Case digest:

Hidalgo enterprises vs balandan

FACTS: Guillermo Balandan and his wife is claiming damages in the sum of P2,000 for the death of their son, Mario. Petitioner was the owner of an Ice plant, who had in their premises 2 tanks filled of water, 9 feet deep. The factory was fenced but Ingress and egress was easily made because the gates were always open and there was no guard assigned in the said gate. Also the tanks didn’t have any barricade or fence. One day when Mario was playing with his friend, they saw the tank inside the factory and began playing and swimming inside it. While bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later, already as a cadaver, having died of ‘asphyxia secondary to drowning.’ The lower decided in the favor of the parents saying that the petitioner is liable for damages due to the doctrine of attractive nuisance. ISSUE: W/N the doctrine of attractive nuisance is applicable in this case? RULING: NO. The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that “One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. American Jurisprudence shows us that the attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location. In the case bar, the tanks themselves cannot fall under such doctrine thus the petitioners cannot be held liable for Mario’s death

Homeowners association of el dipositor vs lood

Facts:

Petitioners filed on April 15, 1970 this action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to set aside respondent court's questioned orders dated February 9, 1970 and March 30, 1970

denying petitioners' motions for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to stay the demolition and removal of their houses and structures on a parcel of public land in barrios Corazon de Jesus and Halo Halo in San Juan, Rizal, (more popularly known as "El Deposito" from the Spanish times), pending final outcome of Civil Case No. 11078 filed by them before respondent court.

Petitioners' action below was one for declaratory relief to declare as null and void as ex post facto legislation, municipal ordinance No. 89, as amended, of respondent Municipality of San Juan, prohibiting squatting on public property and providing a penalty therefor, under which ordinance, petitioners claimed, respondents were summarily demolishing and removing their houses and improvements.

On April 20, 1970, upon issuance of summons requiring respondents to answer the petition, the Court issued a temporary restraining order restraining respondents, until further orders, "from proceeding with the summary destruction, removal and demolition of all other houses found in the premises of the land in barrio Corazon de Jesus and barrio Halo Halo, San Juan, Rizal, by reason of Ordinance No. 89-Amd. as amended, passed by the Municipal Council of San Juan, Rizal, on April 26, 1968 ... ."

Respondents filed their answe

r in due course and the case was thereafter submitted for decision with the filing by the parties of their respective memoranda in lieu of oral argument.

Issue:

Whether or not the court abused its discretion.

Held:

As was well stated in then Judge Reyes' order of September 19, 1968, petitioners failed after several hearings "to show that they have even a color of title to entitle them to exercise the right of possession to the premises in question. On the other hand, the land is admittedly public land and consequently the petitioners have no right to possession

The question of validity or unconstitutionality of municipal ordinance No. 89-Amended need not be resolved in this proceeding, as it should first properly be submitted for resolution of the lower court in the action below. Suffice it to note that the Solicitor General appears to have correctly stated the actual situation in that petitioners do not dispute the authority of the San Juan council to pass ordinances providing for the summary abatement of public nuisances, and that the ordinance in question may not be faulted for being ex post facto in application since it "does not seek to punish an action done which was innocent before the passage of the same. Rather, it punishes the present and continuing act of unlawful occupancy of public property or properties intended for public use.

Jarco marketing vs CA

Facts:

Petitioner is the owner of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City. Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the store's branch manager, operations manager, and supervisor, respectively. Private respondents Conrado and Criselda Aguilar are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar.

On May 9, 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at the department store. Criselda was signing her credit card slip when she heard a loud thud. She looked behind her and beheld her daughter pinned beneath the gift-wrapping counter structure. She was crying and shouting for help. He was brought to Makati Medical Center, where she died after 14 days. She was 6 years old.

Private respondents demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses which they had incurred. Petitioners refused to pay. Consequently, private respondents filed a complaint for damages wherein they sought the payment of P157,522.86 for actual damages, P300,000 for moral damages, P20,000 for attorney's fees and an unspecified amount for loss of income and exemplary damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the proximate cause of the fall of the counter was Zhieneth’s act of clinging to it. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. It found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous counter. The counter was defective, unstable and dangerous. It also ruled that the child was absolutely incapable of negligence or tort. Petitioners now seek for the reversal of this decision.

