WWII 9th Armored Division

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THE NINTH ARMORED D I V I S I O N I N T HE E X P LO I T AT I O N O F REMAGEN BRIDGEHEAD

A RESEARCH REPORT PREPARED BY

COMMITTEE 13, OFFICERS ADVANCED COURSE THE ARMORED SCHOOL

1949-1950

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT J. C. OSBORNE

MAJOR JOHNW. THROCKMORTON

MAJOR JOHN J. K I L L I A N MAJOR ROBERT W. CARPENTER

MAJOR WALTER E. REYNOLDS, JR. , USMC

CAPTAIN FRANK A. W ILLIAMS CAPTAIN SIDNEY H. YOUNG, JR.

CAPTAIN JOHN H. COBB, JR .

FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY MARCH 1950


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This report describes the 9th Armored Division in the

EXPLOITATION, from the breakout of the REMAGEN BRIDGEHEAD to the

encirclement of LEIPSIG.Records and accounts of the planning phase, other than cer-

tain logistical information, are meagre--if not non-existent--and

are purposely omitted from the renort.

Material used in compiling this report consisted of:

1. Reports of higher headquarters.

2. After

-Action Reports of the 9th, Combat Command A,

Combat Command B, Reserve Command, the Armored

Infantry and Tank Battalions, and the Division

Armored Engineer Battalion.

3. Letter interviews with 76 officers who partici-pated inthis phase.

4. Personal interviews with Brigadier GeneralThomas L. Harrold, Lieutenant Colonel M. K. Goers,

Lieutenant Colonel C. F. Fiore, and CaptainJ. W.

Mitchell.

5. "The Training andCombat of the 19th Tank Bat-talion" by Captain Edgar A. Terrell.

After-action reports are not comprehensive and are vague.

They served merely as a framework around which to build the report.

Exceptionally good material was obtained from certain letter


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i n t e r v ie ws . Mre a r e e s p e c i a l l y i n d eb t ed t o t h e f o l l ow i n g o f f i c e r sf o r r e sp o n se an d t h e i n t e r e s t shown:

Captain John W. S c h a l l e sDr. R . W. PomeroyColonel Harry W. JohnsonMajor George I. TaylorAh jor John P. n e e e r ,Lieutenant Colone1 J. I! Tfeyhenneyer , Jr .

T hes e l e t t e r s w ere a g r e a t h e l p ic v i t a l i z i n g th e r e ~ o r t n d i nr ound ing ou t the p ic t u r e w i th many o the r wise unob ta ina ble de ta i l s .

Major R. B e Crayton, Command and Staff Department, TheArmored School , fu rn i she d nzmes and addres ses , and s u e ~ e s t i o n swhich wer e ve r y he lp fu l i n the n la nn ing s t a ge .

The C ommittee m s q u i t e f o r t u n a t e i n b e in g a b l e t o p e r-s o n a l l y i n t e r v i e w G e ne ra l H w r o l d a cd o b t a i n a f i r s t h a n d a cc o un t o fthe 9 t h1 s c om bat e xpe r i e nc e s .

Commanders and per so na l i t i e s , da i l y composi t ion and d isno-s i t i o n of un i t s , a nd His to r y o f th e 9 th Armored Div i s ion a r e a dde di n t h e a p pe nd i ce s i n o r de r t o p r e s e n t a c l e a r , u nb ro ken n a r r a t i v e .

Lt Colone l Rober t J. C. OsborneMajor John W. ThrockmortonIlajor John J. K i l l i a nlla jor Robe rt W. CarpenterMajor Fa l te r E. Reynolds, Jr .,USB4CC a ~ t a i n rank A. W i l l i m sC a ~ t a i n idney H. Young, J r .Cauta in John H. Cobb, Jr.

.r

iii


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page

1 INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 THE ENEMY 5 3 LOGISTICS AND STATISTICS. . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 4 EXPANDING THE BRIDGEHEAD. . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 5 REDUCTION OF LIMBURG 35

6 LIMBURG TO WARBURG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48 7 WARBURGTO LEIPZIG .62-

8 I N RETROSPECT 74

APPENDICES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I. Hi st or y of 9th Armored Div isi on 78 I I. Commanders and Personalities . . . . . . . . .82

I I I. Task Organizat ions and Daily Disp osi t io n. . .85I V. Organ izati ons 9th Armored Divi sion .

Major Un it s 93 V. Enemy Order of Battle . . . . . . . . . . . .94

VI. Enemy Disposition s . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95


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"You will enter .the continent of Europe and, in conjunction

with the other. Allied nations, undertake operations aimed at the

heart of Germany and the destruction of her Armed Forces."1By the

above simple directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to SHAEF,

the second destruction of Germanyas amilitary power was begun.

The successful assault on the NORMANDY beaches on 6 June 1944 com-

pleted the first requirement of the directive. We had"entered the

continent of Europe." Now, with the seizureof bridgeheads over

the RHINE complete, we were truly"aimed at the heart of Germany and

the destruction of her Armed Forces." Few people realized that this

was the beginning of the end, or just how near the end was. Itwas

obviously apparent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to others

experienced in war--to Generals Eisenhower, Bradley, Patton, Hodges,

Simpson, Patch, Devers, Clark--to the British Imperial Staff and

its field commanders--and to the leadersof some of our other Allies.

But to the tired and dirty Doughboys and Tankers, there was stilla

long road before them. There were, however, many changes, in war

"as they knew it." Instead of hardfought gains of 1,000 to 2,000

yards each day, one was now hard-pressed to keep up. "Thirty miles

today--we got to do forty tomorrovr." There were still nights

without time for enough sleep; rations were still canned and cold.

But suddenly "fuel and lube" were more importnnt than ammunition.


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Objectives were suddenly changed from "that hillto your front" to

"the city of LIMBURG, 40miles from here on the AUTOBAHN." And

instead of the proud, well-trained but fanatical SS Divisions and

Panzer Divisions, the opposition was suddenly made up of a beaten

enemy. There were to be many more killed in action, mare wounded

in action; and more missing in action; but the fact remained that

the German Army, as such, was fast becoming; a group of confused and

bewildered individuals.

Atthis period of the war, speed was of the essence,

Capture of terrain was more important than the monping

up of a beaten enemy, Total disruption of the enemy1 sinterior was in order, Onlyconfused and bewildered

enemy organizations were left; fighting everywhere

was by remnant. , .,

For the ensuing month, 22 March- 21 April, thoughsome casual pockets of resistance had tc be forced,the war, for the most part, became a road march. Infact, at one time on the AUTOBAHN north of FRANKFURT,

two armored and two infantry divisions, using both

sides of the road, were moving north abreast towardKASSEL: while in the center of the same road, tens

cf thousands of German prisoners were moving southwithout guard.

German reserves were overrun, rear installations

crushed or ignored, and the civilian populstion be-

wildered. Nazi atrocities came to light.2

Crumbling resistance, frequent attacks from march column,

by-passing or enveloping strongpoints,meeting engagements with

groups of enemy reinforcements, objectives deep in the enemy rear,

maximum speed in reaching objectives and mission type crders--all

cf the above characterize one phase of combat--EXPLOITATION, And

this was it. The background ofthis study is thus laid in the

final stages of the war in Europe.


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This report constitutes an examination of the employment of the 9th Armored Division fromthe breakout of the REMAGEN

bridgehead to the completion of the encirclement of LEIPZIG. The

period covered is 28 March 1945 to 18 April 1945. Events that

occurred prior to the REMAGEN breakout or subsequent to the encir-

clement of LEIPZIG lie outside the purview of this report and will

not be discussed.

The purposes of the report are fourfold:

1. To study the action involving the exploitation of a-

weak, dispirited, and. disorganized enemy from the preparation and

planning phase through the build-up to final victory.

2. To study the organization for combat and the employment.

in combat of the major combat, service, and attached units of the

Division.

3. To examine the adherence to or violation of the present. . .

doctrine of exploitation in the two decisive phases indicated below:

a. The breakout from REMAGEN and the advance to LIMBURG.

b. The advance to LEIPZIG and its encirclement.

4. To determine the lessons to be learned, the conclusions

to be drawn, the recommendations to bemade on current Armored.

Division Tables of OrganizationandEquipment, and recommendations

to be madeon the employment of armored units in the exploitation

phase.As previously stated, arc' as will be shown in subsequent

chapters, the conditions in Germany during this period (28 March


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18 A ~ r i l1945) were r i pe fo r 3 c l ?s s i c example of t h e exp lo i t a t i on .Did the 9 t h Armored Div is ion t akc every a dv an ta ~eof enemy weak-ness? Did it rec eiv e mission-type o r*er s? Did i t by-pass s t rongp o i n t s t h a t d i d n o t i n t e r f e r e w i t h i t s mi s s io n and r ed uc e t h o s et ha t d i d ? Did i t a cc om pl is h i t s m is si on of s e i z i n g c r i t i c a lob j ec t i ves , deep i n t he enemy re a r , which would con t r i bu t e t o t hes t r a t e g i c succes s o f t he campa ign? In sho r t , wha t d id it do andhow d id it perform?

NOTES FOR CF::j.T?n 1

l ~ e ~ o r ty The Supreme Com cnde r t o th e Combined Chie fs ofS ta ff on the Operations i n Europe of t3e Al l ie d Expedi tionary Force ,6 Ju ne 1944 t o 8 Nsy 1945, R ro po r t p repared by Genera l o f t he ~ r m fDwight D. Eisenhuwer (Waehington: Government P r in t in g Off i c e , 1946),pp V I , V I I .2 ~ e n e r a l eorge S . ;att on., Jr ., War As I Knew I t , ( ~ o u ~ h t o nand Miffl in Co.) , p 270.


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CHAPTER 2 THE' ENEMY

" . . .l62. EnemvHATULCTERISTICS uF TFE EXPLCIITATIOW. a . - -Si t ua t io n . When the ex pl o i ta t i on s ta ge has been en ter ed , th eloc a l enemy s i t u a t i a n w i l l most ce r t a i n l y be .me >f can fus ion andp a r t i a l d i sorganizat ion ." (FK 17-30).

AS a r e s u l t of t h e a h o s t c om ple te d i s o r g a n i z a t i s n o fGerman fo rc es immed ia te ly p reced ing t he ca p i t u l a t i on , l i t t l eGerman source mat er i a l cover ing th i s per iod i s ava i la b le . Uni tsdid not ma in ta in th e normal reccrrl s .?f combat, and th e Germancommanders themselves knsw 1 . i t t l e o r no thin^ of what went on out-s i de t h e i r own immediate s pher es .

