, they aretheoretical too, or better metatheoretical)ways of lookin at scientific theory, or ways of lookin atways of lookin at thins. nd this #eans that they also incorporate syste#s, #etascientific syste#s,which confront the scientific syste#s 2now incl(din theories and physical syste#s and the interactionsbetween the#5 of which they are the respective #etatheories. t beins to look as if there are syste#severywhere, and as if everythin co(ld be rearded as a syste#. hat this is in fact so is one of thealleations #ost fre@(ently #ade by the critics of syste#s theory. $or of co(rse if it wereso, callinso#ethin a syste# wo(ld ive no (sef(l infor#ation abo(t it; the ter# by itself wo(ld cease to #akeany distinction between one state of affairs and another.

$ort(nately, everythin is not a syste#, and the ter# is by no #eans an e#pty one. t the very least, tosay of a n(#ber of ele#ents, whether physical or theoretical, that they constit(te a syste# is to denythat they a#o(nt #erely to a pile of ob7ects or a list of words. 8ince there arepiles of ob7ects and listsof words, that is an i#portant distinction. nd since a pile of ob7ects, even when the ob7ects arecaref(lly stacked 2and even if they are fastened toether5 re#ains a pile of ob7ects

> 3= >2albeit a sophisticated one5, and a list of words, even if arraned accordin to the r(les of ra##ar andsynta*, re#ains a 2si#ilarly sophisticated5 list of words, the ideas of dyna#ic interrelation and/or ofcoherent f(nctionin are also i#plicit in the concept of syste#. Dyna#ic interrelation entails chanesof state; coherent f(nctionin entails inp(ts and o(tp(ts. t is easy to see how these properties #ay bereflected in physical syste#s, theoretical syste#s, and #etatheoretical syste#s, and yet take radicallydifferent for#s in the three cases. he conf(sions that often arise are larely d(e to carelessness indistin(ishin levels)to #i*in (p ob7ects and the descriptions of ob7ects, theories and the conditionsof theoretical ade@(acy.

his kind of conf(sion is especially likely to occ(r in disc(ssion between people whose (s(al

preocc(pations are on different levels. $or the @(estion can be asked 2on a #etatheoretical level5whether the vario(s theoretical syste#s, which have been devised to cope with the reat variety ofphysical syste#s to be fo(nd in the world, the#selves constit(te a hiher6order syste# 2a eneralsyste#, perhaps5)whether the sciences taken toether are like a list of words or like a theory, whetherthere can be not #erely a philosophy of science b(t also a science of science. $ro# the beinnin theattraction of eneral syste#s theory was that it see#ed to offer a new basis for the (nification ofscience. y @(estion then is, how are the sciences one, and how are they #any0 Can there be a eneraltheoretical syste#, or only a eneral #etatheory of partic(lar theoretical syste#s, i.e., a eneral#etatheoretical syste#0 f there is a eneral theoretical syste#, what are its ele#ents and the principles


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of its artic(lation0

t #(st be ad#itted fro# the start that in the develop#ent of science every s(ccessf(l step has so farconsisted in the establish#ent of a partic(lar theoretical syste# applicable to a partic(lar physicalsyste#, as in the Ialilean case disc(ssed earlier. &very proble# presents itself in a partic(larconnection, at a partic(lar 7(nct(re of space and ti#e; every law is bo(nded in its reference and theconditions of its application; every e*planation is relevant to so#e restricted 2even if infinite5 set of

possible observations. he syste#s in @(estion #ay have been #ore or less ra#ified, b(t even in its#ost ra#ified for# no sinle syste# has yet e*tended so far as to cover even one of the conventionalfields of science 2altho(h so#e have crossed the bo(ndaries of these conventional fields5. heconventional divisions a#on the sciences have been established on the ro(nds of si#ilarity a#onobservations and e*planatory concepts which s(ested the possibility of (nification into a sinleded(ctively orani 39 >

in #any ways #ore like a list of words 2each -word-5 representin, it is tr(e, a s(bstantial bit of theory5than like a (nified theoretical syste#; and physics has done better than any of the other sciences. wishto stress this point beca(se #any people see# to think that the (nity of science has to contend onlywith divisions between the sciences, overlookin the e@(ally serio(s divisions within the#.

e #iht nevertheless ad#it that (nity is a reali


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recent writers have chosen instead predicates de6

> A! >

scriptive of the #ost ele#entary physical (nits to be fo(nd in the world, na#ely the predicates ofele#entary particle theory. t is in the latter case that we speak of the -red(ction of all sciences to

physics.- n the for#er, all sciences 2incl(din physics5 are red(ced to a co##on observation basis,altho(h since this observation basis is!h"sicalisticand the na#e for the view that this kind ofred(ction is possible is physicalis#,E3F the two are easily conf(sed. Lnce the lan(ae is settled, thered(ction of laws follows the sa#e pattern in both cases. he conditions of red(ction are clear: there(larities described by the ter#s and e*plained by the laws which are red(ced #(st be describable bythe ter#s and e*plainable by the laws to which they are red(ced, the for#er ter#s and laws therebybein eli#inated fro# the description and e*planation. t #ay also be the case that the science which isred(ced nor#ally deals with ob7ects whose parts are nor#ally dealt with by the science to which it isred(ced, altho(h this is not essential; in this connection the ter# -#icrored(ction- has been s(ested.

