WWII 8th Army Report

8/8/2019 WWII 8th Army Report

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THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGELIBRARY

GIFTFROM: August E. Schanzc

Col RetCall Number ?ftV

F L Fo rm 887 (Rev ) 22 Oct 52TJSACGSCP9-0798T25M30 Sep 68


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EIGHTH U.S. ARMYINJAPAN

30 Auqust, 1945 I May, 1946


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XT.

E IG H TH U. S. ARMYIN

JAPAN

30 AUGUST 194)5 1 MAY 1946

Printed by Eighth U. 8. Army Printing Plant(Boonjudo Printing Works)

19 4 6


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Douglas Mac ArthurGeneral of the Army


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Robert L. EichelbergerLieutenant General

Commanding GeneralEighth United States Army


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No Army of this war has achievedgreater glory and distinction

than the Eigh th/'-

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0 * "* rTn:>0 AU GU ST 1045 1 MA Y 1946

, only eight months after the cessation of hostilities, American occupation personnelmay travel throughout Japan casually and unarmed, mingling with a bustling, cooperative

Japanese populace tha t almost universally shows great respect for, but little fear of or resen tment toward, the American conquerors. This fact is a profound tribu te to the Am ericansoldier in Japan ; to army organization, planning , leadership, discipline, and esprit de corps.Secretary of War Patterson crystalized the thought when, speaking of Lt. General RobertL . Eichelbe rger's E igh th Arm y, he said, " . . the most striking impression of all, is the impression made by the troops. Every wh ere their conduct is exem plary. . . they are the bestrepresen tatives th e Am erican nation could h a v e .. . It is an Arm y capable of carrying out thedifficult duties of occupation, an Arm y the A merican nation is proud of."

Last summer General Douglas MacArthur had chosen the Eighth Army to make themain th ru st at Japa n. He had assigned ib the leading role in O peration Coronet. SixthArmy was to set up the play w ith Operation Olympic which was to secure airbases on Kyushulate in October. Then early in 1946 the Eig hth with three corps and ten divisions was toapply the crusher with an assault on Tokyo Plainthe heart of Japan.

Abru ptly th e schedule was changed. On 6 August the atomic bomb was dropped onHirosh ima . Two days later Russia plunged into the war as she catapulted her army deepinto Manchu ria. By 10 August the Japanese had had enough it was announced publicly tha tthe Japanese governm ent would sue for peace. Ei gh th Arm y was given the mission of takingover North ern Honshu and Hokkaido. Here was the opp ortunity for the Eig hth to showwhat it could do. The team was in fine shapeready for action. As far back as Jun e,General Eich elbe rge r had directed his staff to begin planning for the eventuality w hichsuddenly had become a fact. Weeks of ten tativ e planning now must be completed in detailand implem ented in a ma tter of days. On the following afternoon, 11 August, the Am phibious Eighth presented a plan to the corps commanders which alerted them for quick action.

On the same day, the crack 11th A irborn e Division was alerted and directed to moveimm ediately by air from Lu;:on to Okinawa. In four short days the division completed the800-mile move.

By 18 August two possible specific invasion plans were ready for submission to theCommanding Generals of X I and X I V Corps. One called for a strong amphibious landingin th e Tokyo-Yokohama area by X I Corps composed of the veteran 1st Cavalry, Americal,and 43rd Divisions and the 112th Cavalry R egimental Combat T ea m ; th e other, for an


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airborne operation involving the 11th Airb orne and the 27th Divisions flying to the Tokyo area,followed by X I Corps amphibious landings on the shores of Tokyo Bay.

Af ter two days of Tokyo via Ber ne to Washington negotiations, the Japanese capitulatedon 15 Au gust. An advance echelon of the Ei gh th Arm y staff was flown to Okinawa to beprepared for any eventuality. They arrived on 19 Au gust. Following conferences in Manilabetween Japanese emissaries and members of General Mar-Arthur's staff, the concept of theoperation was changed entirely . The new plans were predicated upon the full cooperation ofthe Japanese. The enemy forces would be disarmed under their own supervision and theAllied occupation would be a progressive one following demobilization in specified areas. Incontrast to the o riginal concept, the new plan was designed to avoid possible incidents whichmigh t result in renewed conflict. !N"o seizures of disarmaments were to be accomplished byAllied personnel

A small reconnaissance party including Colonel Du nne, the Eig hth Arm y En gin eer,landed at A tsugi Airfield, 20 miles southwest of Tokyo, on the morning of 28 Au gust. Th eprimary mission of this intrepid group was to determine the condition of the airfield andestablish operational facilities.