The majar sou rce ma t s r i a l a ira i l ab l e c . ~ ns j s t s f r e ~ m t sof i nt er rn ga ti ,- ns of highe r Crervan c.?mmsnders. E, ?w ev ~r , h ere l j . ab i ? i t y of t h ese r e po r t s , i n so fa r a s c ..ncerns spec i f j c d e t a j I- ,

i s . . f t en qur-s t jonahle, dun t.? t he t ime l ag betwean t h r i n t e r r 7-gat ion and th e ac t j.?n d i. scusse .l , t h ~ ! a ck of German ~ ~ c v l n ~ n t s .s i tu a t i ,?n maps, and s im i l a r ma t e r i a l w i th which t 3 r e f r e s h t h eP'JV's mem.?ry, and th e ne n ta l a t t i t u d e -f t h e Pin). In t he i n s t anceof the PW's mcnta l a t t i tu de , t he case af Gensra l Li su te mn tF r i t z B a ye r ls in i s a c as e i n p o i n t . A prn fes s i.ona1 sa ld i e r ?ft h e .31d Gwrnan schnol and t r a d i t i m , General Bayer le i ri , whenint err .>g ats d Jn 16 Ap ri l 1945, could rec.311ect ?nly vaTuelysp e ci fi c d s t a i l s ;.f c e r ta in maj?r even ts i n whjch he, as mmrnander


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> f t h e f m ? u s P y p r Lohr 9 i v i s j . m and l a t e r as c.,minan.lor ?f h eLIII C.>rps, figured . H.)wcver, hi s remembrance .>f pe rs an al embar-rassments was most vivid. I

I n p ic tu ri n g t h e enemy (elemen ts of Army Grmp B ) w i t hwhich t h e 9 t h Arrn.>red Divi si.?n had trr contend east af the RHINE, t h ef ?1 l>wing have been c~ ns id er ed : j rder . ~ f a t t l e ; d isp.>si ti .. -n ;s t r e n g t h ; s u pp ly ; m ~ r a l e ; nd b a t t l e p la ns .

N,?c.>mplete,, r e l i a b l e orde r .?f b a t t l e .>f German f .>rcesea s t zf t h e RHINE a f t e r th e per i3d ending 25 Maroh 1945 e xi st s , duela rg e lg t ? th e almos t o.:\mpl+ e brsakd \wn >f Garman c .~ m u ni c a t i . ~ nsenil t he ? i s .-r ga niz at is n of German f ?rces which made i t s i r t u a 1 1 yim p~ s s ib l e +.r sven th e Gormans t .* kn?w t he di sp * s i t i n >f Germanf jrcos . (See Appenl?ices V and V I . ) American intelligence d.?cu-men ts2 s h ~ w h e f ,311 >wing u n i t opp:>sing elements >f t he 9t h Urnx-edDivis i ~ n iniicate1-i:s

DIVIS TCIN ErnIVYDATE ELEIKENT FCiRCE V I C I N I T Y-26 Mar 45 C C B

KG 89 MU NTA RAURK G 167

27 Mar 45 C C B89 E L LIMRURGI l E L167th Inf Div27 6t h Rem Div6 t h E L SS Div5th Pars. Div


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G lrnl\lrYFi!RCE V I C T N T T I10 Apr 45 CCB vs Armd Brig Ti. BLEICHERODE

K G 266 6 ls t Inf Regt594th Inf RegtCiv ( - ) vs 16 6t h In f Reqt SOmER

11 Apr 45 D i v vs 869th Inf Regt HOFGEISMAR66t h Inf Div11 Apr 45 D i v vs 593d In f Re g t BAD594th Inf Reqt FRAYKENHAUS26 E L

166 E L14 Apr 45 Div vs K G SCHUIDT LE IPZ I G

K G SCHLEISER KG WINDE 409th Adm Div

16 Apr 45 D i v v s 409th A d m Div LETPZIG Rem Bn (627 E) The b reakout from t h e REIFAGEF RRTDG3FXAF was e n t i r e l ydi ff er e nt from th e breakthrough e a s t of the RUiIR. Af terth e i n i t i a l c r u s t i n t h e REFAG3N BRIDGEEEAn had be en pene-t r a t e d , t h e o n ly o p p o s i ti o n w hi ch t h e V C?rps met werei s ~ l a t e d roups, AA crews, and service Ir schoo l t roops ,a 1 1. i n loose ly knot organizat ions which never ered ser iqu sf f

oppo s i t ion t o tha advance .3 German est imates, 'g5 made a f t e r the ca pi tu la t i o n (and

ad justerj , where necessary, on th e ba si s of more re l i a b le a va i l ab leinformation, by American in te l l ig en ce pe rso nne l) f ixe d the Germans t r en g t h on t he ea s t bank of t he RHINE, between K O B L E N Z andDUISBURG (23C ki lomete rs ), and exc lus ive of th e REIbUGEN a r e a , ass ix d i v i s o na l Kampf gruppen e qua l in 6 an average s t re ng th p erkilometer of 42 men, two t o th r e o p i e ce s of a r t i l l e r y , and .06 ATguns. The armored reserve on t h i s fr o n t conc is ted of 15 tan ks.


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I n t h e _SGNL!GEN are a , 14 d i v i s io na l Kmpf qruppen res u l t edi n a f o r c e c o n f r o n ti n g t h e br id ge he ad a v er a gi ng t h e f o i i 6 ~ i f i gs t r e n g t h p e r k i lo m e te r : 80 men, two p i e ce s ~f a r t i l l e r y , and0.5 AT guns. Tank s t r e n gt h a t REIviilGEN was e s t imated a t 50 vehic les .In r e se rva were two d iv i s i on a l Kmpfgruppen, w i th a t o t a l i n fa n t r vs t r e n g t h o f 600 ~ n e n . ~ , ~

Divis io na l Kampf gruppen were a t gr ea t l y reduced s t re ng th -200 t o 300 men each.8 99 Four panzer di vi s i on s, two motorizedb r iga des , and t h re e a r t i l l e r y co rps harl been re l i eve? . f rom theArmy Group B a re a and se n t t o t hc Eas t F ront .'@ Movement of t h e11 th P anzer Div i s i on t o t he sou th on 2 3 - 2 4 Jdjarch 1945 f o r a tt a ch -m e ~ t o Army Group G f u r th e r wenkoned th e A c e r t a i n-backbone f o r def ens e was formsd by the ilA p n s s t i n d u s t r i a l p l a n t sa long t he RHINE and a t the cros s i.ngs ; however, t h e i r value was

12l imi ted because of th e i r immobi l ity ana ha l f -c iv i l i an gun crews .( I t i s a f p a r t i c u l a r n .?te t h a t , d e s p i t e t h a s e l i m i t a t i o n s , t h e s eAB guns gave z form idab le acc oun t af the mse lve s, b ht h cln t h e RHIIXand i n the v i c i n i t y of LSIPZTG.)

Troops, t o a l a rge dog ree , c~ns i s t c - ,3 f Volksturm andst ra gg le rs . Behind th e whole f r o n t wandered a c nfu sed rmy ofs t r a g g l e r s, an army which was re pe at ed ly gathe red and committed~ n l y a s l i p away ag a i n and again.13 Genera l Bayer le in t s des-cr ip t i on 3f the Volksturm zs " the l a s t , a lmss t g ro tesque, imprqvi -s n t i n 7f t he pa r ty i n t he despera t e e f f .?r t t o f end . ff t he super i ir ,we 11-equipped encmyl' l* i s i n te r e s t in g .
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The almost complete breakdown of communications resulted in an acute shortage of all types of supply in the hands of troops. True, a great deal of munitions were warehoused east ofthe RHINE; however, the speed of the American ground attack and the virtually complete superiority in the air gained by the American Air Force made it practically impossible to transport suppliesduring daylight. Even at night, rail movement was exceedingly difficult because of the heavy damages inflicted on roadbeds and terminals.

The gravest shortage was not in ammunition, but in gasoline. German LIII Corps lost its entire reserve of gasoline on 16 March when a trainload was destroyed by air attack.15An amusing side-light on the gasoline shortage is related by Captain R. W. Pomeroy, surgeon of the 52d Armored Infantry Battalion,who was riding in an ambulance with a wounded German soldier. The PW asked if the Americans had encountered the new German 50-mantank. Captain Pomeroy's first reaction was that the PW was trying to impress his captors. However, he noted a twinkle in the man's eye and asked for details of this formidable weapon."Yes, Sir ," replied the PW; "Fifty men - one man to steer it, one man to fire the gun, and forty-eight men to push it!"16

Replacement of vehicles was practically non-existent. Bayerlein considered the loss of 23 tanks in various stages of

repair at ALTENKIRCHEN on 24 March 1943 as a major catastrophe,17

so weak was the tank strength. At the time of its surrender on

9
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--16 Apri l1945, the oncemighty Panzer Lehr Divisionturned over

only a total of 10 tanks and TDs. 18

The belatedattempt at establishing a fortifiedline east

of the RHINE was seriously handicapped by a sh ortage of even suc

primitive tools as picks and shovels. 19

Bayerlein, in commenting on the situation in Army Group B

as of21 March 1945, had this to say, "But what a front! . . A

state of troop moralevarying from suspicion to callous resigna-

tion. An officer corps which lacked confidence and wondered just

what were the demands of duty. 20

Aside from cells of fanatic SS troops, little of the

will to fight, even to save the Fatherland, remained in the common

s er. His civilian brothers were eagerly awaiting the "con-

queror to come and end those unbearable nights of bombing and had

at handy reach white cloths to greet him.21 His supply had failed

him, and more importantly,and quite obviously ,his leaders had

failed him. Such orders as that promulgated by Hitler to the

effect that the REMAGEN BRIDGEHEAD would be destroyed by V-2 bombs

regardless of the resulting toll in German civilians and Ge

22troops had a most dilatory effect on him (actually, several

V-2 bombs did fall within the Bridgehead). Sabotaging their own

vehicles to avoid combat was a common practice among the tank

23crews.

That morale in the officer corps, even at high level, was

low is reflected in the bickering, disobedience of orders, and


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"passing the buck" for failures which were rife. The execution of five officers for dereliction of duty in failing to destroy the LUDENDORF BRIDGE made an impression24 - but not the kind of impression necessary to buck up an already demoralized group. The impossible orders handed down by Hitler, the realization by officers in the higher echelons that total defeat was inevitable, had its effect. Bayerlein relates of being tempted to surrender to the Americans on 25 March 1945 as the result of being humiliated inthe presence of subordinates by a tongue-lashing from Model.25He also tells of being ordered by Model on 3 April 1945 to attack WINTERBERG. Feeling the futility of such action, he simply failed to order the attack; and, on 4 April, reported that the attack had been made, but had failed.26 That these two commanders, Model and Bayerlein, were bitterly opposed is evident. Since they were both key commanders in the battles east of the RHINE, their differences (which neither bothered to conceal) had a very unfavorable effect on the overall conduct of the defense. Bayerlein describes Model's headquarters at OLPE on 29 March 1945 as a mad-house with contra-dictory orders issuing and Model at the battle. 27 On the other side, Model severely censured Bayerlein for failures, blaming hislack of leadership. 28

The hoped-for battle plans of Army Group B were at direct variance with those ordered by the High Command (Hitler). Where Hitler had ordered defense in the truest sense - a defense to the last man - the generals in the field envisioned a delaying action

11
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i n ~ r 2 c . rt ? p r 31-jng th e f i n a l l-lecisi jn u n t i l , perh aps, th e summer-> f 1945 a nd t h e r e by g iv e t h e p \ l i t i g a l l e a d e r s time t- a r r iv e a tnew de c is i -3s . Parad ?x ic al ly , al th.?ugh H it le r -rr .lere? defense, hef.,rbade t r > m p s 2f Army G r >up B t . c r >ss t., th e e a s t bank .?f theRHITB f .r the purpase af a -gan i z ing de fens ive p a s i t i 3ns u n t i 11 March 1945 29

Base6 .?n an e st i ma te as .>f 29 March 1945 t.?t h e e f f e c tt h a t t h e RHINE defense c ~ u l d e c -nsidc re rl b r \ ken and t h a tf u r t h e r a t te m pt s t 3 defe nd were a bsu rd, Army Grw p B asked OBWest f ~ r ew mi ss i? n, In t h e ni gh t nf 29/30 March,Hawever,. \ rdc rs f '3r th e defense were re af f i rnerl by OB West and the imp.xsiblet a s k was c,nt inued ,30

. By t h i s t ime c ~mrnunicat ins wers d i s rup t ed a lmx i t en t i r e ly .The wherea b.?uts 3f army an.! cz rp s s t a f f s were unkn?wn. I n t h eend , the b a t t l e :Tn th e German s id e was re s t r i c t ed t . 3 t h e b l x k i n g.>f v i l la ge s, bri dge s, and imp.>rtant r \a d s . The cmmand was n-?

l a n ge r i n a p x i t i m t.?d i r e c t b a t t l e and m , ~ v e m en t s. ~ 'Disruptedrai lr ,mcl .s and br idges requi red wide ~ J e t . ~ u r snd r e s u l t e r l i n t h epiecemeal ct>mmitment af un it s i n what c,3?rdinate d att ac ks weremade .32

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2

I ff1 n t e r r?gat i .?n :jf General Lieutenant F r i tz B ayerlein,"The Armx-ed Sc h. 2~ 1 ib ra ry (850.88), p 1, Annex 111.2 w C , ~ r p sOperat i: ,ns i n th e ETO, 6 Jan 42 - 9 May 45,"pp 409, 411, 425, 427, 429.


