WWII Army Infantry Report

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REPORT ON THE ARl\fY."'..;..~) ~V'''f~";,.,~;:;,~. :';-:st-;":I~~ ;:'";'"" ;';i\".

. July 1,1939

June 30, 1943


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f" '"~ '~ : : :W , , . ~.~

}{EPORTONT-HEI .i

,ARMYJuLy ~"I939 to Jun~ 30, I943

BIENNIAL REPORTS OF

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALLChief of StafJ of the United States Army. .

to

The Secretary o t War

Morris s';"ett library I u s A F A S

'PropertY. o f U.S . Army.

WASHINGTON

THE INFANTRY JOURNAL

. 1943

,I


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CONTENTS

PART ONE: BIENNIAL REPORT COVERING

JULY 1, ,1939, TO JUNE 30, 1941

TIlE FIRST PHASE . - 12

STATE OF THE ARMED FORf:ES JULY 1, 1939 . 12THE PRESIDENT'S EMERGENCY PROCLAMATION,

SEPTEMBER 8, 1939 _ 13

THE SECOND PHASE . 17THE PRESIDEN-T'S l\IESSAGES, l\IAY

16AND MAY

31~1940 . . _. . . . 17PROGRESS DURING THE \VINTER OF 194-41 23SPECIAL PROBLE1VIS INCIDENT TO THE EXPANSION 24

REORGANIZATION OF COMMAND AND STAFF. 27STATE OF THE ARMED FORCES JULY 1, 1941 29RECOM~{ENDATIONS FOR THE EUl\HNATION OF CER-

TAIN LEGAL LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS 31

GENERAI~ COMMENTS 36

39

. . . 42

445151

53. _. 53

53

54

.. -. . . . .

ARAfAAIENT AND EQUIPAGE 57

NATIONAL GUARD

ORGANIZED RESERVES . 67

UNITED STATES AlILITARY ACADE1H~ 69

RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS 7

CONSTRUCTION AND HOUSING

ORGANIZATION .

ARMORED FORCE

TRAINING

PERSONNEL

Regular ArmyRegular Army Reserve . .Enlisted Reserve.Selective Service


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CONGLUSI01V

ORGANIZATION

LOGISTICS'

TRAINING

AIR FORCES

PLANNING

. ,

, .

PART THREE: NOTES

165165166

166166167168

16~

169171

171

.1 7 117117217 2173

174

1751751761761771....,

, I

177179182

185187188

191191

,

.

.,

1. BATTLE :MANEUVERS REALISTIC

2. ORGANIZATION GEARED TO REQUIREMENTS,

3. AMERICAN-AuSTRALIAN COOPERATION .

4. OVERSEAS UNITS FULLY EQUIPPED5. REVERSE LEND-LEASE6. V0LUME .OFSHIPP1NG 'REQUIRED7. CLOSE COOPERATION BY BRAZIL 8. ALASKA l\fILITARY HIGHWAY 9. UNITY, OF COMMAND

10. JAPANESE 1\;fISCALCULATIONS

1 L NUCLEI OF PACIFIC AIR FORCE

12. AIRBORNE MOVE:MENT OF TROOPS

13. lVIoVES AGAINST JAPAN. PLANNED

14. BOMBER ATTACKS EFFECTIVE

15. J}..MERICAN-BRITISH CONFERENCES

)6. GOVERNMENT OF OCCUPIED AREAS 17. ARMS SUPPLIED TO FRENCH)8. CASABLANCA CQNFERENCE '

) 9. '''' ASHINGTON CONFERENCE 20. CIVILIANS AID FIGHTING UNITS

I . 21. l\fIDDLE EAST 'CONSTRUCTION CURTAILED ..

22. PACIFIC OPERATIONS PLANNED

' 23 . . AID TO, RUSSIA

24. ''''OMEN'S ARMY AUXILIARY CORPS 25. OFFICER PROGRAM

26. CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM27. PUBLIC RELATIONS 28~ HEALTI.I IN THE ARMY ,

29. ORGANIZED LEISURE TIME 'ACTIVITIES

3. EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM EXPANDED. 3 1. TRAINING1

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Jj

3

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, i

PART ONE

,BIENNIAL REPORT

of the

Chief of Staff of the United States Army

-July I" I939" to June 3D} I94I

to

The Secretary of War

" \


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,\

BIENNIAL REPORT OFI

GENERAL GEORGE C. l\fARSHALL

Chief of Staff of the United States ArnJ,y

July I~ I939~ to -June 30) I94I

to /

The Secretary of War

. Dear Afr. Secretary:

'Vith the Nation in a state of unli1nited e1ner-. gency, the undersigned submits the att:ched

. rep.?rt covering the period from his assign111entasCluef of Staffon September 1, 1939 to] uly f, 1941._In reviewing the events of the past two years,

. the extent of this nation's military. preparationluay roughly be divided into two distinct phases,ea-chcoincident with decisive events in the Euro-pe'an war. The first phase, conllnencing with thebeginning of the current conflict' and extendinguntil the late spring 6f i940, ,vas a period of un-certainty as to its influence on the United States.The General Staff, aware of the possibilities of the'situation, particularly with regard' to the time fac-tor, directed Its attention to the urgency of creating .

and equipping an army capable of operating under; the exacting conditions of modern warfare. Upon' lOr ' . . (I939- I94 I)

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the part of the 'Ameri~an people this period wasIuarked .by a slow awakening to the necessity ofaugmenting our armed forces. _

In a democracy such as ours the vVar Depart-

ment is lilnited'in its action by the appropriationsapproved by the President and provided by. the

Congress. These agencies are in turn motivated

by tne will of the people. Consequently the out-standing. characteristic of the first phase was. anincreasing interest in national defense, but an in-

terest still irisufficient to prevent reductions inInilitary appropriations which the War Depart-.

ment had requested as necessary ~o' carry oJ1tcertain objectives. This phase terminated with.the decIsive sllccesses of the Gennan Army in

\Vestern Europe in May, 1940. .

The second phase, which covers approxim~tely .the fiscal year 1941, was marked by a growingnational consciousness of the seriousness of theinternational situation, and by the ready appro- '

,priation of billions of dollars for national defense.Itwitnessed the peacetime mobilization of a citizen

anny upon a wartilne scale, and the establishmentof scores of great military cainps in large trainingareas. It required the reorientation of national .

industry to an unprecedented peacetime produc- .tion rate .. Itinvolved, in effect, a great experimenti.n denl0cracy, a test of the ability of a government'

such as ours' to prepare itself in time of peace,against the ruthless and arbitrary action of other

governments whose leaders take such measures asthey see fit, and strike -\vhen and where they willwith sudden and terrific violence.

(I939-I94I) . 11

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. . .

THE FIRST PHASE

STATE OF'THE ARM'ED FORCES JULY', '939

THE UNDERSIGNEDbecame Acting Chief of Staff

on July I, 1939 and Chief of Staff, September I,. 1939. On July 1 the active Army of the UnitedStates consisted of approximately i74,000 en~istedmen' scattered over 130 posts, camps and stations.~A schematic view of the organization of the active~anny at this time is given by Chart I.*

; \Vithin the United States we had no field army.There existed the mere .framework of about threean.d one-half .square divisions approximately fiftyper cent complete as to personnel and scatteredalnong a number bf army posts. There was such,a shortage in motor Itransportation that divisional

~ training was i!J1practicable. There were virtually'no corps troops, almost no army' troops or G H Qspecial troop units, which are necessary for thefunctioning of the larger tactical units. The Air'Corps consisted of but sixty-two tactical squadrons.The funds which were authorized for trainingwere less than five per cent of the annual "Var

pepart~ent app~opriations. As an army we wereIne~ectlve. Our equipment, 11lodern at the con-ChlSIOn of the \Vorld War, was now, in a large11leasure, obsolescent. In fact, during the post-

. 'war period, continuous paring of appropriation~had reduced the Army virtually to the status' of

that of a third-rate power. . , ., 'In February 1939, while Deputy Chief of Sta~,~

All"


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'my statement to the Senate 'MilitaryAffairs Com- "mittee included this summary of the situation"that it was of vital importance that we have mod-

,ern equipment for the Regular Army and National

Guard; that: we modernize our artillery; that',vereplace our 34-yea~-0Id rifles with more modern,weapons; that we have the antitank and antiair- Icraft materiel, in the actual hands of the troops;that we have the necessary reserves of ammuni-ti0l!; and that these matters be emphatically re-

garded as fundamental to the entire proposition'()f ,national defense. During the post-war periodth'e ..encouraging moves in-national defense prepa-rations had been the augmentation of the Air.Corps to an authorized 5500 plane program, in-.cluding an il).crease on July 1, 1939, of the,_

strength of the Army from 174,000 to 210,000 '.men, and an appropriation of $1 16,000,000 formateriel and 'seacoast defenses. The increase inman power 'was entirely devoted to the garrison:in Pan~ma and to the increase C?fthe Air Corps.

THE PRESIDENT'SEMERGENCYPROCLAMATION.

SEPTEMBER8, 1939 . ,

At the outbreak of the European war ~he Presi-dent issued a limited emergency proclamation inw~.i~h he auth~rized an expansion of the aet~vearmy from 210,000 to 227,000 men,. and an In-crease of the National Guard to 235,000 men.The War Departm~nt' .was also authorized tocreate certain deficiencies including the purchase ,of approximately twelve million dollars worth of.motor .transportation. This - small increase of(I939-I94z) 13.

