ww2 harborcraft pacific

CHAPTER VII

Special Types of Vessels

Various ships and craft were acquired or converted "by the U. S. Army

for the performance of special functions, and their procurement and oper

ations cannot be clearly understood apart from these functions. Such

ships and craft form six main groups: (l) refrigerated vessels, (2) oil-

carrying vessels, (3) hospital ships, (4) amphibian craft and amphibian

vehicles, (5) landing craft, and (6) special fleets operated by the Signal

Corps, the Air Corps, and other organizations.

Refrigerated Vessels

In most of the Southwest Pacific Area, and particularly in New Guinea

and the Philippines, the humid heat made it impossible to transport fresh

foods without refrigeration. During the first few months of the war, when

most of the U. S. troops in the area were being staged in Australia, they

were provided with fresh meats, fruits, vegetables, and other perishable

subsistence procured locally; bat as soon as bases were established in

the islands, which produced almost no subsistence except coconuts and fish,

the problem of moving perishables from Australia and New Zealand became

a matter of concern.

In 1942 the number of refrigerated vessels available to the Army

throughout the world was described by General Gross, Chief of Transpor

tation, as "extremely limited." Since provisions were obtained locally

in Australia and New Zealand it was not feasible to dispatch refrigerated

ships to SWPA, and the only refrigerated space normally available on ves

sels in transpacific service was the ship's icebox, which could carry only

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enough supplies for the crew. Isolated bases could therefore expect few

deliveries of perishables. General Gross recommended on 10 July 1942

"that plans be made to supplement the 'B1 ration with vitamin pills as

required to assure the continued health of the troops stationed at these

bases. "•*•

The theater converted or partly converted a number of barges and

KPM vessels to reefers (refrigerated vessels), but these provided inade

quate refrigerated space to give more than occasional relief from a diet

of canned rations and vitamin pills. To serve the needs of rapidly in

creasing U. S. forces in New Guinea the theater requisitioned refrigerated

vessels for the local fleet. v.rhen the first of the Lakers, the City of

Port Worth, arrived in Australia on 12 March 1943, the Chief of Transpor

tation, USA5TE, wrote that "the refrigeration you installed is an answer

to one of our serious problems and when we get them all, we shall be able

to maintain a refrigerated service to New Guinea. ... Any more ships in

this class and type that you can pass along to me will be like manna from

heaven." Twenty-one of these vessels arrived before the end of 1943, and

the twenty-ninth and last was delivered in May 1944.

Long before that date, however, it was obvious that additional re

frigerated space must be found, not only for transportation but for stor

age. In May 1943 the refrigeration in forward zones was described as

"sadly lacking," and a suggested solution was tc construct refrigerated

barges "to be used solely as floating transient warehouses in water ad

jacent to garrisons or forward combat units"; refrigerated food would be

issued dally from these barges to the troops on shore. In February 1944

the theater presented a requirement for 1,008 portable refrigeration units

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of 26^ cubic feet and 500 of 125 cubic feet. In the same month the Vice-

Chief of ITaval Operations, in reply to inquire from the Chief of Transpor

tation, announced that no refrigerated ships of the Itfavy were available

for transfer to the Southwest Pacific from other areas and that none of

the refrigerated ships allocated to the Pacific Fleet could be withdrawn

without replacement. At the same time G-eneral MacArthur reported that

the "uncertain Australian delivery situation" obliged him to depend on

the United States for his requirements. It became clear that the Chief

of Transportation must take prompt action to meet the needs already exist

ing and those which would develop with intensified operations later in 1944.

On 13 February 1944 G-eneral MacArthur reported that nondelivery of

refrigerated barges and of mobile and semifixed refrigerated equipment,

from both Australian and United States construction, had brought about "a

very unsatisfactory situation." He had already requisitioned 50 knock

down 104-foot refrigerated barges for making deliveries to outlying sup

ply points, and he desired that each of 5 202-foot barges which were

available be fitted with 50,000 cubic feet of reefer space to be used

chiefly for port storage at new bases. G-eneral Somervell replied on 18

March 1944 that approval had been given for supplying the theater with

the 50 refrigerated barges requested (about 1,000,000 cubic feet of reefer

space), the 5 large storage barges (250,000 cubic feet), and refrigeration

equipment for 25 Australian barges (500,000 cubic feet), making a total

of 1,750,000 cubic feet. The barges from the United States were delivered

considerably later; 46 of the 104-foot barges (design 348-A) arrived in

the theater between 20 August 1944 and 1 March 1945 (the remaining four

being canceled), and the 5 large barges (210-root, design 230) arrived

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"between 20 November and 27 December 1944.4

On 2 April 1944 General MacArthur presented an estimate of his reefer

needs through June 1945. He predicted that 307,139 cubic feet of refriger

ated cargo would require movement from Australian ports northward during

each month of this period. Since most ships operating between Australia

and New Guinea had a turnaround in excess of 30 days and since about 20

percent were under repair at al l times, he estimated that movement of this

cargo would require 1,452,841 cubic feet of reefer space per month in 1944

and, because of lengthened turnaround in projected Philippine operations,

about 25 percent more per month during the first half of 1945. The reefer

space actually available, "based on absolute present ship turn around and

percentage laid up for repair,11 was 419,007 cubic feet. G-eneral MacArthur

awaited 200 Cl-H-AYls (requisition for 100 approved 29 December 1943),

each with 12,000 cubic feet of reefer space, but pending their delivery

he required reefer space from other sources. On 4 May 1944 G-eneral Mac-

Arthur requested that four of the Cl-M-AVls be refrigerated to provide

60,000 to 70,000 cubic feet each. Cn 4 July 1944 he complained that the

monthly capacity of the reefer ships available to him was only 280,000

cubic feet, providing only 9 issues of fresh provisions per month. To

provide 21 issues per month would require 990,000 cubic feet of reefer

space. He urged that every effort be made to expedite delivery of the

ships requested on 4 Kay, and that additional reefers be immediately

assigned to the theater for present use.

In response to this request the Turrialba, with about 160,000 cubic

feet of reefer space, was assigned in September to sail from San Francisco

with a full cargo of perishables. On 28 October 1944 the ^ater Division,

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OCT. proposed that the Contessa. the Cefalu. the British Columbia Express,

and the Panama Express, in the permanent local fleet, be reconverted to

fully refrigerated vessels. Before the war they had been employed in the

fruit trade, and when they were converted in the theater to carry troops

their refrigeration machinery had been left intact. On 2 November Gen

eral MacArthur approved reconversion of the Contessa and the Oefalu. which

would increase their reefer space from 82,410 cubic feet to 327,886 cubic

feet. He reported on 28 November that reconversion of the British Columbia

Express and the Panama Express should be completed locally. On 7 December

he requested permission to send the Cefalu and the Contessa to San Fran

cisco, where the work required could be accomplished in 4 weeks. In Aus

tralia the same work would require at least 16 weeks. "Seven Christmas

holidays will be observed "by labor in Australia regardless of work to be

accomplished plus fact that labor is stretching all work to longest period

possible on every job they perfect." The request was granted on 18 Decem

ber 1944, but work on the Contessa was still in progress on 30 March 1945,

and in June 1945, after the reconversion of the Contessa had been completed,

it was planned to dispatch the Cefalu to San Francisco about 15 July 1945,^

On 25 August 1944, before any of these measures had taken effect,

the theater complained that "Heefer ships and barges are critically short

at this time and always have been. Our troops employed in combat opera

tions have without exception had to go for long periods without fresh

meats and other perishable subsistence, in some instances in excess of

six weeks." On 20 September 1944 General MacArthur requested the assign

ment of sufficient reefer shipping to assure delivery of 300,000 cubic

feet of refrigerated subsistence per month to forward bases. Shore reefer

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facilities were available to effect speedy discharge. He announced that

he was about to requisition perishable items from the United States to

supplement the no longer adequate supply from Australia. On 23 September

General Somervell announced an emergency plan for meeting the stated re

quirements temporarily. British-controlled vessels en route from England

to Australia would be diverted to New York, load Army refrigerated cargo

there, discharge the cargo in New Guinea, proceed to Australia, and pick

up 1,250 tons of boneless beef (to be released by General MacArthur as

payment for the space taken by Army cargo in the New York - New Guinea

run) at ]Fremantle for discharge at Calcutta. On 5 October the theater

replied that direct supply from the United States was desired not for New

Guinea (as ASF had assumed) but only for the Philippines, and that no

shipping was available to move United States cargo from New Guinea to the

Philippines. The theater requested 8,135 weight tons of refrigerated

cargo from the United States for direct discharge in the Philippines dur

ing November and 9,920 weight tons during December.'

On 12 October 1944 the Chief of the Water Division, OCT, in a memo

randum for the Refrigerated Vessel Subcommittee of the Joint Military

Transportation Committee, reviewed this correspondence and pointed out

that the British Ministry of War Transport insisted that discharge be

prompt, that it be made in New Guinea, and that compensation be made for

lengthening the time normally required for delivering Australian meats

in Great Britain. Host reefers in the Pacific were in use by the Navy.

The Chief of the Water Division suspected that "Southwest Pacific is

thinking in terms of using whatever ships are dispatched to that theater

v/ith the perishable requisition as floating warehouses. Vith the world

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wide shortage of reefers, this could hardly "be done. ... The British

even if they could "be persuaded to dispatch a refrigerated vessel to that

destination would hardly agree to permit it to remain as a floating stor

age. Any such action would mean that the requirements of the British

Isles for meats from Australia could not be made." The Refrigerated Ves

sel Subcommittee decided on 26 October that no ships were available for

direct dispatch to New Guinea. The Subcommittee observed that some of

the available meats in Australia were being exported to the United King

dom, that refrigerated vessels were loading mutton and lamb in New Zealand

for a 12,000-mile voyage to the United Kingdom, and that diversion of New

Zealand meats for consumption in New Guinea would release reefers for ser

vice elsewhere.®

The subject was further studied by the Joint Logistics Committee of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 27 October. On 2 November 1944 the Planning

Division, ASF, notified General MacArthur of the Committee's decision:

(l) that the steamer Clan McDonald would load at New York on 20 November

200,000 cubic feet of perishables including 1,250 tons of boneless beef

for .lev; Guinea discharge, (2) that no reefers were available for subse

quent direct shipment from the United States to Hew Guinea, (3) that

diversion of British ships to areas north of Australia could not be con

sidered before the "world reefer situation1' improved, and (4) that the

only solution of the problem was shipment from the east coast on British

ships (some of 350,000 cubic feet capacity) to Australia, from which the

theater vould hr've to provide its own transportation to forward areas.