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4 " ~ e p o r t f t he Chief of S ta f f , Army Group B , " GeneralMajor Carl Wagener , The Armared Scho ol Li br ar y ( 850.3) , p p 2 , 3.

50P c i t , " I n te r r og a t io n of Ge ne ra l L ie ute na nt F r i t zBayer le in ," p 9.60p c i t , "Repo rt of th e Chief of S t a f f , Army Group B ," pp 2,3.7 ~ p i t , " I n te r r og a t io n o f Gener al L ie u te na n t F r i t z Ba ye r-l e i n , " p 9 .

c i t , "Report of th e Chief of S t a f f , Army Group B, " pp 2,3.'bp c i t , " I n te r ro ga t io n of Genera l Lieutenant Fr i t z Bayer -l e i n , " p9.

l l ~ p c i t , " ~ e ~ o r t of S t a f f , Army Group B,"f the Chief p 7 .

140p c i t , " I n t e r ro g a t i o n of Genera l Lieutenant Fr i tz Bayer -l e i n , " p 33.-.

16persona l Le t te r , Doc tor R. W . Pomeroy.l7 0p c i t , " I n t e r ro g a t i o n 3f Genera l Lieutenant Fr i tz Bayer -l e i n , " p 25,

c i t , "Report of t h e Chief of S t a f f , Army Group B ," p 3.2 0 ~ pc i t , " In te r rog a t i on of Genera l Lieutenant Fr i t z Bayer-l e i n , " p 51.2 1 ~ p c i t , "Report of t he Chief of S t a f f , Army Group 8," p 3.2 2 ~ pc i t , " In t e r r og a t i on of General Lieutenant Fr i tz Bayer-l e i n , " p 24.


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281b id , '- p 26. 290p .it, "Report of the Chief of S t a f f , Army Group 8," p 12. 32Gp c i t, "Intorrogation of General Lieu tenan t F'ritt Bayer-l e in . "


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CHAPTER 3LOGISTICS AND STATISTICS

The per iod covered by th i s re po r t p robably was t he bu s i es tper io d the supply personnel of t he 9 t h Armored Div is ion had i nt h e i r e n t i r e o p e r a t i o n s . The co ns ta nt ra pi d forw ard movement oft he Div i s i on was r e f l ec t ed d i r e c t l y i n cons t an t changes o f supp lyi n s t a l l a t i o n s . The nece ss i ty of keeping suppl y poi nts withi \ con-ven i en t r each o f advancing combat c~ m a n d s esu l t e d i n cons t a n t l ychanging lacat ions .Likewise dur ing th i s sane per iod , supply agencies .,f t h eF i r s t Army were exper i enc ing t he b us i e s t t ime i n t h e i r h i s t my .

The concert ed Al l i ed d r i ve s deep i n t o t he hea r t of Germanymade it n ec es sa ry t a s h i f t t h e l a c a t i c n s a f u n i t s a nd i n s t a l l a -t i ~ n scon s ta n t l y s.) t ha t t h e y ca ul d b e t t e r s e r ve t h e r a p i d l yadvancing t raops .R a i l d e l i v e r y a f s u p p l i es t o t h e Army de p ot c ~ n t i n u e di r r e g ul a r l y, a nd a t times t h e st ac ka ge i n t h ~ep:rt neareda c r i t i c a l l e v e l . T his s i t u a t i o n c ~ n t i n u e d e ca use .3f t h es i n g l e t r a c k r a i l r a s d which s er v ed t h e ? s p a t .The bulk of the supp l ies was t ra ns fe r r ed by t ru ck fromthe dep . l t t o f 2rward d i s t r i bu t i n g po in t s . D uring t h i s p e r i A ,t he se d i s t ~ n c e swere extremely gre3t and necessitated AdvanceS e c t i o n C >mmunicati .~nsZane furnishing many helvy truck c.?m-panies t~ augment Army t ra ns p ~rtati .311. S me Class I and I11supp l i e s were de l i ve red by a i r , be ing p laced -mil f ~ r w a r ? ,ft h e d e p . ~ t . These a i r d e l i v e r i e s g r e a t 1 r e l i e v e d t h e c r i t i c a ls i t u a t i n .r\f supply and t r a m p z \ r t a t i>n .9

Alth;\ugh the Arny depL!ts for Classes I , 11, 111, and IV m%aveda t l ea s t mc e du r ing t h i s pe r i .>d , a l l excep t t he dep. )t f.-!r C l as s I T 1staye d ea s t 3f the RHINE River beczuse .?f th e i n a b i l i t y ~f th eArivance S e c t i 'm ~ .xun un i ca t i~>n supp ly F i r s t Army un i t s ac r , s s.?ne t c ~


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4

th e r i v e r . This imm,.rbilizxti .n rf the dep- t , while c mbat un i t sc;lntinue.l t c l m.ve e a s t , re qui red t he tr uc k ct3mpanios t.?t r a v e l a sf a r a s 400 m il es r , ~ u n d r i p d e l i v e r i n g s u p p l ie s . This was causings e r i ~ u s 3m pl ica ti .~ ns n t he a m i l l b i l i t y ?f t ru c k t r n n s p ~ r t a t in.In ea r l y Ap ri l , small dumps f dr Classes I , 11, and I V were lclcatedi n t he v i c i n i t y .*f IZNDERKICH an d WEISSENTHURM, and l a t e r a t s ?mefor ward 3ump a t USSEL, VoLN~RSEN, and WRBURG.

L L ~ h i s t h e , p r i ~ r i t y as swit ch ed fr:m ammunitic.n t .rgas ~ l i n c ; nd c a n st a n t e f f ~ r twas exerted t , i n su re t h a t gas . l i n esup ply waulr! keep up wi th t he advancin g arrn'x-ed ? i v i s i ? n s and~ t h e r s . Since trucks cauld n,.rt keep up th e pace an? ra il ro ad swere stopped a t th e RHIIa River, i t wzs n ecessa ry t o e s t a b l i s h as ix - inch cro ss- r i ver p ipe l in e . "Del ivery a t th e western end wasby tank tr uc k c r r a i l tan k ca r , 2nd gns l l i ne was pumped tb?t . - ragetan ks s e t up Jn th e ea s t s id e zf t h e r iv e r . . . .T J t i e i n wi t hth e pipe l i n e , a decanting pa in t was mdved ta t h e v i c i n i t y > fG I E S S E N . " ~

Salvage co l l ec t ing , maintenance re pa i r s , and &her funct i s>nsf e l l f a r be law what was expected . The f a c t ~ r eh ind the l imi t ingf un ct ia ns was t he l ac k .,f t r a n ~ p ~ ~ r t s t i ~ ~ nvai la b le t a m,me mate r ia lt o the depsts . Thraughaut th is per iod , t rucks hau ling Class Isu p p l i e s fo rward were l ~ a d e dwith p r is m er s of war a r sa lvage f ., rt he r e t u r n t r i p s .

A f t e r l op ki ng a t t h e c o n d i t i s n s af su p p ly agen cie s i n th ecammunicat i?n zane, l e t us ~ n c e ga in tu rn t o the 9 th Armzred


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Div i s io n .Following capture of the REMAGEN Bridge, th er e was ag rea t f lo w of v eh icu la r t r a f f i c th rou gh th e Div i s io n a r eamoving east. The road net , of n ece ssi ty being l imi ted byav a i l a b i l i t y of b r id ge c ro ss in g , cou ple? wi th l im it ed p e r -

son nel a va il ab le and urgency of r ap id movement, imposed ag r e a t problem of t r a f f i c c o n t r o l du ri n g t h i s c r i t i c a l p e ri o d.The Div is ion fo rmula ted and execu ted a t r a f f i c c i r cu la t i onpl an t o permit t he smoothest flow po ss ib le of movement overth e RHINE ~ i v e r . 3

B y 26 March, t he o ute r c r e s t of enemy re si st an ce co ntain ingth e bridg ehead kad been broken, and the 9 t h Armored Di vi si on wasro l l in g eas tward . With t h i s , th e p r io r i ty m s swi tched f rom amrnu-n i t i o n t o g aso l in e , and ev e ry e f fo r t p o ss ib le was ex e r t ed t o k eept h a t gaso l ine supply up wi th the advance .

The ra pi d movement and th e g re a t dis ta nc e covered by theDi vis ion a f t e r cro ss in g the MINE River made neces sary un-usu al l y long turn-around t r i p s fo r resupply. The Div is ionu t i l i z e d a l l a v a i la b l e t r u ck s t o e s t a b l i s h and o p er a te g aso-l in e t r uck heads s s c lo se a s p o ss ib le t o r ep len i sh th e l a rg eamounts of gasoline expended .4During t h i s per iod , of the 37 truck companies under Corps

co n t r o l , two were a t t ach ed t o th e 9 t h Armored Div i s ion t o he lpex ped ite th e hand ling of ga sol ine . However, by th e end af March,one of th es e cm pa ni es was ta ke n away f ram Di vis ion . Thus the lo ssduri ng t h i s pe rio d, when supply lin es were extended and l ar ge quan-t i t i e s of gaso l ine were qu ick ly requi rerl,made resupply ? i f f i c u l t .Only by t i r e l a s s and con tinuous ef fo r t af xg a n i c un i t s and thea t tached Q uar te rmaster t rucks was t h i s succ essf u l ly accompl ished;it was of m a t e r i a l a s s i s t a n c e i n e n a bl i n g t h e D i v i s io n t o a t t a i ni t s o bj ec ti ve ,


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Class I an.1 V I supp l ies werc almast the sane as Class 111;us ua ll y th e convoys were made up wi th Clas ses I , 111, a n j V sup-p l i e s , wh i l e C l as ses 11 aria I V were del ivered only as req ues t s ,usual ly weekly.