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17,000 n1en to the Regul~r Anny permitted the"reorganization of our pathetically incoI11plete.square divisions' into five new type triangular

'divisions, and also permitted the assembly of those .divisions, along with other units, in the field forthe winter .. It enabled us to establish the peace'1compielnent of corps troops for one army corps.The limited emergency permitted the number ofarmory drills of the National Guard to be in-creased froln 48 to 60 per year' and an additionalweek of field training to be conducted that' fall

. suppleIUentary to the two weeks of summer can1pand to provide for the training of the recentlyte-

. cruited men.

The urgent necessity for Army maneuvers- in-Volving large units was manifest. For the pastfive years field training had been limited to the

assernbly of the four paper' organizations, called'.,field annies, once every four years, and then onlyfor a two-week period, of which about five dayscould be devoted to very limited action due tolack of Inotor transportation and the unseasoned

,state of the National Guard personnel. This sys-ten1,.together with a general lack of corps troops,heavy artillery, engineers, medical regiments, sig-nal _battalionS',quartermaster truck trains, and acomplete lack of corps headquarters and experi~ence.d high~.r commanders, made it virtually im-pOSSIble for the mobile combat troops of the~{e&"ularArmy to be prepared as an immediately

a~aIlable COlllbatforce, experienced in the tech-. ~Ique of l~rge-scale,field operations. It w


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given opp'ortunities for training in the technique~tactics -and teamwork involved; that the troops beaccustomed 'to operating in large gro~ps.Theauthorized deficiencies and later appropriations

for this purpose permitted the assembly in thelate spring of 1940, some 70,000 Regular Armytroops for the first genuine corps and armymaneuvers in the history of this nation.

The organization of the Army on January 31,1940, as a result of these changes, may be seen

by referring to Chart 2. ".During this p'eriod the war in Europe was in aquiescent 'state. Poland had been conquered 1?ut.the ~i~uation in Western Europe was to all i!1tentsstabIlIzed. There was a feeling my many that thefield fortifications established in France and Bel- ~

gium furnished ample' security to those n'atioris.Requests for further increases in the armed forcesof the United "States were regarded in many quar-ters:as mere war mongering. On February 23,194,'Istated to the Appropriations Committee of th,e,

IHouse of Representatives that if Europe blazed in

the late spring or summer we must put"our housein order before the sparks reached the WesternHemisphere~ Ie was urged that definite mea'suresshould be taken step by step to prepare the nationagainst the possibility of chaotic world conditions.Opposed to plunging into a'sudden expansion ofpersonnel in s~ch a manner that oursmall nucleusof trained troops would be fatally diluted, but yefconscious of the importance of the time factor,the General Staff was equally opposed to the policyof waiting until. the last moment and then attempt~(I939-I94 I) 15


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ing tl~e impossible. With respect to the time fac' , 1 : 'tor, a grave feature was the matter of critical muni-tions' which required a long time to produce, and , 'I iit was felt that there could be no longer delay in

obtaining the deficiencies in equipment .for the ,initial issue to the Regular Army and the National I '.,'Guard. The Army was almost completely lack-.ing in clothing for prospective increases of theRegular Army or the National Guard from a smallpeace strength organization status to full strength.The,fundamental obstacle .at the time was the fact.

that the American people were unable to visualizethe dangerous possibilities of the'situation. Forexample, as late as March of 1940 War Depart-Inent estimates for a small number of replace-lUent airplanes were cut by the House to 57planes. An estimate of $12,000,000 for the devel-

, 0pIUent of a defensive force in Alaska1vas refused.'During rv1ayand June of 1940 the German

, avalanche completely upset the equilibri~nn'of theEuropean continent. Franc'e was eliminated as a

' world power and the British Army lost luost of.its heavy equipment. To luany the invasion of'

Great Britain appeared'imminent. The precari-Ousnessof the situation and its threat' to the secur-ityof the United States became suddenly apparentto OUf pe~ple, and the pendululu of public opinionreverse~ Itself, swinging violently to the other ex-trelue, In an urgent demand for enormous andimluediate increases in nl0dern equipment andof the armed forces. It was at this time that thesecond phase of the period of the current enler-gency commenced.

, . 16 {I939-I94I)

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, hillions recentlYappn:lpriated', they enabled the ',War Department to take a preliminary step of . : ,vast importance to the great expansion soon tocome. 'Skeleton units' could he ,organized and

manufacturers started to work, 0 1 1 " clothirig' andequipment which had to be available by October.It ,was largely for this reason that the inductionof the National Guard and the first of the selecteeswas made possible.

Further authorizations included in the legisla-tion at this'time consisted of a substantial increasein the number of aircraft and funds for additional

,. pilot training together with the inclusion of civi-lian schools to assist in this training; additional

'.money for field exercises, an increase in seacoast. defenses, funds. for modernization of existing

planes, -'establishment of ordnance munitions

plants and the additional purchase of critical itemsof equipment. The Air Corps was authorized tobe increased to 54 combat groups, and funds forthe organization of an armored force were in-

',cluded. The tangible influence of these eventson the organization of the Army is indicated in

Chart 3.At this time Jhe President referred to the desir~ / ability of authorizing him to call out the National

Guard. Although sadly lacking in mod~rn equip-,ment and at less than 40% of its full strength, theGuard represented one of the few organized, de-

fense assets, and its federalization therefore be-came a matter of pressing importance. Another significant development of, the phase' which wewere' entering Was the changing attitude' of our

18, (I939-I94 I)-\"

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industrialists regarding their production capacities

and rates of deliveries with respect to airplaneengines and other itenis of heavy ordnance. Asth.e ~risis abroad developed, they grew increasinglywIllIng to undertake production schedules that

had previously been regarded as out of the ques-tion.

The expansion of the ArnlY during the SU111nlerof 1940 in general followed the long standing pro-~ective mobilization plan, but the violent changeIn the international situation as to the French

!)eet al?d the peril of England, necessitated an1111nledlate reorientation regarding the Ineans at

?ur disposal. The possible loss of the British NavyIntroduced a new time factor for our defensivepreparations, and ilTIrnediately imposed an urgentand trelnendous delnand for the manufacture of

tilne-conslulling critical iteiTISof equipluent.In. 'weighing the problems of the tilTIe factor

. against the possibilities of the situation, two aspectsof the ..matter had to be considered. One relatedto the.'possible dangers of the .situation within thenext SIXmonths. The other related to what should

be done over a period. of years. I t was considered~hat for the tinle being the first issue was of dOln-Illant ilnportance. Ordnance, anll11unition andother critical itenls of equipment could not beproduced overnight, but the other requisite foran arnled force, that is, personnel, was available

and could be conditioned, discipliped and trainedwith the old vVorld vVar material available andthe materiel then under manufacture. It was notbelieved that the Inen necessary to fonn an anny

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of the size required to meet the contingencies ofthe'situation could be ob~ained by voluntary en-listment. The alternative was a selective servicesystem which would furnish sufficient personnelto bring the National Guard and the RegularArmy to full streng~h in the shortest possible time,and to do this in a controlled and therefore effi-cient manner, in contrast to the piecemeal, un-balanced basis of voluntary enlistments. It wassuggested by members of Congress that the Regu-lar Army be tremendously increased. However,

this would have been a futile procedure unlessthe necessary equipment could be made available,and this could have been arranged only by sub-verting the National Guard and making a funda-mental change in the existing military policy ofthe Government. The decision was made to call

the National Guard into the Federal service and . utilize its personne\ and equipment with t.hat of

the Regular Army to. train the first contingent ofthe thousands of men necessary for the defenseof the country. .

The federalization of the National Guard and

the speedy enactment of selective service legisla-tion at once became matters of urgent importanceto the 'Var Department in the summer of 1940.The original request for the federalization of theNational Guard occurred in l\lay with the purposeof utilizing summer calnps while preparingthe cantonments for the' expanded artny, so that

when cold weather set in, the necessary semi-per- ..manent preparations would have been completedfor the firstincrelnent and construction well under

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way for the relnainder. The delnocratic.processes

of legislation resulted in a prolonged debate onthese two measures, which continued throughout

the SUlnlner.In my testinlony before the Senate Appropria-'

tions COlnmittee on August 5, the following state-

Inen ts were nlade:, '"Shelter is a serious problem at the present mo-

ll1ent. \Ve thought that Congress would settle thequestion of authority to order out the NationalGuard, and the matter of cOl1lpulsory training bythe first of August. On that basis, the Guard ,vas to

be brought into the Federal service during Sep-.tember and the first induction of Inen under theSelective Service Act during October. \Vhat has

happened is that the ,veeks have been passing andwe have no authority to enter into contracts to

provide the additional shelter required."\Ve have been tryit1g to find SOIne' manner,

SOlne Ineans for getting startec;l. \Ne want to pro-ceed in an orderly and businesslike manner. 'Veknow exactly what we 'want to do and exactlywhere we want to do it, but we have neither the

authority nor the funds and titne is fleeting. So farc ~ s construction is concerned the winter is upon us,because it requires froln 3 to 4 months to provideproper shelteL vVe had hopes at first to gain timeby providing a progressive tnobilization of the

National Guard during the sunlnler. \Ve plannt::d

to ~'put troops in tent calnps, while better shelterWas being prepared in the climates that delnand-special protection against the winter. However,weeks have CODleand have gone and we have been

(1939-1941) Morris Swett Library, USAF1\S


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urtable to. Inake a start. The present uncertainties"make a businesslike procedure almost impossible.We must make a start. toward getting water lineslaid; a'start on the sewage-disposal syStems; a start

on the te!!lporary roads and certainly the walks to

keep our people out of the mud; and we must getunder way the start of construction of temporaryh()spit'l.l facilities. These are fundalnental necessi-ties and take time to develop."