At daybreak on 80 Augus t, hav ing spanned m ore than 800 miles of ocean, the firstwary paratroopers of the 11th Airborne Division deplaned at Atsugi Airfield to initiate anoperation which, in its own way, was one of the g reates t mili tary gambles of all time. Th issmall group of daring men were landing in a hostile country where they were outnumberedin a ratio of thousands to one by over 4,000.000 men still under arms in Japan. In viewof the doubtful temp er of these Japanese troops, General Eich elberg er flew in early on thefirst day to assume command on the spot and to check preparations for the arriva l of theSuprem e Commander. A short time after General Eichelbe rger had landed, General Mac-Arthur arrived in his C-54, " Bataan." Th e atmosphere was electric with history in themaking as General Mae Arth ur and G eneral Eich elberg er stepped into an automobile to speedto the new Headq uarte rs in Yokohama. Th e road from Atsugi to Yokohama was lined onboth sides w ith armed Japanese soldiers many with their backs to the passing convoyamark of respect reserved previously for the Imp erial family. Th e Japanese government hadplaced a cordon of troops around the airfield and along the road with the specific mission offurnishing complete security for the invading forces. Eve ryw here women and children shylyran in to hid ing, but the men and boys saluted and bowed at the approach of th e paratro ope rs.Th ere was no sign of disturbance or Japanese resistance . Th e reception seemed like achimerical fantasy to the combat-hardened men. Throu ghou t that first day, huge transpo rtslanded at Atsugi Airfield at the rate of almost one every thr ee minutes. By the end of theday, 4,200 troops in 12o j)lanes had completed the move.

Shortly after the first planes had landed, a patrol from the 188th Paraglider Inf antr ysped from Atsugi to the Y'okosuka Naval Base to make contact with the 4th Marine Regimental Cambat Team, which had come under Eighth Army control that morning upon land


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ing am phibiously on. the shores of Tokyo Bay.Aft er being delayed by a typhoon, during the next week the 1st Cavalry Division, the

112th Cavalry Combat Team , and the X I Corps Hea dquarters arrived in Tokyo Bay. Th eAm erical Division arrived in Y okohama on 8 Septem ber. Occupation of Tokyo had beendelayed severa l days to allow the Japanese to disarm th ei r troops within the city. But nowas the Am erical was debarking in Yokohama the 1st Cavalry moved into Tokyo. The A mericanFla g that flew over the Capitol in Washington on the day of Pea rl Harb or was carried tothe Am erican Embassy in Tokyo and ther e in an impressive ceremony General Ma< A rt h ursaid, " Genera l Eic helb erge r, have our country's flag unfurled and in the Tokyo sun let itwave in its full glo ry as a symbol of hope for th e oppressed and as a harbin ger of victo ryfor the right."

In the next five weeks X IV Corps, IX Corps, the 27th, 43d, 97th, 81st; 77th Divisionsand 158th Reg ime ntal Combat Team took up occupation posts in Japan. Through it allGene ral Eichelb erge r toured his units impressing upon the troops the paramount importanceof dress, conduct, discipline, and military courtesyinstilling them with the thought thatthey were the representatives of the United States of America.

The Eighth Army had accomplished its initial missionto bring troops into Japan andoccupy strategic areabut that was not by any means the whole job. While the advanceechelon was still on Okinawa, " mercy teams " were organized to expedite and speed the r elease of the thousands of suffering Allied prisoners in Japanese stockades. These teams wererushed into Yokohama on 30 Aug ust with the advance airborne echelon of Eigh th ArmyHe adq uarte rs. Th ey quickly established contact with the Swiss and Swedish legation, the In te rnational Red Cross, the Un ited States Navy, and the Japanese Liaison Office. The evacuationmachine was primed and put into motion. As a result United S tates planes were swoopingover Japanese prison camps th e very same day to drop food and supplies. Some of the teamsrushed into the interio r to seize camp records for later use in th e War Crimes trials, lestthey be destroyed by recalc itrant camp commanders. In view of the fact that the advanceelements of the Sixth Army did not arrive in Japan until 6 w-eeks later these teams coveredall of Japan to alleviate the suffering of the emaciated prisoners. Allied prisoners were being released and processed for evacuation at the rate of 1,000 per day. In th e liberation ofall prisoners in camps in Honshu, Hokkaido, and Shikoku in only 18 days, Eighth Army wasweeks ahead of the most optim istic pre-occupation time estimates for the ente rprise. In all,.Eighth Army recovered and evacuated 23,985 persons.