S t a t i s t i c sD uring t h i s p e r i d , . t he D i v i s i ~ n v ac ua te d o nl y 606

c a s u a l t i e s ; xpended ap pr ax im te ly 303,876 r3unds of 105-mm h ~ w i t -zer ammunitian and. 900 tans .~f m u n i t i ~ n.ther t h a n 105-mm; c.?n-s u e d 1 ,000 ,000 ga l l ans of gas ol in e, 32,000 gal lzns of engine lil,18,000 p~un- 'szf gear lubr icant , and 2 1,000 poun3s ;.f mis ce lla ne >usgrease . A l s ~dur ing th i s ra p id advance, they captured 16 ,770p r i s < ~ n e r sf w ar , I n a d a i t i a n , t he D i v i si a n s u st a in e d t h e f . 3 1 1 ~ ~ -i n g l a s s e s :

K i l le d i n a c t i. ? nWsunded i n ac t i anM is si ng i n a c t i a nMaterial Destroyed :

TanksSP GunsHalf -TracksT ru cks ( a l l t y p e s )

2 211444

NuTES FOR CEiPTER 3' ~ e ~ ~ > r t Opera t i ons , F i r s t U. S. i'irmy,. 23 Februlry - 8 May

1945, p 63.


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3 After-Action Report, 9th ArmoredDivis ion,March 1945,

G-4 Comments.

4 After-Action Report, 9th Armored Division, April 1945.


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CHAPTER 4 EXPAXDING THE BRIDGEHEAD

The 9t h Armcred D i v i s i ~ n , aving perf xmed th e mnstremarkable si ng le f e a t i n m.-vqern m il it ar y h is t .?r;y--that 3f c r -ss-in g th e RHINE River a l m ~ s t n>pp..-se"-f ?und i t s e l f rec rga niz ing .n20 March 1345 i n assembly ar ea s. C;lmbat C?mmana B was c -nce ntrat e?a t LINZ,' n t.m Jn h e e as t bank s f t h e RHINE River th ree k i l .>-meter s s m t h ~ f th e b r id g e th ey ha4 captured seven days bef -re.Combat elements attached were:

27th Armored I nf an tr y Bat ta l i on52d Armored Infantry Battalion60th Armsxed Infantry Battal ion14th Tank B at t a l i on1 6 th Armored F ie l d Ar t i l l e r y B a t t a l io nCompany C , 89th Cavalry Reconnaissance SquadronCompany B, 9t h Armored Engineer Ba tt al io nCcmpany C., 656th Tank Destroyer Ba tt al is nCompany B , 2d Armored Medical BattalianCompany C , 131st Ordnance Maintenance BattalionThe remainder of th e d iv is ia n, w ith the 4828 A n t i a i r c r a f t

A r t i l le ry (AW) Ba t t a l i r n , the 656th Tank Dest rcyer Battali,- . ln( - ) ,and t he 3458th and 3600th Quarter mas ter Truck C-mpanies at ta ch ed ,were s t i l l *?n h e w es t s i d e ~ f t h o r i v e r .

Passing f ' ram contrdl ~f I11 Corps t o V C.?rps a t t h i s t ime,th e d iv i s io n was o rd e red t o a t t zck so u th alo ng th e ea s t b an k oft h e R H I N E , u s in g on ly th e d iv i s i an a l t r o ap s a l r ead y eas t of t h er i v e r . The remainder af t he d i v i s i ~ n as t c ? c r ~ s s n t h e V C .~rp streadway br idg e a t H C I N N I N G E N , s i x k i l m e t e r s s t ~ u t h.f L I N Z . 2
http:///reader/full/Battali,-.lnhttp:///reader/full/Battali,-.ln


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Late i n the af tern? .?n ~f 2 0 March, C.~mbatC,mmand B r e - ce ived z r ii e rs f r am d iv i s i a n t o r e l i e ve e lemen ts >-f t he . 394thInf an try Regiment (99th In fa ntr y D i v i s i ~ n ) .mt h .f HGNNINGEN,and t a be p re p ar ed t o a t t a c k s s u t h ta wa rd EHRENBREITSTEIN,~ a t a macrcs s t he W INE f r .m COBLENZ sJme 30 kila me ters sc uth . This as -s ignment cau ld have been the bas i s f a r t ru e "m iss i .m type : rders ,"b u t , a s s h a l l be s e e n l a t e r s n, t h i s d r i v e t~ the s . -u th evclvedi n t o a s e r i e s of l i m it e d a b j e c t i v e a t t a c k s w hic h d e f i n i t e l ys l ~ w e d h e p r. >g re ss cf t h e ~ i v i s i . : n . ~

Task o rga n i z a t i m fL ?r h i s a t t a ck was as f . r\ ll ?ws:5Combat C.mand A

Headq ua rt ers C~ mpany Cclmbat Ccmmand A Attached 19th Tank B at t a l i Lm Campany A , p l u s m e plat,.cn )f Campany C and mep l a t o m ~ f Campany F, 89t h Cavalry RecannaissanceSquadronCompany A , 9t h Armored Engineer B at ta l i anCompany A , 2 d Armxed Medical Bat ta l ionSupportC.jmpany A, 13 1s t Orrlnance Maintenance Bat ta 1i .m

Combat C . m a n d BHeadquarters Csmpany, Combat Camnand BAttached27th Armsred Inf an t r y B at t a l i on60 th Armored In fan t r y B a t t a l i ~ n14th Tank Ba t t a l i a nC;mpany C ( - m e p l a t o m ) , p l us one p l a t . v n ?fC >mpany E and m e p l a t x n .3f C:mpany F, 89thCava lry Recannais s ance Squadron
http:///reader/full/plat,.cnhttp:///reader/full/plat,.cn


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C Jmpany B , 9th Arm~rcc!Engineer Ba t ta l ianCompany B, 2d Armdred Medical B a t t a l i ~ nBat te ry B , 482d A n t i a i r c r a f t B a t t a l i mCompany C , 656th Tank Destroyer Battalian

16th Armxed Field A r t l l e t y B a tt al ic nCompany C , 13 1 s t Ordnance .Maintenance B at ta li znCombat C~mmandR-

Headquarters Campany, C~mbatCcmmand RAttached52d Armxed Infan try B nt ta l i ?n2d Tank 0attali .m

The 27th Armxed Inf ant ry Ba tta lio n mmed t c HHONNINGENduri ng th e n igh t ~ f 20-21 March and s ho rt ly a f t e r ni.,Jn .-f th e 21 sthad ta ken mer the ar sa ~c c up ie d y th e 18th Cavalry Squadrzn andth e 3d Battal i .?n, 394th Infa ntr y Regiment, e a st and s> ut he as t fHAMMERSTEIN. The 60 th Armored I n fan t ry B a t t a l i 'm , prepa red t - Jf l ~ l l o wp the advance s f the 27th , moved t o the v ic in i t y - ~ fH ~ M M E R S T E I N ~lon g wi th o th er elements df t h e command.

Orders were received la te i n th e a f te rn jon af 21 March t ca t t ac k a t 0700 th e f ~ l l ~ w i n g,~rning,advance t o th e WEID River ,es ta b l i sh a b ridgehead and await fu r th er ~ r d e r s . Plans werecmrd imted wi th the 38 th In fan t ry Reg iment (2 d In fan t ry Div is i .>n)a t ta c k in g J n t h e l e f t 7

Whilo these plans were i n prag ress, C~mbatCm~nandB 1v.ti t s c~mmandinggeneral, William M. H>>ge, t h r m g h h i s t r a n s f e r f rs mthe 9th ti? th e 4 t h Armored D iv is im . C.l~n el Harry W. Jchnsm


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suoceeded h h as C.>mbat Command Cornrpander .8 Because of t h i s change,Canbat C.>mmanr!A was arderer l t o move e as t . ~ fhe RHINE R iv er ~ ? n22 March, assume command of Cambat Csmmand B t r .x?ps , and carryo u t th e i r m iss io n . The change'mer was n,>t e f f ecte-!, h?wever, u n t i l1000 h..>urs, 23 March.

The attack jumped off as planned, and the C.mbat Clmnand. .b jec t ive , NEUWEID, was a t t a i n e d by 2300 h.:urs an t h e 2213. Typ ic a ld el ay in g a c t i > n t a c t i c s had been met. H as ti l y emplaced miness l.?wea th e Fr ,>gress of th e tanks a t sev era l p y in ts . B l , , w n brirlgesan.! mined approaches i n t h e i r sect. .>r f l ~ r c e Ah e 60th Arm,?reJ In-f a n t r y Batta1 ii.n and Clampany B, 14th Tank Bat tal i% .n, t .?use abrie!ge i n th e 2d I n f a n t r y D i v i s i . ~ n ect,:r t . ~h e n ~ r t h . The 2 7t hArmxed Inf an tr y B at ta li Jn , .,n t h e r i g h t .:f the 6Wh, made as sa ul tc ra ss in gs :f t he WEID R ive r me r f . ~> tb r i d g esn th e i r sect,.r u nde rheavy f i r e f r ~ m 0 and 40 mil l ime ter an t i a i r c r a f t guns. Enemydefenses , s tubb :rn when f i r s t encountered, faded away a t each

success iv e p ~ s A typical examplet i m b e f me ca .> rd imted a t t ack s .accurred a t NEWYEID, which had been s tr on g ly defended u n t i l t h e27th Armxed Infan t ry Bat ta1 i .m mdunted a co ~r d i na te d t t ac ksu pp o rt ed by in t en se a r t i l l e ry co n cen t ra t i an s , T h e a r t i l l e r yprepara t ian ev iden t ly canvinced the defenders , f.->rt h e B a t t a l i o nr e p ~ r t s t h e town was c l ea ne d o ut w it h l i t t l e r e s i s t a n c e , r 10

On the 23d, p a t r ~ l s r . ~ m oth the 27th and 60th Arm-redI n f a n t ry B a t t a l i . ~ n s e p x t e a no enemy c m t a c t t~ t h e f r n n t f ~ r1500 yar ds. On the 24th, b.?th b at ta l ic ns mL-verl f ~ r w a r d .3me


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2G 0 0 y a r d s a g a i n s t l i g h t , s c a t t e r e d r e s i s t a n c e , expatldinp; t h e i rbr id ge he ad over t h e T'JEID t o t h e sou- t'n and ea s t . Troops engagedwere now a t t a ch e d t o Combat Command A . Combat Command B had movedback t o LEXTTE3DORF where t h e s t a f f was employed t o f i t i d a r ea s f o rar1.d co or d i na te ~ov e rn en t c r os s t h e RHINE o f t h e rem a in in g e l em en t so f t h e D i v i si o n .. 11

A t 050 0 h o u r s on 25 March, Combat Command A c o n t i n u e d t h ea t t a c k s o u t h t o s e c u r e a b r i d g e h e a d o v er t h e LOTTR R i v e r i n t h ev i c i n i t y of VALLL:JDiiR, The 27 th Armored It fa nt ry B a t t a l i o n cl ea r edENGERS w h i l e t h e 6 0 t h Ar mo re d I n f a n t r y E a t t a l i o n r e d u c e d BEWORFa g a i n s t h a l f h e a r t e d r e s i s t a n c e . Approximti te ly 150 e n e m y s o l d i e r ss u r r e n de r e d w i t h o u t m c h f i gh ti :l g. A ~ t i t a n kmines wh ich had b eenh a s t i l y l a i d i n t h e s t r e e t s by t h e e n ex y w er e removed b y c i v i l i a n sb e f o r e o ur t r o o p s e n t e r e d .

