XXI Bomber Command Monthly Activity Reports, July 1945, OCR

8/8/2019 XXI Bomber Command Monthly Activity Reports, July 1945, OCR

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Bomber Command,

1 JULY 1945..w-..... ~ _ ~ ~ ____J . ___u


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New Records

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mGELIGifl'S !Q!

llESULTSCOST OF MISSIONSEFFECTIVENESS OF AIRCRAr"r ON MISSIONSUSE OF AIRCRAFT Aim CRE'ISOTHER USES OF AIRCRAFT AND cmTI'1SSTRElIDTH OF THE COMMAlID

CONTENTS

I I I ROllBS FLO\1N PEa ASSIGNED AlRCRAFl'

Prepared By33rd Statistical Control unit

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MO ! THLY ACT I V I TY REPORT1 July 1945

XXI :BOMBER ccrowm

PART IPART IIPART IIIPART IVPART VIPART VII

93 HOuas FIDrn PER ASSIGlIED CBEV-7.1 LOliG RAJrl'rE SORTIES P::R ASSIGNED AIRCRAFT.O.8 OJ' AIiGOR.11E AIRCRAFT LOST

. 9 OF AIRBORNE AIC 1KimED PRIMARY TARGET. 9 4 ~ OF AIRBORNE AIC :BOMBrJ> ANY TARGET*6.7 TONS CARRIED PER AIRBOImE AIRCRAFT

.32.360 TOliS RETEASED ON ALL TARGETS


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1. Destruction Of Targets

No Da..mageNo DamseeNo Dam&l;e

l2}< (Prel im. )4.3% (Prelim.)No Dame.t;e

9%'105%95.7%53.6%13. 4%60.5%2 (Preliminary)one 4 4 (Preliminary)

40% (Prelimlnarr)2 O . ~ (Prelim.)4 0 . ~ (Prelim.)2o,t; (Prelim. )No AssessmentNo Asse811ment

visual

%Destroyed Or Damaged

two visualattacks)

Target

During J'Une the XXI Bomber Command bombed Japan in force ten times. This.plus mining and other combat missions, re su lte d in the larges t monthly effortto date. Urban areas accounted for 64% of the sort ie effor t individual stra.tegic targets 2 6 and mine f ie lds 7%. The resul ts of this p ~ r f o r m a n c e aregiven below.

Nagoya. Arsenal, Chlgusa FactoryNagoya Arsenal.. Atsuta Plant .lfippon Veh1cle Mfg. Co., Nagoya(Same 3.ttack as nagoyaArsenal, Atsuta.)Sumitomo Duralumin Mill, Nagoyalure Naval Arsenal.Tachikava .1.1r De!lOt

The following table summarizes the damage assessment resul ts on these prec is ion t ar ge ts :

Of the ten primary visual targets, seven were bombed visually , while in theo th er th re e cnses weather conditions d iver ted the attacking force to the pri_mary radar target . Of t he fou rt een primary radar targets, 5 were attackedvisually , 6 by radar, and 3 by a combination of the two. Of the to tal targetsassigned, 15 or 6 were attacked visually by a par t of the force. This percen tage g ives an indication of the variable nature of weather conditions overthe Japanese Empire and the consequent diff icul ty in weather prediction.

The XXI Bomber C o ~ d attacked precision targets on four days during themonth of June. These attacks \-lere scheduled to take place on three days, butweather considerations forced a delay of 24 hours for s ix missions scheduledfor 9 June.A to tal of 24 tar@ets were assigned to forces o f v ary ing sizes for thesemissions. ~ o u r t e e n of these afforded a suff icient ly Ood radar bombing runto be assigned as both primary visual and primary radar targets. For the re -maining ten targets, a specif ic primary rmlar target was assigned.

Visual Bombine;Kauanishi Aircraft Co" Himeji PlantMltsublshi Aircraft Co., Mlshlma Plant, TamashimaAichi Aircraft Works, Atsuta PlantAlchi Aircraft Uorks, Nagoya PlantKawanish1 Aircraf t Co" Naruo PlantKawasaki Air cr af t P lant , Kagamigah8.ra (Two Attacks)M1tsubiBhi Aircraf t Plant, Ka6amiga.hara (Two Attacks)Kawasaki Aircraft Co., Akashi Plant (Two Attacks; alsorada r a tt ack)

Radar BombingSum1tomo Light Metals Industry, OsakaAlchi Aircraft Works, Eitoku PlantKawasaki Aircraft Co., Akash1 Plant (AlBOJapeD. Aircraft Company. TomiokaHitachi A i r ~ r & f ' t Co., Chiba()p.k& Inr:t Arsenal, Osaka(Bote. Percent damaged includes removals).