Th e prim ary Eigh th Arm y mission in Japan was to insure "' that Jap an conrply withthe terms agreed on in the instrument of surrender and contained in all directives issued to-the Japanese by the S upreme C ommander for the Allied P owers. "

By orde r of the Suprem e Comm ander, the Japanese General Staff was abolished soonafte r our arriv al and in a m onth and one half almost all of the 4,000,000 men of the JapaneseArmy and Navy who had been stationed in Japan were demobilized. G-2 repo rts repeated


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the message, "No disorders, no opposition, cooperation continues," with almost dull uniformitywhile the people of the world looked on amazed as they witnessed the most rapid and fri ctionless demobilization of all time.

The orders of General MacA rthur followed rapidly. War criminals, including To jo,were taken into custody. Th e treacherous Black Dragon Society and secret police were dissolved. Political prisone rs were released. Woman's suffrage was prom ulgated. A free presswas established. The educational system was revised. All legislation controlling freedom ofspeech, press, and religion was abrogated.

As remarkable as was the success of the demobilization and disarmament of the Japanese armed forces, the task would have been incomplete unless accompanied by an equallyexhaustive program designed to dispose of Japanese arms and other war mate rial. The burdenof the task was placed on the Japanese they were ordered to collect all the impedim entaof war and assemble them at such jdaces as directed by local comm anders. Eigh th A rm ytroops accepted the material and then searched the area thoroughly to insure that all equ ipment had been surrendered and that all stationary military installations had been rendered inoperative. All Japanese amm unition, bulk explosives, and other loaded equipm ent found weredestroyed, except for mate rial retained for technical intelligence or other specified purposes .Th is was accomplished by dum ping at sea, controlled detonation, or bu rnin g. To date 683,000long tons of ammunition have been disposed of.

Eighth Army Military Government swung into action to achieve one of the principalobjectives of the occupation to supervise the execution of the directives of the SupremeCommander of the Allied Pow ers. This involved th e shifting of a whole country from totalitarian feudalism to representative democracy. With M ilitary G overnm ent units at key pointsthroughout all Japan, Eighth Army has been able to keep its hand on the pulse of the country.Th e sudden early end of the war found most of the personnel traine d specifically for gov ernin gJapan still in the Un ited States. Th e efficient and economical use of the personnel availableand the ir ability to attain an unusual degree of cooperation from the Japanese served to ov ercome this handicap at the beginning. Th e rapid flow of trained perso nnel from the Statesmade possible a complete and efficient organization of Military Go vernmen t by the third monthof the occupation. Th e E ighth Arm y policy hay been based on the fact tha t the Japanesepeople are responsible for their own condition and that they must work out their own salvationin rebuilding their economy and achieving self govern ment. This was not a passive attitud e.Manu facturing, industry, agricultu re, mining, fishing, commerce and trade, and other phases ofthe economic life of the people have been studied and analyzed ; action was supervised andexpedited with the end in view of making the people self-sufficient as rapidly as possible. He althstandards have been raised considerably to preven t the spread of epidemics. Pub lic welfare ,rationing systems, and price control have been made more efficient. It migh t be simple to te llthe Japanese what to do and force them to do it, but se lf-government and economic self-sufficiencymust be developed by the people themselves. The refore , M ilitary Governm ent has placed the


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responsibility for reform on the Japanese, while making certain that obstacles to the achievement are removed and that both the spirit and the letter of the directives are carried outin full.

By the 18th of December the Eighth Army military tribunals had begun the arduoustask of bringing suspected Japanese war criminals to justice. Already four m ilitary commissions have tried approxim ately 25 cases involv ing about 50 suspected war criminals. Beforethe trials are complete it is expected that over 500 suspected war criminals will have beentried in Eig hth Arm y Courts. Penalties given by the courts have been severe, but both theJapanese and world press have attested to the fairness and justice with which the trials havebeen conducted.