As soon as t h e 6 0 t h Armored I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n e n t e r e dBEYDGRF, it w as o r d e r e d t o move s o u t h , b y p a s s t h e t m n o f VIEITERS-ETRZ and a t t a c k VliLIJE DAR w h ic h s a t a s t r i d e t h e LO:f,9 R i v e r a t i t sj u n c t i o n w i t h t h e RVI:JE. The B a t t a l i o n Cozmander ord ere d Company At o f o l l m t h e R a t t a l i o n t o a p o i n t i n t h e v i c i n i t y of IfiJEITmSBSTRG,send a p l a t o o n t o occupy the town , a n d a w a i t f u r t h e r o r d e r s . Thep l a t o o n a c c o m p l i s h e d i t s missi .on , t a k i n g a p p r o x im a t e l y 4 0 FVds.

COP-pany F was g i ve n t h e mis s ion o f c l ea r i ng BENDORF, a f t e rwhich i t w a s t o r e l i e v e t h e p l a t o o n i n WEITERSBURG a n d r e v e r t t ob a t t a l i o n r e s e r v e . 1 2 The n e t r e s u l t o f t h e b a t t a l i o n commander I sa c t i o n h e r e w as t o t i e down Co np a ni es A and E i n an d n e a r
http:///reader/full/missi.onhttp:///reader/full/reserve.12http:///reader/full/missi.onhttp:///reader/full/reserve.12


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I'iEITERSWRG, a town he had be en t o l d t o by pa ss . Both t h e 2 7 th an d 6 0 th k rm ored In f an t ry B a t t a l i o n s j o in ed

i n t h e a t t a c k on VALUNDAR. Progr ess was a lmos t comple te ly s toppedon s e v e r a l o c ca s io ns d u r i n g t h e a f t e r n o o n by t e r r i f i c b a r r a ge sf rom 20 and 40 mi l l im ete r a n t i a i r c r a f t g uns l o ca t e d on t h e h i g hg ro un d s m t h of t h e to wn . The town was enveloped f rom th e e a s t byCompany A, 60th k rmored In fa n t ry Fa t t a l io n , and by 04CO hours ont h e 2 6 t h , VALLENDAR ha d b e en c l e a r e d a nd t h e h i c h gr oun d t o t h es o u th , wh ich was t h e f i n a l o b j ec t i v e , had b een o ccu pi ed.

I n d i sc us si n g t he f i e l d a r t i l l e r y p hase of t h i s d r i v es o u th f ro m th e R E M A G E N Bridgehead t o VhLLEi4JlkR, N a jo r ( t h e n c a p t a i n )George I . Taylor, who commanded Battery C , 3d Armored F i e l d Ar t i l l e ryB a t t a l i o n , s t a t e d :

A p la to o n of t h e .UA's was a lway s a t t ach ed t o t h e 3 d andwere he l d i n h ig h rega rd . S inc e th e Luxembourg days i nNovember, t h e &&-FA c oo pe ra ti on l e f t n o t h i ~ g o be d es ir e d.They were always on the job. Task or ga ni za t i on of t h e CombatCommand va r i ed s l i g h t l y f rom day t o day , b u t i n ge ne r al t h e3d w as i n s u p po r t of t h r e e r e i n f o r c e d b a t t a l i o n s who w e rev e ry o f t e n a s s ig n ed or chang ed m i s s io ns i n a m a t t e r ofminutes . I t was i n t e r e s t i n g and c a l le d f o r a l e r t a r t i l l e r y ,b u t t h e d r a i n of f o u r l i a i s o n s e c t i o n s and s i x o bs e rv ers ec t i o n s u s i n g t an k s , h a l f - t r a ck s , and p eeps was a h eavyone. I t was r e g r e t t a b l e t h a t t h e e x p e r t s who d e si gn e d t h et a b l e s of o rg an i za t i o n were n o t made t o f i g h t . t h e i r ownp ap er u n i t s . The b a t t a l i o n wos a lw ay s u n d e r s t r e n g t h i no f f i c e r s , m e n . a n d v e h i c l e s . 13

Du r in s t h i s f o ur -d ay a c t i o n (22 -2 5 arch) t h e D i v i s i o n h a dd r i v en some 20 k i l o m e te r s u p s t r eam p a r a l l e l t o t h e REfIiJE i n co u n t ry

a s u n s u i t ed t o t h e employment o f a rmo r a s co u ld be encountered.I n a n ar ro w zone b e tween t h e r i v e r and t h e m ou ntaino us b l u f f s wh ich


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--

r i s o heycnd i t s na rr ow v a l l e y , t h e 9t:i had s x ~ a . : ~ d e dthe 2EXASEXBridg eh ead s u f f i c i e n t l y f o r t h e o p en in g of e. d r i v e d ee p i n t ocentral .?ermany.

The f ight inp; on th e 25th of hTarch f o r th e h ic h groundbelow TTALL!!VDAR had bee n b i t t e r , and t h e adva nce c on si de ra bl yhampered by th e rugged coun try and by th e dogged re s i s t an ce oft r o o p s from a German a n t i a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y t r a i n i n g ce n t er . Thef i r e fr om enemy m l t i p l c i a : . ~ t i a i r c r a f tmounts was d i r e c t ed ag a i n s to ur t ro o p s t h ro u g h o u t t h e 2 5 th an d ~ l l ofur in g thc: n ig h t th e25th-26th . k t t i m c s t h i s f i r e r e n de r e d t h e m ai n su p pl y ro ad5c ;tween ViiLLEI\JDkR and BElKIORF impassable. Over 500 p r i s o n e r s werecap tu red d u r in g t h e f o u r -day p e r io d . 14

h ia in rou t es were avo ided dur ing th e o per a t i on , whereverp o s s i b l e . T h ir d an d f o u r t h c l a s s r o a d s and e v en t r a i l s vlere u s e di n an end eav or t o b y pas s enemy p o in t s of r e s i s t an ce , know-I t o b eal on c th 6 m;>in rou tes . of advance. Task fo r ce s wi t h i n t he Combat

Somniand were , s o f a r a s p ra c t ic cb ls , r o t a t e d p e r i o d i c a l l y . 1 5The Dr ive t o Limburg

The 9t h Armored D iv is io n was o rder cd by V Corps t o a t t x c kt o t he e a s t on 26 F.'arch w i t h tsvo combat comrnands ab r e a s t , pa ss in gth rough th e 2d In fa n t ry Div i .s ion i n t h e v i c i n i t y of Gi?EXZY!USEN,and s ecu re b r i d g eh eads ac r c s s t h e LAFIB R iv cr a t DIEZ and L I ? G Z R G . .These tojvns wer e t o bc s ecu rcd an d h e ld u n t i l t h e a r r i w . 1 of T h i rdArmy troops, f ol lav j . ag w hi ch t h e D i v i s i o n w as t o c o n t i n u e
http:///reader/full/ollavj.aghttp:///reader/full/ollavj.ag


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t h e a d va nc e t o t h e e a s t a nd s e c u re t h e LIiT3N R iv er l i n e i n t h ed o f p s s e c t o r . F o r t h i s d r i v e , t h e 3 8 t h I n f a n t r y R egim en t (2 dI n f a n t r y ~ i v ii o n ) w as a t t a c h e d t o t h e 9 t h Armored D i v i s i o n ; a n d ,i n tu rn , t h e 2d i3a t ta l io n t o Combat Command A; and the Regiment ( - )t o Combet Command B. 16

Combat Command k w as p la c ed on t h e r i g h t ( s o u t h ) f l a n kw i t h DIEZ i t s o bj ec ti ve ; Combat Command B was t o advance on th el e f t (n o rt h) f l a n k , moving on LIMWJRG.

T ask o r g a n i z a t i o n wa s a s f o l l o w s : 17

Combat Command AHeadquarters Company, Combat Command A

6 0 t h Armored I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n1 4 t h Tank B a t t a l i o n3d Armored F i e l d i i r t i l l e r y E a t t a l i o n2d F a t t a l i o n , 3 8 t h I n f a n t r y Beg im en tCompany C , plus one platoon of Company E and one

pl at oo n of Company F, 89 th Cavalr y Reconn aissanceSquadron

Company '-,9th Armored Znginee r B a t t s l i on"ompany B , 2d i rmored Medica l Ba t t a l ionB a t t e r y A, 4 8 2 d A n t i a i r c r a f t ( i ! ) F a t t a l i o nCompnny ?, 6 5 6 t h T a n k D e s t r o ye r E a t t a l i o nS u p p o r tCompany C , 13 1s t Ordnance Main tenance Ra t t a l io n

"ombat Command BYeadquarters Company, Combnt Command EA t t a c h e d

, 52d Armored I n f a n t r y Ba t t a l i o n1 9 t h Tank F a t t a l i o n1 6 t h Armored F i e l d ~ i r t i l l e r y a t t a l i o n


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3 8 th J r z f an t ry Rcg im n t ( - )Compc.ny i:, plus one platoon of Compr.ny E r'.nd onep l ~ t o o n f Company F, 8 9 th Ccv a l ry R~ co n n a i s s an ce

SquadronCompany E, 9th Armored Fng inee r B at tc l i onCompany i,, 2d l~rmorodM ed ica l Ba t t a l i o nB a t t e r y D , 4 8 2 d b L n t i a i r c rn f t (!a)B a t t a l i o nCompany A , 656th Tank Des t royer Bat ta l ionSuppor tCompany A, 131st Ordnancc ?d7aintcnanceB a t t a l i o n

Combat Command RHeadquarters Company, Combat Command RAt tach ed2 ? th Armored I n f a n t ry B a t t a l i o nZd Tank B a t t a l i o n89th Cavalry Recontmissnnce Squadron ( - )B a t t e r y B , 4 8 2 d A n t i a i r c r a f t (AK) B a t t a l i o n

Combat Cormand B marched a t 0800 on tho 26 th wi th t h ercco n n a i s s o n ce t ro o p l ead in g . A f t e r a n a l mo st u no p~ os ed dvcince,th ey reac hed LIMBURG l c t e i n th e a f te rno on. . The move had beenr e s t r i c t e d o nl y hy p as sa ge t h r o u ~ h h e 2d I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n l i n e s ,

a blown ov er pa ss , and one roa d c r a t e r . The advc nce on LIMBURGtu rn ed out t o be a q u es - t i o n of moving a s f a s t a s p o s s ib l e .

A t one p o in t i n t h e ad van cc, h owev er , i n t h e woods wes tof FPONTABAUR, a German razd b lo ck s u p p o rt ed by a r t i l l e r y h e ld u pth e r eco n n a i s s an ce t ro o p which w c s t o o l i g h t t o remove t h e r c s i s -t a n c e , The t r o o p w as s i d e s t ep p e d t o t h e r i g h t an d g i v e n t h emiss i on o f ma in ta i n ing c on ta c t wi t h Combat Command k under Co lonelHar ro ld . The l ead in g r e in f o rce d b a t t a l i o n was g iv en t h e m i s s io nof le ad in g t h e advance. Sh or t l y t h e r e a f t e r , Combat Comrnnnd B
http:///reader/full/Compc.nyhttp:///reader/full/Compr.nyhttp:///reader/full/Compc.nyhttp:///reader/full/Compr.ny


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crushed i t s w ay t h ro u p h t h e o p p o s i t i o n . Fu r th e r co m p l i cn t io n s d cv c lo p ed when t h e l ead b e t t a l i o n ,

di sc ov er in g t h a t a br id ge was blown on t h e AUTOBAHN e a s t ofMONTABtUR, de to ur ed th ra ug h t h a t town. Fol low ing el em en ts missedt h i s de to ur 2nd moved on t o th e IJJTOBAHN, ne ce ss i t n t in g t h e column'sdoub l ing back on T h i s mi sh ap , wh ich l e f t o ga p i n t h ecolumn of a b o ut 1 0 m i l e s , l a t e r ha d c o n s i de r c b l e e f f e c t i n t h e a t t a c kon LIMBURG..

