Yilmaz, I - Insight Turkey Vol 11 No 2 2009

8/8/2019 Yilmaz, I - Insight Turkey Vol 11 No 2 2009

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E ven though there is no simple causalrelationship between the lack o de-mocracy and political extremism, it has beenargued that institutional exclusion rom thepolitical process and indiscriminate repressionmake extremist groups inclined to adopt revo-lutionary 1 or even worse terrorist methods.Conversely, political participation (even insemi-democratic autocracies) encourages rad-ical groups to pursue their objectives throughpeace ul means. Political pluralism, albeit in alimited orm, can induce radical and even an-ti-systemic parties to moderate their politicaldiscourses.2

Tis paper analyses how and to what extentthe processes o exclusion and/or inclusionpolicies o the regimes, general ramework o political and legal structures, politico-legalconstraints and opportunities in urkey andEgypt have in uenced the trans ormation andmoderation o Islamisms toward a pluralistdiscourse in these two countries. Instead o o-

ABSTRACT

Partial and limited opening o authoritarian political systems in

urkey and Egypt created newdemocratic opportunities orIslamists to participate in public li e.

It also ostered democratic learningby permitting Islamists to competeor power and popular legitimacy. In

the process o democratic opening,Islamists have had to addressand represent the interests o agroup much larger than their ownideological constituency. Tey havealso had to endure repression andparty closures in a semi-democraticpolitical ramework. However,

the democratic learning processcoupled with the establishmentsconstraints has paved the way orthe trans ormation o Islamiststo Muslim democrats. While theprocess in urkey is almost complete,in Egypt there are still heated debateson the trans ormation among theIslamists. Tis study highlightsthe importance o the democraticopportunities given to urkish

Islamists and argues that i givensimilar opportunities, EgyptianIslamism will also trans orm to apost-Islamist phase.

Muslim Democrats in Turkey and Egypt: Participatory Politicsas a Catalyst

HSAN YILMAZ*

* Assist. Pro ., Public Administration Department, Fatih Univer-sity, [email protected]

Insight Turkey Vol. 11 / No. 2 / 2009pp. 93-112


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cusing only on the Islamist discourse, the interaction o discourse, context, struc-

ture and practice will be examined.3

Islamist parties in urkey were successively banned rom politics, but re-emerged a er re raming their discourse in response to their perceived oppor-tunities and constraints. Te current Justice and Development Party (AK Party)has gone a step urther than its Islamist predecessors, dramatically highlighting aprocess o institutional change and ideological moderation. Te increasing mod-eration o the Islamist movement is the result o several institutional actors.4 Te

urkish Islamists have been given the political reedom in a liberalized autocracy 5

to make strategic choices in a political system that rewards political participationwith credible opportunities or power, while at the same time, the state and civilsociety have imposed public institutional constraints on the Islamists in addi-tion to the interactions taking place between Islamists, their constituency and thestate.6 Similar developments have also been taking place in a di erent context,Egypt. A er analyzing the evolution o urkish Islamists to Muslim democrats,the paper will look at the same issue in the Egyptian context.

Evolution of Islamism in Turkey

When the urkish Republic decided to close down all Su brotherhoods andlodges, as a result o the Sunni Hana understanding o pre erring the worst stateto anarchy, chaos and revolution they did not challenge the state. Nevertheless,they continued their existence invisibly and unofcially, without claiming any public or ofcial role. In return, the ofcials turned a blind eye to their existence.Among them, the Nakhsbandi order has played an important role, or all promi-nent urkish Islamist parties have originated in the Nakhsbandi brotherhood.7 Te Khalidi branch o theNakhsbandihas been the most politically active broth-erhood. Its sheikh, Mehmed Zahid Kotku (18971980), preached that it was theduty o observant Muslims to take an active interest in national a airs.8 He didnot perceive the secular state as an absolute enemy. He created a new operationalcode o the brotherhood, synchronized with the political code promoted by thesecular state, that o constitutional legitimacy. By the 1970s, Kotku started pro-moting a second layer o legitimacy, working in tandem with Islamic legitimacy,which was that o political institution building.9

Kotkus disciple Pro essor Necmettin Erbakan and his ollowers have succes-sively established the National Order (Jan. 26, 1970 to Jan. 14, 1971), NationalSalvation (Oct. 11, 1972 to Sept. 12, 1980), Wel are (July 19, 1983 to Jan. 16, 1998),Virtue (Dec. 17, 1997 to June 22, 2001) and Felicity parties (July 20, 2001 to pres-


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ent). With the exception o the existing

Felicity Party (SP), all the others wereshut down by the establishment. Te rstprominent Islamist party in republican

urkey, the National Order Party (MNP)and the National Salvation Party (MSP)were established through Sheikh Kotkuspromotion and support, and he had supervised their activities.10Most o the ound-ers were also disciples o Kotku.11 Erbakanespoused a discourse o new economicand social order based on national as opposed to Western principles. Te basicprogram o this party was based on the demand to disseminate traditional reli-gious values and to achieve the unity o Muslim societies. Te party was shut downa er a military intervention in 1971 on the ground that it was against the secular-ism. Te MSP was ounded in October 1972 a er the generals called Erbakan back

rom voluntary exile in Switzerland. Te MSP ideology was almost the same as thato the closed MNP. Te MSP is usually remembered with its rigorous resistanceagainst urkeys membership o the EU together with Greece in the mid-1970s.12

Te NSP won 11.8 percent o the vote in the national elections o 1973. Itparticipated in a series o three coalition governments in the 1970s. A er themilitary coup in 1980, the NSP was also closed down, together with all other po-litical parties. When the army returned to its barracks in 1983, Erbakan oundeda new party under a new name -- the Wel are Party (RP). Te RP ideology wasnot di erent rom that o the MSP. But, in the early 1990s, the RP realized theneed or turning the party into a mass political movement, adopting an agendathat put stress on social problems rather than on religious themes, using modernpropaganda methods. It particularly tried to mobilize the urban poor, who su -

ered rom the liberalization policies o the 1980s.13

Te RP had steadily increased its share o the vote, and a er the 1994 generallocal elections mayors o several major cities such as Ankara and Istanbul (cur-rent Prime Minister Recep ayyip Erdoan became the mayor o Istanbul at thatdate) were RP members. In 1996, as the bigger partner o a coalition govern-ment (Re ah-Yol) with the rue Path Party (DYP), Erbakan became urkeys

rst Islamist prime minister. Te Erbakan governments policies, in particularly those designed to link urkey more closely with Islamic countries and to widenthe scope o religious reedoms, upset the civil and military bureaucracy.14 Teestablishment also pressurized Islamist and Islamic groups, companies and in-stitutions. Several brie ngs, joined by judicial personnel, journalists and otherpro essionals were organized by the General Sta o the Armed Forces on the

