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Transcript of (x)Coherentism in Epistemology
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Coherentism in Epistemology
Coherentism is a theory of epistemic justification. It implies that for a belief to bejustified it must belong to a coherent system of beliefs. For a system of beliefs to be
coherent, the beliefs that make up that system must cohere with one another. Typically,
this coherence is taken to involve three components: logical consistency, explanatoryrelations, and various inductive (non-explanatory) relations. Rival versions of
coherentism spell out these relations in different ways. They also differ on the exact role
of coherence in justifying beliefs: in some versions, coherence is necessary and sufficientfor justification, but in others it is only necessary.
This article reviews coherentisms recent history, and marks off coherentism from other
theses. The regress argument is the dominant anti-coherentist argument, and it bears onwhether coherentism or its chief rival, foundationalism, is correct. Several coherentist
responses to this argument will be examined. A taxonomy of the many versions of
coherentism is presented and followed by the main arguments for and against
coherentism. After these arguments, which make up the main body of the article, a finalsection considers the future prospects of coherentism.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
1. History2. Describing Coherentism
2. The Regress Argument
1. The Argument
2. Coherentist Responses3. Taxonomy of Coherentist Positions
1. What is it to Belong to a Belief System?2. What is the Makeup of the Coherence Relation?1. The Propositional Relation: Deductive Relations
2. The Propositional Relation: Inductive Relations
3. The Propositional Relation: Explanatory Relations4. The Psychological Realization Condition
4. Arguments for Coherentism
1. For Sufficiency: The Argument from Increased Probability
2. For Necessity: Only Beliefs can Justify Other Beliefs3. For Necessity: The Need for Justified Background Beliefs
4. For Necessity: The Need for Meta-Beliefs
5. Arguments Against Coherentism1. Against Sufficiency: The Input and Isolation Arguments
2. Against Sufficiency: The Alternative Coherent Systems Argument
3. Against Necessity: Feasibility Problems4. Against Necessity: The Preface Paradox
5. Against Necessity: Counterexamples
6. Looking Ahead
7. References and Further Reading
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1. Introduction
a. History
British Idealists such as F.H. Bradley (1846-1924) and Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923)
championed coherentism. So, too, did the philosophers of science Otto Neurath (1882-1945), Carl Hempel (1905-1997), and W.V. Quine (1908-2000). However, it is a group
of contemporary epistemologists that has done the most to develop and defend
coherentism: most notably Laurence BonJour in The Structure of Empirical Knowledge(1985) and Keith Lehrer in Knowledge (1974) and Theory of Knowledge (1990), but also
Gilbert Harman, William Lycan, Nicholas Rescher, and Wilfrid Sellars. Despite this long
list of names, coherentism is a minority position among epistemologists. It is probably
only in moral epistemology that coherentism enjoys wide acceptance. Under theinfluence of a prominent interpretation of John Rawlss model of wide reflective
equilibrium, many moral philosophers have opted for a coherentist view of what justifies
moral beliefs.
b. Describing Coherentism
Epistemological coherentism (or simply coherentism) needs to be distinguished fromseveral other theses. Because it is not a theory of truth, coherentism is not the coherence
theory of truth. That theory says that a proposition is true just in case it coheres with a set
of propositions. This theory of truth has fallen out of favor in large part because it isthought to be too permissive an obviously false proposition such as I am a coffee cup
coheres with this set of propositions: I am not a human, I am in the kitchen cupboard, I
weigh 7 ounces. Even contemporary defenders of coherentism are usually quick to
distance themselves from this theory of truth.
Coherentism is also distinct from a thesis about concepts that sometimes goes under the
name concept holism. Roughly, this thesis says that possessing a particular conceptrequires possessing a number of other concepts: for example, possessing the concept of
assassination requires also having the concepts of killing and death. Concepts, according
to the thesis of holism, do not come individually, but in packages. What is crucial here isthat neither concept holism nor the coherence theory of truth say anything about the
conditions under which a belief is justified.
So exactly what does coherentism have to say regarding when our beliefs are justified?The strongest form of coherentism says that belonging to a coherent system of beliefs is
1. necessary for a belief to be justified and2. by itself sufficient for a belief to be justified.
This viewcall it strong coherentismcan be contrasted with two weaker varieties ofcoherentism. Necessity coherentism just makes the necessity claim at (1). It imposes
coherence as what is often called a structural condition on justification. Structural
conditions just tell us how beliefs must be related to one another if they are to be
justified. However, being related to one another in the required way may not suffice for
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justification, since there might be additional non-structural conditions on justified belief.
A particularly lucid statement of necessity coherentism can be found in the 1992 paper by
Kvanvig and Riggs. By contrast, strong coherentism can be thought of as denying thatthere are any non-structural conditions.
When thinking about strong coherentism, it is important to appreciate the by itselfqualification in (2). This qualification sets coherentism off from one of its most important
rivals. The rival view is typically classified as non-coherentist, but it still gives coherence
a supplemental role in justifying beliefs. This view claims that coherence can boost thejustification of a belief as long as that belief is already independently justified in some
way that is not due to coherence. On this sort of view, coherence is sufficient to boost
beliefs that are independently justified. This, however, is not thought to be strong enough
to deserve the coherentist label. To make coherence sufficient for justification in a waythat deserves the label, one must claim that coherence is sufficient, by itself, to generate
justification in other words, coherence must generate justification from scratch. Call
this sufficiency coherentism. Notice, also, that sufficiency coherentism allows other
factors besides coherence to be sufficient for justification.
Another role that non-coherentists sometimes give to coherence comes in a negativecondition on epistemic justification. This condition says that incoherent beliefs fail to be
justified. It might seem that on this view, coherence is necessary for justification. But this
only follows if coherence and incoherence are contradictories. Below, we will see reasonsto think that they are not contradictories, but instead contraries. This explains why a view
that says that incoherence disqualifies beliefs from being justified is not classified as a
coherentist view. More is required to get the claim that coherence is necessary for
justification.
There are real difficulties for circumscribing self-styled coherentists. Not every self-
styled coherentist subscribes to either (1) or (2). For example, BonJour, in his 1985 book,held that meeting the coherence condition is not sufficient for justification, since he
claimed that, in addition, justified beliefs must meet a distinctive internalist condition.
