WWII 10th Air Force Report

8/9/2019 WWII 10th Air Force Report

1/74

'II


2/74


3/74


4/74

HEADQUARTERSEASTETN AIR 001MAND

SOUTH EAST ASIA

TO: A ll Personnel of Eastern A ir Command, and all R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F.Administrat ive and Service Units Which Have Supported E.A.C. CombatOperations.

1. On 15 December 1943 Eastern A ir ommnand was organized as anintegrated R.A.F.- A.A.F. a ir command, to which were also assignedsquadrons of the Royal Canadian A ir Force and Royal Indian A ir Force.

At t ha t timeI

stated ou r mission and our mutual problems as follows:

"A resourceful , able and wily enemy must be blasted from th ejungles of Burma and driven from its sk ies in days to come. Hisl ines of communication must be ob l i t e r a t ed , h is shipping destroyed,h is wi l l to r e s i s t crushed ...... our life l ine to China must bestrengthened and protected. Every ounce of energy of every man ofth i s Command w i l l be required to accomplish th is purpose. We mustmerge into one unified force, in thought and in deed - a forcenei ther Br i t i sh nor American, with the f au l t s of ne i the r and th ev i r tues of both. There is no time fo r d i s t rus t or suspicion .....We must es tabl ish in Asia a record of Allied a ir victory of which

we can all be proud in th e years to come. Let us writeit

nowin

th e skies over Burma."

2. 'Tithithe fall of Rangoon our mission in Burma is accomplishedand ou r jo in t task f u l f i l l e d . As of 1 June 1945, I am re l inquishingcommand of Eastern A ir Command. The United States Army A ir Forcesuni ts which have fought side by side with th e a ir uni ts of th e B r i t i s hEmpire are being withdrawn.

3. It is with a fee l ing of sincere and frank regre t tha t I b idfarewell to the personnel of Eastern A ir Command. I take this opport-uni ty to thank you all - both mil i tary and civi l ian personnel - fo r th e

f ine spirit of duty, the cooperat ion, and th e loyal ty you have shownduring this entire period. It has been my good fortune to become per-sonally acquainted with many of you. I have been impressed beyondwords by your seriousness of purpose and your ab i l i ty to work success-ful ly together, with a minimum of f r i c t ion and a maximum of accomplish-ment. To my commanders and the i r s ta ff s , to th e ground crews and se r-vice personnel , and above all to th e ga l l an t a ir crews who did the jo bwith the tools and ecuipment t h e i r brothers-in-arms so ably supplied,I extend my hear t f e l t thanks fo r th e v ic to ry your e ffo r t s have brought.

4 ' I rel inquish command reassured through my associa t ion with yout ha t our combined effo r t s wil l , in th e not to o dis tant future, bring us

f i n a l vic tory. The t r iuaph of ou r cause wi l l br ing secur i ty for thoseprinciples of democracy in defense of which we freely offered ou r all,and which we w i l l continue to do u n t i l Japan is smashed. Good luck toeach and every one of you, and may God bless you and preserve you tosee th e day of f ina l vic tory.

GEtrE E. S ,TRATE F,

Lieutenant General, U. S, A ir Forces. :Comanding.


5/74

EASTERN AIR C0i MtlANI) WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUIAMARY

I June 1945 Number 40

TABLE ;OFCONENTS

Section Z EC Sit;3ti.ori Revs eo~Burma VictoryEastern Air Command: The Completion of a MissionScale of EAC Air Effort in South East AsiaEa stern Air Command Combat and Transport

Operations, 1944-1945EAC Comments on Japanese Air StrengthEnemy ir activity; 24 - 30 lMay 1945Review of Enemy

AirActivity, Januiary - June 1945

---- urma ReconguoredJapanese Army Operational Air Strength in S.E.A.

Section II Technical Intelligence and TacticsSpits of 17 Squadron Tangle With Oscars AgainB-24 Sights "Circle of Light"ATAIU Study l ircraft and Equipment on Airfields

Near Rangootn

1-23-5

6

7-89-10

1011-12

13-17

18

1.23

4

Section III Objective Folder an d Tar t Chart DataR a i l a ys in Burma and Siam: Review of Activities

During Six Months, Dec. 1 94 - Mal1945

-Roads in Burma and.' Siam: Review of Activity andDevelopments in 1945

., tha Notes and Notes on WaterwvaysCoastal Shipping, Rangoon - Victoria Point:

Rewiowof ct ivi ty Ja n - I y 1945,.=:Inland aterways of Burma and Siam: Review of

Jap i3ctivity, January to May 1945Bomb Damage Study a t RangoonStores and. Dumps in Burma: Review of Situation

cnd Atta;Ck3 ,JaIu-ryJ ry 1945

1=3

4-6

7-

13-1415-17

17r18

Section IV ar News Froia Other Fighting FrontsTli.e 1tr in t j Pacific

Section V Jap 1 n t i a i rcraf t DefensesJapanese Antiaircraft in Burma, January - May 1945Jap g&ms Heavy 1 Guns in RangoonUA Fire Encountered To Include 28 May .1945

Section VI Special Reports From FE6CTactical unitsWeather Reconnaissance Plays Part in Burma Campaign

1.22-3

3

1-2

p t ~

x ~

$W3 IED

~_

,1

f. '

N

41

r' 4;x'1

>

_s .. r4,


6/74

it

__ . _

. _ _ _ _

-_ ---_

T

_ . war

.1 f

r,


7/74

BUMVj VIGTOR'Y

This is our Swan Song, and as such,it is appropr ia te t h a t we spend alittle time in ' r e f l ec t ion and remi-niscence. This 'campaign which is nowconcluding in Burma ha s witnessedone' 6f th e most'smashing defeats in-f l ic ted on th e Japanese. We have of ten

* talked of th e ',Forgotten Front" buitpos te r i ty mu't never forget ' that inthis campaign over 1I00,000 'Japanesehave been ' k i l ed and new techniques

Sof ae r i a l wara re , ' of a ir support andair supply applied and perfected.Spain was Napoleon's running sore;Burma ha s been an ulcer in th e s ideo f Hirohito '

But things were very d i ff e ren t in 1942. The calamity of Pearl Harbor was followedwith bru ta l suddenness by th e catastrophes of Manila and Singapore, We people ofth e Western world seemed dazed while th e little yellow, men spread out over th ecoas t 'f China, t ' iough Malaya and th e Dutch Fst Indies, through Oceania, un t i lthey threateneda ou r very existence. We w r e unprepared, and th e ability of th eJapanese to eo i s t on th e ' scant ies t of' supplies, to t r ave l l i gh t a n d ' i n f i l t r a t ethrough th e jungles, caused us to fall back and back with an ever-increasing r ap id i ty.

vTwoactors brought success to his t ac t i c s - command of th e se a and command o f th ea i r.

It was then that- we l o s t Rangoon. The Japanese could land where he l iked , bomb wherehe l iked . In va in - tha t va l i an t handful o f th e AVG ahd RAF a t Mingaladon and Toungoostrove agains t overwhelming numbers to stem 'the rush. Daily, almost hourly, th e l inesof communication,-of th e Br i t i sh troops were cu t and they were forced t o ' r e t r e a t , Sothat movement backward continued until after incredible hardships, the remnants ofthe forces straggled through the mountains into India and the Jap was too extendedto follow.

We had not many a i r c r a f t then. Curious as it may seem now, even Calcutta was in th eforward area with f ighters based a t Dum Dum, while l i gh t bombers staged through' t h i sf i e ld . We. planned then fo r th e reconquest qf ,Burma, bu t Europe came first and th ePacif ic second, It seemed as hough th e Chin Hil ls which had so effec t ive ly hal tedth e Japanese advance would prove to be jus t as effec t ive in preventing 'our r e tu rn .Roads did not oi.st and t ha t mountain mass seemed an impenetrable bar r i e r. The al-te rnat ive of a seaborne invasion was' impossible. Suff i c i en t ships did not e x i s t inth e thea t re , and .in o u r helplessness, we rea l ized why Burma had never before beenconquered from t I e north. . . -

In 1942-43 we 1oeld ou r own. Then th e t ide began to turn. The growing operations ofth e life l ine to China over th e Hump and th e inf lux o f more and be t t e r a i r c r a f tbegan to poin t th e way of th e fu ture , In' 1943 few people realized th e significanceof th e f ac t t ha t - seve ra l lonely garrisons in th e Naga Hil ls were being supplied andreinforced ent i re ly by a i r. Other indica t ions were seen in th e supplying of the longrange penetrat ion columne o f Wingate's ' Chindits from th e a ir and in the evacuation

of casual t ies from a has t i ly improvised s t r ip in th e hear t of th e jungle. The turn ingpoin t came in th e Arakan campaign of the winter of 1943. F i r s t of all it was planned-t o supply an ent i re divis ion by a i r, and then th e unexpected happened. The Japanese'used t he i r old in f i l t r a t ion t ac t i c s to cut the communications of several brigadeson th e western side of th e Mayu range. In 1942 these brigades would have fa l len back;in 1943 they held t he i r posi t ions and were supplied by a i r. The Jap was foi led . Hesent his Oscars to sweep back those C-47s but they found a i r c r a f t of a d i ff e r en tca l ibre wait ing and th e enemy f ighters were blown'out of th e sky by the onslaught ofth e Spi t f i res , ir supremacy had been gained, and with air supremacy came secur i ty.of supply.

But no w offensive f ighters as wel l as defensi '

developed th e now tac t ics of ai r supply an d a:

were

low

F

6


8/74

The tomans had a word fo r it heoh, the called their baggage "impedimenta". Supplyhas always been the headache of a commander. It prevents hi advance, res t r ic t shi s movement, and offers a most vulnerable target to the enemy. Our new tacticswere to allow untramieled movement to ur. own troops ,by giving. them the mostfluid supply line of al l , and a t the same time, to destroy completely the enemy'scapability of revictualling his forward troops. This was the basic concept of th eWingate-Cochrane expedition and the reason why, during the Japanese thrust towardAssam, the Allied divisions could form a ,cefensive box at Imphcl, secure in theirsupply and after cutting the enermy's communications,. throw them back with te r r i f icslaughter. This same concept gave M errll . 's Marauders that remarkable mobilitywhich enabled them to seize Myitkyina. So tnese tactics of a ir supply and a irblockade:became the key note of the whole campaign.

The bombers closed the ports and broke every link of the railway system. Theoffensive fighters strangled the lines of communication and swept the airf ieldsclear.

The transports, dayin

day out, supplied the ever-growing armies. Thedefensive, fighters- gave them immunity..

That is the secret of the Battle of Burma. That is why the barrier of the Chin Hillswas no longer tunsurenountable and- why it became the " 'Li t t le Hump":. That is why thearmies of British,; .Indians, Americans and Chinese entered Burma from the north.That is why the capture of Rangoon completed the reconquest of Burma instead ofbeginning it.

* .MIN C J 1'CTIVESOF ALLIED AIR ACTIVITIES IN AC

S(23, Ma y through 29 May 1945)

StrateEgic:Air Foc"'

.

Attacks on Bridge TF102, Bangkok - Singapore line, and troop and AA positions at

Moulmein. Mining of waters Kisseraing Island, Victoria Point and Fell Pa'ssage areas.

North Burma Air Task Force

Attacks on Lampang and Chiengmai airfields, troop positions near Taunggyi, patrolsand escorts.