Te political attitude o religious groups demonstrates

that they are willing to takepart in the system rather than

striving or its total conversion


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danger o Islamic undamentalism in which the ruling party was identi ed as a

reactionary Islamic threat.15

With the support o dominant media groups andunions, chie businessmen clubs, and o the labor unions, the opposition led by the military managed to overthrow the Re ah-Yol government.16

In January 1998, the Constitutional Court closed down the RP and banned Er-bakan rom politics or ve years. Being aware o historys repetition, this time Er-bakans new party was already ready be ore the closure decision. Te Virtue Party (FP) continued operating under the leadership o Erbakans close riend, RecaiKutan, until it too was shut down by the Constitutional Court in June 2001.

A er the RP was ousted rom power, many younger members o the Islamistsalso began thinking that the only way they could succeed was to avoid con ronta-tion with the Kemalist establishment and to stay away rom the instrumentalist useo religious rhetoric in politics. Tis started an internal debate among the Islamists.Tus, a cleavage emerged within the movement between two di erent groups. Tetraditionalists (Gelenekiler), centered on Erbakan and party leader Kutan, op-posed any serious change in approach or policy, while the younger group o re-newalists (Yenilikiler), led by Erdoan, Abdullah Gl and Blent Arn, arguedthat the party needed to revise and renew its approach to a number o undamentalissues, especially democracy, human rights and relations with the West.

Te in uence o this internal debate was re ected in the plat orm o the FP.Te FP embraced Western political values, and anti-Westernism was not on itsagenda. Its slogans included pluralist society, basic rights and liberties, moredemocracy, privatization, decentralization and globalization.17

A er the Constitutional Court closed down the FP, the old guard went on to

establish the Felicity Party (SP), but therenewalists did not join them and insteadormed the AKP, adhering to their renewalist discourse, requently asserting uni-

versal values and value-based discourses such as human rights, democracy andree market principles.18 T ey have learned to avoid con rontational rhetoric. Te

emergence o the AK Party has shown that Muslim politics in urkey is evolv-ing rom an instrumentalist usage o Islam to a new understanding o practic-ing Muslims who deal with daily politics.19 While acknowledging the importanceo religion as personal belie , they accommodated themselves within the secular

constitutional ramework.20

A er this brie historical overview o the evolution o Islamism in urkey we

now turn our attention to analyzing the actors that brought about the above-


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summarized trans ormation o younger generation Islamists into Muslim demo-

crats o the AKP. Doing this will help us to see i and to what extent the urkishcase bears similarities to the Egyptian one.

In the urkish domestic context, there are several major actors that contrib-uted to the trans ormation o Islamists. As can be understood rom our histori-cal summary above, the rst is the ever-present existence o de jure and de actoconstraints imposed upon the Islamist political parties by the Kemalist establish-ment.21 Erbakan had been naively hoping in his every new attempt that the es-tablishment would let him run the country. As opposed to Erbakan, the younger

generations realized that they had to avoid con rontation with the aggressively laicist establishment as this would prevent their staying in power even i they reached it, as the RP governments experience showed. But realizing the Kemalistconstraints is only one o the causes o trans ormation. As experienced politi-cians, the ounders o the AKP knew that in order to come to power they neededthe publics support, and especially its votes. Tus it is obvious that they had totake into account what had been happening at the grassroots level.

Tey rst had to gauge their voters and potential voters reaction to the RP

experience in power, its overthrow by the generals and, in particular, Erbakansrecord. Tey did not have to wait too long. At the rst election in which the FPtook part in 1999, its voters penalized the Islamists and their votes decreased to15.1 percent rom 21.38 o ante-power RP. raditionally, urkish voters act inalmost direct opposition to the wishes o the generals, but this time they indicatedthat they were not happy with Erbakans record in power. Tey would penalizethe generals and penalize them harshly later in November 2002.

In addition to election results, because the younger Islamist politicians had

been in contact with the man in the street, grassroots, Anatolian heartlands andperiphery, they also became aware o the act that the new middle classes wouldno longer vote or an Islamist party a er the ailure in power o the RP. More-over, they established a think tank andsocial research institution. Be ore theestablishment o the AK Party, currentInterior Minister pro essor Beir Atalay,known to be close to the current presi-dent, Gl, established and directed thisinstitution, the Ankara Social StudiesCenter (ANAR), that regularly surveyedsocio-political trends in society and ac-

Te AK Party is a success ulexample showing that

political participation and theopportunities available or the

Islamist parties can generatepolitical change, resulting inthe trans ormation o Islamism


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tual demands o ordinary people. Gl is also known to have requented the o -

ces o this institution be ore establishing the AK Party. Tis scienti c, as it were,awareness o reality should have helped the younger generation o Islamists to develop a down-to-earth and realistic political discourse and party program whenestablishing the AK Party.