Moreover, since BonJour also held (and still holds) that coherence is not necessary forthe justification of a priori beliefs, strictly speaking he did not hold that coherence is
necessary for epistemic justification either. Still his early view should be classified as
coherentist, since he claimed that coherence is a necessary condition on a wide class of
beliefs being justified, namely empirical beliefs.
In what follows, each argument for coherentism will be classified according to whether it
aims to show necessity coherentism, or sufficiency coherentism (this will also coverarguments for strong coherentism, since it is simply the conjunction of necessity
coherentism and sufficiency coherentism). Similarly, each argument against coherentism
will be classified according to whether it targets necessity coherentism, or sufficiencycoherentism (since an argument that targets either of these views is also an argument
against strong coherentism, this will cover arguments against strong coherentism).
Following BonJour and much of the recent literature, the focus will be on our empirical
beliefs and whether there is a coherence condition on the justification of these beliefs.
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One more preliminary point is in order. Since necessity coherentism just makes a claim
about the structure that our justified beliefs must take, it is neutral on whether coherencemust be introspectively accessible if it is to function as a justifier. In other words, it is
neutral on the debate between epistemic internalism and epistemic externalism. So while
the most important recent coherentists namely Laurence BonJour (1985) and KeithLehrer (1974 and 1990) have also espoused epistemological internalism, this
commitment is over and above that of structural coherentism. This makes their views
incompatible with strong coherentism, since the internalist commitment is an additionalcondition over and above that of structural coherentism.
2. The Regress Argument
The Regress Argument goes back at least as far as Aristotles Prior Analytics, Book 1.Like many others, Aristotle takes it to support coherentisms chief rival, foundationalism.
The argument has two stages: one that identifies all of the candidate structural conditions;
and one that rules against the coherentist candidate.
a. The Argument
The argument opens with the claim that some of a persons justified beliefs are justifiedbecause they derive their justification from other beliefs. For example, take my justified
belief that tomorrow is Wednesday. That belief is justified by two other beliefs: my belief
that today is Tuesday and my belief that Tuesday is immediately followed byWednesday. But, if my belief that tomorrow is Wednesday derives its justification from
these other beliefs, then my belief that tomorrow is Wednesday is justified only if these
other beliefs are justified. Consider these other beliefs. One possibility is that they derive
their justification from yet further beliefs, in which case they are dependent for theirjustification on those further beliefs if it is, we can shift our attention to these further
beliefs. The other possibility is that these beliefs are justified, but their justification does
not derive from some other justified beliefs.
Three options emerge. According to the foundationalist option, the series of beliefs
terminates with special justified beliefs called basic beliefs: these beliefs do not owetheir justification to any other beliefs from which they are inferred. According to the
infinitist option, the series of relations wherein one belief derives its justification from
one or more other beliefs goes on without either terminating or circling back on itself.
According to one construal of the coherentist option, the series of beliefs does circle backon itself, so that it includes, once again, previous beliefs in the series.
Standard presentations of the Regress Argument are used to establish foundationalism; tothis end, they include further arguments against the infinitist and coherentist options.
These arguments are the focus of the second stage. Lets focus on the two most popular
arguments against coherentism which figure into the Regress Argument; and letscontinue to construe coherentism as saying that beliefs are justified in virtue of forming a
circle. The first argument makes a circularity charge. By opting for a closed loop, the
charge is that coherentism certifies circular reasoning. A necessity coherentist will be
charged with making circular reasoning necessary for justified belief. A sufficiency
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coherentist will be charged with making circular reasoning part of something (namely,
coherence) that is sufficient for justified belief. But circular reasoning is an epistemic
flaw, not an epistemic virtue. It is neither necessary, nor part of what is sufficient, forjustified belief; in fact, it precludes justified belief.
The second argument takes aim at the claim that coherence is necessary for justification.Since a belief is justified only if, through a chain of other beliefs, we ultimately return to
the original belief, coherentism is committed, despite the initial appearance, to the claim
that the original belief is justified, at least in part, by itself. This is supposed to followfrom the coherentist corollary that if the chain of supporting beliefs did not eventually
double back on the original belief, then the original belief would not be justified. But the
claim that my belief that tomorrow is Wednesday is justified (even in part) by itself is
mistaken after all, it is derived, via inference, from other beliefs. Call this, the self-support charge.
b. Coherentist Responses
Coherentists need not resist the first stage of the regress argument since that stage, recall,just generated the candidate views. Their responses focus on the second stage. That
coherentism is the best of the three candidates is argued for in several ways: byhighlighting shortcomings with infinitism and foundationalism, by giving positive
arguments for coherentism (we will look at these later in Section 4), and by responding to
objections against coherentism. Lets continue with the two objections that have alreadybeen tabled, the circularity and self-support objections, and examine some coherentist
responses to these objections.
Some coherentists have responded to the circularity charge by suggesting that reasoningin a circle is not a problem as long as the circle is large enough. This suggestion has not
found much favor. What is worrisome about circular reasoning, for example, that it is
overly permissive since it allows one to easily construct reasons for any claimwhatsoever, applies just as well to large circles of beliefs.
According to a more instructive reply, the circularity charge and the self-support chargerest on a misconception about coherentism. Often coherentists point out that their view is
that systems of beliefs are what is, in the first place, justified (or unjustified). Individual
beliefs are not the items that are primarily justified (or unjustified). Put in this light, the
whole approach of the regress argument is question begging. For notice the argument hadus begin with an individual belief that was justified, though conditionally so. Then we
went in search of what justifies that belief. This linear approach to justification led to
the circularity and self-support charges. Coherentism, however, proposes a holisticview of justification. On this kind of view, the primary bearer of epistemic justification is
a system of beliefs. Seen in this light, both charges seem to be question begging.
Some have argued that the move to holistic justification fails to really answer the
circularity and self-support charges. For even granting that it is a system of beliefs that is
primarily justified, it is still true that a system of beliefs is justified in virtue of the fact
that the individual beliefs that make up the system relate to one another in a circular
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fashion. And it is still true that a belief must support itself if it is to be justified, since this
is needed if the relevant system of beliefs (and hence the individual belief) is to be
justified. It is not so clear, then, that the reply which highlights the holistic nature ofjustification is successful.