One factor of assistance in this dilemma was the$29,500,000 which the President authorized from

his emergency .fund on August 2, 1940. The avail-.ability of this Sum permitted the initiation o~ con-struction of basic utilities,. hospitals and ware-houses in twelve National Guard camps and alsoa divIsional cantonment at Fort Dix, New Jersey.

The problelns of funds were further compli-

cated by the concurrent consideration of author-.ity to call the National Guard and Selective Serv-,ice legislation. Authorization for the National

Guard to be called into Federal service was finally

given on August 27, 1940, but the $128,000,000necessary for initial construction was not appI::O-priated until September 9. The" first Guard units

"were inducted on September 16, the same day thatthe Selective Service Act was signed by the Presi-dent. Incidentally, the departlnent would have pre-ferred to delay these inductions for about a month91:at least for two weeks, in order to put the money

i r " just appropriated ~o work. This action was pre-

cluded by the advice that the announcement ofsuch plans would probably defeat the passage oCthe. Selective Service Act. 'l\foney for Selective

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Service construction becalue available September24:, as the leaves were beginning to fall.

PROGRESS DURI:'\G THE "\VrNTEI\ OF 1940-41

The expansion of our anned forces fronl 172,-000 to approxiluately one and one-half InillionIne"n in a relatively short tilne illlposed a tremen-dous responsibility on the vVar Departnlent. Abasic requireluent was .the establisl1lllent of shel-ter, hospital facilities and trainiilg areas in strategic'

and. favorable training localities throughout theUluted States. vVith winter upon us, the problemsof construction incident to unusually bad weather

-:-snow, rain and IHud-added further cOl1lplica-t~ons. It was highly i111portant to provide recrea-

_ t!onal facilities and to nlake suitable provisionsfor the spiritual ,velfare of our citizen soldiers.T'he problenls of acquiring land were cOlnplicated

by the fact that in sOlne areas selected as canlpsi.tes, the local population viewed the projects withdIsfavor. In other instances the War Department

Was bOlnbarded with requests fronl local businessbureaus and political delegations .. Errors were

made in the trenlendous prograln which the AnnyH~ldertook during the winter of 1'940-4 I, butvIewed in the light, of the actual achievelHent, it',vould appear that the task was creditably per-lormecl.

The passage of the Selective Service Act in effect

authorized the Annyof the United States to con-sist of 1,400,000 Inen, of which 500,000 were to bein the Regular Anny, 270,000 in the National

Guard, and 63,000 selectee$. A graphical picture(1939-I 94I) 23


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, 1

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, of the active army on ] nne 30, 1941 ~ is indicated; by Chart 4, and its tactical organization by Chart _

5.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS INCIDENT-TO THE EXPANSION

, ' The training of this large force required a tre-:mendous broadening of our Regular Army activi-ties. The continuous formation 'of training cadres,_for new units or schools, resulted in a succession ofdrafts on the rapidiy expanding Regular Army

units for -experienced officers _and noncommis-sioned officers. This ,vas .a disheartening processfOr the commanders concerned, air and ground,who, while struggling to merge large increments ofuntrained men into efficient combat teams, werecalled upon time after_time to give' up their best

leaders -in all grades, and compelled by -circum,.stances to drive ahead in their training ptogramwhile developing new leaders and training new re- .

\ cn~its to replace the losses. The National Guar~. unIts were spared this demoralizing process in or-, der. to give them the fullest opportunity to perfect -

theIr organization. Profiting from events in theEuropean.wa'r, new organizations, new methods of ,employment, and new types of equipment became

- a constant. matter of re-examination and experi-ment. The tempo of the school system was rapidlyincreased, and courses were -quickly established to

.graduate about 600 officers every five weeks. _

The procurement of suita~le officer personnel- was fortunately solved by the fact that during the

lean, post-war years over 100,000 Reserve officersh~d been continuously trained, largely. the prod-

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Uctof the Reserve OfficersTraining Corps. TheseReserve officersconstituted the principal availableasset w'hich ,ve possessed at this time. Without,thei: assistance the program could not have bee~:,.

carned out except in a superficial manner, as IS' .evidenced by the fact that today they constitute75% to go% of the officer strength with RegularArrny units. , .

For the induction of selectees"ve established29 large reception centers throughout the. United

States, where thousands of men could be classified;uniformed and routed to the replacement training

. ~enters where they would receive their basic train-Ing. The locations and capacities of the receptioncenters are indicated by Chart 6.

For the basic training of recruits, 2 I replace-

'inent training centers ,vere established .where each~rm and service of the Army could give individual-lZ.edbasic training in th~ fundamentals of a' sol-dIer. Each .soldier entering- the Anny receives 13weeks of basic training, after which he is assignedto a tactical unit ready to participate in the tacticaltraining of those units. These establishnlents were

. c~nstructed and placed into operation during theWInter and spring of 1940-41, despite seriously'ad-verse ,veather conditions, bottlenecks of material,and shortage of facilities. Their location and ca~pacities are i'ndicated on Chart 7.

The establishment of these centers.marked our,

a:rrival at a normal method of maintaining an. army, and yet they consti~uted' ~ fundamental de-

parture from past practices. No phase of the' de-velopment of the present field army has been'sC?( I939- I94 I) . f 25


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iratifyingand impressive as' the product of the',.training centers, both in quality of selectees and

in the amazing amount of instruction they haveabsorbed in the short period of 13 weeks_.Froln

. now on our. regiments and divisions can steadilyadvance with their combat -training, unburdenedby the necessity of training recruits or delayingtheir work in order to conduct individual instruc-

,tion in weapons or silnilar matters. ,' During the spring of 1941, the program of ex- .

'pansion continued. In March, further increases inthe ,Air Corps were 'authorized and plans under-

.~aken to train 30,000 pilots and 100,000 mechan-ICS annually. Steps were taken 'towards the occu-pation of the new bases in the Atlantic, leased frolnthe British Govenllnent. The augmentation of thegarrisons in our foreign possessions and in Alaska

continued. Closely interrelated with the problemsof procur,enlent, incident to a colossal expansion

. of Our defense forces were rlational cOInmitments. t?furnish great quantities of critical n~unitions to.'SIster democracies. Though short of equipment

ourselves, the international situation demand~d

, t?at ~e furnish equipInent to others. This 'situa-tlon Introduces the nlost difficult problem of co-ordination and ,direction imposed on the WarDepartment iri the present emergency. It repre-sents a complete reversal of the situation iP.1917-'18, when ou.r Allies provided us with practically all'

..o~ our munitions. l~he passage of the Lease-LoanbIll inl\farch, 1941, pennitted the coordinationof the entire matter of placing contracts, the typesof materiel to be lnanufactured and the inspection

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service to be carried on during this period of pro-

?uc~ion. Increased production due to the author-IZatIon of the necessary funds should add. to ourown strength rather than diminish our resources.

To provide additional officer personnel, to offera fair. opportunity to the man in the ranks, a~dn10st lInportant of all, to utilize a rare opportunIty

for securing outstandinO' leaders, the War Depart-lnent has established a ~eries of oHicers' candidate

schools, the students for ,vhich are selected froln

enlisted men of the Army who have given positiveevidence of lnarked capacity as leaders. In a series

of three-n10nth courses these schools will produce

a IninilllU111 of 10,000 officers a year and are ca-

l)~ble of rapid expal~sion if the situation den1ands.

1 he location and type of training given. at the

various officers'. candidate schools is indicated onChart 8.

REORGANIZATION OF COMIVIAND AND STAFF

In the gradual merging of the Army from a

peacetilne basis into an organization' for possible

action, the following additional changes havetaken place: .

General I-Ieadquarters of the field forces was

set up at the Army War College last July to direct

and supervise the training of the troops. More re-

cently it was placed on an operating basis by the

addition of a portion of the War Plans Divisionof the 'Val' Department General Staff. By this ar-

rangelnent, General Headquarters not only'super-

vises training throughout the Army but is being

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tilne the New York base alone has been handling

a v~lume of tonnage comparable to that handled

dunng the W orId War.Incident to the tremendous amount of business

handled by the General Staff during this currentexpansion, it has been found necessary to increase

the number of Deputy Chiefs of Staff from one. to. three .. One of these Deputies is charged solely W i t ?

all matters pertaining to the air force. Another. IScharged with matters pertaining to supply, equIp-

. Inent, construction and the Armored Force. Theother Deputy handles all other matters incident

to General Staff business. .