221 Gro

Sweeps'of Aungba, Prome, Amherst, Kemapyu and Mokpalin areas by Mosquitos, Beau-

fighters and Spiffires. Attacks on troops and enemy positions in Pegu, Loikaw,

Letpadan, Prome, Taun.gyi and Thaton areas by B-25s and Mosquitos.

, Photo Recce Force

Covered main Jap airfields in Siam an d areas in South Burma, Siam and the Andaman

Islands.

.ag- .S i I'.

'. ,'

Page 2 - Section -i


9/74

_EASTERN AIR COAii.?iND: TH E COMiPLETION O'F A T;,iO N

This is our 40th an.la 1 JeeIatelli ence Sum- .mary. In our first iumb I 'b:i d a mont hlyresume of a ir operations from th e f o r a t i o n of th e .:Command in December 1943. In our- 1th number, webrouiht th e story up to th e end. of 1944., Now we 'iJItake up th e t a le , from th e beginning of th e yearto; 'the time of ou r d i s in teg ra t ion , ' ' ' ' :

Januar Ky- The beginning of 1945 saw th e All ies es tabl i shed in North Burma withcomplete a ir super ior i ty over th e whole country. Everywhere ou r armies in Burmawere on th e offensive. On 3 January, 15 Corps occupied Akyab, 14th Army captur-ed Kanbalu and Ye-U and NOAC moved forward from. Bhamo to Loiwing. These ground ad-vances were supported respect ive ly by 224 Group, 221 Group and 10th Air Force.Thunderbolts and Hurribombers provided th e close support, B-25s operated a littlefur ther back from th e ba t t leground, Mosqcuitos, BeaufiMhters and P-38s attackedroad, rail an d r iver L of C and th e fai l-me-never Dakotas of th e CCTF oarried th esupplies to nourish th e troops. The class ic campaign of an army moving and con-queri. ona i rbo rne Ls of C as be : n n i n . Tie madxirum number of sor t ies in oneday hj topped 2000 by th e en d of 1944.. In January,. 1945, it topped 3000.

Liberators -and B-24s of th e Stra tegic Air Force made many attacks on bridges onth e Bura-Siam Railway. This was t h e i r chief s t ra tegic ta rget . Fi f ty- three ofthem mad. a heavy daylight attack on Mandalay, and they were also used in forceon t ac t i ca l t a rge t s as when 69 dropped 300 tons of bombs on Jap Hqs a t Kyauksein support of 14 A-my and 48 of them destroyed stubbornly held posi t ions eas t ofKangaw in support..of 15 Corps. They also played the i r pa r t in coui ter a i r f i e l dac t iv i ty.

Mieiktila, Heho, and Anisakan were th e chief forward bases of th e JAAF duringth is month. They wer- constantly under attack by M squitos and Thunderbolts,P-38s and P-51s concentrated on Nawnghkio and Nansang fur ther eas t : B-24s bomb-

ed those in th e neighborhood of Fahioon and made one excursion to Udonthani f a raway in eastern Siam. The enemy ~ere forced to abandon the i r a i r f i e lds in UpperBurma and use. them a refuel l ing poin ts only. About th e middle of th e month,Ramree Island was invaded th e seaborne landing having been preceded by a terrif-ic aer ia l bombardment by Liberators and B-24s.RoLnd._,bout, th is t i m e t h e sweepsb3 Beaufighters , and.Hurricanes against shipping in Arakan waterways were in tens-i f i ed , while B-25s and Thunderbolts made many at tacks on the enemy still remain-in g in th e Arakan valleys. ; th e end of th e month, 14th Army had reached th eright bank of th e Irrawaddy both above and below Mandalay,

February - A'month of hard-fou t ba t t l e s fo r th e Irrawaddy bridgeheads culmin-ated.with th e tank drive to ' e ik t i l a and th e f lyin to Thabutkon.. Never hada ir cooperat ion been more effect ive and a new high maximum number of operat ionalsort ies in one day was reached at 5768. This remains Eastern ai r Conmmand's re-cord, though fo r three months, 3000 sor t ies per day was average. The greatpropo.ruion of these sor t ies , averaging 70% were made by Transport .Supply aindl ia ison a i rc ra f t .

The longest daylight missionsin formation weremade by Liberators on two days inone week, when they attacked railway t a rge t s at Jumbhorn. Strateic A ir .Forcecontinued to give at tent ion to bridges on th e Burma-Siam Railway, and in a tac t -i ca l ro le , they destroyed dumps at Madaya, j u s t north of bMandalay. Their big-gest effor t , however, was when in coimpany with Superfortrssesses ofXX Bomber Com-mand they dropped 700 tons of bombs on Jap dumps in th e Victoria Lake d i s t r i c t ,in north suburban Ranpon. B-25s continued to knock ou t rai lway bridges southof-iandalay while others ' burnt up Jap-held v i l l ages with napalms. P-38s andP-47s in North Burma, Beaufighters and Mosquit'os in th e centra l plain harassedth e enemy Ls of C r e l en t l e s s ly. Spi t f i res , Thunderbolts anddHurricanes gaveconstant "cab-rank" ro tec t ion to th e advancin, columns. The JAAF indulged inonly occasional snak ra ids 'a t dabwn or dusk. and no challenge Was made to oura ir power. ..

2 '1' -1 -2 - ' I

S ." Section I - Page 3. .


10/74

(Continued)

Jarch - Mandalay and Lashio fell on 8 March, and with th e reopening of th eStil wel l Highway from India to China, th e f i r s t part o f Admiral Mountbatten'smrission was accomplished. M ndalay was a h.-.rd nu t to crack with th e Japsholding out stubbornly in Fort Dufferin.

Rocket p ro jec t i l e s , 2000-lb bombs and low leve l lachine gun and cannon at-tack-were used again and again on th e old fo r t by Beaufighters , B-25s, Hurri-canes and Thunderbolts before res is tance was f ina l ly overcome. Lashio was amore eas i ly won pr ize , bu t B-25s had already destroyed Jap stren th there, ,while P-38s and P-47s prepared th e way.

Another record was broken by 40 P-51s of th e Air QGoilmndos who made th el o n g e s t f i g h t e r sweep hitherto in t h i s theater when they a t tacked th e a i r-f ie ld at Don i-ng *from low level . . Bangkok was also attacked, t h i s t ime bynight, by Libihrators and .3-24s of th e Stra te ic Air Force. 'Their t a rge t swere railway sidings, s ta t ions and workshops. They also destroyed bridgeson th e Bm . ok-Sin _apore l ine and th e Bangkok-Burma l ine was not forgotten.I ts longest bridge at Be n Lum Su m was brought down.

In th e Arakan a fresh landing was-made at Letpan, under an umbrella of Spit-f i r e s and Hurricanes. In th e Irrawaddy Delta and th e Gulf of Martaban, aswell as on a ll navivable n'aterways, B:aufi hters rhubarbed in search of -ship-ping. -25s attacked ta rgets in and around Toungoo. Sixteen P-51s of th eAir Commando attacked th e a i r f i e lds at Min aladon simultaneously with a lo wl eve l attack by th e same number on Hmawbi. This was followed up by an es-corted Liberator and B-24 s t r ike on th e Victo.ria Dumps. Radar i n s t a l l a t ionsat Great Coco in th e Andamans were also destroyed by , StrateGic Air Force.

Apri l - A ll month the-bomb l ine was advancing so rapidly t ha t t ac t i ca l t a r -,ets fo r Hurricanes and Thunderbolts were often among ou r ow n t roops. VCP

technique was perfected. From Meiktila to Thazi, down. th e railway to Toung-oo the.y kept moving with th e forward t roops. Counter.a i r f ie ld act ivi ty wasswitched to Siam. P-51 were gain over Don Muang at low leve l , and whereasbefore t he i r March attack photos had showed 54 a i rc ra f t on this fiid, af terthe i r Apri l :a t tack they only showed two..

Ban Takl i , Nakorn Sawan and Koke Kthiem were each attacked three times by

P-51sor P-4rs. At th e end of th e month a very heavy s t r ike was made on

oirlmein. After being beaten up by Thunderbolts it was bombed. by B-24s.B-24s and Libera tors ma e another iid on th e Siamese capi ta l where the i rt a r "e t s were th e Thai and Samsen Power Sta.tions.

Returning to old ta rgets with new methods, B-24s of 7th Bomb GrouA destroy-ed over 20 bridges on th e Burma-Siam Railway. They used a glide technique,releasing t h e i r bombs a t low l eve l , which was here put into practice opera-t ional ly fo r th e first time with signal success.

Pyinmiaha where th e aerodromes had been used by th e JAAF as forward f ie lds ;was smashed up by B-25s, shor t ly before th e armys arr ival . Toungoo was

net t on th e list and its fall was preceded by a heavy bombardment from th eair.:. Maenty-three B-25s one day, 12 B-25s th e following day, 39 B-24s th enext; 'day and on the. fourth day th e t r iumphal entry of 4 Corps. P-38s,P- 4 7s and Beaufiahters attacked a variety of ta rgets on th e road fromToungoo to Raengoon.,

In th e Ar.kan, Taungup fe l k 5 Corps were pursuing f leeing 4aps acrossth e road to Prome, i j r Yi Wy were harried by Spi t f i r e s , Thunde rb l t s ,Hurrica an at f th e Sbrategic Ai r Force. The l a t t e r were*eCa, des on th e narrow road. Reaching forward th e Stra t -

si . a ombd .bc d l r s t on th Tena Coast,

Page 4-"- Sect ion I i


11/74

ryA

EAC: The Cosi l t ion of a 7fx sion (Conclude,)

-Rang-oon was taken and with its fa l l the second part of Acdtviral1!untbat ten t 5 mis sion w s fuifiAll:?. I~~c rof~ily planner co Lbinedoperation, defenses were oed nd f inal ly n 'utr:1i(;d by heavies,iedluirs and fighiter bo tlbrrs. Per troyps Vi re d o t p p d , n v l 1lindingseffected and after thorough aerial reco aissa le, t rops tiere, landedat the docks in tMh center oi,' th e city, to link up. later with '14th Ayrmy,troops from the nqgth. This then was, the cu].ain J ton of a csmai.sin inthicoh thc air forces c:ooper tad' with the victor 3 u : a iny not .only byrcconri:aissa=nce, stratu c, t ct Id . and lcse support strikes, hut bytaking, uponl it self to i ly that armyr also. It i;as proved that withcommaand of the ci r, ground txoocps can move an it aht -without the normnalLs of C. Thw L of C of 14th l rk ha en 'thy: transport planes of East-ern ir Coimiuand.

Rangoon 'e U on 3 tiay so most v 1 ay hap~ be en spent' in mopping up. l1ithmnlny. f our squadrons pulled out a th4 monso on active over Burma, East-emn ir Coir i. d has be c JDbl4to n et.'all dart~ids of the a y .

S- 25s =operating in twos Lnd t] r .e5.~ have r p _t diy struck at Ja p posi-tionis along ,hei r linesa of retreat. hen ne~cssary, they h vc o peratedin force @: dust headgi arte rk; o r. lrtoris osiu tos havepatrolled the roads leadini; routh fromi the Shan St .tes thx uhev' Karonni

toPapun or i p ru, thlnce by ro d or the . al: ee River to Ma4ul tin.Spitfires, P!-5ls


12/74

'iclii&a I L r !7rI0R I80JE i tYi A

The following table, basedon 1 sing ,il1ed reopot~ts showvscomplete figures :for the pe~-Lod 17 . 23May 1945:

Aircraft iA~teked

75 O.5/ :. 20/5 21/5 22/5 23/5TtCl

_Ta ctical _ __1_ 1 0 0 . J 1 0 : 126 7 8~K7iPe; ., 2hotoRe~ 2 2 1 ~ ~ 4 .

gp Carrier

Combat Car go 1LiaiLson C 1657 l2$ 1971 2722 13484 1814 L178 2 1 8

.2.

h Tonsof Troop Carried

Totals ____jj9 283. 2.