On 15 November 1944 General MacArthur replied that the theater had only

620,000 cubic feet of reefer shipping, including 120,000 cubic feet

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normally under repair; that normal turnaround time to the Philippines

would be 60 days; that vessels of 350,000 cubic feet could not be accoat

modated in forward areas; and that the policy announced on 2 November

would confine the forward areas to four issues of perishables per month.

After further correspondence the Army abandoned its plans to make use of

British reefers through reciprocal aid. British vessels on which the

Army had relied had appeared in port a month or more late, or not at all;

no firm schedules could be based on WSA-BMWT agreements; and the Army (as

informally stated on 3 January 1945) "declined to use mythical space."9

It was foreseen in 1943 that with the arrival of sufficient Cl-M-AVls

and reefer barges in SWPA the reefer problem would be more or less solved;

but the unexpectedly long delay in delivery of this equipment produced

unanticipated shortages of reefer space in 1944. Efforts to obtain tempo

rary reefer space, pending the arrival of the promised equipment, culmi

nated in the abortive plan to divert British-controlled vessels; and the

number of issues of perishables per month to forward areas declined from

nine in July to four in November, during the period of maximum concentra

tion in New Guinea and the beginning of the Philippine campaign. Then,

as in the middle of 1942, the forces in New Guinea, the most unhealthful

and uncomfortable part of the Southwest Pacific Area, lived on canned

rations and vitamin pills. As late as 27 September 1944 the theater was

informed that 21 C1-M-AV1 vessels would be delivered in 1944 and 79 more

by July 1945. Of these, 95 would be equipped with 10,000 cubic feet of

reefer space each and 5 with 105,000 cubic feet each, making a total of

1,475,000 cubic feet. Reefer barges had began to arrive in August 1944,

but the first two Cl-M-AVls, the Glove Hitch and the Timber Hitch, were

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delayed for unexplained reasons till February 1945.

Others followed, and after V-E Day ample reefer space became gradually

available. In August 1945 A3VESPAC had about 900,000 cubic feet of float

ing reefer space, and in September this total increased to about 1,700,000

cubic feet with the assignment of the Maya (200,000 cubic feet), the

Argentinean Reefer (175,000 cubic feet), the Crown Reefer (100,000 cubic

feet), and other arrivals. Considerably after V-J Day there arrived in

the theater three barges of a new type — BEL (Barge, Refrigerated, Large).

Each was 265 feet long, with 8 holds storing the equivalent of 64 carloads

of frozen meats, two deck compartments with a capacity of 500 measurement

tons of fresh vegetables, cheese, eggs, and other perishables, an ice

plant producing 5 tons a day, and a unit making 10 gallons of ice cream

every 7 minutes. It seemed unfortunate that the delivery of adequate

refrigerated equipment had been delayed until the most urgent need for

it was past.

Tankers and Oil Barges

Special floating equipment for carrying oil — that is, oil barges

and tankers — was not greatly needed by the Army in SWPA for intrathea

ter use before 1943. American oil was delivered either in drums, which

required no special equipment, or in bulk. Bulk oil was delivered to

main Australian ports in which Navy and WSA tankers could discharge their

liquid cargo at docks into shore storage facilities. Oil in Australia

was distributed by trucks or tank cars to outlying installations. The

undeveloped island ports north of Australia had at first no facilities

for bulk storage and were therefore supplied with oil in drums. During

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1943 these ports began to construct such facilities, but on a limited

scale. Large and permanent facilities were not desired, since the ports

would be decreasingly used after the center of combat moved to the Phil

ippines. In some ports the facilities could not be reached by large

tankers for direct discharge; in others the facilities were so small that

a large tanker could completely discharge its cargo only by visiting more

than one port. These conditions persisted through the New Guinea period

of the war and were repeated in the Philippines until permanent facilities

were established after the reoccupation of Manila. Most bulk petroleum

therefore continued to be discharged in Australia for transshipment to

forward areas; and a need developed for small tankers, which did not re

quire deep-water ports and did not carry more than one port required, and

for oil barges, which could be carried as cargo in tows from Australia and

could deliver oil in very shallow ports or could be used to discharge tank

ers that could not enter such ports. Even after the reoccupation of Manila

such equipment was needed for delivering bulk oil from Manila to outlying

ports.

Of the oil barges the first were four 80-foot barges (SSS-H) con

structed in Australia before 30 June 1943. By 23 August 1944 USASOS had

received 13 85-foot bulk oil steel barges (SSS-G) from the same source,

and 37 more were delivered later. Prom the United States came 50 102

foot knockdown riveted oil barges (design 348), delivered between 29 De

cember 1943 and 25 March 1944, and 16 120-foot oil barges (design 231),

delivered between 19 January and July 1944. The 120 barges made part of

the huge tows from Australia to New Guinea and later from New Guinea to

the Philippines.

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The Y tankers delivered to SWPA were technically designated as

tanker, liquid cargo, diesel, steel, and tanker, dry and liquid cargo,

diesel, steel, 162 feet. They were built for the Transportation Corps

according to five designs: 286 (162'4W x 27' x 12'10"), 294 (1801 x

30f x 13'6M), 294-A (182I6H x 30' x 14'), 294-AB (182'6» x 30' x 13'6»),

and 294-AC (same dimensions as 294-AB), At least 31 Y tankers had been

12delivered to SWPA by September 1945:

Arrival Hull Design Arrival Hull Design

4 3 1 9 4 4 (cont.) Aug - Y-13 286 Oct 25 Y-35 286 Aug - Y-14 286 Nov 11 Y-44 286 Aug - Y-15 286 Nov - Y-45 286 Hov 1 Y-6 294 Uov 4 Y-4 294 1 9 4 5 Nov 6 Y-7 294 Feb 9 Y-108 294-AC ITov 8 Y-5 294 Mar 4 Y-109 294-AC Nov 8 Y-18 286 Apr 18 Y-46 286 Nov 10 Y-3 294 Jul 2b Y-101 294-AB Nov 10 Y-19 286 Jul 25 Y-103 294-AB Dec 13 Y-20 286 Jul - Y-53 294-A Dec 20 Y-8 294 Jul — Y-58 294-A

Jul - Y-59 294-A 1 9 4 4 Jul - Y-60 — Jan 19 Y-21 286 Sep - Y-56 294-A Feb 28 Y-9 294 Sep - Y-93 294-AB Mar 6 Y-11 294 Sep - Y-100 294-AB Apr 1 Y-10 294

The Y tankers, designed for coastwise service, usually suffered

damage in transit across the Pacific. The Y-5 was mistaken on one occa

sion for a submarine, since its decks were constantly awash. The Y-10,

arriving from the United States on 1 April 1944, required extensive re

pairs which, after "many costly and irritating delays," were finally com

pleted on 17 June. Most other tankers were laid up for repairs immedi

ately on arrival. The trouble was attributed in part to the negligence

and inefficiency of civilian crews, unable or unwilling to make even

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minor repairs; and in at least one instance (that of the Y-15) the crew

was accused of deliberately grounding a tanker. A shortage of spare

parts hampered operations and caused delays. On 30 January 1944 General

Macirthur reported that six of the thirteen Y tankers in the area vere

out of service for repairs, that the crews supplied with tankers were

inexperienced, that no spare parts were furnished with the tankers, and

that their inability to maintain schedules was seriously affecting oper

ations in forward areas.

General MacArthur had already requested additional tankers in 1943.

On 11 November 1943 the Chief of Transportation promised him the Army-

owned tankers T. W. Drennan (22,000 barrels) and Zephyr (18,000 barrels),

and announced that the Navy would eventually send (chiefly for floating

storage) the Sakatonchee and the Seekonk (12,000 barrels each), 6 con

verted Liberties (65,000 barrels each), and 5 old tankers (50,000 barrels

each). The 1. V. Drennan arrived 25 May 1944 and the Zephyr 13 July 1944.

In the meantime General MacArthur had been obliged to use large over

seas tankers, including Navy equipment, for coastwise distribution and

for movements from the main Australian ports to Darwin, Port Moresby, and

Milne Bay for distribution to forward areas. On 18 July 1944 he presented

additional tanker requirements. He remarked that the tactical situation

and the lack of shore tankage in reoccupied ports required the use of

medium and small tankers to maintain the supply of bulk aviation gasoline,

motor-transport gasoline, and automotive diesel fuel. All assigned Army

or Navy medium and small tankers were fully occupied in distribution from

Milne Say, Finschhafen, and Hollandia to consuming areas scattered over

1,600 miles, such as Lae, Aitape, Gloucester, and Biak. By fall, he

8K9954.O—50 28

estimated, there would exist a requirement for moving 540,000 barrels a

month from Finschhafen and Hollandia to areas from 1,250 to 1,500 miles

away, and 270,000 "barrels of tanker capacity in addition to that already

assigned would be needed to meet the total requirements of Naval, Air,

and Land Forces in SWPA. Three commercial tankers were fully occupied in

moving stocks from the east coast of Australia to Darwin, Tort Moresby,

Milne Bay, and Finschhafen, General Mac Arthur urgently requested that

the Chief of Naval Operations assign to the theater four vessels of about

67,500 barrels1 capacity each for carrying "white products," to arrive

in New Guinea by 15 September "in condition to be put into immediate ser

vice."^

In nominal fulfillment of this request the Chief of Naval Operations

assigned four tankers ranging in age from 24 to 32 years, which arrived

months late, the last on 10 January 1945, and in such condition that they

were not fit to be used as shuttle tankers. On 24 January 1945 General

MacArthur, with the concurrence of the Commander, Service Force, 7th Fleet,

renewed his request of 18 July for four shuttle tankers, by the lack of

16

which the Philippine operations were Min jeopardy."