Between six and seven million displaced persons of Asiatic origin had to be eithe rbrought back to Japan or sent to other countries. The responsibility for repatriation wasplaced on the Japanese Gove rnmen t, but E ighth Arm y m ust completely supe rvise the process.Re pat riato n began in October 1945 and is at prese nt in full swing. In the eight pores whererepat riates are processed under the supervision of Eig hth Arm y personnel, there is a flow ofapproximately 11,000 repatriates out of Japan and 80,000 into the country each week. Th ereare still 600,000 foreign nationals in Japan to be repatr iated. 3,800,000 Japanese await re tu rnto their homeland.

On 31 December, with the inactivation of Six Army imminent, Eighth Army took overall the ground forces in the homeland of Japan with her 70,000,000 population.

In order to keep up this hectic pace, Eighth Army has had to maintain militaryefficiency and morale at a high leve l. If the effectiveness of the troops degenerated, litt lecould be accomplished. Of prim e importance was the redeploym ent progra m. Th e 4odDivision, after scarcely three weeks in Japan, had already transferred out all their low-pointpersonnel, had received 5,000 high point men from the 1st Cavalry Division as well as menfrom othe r units and were boarding ships for the Un ited S tates. Plans for demobilization oflarge numbers of men required an organization which would process the returning veteransquickly, efficiently, and co rrect ly. Th e 4th Replacement Depot was assigned the task. TheDepot performed its mission commendably. As an example of efficient redep loym ent, the lastelements of the 27th Division arrived in Japan on the 14th of Septem ber. By the 21st ofthe month, one week later, the first readjustees Were moved to the replacement depot. ByNovem ber the depot was handling 25,000 men per mon th. To date 380,000 men have passedthrough the depot on their way home.

Because of the large turnover it was increasingly important to classify, screen, and givespecialist instruction to all new arrivals from the United States. " On -the- job" training,surveys of skills, and care in assigning men of inactivated units kept working units in action.

W ith this rapid redeployment of troops, the Briti sh Commonwealth Occupation Force s,under Lieutenant General Northcott, lent an air of true international cooperation as they took upposts in Southern Japan with one British Indian Division and two independent brigadesone from


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Australia and one from New Zealand. These forces w ere placed under the operational controlof the Eighth Army.

Surmounting numerous obstacles, by January the A rmy Education Progra m of Ei gh thArm y was functioning smoothly with 73 schools in action; a total en rollment of close to 15,000students were attending 207 different courses. Colonel Spauldiug, Chief of W ar D epa rtm entInformation and Education D ivision, after a two week tour of Eig hth Arm y schools wro te. " Ireturned to Washington with the feeling that you have given the educational program a kindof d rive and direction from headquarters level which it has needed and judg ing from the resultswhich have already been apparent, will go a long way toward assuring its success,"

To augment the schools and training program throughout Eig hth Arm y an extensiveathletic and recreation program was organized. A mong the more spectacular events were theTha nksg iving Day Rocleo and the New Y ear's Day football championship game, each of whichdrew over 50,000 soldier fans from all over the E igh th Arm y area. Recreation hotels, wherethe men spend " a week in heaven," were opened. Post E xchanges were organized te purchase souvenirs at fair cost and make them available to the men at reasonable prices.The Eigh th Army recruiting program was begun early in October, when plans w eremade for recru iting approximately 20 per cent of the command into the Regu lar Arm y.Recruit ing officers were appointed, spot announcements telling of the advantages of the Regu larArm y career were made on radio station W V T R , posters were displayed, booklets were distributed, "Stars and Stripes" joined the campaign. To date 21,800 men in th e Eig hth Arm yhave enlisted.

C-iafttft cr+rm ij nplu /Utc-Dleni in JapanOrga nization for Occu pation.