FUra belows Carried"a1

24 - 30 May 1945x'.A i craft sp ched

25 2 5 65 712 9? .w o ta~

St r a tgc 2

Photo' Recce I ,~,6 ____Ty) C a r r i e rCombat Cargo& Liaison A/C 3 o 1 6 ~1270 16r1':616

To a s l L 69 701 1606 1299 1 ~ 680

Toys o f C r o rrP

No. of Trop~sCarried., w . .. ._.

Totalps ~ . 0 ~~ 5 2 7

Pac b6 -Soctjon ;I


13/74

EASTE', A AO D COM3BAT AND TRANA T OPERATIONS. 19~ 19A

The following sta t i t i ica l outlineof the operations of aircraf t ofEastern Air Command, shows an ova ll picture of activity which, d

spite the obstacles faced, the vadistances involved, the hazardousterrain,, the involved problems ofsupply and maintenance, and, a t times,extremely diff icul t weather, have re-duced enemy aerial effectiveness inthis zone of operations to nil . During1944 alone, .a ircraf t sufficient toequip 17.6 Jap squadrons of 25 aircrafteach were destroyed.

'A .,essful program of denying to the enemy the use of roads, r a i l lines, bridges,cojinmunications and supplies has been accomplished and a t the same time support has beengiven to ground operations. The Command has succeeded in bringing to a successful acn-elusion the longest, in duration and the largest (quantitatively) prs: zm of a.erial

uipply of ground forces by transport that has ye t been accomplish yere,

In .chieving these results, 1.67 enemy .a ircraft were destroyed o .destroyedin aerial combat fo r each EIC' a i rc ra f t so lost in 1944.,, u to ta l o aircraftbeing lost in combat due to a ll causes..

: hter Effort

The tempo of fighter activity increased from 5416 sorties by 490 aircraf t in January19/4, a sortie rate of 11.1, to 13,255 sorties by 633 a i rc ra f t in December 1944, asortie rate of 2.09, .nd was" in large part responsible fo r the a ir superiority achievedin Burma. Working iin cli-se tact ical cooperation with the ground forces in Burma, thefighter a i rc ra f t of i'~C played a vi ta l role by destroying Japanese strong points and

.lines of c o m m u n i c a : t i n O.,

D'ring.:1944 lone, E4 ~ dispatched 113,115 fighter sorties against the enemy. The rate.of act ivi ty was stepped up during the f i r s t quarter of 1945, resulting in 56,705aorties being dispatched against the enemy during this period. From January 1944 -March, 1945, 29,005: tons of bombs were dropped on the enemy. In the month of most in- .tensive fighter operations, February 1945, 18,779 sorties were flown' by 78"1'aircraft

fo r a utilizationh rate of 24.0 per aircraf t . During this one month, 4040 tons ofbombs, 5,350,586 rounds of ammunition, and 1325 pocket projectiles were expended,

Medium Bomber Effort

Medium bombers of the IA C have done a good job of disrupting the Japanese lines ofcomrmunication in, Brma. Their most important act ivi ty has been the wholesale and con-tinuous destruction of railway and road bridges linking Japanese l ines of communica-tion. There is ,no--do.ubit that this act ivi ty contributed significantly to the deterior-.- tion of the Japanese position,i n Burma. From 80 aircraf t in January 1944, the mediumbomber, force of EAC grew/ to '95 aircraf t in March 1945.' Concurrent with this increasein st r ngth, the intonsity, of uti l izat ion increased sharply from 4.0 sprties per

aircraft inJanuary 1944,;to 13.6 sorties per a i rc ra f t in March 1945.

During the period January 1944- March 1945, EA C medium bombers were dispatched on159,873 sorties and dropped 16,036 ton' of bombs on the enemy. The effectiveness ofthis activity is amply demonstrated'-by the breakdown of railway communications inean'ern Burma. ,

S'::-Heav Bomber Effort

-The heavy boiberi ozce of EAC has accomplished a remarkable job in the l ight of th e&normous disaced:inhvolved in strategic bombing missions against the Japanese in

BIrma and Siam~ '

.. lll..'.. Section I - Page 7/ - '


14/74


15/74

-- K E Y-

SORTIES

TONS BOMBS jDROPPED

uk to Mk~itche on th e 'Irrawaddywhile22 East ABrian Brigade occupied. Seikpyu, on the =oppositeside of t i v e r t the.oil c e n t e r 'of C h a u k ; t h e r e the , Eas t Afr icans made afeint cross ing which caused th eeremy considera le wor ry ' and provoked ,a s t rong react ion.

And now :let :us retu.irn to the' f g h i f rt he r north. 4n; Eder , 20 Divis on

forced a"c o s s i n g of the irrawady oppos i t e I yinr .u a4a inst light o p p o s i t i o n . TheCommander of th e eEnemy 15th iyrmy now found himself in a p o s i t i o n of seve ra l poss-=ibilities. it Kyaukmyung 'he w-a eOng-aged in a stiff fight protectig. the northernapproach'es to Inda-a'; -northwest of/Sanain, the 2nd Division was poisd, for apossible cmossing;1 20'Divjsion was on ' his bank o f' th e ive , opposi te My nmu;whilO

we were: holding cy tch' and the' East Afxricans were' h r e a t e n i n g h is oil cent enrs ofChauk '.nd Yenangyaung. '

At his; o in h : yb o .rmoves an d bE'gan a sries of mis' takes

a Th~e~enmyc~mad deidd that ' te inndiil trw n imajor force , thus engag-

ing - ing the pressure on 19 IDiv-isona K a k i y u n y tdrwngs for atction further south.

Page..1 4 iSctin


23/74

VIcioruy~ 3 'wa na" ""Furthest JapPeneration }

Battleine i J a n . 1945

"m Battlehlne 2 8 M o 1 9 4 5

Scale in Miles

0 0 20 '40 60 80 00

__ _ _

_ _


24/74

Burma Reconquered (Continued) .

He did no t appreciate tha t our operat ns at y h e a n i P okku were on a Corpsscale, and he decided tha t fo r the present these forges did not consti tude a men-ace, and accordingly threw what troops he had ,in th is area into an. unnecessari ly-s t r o n g e f f o r t against th e East i f r icans at Seikpyu.

Thus 14th Army's deception plan worked extremely wel l and 7 Division were presentedwith a very l i gh t ly opposed crossing a t Nyaungu on 14 February, th e resul tantbridgehead being Quickly expanded and increased to v i r tua l ly d iv i s iona l s t rength .Followingup were two brigades of 17 Division and a tank brigade, all of which 'grad-ual ly concentrated in the: bridgehead while 7 Division beat o ff th e small enemy a t-tacks which developed.

On 23. February, these brigades strongly headed by tanks, broke out of the&bridge-head, 'crushed some has t i ly assembled 'eneiy forces at Tauntha , and moved through1iahlaing and by 27 .ebruary were four miles from M i k t il a . 1-t this stage th et h i rd brigade of 17 Division was flown in .n d th e fi i .ht was on fo r th e a ll import-ant communications of Meikti la . The"Japanese assembled a ll th e forces available,

mostly L of C t roops into scratch uni ts and prepared to f ight to the las t . Thestand resul ted in the i r annihi la t ion , at l ea s t 2500 enemy being k i l l ed . Our t roopsnow consolidated the i r posi t ions in th e town in preparation fo r enemy attacks whichthey knew would come,,

iMeanwhile, soon a f t e r gaining t he i r bridgehead, 20 Division had been engaged in ex-tremely.:hard f ighting with major enemy forces, and to help them and fur ther to con-fuse the. enemy, 2 Division commenced to 'cross the Irrawaddy at N;azun, eight mileseast of r.inmu. On th e 19 Division front , due to action elsewhere, th e enemy forces.ha d begun to th in ou t by 12 February, and ou r t roops hi t the enemy hard and fol lowed'him up much swif te r than -he had thought possible, toward iM ndalay,

The enemy still believed in his offensive capabi l i t ies and arrogantly continued tounderest imate our forces . He thou .h t tha t by bringing in his 33rd irmy from NEBurma he could, obl i tera te ou r forces at ivMeiktila, thus res tor ing h is Ls. of .C, .adihile th is action was in progress, his 15th army was to hold. ou r force on th e

Irrawaddy a f t e r which both arnies would push us back over th e r iver. He,also order-ed h is forces based, on Yenanyauns to advance and destroy 7 Division' s bridgeheadand th e East Africans on th e west bank.

Accordingly, during th e first part of iMarch, f ierce f i hting developed around Meik-t i l s and a brigade of 5 Indian Division was flown in as reinforcements , bu t the en-emy succeeded in digging"in on th e s t r ip 'and supp l i e shad to be dropped by ai r, Thes t r ip was eventually cleared bu t hard f ighting in th e area continued with sweeps byarmored columns th e main fea ture .

On th e northern pa r t of the front, th e enemy was beginning' to rea l ize that .hisforces were not capable of holding ou r troops and Mandalay fell on 20 March, af terth e Japs at l a s t decided to abandon res is tance at Fort Dufferin and to evacuate whatforces remained. Also by th e middle of arch, res is tance to our bridgeheads atLiyinmu and Ngazun was weakening and ou r forces began a swift advance towvard th e r a i l -way l ine between Mandalay and Meikti la . Stubborn res is tance was encountered atKyaukse and SE of Kuma, stands which 'we . j designed to enable th e enemy to r e t r ea t .into th e hills to th e east . He suffered considerable casual t ies bu t th e bulk. of hisforces reached th e hi l l s and trekked SE towards Kalaw and Taunggyi. This resul tedin th e Jap 15th .rmy being pushed 'out of th e Burma ba t t l e , and despite all its ef-fo r t s it has not ye t succeeded in re-enter ing it.

The actions north of Meiktila brought an end to th e attacks on Meikti la itself andenabled our t roops to commence t he i r move south in th e early days of Apri l . Thir ty-t h i rd Army, responsible fo r th e 'defense to, t'he, south, offered extremely stiff res i s t -ance, but., our armor an d heavy fire power was i r r e s i s t ab le , and th e enemy casual t ies ,were extremely heavy, culminating in a massacre by 17 Division a t Pyawbwe. Fi f thIndian Division, h'o had previously moved into Mieiktila, then took up th e advancesouth and brushing aside what remained of enemy res is tance , swept along a t an ex-t remely rapid r a t e . Enemy delaying attempts at amethin, Shwemyo and Pyinmana werebypassed and then mopped and Toungoo was occupied by 2. April .