However, by conjoining the appeal to epistemic holism with another appeal, a coherentistmight have a fully satisfactory reply. This second appeal identifies another misconception
about coherentism that might lie behind the circularity charge and the self-support
charge. This misconception has to do with the variety of ways in which our beliefs cansupport one another so that they come out justified. Coherentists are fond of metaphors
like rafts, webs, and bricks in an arch. These things stay together because their parts
support one another. Each part both supports, and is supported by, other specific parts. So
too with justified beliefs: each is both supported by, and supports, other beliefs. Thismeans that among support relations, there are symmetrical support relations: one belief
can support a second (perhaps mediately through other beliefs), while the second also
supports the first (again, perhaps, mediately). Beliefs that stand in sufficiently strong
support relations to one another are coherent, and therefore justified.
This contrasts with foundationalisms trademark bifurcation of beliefs into basic beliefsand non-basic beliefs. Basic beliefs do the supporting; non-basic beliefs are what they
support. According to foundationalists, there are no symmetrical support relations. This
much is clear enough. The delicate issue that it raises is this: do the circularity and self-support charges rest on an assumption that beliefs cannot be justified in virtue of standing
in symmetrical support relations to one another? If the charges require this assumption,
then they might beg the question.
Consider the circularity charge first. To simply assert that circular reasoning is
epistemically defective and therefore cannot generate justified beliefs seems very close to
simply asserting that beliefs cannot be justified in virtue of standing in symmetricalsupport relations. What the opponent of coherentism must do is tell us more precisely
why circular reasoning is epistemically defective. While the considerations they call on
might well imply that symmetrical support relations do not justify, they will beineffective if they simply assume this.
We are now in a position to see that the self-support charge is importantly different from
the circularity charge. Where the circularity charge targets the coherentist claim thatbeliefs are justified by standing in support relations that are mediated by other beliefs but
ultimately return to themselves, the self-support charge focuses on an alleged implication
of this, namely that beliefs are therefore justified at least in part because they stand insupport relations to themselves. In slogan form: reflexive relations justify.
So what about the self-support charge? Does making this charge require assuming thatsymmetrical support relations cannot justify? We need to be careful. While the claim that
the support relation is transitive and the claim that supporting relations link back to a
previously linked belief implies that the relevant belief supports itself, coherentists are
not thereby stuck with the claim that this belief is justified in virtue of supporting itself.
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Arguably, it is open to the coherentist to hold, instead, that this belief is justified in virtue
of the circular structure of the support relations, while denying that it is justified in virtue
of supporting itself. Still, this may not be enough, since the coherentist might still have tomaintain that justified belief is compatible with self-support.
3. Taxonomy of Coherentist Positions
Recall that strong coherentism says Ss belief that p is justified if and only if it belongs,
and coheres with, a system of Ss beliefs, and this system is coherent. Central to this
formulation are three notions: the notion of a system of beliefs, the notion of belonging toa system of beliefs, and the notion of a coherent system of beliefs. Lets look at these in
order. As we will see, each can be spelled out in different ways. The result is that
coherentism covers a wide variety of views.
a. What is it to Belong to a Belief System?
What qualifies a set of beliefs as a system of beliefs? Partly, it is the number of beliefs
that make it up. Minimally, a system of beliefs must consist in at least two beliefs. In a
moment, we will see that two is probably not enough. The other extreme that the size ofthe relevant system is ones entire corpus of beliefs must be rejected, on the grounds
that any sufficiently strong incoherence would make all of ones beliefs unjustified. Thisis implausible, since incoherence in ones outlook on one topic, say set theory, should not
affect the epistemic status of ones outlook on an unconnected topic, say whether one is
presently in pain. Between these two extremes lie a number of importantly differentintermediate positions. There are a few general approaches to carving out distinct systems
of beliefs in a belief corpus. Lets look at four.
One way of individuating systems of beliefs is by reference to their subject-matters. Forexample, your beliefs about mathematical matters might form one system of beliefs,
while your beliefs about tonights dinner might form another. Alternatively, systems of
beliefs might be individuated by the sources that produced them: visual beliefs mightform one system, auditory beliefs another, memorial beliefs another, and so forth. The
third possibility involves individuating systems phenomenologically. Beliefs themselves,
or perhaps key episodes that come with acquiring them, might have phenomenologicalmarkers. If these markers stand in similarity relations to one another, this would lead to
grouping beliefs into distinct systems. A final possibility, perhaps the most plausible one,
involves individuating systems of beliefs according to whether the beliefs that belong to a
particular system stand in some dependency relations of a psychological sort to oneanother for example, a psychological relation like that involved in inference. We will
return to this fourth possibility below.
Lets turn to the second notion, that of belonging to a system of beliefs. According to
straightforward accounts of this notion, for a belief to belong to a system of beliefs, it
must relate to the beliefs that make up that system in just the same way that the beliefsrelate to one another if they are to constitute a system of beliefs. This will involve one of
the four possibilities that were just surveyed.
b. What is the Makeup of the Coherence Relation?
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Coherence relations can hold among a set of beliefs that constitute a system. Arguably,
coherence relations can also hold between systems of beliefs. On the simplest view, the
latter occurs when the individual beliefs that are members of the respective systemscohere with one another across systems. As a result, the beliefs belonging to the
respective systems gain in justification. Here, I will focus on the easier case in which a
set of beliefs constitute a single coherent system of beliefs.
A coherent system of beliefs has two basic marks. First, the beliefs have to have
propositional contents which relate to one another in some specified way. Call this thepropositional relation. Additionally, it is plausible to think that the relevant beliefs must
be related to one another in ones psychology in some way, for example by being inferred
from one another. Lets look at the specifics, starting with the propositional relation.
i. The Propositional Relation: Deductive Relations
We need to consider two relations from deductive logic: logical consistency and mutual
derivability. At a minimum, coherence requires logical consistency. So a set of belief
contents, p1, . pn, is coherent only if p1, . pn neither includes, nor logically entails, acontradiction. Logical consistency is far from sufficient, though, since a set of beliefs in a
scattered array of propositions can be logically consistent without being justified.Consider, for example, my belief that Joan is sitting, my belief that 2+2=4, and my belief
that tomorrow is Wednesday. While these beliefs are logically consistent with one
another, more needs to be in place if they are to be justified.