r--- Sm.n.lARY OF ~ t A J O R MISSIOnS %Of TotalMissions Sorties SortiesStrategic Targets (Dayl1ft ) 24 1412 1'61 25%Strategic Targets (Night 2 11 43' 1%Urban Areas (Daylight) 4 2 o ~ 6 12006 31%Urban Areas (Night) 11 1521 9914 27%Mining (Night) 12 361 2081 1 Miscellaneous Sorties - 2 2

*32360otal 562----


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Urban Arons

Dr

Destroyed Or Daoaged3 9 . 5 ~9 7 . ~ (Pre11..i:lina.ry)

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The folloving s gives tha daDage inf l ic ted by target :Osaka and .At3agasaki 8.02 sq, miles (Total to d a t ~ 1 6 3 )Kobe ~ : a ~ (Total t . dat_S.75)HezrwJatsuShizuoka 2.28-Kot;oshima 2.110. . . . . . . . 2.1) (PreliD.inary)royohashi log (PreliminE\rY)1ukuoka 1.37Yokkaichi 1.23 (Prel imin::-ry).....seIJo. Moji, Omuta, &Hobeoka Less than 1 sq. n i. ouch (Prelim.)

TargetsAasUI:l.1gaura SeaplDJle Base (Attacked bytwo forces)Sitachi E!'J6ineering Works, Kaigan Plant

Stra . tegic Tareets OUght)Til.:! 315t.ll tUng oadG i t s debut this oonth in tvo night miEjsions against 011industry ta..'gets. By utUizi..n& the A.?Qr7 equipoent of this specialized \ling,i t is hoP3d t ha t cn. te ri al ~ - can be inf l ic ted at. night on precision targets.I t wil l bo remembered that similar attacka launched in March by other wings ofthe collll!l2.lld vere not successful .

rrThe three at.tacking forces ....hich vore forced to boob p r l m a r ~ " radar targetswere able t.o bomb t.hese targots visual ly and inf l ic t substant1al damage. Theresul ts of those a tta ck s a re as follows:

It should be remembered that substantial. t\a'llage to important strategic targets often resul ts from these incandiary raids against industr ia l and urban areas

Inforcation is not available to assess adequately the resul ts of these twomissions. Preliminary r epor ts i nd icat e that 30% of one target, tho Ut.sube RiverOil Refinory, Yokkaichi, has been des tr oyed o r daoaged, but this assessment includes dalllBgil inf l ic ted on a previous da,ylight mission when a small force bombedth is tal'get as secondary objective.

Over 25 sqWJ.I"e miles of urban and industr ia l areas were burned out duringJune to bring the to tal to date to apyroxil:l&tel;y 120 square miles. The attacksagair.st urban areas for Ju."l.e fa l l into two categories: (1) four daylight largescale attacks agcinst Osaka and Ko'ue in the ear ly part of th e month; (2) threeniE;ht attac.k9 egai.!l.st eleven secondary cit ies during th e l a t te r part of thel:lonth. In these l a t te r raids, cech ci ty WM th e target for a wing attack, except?uh-uoka against which tvo wings vere airborne.

Mining OperationsMinir.g operations vere carr ied on every other night durill June beginning on

. . . . th e s even th . Targets wera the Shimonoseki Strai ts , UUgata, Fushiki , Nanao,Tsu.nl&&. Malzun.t. Fukuoka. Karatsu , Sakata, Obama. Sakai, Hagi, Sonzakl, Yuya:Ba;r and tbB lobe-Osaka area. According to the A-2 Shipping Intelligence Sectioni t is csttoated that as a r ~ s u l t of these operations: (a) passage of a l l butscal lar veasols throuC1 'the Shimonoseki Strai ts vas 1I:!possible for at leas t 7 5 of ;.he period 8-)0 June; (b ) ports on tho H\I coasts of P.on8hu end Iushu vereblockaded for va--ying periods af t or each c i n i ~ . g clsalon, th e length of closurevarying, in tI.11 probabil i ty, 1I!. inverse proport ion to th e importance of th e portto the cncClY. In other ' lords, tho more important ports were probably openedwithin tuo or three days after ,a mining, while soal lcr ports very l ikely reoalnoiclosed for D. week or acre. To componsata for that probabil i ty the larger portsv ~ minod at more frequent intervals; (0) baSed upon the nuober of mines laiddu rin g th e month, i t 1s o s t i m a t o ~ that a t leas t 100 enemy vessels of e ll tyECsand 010.888S \/ore sunk or deJnaod by B-29 la id mines in June; (d) althoU8h thee t rec t of minele.ylng on Japanese imperto and exports cannot be ovoluated on thebasia of avnilable information, i t is estimated that th e available merchant shipt o ~ O vas able to oparn te dur ing June at only about 5 of normal efficiencytho r" l l l . \ l tD of Dublll" 'r: l.no.