The outcome of this request is not entirely clear; but on 1 January

1945 General MacArthur had acquired control over the allocation of ships

to the Seventh Fleet, Previously the Seventh Fleet had made requests for

shipping directly to the Chief of Naval Operations, and General MacArthur

had made requests for Army shipping directly to the War Department. Under

the new procedure all shipping requests of the Seventh Fleet were present

ed through General MacArthor, and the Seventh Fleet deputized an officer 17

to work directly with the Area Petroleum Officer of SWPA. Absence of

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further complaint from the Army suggests that an adequate number of tankers

was at General MacArthur's disposal in the closing months of the war.

Hospital Shi-ps

The transportation of patients required special accommodations and

medical personnel. Until late 1944 all patients returning to the United

States, except urgent cases moved by plane, were carried on transports.

All troop transports were normally equipped with facilities for the care

of such troops as might be expected to require hospitalization, and

the troop units included medical personnel. Added space could be set

aside for hospital use when necessary.

In the early months of the war most patients were hospitalized in

Australia. The first vessel in the theater designated as a hospital ship

under the Hague Convention was the Mactan. which sailed from Manila for

Brisbane on 31 December 1941 with patients and other passengers but was

not employed for hospital use after its arrival in Australia. Two of the

Dutch vessels assigned to the permanent local fleet of SWPA in 1942 —

the Maetsuycker and the Tasman — were converted in Australia to carry

patients to Australia, either for hospitalization there or for transfer

to transports sailing to the United States. After direct sailings between

Hew Guinea and the United States were began in the summer of 1943, it

became necessary to develop large Army hospitals in the New Guinea bases.

By December 1944 it had become a duty of the San Francisco Port of Embar

kation to report the patient-carrying capacity of each vessel sailing

from that port for SWA, and transport surgeons on several troop vessels

arriving in the theater had been unwilling to carry the number of patients

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prescribed "by SFPE. By January 1945 a large number of patients in Army-

hospitals at Finschhafen, Hollandia, and 3iak were awaiting transportation

to the United States, and others were arriving daily in these ports from

the Philippines.

USAF3TE reported to the War Department on 24 August 1943 that ships

being used for the movement of patients to the United States had inade

quate facilities for mental cases, "especially those requiring security

accommodations," with the result that "closed ward" accommodations in the

theater were crowded with mental patients who had to be held in hospitals

for "an unreasonable length of time." USAFJTE records showed that during

the past 6 months 11.5 percent of all casualties returned from SWPA to

the United States "were psychotic and required security accommodations."

USAETE therefore requested that on ships being equipped with hospital

facilities about 12 percent of the patient capacity consist of such accommo

dations. The Surgeon General, USA, pointed out that only 1 percent of the

troop space had been previously required to be equipped for mental patients,

and he recommended that the proportion be increased to 4 percent. Lt.

Col. Donald E. Farr, Chief, Overseas Troop Branch, Movements Division,

OCT, proposed on 18 September that action be initiated to add to each

Army-owned or Army-operated troop transport a number of "mental beds"

equal to 3 percent of its troop capacity. He believed that such facil

ities would require "only the installation of bars across port holes, the

installation of suitable doors, the removal of potential weapons and the

adequate safeguarding of electrical and other fixtures. As these spaces

may be used to carry troops on outbound trips, it should not affect the

total troop lift of the vessels." The request was presented to V.rSA on 7

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October, and the Chief of Transportation directed the same action on Army-

owned and "bareboat-chartered ships. The Maritime Commission was engaged

by 23 December 1943 in converting vessels according to these requirements,

under specifications for Design C4-S-33.19

On 29 January 1944 the Chief of Transportation, ASP, notified Gen

eral MacArthur that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had authorized the operation

of twenty-four Army hospital ships in accordance with Hague Convention X

of 1907. Twenty-one of the ships were to be operated by the Army and three

by the Navy. They were designed for "the evacuation by water to the con

tinental United States of those sick and wounded who may be expected to

require considerable medical care en route, and much assistance in the

event it becomes necessary to abandon ship (the so-called !helpless frac

tion1 of the sick and wounded)." Priorities for patients were set up

without regard to their status (Army, ITavy, Goast Guard, Marine Corps,

Merchant Marine, Allied personnel, civilians), in the following order:

(l) all female patients, (2) litter patients, (3) hospital ambulant

patients requiring considerable care and assistance, (4) mental patients

requiring security accommodations, (5) other hospital ambulant patients,

(6) other mental patients, and (7) troop-class patients. Hospital ships

scheduled by the Chief of Transportation could be "so routed as to assist

in intratheater evacuation without seriously interfering with their pri

mary function of returning selected patients to the continental United

States/ and could be "attached temporarily to the control of an overseas

commander by request to the Chief of Transportation for the local support

of an operation." Several of these vessels were to be assigned to serve

20 the South Pacific and Southwest Pacific areas in common.

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Actual arrival of hospital ships in SWPA was delayed many months,

partly "by difficulties in converting transports to hospital ships and

partly "by what was considered to "be the superior urgency of the need in

Europe and North Africa. The first of the hospital ships to arrive in

SWPA were the three Navy-operated ships. The Comfort sailed from Los

Angeles for SWPA on 21 June 1944. On the same day General MacArthur re

quested an additional hospital ship, "particularly for intra Theater

evacuation and for direct evacuation to United States when necessary,0

to "be available 1 August 1944 and to be assigned temporarily to his con

trol "in support of current operations." General Somervell replied on

29 June that no other hospital ship would be available before late August,

and suggested that General MacArthur retain the Comfort temporarily and

for current operations and continue to use other shipping for returning

patients to the United States. The Mercy became available for retention

in late August, and the Hox>e was assigned to General MacArthur1 s operation

al control on 8 October 1944 for an indefinite period. Apparently the

first of the hospital ships to make the return voyage from SWPA was the

21

Comfort, which sailed from Milne Bay on 2 December 1944.

The Army hospital ship of the most extensive service in SWPA was

probably the Marigold (gross tonnage 11,350, speed 13 knots, patient

capacity 761 including 617 bed patients and 144 ambulatory patients).

Formerly the President Fillmore (built in 1920), used earlier in the war

as a troop transport in the Aleutians, this vessel had been converted to

a hospital ship at Tacoma, Its hull was painted white, with a green band

the whole length of the ship on each side; a huge red cross was painted

in the middle of each side and another on deck, with others on each side

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of the funnel; and the whole vessel was equipped for conspicuous electri

cal illumination from sunset to sunrise. Its lifeboats and life rafts

were also painted white, with red crosses. Its complement consisted of

an operating crew of 121 civilians and the 212th Hospital Ship Complement

of 210. The Marigold sailed from Charleston 9 October 1944 and arrived

at Finschhafen 14 November; visited Milne Bay, Biak, Leyte, Lingayen Gulf,

and Manila; and arrived at Los Angeles 12 May 1945. After undergoing re

pairs the vessel sailed from Los Angeles in July 1945, joined the Eo-pe

and the Mercy at Manila, picked up American prisoners of war at Tokyo

and Yokohama, and arrived at Los Angeles in December. The vessel sailed

a third time from Los Angeles in February 1946, proceeded to Manila,

arrived back at Los Angeles 9 May, and was decommissioned as a hospital

ship 22 July 1946.22

The second of the Army-operated hospital ships to arrive in the thea

ter was apparently the Emily H, H. Weder. which sailed from Charleston in

December 1944, operated locally in the theater, arrived back at Los Ange

les 31 July 1945, made another voyage to Leyte and Manila, and was decom

missioned at Los Angeles in November 1945. The third was probably the

Dogwood, which sailed from Charleston for the Philippines in May 1945.

Later ships were the St. Mini el. the Charles A. Stafford (ex Siboney).

the Chateau Thierry, the St. Olaf. and the Louis A. Milne, all of which

sailed for the theater in the summer of 1945; and the Acadia. the Al

gonquin^ the Ernestine Koranda. the Felix Riesenberg. the John L. Clem,

the Republic, the Seminole. and the Thistle. All these vessels had

apparently been decommissioned or withdrawn from SWPA before the Marigold

returned from her last voyage.23

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Amphibian Graft and Vehicles

Amphibian craft were essentially boats able to move on land as well

as in water, and amphibian vehicles were essentially trucks able to move

in water as well as on land, but the terms were often used interchangeab]

Both were designed not only to land personnel but to carry cargo all the

way between ships and shore dumps. The dumps might be located several

miles inland. Use of these craft and vehicles eliminated the unloading

and reloading that would otherwise have been necessary on the beach. In

a developed port, where ocean-going vessels could load and unload at pier

there was no requirement for amphibian craft and vehicles; but they great

expedited the cargo operations on hostile beaches, in ports that were onl;

slightly developed, and in ports that had been wrecked and dismantled by

the enemy. Amphibian vehicles, like other motor vehicles, were procured

by the Chief of Ordnance and maintained by Ordnance organizations. Am

phibian craft, according to a decision made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

on 10 September 1942, were to be classed with landing craft, and both were

to be procured exclusively by the Navy.