25/74

The advance continued, and all nr iy eforts b stem it f a i l ed , res is tance beingovercome notably at Nyaunglebi an d Pe3u. "e o a k;now that . the t h r ea t to Pe uforced th e en y to abandon Ranoon 'and took away h is capabi l i t ies fo r defending it.1fter Pegu, bad weather, demoli t ions, and mines delayed ou r advance bu t by 1 -ay cu rspearheads were approaching Hleau, 29 miles from Rangoon. On 1 May a parachute andamphibious landing h-was m de by 26 Division, an Arakan divis ion , near Rangoon and by3 May th e city was in our hands af te r l i gh t res is tance had been overcome. From Pegu,5 Division moved SE and af ter overcoming two strong posi t ions succeeded in gain ingthe- l ine of th e Sit tang in the Mokpalin area

To r6turn to 33 Corps - - -After th e fall of Mandalay an d the mopping up of th e areanorth of ieiktila) th i s Corps swung SWi owards th e Irrawaddy, and 20 Division wassent , completely to the J sJ surpr ise , in a swift dash along th e road from eiktilato Taugdwingyi f t e rconsb l ida t ion , two columns moved west and captured .Magwe on23 Airil. l Seventh Division had aeanwhile been breaking out from t he i r bridgeheada. d in quick succession they captured Kya.kpadaung, Chauk, and Yanangyaung. The en-eny opposing themr,:-ith t h e i r re t rea t cu t at Magwe, Mere compelled to cross to th ewest bank of the Irxrawaddy, where two brigades of 7 Division eventually followedthem,

i:Oter uhe fa1l of Miawe, th e advance from Taungdwingyi continued, and a f t e r resist-ance at Allanmyo had.been overcome, Prone was taken. The next enemy stand was atminhla.l;6ii f' Ietpadan and once th i s was overcome our forces moved' swif t lysouth a d c ai p with th e man-oon garrison at a point 60 miles north of Rangoonon -l Ma .... .

Thus th e chief co imunications of Burma were now in our hands and th e Japs, cu t of fon th e west of th e Irrawaddy and in th e Pegu Yomas, could only make fo r th e hi l l seas t o: th e Si t tang. This they have done, bu t about 4000 still remain NW and NE ofProme, f ight ing hard to make the i r escape, while a fur ther 10,000 remain i n - thePegu Yomas wait ipg ther chance to move east. Many wi l l succeed, but wi l l be onlya-ragged force when they reach t h e i r des t ina t ion; many ill die from disease or bek i l l ed by our troops,

NCAC: ,t th e be inning of th e year, Chinese Forces moved s teadi ly along th e roadfrom Bh'rmo to Namkham. Resistance wa s more slight than had been expected an d by17 January, Namkham had been taken and th e advances continued towards Morn-Yu, th ejunction of th e Burma road to China. i junction with CEF Forces was made a t Mong-Yu by th e end of January. The CEF Forces had cleared th e Burma road from th e Sal-weeh, overcoming stiff opposit ion en route, and during January they cleared Wantingand advanced to l ink up with NCiC Forces, which opened the road from Ledo to Chinaand convoys immediately began to pass through. The i. hting. in th is area was help-ed very much by eveints on th e Shweli River, where American t roops were pushingacross di ff i cu l t country to cut th e Lurma road near Narnphakka, and thus t rap th eJapanese fur ther inorth. This task was successfully accomplished and f ierce fighftingdeveloped as th e t rapped Japs t r i ed to fight t he i r way south. At the cost of heavycasualties, th e enemy extr ica ted h is forces and thereaf ter little resistance wasencountered on this par t of th e f ront and in quick succession Kutkai,- Hsenwi, andLashio were captured, th e latter place on 8 March.

On the central sector of' this f ront ChineseForces had been moving steadi ly southfrom th e Shweli "and by th e end of February had chased th e enemy from Namtu and th e

Bawdwin Mines, af ter vhich they advanced along th e road to Hsipaw, overcoming toughJapanese res is tance en route, and captured th e town in th e middle of March,

Meanwhile, on the r ight f lank , th e Bri t i sh 36 Division had been moving. ahead. Inth e beginning of th e year th e Irrawadci was' crossed. an d little opposit ion was'.atfirst encountered The main advance was SE to Mabein on the Shweli, which was tak-en agains t l i gh t res is tance , and th e advance then continued toward ly i tson. Frominformation now hIlid, w e .kno. t h isenemy thought t h i s was our main t h rus t , andaccordingly ,eakene Wo hejh urma road and threw in his main effortagainst -"'! extremely f ierce and bloody f ight ing l a s t ingso ^m.

p ,"p enemy gave way, after which a swift advance wasmade rough Mong Mit and Mogok to Maymyo, where a junctionwas ih19 Division t roop ghail ously taken the town,

ase 16. -Section I t oopi


26/74

Bu r a Reconquered (Concluded)

After t h i s it was evident tha t th e enemy had decided on a complete withdrawal fromNE Burma. He fo u ht where necessary to cover his re t rea t but gradually contactwas broken, and no w his troops from th is erea ar e ei ther around Loilem and Taunggyior fu r the r south. There has been no f ight ing fo r some weeks and our

garrisonis

being considerably reduced.

Conclusion: The f i h t fo r th e re-conquest of Burma is almost over. True, sever-a l thousands of enemy troops remain in th e hills in th e center of th e country, butt he i r effor ts are directed towards only one objective: escape, to join the i r com-rades east of th e Sittan . The majori ty of th e Japanese Forces have e i the r re t r ea t -ed to loulraein, no w th e main enemy center in Burma., or have been pushed in to th ehi l l s eas t of Thazi and TounLoo. Here they are f i ht ing to cover t h e i r r e t r ea t , andto hold poss ib le routes into Siam, u n t i l th e monsoon slows ou r t roops and impedesrurther advance. The tendency of th e .ma n portion o. these forces in th e hi l l s is

tomosve

south., throuth P.aEun and Bilin to .Moulmein, and the enemyis

at present t ry -in g hard to keep open this escape route by holding the l ine of th e Si t tang ato.'bkpalin. But h is offensive capabi l i t ies have been completely blunted.

Thus in a b r i l l i a n t l y foared ciupaign, of less than a year, th e Japs have been. i r iven from th e hear t of Burma, Rangoon, one of th e bes t por ts on the-coas t , is inou r hands. This most important city of Burma wil l now supply ou r t roops and wil lserve as th e base fo r ou r next mo'e 'south towards Singapore and th e Eas t Indies,

Section I -Page 17


27/74

2K>

_ N S E AR IY OPEaINALT AS NGT i

ISCUTI F4$T tSIA

This 'eek t s estimated to ta lstrength of 240Iaircraf t :indicates an increase ofonlyy one 'medium bohbber overthe previous estimate,

For the f i r s t time in over a month the estimated.Order of Battle for theJapanese Army Air Forces in South East 'lsia shows a 'nominal increase ratherthan a decrease, In view of the obvious diff icul t ies of replacements andmaintenance, continued decreases rather than stabilization a t the currentfigure is to be anticipated in the months'ahea d. By careful conservationand s t r i c t itat-ions on operational use theoJapanese may hope to maintaina orce of some numbers, but it is unlikely ' eve r to have more than a nui-sance value.

It is interesting to note that a t the end of 1944' the Japanese Ai r Orderof Battle vtm e estimated a t 297 aircraf t , with 98 of that total based inBurma and only 35 in Siam and south Indo-China. The intervening monthshave witnos od no t only th e loss of a ifth of that strength, bu t alsothe retreat from a ll bases in Burma. With a ll their airfields in Siam andIndo-China now subject to Allied attacks, further retreats may be anticipated.

NFval ar St ren th in South East A s i a

The estimate of navesl: a ir strength shows an increase of three due to theinclusion of a like number o f torpedo bombers, making a total o f 45 forthis wceek.

Disposit ion of' Nayl tircraft

F i g h t e r s Torpedo Bombers Rlecce Fis Tota l

Land Float

So.Indo-China 1 -12 13

Malaya 5 2 3 .4 18 32

5 3 3 4 30 45

oLCIAS"CLW

Page l18- Section I


28/74

$14PAlETARMY, OPERA T10M4AL A/IRSTRE#GTH s ASVA

f JAPANESEA RC AF720..,

/0

0

S5/~5 3

A ADA M A N

S E A

r.

I

AREA FI5HTER! BOMBERSRECCE TOTALSs/E T/E MED LIT SE IEI

SIAM 27 4/15 5 5IN.mdudo ia/0 /0C

So /ndc~ha 26 /0 7 /0 53MALAYA /10--12 22SUMATRA 6 2 25 /0 7 /04TOTALS 135 25 26 32 22240A/C SCAR NICK SALLY LILY PM'419ipes TN

'...

i.,

. 4

ify ..


29/74

IaSSFIE

P.

r .'".

TACTICS

x

-

C Z 1 1


30/74

SPITS OF! 7 SO_IDRONTANWLE IT OSCAR GAIN

Enemy sneak ra ids a g a i n s t forwardformations are not new, no r areth e Nips'

f ighter tac t ics ; howeverthey serve to r e i t e r a t e ho w he f ights .In this 29 Apri l encounter, he em -ployed all th e trimmings which heloves; super ior i ty in numbers,excel lent maneuverabil i ty and t r i ckytop cover, which made th e most ofcloud as a screen. Again th e Spi ts 'superior speed brought all four a/c-.,safely home, a f t e r downing one enemy.

Four Spi t f i res were on pa t ro l between Nyaunglebin and Pogu covering forward troops.Red

1 was leading Red and Green sec t ions back to base af te r completion of patroland was flying a t 1500'. At 0710 approx 10 miles S of Toungoo, he saw s ix plus a/ca t 12 o'clock f ly ing about 3000'.

Owing to th e proximity to base it was thought tha t they were f r iendly a /c but acarefu l watch was kept on them. When one banked against th e skyline they were atonce recognized as Oscars.

Although each p i l o t had about 30 gallons of fuel left Red 1 gave th e order toj e t t i son L/R tanks and turned eas t climbing into th e sun using about Plus 7 boost .He then posit ioned himself 2000 yards away from them a t about 6000' up sun an dnoticed the-main buncl of Oscars were diving down and s t raf ing from ~ 0 0 0 ' . He

then looked around fo r t he i r .top cover which consisted of two aT f in a t 5000'inandout-, of7/1.0coud rAs th e /a gave no indication of seeing us , Red sect ionflew towards th e tojp cover, but on coming within range they dived back into cloudand could not be contacted again.

Red Section then turned south and from s l ight ly up sun made an at tack on th e las te/a. The e/a, eas diving gently down and as Red ,ection t aw with in range d i al .ose chindaele to .Eor t , each a /c 75-100 yards as tern of each other. Red l pu tthe do t on the sixth a7c at 450 yards and held it there unti l 300 yards and justas he was laying on def lec t ion of one r ing th e a /c flew into cloud, At 200 yds,he drew a bead on th e fifth a /c and f i red a 2- second bur s t allowing fo r a 300angle off , while t ravel l ing a t about 220 mph. Strike were not observed as th enose of th e Spi t f i re was covering th e Oscar. When th e nose was depressed again,e /a was observed to b b r e a k i n g hard downto o r t .

By now th e leader o f th e Oscar formation was direct ly above Red 1 a t 1500' andwas s tar t ing h is a t t ack . At th e same time No. 4 of th e formation who was about100' above Red 1 did three f l ick ro l l s to starboard and came into posit ion about250 yards behind at 25 0 angle off . Red 1 using h is superior speed did an a i l e ronturn to starboard and went s t r a igh t down to ' th e deck, th e fourth Oscar firinga t him, Nos 1 and 2 chasing him.

He drew away rapidly and climbed into sun a t 4000. He then turned around and madeanother pass from th e beam, but t h i s time th e Oscar broke when he was 10001 away.