Moreover, the younger generation Islamists knew that even though Erbakanhad employed a religious rhetoric, his parties had never been able to gain thesupport o dominant religious communities nor did it gain the support o someprominent Su orders in urkey. Te dominant religious communities such as

Suleymancs (the ollower o Su leader Sleyman Hilmi unahan) andNurcus(the ollower o Said Nursi, a commentator o Quran) and some brands o the Suorders always gave support to the center-right parties. Te political attitude o re-ligious groups demonstrates that they are willing to take part in the system ratherthan striving or its total conversion.22 Several o the remaining Islamic groupsthat had been supporting Erbakan had also joined other non-supportive Islamicgroups, questioning both the easibility o Islam as a political project and the con-

ormity o Islamism to Islam itsel . Noticing that the social and economic net-works o Islam had been damaged most when Islamism was at its peak in the late1990s, these Islamic groups and businessmen started to withdraw their support

rom Erbakan and the idea o a social rather than political Islam -- which hasbeen advocated by non-Islamist groups such as the Glen movement or a longtime -- gained ground, opening up the way or the trans ormation o Islamism.23

In addition to Kemalist constraints, voters negative reaction to Erbakansrecord in power and realization o socio-political and economical demands o voters, another actor that in uenced younger Islamists trans ormation is theirrealization that the existing system -- that is, the current tacit or implicit socialcontract -- indeed did include sufcient possibilities or others than the politicalelite to represent the national body politic o urkey. From the Islamists point o view, this realization presented some peace with the existing political apparatusthat had been injurious to them since the 1920s.24

Erdoans experiences as mayor o Istanbul had also in uenced the trans-

ormation o the AK Party leaders romIslamist vanguards into pragmatic pol-iticians, where public service provisioneasily trumped ideology. Local voterswant efcient road and sewer repair and

Erdoans experiences asmayor o Istanbul had alsoin uenced the trans ormation

o the AK Party leaders romIslamist vanguards intopragmatic politicians


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trash collection, not utopian endeavors to trans orm society. Te chie executive

ofcer o urkeys largest city learned this lesson well.25

Te AK Party is a success ul example showing that political participation andthe opportunities available or the Islamist parties can generate political change,resulting in the trans ormation o Islamism to non-Islamism in the urkish con-text. Te AK Party has success ully analyzed, understood and responded to thereal concerns o ordinary people as it had to compete in elections to run the coun-try. Te result o the trans ormation and the partys e orts were prized by thepeople in the very rst election in which the party competed,Nov. 3, 2002,and

the AK Party won 34 percent o the vote, enabling it to control almost two-thirdso the parliament.26 Scholars have noted thatthe victory o the AKP was theendorsement o Erdoan who, during the campaign, ran on the issues o humanrights, liberties, economic development and integration into the EU.27

Te AKP increased its share o the vote to 47 percent in the July 22, 2007, elec-tions, the main opposition party receiving only 21 percent.28 Tis election wasprimarily shaped by evaluations o per ormance (economic or otherwise) ratherthan by ideological cleavages.29 As a matter o act, a survey by a polling rm,which predicted the outcome o the 2007 election with precision, has ound thatthe top two concerns leading people to cast a ballot or the AKP that year werenot religious sentiments, but rather the partys economic-policy per ormance andthe attempts o the military and the judiciary to prevent the AKP rom electingits candidate or the presidency.30 In the 2007 elections, even many urkish-Armenians reportedly voted or the AKP Party. Tis is a crucial act showing howsuccess ully ormerly intolerant and exclusivist Islamists trans ormed their visionand political ideology, became Muslim democrats and were able to convince even

non-Muslim citizens o the country o the act. Te success ul trans ormation o the AKP has been noted in Middle East circles.

Liberalized Autocracy and Islamism in Egypt

An authoritarian state and strong Islamist groups, among other oppositionalorces, coexist in Egypt. Te communication channels between the Egyptian re-

gime and the opposition are well-established and they are never totally closed,even or the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood (MB).31 Egyptian autocracy has sur- vived by implementing a system o autocratic power sharing and state-managedpluralism that gave secular, Islamist and ethnic groups opportunity to expresstheir views in the public sphere and even in elected, state-controlled assemblies,but that did not allow these voices to be translated into a uni ed anti-systemic


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or even systemic but oppositional movement capable o threatening the incum-

bents.32

Te liberalized autocracy in Egypt implies ar more political reedoms than ex-

ist in Syria, the ormer Iraq, the oil-rich Gul countries or even in unisia.33 Egypthas a multi-party political system with several political parties, periodic elections,opposition newspapers, popular criticism o the government and an independent judiciary.34 But, the state has been employing pluralist policies not as catalysts orpluralist political participation and demand making, but as valuable instrumentso social control.35

By allowing some public space to the Islamist opposition, the regime has alsobeen able to uphold ears o the Islamist threat, by which coercive measures canbe legitimized and thereby prolong the state o emergency and control elections.36 By arguing that democratization would enable Islamists to overturn the regime andultimately abolish democracy -- however limited it is -- itsel , these movementswere used by the regime to justi y the continuation o its repressive policies.37 Tepersistence o Islamist groups also comes with some advantages or the regime: Is-lamists are an important player in a juggling act by which opposition orces are pit-

ted against one another and struggles occur between secularist, le ist, rightist andIslamist groups probably even more o en than between regime and opposition.38

As ar as the opposition groups are concerned, liberalized autocracy providesthem with two major bene ts. First, it gave them space to criticize the regime andmobilize public support, something that Islamists were particularly good at, be-cause they control mosques and other religious institutions through which they attract a mass ollowing -- in contrast to their secular rivals. Second, the power-sharing arrangement en orces a measure o peace ul coexistence by providing

state-controlled legislatures under whose roo s competing groups can raise theirrespective political and cultural agendas.39

Islamism in Perspective

Te Islamist revival in Egypt began in the 1920s but spread rapidly a er theearly 1970s, reaching its peak in the early 1990s. It consists o several groups rom violent militants to non-violent and gradualist Islamic coalition, and rom theindividualist Su orders to the states Al-Azhar, the Ministry o Awqa and the

Supreme Islamic Council.40

Islamism emerged as a reaction to the perceived causes o such a state o de-privation-economic dependency, cultural sellout, and national humiliation and