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J

er ror i s as fol lovs :No of lormatious644

ANALYSIS OF CIRCULAR E.HRORS BY :F01IHATIONM a r ~ e 1945

i"lING APRIL MAY JUliO TOTAL.=.---= --58 - 3 ~ ~ 3 7 73 34% 2 6 35

3 1 1 5 - 1% 1 7 31 I 1Gf, 2 7 2 ' I!XXI BC 3 1 2 7 32i& 3 1

Boobing Accura.cy

Missions of Hareh-27 and 31 are included withApril .From the above table i t can be seen that approxi!:mhly 30$of the Cot!::land1s bombs f a l l within 1000 faet of the AP. Of the VingS,the 58th, operating in Ma;y & June, has compiled the best record, withthe 73rd and 314th close behind. In analyzing this tabulation, i tmust be remembered tha t bombing accuracy f igures tend to f luctuatesubstantial ly from month to month. For this reason, data is presentedfo r the three month period as a Whole, and to be valid, any comparison

by '-Ting should be confined to the three month basie.The f o l l o ~ r i n g table sUJm;)IU"izes the accuracy in terms ofthe second element, the d ista nc e o f the.actual NFl from the assignedMPI. During this period, th e average circular error of the Comm.n.ndhas been calculated to be approxicately 1100 fee t . The avor89 for ...

mation pat tern baa been in an area slLghtly 10s8 the four mill ionsquare feet

IncludeB the !Ollawi"hformations 7Jrd \ l ing _ NiBaion _ Shizuoka Ale Engine Plant313th YiD8 - Mission - Target 6195313th Ving _ Mission 126 _ Hnmaoatsu A./7313th Wing - Mission 126 _ T01'obasbi314th V1n _ Mi8sion lqq _ City of Tokyo

[Ii: IThe Operations Analysis Section has recently prepared a deta i led study of the bombiIl& accuracy of tbia Command. Although thef ina l report for this BtudJ' has not been c o c p l e t ~ the follov1n8 data8 ~ i z e 8 soce of the sta t is t ics it vU l contain;

The folloWing table sumoarizes the bOlllb1ng accuracy o f theCot:!NU1d in terl!l.s of -the bOlllbs within 1000 feet of the aiming point :

To determine the accuracy against prec is ion targets, a totalof 39 daiYl1ght missions beginning with 27 March were a n a l y z e d ~ Thevery high alt i tude attacku prior to this date were OI:litted as unrepresentative of current operations. All available strike photography fromthese missions has been exaoined i n det ai l, and vhere possible, bombplot a fo r 6ach fcrnation were prepared. \1hen smoke or overcAst prevented identification of the actual bomb burst, accuracy was determinedby calculation from b o m b s - l ~ a l r photographs. Insofar as information\rae available, forma.tions dropping by radar ....ere also included. Thetbl.-ee Illost important elecents in dehrmin,ing bombing accuracy are:(1) Percentage of hi ts within a cer ta in dlstance from the aiming point ;(2) The rad ia l or circular error or the distance between the actualNPl end the asaigned HPI; and (3) The size of the bocb pat tern . Eachof ihese e lements bas been considered in th is study.

PERCENT OJ' :BOMBS REI&UiED AT TARGET :FALLnrG VITHIN 1000' OF A.P.Prechi .m Targets Only

2.

!reakdawn of this figure by circularCircular Error0I:i mile1-2 mile

un~ s u a l Sif;hting - No of Formations With CEA 0 Radar S ~ ! . ~ ! ! LI Target _rot 110,nBG ! 1 ~ ' 1000'- 2000

1- ! ~ e c::n. A s s e s ~ Assess- Asses&-TOTAL2000' '000' 000' able able able58 1. 10 5 4 0 7 2 23 33 21 8 1 18 1 1 4 23 1 5 7 10 6 3 4 0 41,31 I 18 16 9 I ~ 1 7 4 3 70XXI BC I 70 54 ----L.12 I 5 33 I 1... 7 I 255".


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J. Enemy Fighter Renctlon

Pntwrn S ize7,000,000"". >'t. IILess Than 4,000,000SG. Ft. !

1100 Ft.UOCi Ft.

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2 J(1,i

~ - April I.-\ay June!I . tU:ci{s Per 8-29 Over Tho Target 0.8 O.J O.JAttucJi.s Per 8-29 LOJI'\ 105 110 158AtUi.c:t.s per 8 - ~ ~ ~ r l 16 14 16Attuc..:s ?er B - Lost I..nd " " " " "" I lJ 12 14

Joyanesc f igbters again did not const i tute Q ser ious inter fe renceto the comrr.nndls combat effor t during too conth. however. on the Kobe mission of Y Juno, tllere i/e!'e 100 - 125 f ighters which o ffe re d th e s t i f fes t oppasi tion to tile superforts Since the Tokyo mission of 27 January. JlOwever,destJita the fuct tw t f ighter oyposition lIus yet to show u general lIlll.rk,,-dincrcil3e, it must bu pointed out tnat with t l fu l l of Okinawu. ffinny of theJup f ighters L.nd trainers have btlen c o n v c r t ~ d into B-29 interceptors unt i lsucn t:ur.e as thc;.> muy be needed to rapel / i l l invasion. und good buso wt:atherplus fuvorublc f l ight conditions muy resu1.t in rencwed f ignter activi ty.