STATE OF THE ARMED FORCES JULY 1, 1941

Today the Army has been increased eightfold

and consists of approximately1,400,000

men. Theground forces in the continental United Statesf~rm four annies of nine anny corps and twenty-lune divisions, and an armored force of four divi-sions, soon to be increased to six. l.~he air force

includes fifty-four combat groups, and the initialequipment requirements of these forces will be

met with the stocks now on hand and under man-ufacture, plus those to be produced from funds setup in current estimates. i

The strength of the Army is now allocated ap-

proximately as follows: 456,000 meI1 to the 29divisions of the field armies; 43,000 Inen to the

Annored Force; 308,000 men to some 215 regi-Inents or silnilar units of field and antiaircraft ar-tillery, engineers, signal troops, ete., who form theCorps, Anny, and GHQ troops to support the

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creasing nUluber of items and the next four

months should greatly inlprove the situation.Small as it was, the Regular Army personnel has

b~en the invaluable leaven of the present forceswIthout which developments to date would have

been impossible except in rather superficial resultsto be measured principally in numbers. The prog-ress made has proved the soundness of the plans

laboriously prepared throughout the years ~y theGeneral Staff, despite the lack of opportunity towork with large bodies of troops, or for that mat-

t~r, ,~ith a complete organization of any kind inContInental United States. The elaborate schoolsystem of the Army maintained since 1920 has de-

clared a huge dividend. Our experienced officersand noncommissioned officers have been ready in

te~h.nical knowledge, in skill as instructors and

abIlIty as leaders to unify the various elements ofour professional and citizen soldiers into a great

anny of the United States.

RECOMMEDATIONS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF CER-

TAIN LEGAL LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS

The foregoing has been largely a recital of prob-lenls and progress during the past two years. An

. effort has been made to indicate some of the com-

plications involved in the rapid creation of a largearmy under peacetime conditions. As this report issubmitted the possibilities of a year ago have be-

~ome dangerously near probabilities today, and. itISvital to the security of the nation that the hazards

of th~ present crisis be fully recognized.What has happened is history. Of grave concern

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' today are the contingencies of the present and thefuture. There are legal restrictions on the use othe Armed Forces which should be removed with

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out delay. Events of the past two months are con,vincing proof of the terrific striking power possessed by a nation administered purely on' a mili-tarybasis. Events of the past few days are evenmore forcible indications of the suddenness with,which arm,ed conflict can spread to areas hitherto

lconsidered free from attack., ' .It is therefore urgently. recolnmended that theWar'Department be given authority to extend the:period of service of the Selective Service !nen, the .

.officers of the Reserv~Corps' and the, unIts of theNational Guard. . I '

It is the purpose of the War Departlnent to pro-ceed with the military training of annual incre-

Inen.ts of selectees, rep.lacin.g those ~ow in a~tivejserVIceas soon as the SituatIon permits, especIally.th.eolder men. In general, the same i,:,tention per-,talns to the Reserve officerswho we WIshgradually:"to replace with others who have not yet been lbrought into active service. However, a fixed rule

cannot be applied at this time, in our opinion.Some are in Hawaii, SOlnein'the Aleutian Islands,

,others in units to be dispatched to overseas bases;and still others are in organizations to be trained I

, as "task forces" for possible special operations. 'In the light of the situation it is believed that

'our interests are inlperiled and that a grave na- . 1tional emergency exists. \Vhatever we do for the inational defense should be done in the mQst effi-cient luanner. Differences of views regarding I

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e national policy sho~ld not, it SeeIl1S to Ine, bef permitted to obscure the facts relating to the

preparation of the anned forces for service, which

has been the purpose of our vast prograIn of the

past twelve months. When and where these forcesare. to serve are questions to be deternlined bytheIr Commander-in-Chief and the Congress, andshould not be confused with the problenl of theirreadiness for service. All, it is believed, .will adlllit

that the time factor has beep of dominant ilnpor-

~ance in the march of events since Septelnber 1939,In the availability of materiel, in the effect of the

complete readiness of huge, highly trained units

for employment in chosen theaters. The lnaterielphase of Our task is generally understood. The

~er~onnel phase is not, and it is here that legal

lImItations, acceptable at the tilne of their passage,now halnstring the development of the Army intoa force immediately available for whatever de-fensive measures may be necessary.

To illustrate: In accordance with plans of longstanding we have reached the point of availabilityof troops and materiel, where we now can, andurgently should organize and train certain "task~orces" against the possibility of the necessity aris-Ing for their use. What is the status of these troops?

The Regular Army divisions contain froln 75% to

9% Reserve officers whose ternl of service is legal-ly lilnited to twelve months. In other words, SaIne

600 officers in a division under the law wouldSOon be entitled to drop their present duties andreturn to their haInes. The twelve months' serviceperiod of many, if not Inost of the officers in the(I939-I94I) 33

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fi .. d... "lidist priOrity .IVlSlons, IS.now near y camp ete . 4Must we replace most of the trained officer per-"sonnel of a division-the leaders __at the momentof departure for strategic localities? In two of theregular divisions we have restricted the enlistedpersonnel to three-year men, but in the others, ofnecessity, the number of selectees varies from 2 5 %to 50% . The problem here is the same as for the"Reserve officer personnel. The National Guardunits involve three distinct limitations as to per-

.sonnel-that for the National Guard unit, that for

the 10% Reserve- officers in their regiments andnow being increased, and that pertaining to selec-tees who comprise more than 50% of the men inthe ranks. Eurthermore, a task force involves allcomponents. vVhile we may select regular units asthe divisional components for task forces, we must

utilize National Guard organizations for the spe-cial supporting units-antiaircraft, heavy artillery,engineers, ete. So we have becorne involved in acomplete confusion of restrictive details, regard-ing personnel. Add to this problern the fact thatplans for large '\.lnitsmust cover every conceivable

contingency, based on the means "available; thattime is required to prepare such a force; and thatunder present conditions we must submit thesepl~ns to the time consuming business of publicinvestigation and debate-alof.g with the advertise-

. ment of such plans to the world at large, and I

. submit that the limitations referred to. should beremoved as quickly as possible if we are to have afair opportunity to protect. ourselves against thecoldly calculated, secret and sudden action that

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n:ight be directed against us. Incidentally, ourhIstory includes SOl1le.unfortunate incidents re-sUlting from quite sinlilar le


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. . . .War. In the case of officers of the Regular Army,however, the law governing their removal froIl1

, the active list requires aprocedure so cumbersomeas to make it totally ineffective during a nationalemergency. In brief, the War Department desires

I authority to correct deficiencies in the. Regular, Army as it is now able to do-'for the National

Guard and the Officers Reserve Corps. -So far as temporary promotions are concerned,

the War Department has recently established amechanism to improve leadership. A system of

promotion by selection to the grade of colonel hasbeen instituted, and to date 286 lieutenant colo-.nels have been selected for advancement. It is in-tended that this procedure will be carried pro-gressively . into the lower grades. / In all thesematters the interests of the soldier and the nation,

rather than that of. the individual officer, havegoverned. L

. These proposals which the \VarDepartmentrecommends for action' by Congress have but onepurp~se, the security of the American people; topermit the development of the National Defenseon the orderly and businesslike basis necessary ifthe dangers of the present situation are to be met.Such a purpose does not admit of delay.

GENERAL COMMENTS

.While all branches of the service have had tocarry a rapidly increasing burden in the expan-

i sion program, I do not think the publi~ generallyappreciates the vastness of the undertaking which,has been imposed upon the Air Corps in both per- ,

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. . ,...., In closing ,this repor,t it Shouldbe.srated that the 1 '\

I progress achIeved dunng the past two years .couldnot have .been made without the highly efficient .\cooperation of the War Department staff and the

commanders and staffs in the field. Their cheerfulacceptance of the tremendous burdens of respon-sibility has furnished a reassurance which cannotbe measured :n words of thanks. .

G. C. MARSHALL,General~ United States Army,

Chief o f Staff.,Washington~ D. C.~

July I~ I94I ..

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ORGANIZA TION

l\IILITARY OPERATIONS abroad constitute a gl'eat

laboratory and proving ground for the devel?p-TIlent and testing of organization an~ Inaten.el.

These operations have been charactenzed by In-~reasinguse and ilnportance of armored, Inotor-lzed and other specialized divisions and by con-current effort for developrnent of means to coun-ter annored (tank) divisions operating in closecoordination with air and Inotorized units from

1l10?ile striking forces of great ,speed and pow~rwlllch so far have been unifonnly successful Inth~ir operations. We have given careful consider- :

allon to foreign Inilitary developlnents and, as aresult, our own of


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_ After three years of careful. study and tests, an. organization for a triangular infantry. division waS

approved and placed in effect in the Regular Armyduring the fiscal year 1940. The square division,

adopted during the World War 'and modified sev~eral times since, has been retained in the NationalGuard.

The organization of the horse cavalry regimentwas revised as a first step in the reorganization ofthe horse cavalry' division. New organizations

adopted included the horse-mechanized cavalry.regiment designed as the reconnaissance unit ofa corps; the antitank battalion,' and the corps topo-graphic company. In addition, approximately 100tables of organization for other units were re~viewed and brought up to date without ,any essen-tial changes in organization.