Prior to the capitulation of Japan the Sixth Army had been designated to carry outthe Olympic Operation on the island of Kyushu and the Eighth Army to carry out theCorone t Operation in the Tokyo area of Honshu. To carry out service command functionsfor these two operations, AS CO M O had been activated for S ixth Arm y and U SA SC OMC for Eig hth Arm y. With the capitulation of Japan these two armies and th eir servicecommand headquarters were designated to perform the occupation, the Eig hth Arm y beingassigned tha t portion of Honshu north of a line drawn roughly across Honshu just south ofYokohama, and the island of Hokkaido, and the Sixth Army being assigned that portion ofHonshu south of this line and the islands of Kyushu and S hikoku. In collaboration withthe ir assigned corps and divisions, hasty plans were formulated in the Phil ipp ine Islands toto curry out the occupation as prescribed in the Downfall Plan.Initial Movem ent to Japan.

To the Eighth Army was assigned the initial operation effort, beginning with airborne


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movements to Atsugi Airfield nea r Tokyo. The 11th Airborn e and 27th Infan try Divisionswere flown in from Okinawa, carrying with them 10 D/S of Classes I, II, III and IV, andand two uni ts of fire, Class 5. Th e w aterborne m ovements, which followed immediately^carried with them 30 D/S of Classes I, II and IV less Engineer construction materials, 15D/S of Class I I I and II IA , 3 U /F for combat troops and 1 U/ F for service troops. Th efollow-up supply for the airborne elements was effected by flying in 1-1/3 D/S each day,star ting on D/7, and continuing u nti l the waterborne supplies became available. Because ofthe peaceful reception of the occupying forces no supply problems developed and none of theplanned emergency airdrops was required.External Supply Plan.

At the time that the occupation began supplies were enroute from the Zone of theInterior to the Philippine Islands to equip the divisions which were to be mounted out fromthe planned O lympic Ope ration. These ships were loaded with equipment and suppliesfor combat operations and, because they w ere to be discharged in the Ph ilipp ine Islands andthere issued to divisions, there was no particular cargo plan carried out when they were loadedfrom the Zone of the In te rio r. Because of the short time element, the follow-up supplies forthe occupation necessarily had to come from these already loaded ships which were in or en-route to the Philip pines and from supplies on hand in Philippine bases. A hurried resupplyshipping plan was arrived at which provided the requirements of the occupation forces but atthe same time made necessary the shipment to and discharge in the occupation area of thousands of tons of equ ipm ent and supplies which were not require d. Also because of the shorttime element, the norm al 120 days' order and shipping time could not be met for late rresupply and the decision was made to accomplish resupply until 1 January 1946 by orderingfrom the Zone of the Interior standard loaded type ships Vhich had been planned for theOlymp ic Ope ration. It was also decided that A FW E SPA C would be responsible forautomatic resupply of the occupation area until 1 March 1946, placing requisitions on theZone of the Int er io r to cover that period between 1 January and 1 March 1946. Effectivewith the supplies to start arriving on 1 March 1946 the occupation armies were maderesponsible for placing requisitions, first through AFWESPAC in order to utilize PacificTh ea ter excesses, and, effective 1 May 1946, direct on San Francisco Por t of Embarkation*Internal Supply Plan.

To support its zone of responsibility Eighth Army established Yokohama as its chiefsupply base and, in view of the efficiency of the Japanese railway system, requ ired only asmall subsidiary base at O taru on the island of Hokkaido j)lus division railheads to accomplishits supply mission. Th e Sixth Arm y, however, established bases at Nagoya, X ur e, Fuku oka,and Sasebo. La ter , on 1 March 1946, under Eigh th A rmy , another base was established at Kob eafter tha t po rt was cleared of mines. In both instances the accompanying service command


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headquarters were assigned the mission of the logistical support of the occupation forces.After a peaceful occupation permitted and the rapid reduction of the occupation forces

demanded the consolidation of units and effort, a decision was made to inactivate Sixth ArmyHea dqua rters and AS CO M O effective 1 Janu ary 1946, and to close out as many supplybases as possible. Th e bases at Ku re , Nagoya, Fukuo ka, and Otaru were closed over a periodof tim e and at present only railheads exist at Sasebo, Fukuok a, and Otaru for the sup portof units in the ir areas. Th e A rm y divisions also have division railheads but th e main supplybases are and will be at Yokohama and Kobe, from which points the railheds will be supplied .Initial Occu jmtion Activities.

1. Ini tial effort in each area was directed to opening the por t facilities to pe rm itimmediate resupply.

2. Th e r etu rn of released prisoners of war and other rep atriates requ ired specialattention to their medical cure, feeding, and clothing for their return trip.