Experiments by various manufacturers, in close relation with Army

and Navy research agencies, were in progress in 1942 and 1943, and re

sulted in five main types of amphibien craft and vehicles. The three

types of amphibian craft were the LVT — landing vehicle, tracked (un

armored) — called "alligator"; the LVT(A) — landing vehicle, tracked

(armored) —• called "water buffalo," more heavily armored than the' "alli

gator"; and the M29C — cargo carrier — called "weasel" and designed to

operate in rivers, swamps, and mud. These craft moved by means of endless

cleated or fluked tracks. The two types of amphibian vehicles were the

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amphibian jeep — ^ton 4-x-4 amphibian truck — and the DIOT — 2§-ton

6-x-6 amphibian truck. In water these moved by means of a propeller, on

land by four or six wheels, all with driving power. The craft and vehi

cles had the following characteristics:24

Pas - Speed Tvne TH«,«*.«^». Weight Cargo sen- Speed (land, T£&e Dimensions (pounds) (pounds) gers (water) mph) Crew

LVT(l) 21«6«x9il0Mx8»2" 16,900 4,500 20 4 knots 15 3 LVT(2) 26'l"xlO'8Mx8«l» 25,200 6,500 24 5.4 knots 25 3 LVT(3) 24 ' l i "xLl 'x8 '5 | w 28,000 8,000 24 5.2 knots 25 3 LVT(4) 26ll"xl0l8"x8'2i-" 23,350 8,000 24 5.5 knots 15 3 LVT(A)(l) 26*l«xl0»8Mxl0'l« 32,800 1,000 24 5.4 knots 25 6 LVT(A)(2) 26ll' lxl0«8Mxl0llM 38,000 2,000 24 5.2 knots 25 5 LVT(A)(4) 26'lWxl0'8Hxl0'l» 35,100 5,000 24 5.2 knots 15 5 M29C 15'9«x5»10i»x5«10jM 5,971 1,200 - 3-4 mph 26.4 1 Jeep 15'7"x5!4H 3,700 800 - 4.7 knots 50 1

DUKW 31 ! 8 M 3C8 ! X7>1-3/16" 14,000 5,000 25 5.5 knots 50 1

The Army manifested l i t t l e interest in amphibian craft , and those in

SWPA were evidently employed by Navy and Marine Corps organizations. .Am

phibian vehicles, however, were organic equipment of four types of TC

organizations. The TC amphibian truck company (T/E 55-37, 29 Apr 43) was

provided with 50 DUKWs and 1 amphibian jeep; the TC harbor-craft company

(T/O&E 55-177, 19 May 43) with 1 amphibian jeep; the TC service organiza

t ion (T/O&E 55-500, 17 August 43) with 48 DUKWs; and the TC floating

spare-parts depot (T/O&E 55-310T, 6 July 45) with 2 DUKWs. By 5 February

1943 SWPA had requested 150 ECJKWs, of which 25, procured for the 2d Engi

neer Special Brigade, were already en route with Engineer personnel to

operate them. On 16 March 1943 OCT took action to procure 25 DUKtfs to

be used by USASOS for cargo-handling purposes and to be manned by TC oper

ators and mechanics. On 20 March 1943 the theater ordered 500 DUKWs for

the Transportation Corps, which was convinced by the experience of the

Engineers with those already arrived that the DUKW would be "a very useful

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piece of equipment in the island areas and in conjunction with small ships.1'

The Chief of Transportation, USA3TB, reported on 20 May 1943 that the Navy

and the Amphibious Engineers were holding equipment in reserve for train

ing and tactical operation while the Transportation Corps was "trying to

make cargo landings at all sorts of isolated places" — for instance, at

Millingambi, a new landing point near Darwin, where shallow water required

movement of cargo from a ship lying 25 miles from shore. By the end of

1943 a total of 1,400 amphibian trucks had been ordered by SWPA, of which

50 had been received in the theater by the end of May 1943 and 1,220 had

been dispatched by 10 April 1944.25

A detailed argument in favor of the use of DUKWs during and after

combat operations was presented in May 1943 by Lieutenant Colonels Alfred

W. Parry, Jr., and Rudolph C# Lehnau, Control Division, ASF, after an in

spection of the South Pacific and Southwest Pacific areas. They proposed

the establishment of "amphibian cargo landing companies," each to be pro

vided with 60 DUKWs (with spare underwater parts) besides 4 50-ton self-

propelled barges (to handle airplanes, automobiles, and other "long,

large, and bulky packages"), 2 crawler cranes (1 20-ton and 1 15-ton), 3

5-ton truck cranes with oversize tires and 4-wheel drive, 1 fueling tank

truck and greasing outfit, 1 30-foot trailer and unit, and other equip

ment. It was believed that a DTJKW outfit transporting cargo from a ves

sel anchored one mile from shore to a dump three miles inland could make

the round trip with four tons in one hour, ^or loading and unloading,

the proposed amphibian cargo landing company would require support by

stevedores, either included in the company or organized as two separate

companies. Parry and Lehnau advocated the use of DUKtfs, in conjunction

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with standardized interisland transports and standardized refrigerated

"barges, for the following reasons:

The South Sea Islands have like characteristics from a transportation viewpoint. They are invariably protected by an encircling coral reef, with "breaks in the reef through which vessels may enter, and "by virtue of these protecting coral reefs usually relatively smooth water will be found at anchorages adjacent to the beaches. The islands will differ as to the slope of the beach and the distance from the beach where vessels of varying sizes may anchor in safety, tfe know, therefore, that as the campaign develops and we move from island to island, that we shall always be confronted with the problem of taking supplies ashore from an anchored ship over a sandy coral beach, where no facilities of any kind exist. It can be assumed that where facilities do exist they probably will be destroyed in the path of our advance. Therefore, we must be prepared with a substantial amount of mobile equipment so designed as to be capable of unloading and landing every type of material that combat forces will require. The building of docks is objectionable because it takes too long, and it adds to our water transportation burden to have to transport materials for the construction of the docks. The same generally is true with respect to building smaller docks for barges or lighters. Besides the objection noted, permanent developments are undesirable because the beachhead which might be important from a supply angle at one time, would probably be useless and abandoned shortly thereafter as the campaign progresses. Of course the island campaigns must be based upon the nearest adjacent large Port. For example, the northern ports of Australia are logically the water bases for the New Guinea campaign and for islands to the north and west, just as Noumea and Espiritu Santo are logically the bases for the campaign in the Solomons, Gilberts, Russells, etc. Therefore, any comprehensive transportation plan must envisage the movement of materials and supplies from the nearest large water base to the advanced combat zones as quickly, safely, and with a minimum of rehandling, as possible.2^

In June 1943, according to a newspaper notice, the natives of New

Guinea were still frightened by the "new and terrible monster of war"

that had appeared among them. It rolled along forest roads, moved with

out hesitation over logs and through mud, changed easily from land to

sea or sea to land operation, could carry troops with full equipment,

ammunition, and rations, and could pick up cargoes in scattered places,

cross a river or a bay, and discharge without the two handlings that

otherwise would have been unavoidable. This notice was somewhat opti

mistic, for a DUZV, like other wheeled vehicles, could sink in mud or

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sand and be stopped by a sufficiently large obstacle; but with its six-

wheel drive it could move under various conditions where ordinary trucks

were powerless. As late as October 1943, however, the use of DUKV/s in the

theater was still "in an experimental stage." Tactical use of the DUKVT

in assault landings was contemplated, and "the primary use of the Dukw,

i.e. to speed up the turn-around of ships," was kept constantly in mind;

but information as to performance was not yet available. Maintenance was

expensive. General Somervell reported from SWPA that shipment of DUKV/s

to the theater in advance of TC companies had resulted in poor operation

and maintenance "by troops assigned indiscriminately to the operation with

consequent loss of faith in their capacity to unload ships." He believed

that arrival of amphibian truck companies, specially trained in operating

DUKWs, would "give confidence in the value of this equipment." His pre

diction was evidently correct. Two amphibian truck companies (the 464th

and 465th) arrived in Hew Guinea in September 1943, and eventually at

?7least forty-six others served in the theater.

Landing Ships and Landing Craft

The procurement of landing ships and landing craft for Army use was

originally a responsibility of the Chief of Transportation, but on 10

September 1942, by decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was transferred

to the Navy. On one occasion OCT began to fill a requisition of 7 Decem

ber 1942 from SWPA for 38 "truck lighters" (design 289, BTL 826-831, 833

834, 839-852, 873-886), which were dispatched from San Francisco in Feb

ruary 1944; but these were among 207 Army hulls that had been taken over

by the Navy and completed as LCM(3)s. With this exception the Transpor

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tation Corps was concerned with landing ships and landing craft mainly as

bulky cargo to be delivered. They were specialized combat vessels, de

signed for use in landings on hostile shores and not mainly for transpor

tation of men and cargo between points within a zone of communication.28

The la t ter use, however, became increasingly prominent in 1944 and later.

Their main use in SWPA was by the Navy Amphibian Force and by the

three Engineer amphibian brigades (the 2d, 3d, and 4th). Each brigade

required 540 LCV(P)s, 503 LCM(3)s, and 40 LCCs or LCS(S)s. The LCV(P)

— landing craft, vehicle, personnel — was a 36-foot ramped boat with a

crew of 3, a speed of 9 knots, and a capacity of 36 troops, 8,100 pounds

of general cargo, or 1 6,000-pound vehicle; i t was designed chiefly for

landing troops on beaches. The LCM(3) — landing craft, mechanized

(mark 3) — was a 50-foot ramped boat with a crew of 4, a speed of from

9 to 11 knots, and a capacity of 60 troops, 60,000 pounds of cargo, or

1 30-ton tank; i t was designed chiefly for beaching tanks or motor vehi

cles. (Later the LCM(6) was produced, with 6 feet of added length and a

knot of added speed.) The LCC — landing craft, control — was a 56-foot

boat with a crew of 14 and a speed of 13-J- knots, designed as "lead-in

navigational craft for landing craft" and for traffic control and pre

liminary hydrographic surveys; i t was not intended for beaching. The

LCS(S) — landing craft, support (small) — was a wooden boat 36' 8" long,

with a crew of 6 and a speed of 12 knots, able to carry 3 or 4 men besides

crew and gunners and designed Mto render close supporting automatic and

rocket f ire to assault waves." These craft, intended for ship-to-shore

operations, were capable of "shore-to-shore" operations over considerable

distances. Each brigade could land one Engineer triangular division with

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?9its equipment and artillery.