Upon r ea ch in g t h e IIUTOBAHN a t I\TO?!Ti,Bi,UR, Combat Cormand Eencoun tered a combat command of t h e 7 t h Armored Di vi si on underC o l o n c l T r i p p l e t t . t conference be tween Colonel Harry W . Johnson(commanding Combat Commcnd B ) a n d C o l o n e l T r i p p l e t t i n d i c a t e d t h a tt h e r e wa s a p p s r e n t l y a t i e - u p i n o r d e rs fr o m C or ps, i n a s m c h a sh i s o b j ec t i ve w as a l s o LIbWRG. I n v e s t i g a t i o n r e v e ~ l e d h a t h i sor de rs had bee n changed bu t he had not been informed. 1 9

\while messages went ba ck th rou gh command cha nne ls t oco r r ec t t h i s e r r o r , t h e co lum ns k ep t moving. Fo r ab o u t a n h o u rboth combat commands were racing abreast :!om t h e PJJTOBJIHN f o rLIhrIBURG. P ee ps w er e f o r c ed t o t r a v e l 35 mph t o k eep u p wi th t h et a n k s i n t h e column. Orders were f i n a l l y changed f o r Co lonelT r ip p l e t t , however., an d h i s column tu rn ed n o r th and e a s t , w h i l eColonel Johns on 's combat command cont inued t h e i r d ri ve t oL I M B J R G . ~ ~

Meanwh ile, i n t h e Combat Command A s e c t o r , p o s i t i o n s hadb een co n s o l i d a t ed n lo n g t h e h ig h g rou nd s o u th o f VALLENDAR b y e a r l y


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ro r n in g o f th e 26 th ; and u t 1130 hours , th e cormand was re l ie ve dof r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e a r e a by t h e 2 7 t h . rm or ed I n f a n t r y Ba t-t a l i o n un de r Combat Command R.

Combzt Comrr,and h launched i t s a t t a c k t o t h e e a s t a t 1 500hours on th e 26 th wi th DfEZ a s i t s ob je ct iv e. Movemont on HILL-SCHEID w a s made i n one co lumn where l i g h t re s i s t an ce was e l imin a tedb y a r t i l l e r y f i r e . Company B , 60 th Armored Infantry B a t t a l i o ndelayed i t s adv an ce l o n g en m g h t o ch eck HILLSCHEID thorough ly .The rema inde r of t h e combat command se pa ra te d i n t o two colu mnsand con t inued eas tward .

S t an d in g b es id e h i s p eep , Co lo n el Ha r ro ld h ea rd t h e d iv i -s i o n commander announce over t h e r a d i o t h a t Combat Command B,r ac in g dawn t h e AUTOWHN a t 35 mph i n d w b l e columns, had re ache dLIMBURG, t h e i r o bj ec t i ve f o r t h e next day. At th e t im e, no oner e a l i z e d t h a t t h i s was t h e s t a r t i n g s i g n al f o r t h e r a ce of t h earmored d iv i s io ns ac ro ss Germany. I t was t o b e t h e F i r s t , T hi rd ,and Nin th American Armies compet ing da i l y fo r pu b l ic i t y andm i l eag e . Once ag a in , a rmo r was i n t h e ex p lo i t a t i o n .

Combat Command A reached th e wes t bank of th e L A H N Rivero p p o s i t e DIE2 a t 19 50 t h a t n ig h t . Lead e l emen t s of t h e 6 0 thArmored In f an t r y Ba t t a l i o n , whose o b j ec t i v e i n c lu d ed t h e e s t a b -l i s h m e n t of a br i d ge h e ad o ve r t h e r i v e r , met t h e i r f i r s t or g an i ze dre s i s t an ce of th e day f rom a g roup o f s tubborn enemy dug i n on t h ee a s t b an k.

A l l b r i d g e s ov er t h e r i v e r i n t h e b a t t a l i o n ' s s e c t o r had


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been b lown; and L ieu ten an t Co lonel Co l l in s , t h e b a t t a l i o n commander,o r de r ed t h e a t t a c h e d E ng in e er P l a t o o n t o c o n s t r u c t n f o o t b r i d ge .F u t b e ca u se of t h e w i d t h , d e p th , a nd s w i f t c u r r e n t of t h e r i v e r ,such a b r i d g e c o ul d b e c o n s t r u ct e d o n l y a t p o i n t s w e l l c ov er ed b yobserved enemy small arms f i r e wi t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t t h e e ng in ee rmiss ion cou ld no t be accompl i shed . 21

A tt em pt s t o f ,o rd t h e r i v e r f a i l e d , and p a t r o l s w er e u n a bl et o f i n d c r o s s i n g p o i n t s o n e i t h e r f l a n k of t h e c ombat c o n ~ a n dsector. Company B, 1 4 t h Tank Ba t t a l i o n , was t h e n o rde red i n t of i r i n g p o s i t i o n s on t h e w e s t b an k of t h e r i v e r a nd p u l v er i z e d t h eb u i l d i n g s a nd p o s s i b l e enemy f i r i n g p o s i t i o n s on t h e e a s t b an k.A t da yl ig h t t h e nex t morn ing, Companies B and C , .Goth ArmoredI n f a n t ry B a t t a l i o n , w e re s e n t n o r th t o t h e v i c i n i t y of LIMEWRG,where a cr os si ng hod be en e st a bl is he d by Combat Command B, w i t hth e m i s s io n of c ro s s in g t h e r i v e r and a t t a ck in g DIEZ f ro m t h en o r th an d ea s t .

m i l e t h i s m aneuver w as i n p r og r es s , a n u n i d e n t i f i e de n g in e e r s o l d i e r swam t o t h e e a s t b an k o f . t h e r i v e r a t t h e s o u thedge of DIEZ and untied n l o n g b a rg e an cho red t h e re . S i n c e t h eb a r ge was l o n g e r t h a n t h e r i v e r was wi de a t t h a t p o i nt , t h e ba r g ewas p u l l e d d i a g o n a l l y a c r o s s t h e r i v e r , f or mi ng a f o o t b r i d g eover which Company li, 6 0 th h rm ored I n f a n t ry Ba t t a l i o n , p a ss ed. 2 2

Ps y ch o lo gi ca l wa rp a re p l ay ed a m ino r b u t y e t im p o r t an tr o l e a t t h i s s t a g e of t h e o pe r at i on s. h p owerf u l p u b l i c ad d r e s ss y s tem h ad b een made av a i l a b l e t o t h e 6 0 th Armored In f an t r y


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B a t t a l i o n , a nd t h i s w a s s e t up on th e wes t bank of t h e L A H N Riv e r .K ar ni ng s w er e b r o a d c a st t o t h e c i v i l i a n s a nd s o l d i e r s on t h e o t he rs i d e wh il e Company A c l e a r e d t h e c i t y . Due t o t h e e f f e c t s of t h et an k s f i r i n g d u r in g t h e n ig h t , t h e s p eedy c ro s s in g of Company A ,a nd t h e w a r ni n g s b r o a d c a s t t o t h e p e o pl e an d s o l d i e r s , t h e d u g- i nenemy on t h e e a s t ba nk of t h e r i v e r and t h o s e i n p o s i t i o n i n t h etown of DIEZ s u rr e nd e re d w i t h o u t f u r t h e r r e s i s t a n c e . 23 s e v e r a lo f f i c e r s en d o ve r 200 en l i s t ed men v rerc tak en p r i son er . The tmrnwas quickly checked and outposted,

D ur in g t h i s f i v e - d a y p e r io d ( 2 2 - 27 Narch) t h e 9t h ArmoredDiv i s i o n h ad ad vanced t h e f r o n t l i n e s some 68 m i le s , c ap tu red2 ,5 18 p r i s o n e r s , and e s t a b l i s h e d c o n t ac t w i th t h e T hi rd .Army n o r th

1. Although t h e Div is i on had been g iven "miss ion type t 'o r de r s f o r i t s i n i t i a l br ea ko ut f rom t h e RELYLGEN Bridgehead, i tf a i l e d t o t a k e ad va n ta g e of t h e s e o rd e r s and of t h e r ap id lyweakening German s i tuat ion, and caused i t s combat commands t omake l i m i t e d o b j e c t i v e a t t a c k s w hi ch d e f i n i t e l y s low ed t h e p r o-g re s s of t h e Div i s i o n .

2 . World War 11 t a b l e s of orge.nizat ion and equipment ,p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r t h e 105 m i ll i me t er h m ri tz e r f i e l d a r t i l l e r yun i t s , were demons t ra ted t o have been ex t r emely weak i n manpowera nd t r a n s p o r t a t i o n f o r t h e d u t i e s of l i a i s o n a nd fo r wa r d o bs er va -t i o n . T h i s s h o rt c om i ng h a s b e e n c o r r e c t e d i n p r e se n t -d a y t a b l e s


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of o rgan iza t ion .3 . One phase of psychologi~celwarfare proved i t s p r a c t i c a l

v a lu e i n comb&t d u r in g t h e p e r i o d co ve red b y t h i s ch ap t e r .

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 4

l ~ f t e r - ~ c t i o n Combat Command B, 9th Armoredeport ,Divis ion, hfarch 1945, . p 11.' ~ f t e r - ~ c t i o nRepor t , . 9 th Armored Div is ion , Blarch 1945 ,

p 2 2 .' ~ f t e r - h e t i o n Repo rt, Combat Command B , 9t h ArmoredDivision, March 1945, p 11.4 ~ f t e r - ~ c t i o n 9 t h Armored D i v i s i o n, March 1 94 5,eport ,p 2 2 .

' ~ f t e r - ~ c t i o nRepor t , Combat Command F, 9t h krmoredDivision, March 1945, p 11.

' A f t e r - ~ c t i o n Rep ort , Combat Command A , 9th ArmoredDi vi si on , March 1945, p 17.1 0 k f t e r - ~ c t i o n Rep or t , 2 7 th h rm orcd In f a n t ry Ba t t a l i o n ,

March 1945, p 8.l l ~ f t c r - ~ c t i o nRepo rt , Combat Command B , 9t h IIrmoredDiv isi on, March 1945, p 12. .1 2 [L f t e r - ~ c t i o n ep o r t , 6 0 th Armored In f an t ry Ba t t a l i o n ,

h5arch 1945, p 9.13b1a jor George I . T ay lo r , L e t t e r In t e rvi ew.l 4 ~ f ' t e r - ~ c t i o neport , Combat Coinmand A , 9th ArmoredDivision, Blarch 1945, .p 19.


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16i,fter-dction Report, 9th ;&rmored Div is io n, March 1945,p 22 .

1 8 ~ o l o n e l a rr y W . Johnson, L et t er Interview.

20,1f'ter - t ac t ion ~ e ~ o r t 9 th Armored'Combat Command B ,Division, March 1945, p 12.2 1 ~ f t e r - k c t i o n Report, 60th ~rmore 'd nfa n t ry Bat ta l ion ,March '1945, p 10.

2 4 ~ f t e r - ~ c t i o neport , 9th Armored D ivi sio n, l a r c h 1945;passim.