%either of these versions of red(ctionis# can be said to have s(cceeded, b(t it wo(ld be rash to say thatthey never co(ld s(cceed. Lppenhei# and P(tna#, on the basis of the ass(#ption of #icrored(ctiondown to particle physics, are prepared to speak of the (nity of science as a -workin hypothesis.-EAF8ince all s(ch prora#s of red(ction involve one reat inconvenience, na#ely, that the laws of thered(ced science look very co#plicated when they are e*pressed in the lan(ae of the f(nda#entalscience 2i#aine tryin to e*press the laws of econo#ics in the lan(ae of @(ant(# #echanics5,Lppenhei# and P(tna# list si* reducti-e le-els, as follows:

4 8ocial ro(ps

" 2(lticell(lar5 livin thins

A Cells

3 olec(les

to#s

1 &le#entary particles

and content the#selves with red(ction between ad7acent levels. ed(ction is obvio(sly transitive, b(t itwo(ld be silly to try to de#onstrate that in partic(lar cases. his is (nity in principle rather than inpractice, and it is hihly pla(sible, as so #any thins are in principle. ed(ction to a physical thinlan(ae is even #ore pla(sible for a very obvio(s reason, na#ely, that all the data on which we baseo(r concl(sions, in sciences as diverse as cos#oloy and #icrobioloy, have to be rendered in#acroscopic for# 2spectral lines, chro#atora#s5 before we

> A1 >

can take the# in; o(r bioloical co##(nity forces a kind of episte#oloical (nity on o(r knowlede.he thesis of physicalis# is stroner than this, of co(rse, since it will not accept 7(st any #acroscopicobservation as part of the basis 2e.., -its alive,- -shes anry-5, b(t Carnap at least considered it to beestablished in its essentials: while he says that -there is at present no unit" of laws,- he contin(es,

Ln the other hand, there is a unit" of languagein science, vi


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he possibility of red(ction is philosophically interestin, b(t the tro(ble with it as a workin basis forthe (nity of science is that nobody really wants to doit. here are cases, of co(rse, in which red(ctionreally works and everybody is ratef(l for it, as when the theory of certain diseases, which hadfor#erly been st(died only at the ross level of sy#pto#s, was red(ced to a theory abo(t#icrooranis#s and cells. 'et there is a li#it to the co#ple*ity that one discipline can handle, andphysicists do not at the #o#ent want to b(rden the#selves with oranic che#istry, let alone political

science. he world #ay be a sinle very co#ple* physical syste#, b(t that does not #ean that a sinlevery co#ple* theoretical syste# is the best way of representin it.

61

S(%t#esis

he red(ction of one science to another #akes no ass(#ptions abo(t a si#ilarity of for#al str(ct(re onthe two levels in @(estion. t is only necessary that the ter#s and laws on the hiher level sho(ld beeli#inable in favor of ter#s and laws on the lower level. wish now to #ove on to a stronerconception of the (nity of science in which s(ch a for#al si#ilarity appears either instead of or inaddition to the thesis of red(ction. here is said to e*ist a #odel or pattern of scientific theory, of which

each partic(lar theory is an instantiation, so that hiher level sciences recapit(late, altho(h with #oreco#ple* ele#ents, the str(ct(re of lower level sciences. his clai# is clearly independent of thered(ctionist clai#, and #any of its proponents re7ect the latter on the ro(nds that en(ine noveltye#eres at the different levels, altho(h the basic pattern is reprod(ced on each.

ltho(h red(ction is not a necessary part of this synthetic view, the sciences are nearly alwaysarraned in a hierarchy very si#ilar to

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the red(ctionist one iven above; a part6whole relationship of so#e sort is held to obtain betweenlevels, altho(h the wholes #ay not be e*plainable witho(t resid(e in ter#s of their parts. he sciencesth(s for# a totality, the (nit of which is provided by the archetypal str(ct(re that reappears at eachstae, like a si#ilar arrane#ent of roo#s on the different floors of a tall ho(se. Lne of the #ostthoro(h workins o(t of this idea is to be fo(nd in the syste# of 8ynoptic %at(ralis# developed byIeore Perrio Coner. he -r(#ent- of this work p(ts the view (nder disc(ssion so clearly that itis worth @(otin.