By 23 July 1943 500 LCV(P)s of the 1,620 required by the three bri

gades for 1943 had been delivered and 200 were en route; and 120 LCM(3)s

of the 1,509 required had been dispatched for the theater. The LCV(P)s

were shipped knocked down and were assembled by the 411th Base Shop Bat

talion at Cairns, Australia. The LCM(3)s required deck space that was

much needed by other priority cargo, but experiments were in progress to

30ship them in sections, capable of stowage under deck.

Various alterations in the requirements of Engineer brigades were

made during 1943 and 1944. In September 1943 the Quebec Conference allo

cated 540 LCV(P)s and 405 LCM(3)s for each of the three brigades for

1944. On 6 May 1943 General MacArthur had requested the shipment of

LCTs in iectionalized form as added equipment; the request was still

under st'xLy in September. The LOT — landing craft, tank — was produced

in several models, all ramped, some of British manufacture. The two

American models were the LCT(5) — length 117'6", speed 8 knots, range

700 miles, crew 1 officer and 12 enlisted men, capacity 4 40-ton tanks

or 250 tons of general cargo; and the LCT(6) — length 120'4", speed 7

knots, range 700 miles, crew 1 officer and 11 enlisted men, capacity as

for LCT(5). The LCCs originally called for were not available; on 30

September 1943 General MacArthur accepted 35 45-foot Navy picket boats

and 5 63-foot crash boats for each brigade as an equivalent. On 16

November 1943 the requirement for command and navigation boats was stated

as 24 63-foot crash boats or equivalent, 23 picket boats, and 28 LCS(S)s

for each brip^de. The requirement for LCM(3)s was raised from 1,509 to

2,109 on 29 November 1943 and to 2,534 on 28 February 1944. In the mean

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time, on 6 October 1943, General MacArthur reported that the LCV(P), be

cause of Mits inability to operate over long exposed water routes invar

iably encountered and its small pay load," was not suited for extensive

use in SVfPA; and he reduced his requirement from 1,620 to 1,000, the

eliminated 620 to be replaced by LCTs (63 LCTs for each 270 LCV(P)s) or

by LCMs (4 LCMs for each LCT not furnished). On 28 January 1944 General

MacArthur reported that the LCS(S) was too lightly armored to serve

effectively "in restricted waters to locate and destroy enemy barges and

isolated enemy groups ashore"; and he requested the substitution of LCS(L)s.

These craft — landing craft, support (large) — were 158'5" long, with

a crew of 5 officers and 68 enlisted men, and were designed "to provide

fire support for landing operations and to intercept and destroy inter

island barge traffic." Most of these requested changes were made in the

course of 1944.31

The equipment and the operations of the Engineer special brigades

pertained entirely to Army transportation but not, in theory, to the part

of Army transportation that was controlled by the Chief Transportation

Officer, XJSASOS. In practice, however, various items of Engineer special

brigade equipment were used by the TC. The theater admitted in October

1943 that LCMs were assigned for lightering of cargo when other cargo-

handling equipment was not available. On 6 October 1943 General MacAr

thur requested 24 LCTs "for USASOS and other Army requirements" (besides

the LCTs requested for the three brigades). On 28 February 1944 he re

quested 212 LCMs for USASOS, of which 12 were for the 4 Engineer ports

construction and repair groups in or committed to the theater and 200

were for the Transportation Corps for use by Q^ boat companies and by

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projected harbor-craft companies. Landing craft were not assigned as

organic equipment in the tables of equipment of such TC organizations,

and no clear account is found of the Engineer equipment actually used

by the Transportation Corps in New Guinea and the Philippines; but TO

organizations in island ports appear to have obtained quantities of such

32equipment for temporary use.

On 7 April 1945 the Joint Chiefs of Staff, observing that lack of

ships had "immobilized" supplies and troops in the South Pacific and in

rear areas of the Southwest Pacific, directed those areas to "examine

their requirements for assault shipping in the light of current opera

tional directives to the end that such as can be spared without prejudice

to current and projected operations will be made available to assist in

redeploying Troops across the Pacific and in moving forward Troops and

supplies from the South Pacific and the Rear Areas of the Southwest Pac

ific." General MaArthur replied on 11 April that assault ships and craft

were being used "to the fullest extent possible for movement of personnel

and cargo from rear to combat areas," and that later he might be able to

use more LSTs and LSMs "for logistic purposes." These were comparatively

large oceangoing vessels, the LSM (landing ship, medium) being 2031 6"

long and the LST (landing ship, tank) 328• long. Both were designed for

landing waterproofed tanks or vehicles over a ramp but could be used for

considerable distances as personnel carriers. General MacArthur reported

further on 12 April that 20 LSTs had been working for some time as a task

group "to displace forward heavy equipment and troops," that it would be

augmented with other LSTs and with LSMs as they were released from oper

ations, that LCTs not required at rear ports for loading and unloading

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large ships were being "displaced forward to perform similar duties in

Philippine ports," and that LCIs (landing craft, infantry, 158' 5fn long,

with accommodations to carry 6 officers and 182 enlisted men for 48 hours)

not committed to operations were in use for personnel (such as replace

ments) having little or no equipment.33

With. V-J Day all assault vessels "became surplus except as noncombat

use for them might "be found. On 20 November 1945 General MacArthur re

quested instructions as to disposition of assault vessels, particularly

LCMs and LCV(P)s. He was informed in reply that the Navy had title to

all such vessels, that a number (not yet determined) of LCM(6)s and LCV(P)s

would be needed for training Engineers in Zone of Interior, and that ves

sels surplus to Army needs in the theater should be turned over to the

local Navy commander for disposal as directed by the Bureau of Ships,

Navy Department. Use was found for some of the vessels as cargo and per

sonnel carriers in the theater. On 9 January 1946 AWESPAC controlled 17

LCV(P)s and 454 LCMs. In March 1946 AWESPAC requested assignment of 10

LCIs; in June the Navy transferred 9 LCTs and 2 LCIs to the Army, which

was assembling crews for "amphibious" vessels received from the Navy; and

plans were made in September 1946 for an "AFWESPAC Permanent Fleet" of 65

vessels, of which 57 would be landing ships and craft (44 LCTs, 11 LSTs,

and 2 LCIs).34

Special Fleets

As repeatedly mentioned, many Army vessels in SWPA were operated by

organizations other than the Transportation Corps. In a sense the hospi

tal ships could be described as the fleet of the Medical Corps. Probably

889954 0—50 29

the largest fleet of the kind was operated by the Air Corps, consisting

of retrievers, repair ships, a number of FS vessels, and other ships and

craft. Quantities of amphibian vehicles and craft and of landing craft

were operated by Engineer special brigades. Certain refrigerated barges,

FS vessels, and other vessels were operated by the Quartermaster Corps.

Available information concerning these and other special fleets is too

fragmentary and vague to be worth collecting.

A little more can be learned about the Signal Corps fleet, manned

by detachments known eventually as mobile and seaborne communications

units. Small schooners and oceangoing lighters were equipped with radio

equipment to provide communications during assault and while fixed facil

ities were being installed ashore, and for use as stand-by or emergency

facilities, A GHQ, Seaborne Communications Fleet was established early in

1944, though not officially authorized before January 1945, The Transpor

tation Corps provided crews for the vessels of this fleet; the Signal

Corps directed where and when the vessels would move. The part of the

fleet that served in the Leyte invasion included the PCBs (Patrol Craft

Escorts (Rescue)) 848, 849, and 850, the FP-47, and the Apache. The

Apache was outfitted as a broadcast ship. The FP-47, formerly equipped

for Chemical Warfare operation, was converted as a press ship for war

correspondents. Both vessels served at Leyte, Lingayen Gulf, and Manila,

One of the Cl-M-AVls, the Spindle Eye, was converted to a "news trans

mission ship." On 22 May 1945 General MacArthur requested the assignment

of a vessel for the use of war correspondents, with a press room, broad

casting facilities, quarters for correspondents, censors1 offices, and

capacity for carrying a number of quarter-ton vehicles. ASF suggested

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that either a Baltic coaster or a C1-M-AV1 might "be converted for such

use; "but General MacArthur replied that neither would be of shallow enough

draft to come close to shore, and recommended the conversion of an LST,

the signal equipment to "be procured and installed by the Chief Signal Of

ficer, ASF, in accordance with plans and specifications furnished "by SWPA.

Decision was made, however, to convert a C1-M-AV1. As finally equipped,

the vessel was described as a "radio city," with 5 radio transmitters

(one of 7,500 watts, 4 of 3,000 watts), broadcasting studios with the

newest dynamic microphones, 5 Presto precision turntables for disc record

ings, 2 film recorders, 108 new typewriters, and other equipment. The

crew included 35 Signal Corps technicians, 3 Navy radar men, and 45 mer

chant mariners, in addition to a basic ATS crew. Designed for use in re

porting the invasion of Japan, the Spindle Eye sailed from Seattle for

Tokyo 16 September 1945 and remained in service in the theater till April

1946.36

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Notes on Chapter VII

1. Memo, CofTS SOS to Direc tor , Planning Div, SOS, 10 Jul 42, sub: Food Supply, Bobcat. In OCT HB f i l e , Ocean Transportation - Refr igerat ion.

2. L t r , CofT USAF3T3 (Brig Gen Thomas 3 . Wilson) to Chief, Water Div, OCT ASF, 29 Mar 43 . Notes in OCT KB f i l e , SWPA - Shipping.

3 . ( l ) Memo, Lt Cols Alfred W. Parry, J r . , and Rudolph C. Lehnau for Chief, Control Div, ASF, 21 May 43, sub: Transportation Plan for Paci f ic Theatres. In OCT KB f i l e , POA - Inspection Tr ips . (2) Memo, Director of Plans and Operations, ASF (Maj Gen LeRoy Lutes) , for Director of Mater ie l , ASF, 28 Feb 44, sub: Portable Type Refrigerat ion Uni t s . In ASF Planning Div, day f i l e , SWPA. (3) Memo, Vice CNO (Adm F. J . Home) to CofT -AS t 18 Feb 44, sub: Refrigerated Ships for Southwest Paci f ic Theater. In OCT 565.4 SWPA. (4) Rad, CinC SWPA to CG ASF, 18 Feb 44, Onu-In 12942 (18 Feb 44 ) . Same f i l e .