Issues:

(1) Whether the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to negligence

(2) In case of a finding of negligence, whether the same was attributable to private respondents for maintaining a defective counter or to CRISELDA and ZHIENETH for failing to exercise due and reasonable care while inside the store premises

Held:

(1) An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is "a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it

happens." On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is "the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." The test in determining the existence of negligence is: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. We rule that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH was no accident and that ZHIENETH's death could only be attributed to negligence.

(2) It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to a physician are generally considered declarations and admissions. All that is required for their admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be made or uttered under the influence of a startling event before the declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person who testified in court. Under the circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales' testimony on the matter, i.e., ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her tragic death. Sadly, petitioners did, through their negligence or omission to secure or make stable the counter's base.

Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the store's employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family. Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors children below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse. The physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence on record reveal otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after all. Shaped like an inverted "L," the counter was heavy, huge, and its top laden with formica. It protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base was not secured. CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand. CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch when she

signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at the time ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot away from her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from CRISELDA. The time and distance were both significant. ZHIENETH was near her mother and did not loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon us. She even admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did not do anything; the counter just fell on her.

Lunod vs Menesses

Facts:

Plaintiffs own farmlands situated near a lake. Meneses owns a fishpondand piece of land between the lake and a river. The plaintiffs claim theexistence, in favor of their rice fields, of a statutory easement permittingthe flow of water over Meneses’ land. This allowed water collected upontheir land and the lake to flow through Meneses’ land and into the river.Plaintiffs’ lands were flooded and their plantations destroyed.

Issue: whether or not menses is liable or not

Held:

Meneses cannot block the flow of water. Art. 552 (A637, NCC): Lowerestates must receive the waters which naturally and without intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as well as thestone or earth which they carry with them. Neither may the owner of thelower estate construct works preventing this easement, nor one of thehigher estates works increasing this burden. In addition, under the landof waters, Meneses had no right to construct the works which blocks thepassage through his land and the outlet to the river. Having done so, tothe detriment of the easement charged on his estate, he violated the law

Masallo vs cesar

Facts:

Plaintiff in this action, averring that he is the owner of the tract of land in question, brought

an action of desahucio [eviction] in the court of the justice of the peace of the municipality

of Lezo against the defendant, for the purpose of recovering possession thereof. From the

decision of the justice of the peace an appeal was taken to the Court of First Instance of

Capiz, and the case there tried de novo.

It is averred in the complaint that on or about the 12th day of June, 1915, the defendant by

force and intimidation deprived plaintiff of the possession of the land in suit, and has since

that time withheld it from him to his damage in the sum of P25. The defendant answered,

denying the averments of the complaint regarding the alleged eviction, and asserted, by

way of defense, that the land in question is her property and has been in her possession

without interruption for more than twenty years. The trial court gave judgment in favor of

the plaintiff in accordance with the prayer of his complaint.

From the evidence taken at the trial it appears that the defendant had been in possession of

the land in question for a long period prior to the occurrence of the incidents out of which

this litigation arose.

On March 8, 1915, while the defendant was in possession of the land in question, one Matea

Crispino executed a deed to the plaintiff herein, whereby she undertook to sell and transfer

to him the land in question. It was admitted by Matea Crispino in her testimony at the trial

that she has not been in possession of the land which is the subject-matter of her deed to

plaintiff, since the cessation of the Spanish sovereignty in these Islands. (Stenographic

notes, p. 10.) She stated, however, that he land in question had been mortgaged by her to

one Eugenia Perez, who testified on behalf of plaintiff that she, Perez, had been in

possession of the land from 1889 until 1914.