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CHAPTER 5 THE REDUCTION OF LIMBURG

Operating under Let te r of Ins t ruc t ions , V ( 'orps, 26 March1945, the 9th Armored Divis ion launched i t s a t t ack on LIMBURG--akey communication cen te r , the capture of which was vi ta l to futureoperat ions to the north and eas t . Vlbile Combat Command A wasseeking a cross ing of the LiLT-IN River (canal) in the v ic in i ty ofDIEZ, Combat Command B had run in to a two-pronged problem a tLIMBURG. The reduct ion of LIMBURG included not only a r i ve rcrossing in the face of hos t i le r es i s t ance , but a lso the reduct ionof a bui l t -up area .

The Combat COITllllf.lnd B task organiza t ion during t h i s periodi s indica ted below:

Combat Command BColonel Harry VI!. Johnson, Commanding

Headquarters Company, Combat Command B19th Tank Bat ta l ion52 d Armored Infantry Bat ta l ion16th Armored Fie ld A r t i l l e ry Bat ta l ion38th Infant ry Regiment ( - 2d Bat ta l ion)Company C - on e platoon, Company E - on e pla toon ,Company F, 89th Cavalry Reconnaissance SquadronCompany B, 9th Armored Engineer Bat ta l ionBat tery D, 482d Ant i a i r c r a f t Art i l l e ry Bat ta l ionCompany f ~ , 2d Armored Medical Bat ta l ionCompany A, 656th Tank Destroyer Bat ta l ionCompany A, l 3 l s t Armored Ordnance Maintenance Bat t a l i on"During the day, 26 March 1945. Company C, 52 d il.rmored

Infan t ry Battal ion, was a t tached to the 19th Tank Bat t a l i on whichwas leading the Combat Command B column. Only l i g h t opposit ion

35


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w ~ s met o.s the column approached LIMBURG from thE; north. ,,1 Nearthe LiI.HN River (canal), i t was suddenly noted by the leading ele-ments that the main bridge was s t i l l intact . The lead tanks madea ru n for i t - - four succeeded in crossing th e bridge before i t waSblown by the enemy. Separated from the infantry and the remainderof the batta l ion, ' these four tanks were soon immobilized. Fortun-ately the tank crews were no t a ll casualties. Although they couldno t maneuver, the tanks continued to f ire with the i r guns.

Company C, 52d Armored Infantry Battalion, attached to the19th Tank Battalion, was given the mission of finding an entranceto the ci ty . This i t succeeded in doing by repairing the railroadbridge into the ci ty to th e extent that infantry could cross dis-mounted. Soon after entering the c i ty , Company C ini t iated thereduction against moderate to s t i f f resis tance. This infantrycompany progressed favorably unt i l 261730 March, at which timethe reduction of the ci ty was assigned to the 52d Armored InfantryBattal ion. Company C was relieved from i t s attachment to the 19thTank Battalion and reverted to the control of i ts parent uni t . I twill be noted here that the Company had been engaged in this f ightwi th none of i ts share of the batta l ion supporting weapons. A llof these weapons were under bat tal ion control for the advance toLIMBURG. 2

Upon the assignment of the reduction mission to the 52dArmored Infantry Battalion, Companies A and B were rushed into theci ty . Company A was moved into the l ine on the l e f t of Company C

36


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and was given th e mission of advancing throo/!:h the center of thecity and seizing the high ground to the sruth and southeast.

At 2200, Company B was moved across the r iver to take upa posi t i on on th e le f t of C:olfipany A. At th i s time, the 52d'ss u p p o ~ t i n g weapons were attached to the assaul t companies to pro-vide close mortar and machine gun support during the reduction;however, the machine gun platoon attached to Company A did notsucceed in locating th e company unt i l daylight 27 March. TheCommanding Officer"," Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 52dArmored Infantry Battalion, stated tha t although LIMBURG was nota large c i ty , i t was one of the most confusing he had ever seen.Due to the i r regular i ty of the streets and the darkness, i t wasalmost impossible to find anything.3

With the three r i f le companies abreast, C on the r ight , Ain the center, and supported by attached machi ne guns, the Battali onadvanced through the city to the southeastern sec to r . The Bat-tal ion mortars furnished support from positions jus t behind theassault companies. They were held under batta l ion control. Nonebut the f i r s t four tanks had succeeded in crossing the r iver andentering the c i ty .

Upon reaching the southeastern sector of the ci ty , theentire Battalion was held up by heavy small arms f ire from thehigh ground just outside the ci ty to th e southeast. Failure toadvance any farther during darkness indicated that a coordinateddaylight attack would have to be made in order to dislodge or

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cJOGtroy the enemy. Plans fo r th i s a t t ack wore made; however, a tdawn on 27 1 , ~ a r c h , a heavy ground fog reduced v is ib i l i ty to theextent tha t an y type of ground operat ions agains t the enemy wasvi r tua l ly impossible . I t wa s not u n t i l 1200 on the 27th of Marchtha t a coordinated at tack with infantry an d tanks reduced thepocket . During the night 26/27 March and during the early morningof 27 March, the 9th Armored Engineer Battal ion had thrown a pon-toon treadway br idge across the canal . This bridge permit ted thepassage of the tanks which joined in the successful a t tack .

During the reduct ion of LIMBURG, 125 of the enemy wereki l l ed , 15 0 wounded, and 1,800 taken prisoner .. w r casua l t ieswere l i g h t to moderate-- the exact f igures for the reduct ion ofLHffiURG were not rec orded as such. t'The 52d Armored InfantryBatta.lion did, however, record three off ice rs k i l led in ac t ion- -two of them being company commanders. This cons t i tu ted a ser iousloss tc a ba t ta l ion . It i s in te res t ing to note tha t a P-47 airplanewas taken i n t a c t and undamaged. ,,4 Company C, 52d :\.rmorcd InfantryBat ta l ion , did not par t ic ipa te in the coordinated at tack on 27March. At 0645 tha t day, Company C wa s withdrawn from the l ine toform the Battal ion reserve. Par t of the Company wa s assigned themission of securing the br idge a t DEHRN. The bridge wa s in tac ta t tha t t ime. This detachment waS withdrawn a t 1230 hours whenit Was discovered tha t the enemy had j u s t blown the br idge.

At 271330 March, the 52d Armored Infantry Bat ta l ion wasnot i f ied tha t Combat Command R would pass through the Battal ion

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zone using the pontoon bridge across the LAHN River . At the samet ime, the Battal ion wa s given the mission of clear ing i t s zone assoon as Combat Command R ha d passed. Companies Band C accomplishedthe clear ing mission and out posted the southern par t of the sectorto the south and southeas t of the c i ty .

At 281445 March, the 52d Armored Infantry Bat ta l ion wasordered to move to OFFHEIM upon completion of i t s r e l i e f by e le -ments of the 2d infantry Divis ion. This r e l i e f waS accomplisheda t 1600,and the Battal ion closed a t O F F H E H ~ a t 1845 hours 28 March.The reduct i on of LHmtJRG was successfu l ly completed. and th i s phaseof the ba t t l e wa s over.

With the recons t ruct ion of the t ac t i ca l phase of the opera-ti .on completE:;, at tent ion rm.J.st be directed to one other phase--thel ibe ra t ion , t reatment , and evo.cuation of the Allied Prisoners ofWar found i.n three hospita ls in LIHEURG. This recount i s includedin t h i s repor t because it i s believed to be an outstanding exampleof the many large and small problems tha t confront the commanderof an exploi t ing force. I t i s fur ther believed to be essen t ia ltha t such contingencies as are descr ibed below be considered inplanning an explo i ta t ion .

The medics sa t a t the rear of the column during the earlyaf ternoon at tack (2 6 March). Between 1600 and 1700 hours(af ter taking care of one of ou r en l i s ted men who had beenshot while searching a Prisoner of War and who l a t e r died) ,I went to the command post on the outsk i r t s of the ci ty and

wa s there told t h a t a Bri ti sh Major General who was a Prisonerof War in the hospita l down the road wanted to see the medicaloff icer .I didn ' t get to see him u n t i l af te r dark, but then went to

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thu h o s p i t ~ l (the new one N. of the r iver) and w ~ s greetedmost graciously (!) by the German Medical Officer in charge.One of the Sisters guided me to the General's room and therea f t e r confusing the dressed aide for the undressed Generalwe had a most delightful chat: The M.G. in his long under-wear and I in a very dir ty and unkept outf i t considering i t sone day's use. Major General Fortune was most informative.He had been a Prisoner of War since 1940. Being the rankingBrit ish P.W. he had been allowed l ibert ies of the GermanPrisons and hospitals and had been very inf luentia l in keepingthings "in order." He said there were two hospitals on theother side of the r iver , in the ci ty proper, which had manyAllied P.W.'s. One, the larger of the two, was not in suchbad shape. The smaller, however, he said we shoulrl see f i r s t ,for there the conditions were deplorable. We spent a mostpleasant hour as he gave me the information and when I l e f tfu l l arrangements were made for housing our Hedics in thehospital . The Jerry and his "Sisters" real ly dashed out togive us service, clearing ou t a couple of rooms for a l l of usand cu r meager medical set-up and for the f i r s t night in sometime we not only slept in a hospital , but between sheets.The following morning March 27 I went down to the r iverearly and run across one of our Infantry officers there. Viepoled our way across the stream in a boat (the pontoon or newbridge being uncompleted as yet) and went into the town. Fol-lowing the Hajor General's direct ion we went up the hi l l ,stopped in the cathedral mid the stares of the bell igerentand curious krauts , then on down toward the R.R. t racks tothe church alongside of which Was the frame barracks buildingused as the i r hospital . As we approached the church we saw ablack haired G.I. standing in front watching us. Somewhatsurprised a t seeing him (for there were none of our men thereas fa r as we knew) we asked him i f he was a "G.I." "You'redamned r ight ," he answered, "and are we glad to see youl"Briefly the conditions were sad indeed. All told therewere probably only 50 to 75 in this hospital (although Ilearned la ter there were more in the other and larger h'ospi ta lin the other part of town) but these men were in the worsti m a ~ i n ' : l . b l e condition. We were the f i r s t fresh "Americansthey had seen for months or years" and the i r expressions andfeelings were unlimited. Anybody would have thought we walkedthere from Paris a ll alone! Many were nothing but skin andbonesj (one la te r made Life Magazine and syndicated papers inthis country); a l l had infected wounds and or pneumonia oron0 of i ts a l l ies . Post-surgicals, freshly wounded, bellywounds-, cachectic, pneumoniaj French, Brit ish, I tal ians werea l l mixed together. Mainly i f not ent i rely off icers , I neverlearned the i r rank. Part of them were huddled in the framebuilding, but most and the saddest cases had been taken to the