By pull ing on th e s t ick he was able to get a 900/450 shot but again no resu l t swere observed,

The other Oscars had now organized themselves and formed up above and around him.Red 1 was forced to dive away. Using Plus_18 pounds and ai leron turns he soonoutdistanced them, climbed up again to 6000' and picked on enemy to p cover of two'a /c 1000' above and 1500 yards behind. Red 1 then posit ioned himself 1000 yardsup sun and due bort to his a t tack but a s u s u a l e turned gently into him and ashe came into range t igh tened up th e turn so tha t he could only f i re at them a t af ron ta l ugarter w th a shor t burs t . He pulled s t r a igh t up to 2000' above anddid a ro l l ing at tack on th e No. 2 man f i r ing a shor t bu r s t from 500 yards but hadto break away before he could close in as th e No, 1 of th e formation was get t ing

into posi t ion to start f i r ing .

1r'

10 4 { _ , . . 'k. 1 4 A : 1 ' .

:

.. _ ,r, ' . Y


31/74

Szts of W'7a,CS th Oscr Ar-2 in Concludedo

One a /c which had been f lying on th e same l eve l about 2000 yards in f ront o f them,turned back and climbing into th e sun, made a pass a t Red 1 who, however, had beenwatching him and broke down into him and climbed into th e sun. This l a s t e/ashowed no hurry to go home and n ot only did he remain as r ea r cover fo r the previousa/ o bu t turng b c k and enga'ed : t i thRed 1.

Red 1 had climbed above th e Oscar and dived into th e at tack but immediately th ea/Zc turned into hi and, tightened h is turn so tha t Red 1 was munable to get a shot.Red 1 pulled up and did three consecutive rol l ing at tacks on th e Oscar, but eachtime he t ightened h is turn and Red 1 was unable to f i r e .

Red 1 again positioned h iself up sun and made a pass a t th e Oscar wh o did a f l i ckhalf rol l and dived fo r about 10001 zooming up behind Red 1 who also pulled upagain. Red 1 wihose ' p e t ro l was now down to 15 gallons, made a l a s t at tack f i r ing o ffth e remainder of h is ammun.tion, bu t .sr ble to obtain any s t r ikes as th e Oscarkept t t rn ing ins ide him. Red 1 then returned to base.

When Red 1 ordered th e sections to drop t he i r Idng range tanks, Green 1 was unableto do th is so Green Section climbed to 4000' into th e sun. By th is time th e e/a wereident i f ied as Oscars II flying in loose pairs , one pair as to p cover a t 5000t. Asth is to p cover pair ro l led over andc dived to at tack th e Red Section, Green 1 divedthrough cloud and tagged on 2000 yds behind th e No.2 of the enemy pair. This Oscarmade his attack and pulled up left, Green 1 pulled inside hi n and closed to 500 yds.The enemy No. 1 then observed Green 1 and pulled down 'to attack and th e No. 2 beganto break violent ly left. Green 1 opened f i re a t 250 angle o ff a t 400 yds an d scored

s t r ikes on his engine and observed flames from th e por t side of th e engine cowling,gave him a fu r the r burst . and th e whole engine bur s t into flames. He ro l led over

and wentver t i ca l ly into th e deck with black smoke pouring from him. Airc ra f t f e l l

from about 1500 ft. It blew up on hi t t ing th e deck. As Green 1 broke o ff h is at tack

and pulled up into th e sun, a single Oscar made a head-on at tack on him, so hedived below him anid thed th e Oscar ro l led on his back and made a ro l l ing at tack on

him. At th is point , Green 1 was able to je t t ison his long range tank and as he was

about to break , he observed a fur ther Oscar making a quarter at tack from starboard

and another one nmaking a- s imi lar attack from port, ':a fourth a t tacking from as t e rn

and below .CGreon. went violent ly r igh t and downwards among th e t rees . By takingviolent evasive action he los t them. As Green. 2 had only about.15 gallons o f fuel

remaining wi. Green 1 began h is a t t ack , th e section leader ordered him to re turn

to base. As he ;began to do th is he saw Green i t s victim burning on th e deck.

j-.

[ .'

Page S l :i , I ,^j U^ II


32/74

/1-24 SIGHTS "CIRCLES OF LICHT

A B-24 of th e llth Bomb Group on asnooper mission over Truk during th eear ly morning hours o f 3'May 1945,encountered what may prove to be asbaffl ing a phenomena as the bal ls off i re seen by th e B-29s\while over th eJapanese mainland. (Excerpted From Hq.AAF, POA, Air Intell,Memo No.4, 8 May1945.)

The B-24 first observed two red-c i rc les o f l i g h t approaching th e plane from belowwhile still over th e Truk a t o l l . One l i gh t was on th e r igh t and th e other was seenon th e l e f t of- the B-24 The l i g h t on th e left side turned back a f t e r one and onehalf hours. The one on th e r igh t remained with th e bomber u n t i l th e B-24 was only10 miles from Guam. From th e time t ha t th e B-24 left th e a to l l , th e l i g h t neverleft its posit ion on th e r igh t side, It was reported by th e crew members as some-times ahead, sometimes behind, and sometimes alongside th e B-24 and always about1200 to 1500 yds d i s t an t . !

At day break, th e crew reported t ha t th is l ight climbed to 15,000 ft and stayed inthe sun. It was a shor t time afterward t ha t th e B-24 le t down and went through a300 foot .ndercast and l o s t s igh t of the l i gh t ,

During th e f l i g h t from Truk to Guam, th e l i gh t was observed to change from anorange color to a br ight yellow or white l ike e lec t r i c l igh t . The l i gh t was alsodescribed as sometimes looking l ike a phosphorous glow. This sequence of colorchanges occurred a t regular in tervals . The l i gh t appeared to be about one foot in.diameter and th e cha-nges in color did not follcw a pat tern of acceler r t ion or de-celeration. - .

The l ight followdc the B-24 in dives from 11,000 ft to 3000 f t , through sharp coursechanges and even br'ief cloud cover always keeping its same re la t ive posi t ion anddistance. At one time, th e p i l o t turned into the& i gh t and he def ini te ly repor tsno closure occurring. During th e n igh t high ci r rus clouds masked th e moonlight andno pa r t of objec t was observedexcept th e l i gh t . At daybreak, th e l i gh t changed to

a. steady white glow and a possible wing shape with a s i lve r glow was noted by some

members of th e crew.

Guam radar uni ts reported no bogies plot ted a t any time tha t th is l ight was within

its range. The crew imembers reported tha t th e l i g h t f inal ly left them when only 10

miles from Guam. The l i g h t was never close enough to th e bomber to give -a s ingle

blip on'the radar and therefore should-have been eas i ly detected. Two bl ips with

IFF were no t reported a t th is time, th e B-24 being th e only plane on th e scope.

The repor t from th e Guam radar uni ts plus th e fac t tha t the l i gh t was always seen

on the right side of th e B-24, an d that even when the.bomber turned into th e l i gh t ,

no rate of closure was noted tends to make th e possibi l i ty of a je t powered or

even a conventional 'type a i r c r a f t a doubtful one.

A preliminary evaluation by the Ass i s t an t Chief of Air Sta ff In te l l igencegives

th e ,following poss ib i l i t i e s :

"It is believed th e l ights observed were those of an unknown type mounted on Japan-

ese a i r c r a f t with th e capabi l i t ies o f an Irving on an experimental or observation

mission. While cer ta in je t exhaust flame character is t ics are apparent, th erange and

.length of l i g h t greatly exceed th e known capabi l i t ies of friendly or enemy je t

a i r c r a f t , While observations vary considerably from character is t ics of "Ballsof

Fire" recently soon over Japanese homeland, there is grea t need fo r in te l l igence

on all a ir rheno.oina.

'" - .:,s


33/74

ATATh STUDY A@ AND EQUIPMENT OA R FELS NEAR RANGOON

i4fl aladon Artsitr.

Zas t k w i n A i r s t r f

Zay'tkwin DU:: T.

Hmawbi Airstr ip,

Hle uirstri.

There were no aircraftJohn Haig, Tongyi, and

4TAIU par t ies with ground troops andin the sea borne invasion of Rangoon

have made a' a r t i a l examina t ionofa i r f i e lds and dumps in th e area. Com-plete reports , and photographs havenot been received to date but it ap-pears from information at.hand thatconsiderable equipment of technicalinterest ha s been recovered. A listof items so fa r reported appears below.(Information supplied and par t ly eval-

uated by ATAIU, SEA).

Four nearly complete a/ c were found, including:

1 - Unidentified type described as a single engine twoplace recce-bomber, (Probably,Ki.30 'ANN')

1 - Sal ly 21 '- Oscar 21 - Sonia

There were also miscellaneous parts of other Sal lys , 0 bars,a Frank, and some trainers,

4 - Dinahs1 - Oscar 2

Parts of :

2 - Sallys1 - Dinah

"3 -Oscars1 - Id a

17 - Engines

6' - Tonys; three reported in good shape but not reflyable,

7 - Dinahs7 - Spare engines

found a t the following a i r f i e l d s Pabst, Highland Queen,Cascade.

Dump a n .Shop Area a t Milestone 33 on Pegu Road.

Parts o f: 2 - Helens,2 Dinahs, 2 Tojos., OscarCrated machine shop equipment was found.near th e entrancdto the dump.

Insein Dump. This appears to have been th e main dugp area so fa r located.Equipment found included: About 300 a /c engines ranging in condition from pract ic-a l ly new to badly damaged. Some new types such as th e Ha 45 used in FRANK were'amongthem. . . Propellers, including three and four blade elect r ic pitch change.

Also considerably quantities, of th e following:

Radio equipment, direc t ion f inding equipment, engine instruments, autonmtic p i lo t s ,navigation instruments and computers, bomb s ights , bomb racks, machine guns varyingin cal iber from 7.7mm to 40mm.

A metal salvage factory was located between , Insein andM e .rd scrap were prepared and pressed into bales for.

S vt also found in the dock. area of Rangoon.

Pige 4 - Section II

8888j


34/74

CAPTURED SAP A P

DINAH 3

FRANK

The photographs here reproduced were receivedf'rom TAI Unit SWPTA.

Both FRANK and DINAH 3 crashes have been ex-amined by TAI Inspectors in the Burma Theater.

The FRANK shown, to the left, was repaired inthe Phil ippiresand has undergone test f'ights.

D)INAH 3 differs from earlier models chiefly in

the shape of the fusela, e nose section}?n theirncoirorati~on of Ha 112 direct injection en-gines in nacelles that extend beyond t rai l ingedge of the wing.Evidence of the use of watermethanol injection is present in some: ins4aric--es.

Th e designation of the glider ws not ,een,

GLIDER

(UNDESIGNA TED)


35/74

FIRST CRASHED Ki 30 'ANN'

EXAMINED BY ATAIU AT MINGALADON

Th e first crash examination, as fa r as is known, o f an enemy a i rc ra f t tenta t ive-ly identified as Ki 30 'ANN' was made recent ly on Mingaladon Airstr ip by anATAIU inspection par ty. Pos i t ive confirmation o f th e i den t i f i ca t ion was not pos-sible from plates and rmrkings but dimensions and general characteristics checkclosely with what is known of 'AIN' (now considered obsolete.) Some sa l i en t factsare l i s ted below:

Purpose - 2 place recce-bomber.Description - S/E all metal low mid-wing monoplane., .

p-'an I? feet, 4 inches

Len&th - 33 ft. (Approximate.)

g a g - Flat center panel, marked d i-hedral on outer panels . Stra ight ta -per on leading and t r a i l ing edgeswith rounded t i p s .