4 . (1) Rad, CinC SWPA to CG ASF, 18 Feb 44, c i t ed in n. 3 (4 ) . (2) Rad, CG ASF to CinC SWPA, 18 Mar 44. In ASF Planning Div, day f i l e , SWPA.

5. (1) Rad, CinC SWPA to CG ASF, 2 Apr 44, Cm-In 1452 (3 Apr 44) . In OCT 563.5 SWPA. (2) Rad, same to same, 4 May 44, Cm-In 2798 (4 May 44) . In OCT 461.1 SWPA. (3) Rad, same to same, 4 Jul 44, Cm-In 2667 (4 Jul 44) . Same f i l e .

6. (1) Rad, CG ASF to CinC APPAC, 22 Sep 44, Cm-Out 35124. Same f i l e . (2) Rad, Chief, Water Div, OCT ASF (Col R. M. Hicks), to CinC SWPA, 28 Oct 44. In OCT 564 SWPA. (3) Rad, CinC SWPA to CG ASF, 2 Nov 44. Same f i l e . (4) Rad, same to same, 28 Nov 44. Same f i l e . (5) Rad, same to same, 7 Dec 44. Same f i l e . (6) Rad, Chief, Water Div, OCT ASF,to CG USASOS, 18 Dec 44. Same f i l e . (?) Rad, CG USASOS to CofT ASF, 30 Mar 45 . Same f i l e . (8) Rad, CinC SWPA to CG ASF, 23 Jun 45. Same f i l e . According to HTC Hq., Sep 1945, p . 7, the Contessa was again dispatched for San Francisco on 20 Sep 45; i t s ch i l l ed compartments did not maintain a suff i c i e n t l y low temperature for operations in the t r o p i c s .

7. (1) Memo, ACofS G-4 GHQ SWPA (Brig Gen L. J . Whitlock) for CofS GHQ SWPA, 28 Aug 44, sub: Logis t ic Estimate, Musketeer Operations. In ASF Planning Div f i l e , Musketeer Operations. (2) Rad, CinC SWPA.to CG ASF, 20 Sep 44, Cm-In 19529 (21 Sep 44) . In OCT 563.5 SWPA. (3) Rad, CG ASF to CinC SWPA, 23 Sep 44, Cm-Out 36436 (23 Sep 44 ) . Same f i l e . (4) Rad, CG USASOS to WD, 5 Oct 44, Cm-In 5041 (5 Oct 44) . Same f i l e .

8. ( l ) Memo, Chief, Water Div, OCT ASF (Col R. M. Hicks) , for Refrigerated Vessel Subcommittee, Jo in t Mili tary Transportation Committee, 12 Oct 44, sub: Shipment of Per ishables to ACCUMULATION. Same f i l e . (2) Memo, Chief, Ocean Traffic Br, Water Div, OCT ASF (Lt Col Arthur G. Syran), for Plans Div, ASF, 28 Oct 44, sub: Shipment of Per ishables to Southwest Pac i f ic Area. Same f i l e .

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9. (1) Had, Planning Div ASF to CinC SWPA, 2 Nov 44, Cm-Out 56141 (2 Nov 44). Same f i l e . (2) Rad, CinC SWPA to CG.ASF, 15 Nov 44, Cm-In 14229 (15 NOT 44). Same f i l e . (3) Ltr, Chief, Ocean Traffic Br, Water Div, OCT ASP (Col Arthur G. Syran), to Maj Raymond E. Veith, Hq, Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation, 3 Jan 45. In OCT HB f i l e , Ocean Transportation - Refrigeration. According to HTC Hq, Jan 1945, p . 10, the Clan McDonald arrived in the theater 13 Jan 45 and was s t i l l discharging cargo at Hollandia at the end. of the month; reefer compartments on the Turrlalba. which was receiving cargo from the Clan McDonald, had "broken down.

10. ( l ) Memo, Director of Plans and Operations, ASF (Maj Gen LeRoy Lutes), for Deputy CofS GHQ, SWPA (Brig Gen R. J. Marshall), 27 Sep 44, sub: Supply Problems in Southwest Pacific Area. In ASF Planning Div, 12a day f i l e , SWPA. Also to be delivered by the end of 1944 were the 1,008 portable reefer units of 26f cubic feet and the 500 units of 125 cubic feet ordered nearly a year before. (2) 1st ind, Executive, Adm. Div, OCT ASF (J&t Col A. H. Harder), to CG AAF, 23 Sep 44, on an unidentified l t r . In OCT 565.4 SWPA. This l e t t e r announced that delivery of the Cl-M-AVls would begin in Oct 1944. Delay was attributed to "the cr i t ica l nature of e lect r ica l and refrigerator machinery." (3) Utilization of Vessels Employed by U. S. Army in the Supply of Theaters from United States, 16-31 Aug 44, prepared by Control Div, OCT ASF, 10 Sep 44. In OCT HB, organizat ional f i l e , Water Div - Vessel Utilization Kpt. This asserts that there existed in Aug 1944 "a c r i t i ca l shortage of reefer ships and other refrigerated cargo space to satisfy overall needs of a l l the theaters. . . . The problem cannot be alleviated, in the near future, by new construction or conversion, due to the scarcity of refrigerating equipment."

11. ( l ) HTC Hq, Aug 1945, p . 9; Sep 1945, p . 7. (2) "Make Mine Tutti-F r u t t i . " In Army Transportation Journal. Vol I , No. 2 (Mar 1945), p . 5.

12. App 37 . this volume.

13. ( l ) The Army's Cargo Fleet in World War I I , prepared by Harold Larson, Historical Unit, V/ater Div OCT ASF, May 1945, p . 121. (2) KTC Hq, Mar-Jun 1944, pp. 20-21. (3) Rad, CinC SWPA to CG ASF, 30 Jan 44, Cm-In 20179 (30 Jan 44). In OCT 565.4 SWPA.

14. ( l ) Rad (draf t ) , CofT ASF to CinC SWPA, 11 Nov 43, Cm-Out 4619 (12 Nov 43). In OCT 565.4 SWPA. (2) App _37_. this volume.

15. (1) Rad, CinC SWPA to CG ASF, 14 Feb 44, Cm-In 9747 (14 Feb 44). In OCT 565.4 SWPA. (2) Rad, same to same, 18 Jul 44, Cm-In 14830 (18 Jul 44). In OCT 561.1 SWPA.

16. Rad, same to same, 24 Jan 45, Cm-In 24878 (25 Jan 45). Same

f i l e .

17. Joint Army and Navy Supply and Shipping Conference, 1-6 May 45. Notes in OCT HB f i l e , SWPA - Shipping.

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18. HTC HOL, Dec 1944, pp. 9-10; Jan 1945, p. 9.

19. (l) Ltr, Asst AG USAFIE to TAG, 24 Aug 43, sub: Evacuation of Psychotic Cases to United States. (2) Memo, Operations Br, AGO, to Surgeon General USA, 2 Sep 43, same sub. (3) Memo, Chief, Overseas Troop Br, Movements Div, OCT ASF (Lt Col Donald E. Farr), for Chief, Water Div, OCT ASF, 18 Sep 43, same sub. (4) 2d ind on same, Farr to TAG, 15 Oct 43. (5) Memo, Chief, Water Div, OCT ASF (Col H. M. Hicks), to Director of Allocations and Assignments, WSA, 7 Oct 43. (6) Ltr, U. S. Maritime Commission (H. L. Vickery) to OCT ASF, 23 Dec 43, sub: Hospital Spaces on Vessels Converted to Carry Troops. All in OCT 632 SWPA (clear file).

20. Ltr, CofT ASF to CinC SWPA, 29 Jan 44, sub: Hospital Ships. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Shipping.

21. (l) Had, CinC SWPA to CG ASF, 21 Jun 44, Cm-In 17321 (21 Jun 44). (2) Had, CG ASF to CinC SWPA, 29 Jun 44, Cm-Out 58030. (3) Had, same to same, 5 Jul 44, Cm-Out 60711. (4) Had, CNO to Com 7th Fit, 8 Oct 44, Cm-In 7679 (8 Oct 44). (5) Had, CG ASF to CinC SWPA, 9 Oct 44. All in OCT 565.4 SWPA. (6) Had, CG USASOS to WD, 3 Dec 44, Cm-In 3397 (4 Dec 44). In OCT 370.05 SWPA,

22. (l) Fact Sheet on U. S. Army Hospital Ship "Marigold," 1944, prepared by Office of Technical Information, OCT ASF. In OCT HB file, Ocean Transportation - Vessels - Hospital Ships - Marigold, (2) Table, office of origin not named, 16 Feb 45, sub: U. S. Army Hospital Ships. In OCT HB file, Ocean Transportation - Vessels - Hospital Ships. (3) HTC Hq., Apr 1945, p. 8; Jun 1945, p. 8; Aug 1945, p. 8. (4) Roland W. Charles, Troopships of World War II (Wash., copyright 1947), p. 344. (5) WD GO 75, 22 Jul 46.

23. (l) Had, CG ASF to CinC SWPA, 16 May 45, Cm-Out 83409. In OCT 565.4 SWPA. (2) Article in New York Times. 29 May 45, p. 2, dtd Washington, 28 May 45, sub: "Increase Capacity of Hospital Fleet." Clipping in OCT HB file, Ocean Transportation - Vessels - Hospital Ships. (3) HTC Hq, Feb 1945, pp. 10-11; Jun 1945, p. 8; Jul 1945, p. 8; Aug 1945, p. 8; Nov 1945, p. 13; Dec 1945, p. 11; Jan 1946, pp. 17-18; Feb 1946, p. 15; Mar 1946, p. 15; Apr 1946, p. 10. (4) Charles, op., cit,., pp. 332, 334-335, 337, 343, 346-347, 350.