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in view o all the ailed ideologies and o

the western cultural, political and eco-nomic onslaught, Islam was seen as theonly doctrine that could bring about achange.41 Te MB emerged in 1928 whenthe secular-nationalist Wa dist Party andthe royal amily ruled the country. TeMB was ounded by Hassan al-Banna, inwhose view the MB had to be organized as a movement rather than a party asAl-Banna espoused a bottom-up approach and did not believe in the orce ul trans-

ormation o society using state power. Al-Bannas explicit rejection o the notiono party appealed in part to the unattractive experience o party politics in Egyptduring the decades ollowing World War I. Al-Bannas rejection ran deeper, how-ever, or in act he condemned not only parties but the modern nation-state and allits institutions as undamentally un-Islamic. Te nation-state was a Western inno- vation that contradicted the transnational character o the umma by breaking it upinto smaller units. In addition, parties as political organizations were, in al-Bannasopinion, nothing but orms o institutionalized disunity, disrupting by their very nature the inner harmony which was an essential eature o any Islamic polity.42 Inaddition to Al-Bannas advice not to establish a political party, maybe a more cru-cial actor was the regimes harsh treatment o the MB. An MB political party wouldnever been allowed by the regime as it would be a credible oppositional orce inthe political arena against the autocratic establishments parties. It is only in recentyears that opposition to the notion o a legitimate Islamist party has been overcomeamong the MB circles and they even prepared a political party program.43

Al-Banna was assassinated by the state in 1949 and was replaced by Hassan al-Hudaybi as the spiritual guide. Despite its close connection with the state, the MB

aced harsh suppression a er the 1952 revolution by secular nationalist GamalAbdel Nasser. MB gures such as Sayyed Qutb were sent to jail and executed, andthe state outlawed the organization.

A er Nasser, a split divided the movement between revolutionary views likethose o Qutb and the gradualist views o al-Hudaybi. Both sides agreed thatEgyptian society and polity was one o Jahili, which was characterized by the wor-ship o man by man, and the sovereignty o man over man. While both strived oran alternative Islamic state and society, they di ered on the ways to achieve suchorder. Hudaybi called or preaching or the Islamic cause. Both wings shared anopposition to Zionism, crusaders, communism, secularism and Nasserism.44 TeMB did not publicly denounce the state as an enemy to Islam and did not call or a

Con orming to its strategy o working within the ofcial

institutions, the MB made useo the pro essional syndicates

as a ground to expand its ranksand develop a white-collar base


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political revolt against it.45 Several pro-violence individuals and groups split rom

the MB, as the MB remained loyal to its non-violent and bottom-up approach.Te pro-violent militants declare society to be jahiliyya (the state o ignorance be-ore Islam) and consider the state as in del. Te moderates and conservatives like

MB ollowers and members avoid blanket condemnation, while being critical o the state or not implementing Islamic laws.46 Moderate groups like the MB work within institutional channels, such as running candidates within the pro essionalsyndicates and in parliamentary elections.47 Con orming to its strategy o workingwithin the ofcial institutions, the MB made use o the pro essional syndicates asa ground to expand its ranks and develop a white-collar base.48 Moreover, privatecharity and aid organizations, usually connected to mosques, were establishedby both the MB and other Islamist groups.49 At the same time, the MB engagedin political mobilization.50 As a result, the MB established a very power ul socialbase, with important rami cations in the political sphere.

Participating at the Elections and the Emergence o Muslim Democrats

Since the MB did (could) not establish its own party, because o both state re-pression and al-Bannas advice, it entered into electoral alliances with secular par-

ties. Te MB guaranteed support rom its religious social base, presenting votingas a religious obligation, and these secular opposition parties, in return, suppliedthe MB a legal venue or participating in elections and running its own candi-dates. Te rst o these alliances was between the MB and the liberal al-Wa d inthe 1984 elections. Despite al-Wa ds strong secular roots, the MB insisted that itdeclare its commitment to considering Sharia in legislative activities. Te MB ne-gotiated a similar deal with the socialist party al-Amal in the 1987 elections, butinstead o a temporary alliance, al-Amal agreed to an MB takeover. Tis allianceattracted another party: the liberal al-Ahrar. Tis new alliance won 17 percent o the vote and 60 seats and led opposition in the parliament.51 In the meantime,the pro-violence groups directed their harshest criticism against the MB or itsparticipation in the democratic process as a means to advance their own politicalagenda.52 Even its alliances with the secular parties shows that the MB could work with secular groups and institutions.

Since the early 1990s, Egypt has experienced a substantial degree o politicaldeliberalization. Repressive amendments to the penal code and to legislation gov-erning pro essional syndicates and trade unions, as well as unprecedented electoral

raud are only some o the indicators.53 Since 1998, the Political Parties Commit-tee (PPC) has closed seven o the 16 legal opposition parties. Te government isnot only preventing group and party development, but also preventing prominent


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independent individuals rom using already existing parties to run in the parlia-mentary elections.54 Te parliamentary elections o 1990 were marked by raud,intimidation and a previously unseen level o violence.55 In the 1995 elections, Is-lamist candidates were detained so that they could not participate in the elections. Te Islamists main collaborator, Al-Amal, was suspended rom operating.56 InJune 1995 the government started a series o detentions and military trials o lead-ing MB members. Te organizations headquarters and over 5,000 ofces were

shut down. From 1993 to 1995 more than 1,000 MB activists were detained.57 Inthe 2000 elections, they ran as independents and won 17 seats -- more than the to-tal number o seats won by all opposition parties combined -- again becoming thelargest opposition block in parliament.58 A more striking victory occurred in the2005 elections, when the MB secured 88 seats, more seats than those won by any opposition party since the 1952 revolution. But this success gave way to a regimeclampdown on Islamists. Te MBs countermove was to use its presence in parlia-ment to draw public attention to the regimes use o suppression and intimidationin a bid to make a national cause out o the matter. Members o parliament romthe MB (they sit as nominal independents) raised questions about transparency,corruption, the role o Sharia in public li e, and democratic re orm -- all issuesthat were and are o great signi cance to the Islamists popular base.59

Te emergence o the AK Party has shown that Muslim politics in urkey is evolving rom an instrumen-talist usage o Islam to a new understanding o practicing Muslims who deal with daily politics.