FlIps - S p l i t type divided into tw osections.C o c 1 i t enclosure - Long greenhouseextends well a f t of t r a i l ing edge ofwine,

E n i n e - 'wir row, 14 cyl . radia l notpositivjy ' nt i f i ed from pla tes .Probably Ha .

Empennage - Horizontal s t a b i l i z e r an delevators have s t r a igh t taper leadingand t r a i l ing edges with squared t ips .Fin and rudder were not found.

Landing gear - Fixed with spats.

ropel lor - 3 blade, contro l lablepitch;

Fuel t anks - Two tanks are located ineach wing roo t and two in fuselage.All are unprotected.

Armaent - Not recovered. Gun rmountsindicate single f ix small cal iber inpor t wing only and flexible gun inaf te r cockpit .

Bombs - Bombs are carried in ternal lyin a fuselage bomb bay, 8' 6" long.

tomb loading and capacity not known.


36/74

The DIiAH 3 (left) was photographedby TAIC, AAF, SWPA.Note the differ-

ence from the earlier Dinah shown

above and below.(Photos from TAIC)


37/74

MAPLi11

P/NA H-2

DINAH 3, th e l a t e s t vers ion th e well-known Japanese Army reconnaissance a/c, is

eas i ly dist inguished from e a r l i e r models by its long p lex i -g l a s s canopy f a i r ed

into the forward nose section of the fuselage, thusgiving it a highly stream-

l ined appearance. Another recogni t ion fea ture is provided by th e enlarged en-gine nacel les , which extend beyond th e t r a i l i n g edge of th e wing.

DINAH 3,has a great ly improved performance, being fitted with Mitsubishi Ha 112Model 2 engines of approximately 1450 HP in place o f th e Mitsubishi Type 1 en-

gines of 1050 HP in Dinah 2. It now ranks as one o f th e f a s t e s t twin-engineda i rc ra f t in th e world. Comparative f igures from TAIC are given below:

DINAH 2

Span : 48 ' 3" 48' 3"Length : 36' 3" 36' 3"

Weight, Gross : 11,882 lbs 12,405 IbsMaximum RangeSnormal fue l ) 1795 miles 1915 miles

Maximum Speed 7 mph at 19,300'.

DECxia~ lASSI

DINAH

J

- . 0 as k-


38/74

DECi~lE

A . "

I


39/74

RAILWAYS IN BURMi ANiD SIAMjREVI f1TOF ACTIVITY DURING SIX MONT HS

DEC BrER 4 - IAY

During th e six months under reviews th e14th Army has r ecap tu red thd; bulk of the

r a i lw ay 'tracks south of Mo aung j an d dxr-

ng t h i s . p e r i Q d . Japtanese-held lines of-communic a ti on changed from l inesa o sup-puyt to l i ne s of r e t r e a t .

At tIe- be ' inning 'o f the campaign,_ it was gene.raly accepted t h a tth e r a i lways cou ld be in t e r d i c ted in two ways; by the d e s t r u c t i o n o f ' loco-

motives, and by th e deaolition o f ke y br idges . Th e fo rmer.was hard to accomn

plisb, because th e Jai-apan.ese used th e rie.h4ays -. almost .exclusively by n i g h t

an d t o o k great care to > u i l d a l m o s t i m p r e g n a b l e - l a c e shelters a t many points

along th e ra i lway ' l i n e . The latter vas also a dif ficult t a s k because ci th eJapanese p l a n of tbuildirig one o r more bypasses at th e important br idges&

Bridgles became a f o c a l po in t in : a stern con tes t be tween .ou r ;abil-

ity to bomb them oult and the Jap c a p a c i t y r f o r r e p a i r. In o r d e r to concen

trate bombing on se lec ted- br idges , d i r e c t i v e s were i s s u e d f rom- t ime to" t imein c o n s u l t a t i o n a .th th e A ny It was dec ided . , that th e a.gobnMaridaay

l ine was th'e * m o s t i m p o r t a n t , wit h the,- Ye U"Y-vYwatatmg an d the Sagaing.ShW %'ebdsec t ion of nexlt; imtportance, an d the ling; Mandal a y - L a s h i o of.. third importaiceiT h e - plari' was-.to g e t at least twao., breaks about - 30 mile s apart, and then tryto c.ean up allrollin-stock e n d o ' c o o t i v e s between th e two .breaks . It was

a lso dec ided t h a t . tatic ally th e m o t sou ther ly b r i d g e should be Toungoo

2.263 which was Tithire range of th e -25s. Hence th e p i c t u r e on 20),December,1944, w as t h r e e breaks on th e Rangoon-anda. lay l ine , Toun oo , in the , and My-

ittha, wti a t t empts , being made to get Pyinmana and Kyaukse as compl imentarybreaks to S i n t - e an d Myittha; th ree breas on th e line between Shwebo and

WVuntho, for there wre fe w good .bridges s o u t h o f Shvwebo; n o break o n the Y e-

U-Ywatauiag l i n e , Toh conc nt r te d forts' were being made to put ou t th e

Mu R i v e r br idge : an d t h r e e breaks on thie l i n e . from andalay to Lashio. Th e

14th A n y were now -raidly approaching Ye--U.

T h e Japs remlizizng the threat to th e Ye-U b r a n c h line had been

steadily withdrawin r o l l i n g s tock fr o ru the nor th p a r t of th e l ine to, th e south ,

an d had been using thieline from .Sagain ' to; Shwebo,: As th e threat to Ye-U, r~ewv -st ragerso th e Ja p s co m m a e d ' a very Lhorough ., emo liton program. A llbride of any size nor th of ln ion w4Vere b l o w n up an d a s the oppos i t ion at

Alon melted, more bridge were blown up t owards Ywataung, wter a s y s t e m a t i c

destruction of rolningsto ck was being carried out Iby pushing wagons overthe

emnbankient which oorn~ects Ywataung with the Ava Bridge. At th e same t imethe

Japs wer~e i m p l e m e n t i n g their threat to take u p the railw ay , line,. an d PR w:-s

spotting, largeidumps o f rails, w i c h were bpingloaded on to barges f r o m

sma l l jet-ties at Sagaing7, and ' piles of burnt sleepers. Already locos and '

some rol l ing s tk were bei n, ru n ino th e I r raadClye low th e Ava irid de .

It become ckar that th e -Jars were wi thdrawing LAllthey could . in-to Mandalay. Hence a ir strikes were mnade on Sa in g an d efforts were madeto smash up iayjmyo y a r d s -and iiitnge r a i lway br idge . Th e Japanese , realiz-

in g that w i t h -forward move:nent of o ur aircraft; th e vu lne r ab i l i t y of. th eR a n g o o n - M a n d a l a y line w as increasing, embarked o n a coer e n s i v e b y p a s sbr idge bui ld ing p o l i c y. They used. ca l l t ypes of construction, i n c l u d i n g fe

ry .ransipmnt poilis,and caulsew4 type bridges. At this time, too, th eProe-Ragoon line be came of inc resing~ iportnce an d this as reflectedby the Jap2~ xtensi6 oF bypTIas bi l i~ng in t~ i s area.

~8-~$~c~r L ~ IJ-a g


40/74

DECySIhp failways in Burma and Siam (ContinuedThe extensive destructions north of Sagaing then led to a reconsid-

era t ion of whether or n o t th e railway l ines had been bombed to o much. It wa smost di ff i cu l t to provide a nice balance between denial of th e main routes toth e Japanese and preserving as much of th e l ine as possible fo r ou r own usea f t e r recapture This balance was int imate ly connected with the speed of ad-vance by lando It was still evident tha t th e rout e from Rangoon to Mandalaywas th e most important, and th e branch l ines , Thazi- ivingyan, and Pjinmana-Kyci.kpadaung were assuming a grea ter t ac t i ca l importance as 14th Army pressedclose to them. As r e a r d s brides consultation took place with th e Army asto th e number of breaks r.equired. Itas r rit ined that as the grea tes t \ac t iv i ty on th e l i nes appeared t -obe north of TOungoo, Bridge A.263 -t Toung-oo. mnst be kept out, together with ei ther Thawatti or Sw a to form a doublebreak, also to be kept out were Pyinmana and Sinthe, Myi.ttha and Kyaukse.Myitnge was -dropped ou t of th e list, and it was considered t h a t some break be-tween'.T:aungdwingyi ard Pyinmana would be desirable,. On the. Ranp;on-Prome l i ne ,bridges s o u t h o f Letpadan and its spur l ihe to Tharrawaddy were chosen.

At th is -time' another point arose. Li t t l e serviceable ro l l ings tock.had so f a r been captur~ed owing to the denial policy of th e Japanese. There-fore th e .Army pressed fo r an eubargo on th e strafing of s ta t ionary ro l l i ng -stock. The argument against th i s was the fac t . tha t very seldom -ere moving

' t ra ins , seen except at night , while th e Jap was obviously protecting some ofh is -wiagons by th e use ofbiblast wal l ,particularly .as the new year had seenmany.po.werfiul s t i ikes -on such ra i lway yards as .Toungoo ,-Pyinmana, Thazi andYamethin. Iihen it became obvious through n i - h t rhubarbs of 24, 25'and 26 Jan-uary t ha t th e Japs were still using, tle line to its xiaium capacity at night,and t ha t l a d e d wagons were being leit s ta t ionary in railwcay sta t ions during

th e day, th e embargo was rescinded and a l l roll ingstock could be attacked. Thew-isdom of this move was im.ediately ref lec ted inth e o il f i res s tar ted amongro l l ings tock on the , Kyaukpadaung-Pyi ana I ines, fo r example, at Ttnagdwingyion- i7L- Februar,- id 'long the. Thazi-Shwenyaun l ine which was packed with.rollingsto.cko

At th e end of February and be innrin o f March, there was, th e dram-atic advance to Meikti la. This was a complete surprise to th e Jap, whoseplcnls fr 'denial were(upset. Froa this poin t dates th e time.timehen th e J .p HiiCoaand l o s t touch with th e rea l i t i e s i'o. th e s i tua t ion , except tha t it was be-.oming obvious to them t ha t Burma could no t be held fo r long in th e face of our

.tankLs.which were nowvable to operate o v e r b e t t e r t e r ra in . This speedy advanceand the.promise of even speedier.ones a lt ~eed th e plan for. imposing breaks in

th e Ran p o n - m i dalay l ine . Hitherto it had been a case fo r th e .prevention of

mater ia l arrit rinr no in t became a race to stop. withdrawal of .equipmiet,. Theeffort, ut into breakin brid ges had not resulted in unqualified ;su ccess be-cause th e J.Sps had ant ic ipated th e attacks ,by. the i r tremendous bridge buildingandS repai r eff.orus,:i Hov ever, suff id ient delays had been in f l i c t ed as to "render

great help to ou r advancing a-'mies. The number of bridges, to be t tacked was

reduced, and at th e same time included br idges .as far-south a A,.~ at Pyun-taza . The' Air Force pressed, to attacks on Pazundaung, th e 750

1oridge .. ust

.north of Ran con; where act ivi ty was cons is tent bu t owing to-a lack of 2 5 0'

-spans nebessary ,.to repair any damage, it was decided to leave the. bridge sev-

erely .alone in th e hope t h a t it might be captured in tact . Opinions were sway-ed at th is ti e ib: cause th e f a s t moving army columns had captured SintheBrid.e in t act, and th e Jap uardc? whose .job t was to blow up th e bridge, , wasS t a k e n pr isoner a'ile he slept .