24. (l) ONI 226 - Allied Landing Craft and Ships, 7 Apr 44, and Supplement 1, undtd. In OCT HB, Topical File - Navy. Includes photographs and diagrams. The LVT(3) and LVT(4) discharged by a stern ramp. ^2) Article in New York Times. 15 May 44, by Hanson W. Baldwin, sub: Our Amphibious Fleet. Clipping in OCT HB, Ocean Transportation - Vessels Landing Craft.

25. (1) Memo, Chief, Landing Craft Br, Planning Div, OCT ASF (Lt Cmdr G. B. Taylor), for ACofT for Operations, 5 Feb 43, sub: 2j Ton Dutatf. In OCT HB, V/ylie file, Amphibian Vehicles. (2) Memo, ACofT for Operations (Brig Gen Robert H. Wylie) for ACofT for Personnel and Trailing, 16 Mar 43,

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* T ° n ^ k " 1 0 1 1 8ft 1 Trucks for SWPA. Same f i l e . (3) Ltr, CofT USABTE U3rig Gen Thomas B. Wilson) to ACofT for Operations, 20 May 43. In OCT HB f i l e , SWPA - Shipping. (4) Report on Status of Floating Equipment for Southwest Pac i f i c Theater, 10 Apr 44, prepared by Dist r ibut ion Sec, Stock Control Br, Requirements Div, OCT ASF. In Water Transport Service Div, Harbor Boat Sec, OCT. Omitted from l a t e r reports as not a TC item. Later f igures from other sources have not been found.

26. Memo, Lt Cols Alfred W. Parry, J r . , and Rudolph C. Lehnau for Chief, Control Div, ASF, 21 May 43, sub: Transportation Plan for Pacif ic Theaters . In OCT HB f i l e , POA - Inspection Trips .

27. ( l ) "New Yankee War Monsters S t i r New Guinea Natives," by Hal 01 F lahe r ty , copyrighted by Detroi t News and Chicago Daily News. 19 Jun 43, r ep r in t ed in A Report from the Front . By GMC Truck & Coach Div, General Motors Corp, Pont iac , Mich, undtd. In CCT HB, Wylie f i l e , Amphibian Vehic l e s . (2) Somervell quest ionnaire , question 202. (3) Memo, CG ASF for CofS ASF, 3 Oct 43.' In ASF Planning Div f i l e , Report of General Somerv e l l , SWPA. (4) App 4 1 , t h i s volume.

28. (1) Memo, ACofS OPD GSUSA (Maj Gen Thomas T. Handy) for G-3, G-4, CG- SOS, and CG AGF, 14 Sep 42, sub: Amphibious Craft, Recommendations and Supply of. In OCT HB, Topical F i l e - Navy - Landing Craft. I t developed from l a t e r correspondence that "amphibious craf t" included a l l ships and c r a f t designed for use in combat landing operations but did not include amphibious v e h i c l e s . (2) Float ing Equipment Sta tus , Southwest Pacif ic Area, 29 Feb 44, c i t ed in n. 25(4) . (3) Report of Army Small Boat Construct i o n , 1 Ju l 4 0 - 3 1 May 45, dtd 18 May 45. In OCT HB, Organizational F i le - Water Div - Small Boats.

29. (1) ONI 226, c i ted in n. 24(1). (2) Baldwin, Our Amphibious T l e e t , c i t ed in n. 24(2) . (3) Memo, Chief, Landing Craft Br, Planning Div, OCT ASF (Lt Ciadr G. E. Taylor) , for CofT ASF, 23 Jul 43 . In OCT HB, Gross f i l e , Landing Craft .

30. Memo, 23 Jul 43, c i ted in n. 29(3) .

3 1 . (1) Had, CofS USA to CinC SWPA, 17 Sep 43, Cm-Out 8936 (19 Sep 4 3 ) . (2) Had, same to same, 20 Sep 43, Cm-Out 9534 (21 Sep 43) . (3) Had, CinC SWPA to WD, 30 Sep 43, Cm-In 20832 (30 Sep 43) . (4) Rad, same to same, 14 Nov 43 , Cm-In 8584 (14 Nov 43) . (5) Rad, CofS USA to CinC SWPA, 16 Nov 43 , Cm-Out 7977 (20 Nov 43) . (6) Memo, AG ASF to CofT ASF, 24 Sep 43 , sub: Landing Craft for the Southwest Pacif ic Area. (7) Rad, CinC SWPA to V/D, 29 Nov 43 , Cm-In 17797 (29 Nov 43) . (8) Rad, same to same, 28 Teb 44, Cm-In 20110 (29 Feb 44) . (9) dad, same to same, 6 Oct 43, Cm-In 3498 (6 Oct 43 ) . (10) Rad, same to same, 28 Jan 44, Cm-In 18780 (28 Jan 44)• All in OCT 565.4 SWPA. ( l l ) ONI 226, c i ted in n. 24(1) .

32 (1) Somervell ques t ionnaire , question 196g. (2) Rad, CinC SWPA to WD,#6 Oct 43 , Cm-In 3498 (6 Oct 43) . In OCT 565.4 SWPA. (3) Rad, same to same, 28 Feb 44, Cm-In 20110 (29 Feb 44) . Same f i l e .

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33. (1) Had, JCS to CinC SWPA and CinC POA, 7 Apr 45, Cm-In 7012 (8 Apr 45). In OCT H3, v/ylie file, Radios - Ships for Pacific Theaters. (2) Had, CinC SWPA to COMINCH, 11 Apr 45, Cm-In 15364 (17 Apr 45). Same file. (3) Had, CinC SWPA to WD, 12 Apr 45, Cm-In 10802 (12 Apr 45). In OCT 560 SWPA. (4) ONI 226, cited in n. 24(1).

34. (1) Rad, CinC AFPAC to CG ASF, 20 Nov 45, Cm-In 60924 (20 Nov 45). (2) Rad (draft), Chief, Requirements & Distribution Div, OCT ASF (lit Col James M. Clow), to CinC AFPAC, 21 Nov 45. (3) Rad, CG AFWESPAC to CG ASP, 9 Jan 46, Cm-In 1934 (10 Jan 46). All in OCT 560 SWPA. (4) HTC Hq, Mar 1346, pp. 6-7, 15, 23; Jun 1946, p. 15; Sep 1946, p. 2.

35. (1) "Manila and the Capitulation," by Lt Col D. V. Eddy, SC. In Signals: Journal of the Army Signal Association. Vol I, No. 5 (May-Jun 1947), pp. 42-47. (2) Notes of interview with Lt Col J. S. Fahnestock, formerly Chief, Overseas Operating 3r, Operations Div, OCT ASF, 10 Apr and 14 Sep 45. In OCT HB file, STCPA - Miscellaneous.

36. (l) Rad, CinC SWPA to CG ASF, 22 May 45, Cm-In 21194. (2) Rad, CG ASF to CinC SWPA, 23 May 45, Cm-Cut 87006. (3) Rad, CinC SWPA to C5 ASF, 12 Jun 45, Cm-In 11626 (12 Jun 45). U ) Rad, Projected Logistics Sec, Logistics Grp, OPD GSUSA, to CinC SWPA, 15 Jun 45, Cm-Out 17928. (5) Disposition form, Chief, Projected Logistics Sec, Logistics Grp (Col Keith if. Barney), to CG ASF, 11 Jul 45. All in OCT 561.1 SWPA. (6) Army Command and Administrative Communications System. Part III. Signal Corps Domestic Communications Network as Extended to Oversea Terminals during the Period of Demobilization, 14 August 1945 - 31 December 1945, compiled by Pauline M. Oakes, Historian for Project B-5c, Mar 1946, Historical Sec, Special Activities, OCSigO, pp. 59-60.

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CHAPTER VIII

Port Characteristics and Facilities

Probably as much as 90 percent of the cargo and passenger traffic

of the U. S. Army in the Southwest Pacific Area was moved through ports,

within ports, and by water between ports. A full account of the hundreds

of ports in the Southwest Pacific Area would require a volume. Attention

must here be confined to ports that were used extensively by the U. S.

Army, and to port characteristics that had a bearing on Army use of the

ports. Australian, New Guinea, and Philippine ports formed three groups

with differing physical characteristics, facilities, and relations to the

needs of the Army.

Information as to the condition and facilities of the ports at dif

ferent dates is less easily found than might be expected. A main source

of information is reports of cargo security officers. Such officers,

usually lieutenants recently commissioned and usually sent to the South

west Pacific on their first assignment, might visit several ports but not

have occasion to remain long enough in any one to obtain a thorough under

standing of its characteristics and operations. Their recent training by

the Transportation Corps could not entirely compensate for their usual lack

of experience in the Army and in water transportation. These officers,

however, as well as masters of vessels returning from the Southwest Pacific,

were interviewed by intelligence officers of the Army and the Navy in San

Francisco. Late in the war the Office of the Chief of Transportation, AST,

began to issue a publication entitled Information from Mariners, later

Positive Intelligence Bulletin, consisting mainly of facts collected from

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such interviews and reports, with accompanying photographs and maps. This

chapter and to some extent the following are based in large part upon such

sources, supplemented by other records and corrected when feasible by ex

perienced and responsible officers who directed water transport in the

Southwest Pacific*

Ports in

The Australian ports were the main centers of transportation in a

continent in which the development of rail, highway, and air transportation

had been limited* Being in the Australian Zone of Interior, these ports

could be described as hosts of the U. S. Army. They were used by the Army

as the most available centers for the staging of personnel and the pro

curement, storage, maintenance, and issue of equipment and supplies for

combat operations in Hew Guinea, Army use of Australian ports declined

after it became possible to use the ports of New Guinea, and declined

still more after the Philippines became the main zone of combat*

Bases were established early in 1942 by the U, S. Army in seven Aus

tralian ports — Darwin (Base l), Townsville (Base 2), Brisbane (Base 3),

Melbourne (Base 4), Adelaide (Base 5), Perth, or more accurately Freman

tle (Base 6), and Sydney (Base 7)# Bases 5 and 6 were discontinued early

in 1943, Base 5 was reestablished at Cairns during the same year, and

Bases 1, 4, and 5 were discontinued in 1944. The volume of Army traffic

through Darwin, Adelaide, and Perth, was very small, and Army traffic

through Melbourne was not heavy at any time after the summer of 1942.