Six Regular Army infantry divisions and twO.sets of corps troops were formed during the reportperiod, partly by consolidations or conversions ofexisting units and partly by utilization. of in-

creased personnel made available by augmenta-tions to the Army. In addition to these large units.a number of small units' were organized. These~vere.used to complete battalions and regimentsand to provid~ service elements, previously lack-ing. 'The organization of these units not only

materially increased the field efficiency of the~rmy, but greatly facilitated the greater expan-SIon soon to conle. The new organizations weretested in division, corps, and Army maneuvers in

.the winter and spring of 1939-194. These ma-

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.neuvers formed a sound basis for future planning,revision,. and further tests.. . "

. Continuing study is given our own and foreignorganizations to take full advantage of develop- ,ments in weapons, transportation, equipment, and'technique. In general, our organizations are soundand well balanced and fully adaptable to modernwarfare. Because we have no definite theater of .?perations, most divisions are necessarily g~neral .In purpose and are not specialized. A new typem~torized division organization which is intendedpnmarily to complement armore9- units has beenapp:oved. Current study is being given to the or:ganlZation of a division designed' primarily foroperation in mountainous country; and of other

~pecial units which have only a restricted use. -There are 33 divisions now in a-ctiveservice, asfollows.' '. ..' .

26 Infantry Divisions incl~ding 18 National, Guard (Square) and 8 Regular Army

, (Triangular);

1 . Motorized Division (Triangular);4 Armored Divisions; .2 Horse Cavalry Divis~ons, one partly, com-

. plete.There are. also enough, service and reinforcing';'troops to complete a balanced field force to two'

_armies, 'totalling four army corps. The two re-maining armies, totall~l1g five army corps, are. in-complete. .,..

. Present trends in organizatio~ are in' the direc-tion of increasing the proportion of armored,motorized, and anti-mechanized units.

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ARMORED FORCE

A 'Var Department directive dated July 10,1940, created for service test an Annored Force toincl ude all armored corps and G H Q reserve tankunits. It also prescribed the duties of the Chief of

the Armored Force, combining the conllnandfunctions of a cOlnmander of a large tactical unit

and many of the responsibilities of the chief of acombatant arm. This included the developlnentof tactical and training doctrines for all units of

the Annored Force and,' research and advisoryfunctions pertaining to developlnent and procure-ment of all special transportation, armament, andequipment used primarily by annored units.

Regular Army personnel, consisting of the 7thCavalry Brigade (nlechanized), the 66th Infantry

(light tanks), and a few scattered Infantry tankunits, were the nucleus for the initial'organization

of the Armored Force. This organization consisted

of the ]st Armored Corps, the 1 st and 2nd Ar-

mored Divisions, one GHO reserve tank battalion"'-

(70th), and the Armored Force Board. The station

of the ]st Corps, the 1st Annored Division andthe Board was at Fort Knox, Kentucky. The 2nd

Arnlored Division was organized at Fort Benning,

and the 70th Tank Battalion at Fort l\leade, 1\Jary- ,land.

In Novenlber, 1940, the Annored Force School

was activated at Fort Knox, Kentucky. The over-head for this unit consisted of about 182 officers

and 1,847 enlisted men. This school has a capacityof over 6,000 students at anyone tilne, or a grad-

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uating capacity of about' 26,000 students per 'year.During the months ofN ovember and Decem-

ber, 1940,and January, 1941, four National Guardreserve tank battalions were activated and broughtinto the federal service. These were' the 191st atFort Meade, Maryland, the I92nd at Fort Kn~x,Kentucky, the 193rd at Fort Benning, GeorgIa,.and the 194th at Fort Lewis, Washington. .

In February, 1941, the 1st GHQ Reserve Tank

Group Headquarters was activated at Fort Knox,!


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_. '1 bl' ffi' . ." f . 1been aval a e In su lCIent quanuqes or min ~

mum training only. This,condition will c9ntinueuntil about September, 1941.

Training tests of arnlored units have indicatedthat these units have met their training require- jmente Due, however, to the tr~mendous expansi,on

. involved, armored ul)its have not reached theirultil11ate efficiency.

TRAINING

Trained, disciplined manpower is the funda-mental requirement of any army. Our traini~gprogram, has been designed to build a seasonedbody of men who have the basic knowledge andskill to handle any job that may be assigned to

them. Its purposeJs to build soldiers and leaders;men who, when they' have cOlllpleted their basic / training, can take their places in planes or in tanks

or hehind guns or in the operation of technicalequipl11ent with only the final detailed instructionnecessary to cover the' mechanislll which they are

to use. Regardless of other 'materiel shortages, wehave the equipment to give this basic training, and, our purpose has been to cOlllplete it while the pro-, duction of modern weapons is catching up with

our develop111entof modern lllanpower. i'he sol-dier of today has devoted only 20 hours to close

or~e~ drill ~ut of a total of 572 hours of his basictraInll~g penod. He has spent his tirne in learningthe thUlgS that rnake a man efficient in cOlllbat;that cause him tO,ac'tintelligently in an eillergency,a!ld ,that toughen him physically to withstand thengors of modern warfare. Basic training cuhni-

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.n~tes in field maneuver~ designed to weld in-dividuals into seasoned efficient' combat teams andto develop the cbm~and leadership and staff technique necessary for the handling of large units

on the modern battlefield. The comprehensivetraining program carried out during the FiscalYe~r . 1940 was made possible through th~ appro-pr~atIon of addi.tional special field' exerCl~es as a:esu~t of the unlimited emergency and the Increas-Ing Importance of national defense. j

By early September, 1939, the following h~dbeen. completed: the First Army maneuvers InNew York and Virginia, training about 100,000'officers and men of the Regular Army, NationalGuard", and Organized Reserves; the Fourth Armycommand post exercise, held at the Presidio ofSan Francisco anG training about 700 officers ofall components. " . '

Further intensive training for all individualsand units 'of the Regular Army was initiated inSeptember and October, 1939, and continued

. throughotIt the year. Armory drills for National'. Guard units were increased by twelve, and seven.additional days of field training away from homearmories were given all units. Five complete Reg-u~~r Army infantry divisions and one cavalry di..:VISion were assembled in divisional. camps or

.cantonments for intensive training as 'divisions. inthe field. Corps area commanders assembled 'theirnon-divisional troops for intensive field training.

, Troops of the overseas garrisons conducted specialfield training and field>exercises pertinent to theiras~igned missions. . , , . ('

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.The training of pilots and mechanics for the!. 'augmented Air Corps was successfully expanded

by use of civilian schools in addition to full capac-ity of expanded Air Corps ~raining agencies. Pro-

curement of missing equipment was pushed to theutmost in order to provide a sufficient amount forbest training results. Several thousand ReserveOfficers were ordered to active duty for varying'periods to assist in and benefit from the intensifiedtraining.

'The 3rd Djvision assembled at Fort Lewis"Washington, and underwent preliminary trainingthere. In January, 1940, it moved by transport to

join the fleet in the Pacific and to participate inlanding exercises in the vicinity of Monterey, Cal-ifornia. After these exercises, the division was

given intensive field training at Fort Ord, Cali-fornia. _ .

The assembly and divisional training of the 1st,5th, and 6th Divisions, together with Fourth Corpstroops and nondivisional units,- culminated in.April, 1940, with three weeks of corps .maneuvers

at Fort Benning, Georgia. During this time the2nd Division and 1st Cavalry Division and corpstroops luaneuvered in eastern Texas. This wasfollowed by three weeks of corps versus corpsl11aneuversbetween these two forces, plus the 7thCavalry Mechanized Brigade, in the Sabine Area

of. Louisiana.' .During major divisional and corps field exer-

cises, the division commander and staff of eachNational Guard division was given a three-day

period of training in actual commahd and han....

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?ling of.one of the Regular Army' divisions;' Dur- .lng the large .maneuvers in the Sabine Area, any'Nat~onal Guard state adjutant general and 'any

National Guard division commander who had notpatticipatedas a division commander in a,corpsexercise was invited to attend the maneuvers asobserver: , .

Throughout the' fiscal year 1940,' practicaltraining in the' field for officers of all grade,Swas

stressed. Courses at the Command and GeneralStaff School and the spec~al service schools of thearms and services were suspended February .I~t;1940, and officers on duty there were sent to unItsof the Army undergoing field training. :

In order to disseminate to officers and men_of

~he Army the lessons gained from the current warl~ .Europe, steps were taken to facilitate the re- ,VISIonof our training literature and revision of.,all mobilization training programs; Increased ap-propriations by Congress for' this purpose -have. 'made this possible.- - -;':

.' During the fiscal year_1941, the Army ~xtended'Its training activity on a scale never before at-~empted in peacetime. The. primary training ob-Jective Was the preparation of units to take thefield on short notice at existing strength ready tofunction effectIvely in combat. - ' ..