T ifinal st a1ea was be'in :rapidly reached, The Japanese r ea l i z ingt ha t the i r l i nes :c

omnuunrication between Rangoon and Prome were insecure

b u i l t a large b 'pass bridAj a t Myo(lin_, ndi thus provided themselves with tworailway routes -one on each side of th e Irrawaddy, north dt'Henzada. Air at-;

tacks wiere still going on a a ins t th e bridges south of Letpadan. It was

equally . c lear that th e Japs were uncble to contain our fas t moving- tank col-

umns which were speeding down th e main l ine and had captured Pyinmana andToungoo in quick successions Pe -;as a-vitalpointto th e Jap, fo r it was

t e : . inus of . his rail eI"t a

Page"2 - Section III


41/74

9601000

1464 BI 1it

KAOPH1 51 27/5/45'

LAMAIH4 ni63

Kf~LUNPf 0167

S CA LE I N M IL E

96980

'V PASS SERVICEABLE21/5/45(/A$ UNSERVICEABLE13/5/45RANS'hP14ENT BRIDGE SERVICEABLE13/5/45

N.1.'IYrASS SERVICEABLE

c'

of 10sTT471 BYPASS SRVICEABLE 135/4NErKAW Q277'rZS BYPASS SER~VICEABLE /5/45

K4WON HlAN!Q 23 BYPASS SERVICEABLE 27/5/459 IltPYi? Q 128 BYPASS SERYICEABLE27/5/45

BAN NAUNG LU Q3386 6Y PASS

BAN LONG GABAUNG Q365

NPEQNG WIWAT

T.F.5., RACBLJRJ27/414

R&UI

T.F. 121 27/5/45

BAN DARA T.A.51. ZZ/5146

26 22//I45

U T.F.44 22/5/45

U LF 0OF

1000

1040102

5 1A M

BURMA-SIAM

BRIDGE SERVICEABILITYCHART

^ ^RAILWAY

0 BY-PASS

BRIDGE UNSERVICEABLE

UNDER CONSTRUCTION

INFORMATION FROM PHOTOGRAPHS ONLY

29MAY 1945

1020


42/74


43/74

Ground report~s indicated that t r ps i re b ig t ianported by rail from Prometo P ;u, -and wh n th s ovvtntwhch t'he Ai',r Fo~'ce h ocd e~onsiderbly by itsa ,tanks: was compoi..ted,b dts re tf w e uand . n, ooon. hen Pe u,aid l' a.noon f el l , the escalje line' r'pm Pe x.tao, T hnb t wa nd continuaes tobe hhmnrered a'lon-ag sth h ane ce3f to t h 'Amy ' swi she s th ebornbin

2bf bridges b s ;e m h c u r t il~d,

During t sr dtrte ~r Fo-rce ve i 16 crbher :nd fa rCher afieald to knock ou',_ x ot ra il cent ers and bridges in Siam. At the be-~inning ,{.moon was #1l1-At Cg -t-. ,t" o t t 4s p~ast ;red the Qnt ra l Sta~tion while 13B 9s pqonpetely estroye&M ro th ra ra l l in . yard~sIt becam~emor o and i or &eMv d nth tz.th~e : r : , bht tl ne ck7 of J ,p ailborne suav-

11li'. was be;tween PE ; U n T;j b u z a t -t t has 1. t;r statihe Burm-Siamline joined the iou4*-,res Q= .C~aos o p e a t i c u p rbm he Tenasserim

nirts could put their to d, r~ wx_hilea, cons der&le quati ty ofsuzpplies i"::; brou ght inj r, 2 "= . liniMe .* Thei 5 vvs fully a ive to thevulnr ability of. Pey iuoio4ePin tb hhokk i s w1 as that there wer~every few bridges 'i ch I w x ' w w9* th t& c k ( b y i- 214s, awo' verr c h s t -Kya kkathaanid 1{.iinpaleo whe re t +a a peod of ejiair wivs odigions I~n order to keep

Ja eene uesn orestpise :o a tuc1.. was chi&vecd b lternating betweenbombin , -,lo q :th. Pc i-iuoulm eAn rout e and thc Bur mna--Sia n 2line, A nin, e to,_b a er tb :B r 'S a t. ,Fc ~ l r d s .ou h f ~ a b u a a .o hto Y&ewere ,chosen s, srand aies;,i. .the= ;sal~e tare 29 s ver .ati lsng~nd finallydestr oe~d hd ni v1.ATa d t :.< n:;'k,>ar"anB 2 ce i i i s cdthe Nakorn Chaisei br~d

The Burt~~~~-rin,~z 4a.:r tcaeh.i.n t uerd ct i~iar Ct 5aofl5. the d4iculty d iptni rtoz;z or w. v -Yf 'ktasI, ai the 0 0 4 t e t-

batte; o thebr .d es, r s on ru d t hu~ cth t:fowi of iate l a h . n v el? COi ei~yttoppedod, ra y k d It omp .ted that . lOe b e aks w r n c ss ryb e t w e n i o l t n

,

dions tQ f ? o c to ~a i1 n ia iuwh i l e such :RRat ;bn a o ;tBan sues nk sa eeh svil attacked to knock out .yds supplying 'the ..ie with traffic, There were few large places. along theq$, na--+5 'line i t se l f , ivhe , t h,,Jap hnod c= t i ly ;, u lt s 3spurs f spc r l se .d arhubffth 'teesco "pli~c ted h ,tic;p~or ii ty K,o 4. can s ;.It thus be cite M.eds - B241s 1t d

rairs who vr i o, to .be ,nwhich .r.salled i'J . z polbcdsb ;

t le n; w I1zon QfXmb,. n:d suq cteL 1icl - ridlges IaI 6 3 3 at L m coul o vab e h i tA w a t h e r e6 fu~ss jalso k t t .. e: an~gdo, hi ;z z. ai:ln hATh ctedc 'a

feederr to :'the; r6ad'a run i r rr cy^th into thy. Hpaw-Ls aryva c: ec l r'ac er d asbei a hd'nor . h6, pi te tfi bo bps a a n'}i id a y. 1 . J i n a y, 'f;_ r 1 k(-cfdow3 sn4 x y ow the r: have ,re ~ned destroyedl to tie pr es'ft'd4SV 12 I

Since the successes in the h l1.'in s' Pave .r ofcontr'ol of th e sea lanesof th e Japanese' outer zone, indications have, been : rhc 'gtitth. aaeebcmcxc eo d ag y n rvous '6io1,t h !Ka it y Y'3the ; n oh in ; , t. A )h~ inmdiatel ; sywiintro s~ . n h adt "c6iutry odea3. zith the o i tis na,:'r while airs.

attack s w iee te a as~t j 'b r- ides ' l r hng tt kk - ,f in P enh fi n ~o t ably ..tKrabinbuiri.N It: ha d alwua s1 -S i bIn h, I ti }as ,a ecndaZ' ;line t~a&thn Bur na-iam aid. th is d b ; d a v t h " h e dev.stating 4t cs o aXh o a org, NaNi rg, anc;;u h rn Juxb h rnC as b e Vi 'ii 1 k, n' a5cti vi terarournd ythe bro k n r .d . atTIa burr .t o gether= witih the .txv ty 6bseaivcd don the line :,f rn m Tunigeoa.to rron ha sho vn that thi;-route alo w el xsed ?occihei35%had.alreadyr dea l . : ; svblow at. Kuala-Lumpuar, which"t ,#the&r'4jath i p i g ' t iland str k s ngr pofes,.brought hiorn to theoJJto rthe .fn essit 'for reorientinghis f"o rces. Ground reports in-dicated that the area betwecx Uborn and Udorn was thbe s i t e of new~4imps.o: attac~jia, W:efirst oi:carried ott=on' Gunboi ' d k o a t a n d latterly the irout.,i fioxn J n tr >ur ng;h s be c m h a r d c h t ; }Ju 'bnornihas& gain bL endevas t ~dwLlc-t1re. are: yc -been adiein the railway inr outh jr. e t M olin{rjtreumendods fliying cdistances,

th ' . ralmoz_,tles~ctial b r c s h l' tr'ategic ir Force is now busily' engagedin bakng._ the,rout s: ' Lt o and ,out, f an ok, rout s vhi t ah ,11LL


44/74

Review o e j a t t Develoinen t's in l915

In s in g up Ja use 'o f oads~ n supplyngSr mia up to . the nd'of l Z4it was sa id (EAc

WIS No.18) that roads alonehad\

not .asyret

played a vital part except in their" forwardareas. Railways and- coasta'l shippin'g remained::he backbone;;of the Japan ~e supplyr system.

In reviewg the, subject : for :the ensuing five'months wh~ich, preceded the _fall of Raiagoon, it-can be said that the samep remarks apply. The-~'aps, ,in retreat for-; the whole:-period, -s'tll'

depended on those ralway5-'that wer'e' lef t ' tothem anid, a s' far ds Rangoon, upon ' coas alshipping as wiell . It shou d jo be assumedfrom"'this that roads plyed.no part 6t.a1 inthe back areas. On. the: contrar~y, they wereuised , xesve obyp.,assing railway breas~e x d ' f o ~ l o c I . - s ndump areas like' Rangoonnfroclusi..

Central -Burma-and the' Shan States =ire well provided with' road, in some cases runningparallel 'to: the rg2ltc , n others serving arecs where;i'no railways exis t eg theArakan, and the Shah States. The road from.Lampang :via, Chiengrai and "KengLuxig toThazi eras 'groatl .. improvod by the Japs in 1943--44 and it was to be expected thatthey woc rn ae considerale; uae :of;:this for supply-and,withdra l1. It is wellser'ved y the :Bsn ok.Chienginai'irailway and its uise seemed an obvious development:This: development never took place~ and. it is ,estimated' that at ' no' ime; after theoentry 15ti f ' l i s n t h a l nga h tut :.,ealy

n 94longhata oute,:oahan5r7he:

yt n 1944;en erwgaurm

.it coonem ryinte che u pearid-withdrawal canter and th~e railways radia ing from it continiued to , rardsupplies until they were overrun.un

The failtu to use this tetil valuable: road route, leads to considerat ,.n ofthe fact' that gexeol ;y paking the Japs a~Lvays used railways in preference to;

roads. This they. did 'in spite: of the acknowledged. greater vulnerability to f ttack.ofk: the f orlers and may have ,been: due to .an iuffic'ien~t number of 'm'otor vehicles

-beng avaifable. Te . 'a was well'. supplyied vwi h raoling 'stock,'and ine pi'te cifheavylosses was able to maintain a supply of. locomotiv'es of ;some. kind to 'keep it inmotion. His' amb tious programme of building t da d: woden .coastal vesls ' aroundthe, coasts of., South

& l ts ia c'oupled with, vi gorous coirandeering- ofthho vessels

Qf the ma.ritime ;native populat'ioni, enabled .him tomaintain .,a considerabl.e ,sea ,bornesupply line along tho TenasseriiriCast. M&t6 'bod vehiclies, on th.e other hand,appear, to have been in short supply, and those available wore evidently of limitedceapacity. and an a ,poor-state of se rv iceab i l i t y :

The consistency of the informs iin :in this connection obtained from :Jap 'PGT inter-rogations .ia also of interest. Most of them styte that, a 't e .disemnbarkation at 'port,units ,.eithercame 'on: by: traehbicycled or marched tozstheir-:forwar~d -ositions. 'Thefew who w ee able' to comne by Mt conf irmhtht the. vehicles were =;n bad' condition.'The considera ble "'extent to which the humrble.ox, drawn ;cart w ,s used also points tothe .absenoee of 'a substantial quantity of 'mtor vehicles,. To, add totheir_ troubles

supply ..ofMT

fuel miens to,*have, be difficult. T~ s is ~instancedby; a: report on'

a.journey by 11T !ver- the fir one-' Tangup , oad.'in November 1944.-Apparently the fuel'was of such poor I ur i t thait, after each'sp, h c r b e t r a d t b drainedand high grade f u e l pours din before the. engine wouild , srt again.