C H A N


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In December 2006, Mubarak prompt-

ed parliament to amend the Constitutionto ban any re erence to religion in politi-cal activity, revoking judicial supervisionover any elections, and replacing Emer-gency Laws with a harsher Anti- error-ism Law, which gives security ofcerscarte blanche in dealing with the Isla-mists.60 Tis was ollowed by a state-led

campaign aimed at eradicating the MB. For the rst time, the MBs assets werecon scated, and its deputy supreme guide, along with 40 o its leadership cadres,was re erred to a military court in the summer o 2007.61

It should be noted that despite this almost constant repression and the act thatthe MB had never been legally recognized, the democratic learning experience o electoral alliances broadened the political basis o the movement, both by attract-ing more urbanite white-collar pro essionals and by providing opportunities orexperimentation with new approaches toward social re orm and democracy, asa result o physically and discursively interacting with secular, le ist and liberalparties.62 Te younger generation MB members involvement in syndicates, alongwith participation in municipal and national elections, has been in uential in thetrans ormation and moderation o the MB. Tese younger generations representa secular-leaning and pluralist Islamic approach towards politics and have beenin uential in changing the MB along these lines.63 Tus, or instance, in 1995the MB stated that Islam endorses political pluralism.64 Even though the use o religious ideology in the discourse o the younger generations is still central tomobilizing grassroots, it plays only a minimal role in their discourse, in contrastto the elders o the MB. It seems that the younger generations o the MB, while

ghting or legality and trying to demonstrate their commitment to secular poli-tics, are likely to go urther.65

As a matter o act, in 1996 some o these younger generation MB membersled by a rising member, Abu al-Ila Madi, le the MB to orm an independentpolitical party (al-Wasat or the Center Party).66 Al Wasat has been repeatedly denied legal status by the regime o President Hosni Mubarak. Te regime andthe MB share the objective o preventing al-Wasat rom legally entering the legalpolitical arena, or it has the potential to challenge both the regime and the MBsdominant role among opposition ormations.67 Al-Wasat is a centrist party thatdoes not insist on quali ying the existing state as un-Islamic.68 Unlike Islamists,

Te younger generation MBmembers involvement insyndicates, along withparticipation in municipal andnational elections, has beenin uential in the trans ormationand moderation o the MB

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these Muslim democrats view political

li e with a pragmatic eye and their maingoal tends to be more mundane, such ascra ing viable electoral plat orms andstable governing coalitions to serve indi- vidual and collective interests -- Islamicas well as secular --within a democraticarena whose bounds they respect, win or lose.69 Te Muslim democrats o al-Wasat reinterpret the message o Islam in tune with the notions o democracy and political pluralism. Tey distinguish between the concept o democracy asa process that they see as potentially compatible with Islam, and the concept o democracy as Westernization about which they hold reservations.70 Tey clearly renounce the idea that Islamists have a monopoly on the absolute truth. Tey seedi erent interpretations o tradition as e orts at human understanding. Ques-tioning or opposing an Islamist claim does not constitute rejection o Islam. Tey

avor political participation within the constitutional and legal ramework.71 Forinstance, Article 3 o the party program reads: Citizenship determines the rightsand duties o all Egyptians and is the basis o the relations between all Egyptians.

Tere should be no discrimination between citizens on the basis o religion, gen-der, color or ethnicity in terms o their rights, including the right to hold publicofce. Article 6 reads: Complete equality between men and women in terms o political and civil rights. Competency, pro essional background and the ability to undertake the responsibility should be the criteria or holding o public ofce,

or example in the judiciary, or or the presidency, and Article 8, A respector human dignity and all human rights -- whether civil, political, social, eco-

nomic or cultural -- which are stipulated by revealed religions and internationalconventions.72

Tree arguments explain the trans ormation o al-Wasat ounders. First, Isla-mist ideological moderation was driven in part by strategic calculation, but wasalso a result o a political learning process, that is, o change in core values andbelie s. Second, value change was acilitated by the interaction o Islamists andsecular opposition leaders in pursuit o common goals, including re orming theauthoritarian state. Te states repression contributed to democratic learning by creating incentives or sustained interaction and cooperation between Islamistand secular opposition. Over time, Egyptian Marxists, Nasserists, independentsand Islamists, none o whom had previously accorded a high priority to democ-racy, gravitated toward a democratic agenda, in part to assume the moral highground vis--vis the autocratic establishment and in part because, as victims o

Te Muslim democrats o al-Wasat reinterpret the

message o Islam in tune withthe notions o democracy and

political pluralism

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repression, they had come to value de-

mocracy more than in the past, pavingthe way or the emergence o a shareddemocratic agenda and a more activecross-partisan campaign or political re-

orm.73 Tird, the institutional opportu-nities and incentives or such interactionwere created by a mix o regime accom-

modation and repression o the countrys Islamist opposition groups.74

With the passing o the old generation o leaders, the policies o the MB wouldseem to be moving ever closer to the al-Wasat plat orm. It is signi cant that thenew general guide o the MB rom January 2004, Muhammad Mahdi Aki , al-though now in his 70s, has always been close to the younger generation, and re-portedly played a prominent role in encouraging the al-Wasat initiative o 1996against the opposition o the top MB leadership o the time. A re orm initiativeannounced by Aki in the spring o 2004 places the MB very close to the principlespropounded by al-Wasat.75

Tese experiences in uenced the MB to seriously consider the possibility o orming their own party as a way o pursuing political participation, and themovement prepared a dra party plat orm. Discussions inside the MB on the

ormation o a political party go back to the 1980s and 1990s when membersstarted debating the importance and utility o a party, resulting in some initiativesin that direction, such as the proposals to ound a Consultation Party in 1986and a Re orm Party in the early 1990s, even though these initiatives did notprogress as ar as orming a party, thus the e orts aded quickly, partly becauseo the expectation that any attempt to gain legal recognition would be utile.76 In

the 2000s, the MB wanted to reassure the broader public about its intentions, andseveral MB leading gures strove during the period o political dynamism in 2004and 2005 to suggest that the organization, while legally unrecognized, wished totrans orm itsel into a civil political party with a ully legal status. Tus, in latesummer 2007, the MB distributed its rst dra o a party plat orm to a group o intellectuals and analysts. Te plat orm was not to serve as a document or an ex-isting political party or even one about to be ounded, as the MB remains withoutlegal recognition in Egypt. Yet the MB leaders wanted to signal what sort o party they would ound i allowed to do so. Te most important point that the newprogram underscores that the movement has changed its ocus rom implemen-tation o the Sharia to Sharia as an Islamic rame o re erence (marjaiyya).77 Te program endeavors to signal that the MBs prospective party would be no