Taking advantage of the lessons learned in the~xercises conducted by Regular Army' units dur-Ing the preceding winter and spring; all four'

.armies c'lrried out maneuvers in the summer andfall, of 1940, involving all continental RegularArmy and National Guard mobile forces. Progress I

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't attained was marked, but the exercises demon- ' I istrated the necessity of continuing it:It


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maneuvers' involving" mo're than -half a millionmen. ' . ,'."

oro provide means for the training of selectees,those inducted early were assigned to Regular

Army and National Guard units. The replacementtraining center prograIll of the army mobi~izationplan wa3 initiated and as fast as constructIon wascompleted, 21 cen~ers were opened. The nlajoritybegan operating in ~Iarch. and April,. and by J ~newere functioning at Illaximum capacity, receIVIng

sel~c~eesfronl reception centers. At replacen:~nttraInIng centers selectees and recruits are gIven'basic training iI; their arm -or service for a periodof 13 week~ and then are assigned to units. Theluaximum trainee capacity of these centers is now'ap~r.oximately 182,500. This systeIll is greatly

faCIhtating the training of the entire arnlY, "Training in special operations was conducted

?y selected units. Two divisions trained in land-.~n~operations, two combat teams participated in]Oln~ exercises with the Navy' in the Caribbean~rea, and units stationed in the snow belt special-

Ized.in winter,warfare training and tests of specialeqUIpment. - ':

Special attention has been given to air training.Tactical squadrons in continental United States 'and overseas stations have increased 500 per' cent.,fr~m the 1939 total. This has required additional

flY~ngpersonnel, 'likewise has accounted for,' the?f1ginal three schools operating iri1939, expand~lng to a total of 40 schools, 28 of which are con':dueted through civilian, contract arrangement.Additional flying training schools' are authorized

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;:tr~dlikely by the end of the present calendar y~arwill be in full operation. rT'welve of the flyIngschools have been design'ated for the training o fR. A. F. Hying c;dets.

, .Pilot training has been, increased 700 per. cell;tfrom the output of graduates in. 1939. It is esU-mated that at the close of the present fiscal year,the production of pilots for this period will beapproximately 3,400. Enlisted personnel has kept.pace in the development, for its strengtH has in-cr~ased six times over that existing in 1939. Thepresent figure of 132,0_o0 has been augmented bynearly 10,000 flying cadets, together with perso~-

.nel from former National Guard squadrons noWinducted into Federal service. To assure that suf-

" ficient technicians are available for combat crewS

and' ground crews, the technical schools havestepped up their productioriof trained graduates16 times over the output of 1939. The close of thecurrent fiscal year will see 20,000 graduates r.eturnto squadrons where'their services will be largelyinstrumental in the success of the Air Corps ex-

.pansion program.Evaluation of lessons learned from current op-

erations abroad and numerous changes in our or-ganization and equipment have necessitated a wide

,revision of training literature for the Army. Sixtyfield manuals and one hundred sixty technical

manuals ivereprepared and printed during thefiscal year. Complete revision of army extensioncqurses is in progress.

. Supplemented by the facilities of the motionpicture industry, the Signal Corps is engaged in a

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compl~e~lensivetrai~ing film prod~ction prograr~.Some eighty training films and ninety fihn stripsU.bject~have already been completed and ,~is-tnbuted throuo-hout the service. These visual aids

are proving o tgreat value in the training of the. new army. .

PERSONNEL

REGULAR ARMY

Officers: rrhe authorizedco~missioned strengthof the Regular Army at 'the close of the fiscal year1940 was 13,637, and at the close of the fiscal year1941, it, was 14,0 16. Under the provisions of theA~t ?f April 3, 1939, the comlnissioned strengthwIll !ncrease to 14,490 in the fiscal year 1942, and

ContInue to increas'e annually by approximatelyequal increments until the strength of 16,719 isreached on June 30, 1949. Present plans do not

I Contemplate any additional increase in the Reg-ular Army cOlnmissioned strength beyond thatnow authorized. Increased demands for commis-~ioned personnel will continue to be met by bring- .Ing Reserve officers to extended active duty. _

. During the past fiscal .year there has been a re-dIstribution of Regular Army officers in an effortto.maintain the greatest possible number on duty

WIth the field forces and in the overseas garrisons. \As new units have been activated and new installa-'tions have been created, it has been necessary toreassign Regular Army officers so as to provide a

l nUcleus 6f experienced officer personnel with these,(I939-I94 I) 5 1 '


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new units and installations. The additional posi .tions created throughout the military establish'ment which could' not be filled by Regular ArIl1officers have been filled by calling Reserve officer

to extended active duty. .' ,Enlisted"Nlen: At the beginning of the fiscalyear

1940, the Regular Army was in the process of e~'pan ding from 174,000 to 210,000 enlisted men 11order to provide for the increased strength author

ize,dfor the A,.ir,Corps and for augmentation of t.h i .Panama garrison." .

. In the limited -emergency proclamation of sep

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t,ember 8, '939, the Presid,ent ordered that the en.listed strength of the Regular Army be increase

. to 227,000 enlisted men as rapidly as possible bmeans of voluntary enlistment. After an'intensiv

.,'recruiting drive, this objective was reached in February, 1940.

Rapid expansion was still being effected at thou.tset of the fiscal.year' 1941. The annual appropnation act provided for an increase to the authori~ed .strength of 280,000, which permitted the aC

tlVatlon of three additional triangular divisionscertain coast defense units, rnechanized units ancertain corps, army, and GHQ troops: The Firs

, Supplemental National Defense AppropriatioAct, 1941, furnished funds for increasing thesforces by 95,000, bringing the strength for whic

appropriat~ons had been made to 375,000. ThiaugmentatIon permitted the activation of two ar~o:e.d divisio.ns, certain increases in trianguladIv1sIons prevIously autnorized, ,aswell as the implementation of organizations in the zone of th]

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.interior, such as reception centers. 'The Third Sup-plcrnental National Defense Appropl:iation Act,

]911, provided a total enlisted strength for thel~eguI~r Anny and the National Guard, including

Sel~ctlve Service Trainees, of 1,418,000 by the endof fiscal year 1941.

REGULAR ARMY RESERVE

In the beginning of fiscal year 1941, the strength

~f the Regular Army Reserve was 28,099. In F~b-

1uary, 1941, this component was ordered to actIve,duty under the authority of Public Resolution No.J 96, Sev.enty-Sixth Congress. Discharges for depend-i j ency, In accordance with the above-ll1entl0ned~resolution, reduced the available nlunber of Reg-

1 ular Arn1Y Reservists to 12,260.~I ENLISTED RESERVE

~ i 'rhe ~tre.ngth of the Enlisted Reserve Corps atI ' j th c ~eglnlllng of the .fiscal year I941 ,~as 3,233 . By"~!al ch 3 I, 1941, tlns strength had Increased to: 1 ~,6~8, of wh~ch nUInbe~ 34 were on active duty.

1 '\ Enhstinents In the Enhsted Reserve Corps werel suspended except in case of men who had servedt ; two years in the Regular Army, and of ll1ell1bersi of tl~e Air Corps Enlisted Reserve over Selective9 SerVIce age.J

1 SELECTIVE SERVICE

" 1 '[he Selective l~raining and Service Act, ap-j pro~ed Septernber. 1.6, 1910, pre.scribed the regis-- \ trat10n of lli.ale CItIzens and ~hens between the(ges of 21 and 36, and authorIzed the call of not

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more than 900,000 registrants in anyone year foa period of twelve consecutive months' train~Iland service. Each such man, after the completIotl

of his period of training is to be transferred toreserve component of the Army of the Unite

States. Until he attains the age of .orty'"five 0until the expiration of a period often years aftesuch transfer, he is to be a member of such'reserV

component and shall be subject to such hainiIl

and service as may be prescribed by law.'

CONSTRUCTION AND HOUSING

Appropriations authorized by t,he se,venty-Sixt~Congress and allotments from the WP A mad

lavailable approximately $127,000,000 for! perJmanent and temporary construction during th1fiscal year 1940. The larger, part of this sum wa~sed for increasing the operating facilities at estabhshed air fields and for establishing two air baseand two air depots in the continental UniteStates, one air base in Puerto Rico, one air base i

Panama, and an air station at Fairbanks, Alaska.In addition, three new posts were established i

the Panarn~ CanalDepartmen~. These provide acommodatl0ns for an increase. of about 5,800 enlisted men of the coast artillery. '

Temporary housing was provided at all postScamps, and stations where garrisons were increase j

'a.s a result of the Army's expansion to 227,000 enhsted men. ' .

For the fiscal year 1941, funds in the amount 0 1$1,633,13?,355 have been appropriated by th(Seventy-SIxth Congress for construction necessar1

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to acc?mmodate the Army, -as autho~ized by the \,S.elective Service Act and the act calling th~ Na-tIonal Guard into federal service for a period ?fone year. _ .

9-ua:termaster Corps Construction: This legis-latIon Imposed upon the Quartermaster Corps thetremendous task of housing approximately 1,4?0,-000 Illen. As time was a major factor, cons~rucuon

was pushed vigorously throughout the wI~ter of

]940-41. Progress was hampered by excepuonallyunfavorable climatic conditions and shortages of

labor and materials. However, construction neces-sary to house the above number of men has now.

been ac~omplished, and some 45 communities withPopUlatIons ranging from 10,000 to 63,000 have

been COI1.structed.l\Jore than one-half of these com-,Illunities have been erected at new camp sites,

where initiation of 'construction ,vas dependent

, :upon land acquisition.