This last set of beliefs illustrates another important point. While coherentists will claim
that this set of beliefs does not exhibit coherence, it is at the same time implausible to
claim that this set is incoherent. It is not incoherent, since no one of the beliefs is in directconflict with, that is, contradicts, any of the others. It follows that coherence and
incoherence are contraries, not contradictories. If a set of beliefs is coherent, then it is not
incoherent; if a set of beliefs is incoherent, then it is not coherent; but as this last caseillustrates, there are sets of beliefs that fail to be coherent, but are not incoherent either.
The fact that coherence and incoherence are contraries explains the earlier point about
why deeming incoherent beliefs unjustified is not enough to make one a coherentist. Justbecause a theory disqualifies incoherent beliefs from being justified, it is not thereby
committed to holding that coherence is necessary for justification.
Consider, next, mutual derivability. Though it is plausible that logical consistency isnecessary for coherence, it is too much to require that each believed proposition entail
each of the other believed propositions in the system. In fact, it is even too much to
require that each believed proposition entail at least one of the other believedpropositions. To see why these requirements are too strong, consider these four beliefs:
the belief that Moe is wincing, the belief that Moe is squealing, the belief that Moe is
yelling that hurts, and the belief that Moe is in pain. None of these beliefs logicallyimplies any of the others. Nor does the conjunction of any three of them imply the fourth.
Despite the lack of entailments, though, the beliefs together seem to constitute a system
of beliefs that is intuitively quite coherent. So coherence can be earned by relations
weaker than entailment.
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ii. The Propositional Relation: Inductive Relations
Many coherentists have required, in addition to logical consistency, probabilisticconsistency. So if one believes that p is 0.9 likely to be true, then one would be required
to believe that not-p is 0.1 likely to be true. Here probability assignments appear in the
content of what is believed. Alternatively, a theory of probability might generateconsistency constraints by imposing constraints on the degrees of confidence with which
we believe things. So take a person who believes p, but is not fully confident that p is
correct; she believes p to a degree of 0.9. Here 0.9 is not part of the content of what shebelieves; it measures her confidence in believing p. Consistency might then require that
she believe not-p to a degree of 0.1. In one of these two ways, the axioms of probability
might help set coherence constraints.
Besides being probabilistically consistent with one another, coherent beliefs gain in
justification from being inferred from one another in conformity with the canons of
cogent inductive reasoning. Foundationalists, at least moderate foundationalists, have just
as much at stake in the project of identifying these canons. It is common to identifydistinct branches of inductive reasoning, each with their own respective canons: for
example, inference to the best explanation, enumerative induction, and various forms ofstatistical reasoning. For present purposes, what is crucial in all of this is that beliefs
inferred from one another in conformity with the identified canons (whatever the exact
canons are) boost coherence, and therefore justification.iii. The Propositional Relation: Explanatory Relations
To supplement the requirements of logical, and probabilistic, consistency, coherentists
often introduce explanatory relations. This allows them to concur that the systemconsisting in the beliefs that Moe is wincing, Moe is squealing, and Moe is yelling that
hurts coheres with the belief that Moe is in pain. In addition, it allows us to disqualify
the set consisting in my beliefs that Joan is sitting, 2+2=4, and tomorrow is Wednesdayon the grounds that these propositions do not in any way explain one another.
There are two ways that a proposition can be involved in an explanatory relation: asbeing what is explained, or as being what does the explaining. These are not exclusive.
The fact there are toxic fumes in the room is explained by the fact that the cap is off the
bottle of toxic liquid. The fact that there are toxic fumes in the room, in turn, explains the
fact that I am feeling sick. So I might believe that I am feeling sick, draw an explanatoryinference and believe that there must be toxic fumes in the air, and then from that belief
draw a second explanatory inference and believe that the cap must be off the bottle. In
this case, that there are toxic fumes in the air serves to both explain why I am sick and inturn serves as the explanatory basis for the cap being off the bottle. Often what drives
coherentists to think that a coherent set of beliefs must consist in more than two beliefs is
that the needed explanatory richness requires more than two beliefs.
Disagreement enters when coherentists say exactly what makes one thing a good
explanation of another. Among the determinants of good explanation are predictive
power, simplicity, fit with other claims that one is justified in believing, and fecundity in
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answering questions. The nature and relative weight of these, and other, determinants is
quite controversial. At this level of detail, coherentists, even so-called explanationists
who stress the central played by explanatory considerations, frequently diverge.
Not all coherentists include explanatory relations among the determinants of coherence.
See Lehrer (1990) for example. Those that do include them usually give one of two kindsof accounts for why believed propositions that do a good job of explaining one another
increase coherence and hence boost justification. One kind of account claims that when
beliefs do this, they make each other more likely to be true. On this kind of account,explanatory relations are construed as ultimately being inductive probabilifying relations.
On an alterative account, explanatory relations are irreducible ingredients of coherence,
ingredients that are simply obvious parts of what contributes to coherence.
iv. The Psychological Realization Condition
It is not enough that the contents of a persons beliefs happen to cohere with one another.
Another condition is needed. In the cognizers mind, these beliefs must stand in some
relation to one another. This extra condition might be incorporated into an account of abelief system. Lets consider another way of incorporating the condition. Suppose some
coherentist elects to individuate belief systems by the subject-matter of the beliefcontents. Such a coherentist might then introduce a distinct psychological realization
condition, one that figures into an account of the coherence relation rather than into an
account of a system of beliefs. If the beliefs in some system are to cohere with oneanother, they must interact with one another for example, by being inferred from one
another.
On the inferential approach a belief coheres with the rest of the beliefs in some system ofbeliefs only if it stands in one of two inferential relations to beliefs in that system of
beliefs: it might be inferred from one, or more, beliefs in the system; or, it might be a
belief from which one, or more, beliefs in the system have been inferred.
But inference is just one option. Arguably, another option would be to impose a
counterfactual condition. Roughly, this kind of condition says that a belief coheres withother beliefs in the system to which it belongs only if the following counterfactual
conditional claim is true: if the rest of the system were markedly different, in some
specified way, then the person would not hold that belief.