Te states repressioncontributed to democraticlearning by creating incentives

or sustained interaction andcooperation between Islamistand secular opposition

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di erent rom a European Christian

democratic party, in that it will only useits religious understanding to guide itspolicy choices. Younger members o theMB also advocate a unctional separa-tion between a political party and broad-er religious movement, with the ormer

ocused mainly on political participationand the latter on religious activism.78

Te emergence o the Egyptian Mus-lim democrats both in al-Wasat and MB circles shows that even limited politicalparticipation opportunities in a liberalized autocratic system can induce radicalopposition to moderate its discourse and goals. Te Muslim democrats appearto have thought that their reorganization as an open, transparent, and democraticparty would enable them to evade state repression, expand their visibility and in-

uence, and reduce their isolation rom other groups in Egyptian civil society.79 Te trans ormation o Egyptian Islamism is attributable not only to the regimeso en repressive counterattacks through legislation or in the streets, but also, sim-ilar to the urkish case, a decline in its popular support: the partial success o theIslamist MB movement in Islamizing Egyptian society allowed many people tobelieve that things could change or the better within the context o the existinglegal arrangements, without changing the constitutional ramework.80

Conclusion

Te Egyptian case suggests that democratic learning in nondemocratic settingsis also possible as a result o actors such as regime accommodation and repres-

sion. Tis case has several similarities tothe urkish case. In both, the partial andlimited opening o these countries au-thoritarian political systems created newdemocratic opportunities or Islamists toparticipate in public li e and politics, os-tering democratic learning by permittingIslamists to compete or power and masssupport. In the process as elected or pro-spective ofcials and ruling politicians,they have had to address and representthe interests o a group much larger than

Younger members o the MBalso advocate a unctional

separation between a politicalparty and broader religiousmovement, with the ormer

ocused mainly on politicalparticipation and the latter on

religious activism

Te emergence o theEgyptian Muslim democrats

both in al-Wasat and MBcircles shows that even

limited political participationopportunities in a liberalized

autocratic system can induceradical opposition to moderateits discourse and goals

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HSAN YILMAZ

their own ideological constituency. Hence the limited practice o democracy

-- regularly interrupted by the establishment, in urkey the army and in Egyptthe Mubarak regime being the main actors -- contributed to democratic learn-ing even within liberalized autocratic regimes. Islamists in both countries havehad to endure state repression, party closures and regime meddling with daily democratic li e (in the urkish case actual military coups detat every 10 years andin the Egyptian case a continuous ban on the MB) and in the semi-democraticprocess, their opposition to the regimes restrictions and inter erence paved theway or the Islamists metamorphosis into a principled opposition to autocraticrestraints on reedoms. Islamists similar trans ormations in both countries sug-gest also that these post-Islamist trans ormations are not accidental. Tese two-- the AK Party o urkey and Hizb al-Wasat, and also younger generation MBmembers in Egypt -- post-Islamist experiences have o a lot to tell to other coun-tries and autocratic and/or authoritarian regimes in the greater Middle East.

On a last note, while in urkey a Nakhshi (an outlawed religious brother-hood) sheikh (Mehmet Zahid Kotku) developed a systemic operational code orIslamists to orm Islamist parties to compete within the constitutional limits back

in the late 1960s, in Egypt the MBs ambiguous position toward being systemic oranti-systemic, its re usal to establish a political party but at the same time being apolitical movement and the regimes almost constant repression o the movementand never legalizing it have delayed the post-Islamist developments taking placeas it did in urkey. By looking at the urkish experience, one cannot help butthink that, i the MB could develop such an operational code allowing EgyptianIslamists to establish an Islamist party with a pro-systemic program as opposed toits anti-systemic discourse, the Egyptian regime would presumably nd it muchmore difcult to suppress the MB, possibly resulting in the post-Islamization o the MB much earlier, and that helping the long-term stability o the country orpolitical integration o the socially deep-rooted and well-grounded MB wouldmean the removal o a source o domestic con ict and enhance the long-termstability o the Egyptian political system.

Endnotes1. In Pahlavi Iran, or example, all possible channels or political expression and participation

and Islamism represented the only opening le or protest, and it was used by di erent groups andpowers seeking probably completely di erent goals, Nazih N. M. Ayubi, Te Political Revival o Islam: Te Case o Egypt,International Journal o Middle East Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4, (Winter,1980), p. 487.

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2. Carrie Wickham Te Path to Moderation. Strategy and Learning in the Formation o EgyptsWasat Party,Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 2, (Spring 2004), p. 223. See also Sheri Berman, aming Extremist Parties: Lessons rom Europe, Journal o Democracy, Vol. 19 (January, 2008),pp. 5-18.

3. Ase Bayat, Islamism and Social Movement Teory,Tird World Quarterly , Vol. 26, No. 6(2005), p. 906.

4. R. Quinn Mecham, From the Ashes o Virtue, A Promise o Light: Te rans ormation o Political Islam in urkey,Tird World Quarterly , Vol. 25, No. 2, (2004), p. 339.