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basement of the church for protection frolf. ~ r t ; l le ry anJbombs (a l l ied) and were bedded down on the cru.J0st of beds,even one on th e concrete mortorium slab, in the cold, dark,damp basement. Our guide (the above mentioned dark hairedlad from Brooklyn) guided us by f lashl ight , with s i lentGermans following us. Russians, Serbs, I ta l ians , Amcrico.ns,Bri t ish , e tc . , officers and enlis ted men alike were there inthis basement. Tears of joy were plent i ful . I walked fromroom to rOOm ut te r ly s t u n ~ e d for i t was my f i r s t contact withsuch conditions. In ooe room perhaps 10 by 10 where the menwere more numerous than the cubic fee t , I hailed them askingi f there were any Americans. A loud chorus of "Hey Joe.""Any.from the 9th Armored?" I asked. A weak answer from thecorner, "Here, s i r !" I walked over there to shine my l ightin the face of a bearded unrecognizable creature. He askedme. what outf i t I was with and when I told him he called me byname. Hy hear t welled up in my throat , and I could say nothingsensible, for here WaS a chap I couldn't name who rememberedme from early Sblte days and had been "lost" in the Bulge. Isaw him several times la te r that day and each time he spoke tome and thanked me as i f I had anything to do with i t .But these men had been taken from the i r ward, the barracksoutside, which was nothing but a vermine infested building,stacked with straw t icks , many of which were sp l i t spi l l ingtheir dir ty contents a l l ove r the f loor . Those tha t had beenable to walk got their meals and had to clean the place. Theothers were dependent upoo tho able, and our guide, to feedthem. The b e d - r i d ~ e n were just out of luck, unless somebodyhappened to thin..l( of them. And the one tha t thought of themthe most waS Terry (wish I knew his las t name) the darkhaired Brooklyn lad, a Battalion aid man who had been cap-tured uninjured a t Metz. He had real ly done a fine job.All the men and officers fa i r ly loved him for his heart wast rue . He was more than an orderly, apparently, for he gavethe men sp i r i t and l i fe which they said they would have los tlong ago but for him. He was te l l ing me about i t : "You know,Captai n," he said, "I'm a Jew, and when I was co.ptured I toldthem that . The guard warned me and said I should say I wasProtestant. I did and was glad, for they t reated me bet te r .I speak Jewish," and he f l i r ted his head, "yet these peoplethink I have learned a lo t of German in the past 6 months.Really what I am speaking to them is Jewish!" He was woundedin our a i r attacks and ( is) going back to have some shrapnelremoved from his leg. He said the Germans paid him 41 Marksa month ($4.00)--which he used as to i l e t paper. Terrypractically ran the hospi ta l - - i t was Terry th is and Terrythat espeCially as we spent the remainder of the day evacuatingthese men across th e newly constructed bridge. Even the Jerryhospital personnel came to our Peep to say good-bye as we

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pulled out behind the las t ambulunce to return to "our side"of the r iver .Perhaps I have gone into too nuch deta i l here. Colonel,but th i s was a most impressive incident to me. and may be ofsome value to you. These men were a l l evaouated by noon toour Medical tin which had moved up in the ear ly morning andwere se t up in the h o s p ~ t a l where we had slept ( incidenta l lywhere the photographs were t ~ k e n , while we were busy evacuat-ing the ~ r o u p ) and a l l was under good control . Aside fromMaj. Gen. Fortune in the original and best hospi ta l . I havea few names of those we tOQk out--off icers who were -of greatservice to us in th i s and were most interested in gett ingsome type of commendation for Terry: Capt. John E. Bridgman.Maj. Richard Kirby. Capt. Paul Van Dugucht. 5

EvaluationEvaluation of a specific bat t l e or phase of a campaign is

a part icular ly treacherous undertaking--especially when the evalua-t ion is made five years af te r the action and when the units wereso small tha t h is tor ies are incomplete or non-existent. Completelyunrecorded in a l l but dimming memory are the many variables tha tinfluence the commander's decision--awareness of the bat t le f ie ld ,condition of troops and uni t s , condition and completeness of equip-ment t and pressure from higher headquarters . In many his tor ica lrecords of small u n i t . s ~ such important considerations o.s weather

. and terrain are completely unmentioned. All of the above omis-sions are pertinent to the re.duction of LIMEURG with the exceptionof one cryptic statement conc.crning the ,presence of ground fo g onthe morning of 27 ~ a r ? h .

From the information availo.ble to this committee. i t i s believed tha t the reduction of LU::BURG wa.s not a classic example of the proper reduction of 0. strong PQint impeding an exploiting

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force. In arriving at the above conclusion', t h ( - ~ follovdnl!, pertinentfactors were consid6red:

1. Combat Command B was ordered to march on LIMBURG and toreduce that strongpoint.

2. !n the advance on LIMBURG, the Combat Command B columnbecame separated. A gap of approximately ten miles between elementsof Combat Command 13 resul ted. (This event was reported in the pre-ceding; chn.ph:r.)

3. LIMBURG hud long bvon recognized as a key cOIllIJllnicationcenter in the zone.

4. Combat Command B entered LIMBURG with a tank hea.vy teamleading in spite of the fact that a sizeable r iver had to be cros-sed--probably forced and a sizeable city had to be reduced--pro-bably by building-to-building reduction.

5. Supporting engineers and supporting weapons were notwell forflard in the column.

6. An unreconnoitered night attack was made.7. The night attack was piecemec.l and without detailed

pl3.nning.8. LIMBURG was reduced in less than 24 hours.I t is believed that individual discussion of each of the

above factors would result in placing fa lse value on them. Thisis due to the interrelat ion of a l l factors in combat. Again, fromthe i n f o r m ~ t i o n av::.ilable Combat Command B was ordered to advanceon LIMBURG and to reduce that ci ty as a strongpoint impeding an

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exploiting force. This mission was begun on 26 N.nrch. A tankheavy team, the .l9th Medium Tank Battalion with Company A_ 52dArmored Infantry Ba.tta.lion attached, led this phase. This em-ployment was in ~ t r i c t adherence to the present doctrine of theemployment of armor in the exploitation a.s outlined in FieldManuat 1 7 - ~ O O , As described in the preceding chapter, theCombat COlJlIll!lnd B column became separated when i t turned off theAUTOBAHN to avoid a blwln bridge. This separation could onlyhQve been due to (1 ) incomplete orders or a lack of orders;(2) too much interval in the column; (3) improper route marking;or (4) a combination of the above three. Vihutever the cause, theresult was a ten-mile gap in the Combat Command B column. Thisgap" in a ll probability, had considerable influence in the com-mander's use of troops for the attack of LIMBURG.

The ci ty of LIMBURG had early been recognized as a keycommunication center in this sector of Germany. This aloneshould have been adequate evidence that the ci ty would bedefended to the maxinum possible to include the blONing ofbridges over the LAHN River, or ut least their preparation fordemolit ion.

Thus, faced with the possibi l i ty of having to force ar iver crossing, coupled with the possible task of a building-to-building reduction of a si2eable town, i t is believed that CombatCommand B should have entered LIMBURG with an infantry-heavy teamor at the very l ~ a s t a balanced t a n k ~ i n f a n t r y team. I t is further


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believed tha t with armored infantry in the lead in this case,there was a chance, probably a very good chance, that r.ombatCommand B could ha"e seized the bridge and thus have preventedi ts demolition. Four tanks and much time would have been s a v e d ~ With tanks in the lead, there was l i t t l e or no chance of pre-venting the demolition of the bridge. One could only t rus t toluck tha t i t had not been mined.

In a similar manner J i t i s believed that hud a coordinatedattack been made with th e 52d Armored Infantry Battulion, heavilysupported by tanks and ar t i l lery , LIMBURG could and probably wouldhav8 been reduced during the ~ t e r n o o n or early evening of 26March. In this event, 12 to 18 hours could have been saved, inaddition to the risk of a night attack in an unrecnnnoitered ci ty .

As a result of some a ll of the above-mentioned factorsand contingencies, Combat C o ~ ~ n d B assigned the reduction of thecity of LIMBURG to the 52d Armored Infantry Battalion at 261730March 1945. This bat tal ion was ordered to continue i t s effortsto reduce the ci ty throughout the night 26/27 March. At the latehour of 1730 and during the month of March, there was time forl i t t l e or no daylight reconnuissance by the Battalion less CompanyC. (Attention is invited to the fact that C o m ~ a n y C arrived a tLIMBURG ear l ie r with the 19th Medium Tank Battalion und crossedinto the ci ty via the blown railroad bridge".) In addition to thelack of reconnaissance, the "Battalion was committed piecemeal tothe attack. Company C was committed shortly af ter i t arrived

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with the 19th Tank Bat ta l ion , while Companies A an d B were com-mitted af ter 1730 hours. Objectives assigned, i f any, were notrecorded, nor were boundaries, zonElS of ac t ion . or support. Like-wise. the progress made by the assaul t companies throogh the nightwas not recorded. The After-Aotion Report of the 52d ArmoredInfantry Batta l ion doos ind icu tc . however. t ha t the reduotion wasnot accomplished un t i l a f t e r 271200 March, .when a coordinatedat tack by the Batta l ion. supported by tanks and a r t i l l e r y . suc-ceeded in destroying the enemy on the high ground to th o southeastof tho ci ty . I'n view of whut is known now. the gains : ~ c h i e v e d through the night a.ttack were not worth the calculated r i sk taken

. I t was shown conclusively on two occasions during th isperiod tha t a uni t ordered to make a night at tack m st beallowed ample t ime fo r daylight reconnaissance. for-deta i ledpbnning . and for a thorrugh brief ing of offioers an d en-l i s ted men. To neglect these things i s to court f a i lu re .A properly coordinated and closely supervised In fan t ry-Tank-Arti l lery team proved, during th is period, to be thecombination necessary to gain victory.6

To the credi t of Combat Command B must be added i t s aggres-siveness ~ n d perseverance. LIMBURG was reduced in less than 24hoors and in a very workmanlike manner.

The follO\'ring: principles in the employment of armor in theexploi ta t ion were adhered to :

1. A t '1nk-heavy team led the exploi ta t ion.2. The strong point of LIMBURG. impeding the exploi t ing

fo rce , w ~ s reduced quickly.3. The bridge a t LIMBURG was seized promptly.

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The followi ng principle s wer(;; violuted:1. Infc.ntry was no t used to perform the following tasks,

usually c o n s i ~ e r e d infantry tasks:a. Leading a r iver crossing thnt may have to be

forced.b. The reduction of a c i ty .

2. A piecemeal attack waS made.3 . A dangerous and unnecessary night uttack waS made wi th

l i t t le planning and l i t t le or no reconnaissance.4. Although the bridge a t L I ~ ~ R G waS seized, i t was not

examined for demolition.

NOTES FOR CBAPTER 5

l A f t e r ~ A c t i o n Report, 52d Armored Infantry Battalion,March 1945, p 6.2personnl Interview, Captain J . W. ~ ( i t c h e l l , Commander,Headquarters Company, 52d Armored Infantry Battalion.

40p c i t ~ After-Action Report, pp 6 and 7.5Letter, Dr . R. W. Pomeroy" former Battalion Surgeon,52d Armored Infantry Bnttalion.60 p ci t , After-Action Report, Section IV, BattalionCommander's Comments.

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CHAPTER 6LIMBURG TO W.ARBURG

27 March - 2 Apri 1 1945

With the obstacle of the LAHN River behind, the elementsof the 9th ~ r m o r e d Division were again free to continue theirrace ucross Germany. During this period (27 March - 2 April 1945)the task organization of the 9th Armored Division was as follows:

9th Armored DivisionMajor General John W. Leonard

Combat Command A - Brigadier General Thomas L. Harrold60th Armored Infantry Battalion (attached Company B, 14thTank Battalion, one platoon, Company A, 9th ArmoredEngineer Battalion)14th Tank Battalion (-) (+ attached one platoon Company A,9th Armored Engineer Battalion. Company C, 656th TankDestroyer Battalion)2d Battalion,. 38th Infantry Regiment (+ Company C, 14thTank Battalion and one platoon. Company A. 9th ArmoredEng

WWII 9th Armored Division

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