The developlnent of the necessary services in agr~~t .many cases called for the instalhition of basicutl~ItIes at some distances frOlll the centers of popu-latIon. The established 'policy provided. for tentcamps for National Guard units in those sectionswhere climatic conditions permitted such housingfor the period of. National Guard service, and for

mobilization type cantonment construction in~ther cases. The housing for well over half a inil-~l?~ men at new camps is approximately evenlydIVIded between teruporary cantonments and tentcamp construction. HOllsing constructed duringthe emergency at established permanent Regular

Army posts consists 1110Stlyof. cantonment con-'(1939-1941) 55


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I . , 'i , ', . :r , ,

,,' j

: '. '. 1 \ , 1 , :

:(I,

,I

I : :

struc~ion. Existing perm~~ent~a~~ties have bee~

utilized wherever possible, and no new permane~ihousing has been authorized. ',]

, Hospitalization has been provided at the' postand camps by enlarging existing hospitals, can:

verting permanent barracks into hospitals, or b. the erection 'of new cantonment hospitals. The

capacity of general hospitals has been increase~

approximately 10,00 beds by the c~:)l:struc~ion. 0;

9, new,' general hospItals and by addItIons to, eXlsting hospitals. "

'. . In addition to the housing and hospitalizatio Jne(:essary to accommodate an army of 1,400,00.men, recreation facilities,' chapels, service clubs

hostess houses, railroad facilities necessary fo

their con,venience ,and comfort have been prlf.vided. '

Corps of' Engineer Construction: In order t;distribute the load of construction and to assis

in expediting the Air Corps construction prograthe transfer, from the Quartermaster Corps to th

Corps of Engineers of all construction at Air Corpstations, Panama excepted, and all construction i

Alaska, was authorized on Novemb~r 20, 194The authority for this transfer is contained i

Section 102, Public 781, Seventy-Sixth Congresiapproved September 9, 1940. Seventy-two project~

were transferred during the period December1940-l\larch 1, 1941, and 15 additional project!were a~signed directly to the Corps of Engine~rs.

Dunng the early part of the fourth quarter 0the fiscal year 1941, the Corps of Engineers warespons~ble for Air Corps construction work i

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: the ~otal a'~ount' of $624,465,000. The 'Corps of-EngIneers has been able to assume, this additional,~onstruction load by making use of its decentral- '

IZ~d'organization of eleven divisions and fifty,dIstricts covering the entire ~ontinental Unite~Stat.es,Alaska, and the insul~.r possessions. In thoseprojects which were taken over from the Quarter-master Corps, the continued orderly progress ofthe work during the transition period was assured

by absorbing in the organization of the Corps ofEngineers a large "part of the local personnel of,the Quartermaster Corps. ~ I ' : . . . .

Defense Housing: As a result ofappr?pnatlo~smad~ by the Se-venty-Sixth Congress In PublIcNumbers 671, 781, and 849, the Pres~dent has ap- ",

prov~d the construction of'21,893 unIts of defensehOUSIngfor the families of non-commissioned pffi-cers of the first three grades and perman'endy em-ployed civilians of the War Department. This ~program is well along toward completion. " ,

WPA Projects: Under the terms of the "Emer-

gency Relief Appropriations Act, fiscal-year 1941," ,_WPA projects totalling apprQximatey $70,000,000 '

,~ave been approved bythe President for construc-tion or improvement .a~ War Department' posts,camps, and Istations. I, " , .

ARMAMENT AND EQUIPAGETroop bases I for a protective mobilization plan

of approxima~ely 1,400,000 men and an, aug~mented force representing a ground army of about' ,

, 2,200,000 men, plus an ait force and replacements; > '

, have heen established. Funds provided during fis-(Z939-Z94z) 5 7 '


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=~cal year 1941, plus stocks on hand. or under p.rocureillent, will, with some exceptions, provIde

IllOdernequipment for the over-all require111e~ltSin critical and essential items for the protectlve

lllobilizarion plan and initial allowances in critical

itellls for the augnlented force. The e~ceptions

lnentioned con1prise largely amnlunition, cOlnba~.rnaintenance in 1110tor vehiCles, cOlllpletio11 of thel1lodernized seacoast defense program, sonle chem-

icallllunitions, and cOlnbat reserve stocks of cloth-

ing and equipage. Financing of these shortages' S!lou~d be provided in subsequent estiluates. '

" a.1'vIechanization:' 'Fhe mounting experiencerand'lessons learned 'from the present European

conflict dictate a greater proportion of mechanized,

units in Our Anny. This' has been acco111plished bythe provision in the protective Inobilization plan

and the augmented force of 6 and 8 annored divi-- sions, 9 light tank battalions, 6 and 16 Inedillll1'

l~an!< battalions to I,>eeqnipped with heav~ t~nks IIn these respective forces. From the appropnations

proVi~e.d.during fiscal year 1941

, procurenlent hasbeen InItIated to cover-the various types of cOlnbatvehicles, such as light" and mediuln t


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b. A.ntiaircraft: Consid~rable progress has beel1ma?~ In providing for- critical items of. modernantIaIrcraft equipment. Funds made avaIlable. by

a~propriations for the fiscal year 1941, togetherWIth.items previously provided Jar, will generally ,provIde guns and automatic weapons, as well as thenecessary searchlights and fire control instrumen~sfor t~e 88 antiaircraft regiments, mobile and s~mI-? 1 ob1Ie,and the 16 separate antiaircr~ft battahonsIncluded in the expanded force. ..'

The only items of this type remaInIng to befinanced to complete the requirements of the f?rceof approximately 2,200,000 men, are some cahb~r.50 machine.guns and mounts, 37-mm. automatIcguns, the necessary fire control equipment for.these weapons, and some searchlight trucks .. The 90-mm.antiaircraft gun has been standard-Ized, and a large number of these guns are in pro-duction.

c. Se.acoast Defense: A modernization program

Was initiated in fiscal year 1941 to replace out-moded armament with equipment. of the mQst~odern type for all harbor defenses in the con-tInental United States. The 'programs for augmen-tation of the seacoast defenses of Hawaii and thePanama Canal were substantially advanced in fis-

cal year 1941. .. Funds made availab'le by appropriations for the

fIscal year 1941 will' provide essential fire controlelements and some ordnance materiel for existingannament aid installations. Shortages in equip-ment for the modernization progralll initiated in

fiscalyear 1941 must be financed by subsequent' ap-(I939-I94I) 59


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. - . > : c . ,

propriations 'as constructIon on the variousprbjects progresses. . "

d .. Miscellaneous Equiprnent: lVloderns111aIl

anns and art~llery weapons have beel).Jinance~t ? yappropriationsfor the fiscal year 1941 in quantltlessufficient to tneet, with 'but few exceptions, the

over-all requiremen~s of the protective Inobiliza-

. tion pl~n and the initial requiren1ents of the aug-. luented force. These Inodern 1veapons include 60-

111111.aI).d 81-1111n.mortars, 111achine guns of variot~Stypes, selni~automatic rifles,3.7-1111n. tank and anU-

tank guns, lOS-111m.howitzers, and heavy artilleryci:unprising 15S-1111n.and 8-inch guns and 240-11111

howitzers. About 900,000 seini-aut~)lnatic rifles,,,ill have been provided upon the cOlnpletion of

, the. present progra 111, which represents. the ap-proxilnat.eover-all requirements of the protective

lllobilization plans as well as the initial require-inents of the auglnented force. .

- Procurelnent of sufficient 105-aim. howitzers for

~h~ .initial needs of the auglnented force ha~ been

InItIated for the purpose of replacing the 75-11llIl .. glin in the divisional light artillery regilnents .

. Upon cOlnpletion of the program for the fiscal

' year 1 ~41, there will be sufficient 155-111111.guns, Ic0111pnslng modernized (high-speed) and new ~I Itypes, to cover the initial requirement of the ex-I

. panded force. Fl~rther prOcl.lrelnent ~f these \veap-ons to nleet ~"equireinents to cover Inainten~nce hasbeen held In abeyance pending conclUSIons on.

tests now in process relating to the adoption ofalnew 155-1~ln. howitzer and 4.5-inch gun. 'rhese

Ja~ter weapons are Inounted on identical carriages.

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They present no production 'difficulties, and ~p-pear to offer great promise. Special ordnance maln~tenance vehicles have been financed to meet theoyer-all requirements of the protective mobili~a-tIon plan and, with but few exceptions, the nee~sof t.his force in signal, chemical, quarterI?aster~engIneer, and medical items are being provIded.

e. Motorization: Funds .provided for.procure-ment of motor vehicles during the fiscalyear 1941,

f:om both regular and supplemental appropria-tIo?,s, were adequate to complete the initial re-qUIrements of the' protective mobilization pl~n~nd provided a limited amount for normal traIn-Ing replacement.. .

~actical organizations are being completely--,-,

equIpped with new equipment, Model 1939 andlater, and the replaced vehicles made available foradministrative use. Approximately 50% bf theabove requirements in motor vehicles will be filledby July 1, 1941, by actual deliveries of vehiclesnow under procurement. The delivery of 100%

of the above requirements will be accomplishedby about March, 1942,' provided none of the ve-hIcles under procurement are diverted to other,U ses. . _ '

. A 'marked improvement in cross-country mohil-. I ty of tactical vehicles has resulted from develop-

ment of the all-wheel drive.f. Distribution: All Regular Army and National

Guard organizations have been arranged on one'priority list for the distrib'ution of the more impor- "tant items of equipment which are essential to

combat or. training. Individual National GuardI (Z939-Z94Z) / " 61


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. , - , - - - - - - - . . . . . . . . . . . , . ! " " . :. . : : : .. . - - ,~ ~

i i : : . .1 j : 1 I

J ! 'and Regular Army units are placed on. this l i s t . jj according to their probable elnployment in t~ e .,,', event of an emergency" and. according to '~~el

t~aining needs. AJI equipment and alnulun!tl0

lresources, ,whether procured from Natlon~Guard, Regular Army funds, or funds not specIfically appropriated to either, have been pooledand distribution is being Inade to both componentSin such a manner as to best meet ,the problems othe present emergency. The Chief of the National,

Guard Bure~u has cooperated in every way in theestablish.ment of policies affecting the diversion oequipment or, funds to or from the National,Guard. . _ I

. Shortages of equipment exist in most organiza',,tions and, with but few exceptions, are being

~i~~ overcome .. These shortages are primariIY

. (I) The rapid, far-reaching expansion of tbeArmy. " I

(2) The time lag between the availability offunds' and delivery of supplies.