5. Tere are both de jure and de acto constraints in the name o Kemalism limiting a ully unctioning democracy in urkey. Te 1982 constitution, which was prepared a er the Sept. 12,

1980 military coup, severely limits the democratic power o parliament and elected governmentcompared to Western democracies. Until very recently, through the National Security Council themilitary had direct in uence on the government. A parallel military court structure with even aSupreme Court o Appeals which has no equivalent in the West makes even a black-letter civiliancontrol o the military impossible. In addition to these de jure actors, it is well known that themilitary has always in uenced daily politics either with almost periodical coups dtat or with athreat o new coups occurrence. In the name o Kemalist principles, national security or protectiono secularism the generals inter ere with many issues which in the West would normally be consid-ered civilian concerns. But the opposite has not been possible. Civilians who question the armysmotives, its dealings or budget have been accused o being people with bad intentions, to say theleast. Even today, very ew dare to question the military. It is also a act that there have always beencivilian supporters o such a Kemalist autocracy among elite circles such as the media, politics, busi-

ness and even judiciary. Te reason I call this an autocracy is to highlight that the urkish military justi es its actions by constantly re erring to Musta a Kemal Atatrk and sees itsel as the embodi-ment o his perceived ideals and vision. It is usual to hear statements rom the generals and otherelite like, What would Ataturk do in this situation?, Ataturk would be upset with this, Ataturk would beat (or chase a er) them with a stick and so on. Tus, in a sense, urkey is still a Kemalistautocracy, as i he were still alive, thanks to his grand embodiment, the urkish military.

6. Mecham, From the Ashes o Virtue, A Promise o Light: Te rans ormation o PoliticalIslam in urkey, p. 339.

7. Seri Mardin, urkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and oday: Continuity, Ruptureand Reconstruction in Operational Codes,urkish Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, (2005), p. 152.

8. Tomas W. Smith, Between Allah and Ataturk: Liberal Islam in urkey,Te International Journal o Human Rights, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2005), p. 316.

9.Mardin urkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and oday: Continuity, Rupture and Re-construction in Operational Codes, p. 158.

10. Rusen akr,Ne Seriat Ne Demokrasi: Re ah Partisini Anlamak(Neither the Sharia NorDemocracy: o Understand the Wel are Party), (Istanbul: Metis Yaynlar, 1994), cited in Mardin, urkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and oday: Continuity, Rupture and Reconstruction inOperational Codes, p. 157.

11. Ergun Yildirim et al, A Sociological Representation o the Justice and Development Party:Is It a Political Design or a Political Becoming?,urkish Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2007), p. 6.

12. Omer Caha, urkish Election o November 2002 and the Rise o Moderate Political Is-lam, Alternatives: urkish Journal o International Relations, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2003), pp. 103-104.13. Ihsan Dagi, rans ormation o Islamic Political Identity in urkey: Rethinking the West

and Westernization, urkish Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2005), p. 25.

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14. Caha, urkish Election o November 2002 and the Rise o Moderate Political Islam, p.104.

15. Dagi, rans ormation o Islamic Political Identity in urkey: Rethinking the West andWesternization, p. 27.


17. Ihsan Yilmaz, State, Law, Civil Society and Islam in Contemporary urkey,Te MuslimWorld , Vol. 95, No. 3 (2005), p. 402.

18.Yildirim et al, A Sociological Representation o the Justice and Development Party: Is It aPolitical Design or a Political Becoming?, p. 17.

19. Ihsan Yilmaz, Ijtihad and adjid by Conduct: Te Glen Movement, in M. Hakan Yavuz

and John Esposito, urkish Islam and the Secular State: Te Glen Movement , (Syracuse, New York:Syracuse University Press, 2003), p. 227.20. Mecham, From the Ashes o Virtue, A Promise o Light: Te rans ormation o Political

Islam in urkey, p. 350.21. Gamze Cavdar, Islamist New Tinking in urkey: A Model or Political Learning?,Politi-

cal Science Quarterly, Vol. 121, No. 3 (2006), p. 480.22. Caha, urkish Election o November 2002 and the Rise o Moderate Political Islam, p.

112.23. Ihsan Dagi, urkeys AKP in Power, Journal o Democracy, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2008), p. 27.24. Yasin Aktay, Diaspora and Stability: Constitutive Elements in a Body o Knowledge, in M.

Hakan Yavuz and John Esposito,urkish Islam and the Secular State: Te Glen Movement , (Syra-cuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2003), p. 139.25. Dagi, urkeys AKP in Power, p. 28.26.See in detail, Ali Carkoglu, urkeys November Elections: A New Beginning?, Middle East

Review o International Afairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (2002), pp. 30-41; Soli zel urkey at the Polls: A erthe sunami, Journal o Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2003), pp. 80-94; Ziya Onis and E. Fuat Keyman urkey at the Polls: A New Path Emerges, Journal o Democracy, Vol. 14, No.2 (2003), pp. 95-108.


28. See in detail, Ali Carkoglu, A New Electoral Victory or the Pro-Islamists or the New

Centre-Right? Te Justice and Development Party Phenomenon in the July 2007 Parliamentary Elections in urkey,South European Society and Politics, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2007), pp. 501-519.29. Carkoglu, A New Electoral Victory or the Pro-Islamists or the New Centre-Right? Te

Justice and Development Party Phenomenon in the July 2007 Parliamentary Elections in urkey,p. 518.

30. Dagi, urkeys AKP in Power, pp. 29-30.31. Holger Albrecht, How can Opposition Support Authoritarianism? Lessons rom Egypt,

Democratization , Vol. 12, No. 3 (2005), p. 393.32. Daniel Brumberg, Islam is Not the Solution (or the Problem),Te Washington Quarterly,

Vol. 29, No. 1 (2005), p. 106.

33. Albrecht, How can Opposition Support Authoritarianism? Lessons rom Egypt, p. 389.34. Ase Bayat, Revolution without Movement, Movement without Revolution: Comparing

Islamic Activism in Iran and Egypt,Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 40, No. 1(1998), p. 168.

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35. R. Bianchi,Unruly Corporatism: Associational Li e in wentieth-Century Egypt , (New York:Ox ord University Press, 1989), p. 23.

36. Albrecht, How can Opposition Support Authoritarianism? Lessons rom Egypt, p. 390.37. Albrecht, How can Opposition Support Authoritarianism? Lessons rom Egypt, p. 383.38. Holger Albrecht and Eva Wegner, Autocrats and Islamists: Contenders and Containment

in Egypt and Morocco,Te Journal o North A rican Studies, Vol. 11 No. 2 (2006), p. 136.39. Brumberg, Islam is Not the Solution (or the Problem), p. 107.40. Bayat, Revolution without Movement, Movement without Revolution: Comparing Islamic

Activism in Iran and Egypt, p. 155.41. Bayat, Revolution without Movement, Movement without Revolution: Comparing Islamic

Activism in Iran and Egypt, p. 158.