Effectiveness or Enemoc Fighter Attacks

Tao tx r cent of enecy a i rc ruf t attacd.ng ;11l1cn wero des tror ed o r protx.,bly dt:stroy.:d decrease slignt:ly in June to 1J.&;I. cocpc.red to t he l b.? ];n . c ~ r d for lIit;.y. f!o",ever. 4 .) eneJ:lY uircrc.ft were destroyed per 8-29 los t tomelllJ uction or unknown COl:.rlRred to 2.2 in Ir.!c.y. Fightkr escor t lI'llS givenfOl tc.ree missl.ono during the ~ n t h . lotission& on Ulose deys S'"


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JUN'

12712114771880

/FED

60246000

2

OOO

10012000

AlJIIRAOE BOMB trEIGlfI' PER AIRCRAFT

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4. Boob and Fuel Data

l J .OOO, - - - - - - - - - - - - ; co= ,

Average fuel returned reoaincd at approximately th e Maylevel, the Coomand averaging 742 gallons returned in June cocpa.red to750 i n ~ . The 73rd t l ing averaged 710 gallons, the 314th \ling 733gallons, tho 313th Uing 748 gallons. and tho 58th tTing 750 gallons.Potential i t ies of tho B-29B stripped aircraft were partiallyindicated by th e performance of the 315th Ving in i t s f i r s t tvo combatmissions on the 26th and 29th of June. Tho average bocb load per air_craft vns 14.631 pounds and 14,647 for these missions from Guam. Thisload can be expected to increase substantial ly inasmuch as the averagefuel returned was 1320 gallons and 1181 gallons. Average gallons con-sumed per hour on these f i rs t two missions was only 367.2 and 379.7

compared to 416 for the Col:lll1and

The Collltl8nd averaged. the largest bOClb load on record dur_ing June. each plano carrying an average of 13.445 pounds inchningmining missions of the 313th Wing, or 13.506 pounds for bombing mis-sions alone. The 73rd 1'f1ng a v e r ~ e d 13,935 pounds, the 313th lUng13.547 includitl& minitl& missions and 13.761 pounds excluding mining:nissions. the 58th \ling 13.379 poums. and th e 314th lIing 12.949pounds. I t should be rem.el!lbered that these figures include substan-t ia ! loadings of the 1'-47 incendiary bombs. Aircraf t car ry ing thesebombs are l imited to a load of 184 bombs, or 12.680 pounds. If aircraft carrying 1 ~ bombs ere excluled from the above compariBon, th eto ta l for each wing is I n c r e a s e ~ by approximately 3 5 ~ 5 0 pounds.

\lings substantial ly exceeded their figures. th e 314th\ l ing achieving the largest increase with a 1500 pound raise over May.I t must be pointed out that th is .tTing is at a weight disadvant8ebecaUBe of the distance difforential .


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' . . ' . " ' ; ' i ~,PART I I COST or MISSIONS

Aircraft and crow combat 106S08 for thli month of Juno worcextroneIy 10'11. A to tal of 44 aircraft vere los t on combat missionsthis DOnth. '!'his represents a loss rate of O.S% on cocbat missions,substantially below the 2.1% rate for May and lover than tho rata fo rany previous moth.The low loss rate can be attributed largoly to tho l ight lydefonded targets that were attacked during thO month. Tho Tokyo andllogoye urban aroas wore no t attacked at a l l whilo on two missionsagainst Osaka, poor weathor proventad aore than a row cnelll fightersfroe b e c o ~ n g airborne against tho attacking force. I t should be notedthat approxloatoly 50;& of the cocbat losses oecured on tvo c.isslons early

in tho moth agninst Osaka and Kobe.The throe night attacks against oloven socondary cit ies vorocarried out at oxceptionally low cost. As a rosult of woak defensos,particulaxl:.r sco rch- li gh ts . a t those torgets, only four aircraf t \tore

los t or O . 2 ~ of tho sort ies .Only one aircraf t vas los t on cin1D.8 cissions, a loss rateof O . 3 ~ .

E=c:,y ActionCocbe.t OperationslUnknown on MissionsRoclass &:. RcorgRotation

Total

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XXI Bomber Command Monthly Activity Reports, July 1945, OCR

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Transcript of XXI Bomber Command Monthly Activity Reports, July 1945, OCR