3. Th e allocation of warehouses, office buildings, billets, and other facilities require dthe establishment of a special allocations board to permit logical and planned assignment.4. Th e major initial effort of the corps and divisions was directed to ta king over,

collecting, storin g, guarding, and disposing of captured enemy equipment and supplies. Item sof warfare have been destroyed, ammunition be ing dumped at sea by the Japanese underArm y supervision. Certain military items were collected for souvenirs for the troops or forretu rn to the United States as war mem orials. All non-military and certain demilitarizeditems of equipment and supply have been returne d to the Japanese Gov ernmen t for civiliauuse.

5. The Japanese railway system was placed under military supervision and so organizedas to carry out all functions required by the occupation forces, but to distu rb the req uir ements of the civilian economy as little as possible.

6. As soon as the essential items of resupply had been discharged, atten tion was concentrated on screening of cargo in harbor and enroute to avoid as far as possible discharg ingcargo which would not be requ ired. Ships were turned around without discharge, and selectivedischarge and backloading were carried out wherever possible.Later Ma jor Activities.

1. Attention was given immediately to the acute problems of supply made evident bythe early approach of cold wea ther. Heating units, woolen clothing for all troops, and anadequate supply of coal from Japanese sources required constant follow-up before adequateamounts were on hand.

2. An intensive p rogram was initiated, and is continuing, to accomplish the maximumrecovery of American and Allied remains and their interment in centralized mausoleums andcemeteries.

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3. The rapid inactivation of divisions and other unit9 required by the demobilizationprogram added a tremendous load to the supply depots and was made possible only by adoptinga plan of storage on rail cars. By this plan units were perm itted to load their equipment forturn -in at the rate required to meet their inactivation dates and regardless of the rate atwhich these cars could be unloaded by the receiving depots. From a peak of 12,000 loadedrail cars this backlog has been decreased to a backlog of 6,000 as of 28 April 1946.4. In orde r to facilitate th is turn-in of equipment and to raise the standards ofpackaging, both civilian packing and crating experts and military packing and crating teamswere secured from the Zone of the In teri or. These experts and teams have worked withboth the units and the depots, and the turn-in program is now well under control.

5. With the establishment of the so-called " Disposition L ev el " of 80 J un e 1949 acontinuing program was initiated for the determination of excesses of supplies and equipmentin the occupation area. Un til 1 May 1946 these excesses have been reported to A FW E SPA Cbut after 1 May 1946 they will be declared as surpluses d irect to th e Fo reig n LiquidationCommission.6. As directed by higher headquarters, the Eigh th Arm y became entirely responsiblefor the exte rnal logistic suppo rt of its own area and of United States-occupied Korea as of15 A pr il 1946. The necessary directives and methods of procedure have been prepared anddirect supp ly relationsh ip with San Francisco P ort of Emb arkation has now been established.

7. Dire ct initial supply support was rendered the British Commonwealth OccupationForces upon their arrival at Kure, continuing until their own resupply permitted them to beself sufficient. Ho we ver, they will be provided indefinitely with Class I I I and I I I A suppliesfrom United S tates military sources. The ir taking over of the southern end of Honshu andof Shikoku is proceeding smoothly from a supply standpoint.8. As a fu rth er consolidation of effort and personnel, Headquarte rs USA SCOM C wasinactivated on 1 March 1946 and its major supply functions taken over by Headquarter s Eig hthAr m y. A small headqu arters, Yokohama Base, was established to supervise the port and certaindepot activities in the immediate Yokohama area. Similar limited functions are being carriedout by Headquarters, Kobe Base.

9. Th e import-expo rt program, as directed by SC AP to fur the r the Japanese civilianeconomy, has necessarily involved military logistic plans in the demands made on port, railway,and warehousing facilities. No difficulty is anticipated in carrying out th is prog ram and nointerference with military activities has been encountered to date.10. The most recent major project requiring careful attention is the provision ofhousing for the dependents of the occupation forces. Whereas th is responsibility has beengiven to the Japanese Government, a program of close supervision and follow-up has beenestablished to assure its successful accomplishment.