Issued: who is the lawful owner of the property

Held:

In this case the defendant Maria Cesar is shown to have had the prior peaceful possession of the disputed parcel of ground for an indefinite period of time in the part. Therefore, when the plaintiff, after acquiring a deed to the land from a third person, entered upon the premises with his laborers and began plowing the land, it was he who was guilty of the wrongful seizure of the property; and the defendant undoubtedly then had a perfect right to maintain an action of unlawful detainer against the plaintiff to regain possession. Instead of instituting such an action, as the defendant was well entitled to do, she warned the plaintiff off, or as he would have us believe, ejected him by force, intimidation, and violence.

Availing himself of the situation thus created, the plaintiff now seeks to turn the tables, so to speak, upon the original possessor, and founding his right upon the transitory possession which he had wrongfully acquired, he would not employ against the defendant the same remedy which might properly have been used against himself if he had not vacated the premises.

The mere suggestion of such a possibility carries its own refutation on its face. The law

discourages continued wrangling over the possession of property, as being fraught with

danger to the peace of society; and the purpose of the action of forcible entry and detainer

is to make the right of possession secure. This purpose would be totally frustrated, if a

petty warfare could be conducted by two rival claimants who might alternate with each

other in possession, one putting the other out to-day, only to be in turn himself forcibly

ejected tomorrow. The only way to prevent this is to hold, in conformity with the evident

intent of the statute, that the remedy of forcible entry and detainer was intended to be used

against the usurper and not against the person wronged. The rule thus to be applied may

be simply summed up by saying that the plaintiff in an action of forcible entry and detainer

cannot succeed where it appears that, as between himself and the defendant, the latter had

a possession antedating his own; and to ascertain this it is proper to look to the situation as

it existed before the first act of spoliation occurred.

It is stated in the decision that "the plaintiff had acquired possession of the parcel of land in

dispute on or about the 8th of March, 1915, by purchase from Matea Crispino, who sold it

to him by the deed Exhibit A."

Monteblanco vs hinigaran sugar plantation

Facts:

On September 18, 1924, case No. 299 of the justice of the peace court of Hinigaran was instituted in said court. The Philippine National Bank intervened therein, filing its pleading in intervention to that effect on October 18, 1924, and the plaintiff amended his complaint on the same date praying that the defendant the Hinigaran Sugar Plantation Inc. be ordered to return to him the land described therein, having alleged in his former complaint that said defendant and its codefendants Nicetas Siguenza and Agustin Coruña have been detaining it since the month of August, 1924; that in the meantime a preliminary injunction be issued against them and their agents or representatives to prevent them from

continuing to perform acts in violation of his right of possession, and that they indemnify him in the sum of P500, with costs of the suit.

On December 11, 1924, the justice of the peace court of Hinigaran, considering that the trial of the case devolved upon the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, forwarded it to the latter court, issuing its order to that effect on said date. The Court of First Instance remanded the case to the justice of the peace court with instructions to the effect that if it was of the opinion that the case did not come within its jurisdiction it should issue an order that effect and later inform the parties thereof so that they might bring the action they deemed proper. The justice of the peace court, acting in pursuance of said instructions, rendered its decision on January 6, 1925, dismissing the case and ordering the dissolution of the writs of preliminary injunction issued by it, notifying the parties that they could bring the action or actions they deemed proper in the competent court. The plaintiff appealed from this decision to the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros which, after due hearing, again ordered the case remanded to the justice of the peace court of Hinigaran in its order of April 6, 1925, directing said court to try it and pass upon the questions raised therein on the ground that it merely involved forcible entry and detainer which is of the nature of those coming under its exclusive jurisdiction. This was done without the least objection on the part of the defendants or the intervenors, much less the plaintiff.

The justice of the peace court of Hinigaran received the case so remanded to it on June 15, 1925, and on the same date notified the interested parties of the fact that the case had again been remanded to it. Thereafter, it took no other action thereon until             November 20, 1933, when, after Nicetas Siguenza had filed her motion to be permitted to intervene therein, it ordered that the hearing be held on December 20, 1933, at 10 o'clock in the morning. Six days after the date of the hearing which was attended by the interested parties, the justice of the peace court rendered its judgment which was declared null and void by the lower court on the grounds already stated, that is, that said justice of the peace court had no jurisdiction to render it. The lower court, in annulling said judgment, based its opinion upon the provisions of section 64 of Act No. 190,