The main task, therefores of the ir Forces engaged; on attacking communcations hasbeen to:disorganize rail traffric v, muchi as pobsible;, thus. the Jatp would. be forcedto depend upon rood transport in which respect hi was believed~ to be ywdakest.

Attaks: erience in~ this theatre, has shown tha't, with few exceptions,. th e


45/74

Roads in Burma an Siam(iontinuedi

Stra tegic a t tacks ~bnoroads have co sequently been mainly secondary to at tacks onrai lways. It was found, however, tha t considerable improvement' to the effects ofbreaking a rai lway bridge could be achieved by disrupting th e corresponding roadbridge; or, if th is was not a suitable t a rge t , by destroying .a bridge on any sect ionof road which could form a bypass loop to th e broken rai lway. The Japs,, well aware

of th is danger, prepared addi t ional bridges a t crossings they thought would beattacked. Two good examples of th is are quoted.

1. TouO9,sgo road an d rail bridge over th e Kabaung Chaung. Here th e Jap had aroad bypass-completed in readiness fo r ou r at tacks , which began, la te in December1944.

2. Biin River. After losing th e main road bridge th e Japs b u i l t no l e s s thanthree wooden bridges, in addit ion to three rai lway bypasses This was probably th emost determined o f all Ja p e ffo r t s to keep a river crossing open and although itnever really succeeded, it has involved th e a i r forces in a considerable effort tomaintain th e breaks.

Stra tegic attacks wore also made on th e Prome-Taungup road. Heavy bombers on 30 De c1944 destroyed th e br idges at both ends an d caused a heavy landslide in th e regionof M.S.56 about midway along its length. With thei r customary speed th e Japs made,good th e breaks and built bypasses; th e road wa s in operation again, less than threeweeks l a t e r, . .

As soon as .the Allied a d v n c e brought any road within range of ou r t ac t i ca l squadrons,th e problem o f its in ter rupt ion underwent a change. Thunderbolts, 'urribombers, ' Mos-'quitos and B-25s would be concentrated on it to break ' i t up and maintain th e breaks.Following up t he i r 'devastat ing t reatment of th e Kalewa - Ye-U road a t the. end of1944, t ac t i ca l squadrons sys temat ica l ly in ter fered with enemy t r anspor t along th e

l ines of withdrawal -- Til in-Pakokiu, Shwobo-Sagaing, Lashio-Mandalay and th e Arakancoas ta l road. Attacks on th e bridges eas t .o f Thazi as soon as Meiktila was capturedser ious ly handicappE d Ja p movements. Later on, during the. ace fo r Toungoo.between14th Army and th e main body of th e Ja p I5th Army, th e systematic 1bombing of the roadbridges between Kems.pyU an d Loilem and 'between Loikaw and Aungban played -a. big partin enabling th e 14th Army to win th e race. Th e Japs built bypasses but the ra te ofdes t ruc t ion wa s too fast.

On e very important , though less spectacular form of at tack wa s th e continuous pa t ro l -l ing by Beaus and Mosquitos. The rare occasions on which MT were actually caught ar e

evidence of th e success achieved by t he i r patro ls in l imi t ing Ja p traffic to th e

hours of darkness. Movement was fur ther limited by night patro ls whenever condit ionspermit ted. The delay occasioned thereby and th e e f f o r t involved in preparing I T

hides and camouflage was all a contribution to th e de fea t of th e Ja p forces.

New Construction: Since Burma possesses a very considerable road system th e Jap has'

not been obliged to build a grea t number of new roads. His policy appears to have

been to improve to MT standard any route which cons t i tu ted th e only way into or out

of a given area, and later to build a secondary route. By th e end o f 1943 he was

known to have made th e Prome-Taungup road passable 'to MT throughout th e year and byDecember 1944 to have gone a long way to completing another and en t i r e ly new road

fu r the r nor th l inking th e Irrawaddy val ley with th e Arakan coast .

Reports wore also avai lable suggest ing t ha the was building a through road from

Komapvu (a t th e eas tern end of th e road running to Toungoo and th e southern end of

the road running nor th to Lailem) due eas t to th e Chiengmai area . There is photo-

graphic ovidence t ha t by a ci rcui tous route, th e road, a t l eas t jeepable throughout ,

ha s been completed; but . there is nothing to say t ha t any grea t weight of wheeled

t r a ff ic can pass over it. It is most improbable t ha t it can carry anything a tall

in th e monsoon.

Far ther a f i e ld , th e road running west from Bangkok to Nakorn Pathom, construction

of which was previously reported abandoned,was found early in March 1945 to bein

operation. This completed a continuous road from Bangkok to Moulmein para l l e l with

the rai lway. In th e peninsular area it became known in Apri l 1945 t ha t he had bu i l t

fair weather road across from Tenasserim to th e Siamesecoast at Prachuab Girikhan.

HI ha s thus provided n lt e t iv to th e exist ing road across th e Kra Isthmus

(Paknam - Ihao IHuagangtEon III - Page 5


46/74

Roads in Burma andSiar(ConcludedE,{ S R f t E D

Reports also suggest tha t construction is taking place on another road fur ther south.More in teres t ing perhaps, than the roads vhich th e Jap has bui l t , most of which werewell khown before th e period under review, are those which, contrary to expectat ion,

he has*not bui l t . Chief among these are:

1. The extension from Ban Mea which would have linked Chiengmai with Chiengrai.2. The section between Mong Pan and Mong Ton which would have linked Chiengmaiwith Namsang, thus dupl ica t ing the longer route from NW Siam (Lampang-Chiengmai-Kengtung-Namsang.Thazi),

3. The section between Mesoht an Tak(Raheang) which would have linked Moulmeinwith e i ther Uttaradi t or Pitsanuloke on th e Bangkok-Chiengmai railway.4. The road from Waw to Sittang which would have completed th e road frQm Pegu toMartaban.

5. The section Myittha-Ban Wang Yai which would have provided a usefu l l ink betweenthe Burma-Siam Railwa. and th e Tenasserim Coast.

The fa i lure to complote those in Siam can be t raced in some measure to lack of cooper-at ion from th e Siamese themselves ,coupled with th e destruction of th e Siamese cementfac tory, which l imited th e construction of large bridges. Those in Burma were presum-ably not completed from a general lack. o f th e necessary fac i l i t i e s arnd labot, a ll anindica t ion of th e cumulative success of s t ra tegic bombing of r ea r supply l ines an dins ta l l a t ions

This be l i e f is accentuated by th e s m l l extent to which th e Japs-have carried;: u t roadmaintenance and repai r. A-t no. time did he do more work than th e absolute minimum de-manded by mil i tary n e c e c i t y. A good example o f this is th e main trunk road fromRangoon-Mandalay. This w o once a two-way metalled road but th e Japs.allowed it tofall into disrepai r. Inysome sec t ions th e surface disappeared, ruts were scored and

' t r a ff ic even had to leave th e road and use the para l l e l ca r t t racks. Doubtless trafficwas delayed by th e bad surfaces of many roads, bu t th e Japs ei ther could not, orwould not undertake extensive repai rs , except in cases where complete cessation oft ra ff i c was threatened.

The scene now sh i f t s to a d i ff e ren t area. Except in th e Malay Peninsula, the roads ar efew and those tha t ex i s t are, by comparison, of l imited capacity. Once again th . Japswi l l have to re ly mainly upon rail t ranspor t ; once again they wi l l have navigabler ivers and f l ee t s of native boats to help them out . Already s t ra teg ic bo-bin of theirrai lway br idges and aterways has taken place. Before long they w i l l be facing at tackson t he i r roads s imi lar to, a l b e i t more in tense than, those they have experienced in Burma.

Pa-e 6 -Section III DECLASSIFSIED


47/74

ROAD NOE A D O TS N ATR~fi Y

BURMA:

r LacTakaw F e r r y : This . was . cove red on 15 May an d noth ing is r e p o r t e d .A ru n ' pstxeam. from Takaw showed

no a l t e r n a t i v e f e r ry in opera -tion.

S AJ~l'a,

ChienmaI44e oneo A f u r t h e r r e p o r t on th e cons t ruc t ion o f th e road ' is now avail-able.t st a te s that POW comprise th e l abor. and a re driven towords each day in orries,

Some valuable i n f o r m a t i o n on serviceability o f roads in Siam is provided in th eI.S.T.D. M>>onthly Summary dated 1 May 1945. It is ob ta ined from a highly reliables5iamese sour e, s

Route No. 1 5 - Udorn - Thon Kaen A ll weather M.T.dute No . 17 -Udorn - Nakon Panom All weather M. T.

Route: o.['3 8 n -o Nakon Panom -All wea the r M.T.TJ&3rn - Loey - F a i r weathe r - unrietal led,

Route Nos. -19 & 19A - Ubon - Yasodhorn - R o i e t -MahasaraIam -KhonKaen All .weather M.T.

I r a n ( N 2 3 1 T jo i S r _S28. 'This road runs sou th from Trazg (QN1213) and.to th e east of the Trang - Ban Kan Tang railway. Interpretation

of photographs o f December 194 an d Februa ry 1 9 4 5 r e v r e a t l t h e

fo l lowing p a r t i c u l a r s , ( C P I C D . I R T/247,,1 May 14 5 refers:.)Ter~i. . F a i r l y flaundulating in places.

. id th . . '.Average 15-.20 ft.Surface Condi t ion . No de f in i t e s t a t ement p o s s i b l e due, to ' smal l

leofphotoraph., i'pears to . be in good c o n d i t i o n , probab lyof :Ireent c o n s t r u c t i o n . Constructional activity seen 4-3 /4 milespouth . f Trang.Classification. F a i r weather M.T.Concelmnt. ffective cover in plantations fo r almost 'ent i relength. Dep,.loyment genera l ly p o s s i b l e , though l imited.

T rfes.QN129276

- Bridge over s t r e u m . 60 ft steel or rasonry.QN137275 - Bridge o v e r s t ream. 80 ft steel or masonry.4N191089 - Bridge over Khlong Lamleng. 195 ft (approx) .QS201843 (approx) B r i d g e or causeway ( incomple t e ) ) ,

Refe rence to te sketch map of l o u t e s in Malaya, published in AC, WIS 'No. 38 da ted18 *Y . 45; indictbs. that development of this road w l l provide a use fu l wes t c o a s tthrough route beteon Takuapa an d Setul as soon a s : t he s e c t i o n between Krab i and

Phang Nga, repor ted as under c o n s t r u c t i o n , is complete .

WWII 10th Air Force Report

Documents

Transcript of WWII 10th Air Force Report