he (niverse, st(died (nder the li#itations which beset h(#an thinkin, presents itself as avast syste# of syste#s which are strikinly si#ilar in the eneral principles of theirstr(ct(res and processes. #on the #a7or syste#s, or real#s, are those co##onlyreferred to as atter, Kife, ind. &ach of these real#s develops thro(h a series of levels,and st(died in e#pirical detail, fro# level to level and fro# real# to real#, the str(ct(res

and processes of #atter, or the physical world, are seen to rese#ble those of life, or theoranis#s, and both the physical world and the oranis#s rese#ble a nervo(s syste#f(nctionin as a #ind. he rese#blances of str(ct(res and processes thro(ho(t the levelsand real#s indicate that the (niverse is not #erely a series of evol(tions, b(t also of-epito#i


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coordinations, fro# str(ct(res and processes which are loical to str(ct(res and processeswhich are personal and societal. st(dy of #ans ad7(st#ents of his str(ct(res andprocesses to those of the s(rro(ndin (niverse which he epito#i A3 >

the syste# of levels. hese cases of iso#orphis# between theories, each iso#orphic with a verydifferent physical syste#, have led so#e people to the e*pectation that if only we look hard eno(h we#(st find the# everywhere. E-he h(#an (nderstandin,- says $rancis Bacon, -is of its own nat(reprone to s(ppose the e*istence of #ore order and re(larity in the world than it finds. nd tho(h therebe #any thins in nat(re which are sin(lar and (n#atched, yet it devises for the# parallels andcon7(ates and relatives which do not e*ist.-E?F F hat there sho(ld be cases of s(ch iso#orphis#between theories, which #akes it possible to (se one theory as a #odel for another and s(ests linesof investiation which #iht otherwise be overlooked, see#s to #e a nat(ral conse@(ence of the factthat the li#ited n(#ber of derees of freedo# in the physical world restricts the n(#ber of possibilitiesof str(ct(re; that the n(#ber of possibilities is still f(rther red(ced if to the str(ct(re in @(estion isadded a f(nction 2s(ch as rowth, ho#eostasis, replication, etc.5, since this has the effect of eli#inatinall b(t a few of the derees of freedo# available to the str(ct(re in its nonf(nctional state; and that thenat(ral li#itations of o(r intellect keep down the n(#ber of types of theoretical syste#s we are capableof constr(ctin. B(t it is one thin not to be s(rprised by e*ceptions, another to #istake the# for ther(le.

here is, of co(rse, a sense in which all possible sciences do confor# to a rather narrowly defined setof r(les, na#ely those of loic and its vario(s associated disciplines 2set theory, #athe#atics ineneral5. n a finite world containin a finite n(#ber of kinds of thins reactin with one another in afinite n(#ber of ways, there is a finite n(#ber of possibilities, and all of these are anticipated inprinciple by so#e branch or other of #athe#atics. he n(#ber of branches of #athe#atics which hasbeen worked o(t to any deree of co#ple*ity is severely li#ited, altho(h for the reasons iven aboveit is not entirely s(rprisin that already so#e branches sho(ld t(rn o(t to be applicable to #ore than one

set of e#pirical conditions. o be loical, however, only #eans not to be inconsistent; it does not #eanto confor# to any partic(lar pattern in detail, and in eneral we find the e#pirical tr(ths of partic(larsciences fillin o(t the skeleton of loic and #athe#atics in @(ite different ways and at @(ite differentpoints.

"1

E%c(clo2edia

he thesis of red(ction ass(#es that there is a basic science in ter#s of which the tr(ths of all the


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others can be e*pressed; the synthetic view o(tlined above ass(#es that there is a s(perscience inwhose

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i#ae all the partic(lar sciences are #ade. %either view can be entirely #istaken. Partial red(ctions

between ad7acent levels have been carried o(t with reat s(ccess; and iso#orphis#s do e*ist betweenele#ents of theories on different levels, so that their loical for# #iht pla(sibly be tho(ht of as anele#ent of a s(per theory. B(t both are clearly prora##atic rather than de#onstrable, and eachenco(nters serio(s philosophical diffic(lties: red(ction faces the proble# of e#erence, thehierarchical synthesis faces the daner of Platonis#. 2&ach of the iso#orphis#s between theories #(stbe tested e#pirically on both sides before it can be accepted, and by the ti#e this is done its predictive)as apart fro# its s(estive)power has already been rendered s(perfl(o(s.5