(3) Lack of modem or modernized d,epo.stocks. .

(4) Tir:te required for overhaul o.r'moderniza-,, " , lIon of old equipment which has been, . stored since 1918 " t

g. Atrplane Procurement: A substantial numberof airplanes ofthe most Inodern combat and train-ing types are being provided from appropriations;for .the fiscal year 1941. These, along with presentavaIlable resources, will provide the 54 combat,and 6 transport groups of the Air Corps program

. l _~_ ._ . 6~_ _ _ __ ._, ( r939- r94I


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with init~al requirements andq.ll1ple reserves.Some equipment for service units under the pro-'

gram has been deferred to the fiscal ye~r 1942 ..l\faterial progress has been made in the develop~

meq,t and acquisition of combat aircraft which. ~re

equal or ~~perior in performance and adaptabilIty

to any mIlitary planes in the world today.

l\fanufacturing plant space has ~een exp~nded

130 ~er cent to facilitate production ?f aircraft

an~ aIrcraft accessories. Actual production, mean-whIle, was three times greater in the fiscal year

1941 than in the,fiscal year 1939.

NATIONAL GUARD

The National Guard has made more substantial

~ains in training, personnel, and equip~ent dur-l~g .the fiscal years 1940 and 1941 than during a?ySlml~ar peacetime period in its history. Upon In-ductIon it provided 20,006 officers, 216 warrant

officers, and 282,805 enlisted men. The following

~omparative figures illustrate the steady increase

In the total strength of the actual Guard:

June 30,1939 199,491.June 30, 1940 241,612

June 30, 1941 303,027.

For the fiscal year 1940, armory drill periods

were increased from 48 hours to 60 hours, andseven days were added to the normal period of field

training at or near home stations. A resulting im-provement in the combat efficiency of the Guard

~vasnoted during the maneuvers of the First ArmyIn August, 1939. "

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to capa~ity. For the fiscal year 1941 th~ annualfield traInIng period was again increased from 15to 21 days and an additional period of seven dayswas."authorized; the number of armory drills was

a~aln increased; there was nation-wide participa-tIon in the maneuvers held by all four field armiesduring the summer of 1940

To make the character of our forces conform~ot~e new demands of modern war, many reorgan-IZatIons, conversions and increases were madeprior to federal indu'ction. Four National Guardcavalry divisions were broken up. Sevent.een cav-alry regiments were converted into 7 horse-mec~-

I anlzed cavalry regiments, 7 field artillery regI-ments: 7 coast artillery regiluents :and s.epar~te

battahons, and one antitank battahon. EIght In-fantry regiments were converted into 4 field artil-ler~ regiments, - 8 coast artillery regituents, oneantitank battalion and one luilitary police bat""t r 'a IOn. Tank companies were withdrawn from in-fantry divisions and formed into tank battalions.

IAntitank units were expanded and increased in! number. Nine new observation squadrons '\TereI organized. " - .

I Officer allotments were increased from mainte-! nance strength to equal Regtilar Army peaceIstrength. The .increase in strength authorized byi executive order of September 6, 1939, was virtu-ally complete at the beginning of the fiscal year.

I As a result of increases in officer strength, con-Iversion of units, and officer losses for physical andIOther reasons; a great Inany appointnlents andpromotions were made in the National Guard

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-~~I

. . 1throughout the country. This necessitated exa~:jination and formal procedure for fede:a~ re~ogIldtion, and the magnitude of the task IS IndIcate

by the fact that the National Guard Bureau cOrl

pl~ted action on cases as follows:

July, 1940 ......... 1089 January, 1941 35211

August 1281 February .. ~. ~ 314~September 1500 March 39October - 1870 April 1 4 0 4 ,November 1553 May 5 73

December 1314 June 41

Because there was no legislative provision for

money allowances to dependents of enlisted melin federal service, and because it was understood

that draft boards would defer draftees with depend-,

ents, instructions were issued on. July 23, 1 9 4 0 ' 1

that upon request, discharge would be granted eIl'listed men with persons dependent solely upol1them for support. This process was initiated early,in all units regardless of prospective inductiol1,dates, in order to give opportunity for filling va'

cancies by local enlistlnents. From the date of these,

instructions on June 30, 1941, it was reported that,51,501 enlisted men had been discharged all,account of dependency. This loss would appear,large, but it made the Guard conform in personnel,

to the other elements of the Army and it wasrapidly remedied by enlistments. .

Induction of the National Guard left the statesjwithout their normal forces for suppressing localdisturbances. By act of Congress, approved Octo'

ber 21, 1940, a state is authorized to organize and

maintain local defense forces so long as any part 066 (1939-1941


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its National Guard is in active federal service.Under this authority, and by virtue of existing andnew state legislation, these forces were createdunder such designations as State Guard, DefenseForce, Reserve Militia Active Militia, Reserve~lilitary Force, Home 'Guards, Protective Force,Home Defense Force Defense Guard, State De-f 'ense Corps, Reserve Defense Corps. More thanthree-fourths of the states have raised suchforces.

Rifles and bayonets have been made availablefor issue in quantities equal to fifty pe~ cent of thenormal National Guard allotment to each state,a.nd training literature has been issued. Ammuni-tion, cartridge belts, mess kits, and other items offield equipment have been made available for sale

to the states, while procurement of uniforms hasbe:n left to the states alone. By June 30, 1941,UnIts had been organized "\fith a total strength of85,587.

ORGANIZED RESERVES

. The activities of "thiscomponent show a markedIncrease throughout the two years c~vered by thisrepOrt. Never before has the Officers' ReserveCorps been afforded stICh splendid opportunitiesfor training in peacetime.

During the fiscal year 1940 appropriations madePOssible the training.of a greater number of offi-cers for'14-day periods than previously. The num-ber of students taking 3-month courses at serviceSchools ,vas three times greater than it had beenthe year before. In addition, about 2,500 officers(I939-194~) 67


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were trained for 28-day periods with units of the

Third Army during the spring of 1940.

During 1939-40, opportunities for extended ~c'

tive duty for periods of six' months or more ~lt~the Air Corps and other Regular Army unItS

including opportunities offere~ under the ThOJ11ason Act-were expanded dunng the last half 0 ithe fiscal year, and on June 30, 1940, more thaIlI2,700 Reserve officers were on such duty. I

Even greater strides were made during the fiscal'year 1941. The passage of Public Resolution N o .96, Seventy-Sixth Congress, which became effective

August 27, 1940, permitted the ordering of R e'serve officers to extended active duty, with O J Iwithout their consent, for a period of twelve coIl'

secutive months. Pursuant to this authority thelnumber of Reserve officers on active duty h~ssteadil y increased, and on J tine 30, 1941, approxl,l

mately 55,000 Reserve officers, or about 55 % o flthose eligible, were on active duty. These officers,

have been used to meet the need for additionall

officers in carrying out the current military expan'sion and wherever possible have been assigned as

replacements, thereby making additional RegUlarlArmy officers available for troop duty.

Fourteen-day training was discontinued, except,in isolated cases, as the opportunities for bringing

lReserve officers to doty f9r extended periods,elirninated the need for this type of trailJing.Although the eligible strength. showed no ma'

terial increase during either of the fiscal years,

greater effectiveness of the Officers' Reserve Corps

has been attained through improved training op'

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POrtu~~ties and physical ;;andards. An i.ncre~s~of.appr:oximately 1o~ over previous years In ongIn,!l1appointments fromothe Reserve Officers' TrainingCorps was a contributing factor. This inc~ease was

offset by a corresponding decrease of app0111t,?entsfrom .civillife as a result of a general suspensIon ofappOIntments from this source imposed at the close0 . the calendar year 1939. In addition, a classifica-tIon system, which was set up during t~e past y~ar, \has made readily available detailed InformatIonpertaining to the Officers' Reserve Corps alongSUch lines as civil pur.suits of th~ .individual,progress of training,. and other statIstIc~1 data.

yoluntary training performed through the pur-_S~lItof courses of instruction of the Army Exten-

~lon Courses and attendance at troop schools was~nc~e~sed,resulting in a better preparation of theIn~IVIdual for entering upon a tour of extend~dactIve duty. Improvelnent in all phases was satIs-fact?ry with possibilities of further progress as theavaIlable facilities (lre augmented. .

UNITED STATESMILITART ACADEMr

Legislation for the fiscal years 1937 and 1938appropriated funds for the acquisition of approxi-mately 6,068 acres of land. Of this alnount, theWar Department has acquired title to 2,533 acres.

At the end of the fiscal year 1941,

WWII Army Infantry Report

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