4. Arguments for Coherentism
Lets now survey some of the main arguments for, and against, coherentism. This section
reviews four arguments for coherentism. The first attempts to show that coherence issufficient for justification. Three more attempt to show that it is necessary.
a. For Sufficiency: The Argument from Increased Probability
In An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, C.I. Lewis (1883-1964) introduced a case
that has been widely discussed. A number of witnesses report the same thing about some
event for example, that Nancy was at last nights party. However, the witnesses are
unreliable about this sort of thing. Moreover, their reports are made completely
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independently of one another in other words, the report of any one witness was in no
way influenced by the report of any of the other witnesses. According to Lewis, the
congruence of the reports establishes a high probability of what they agree upon. (p.246) The point is meant to generalize: whenever a number of unreliable sources operate
independently of one another, and they converge with the same finding, this boosts the
probability that that finding is correct. This is so regardless of whether the sources areindividual testifiers, various sensory modalities, or any combination of sources. Items that
individually are quite unreliable and would not justify belief, when taken together under
conditions of independent operation and convergence, produce justified beliefs.
This argument has been charged with several shortcomings. For one, it is not clear that
the argument, even if sound, establishes coherentism. The argument appears to rest on an
inference to the best explanation, one that can be construed along foundationalist lines.So, for each source, S1 . . . Sn, I am justified in believing S1 reports p, S2 reports p . . .
Sn reports p. According to foundationalists, these beliefs are justified without being
inferred from any other beliefs; they are basic beliefs. Then, inferring to the best
explanation, I come to believe p. This belief-that-p is a non-basic belief, but since it restson basic beliefs, the overall picture is a foundationalist one, not a coherentist one.
Second, even on standard coherence views, it is not clear that the reports-that-p cohere
with one another. Logical coherence, both in the sense of logical consistency and in the
sense of mutual derivability, is in place; but the explanatory relations that coherentists sooften emphasize are not.
Third, it is controversial whether the argument is cogent. One issue here concerns
whether each source, taken individually, provides justification for believing p. If eachindependently confers some justification, then one of coherentisms rivals namely, a
version of foundationalism which says that coherence can boost overall justification, but
cannot generate justification from scratch can agree. On the other hand, if each sourcefails on its own to confer any justification whatsoever, then the question remains: does
this kind of case show that coherence can create justification from scratch? If the
argument is to establish that coherence is by itself sufficient to generate justification, weneed to take each individual source as, on its own, providing no justification whatsoever
for believing p. Recently Bayesian proofs have been offered to show that the convergence
of such sources does not increase the probability of p (see Huemer 1997 and Olson 2005).
Their convergence would have been just as likely had p been false.b. For Necessity: Only Beliefs can Justify Other Beliefs
The next coherentist argument traces to work by Wilfrid Sellars (1973) and DonaldDavidson (1986). Often this argument is put forth as an anti-foundationalist argument.
However, if successful, it establishes the stronger positive claim of necessity
coherentism. According to this argument, only beliefs are suited to justify beliefs. AsDavidson puts it, nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another
belief (1986, p.126). Consider the obvious alternative what justifies our empirical
beliefs about the external world are perceptual states. But perceptual states are either
states that have propositions as their objects, or they dont. If they have propositions as
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their objects, then we need to be aware of these propositions in the sense that we need to
believe these propositions in order for the initial belief to be justified. But it is these
further beliefs that are really doing the justifying. On the other hand, if they do not havepropositions as objects, then, no logical relations can hold between their objects and the
propositional contents of the beliefs that they are supposed to justify. That seems to leave
perceptual states standing in only causal relations to the relevant empirical beliefs. But,Davidson claims, the mere fact that a belief is caused by a perceptual state implies
nothing about whether that belief is justified.
Foundationalists have replied in a number of ways. First, suppose perceptual states do not
take propositions as their objects. It is not clear why there needs to be a logical relation
between the objects of perceptual states, and the contents of the beliefs that they are
supposed to justify. Non-perceptual states can figure into statements of conditionalprobability, so that on their obtaining, a given belief is likely to be true to some degree or
other. Alternatively, they can bear explanatory relations to the beliefs that they are
alleged to justify. Second, suppose the relevant perceptual states do take propositions as
their objects. It is not at all obvious that one needs to be aware of them for them tojustify, though perhaps one does need to be aware of them if one is to show that ones
belief is justified. Here, the coherentist argument is often charged with conflating thenotion of a justified belief with the notion of being in a position to show that ones belief
is justified.
c. For Necessity: The Need for Justified Background Beliefs
Coherentists sometimes argue in the following way. First, they invoke a prosaic justified
belief about the external world say my present belief that there is a computer in front of
me. Then they claim that this belief is justified only if I am justified in believing that thelighting is normal, that my eyes are functioning properly, that no tricks are being played
on me, and so forth. For if I am not justified in making these assumptions, then my belief
that there is a computer in front of me would not be justified. Generalizing, the claim isthat our beliefs about the external world are justified only if some set of justified
background beliefs is in place.
This argument has also been challenged. The key claimthat my belief that there is a
computer in front of me is justified only if I am justified in believing these other thingsis
not obvious. A young child, for example, might believe there is a computer in front of
her, and this belief might be justified, even though she is not yet justified in believinganything about the lighting, her visual processes, and so forth. If this is correct, then the
most the argument can show is that if someone has a justified belief that there is a
computer in front of them and if they believe that the lighting is normal, that their eyesare functioning well, and so forth, then these latter beliefs had better be justified. This,
however, is consistent with foundationalism. Moreover, some epistemologists argue that
the psychological realization condition might not be met. For it is implausible to thinkthat I infer that there is a computer in front of me from one or more of my beliefs about
the lighting, my eyes, and absence of tricksters. Nor do I infer any of these latter beliefs
from my belief that there is a computer in front of me. Maybe this non-content
requirement will do instead: my computer belief is counterfactually dependent on my
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beliefs about the lighting, my eyes, and so forth, so that if I did not have any of the latter
beliefs, then I would not have the computer belief either. This is far from obvious,
though. Perhaps, in the imagined counterfactual situation, my state is like the childs. Soeven a relation of counterfactual dependence might not be needed.
d. For Necessity: The Need for Meta-Beliefs
There is another argument that begins from a prosaic justified belief about the external
world. Consider, again, my empirically justified belief that there is a computer in front of
me. For this belief to be justified, I must possess some reason for holding it. But topossess a reason is to believe that reason. Since the reason presumably needs to be a good
one, I must believe it in such a way that my belief in that reason is a justified belief. This
yields a second justified belief. This second justified belief can then be subjected to the
same argument, an argument that will yield some third justified belief. And so on.