Held:

The purpose of the law in fixing at one year the period within which actions for forcible entry and detainer may be brought, is undoubtedly to require cases of said nature to be tried as soon as possible and decided promptly, this being likewise inferable from the provisions thereof to the effect that appeals in said cases must be perfected within the peremptory period of ten days; that in case of an appeal by the defendant, the judgment shall be executed unless he files a bond with sufficient sureties to answer for the payment of rents, damages and costs; and that in any case must pay to the plaintiff or into the Court of First Instance, at the option of the defendant, the amount of the rent due or determined by the judge in his judgment, said payments to be made on the tenth of each calendar month (sec. 88, Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 4115). Furthermore, the law itself (sec. 83, Act No. 190) provides that in cases of forcible entry and detainer, no continuance of hearings shall be granted for more than one week unless the defendant files a bond in favor

of the plaintiff, which shows that the purpose of the law in these cases is to avoid any delay in the proceedings in the justice of the peace courts.

The parties and the justice of the peace court allowed not only the said eleven months and some days but nearly about eight years to elapse without making any effort or taking any action to terminate the case. With this inaction or rather neglect on their part, they made it understood that they abandoned the case, particularly the plaintiff, being no longer interested in the result thereof. There was necessity for the justice of the peace court to revive it by ordering the hearing thereof, after having forgotten and abandoned it for eight years, five months, and five days, in order to be able to render judgment in question.

For purposes of the law, the case had died in the justice of the peace court one year after it had been remanded thereto by the Court of First Instance, with no step having been taken towards its termination in one way or another. To revive it, it was necessary to the new pleadings, and even admitting the fiction that prior to the trial had eight years later, the parties again presented the pleadings already presented by them, the result would be the same because, as the year during which the justice of the peace court could act with jurisdiction had already elapsed, said court already lost its jurisdiction and could not again have it whether by its own will or by the will of the parties.

Supia vs Quintero

Facts:

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to annul the proceedings had in civil case No. 3206 of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, entitled Juan L. Ayala, plaintiff, vs. Fermin Supia and Gavina Batioco, defendants. The facts are not in dispute. The only question presented is one of law, and may be stated in a general way as follows: In an action of forcible entry and detainer, will the mere filing of an answer, claiming title to the premises involved, divest a justice of the peace of jurisdiction?

Issue:

Held:

Our statute clearly contemplates that the mere fact that the question of title is raised in the answer, should not oust a justice of the peace of jurisdiction; and so it provides that "he may receive evidence upon the question of title therein solely for the purpose of determining the character and extent of possession and damages for detention.

, the general purpose of the statutes creating the action is "that, regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable and quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. One who is guilty of a forcible entry, therefore, or of a forcible detainer after a peaceable but unlawful entry, is not only subject to indictment, but is required to restore possession to the party from whom it was so taken or detained, and in a proper case is often required to pay him treble damages, notwithstanding the fact that the entrant may have had the superior title or the better right to present possession. In affording this remedy of restitution the object of the statutes is to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the reasonable hope such withdrawal would create that some advantage must accrue to those persons who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of property, resort to force to gain possession rather than to some appropriate action in the courts to assert their claims. This is the philosophy at the foundation of all these actions of forcible entry and detainer which are designed to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his

CIVIL CODE provides:

Anyone deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, and any landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or determination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, and the legal representatives or assigns of any such landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person, shall at any time within one year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession be entitled, as against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or against any person or persons claiming under them, to restitution of the land, building, and premises possession of which is unlawfully withheld, together with damages and costs: Provided, however, That no landlord shall commence any action against a tenant for restitution of possession of any land or building for failure to pay rent or to comply with the conditions of his lease, unless the tenant shall have failed, for a period of three day, to pay the rent due or comply with the conditions of his lease after demand therefor. The demand for payment or for the performance of any condition of the lease may be made upon the tenant personally, or by serving written notice of such demand upon any person who may be found upon the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises, if neither the tenant nor any other person can be found thereon at the time the landlord or his agent may have gone there for the purpose of making such demand.