weaker position, which reflects ele#ents of both these stron ones, can be fo(nd in the works ofpeople like 8pencer in the nineteenth cent(ry and Ltto %e(rath in the twentieth. +ere the (nity ofscience is a social rather than a loical #atter; science, as a cooperative enterprise, involvesinvestiations of different parts of the world by different people, whose findins can then be asse#bledin a classification witho(t hierarchy, a syste# of cooperation witho(t precedence. %o one will deny thatche#istry deals with areates whose parts are dealt with by physics, b(t this does not #ean thatphysics has to be done first, nor that che#istry #ay not throw so#e liht on the proble#s of physics.-he division of labor in science,- says +erbert 8pencer,

has been not only a speciali A" >instr(#ents5, b(t of all the re(larities we act(ally take note of, so#e on this level and so#e on that,only a few will serve as the startin point for interestin scientific develop#ents. %e(rath, for his part,stresses the (nrealistic character of other prora#s for the (nification of science, #ost of the# 2likethat of Keibni


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f one re7ects the idea of s(ch a s(per science and also the idea of a pse(dorationalisticanticipation of thesyste# of science, what is the #a*i#(# of scientific coordination whichre#ains possible0 he answer iven by the (nity of science #ove#ent is: an encyclopediaof (nified science. . . . Lne cannot co#pare the historically iven with -the realscience.- . . . n encyclopedia and not a syste# is the en(ine #odel of science as a whole.n encyclopedic interation of scientific state#ents, with all the discrepancies and

diffic(lties which appear, is the #a*i#(# of interation which we can achieve. . . . t isaainst the principle of encyclopedis# to i#aine that one -co(ld- eli#inate all s(chdiffic(lties. o believe this is to entertain a variation of Kaplaces fa#o(s de#on. . . . 8(chis the idea of thes"stemin contrast to the idea of an enc"clo!edia; the anticipatedco#pleteness of the syste# as opposed to the stressed inco#pleteness of an encyclopedia.E9F

%ow, this talk of encyclopedias will see# like pretty pale st(ff to diehard (nitarians, and it #ay appearthat by now have forotten all abo(t eneral syste#s theory. B(t #y (nderlyin @(estion is, what isthe relevance of eneral syste#s theory to the (nity of science 2and vice versa50 8o far have si#plytried to show what so#e people have (nderstood by the (nity of science. want now to ask as(pple#entary @(estion, na#ely, what is the point of havin a (nified science0 fter dealin with that,

shall ret(rn to eneral syste#s theory #ore specifically.ost efforts at the (nification of science, think, have been (ndertaken fro# either of two #otives, oneperfectly so(nd, the other involvin serio(s daners. Ket #e deal with the danero(s one first. t is aco##on co#plaint that h(#an life and h(#an knowlede are rerettably (nsyste#atic andfra#ented, and there appears to be a very powerf(l psycholoical desire to et it all tied toether intoso#e coherent whole. 8cience see#ed for a lon ti#e the ideal aent of s(ch a total interation. passae attrib(ted so#ewhere to +(o (nsterber s(#s (p this feelin ad#irably: -L(r ti#e lonsfor a new synthesis)it

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waits for science to satisfy o(r hiher needs for a view of the world that shall ive (nity to o(r scatterede*perience.- Ln an ele#entary level this desire for wholeness shows (p in Iestalt pheno#ena of-clos(re,- in which the #ind #oves fro# an al#ost co#plete representation to a co#plete one, or evenin #ore advanced staes fro# a #ere indication to a co#plete representation. his t(rns o(t to be very(sef(l in perception, altho(h even there it has its risks. n a search for the (nity of science it is, believe, pernicio(s if taken by itself; if, that is, all that is desired is kind of #ental clos(re, a tidyin6(pof the scientific conception of the world. he presentation of separate tho(h apparently relatedele#ents is no ar(#ent for the independent e*istence of a whole of which they are the parts, altho(hthat is what the need for clos(re see#s to drive #any people to when it co#es to the conte#plation ofscientific theories. 2t #(st be (nderstood aain that a# not sayin that the worldis not a (nified

syste#; a# sayin that we have no ro(nds as yet for clai#in that theor"is.5 ccordin to . I.Collinwood, scientists si#ply cannot help tryin to (nify science, altho(h he thinks that theiratte#pts are doo#ed to fail(re:

8cience always believes that it has 7(st discovered the (lti#ate tr(th and that all past aeshave been s(nk in a fo of inorance and s(perstition. t has no sense of its solidarity withand debt to its own past and other for#s of conscio(sness. nd f(rther, it is as i#possible toclassify sciences and red(ce the# to a sinle ordered cos#os of tho(ht as it is to do thesa#e with works of art.


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he atte#pt has been #ade over and over aain to red(ce all the sciences to s(ch anordered whole. t see#s obvio(s that there #(st be a table or hierarchy of sciences in whicheach has its p

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