42. Husain Haqqani and Hillel Fradkin, Islamist Parties and Democracy: Going back to theOrigins, Journal o Democracy, Vol. 19, No. 3 (July, 2008), pp. 14-15.

43. See Nathan J. Brown and Amr Hamzawy, Te Dra Party Plat orm o the Egyptian MuslimBrotherhood: Foray Into Political Integration or Retreat Into Old Positions?,CSID 9th Annual Con- erence, Political Islam and Democracy - What do Islamists and Islamic Movements want? , Washing-ton, D.C., 2008, (CSID: Con erence Proceedings, 2008), pp. 40-59.

44. Bayat, Revolution without Movement, Movement without Revolution: Comparing IslamicActivism in Iran and Egypt, p. 160.

45. Hazem Kandil, Islamization o the Egyptian Intelligentsia: Discourse and Structure in So-cialization Strategies,Symposium: Democracy and Its Development , University o Cali ornia Irvine,

2008, (Irvine, CA: Center or the Study o Democracy, 2008), p. 3.46. Salwa Ismail, Religious Orthodoxy as Public Morality: Te State, Islamism and CulturalPolitics in Egypt,Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 8, No. 14 (1999), p. 25.

47. Ismail, Religious Orthodoxy as Public Morality: Te State, Islamism and Cultural Politicsin Egypt, p. 25.

48. Salwa Ismail, Con ronting the Other: Identity, Culture, Politics, and Conservative Islamismin Egypt,International Journal o Middle East Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1998), p. 200.

49. Ismail, Con ronting the Other: Identity, Culture, Politics, and Conservative Islamism inEgypt, p. 201.

50. Salwa Ismail, Te Paradox o Islamist Politics, Middle East Report , No. 221 (Winter, 2001),

p. 37.51. Augustus Richard Norton, Twarted Politics: Te Case o Egypts Hizb al-Wasat, in Robert

W. He ner,Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization , (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 136.

52. Nelly Lahoud, Why Jihad and not Democracy,CSID 9th Annual Con erence, Political Islamand Democracy - What do Islamists and Islamic Movements want? , Washington, D.C., 2008, (CSID:Con erence Proceedings, 2008), p. 6.

53. Eberhard Kienle, More than a Response to Islamism: Te Political Deliberalization o Egyptin the 1990s, Middle East Journal , Vol. 52, No. 2 (Spring, 1998), p. 219.

54. Joshua A. Stacher, Parties Over: Te Demise o Egypts Opposition Parties,British Journal

o Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2004), p. 215.55. Norton, Twarted Politics: Te Case o Egypts Hizb al-Wasat, pp. 136-141.56. Ase Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist urn, (Stan-

ord: Stan ord University Press, 2007), p. 144.

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57. Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist urn, p. 171.

58. Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist urn, p. 138.59. Brown and Hamzawy, Te Dra Party Plat orm o the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood:Foray into Political Integration or Retreat into Old Positions?, p. 53.

60. Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC),Prisoners o Faith Campaign Pack: MuslimBrotherhood , (London, UK: 2007), retrieved March 5, 2009, rom http://www.ihrc.org.uk/ le/PF070515KhairatAlShaterFinal.pd

61. IHRC,Prisoners o Faith Campaign Pack: Muslim Brotherhood .62. Jan Stark, Beyond errorism and State Hegemony: Assessing the Islamist Mainstream in

Egypt and Malaysia,Tird World Quarterly , Vol. 26, No. 2 (2005), p. 312.63. Mohammed Zahid and Michael Medley, Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Sudan,Review

o A rican Political Economy, Vol. 33, No. 110 (2006), p. 705.64. Norton, Twarted Politics: Te Case o Egypts Hizb al-Wasat, p. 140.65. Zahid and Medley, Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Sudan, p. 705.66. Brown and Hamzawy, Te Dra Party Plat orm o the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood:

Foray into Political Integration or Retreat into Old Positions?, p. 46. See al-Wasats party programin English on http://www.alwasatparty.com/htmltonuke.php? lnavn= les/Eng-program.htm

67. Muhammed Ayoob, Te Many Faces o Political Islam,CSID 9th Annual Con erence, Po-litical Islam and Democracy - What do Islamists and Islamic Movements want? ? , Washington, D.C.,2008, (CSID: Con erence Proceedings, 2008), pp. 294-295.

68. Ismail, Te Paradox o Islamist Politics, p. 36.

69.Vali Nasr, Te Rise o Muslim Democracy, Journal o Democracy, Vol. 16, No. 2 (April,2005), p. 13.

70. James G. Mellon, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Islamism and Inter-State Relations in the ArabWorld,Nationalism and Ethnic Politics , Vol. 8, No. 4 (2002), pp. 12-13.

71. Ismail, Te Paradox o Islamist Politics, p. 36.72. Al-Wasat Party, Al-Wasat Al-Jadeeds Party Program, retrieved on March 5, 2009, rom

http://www.alwasatparty.com/htmltonuke.php? lnavn= les/Eng-program.htm73. Wickham, Te Path to Moderation. Strategy and Learning in the Formation o Egypts

Wasat Party, p. 225.74. Wickham, Te Path to Moderation. Strategy and Learning in the Formation o Egypts

Wasat Party, p. 207.75. Bjrn Olav Utvik, Hizb al-Wasat and the Potential or Change in Egyptian Islamism,Cri-

tique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Fall, 2005), p. 305.76. Brown and Hamzawy, Te Dra Party Plat orm o the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood:

Foray into Political Integration or Retreat into Old Positions?, p. 50.77. Brown and Hamzawy, Te Dra Party Plat orm o the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood:

Foray into Political Integration or Retreat into Old Positions?, p. 55.78. Brown and Hamzawy, Te Dra Party Plat orm o the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood:

Foray into Political Integration or Retreat into Old Positions?, p. 41.

79. Wickham, Te Path to Moderation. Strategy and Learning in the Formation o EgyptsWasat Party, p. 223.80. Bayat, Islamism and Social Movement Teory, p. 898.

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