Foundationalists have charged that this argument is psychologically unrealistic. Surely,
having a justified belief that there is a computer in front of me does not require having an
infinite number of justified beliefs. Coherentists have a good reason to avoid beingcommitted to this kind of result: it is much more psychologically realistic to posit
coherent systems of beliefs that are finite. If this is right, the argument is best thought ofas a reductio ad absurdum of one, or more, of the claims that lead to the result either the
claim that justified belief requires possessing a reason, the claim that possessing a reason
requires believing that reason, or the claim that possessing a reason requires believing itwith justification.
Moreover, this argument does not clearly support coherentism. Instead, it seems to
support infinitism. Plus, the demand that it makes is a demand for linear justification: mycomputer belief relies for its justification on my having a second justified belief; in turn,
this second justified belief relies for its justification on my having some third justified
belief. These dependency relations are asymmetric one-way relations, the hallmark oflinear justification, not coherence justification.
5. Arguments Against Coherentism
This section takes up five arguments against coherentism. These are in addition to the
circularity and self-support charges that that were discussed earlier.
a. Against Sufficiency: The Input and Isolation Arguments
One argument against sufficiency coherentism says that it fails to recognize the
indispensable role that experience plays in justifying our beliefs about the external world.
That sufficiency coherentism gives no essential role to experience follows from the factthat the states that suffice to justify our beliefs are, on this view, limited to other beliefs.
That this is grounds for rejecting sufficiency coherentism is spelled out in several
different ways. One way appeals to a lack of connection to the truth: since the view doesnot give any essential role to the central source of input from the external world, namely
experience, there is no reason to expect a coherent system of beliefs to accurately reflect
the external world. This line of attack is often referred to as the isolation objection.
Alternatively, an opponent of sufficiency coherentism might not appeal to truth-
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conductivity. Instead, she might simply claim that it is implausible to deny that part of
what justifies my present belief that there is a computer in front of me is the nature of my
present visual and tactile experiences. So even if my experience is not reflective of thetruth, perhaps because I am a deceived brain-in-a-vat, my perceptual beliefs will be
justified only if they suitably fit with what my perceptual states are reporting.
Of course, proponents of necessity coherentism are free to impose other necessary
conditions on justified belief, conditions that can include things about experience. But
what about proponents of sufficiency coherentism? How can they respond? Lets look atthree ways. The first is from Laurence BonJour (1985, chapters 6 and 7). BonJour
identifies a class of beliefs that he calls cognitively spontaneous beliefs. Roughly, these
are non-inferential beliefs that arise in us in a non-voluntary way. A subset of these
beliefs can be justified from within ones system of beliefs by appeal to two other beliefs:the belief that these first-order beliefs occur spontaneously, plus the belief that first-order
spontaneous beliefs of a specific kind (a kind individuated by its characteristic subject
matter, or by its apparent mode of sensory production) tend to be true. According to
BonJour, invoking cognitively spontaneous beliefs in this way explains how experiencecan make a difference to the justificatory status of our beliefs experiences do this via
their being reflected in a subset of our beliefs. BonJour contends that in addition acoherentist must give an account of how experiences must make a difference to the
justification of some of our beliefs. Here, he introduces the Observation Requirement:
roughly, any system of beliefs that contains empirically justified beliefs must include thebelief that a significant likelihood of truth attaches to a reasonable variety of cognitively
spontaneous beliefs.
Alternatively, Keith Lehrer (see chapter 6 of his 1990 book) calls on the fact that ahumans typical body of beliefs is going to include beliefs about the conditions under
which she reliably forms beliefs. Lehrer points out that this belief is either true or false. If
it is true, then in tandem with beliefs about the conditions under which one formed somebeliefs, plus the beliefs themselves, the truth of the beliefs, and their being justified,
follows. On the other hand, if a belief about the conditions under which one reliably
forms beliefs is false, then the justification for the relevant belief is defeated (this entailsthat one fails to know, though the belief still enjoys what Lehrer calls personal
justification).
Third, a coherentist might challenge the assumption that experiences and beliefs aredistinct. On some views of perceptual states (for example, the view that Armstrong
defends in chapter 10 of his 1968 book), perceptual states, or at least a significant class of
perceptual states, involve, and entail, believing. On these views, when one of the relevantperceptual states supplies input from the external world, ones corpus of beliefs is
provided with input from the external world. The viability of this response turns on the
case for thinking that perceiving is believing.b. Against Sufficiency: The Alternative Coherent Systems Argument
A second argument against sufficiency coherentism connects in some ways with the last
argument. According to this second argument, for each system of coherent beliefs, there
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are multiple alternative systems alternative because they include beliefs with different,
logically incompatible, contents that are just as coherent. However, if there are plenty
of highly, equally coherent, but incompatible, systems, and if few of these systems do anadequate job of faithfully representing reality, then coherentism is not a good indicator of
truth. Since this line of reasoning is readily knowable, beliefs that coherently fit together
are not, at least by virtue of their coherence alone, justified.
The exact number of alternative systems that are equally coherent depends on the exact
details of what constitutes coherence. But like most of the standard arguments for, andagainst, coherentism, the soundness of this argument is not thought to turn on these
details. Nor is it clear that coherentists can reply by denying the view of epistemic
justification invoked in the argument. Even if one were to deny the externalist thesis
which says that the mark of justified beliefs is that they are likely to be true, in someobjective non-epistemic sense of likely, epistemic internalism might not provide
refuge. For BonJour, Lehrer, and other internalists, beliefs that are not likely, in the same
externalist sense, to be true can be justified: for example, my belief that there is a
computer in front of me would be justified even if I were a lifelong deceived brain-in-a-vat. But it is not clear that it is reasonable, by internalist lights, to hold a coherent system
of beliefs just because they are coherent, while it is reasonable to believe that there areplenty of alternative equally coherent, but incompatible, belief systems. So, this objection
might go through whether one weds coherentism to epistemic externalism or internalism.