11. The War Department directive that directed formal property accountability beinitiated on 1 April 1946 required the preparation of appropriate instructions to all elements


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of the occupation forces. Th is program was successfully established by the tar ge t date.Major Statistics.

1. Engineer Construction.a. Eigh t airfield runways completed or u nde r construction, four asphalt and four

concrete, ranging from 5,000 to 8,000 feet in length, and from 2 9 ^ to 1 0 0 ^ complete.b. All troops adequately housed except for some units now moving to new locations.c. 21 bulk petroleum installations constructed or rehabilitated, all but one 1 0 0 ^

complete.d. 13 hospitals operating adequate to excellent facilities with 7,800 beds established.e. Housing units jus t commencing construction, with an anticipated requ irem ent of

8,000 units.f. Difficulties : Japanese shortages of basic ma terials , especially iron and coal, and

Japanese inexperience in producing certain items.2. Railway activity to 28 April 1946.a. 940,000 personnel were hauled an average of 100 miles p er tr ip , rep resent ing

only 1/2 of 1% of the Japanese passenger traffic for the same period.b. Two million tons of freight were hauled an average of 100 miles, represen ting

only b% of the Japanese freight traffic for the same period.3. Port activities to 26 April 1946.

a. Tonnages received :Yokohama - 946,562 L /T Nagoya - 147,450 L /T Kobe - 58,103 L /Tb. 55,886 L/T outloaded to the United States.

4" Jajjanese military items :a. Am munition destroyed to date683,000 L /Tb. Animnuition remaining172,000 L/Tc. 4,600 airplanes destroyed.

5. Long tons of excesses remaining as of 15 April:225cws -Engr - 10,100

M ed 1,175O rd 54,400Q M 3,800Sig 7,500Others 0Total - 78,200

6. Civilian food imp ort prog ram .~. - in


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a. Unde r Arm y control as emergency reserve94,500 L/T .b. Total tonnage being imported or turned over to Japanese845,400 L/T.

7. Graves Registration activity.a. Ap proxim ately 3345 remains have been recovered.b. 1017 graves now in Yokohama Cemetery.c. 2315 cremated remains in U S A F Mausoleum, of which 202 are American andbalance Allied nationals.

Much has been accomplished in the past eight months. The Japanese people have recentlyexperieneced their first free election An amazing 72 per cent of those eligible exercised theirfranchise. They displayed astute judgment in choosing a middle of the road policy rejectingboth the arch-conservatives and the extreme leftists. But the greatest lesson taught here inJapa n was conveyed through the demeanor, discipline, and conduct of our troops as summedup by the Supreme Commander:

" I wish to pay trib ute to magnificent conduct of the troops. With few exceptions, theycould well be taken as a model for all time as a conquering Army. Historians in later years,when passions cool, can arraign their conduct."

"T he y could as easilyand understandablyhave emulated the ruthlessness which theirenemy free ly practiced when conditions w ere reversedbut their perfec t balance between theirimplacable firmne ss of duty on the one hand and resolute res tra int from cruelness and bruta lityon the other, hay taught a lesson to the Japanese civil population that is startling in its impact."

"Nothing has so tended to impress Japanese thoughtnot even the catastrojjhic fact ofmilitary defeat itself. They have for the first time seen the free man's way of life in actualaction and it has stunned them to new thoughts and new ideas."

n


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INIT4AL LOCATIONOF MAJOR COMBATUNITS IN E IGHTHNORTH P A C I F I C O \C E A NiARMY OCCUPATION


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LOCATION OFEIGHTH ARMYMAJOR COMBAT UNTO

NORTH P A C I F I C 0 \C E A N


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PROPOSED LOCATIONEIGHTH ARMYMAJOR COMBAT ,


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DATE DU E (DA Pam 28-30}

DA FORM 18 81 , 1 JAN 5 7 *GPO: IMOOF5S0I46


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COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARYVENWQRTH

3 1695 00273 5637

U. S. Army, EighthArmy,^ E ig h th U. S. Army in

TITLE J a p a n , JO AugustU56e 1 Hay I9k6.DATE BORROWER'S NAME

9lf0U56eU. S. Array. E ig h th Array.E ig h th U. S. Array in Ja p a n , 30August 1945-1 May 1946,

BOOKBINDIN


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WWII 8th Army Report

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Transcript of WWII 8th Army Report