A sufficiency coherentist might try to respond to this argument in the same way that she
responds to the input problem. She might claim, for example, that a sufficient bulk of a
persons beliefs are cognitively spontaneous beliefs. Since these beliefs are involuntarily
acquired, they will constrain the number, and nature, of alternative equally coherentsystems that one could have. Alternatively, a large bulk of our beliefs will be firmly in
place if perceiving is believing.
c. Against Necessity: Feasibility Problems
Lets turn to some arguments against necessity coherentism. It is highly plausible that
humans have plenty of justified beliefs. So, if justification requires coherence, it must bepsychologically realistic to think that each of us has coherent systems of beliefs. How
psychologically realistic is this?
Again, the answer depends, in part, on the make up of the coherence relation. As we saw,coherence at a minimum requires logical consistency. Christopher Cherniak (see
Cherniak 1984) considers using a truth-table to determine whether a system of 138
beliefs is logically consistent. If one were so quick that one could check each line of thetruth table for this long conjunction in the time it takes a light ray to traverse the diameter
of a proton, it would still take more than twenty billion years to work through the entire
table. Since 138 beliefs is hardly an inordinate number of beliefs for a system to have, itappears that coherence cannot be checked for in any humanly feasible way.
While this sort of consideration might pose a problem for a position that couples
coherentism with internalism (as BonJour and Lehrer do), coherentism itself does not
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require a person to verify that it is logically consistent. It does not even require that a
person be able to verify this. It just requires that the system in fact be logically consistent.
Still, there might be problems in the neighborhood. One is that Cherniaks point mightwell imply that we do not form, or sustain, our beliefs in virtue of their coherence, since
any cognitive mechanism that could do this would need to be much more powerful than
any mechanisms we have. Second, it is highly plausible to think that we are often in aposition to show that our beliefs are justified; but Cherniaks point suggests that if
coherentism were right, this would often be beyond our abilities.
d. Against Necessity: The Preface Paradox
Another argument questions whether logical inconsistency, an obvious mark of
incoherence, really entails a lack of justification. Imagine an historian who has just
completed her lifelong book project. She has double and triple checked each claim thatshe makes in the book, and each has checked out. For each of the claims she makes, c1,
.. cn, she has a justified belief that it is true: she has the justified belief that c1 is true,
the justified belief that c2 is true, , and the justified belief that cn is true. At the same
time, she is fully aware of the fact that historians make mistakes. In all likelihood, herbook contains at least one mistake. For this reason, she is justified in believing that at
least one of the claims that she makes in her book is false. But this yields a set of beliefsthat is not logically consistent, since it includes the belief that c1 is true, the belief that c2
is true, , the belief that cn is true, and the belief that at least one of c1 through cn is
false. Some epistemologists, for example, Foley 1992, have argued that the historian isjustified in believing this set of logically inconsistent claims. And, all of these beliefs
remain justified even if she knows they are logically inconsistent.
In response, the coherentist might appropriate any of a number of views on this PrefaceParadox. For example, John Pollock (1986) has suggested a simple reason for thinking
that the historians beliefs cannot be both logically inconsistent and justified. Since a set
of inconsistent propositions logically implies anything whatsoever, adding a widelyaccepted principle concerning justification will yield the result that one can be justified in
believing anything whatsoever. The principle is the closure principle: roughly, it says that
if one is justified in believing some set of propositions and one is justified in believingthat those propositions logically imply some other proposition, then upon deducing this
other proposition from the set that one starts from, one is justified in believing that
proposition.
A second set of cases involve beliefs that are logically inconsistent, although this is
unknown to the person who holds them. For example, while Frege had good reason to
believe that the axioms of arithmetic that he came up with were consistent, Russellshowed that in fact they were not consistent. It is quite plausible that Freges beliefs in
each of the axioms were, though logically inconsistent, nonetheless justified (see
Kornblith 1989). BonJour (1989) responded to this case, as well as the Preface Paradox,by agreeing that both Freges, and the historians beliefs, are justified. He claimed that
logical consistency is overrated; it is, in fact, not an essential component of coherence.
e. Against Necessity: Counterexamples
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There appear to be straightforward counterexamples to coherentism. Introspective beliefs
constitute an important class of such cases. On a broad interpretation of empirical that
encompasses sources of belief in addition to the sensory modalities (one that contrastswith the a priori), introspective beliefs count as empirical. Consider, then, my
introspective belief that I am in pain, or my introspective belief that something looks red
to me. These beliefs are not inferred from any other beliefs I did not arrive at either ofthem by inference from premises. They are not based on any other beliefs.
In response, Lehrer (1990, p. 89) has suggested that a coherentist might identify one, ormore, background beliefs, and claim that, though the introspective belief is not inferred
from these background belief, the introspective belief is justified because it coheres with
the background beliefs. For example, to handle the introspective belief that something
looks red to me, Lehrer points to the background belief that if I believe something looksred to me then, unless something untoward is going on, the best explanation is that there
is something that does look red to me.
It is not clear that this response works. Let R be the proposition that something looks redto me. Lehrers suggestion requires that coherence holds between (i) R and (ii) if I
believe R, then R. It is not clear, though, that coherence does hold between these. Thoughthey are logically consistent, neither entails the other; moreover, they need not be
inductively related to one another; nor is it clear that either explains the other.
6. Looking Ahead
Intense discussion of coherentism has been intermittent. Two recent defenses of the
position, Laurence BonJours 1985 The Structure of Empirical Knowledge and Keith
Lehrers 1990 version of Knowledge, significantly advanced the issues and triggeredsubstantial literatures, which mostly attacked coherentism. But undoubtedly, work on
coherentism has suffered from the fact that so few philosophers are coherentists. Even
BonJour, who did so much to reinvigorate the discussion, has abandoned coherentism.See his 1999 paper for his renunciation. With the exception of work being done by
Bayesians, few epistemologists are presently working on coherentism.
Epistemology would be better off if this were not so. For even if coherentism falls to
some objection, it would be nice if we had a better idea of exactly what range of positions
fall. Moreover, when it comes to the task of clarifying the nature of coherence, an appeal
can be made to many foundationalists. While there might not be much motivation todevelop a position that one rejects, there is this: many foundationalists want to
incorporate considerations about coherence. As we saw, they usually do this in one of
two ways, either by allowing coherence to boost the level of justification enjoyed bybeliefs that are independently justified in some non-coherentist fashion, or by stamping
incoherent beliefs as unjustified. Defending these conditions on justification requires
clarifying the nature of coherence. So, it is not just coherentists that have a stake inclarifying coherence.
7. References and Further Reading
* Akiba, Ken. (2000) Shogenjis Probabilistic Measure of Coherence is Incoherent.
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Analysis 60: 356-359.
* Aristotle. (1989) Posteriori Analytics. Trans. Robin Smith. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett
Publishing Company.* Armstrong, David. (1968) A Materialist Theory of the Mind. New York: Routledge.
* Audi, Robert. (1993) The Structure of Justification. New York: Cambridge
University Press.* Aune, Bruce. (1967) Knowledge, Mind, and Nature. New York: Random House.
* Blanshard, Brand. (1939) The Nature of Thought. New York: G. Allen and Unwin
Ltd.* BonJour, Laurence. (1985) The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
* BonJour, Laurence. (1989) Replies and Clarificiations. In John Bender, ed., The
Current State of the Coherence Theory. Dordrecht: Kluwer.* BonJour, Laurence. (1999) The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism. In
John Greco and Ernest Sosa, eds., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Malden, MA:
Blackwell.
* Cherniak, Christopher. (1984) Computational Complexity and the UniversalAcceptance of Logic. Journal of Philosophy 81: 739-758.
* Chisholm, Roderick. (1982) The Foundations of Knowing. Minneapolis, MN:University of Minnesota Press.
* Chisholm, Roderick (1989) Theory of Knowledge 3rd edition. Englewood Cliffs,
CA: Prentice Hall.* Cross, Charles. (1999) Coherence and Truth Conducive Justification. Analysis 59:
186-193.
* Daniels, Norman. (1996) Justice and Justification: Reflective Equilibrium in Theory
and Practice. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.* Davidson, Donald. (1986) A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge. In Ernest
LePore, ed., Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald
Davidson. New York: Blackwell.* Earman, John. (1992) Bayes or Bust? Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
* Elgin, Catherine. (2005) Non-foundationalist Epistemology: Holism, Coherence,
and Tenability. In Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa, eds., Contemporary Debates inEpistemology. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
* Foley, Richard. (1978) Inferential Justification and the Infinite Regress. American
Philosophical Quarterly 15: 311-316.
* Foley, Richard. (1987) The Theory of Epistemic Rationality. Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press.
* Foley, Richard. (1992) Being Knowingly Incoherent. Nous 26: 181-203.
* Goldman, Alan. (1988) Empirical Knowledge. Berkeley, CA: University ofCalifornia Press.
* Goodman, Nelson. (1951) The Structure of Appearance. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.* Haack, Susan. (1993) Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
* Hansson, S.O. and Erik Olsson (1999) Providing Foundations for Coherentism.
Erkenntnis 51: 243-265.
* Harman, Gilbert. (1973) Thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
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* Harman, Gilbert. (1986) Change in View. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
* Horwich, Paul. (1982) Probability and Evidence. New York: Cambridge University
Press.* Huemer, Michael. (1997) Probability and Coherence Justification. Southern
Journal of Philosophy 35: 463-472.
* Jeffrey, Richard. (1983) The Logic of Decision 2nd edition. Chicago: University ofChicago Press.
* Klein, Peter. (1985) The Virtues of Inconsistency. The Monist 68: 105-135.
* Klein, Peter. (1999) Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.Philosophical Perspectives 13: 297-325.
* Klein, Peter and Ted Warfield. (1994) What Price Coherence? Analysis 54: 129-
132.
* Klein, Peter and Ted Warfield. (1996) No Help for the Coherentist. Analysis 56:118-121.
* Kornblith, Hilary. (1989). The Unattainability of Coherence. In John Bender, ed.,
The Current State of the Coherence Theory. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
* Kvanvig, Jonathan. (1995) Coherentists Distractions. Philosophical Topics 23:257-75.
* Kvanvig, Jonathan. (2003) Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification, StanfordEncyclopedia of Philosophy.
* Kvanvig, Jonathan. (2003) The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of
Understanding. New York: Cambridge University Press.* Kvanvig, Jonathan and Wayne Riggs. (1992) Can a Coherence Theory Appeal to
Appearance States? Philosophical Studies 67: 197-217.
* Lehrer, Keith. (1974) Knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press.
* Lehrer, Keith. (1997) Justification, Coherence, and Knowledge. Erkenntnis 50:243-257.
* Lehrer, Keith. (1990) Theory of Knowledge. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
* Lewis, C.I. (1946) An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. LaSalle, IL: OpenCourt.
* Lycan, William. (1988) Judgment and Justification. New York: Cambridge
University Press.* Lycan, William. (1996) Plantinga and Coherentisms. In Jonathan Kvanvig, ed.,
Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield.
* Makinson, David. (1965) The Paradox of the Preface. Analysis 25: 205-207.
* Merricks, Trenton. (1995) On Behalf of the Coherentist. Analysis 55: 306-309.* Olsson, Erik. (1999) Cohering With. Erkenntnis 50: 273-291.
* Olsson, Erik. (2001) Why Coherence is not Truth-Conducive. Analysis 61: 236-
241.* Olsson, Erik. (2002) What is the Problem of Coherence and Truth? Journal of
Philosophy 99: 246-272.
* Olsson, Erik. (2005) Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification. NewYork: Oxford University Press.
* Plantinga, Alvin. (1993) Warrant: The Current Debate. New York: Oxford
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* Pollock, John. (1979) A Plethora of Epistemological Theories. In George Pappas
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* Pollock, John. (1986) The Paradox of the Preface. Philosophy of Science 53: 246-
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* Post, John. (1980) Infinite Regresses of Justification and Explanation.Philosophical Studies 38: 31-52.
* Pryor, James. (2005) There Is Immediate Justification. In Matthias Steup and
Ernest Sosa eds., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Malden, MA: Blackwell.* Quine, W. and J. Ullian. (1970) The Web of Belief. New York: Random House.
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Paul.* Rawls, John. (1971) A Theory of Justice. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press.
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* Shogenji, Tomoji. (1999) Is Coherence Truth-Conducive? Analysis 59: 338-345.
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Author Information
Peter MurphyEmail: [email protected]
University of Indianapolis
Last updated: October 15, 2006 | Originally published: October/15/2006
Categories: Epistemology