Bases had been established in these four ports at a time when the Nether

lands East Indies were expected to be the main center of combat and when

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Australia itself was threatened with invasion. By the middle of 1942 it

was obvious that these ports were not well suited for the support of New

Guinea operations. Discussion will therefore be limited to the four

ports which continued to "be used on a large scale by the Army.

Sydney was the largest port and the largest city in Australia. The

port consisted of a series of harbors in the coves of a large, irregular

bay, which was reached through an entrance a mile wide and at least 80

feet deep. On 29 April 1942 the port had 177 ship berths, of which 44

were directly connected with railways and most were provided with electric

cranes, the largest of which could lift 150 tons. On or adjacent to the

wharves was covered storage space totaling 4,119,000 square feet. Other

warehouse space was available at the end of a barge route 15 miles up the

Parramatta River. In 1942 the port could accommodate 81 oceangoing ves

sels at one time, at the docks, in addition to 10 or 15 unloading at anchor

age. Depths alongside varied from 7 to 35 feet. At Glebe Island, where

the Army was assigned two marginal wharves for its exclusive use, the low-

water depths were 31 and 33 feet. Sydney was the main industrial and com

mercial center of Australia (closely followed by Melbourne), the headquar

ters of most shipping firms and agents, and the port best equipped for

constructing and repairing ships and small craft.

Brisbane, a much smaller port than Sydney, had the advantage of lying

515 miles nearer New Guinea. The city and port were situated on the Bris

bane River, 15 miles from the sea. The width and depth of the river, which

was constantly dredged, were sufficient to receive vessels up to 650 feet

long, with a draft of 26 or 27 feet. In 1942 the port had 50 wharves, all

marginal (the longest 1,728 feet long), providing 28 berths (of which 14

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had railway connections) for large vessels "but a"ble to accommodate only

13 or 14 oceangoing vessels at one time. -*t that period the heaviest cranes

could handle 10 tons; by March 1943 the Army had added 1 50-ton crane and

2 15-ton cranes. The Army leased Brett's Wharf (with three Liberty "berths)

and Pinkenba Wharf (with one Liberty and one smaller berth), and on 5 July

1943 began operation of the Bulimba Boat Yard, across the river from Brett1s

Wharf, to assemble barges and repair small craft. As late as May 1943

only 1 drydock, capable of handling vessels up to 300 feet long, was avail

able; larger vessels were obliged to go to Sydney for repairs. Storage

space had been widely scattered at the beginning of the war, when Japanese

bombing seemed imminent. The coastwise railway changed gauge at the Bris

bane yards. These conditions required an excessive amount of motor trans

portation, with resulting congestion.^

Townsvilie, much smaller and more poorly equipped than Brisbane, was

785 miles nearer to New Guinea, and in consequence the Army used its limited

facilities to the utmost. Anchorages were from 2 to 6 miles from shore and

could accommodate at least 75 vessels. The port was entered through a

dredged channel with a minimum depth of 27 feet at low water and a minimum

width of 250 feet. Constant dredging maintained sufficient depth beside

the two piers (2,450 and 500 feet long) to receive vessels with a draft of

28 feet. The six berths were provided with rail connections, were equipped

with lifting gear able to handle 20 tons, and were adjacent to 112,010

square feet of inclosed storage space. Only small repairs were possible

in the absence of drydocks, divers, and diving gear.

Cairns, still closer to New Guinea, had been used before the war as

an outlet for the sugar trade of northern Queensland, but its facilities

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had teen little developed. In 1943 the heavy demands of New Guinea, ex

ceeding the capacity of Townsville, led to the temporary establishment of

Base 5 at Cairns. The port lay at the mouth of the Barron River, with

berthing space for from 5 to 7 oceangoing vessels in 26 feet of water be

side marginal wharves with rail connections. In August 1943 the water

beside the berths had been deepened to about 30 feet. An Army machine

shop could handle minor repairs, and divers were available for minor under

water operations. A Naval dock and base were under construction a mile

up the river.^

A number of other pox*ts on the east coast of Australia were occa

sionally used on a small scale by the Army. Newcastle, between Sydney

and Brisbane, was a center of marine construction. Between Brisbane and

Townsville were Gladstone (port of Rockhampton, with 774-foot wharf, berths

for 2 Liberties, 75 to 100 longshoremen), Port Alma (1000-foot wharf,

berths for 2 Liberties), Mackay (berthing space for 2 Liberties), and Bowen

(coaling port). North of Cairns were Cooktown (sawmill town with 12 feet

of water at a jetty), Portland Roads (15 feet of water alongside, and an

anchorage where Liberties could unload into lighters), and Thursday Island

and Horn Island (with decrepit jetties receiving occasional cargo for an

air depot).

Ports in New Guinea and Ad.iacent Islands

At least 95 percent of all supply and troop movements in the region

north and east of Australia were necessarily made by water. In New Guinea

and the numerous surrounding islands there were no railroads and, as late

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as May 1943, only about 600 miles of surfaced road. At the "beginning of

the war the main ports which had fallen into Allied hands by 1943 had the

following import capacities in terms of ship tons daily: Milne Bay 2,500,

Port Moresby 1,500, Buna 1,000, Morobe 250, Salamaua 100, and Madang 100.

At most points the only means of getting supplies ashore was by lighters.

It was estimated in May 1943 that monthly maintenance requirements would

eventually total 340,000 ship tons (including gasoline in drums). The

reception and distribution of this tonnage, and of added tonnage necessary

for building up stocks, would require the development of port facilities

at several points, the construction or enlarging of airfields and camps,

and the building of roads. This development would require barges, dredges,

tractors, bulldozers, portable sawmills, power generators, well-digging

apparatus, and other equipment. The climate would require tropical cloth

ing, special medicines, refrigerative equipment, and other special supplies,

and would cause nearly all equipment to deteriorate rapidly from rust, rot,

7

and the attacks of rodents, insects, and fungi.

An effect of these conditions was to establish a close relation be

tween transportation and engineering operations. The land masses were rug

ged, mountainous islands, heavily forested, fringed with mangrove swamps

and coral reefs. Terrain suitable for airfields or even for storehouses

might not be found close to shore. The best sites for airfields were

usually plains or plateaus occupied by coconut groves or konai grass. Ac

cess to inland installations required the clearing of jungles and the build

ing of roads. Mountain streams overflowed quickly in the torrential rains.

Some of the streams could be crossed only by rock or concrete fords, impass

able during rains; others required bridges on piles, heavy enough to with

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stand sudden floods. Coral formed a satisfactory material for surfacing

roads, airfields, and hardstandings. It was usually found in deposits

soft enough to be excavated with scrapers or power shovels and crushed

with heavy tractors and rollers. Gravel and sand were usually available,

and could "be supplemented with crushed "boulders if crushing equipment was

at hand. For heavy traffic these materials might be bound with a thin

layer of bitumen. Storehouses, quarters, hospitals, and other structures

could be made of poles bound with vines and thatched with sago leaves or

kunai grass, which harbored vermin and were combustible. Buildings with

light frames, roofs of corrugated iron, and floors of gravel, wood, or

thin concrete were constructed when materials were obtainable. Local tim

ber was suitable for most purposes when sawmills could be set up. The

standard pier or wharf was a pile structure 30 feet wide and 330 feet long,

usually parallel to the beach and connected with it at each end by approaches

30 feet wide. Standard sets of materials for such a dock were shipped to

forward engineer depots. Hardwood piles could usually be driven into a

coral bottom without difficulty. Engineer units were also called upon to

build jetties for small ships, earth and rock fills as landing points, and

other special beach constructions. In general, the progress of tactical

operations was "sharply limited to the rate of progress of engineer work,"

and the desired speed could be obtained only by "the application of horse

power through heavy mechanical equipment."8

Port Moresby was the headquarters of the territorial government of

Papua (under Australian control) and of all the small ships supplying the

coast from Merauke to Milne Bay. The port was entered through a narrow

channel (minimum depth 18 fathoms) between reefs, leading to an almost

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landlocked harbor with an anchorage area of 5 square miles, 5 to 10 fathoms

deep and able to hold about 50 vessels. Minimum depth at the docks was 28

or 29 feet. The main Australian wharf consisted in March 1943 of a wooden

causeway 250 feet long and 25 feet wide and a T pier at the end, 330 feet

long and 30 feet wide, with wooden planks on piles, A Liberty, overhang

ing, could discharge at each end of the pier, with smaller vessels inside

the T. The Australians had also two small jetties, where barges were dis

charged by hand. In October and November 1942 the 96th Engineers General

Service Regiment built wharfs at Tatana Island, 6 miles by water and 10 by

land from the Australian dock. The island, half a mile from shore, was

half a mile long and a quarter of a mile wide and was free from reefs. A

causeway was constructed from shore with 60,000 yards of dirt and gravel.

The main dock, with 30 feet of water available, was formed by a planked

wharf 320 feet long, resting on 6 wooden barges (each 251 x 601) anchored

to dolphins, and connected with the island by 2 planked causeways on 17 pon

toons. A smaller dock, for lighters, was adjacent. Between Tatana Island

and the main Australian dock was a dock for petroleum products, with a

pipeline to storage facilities.

Army activity in Port Moresby was begun in April 1942 by the Engineers,

building airfields and roads, and the Air Corps. At the height of the

Buna-Gona campaign no barges and no heavy-lift gear were available; ves

sels discharged with their own gear, and a few small Australian vessels

served as substitutes for barges. The first barges and tugs arrived in

August 1942 and were used at first to move cargo to a point 12 miles up

the narrow, shallow, crooked channel of the Vanapa River, to a 50-foot pier,

20 feet wide, where supplies were unloaded, by hand or by winches and a

ginpole, into trucks and moved to the Xenosia Horona airstrip, 30 miles

by air from Port Moresby. Supply dumps were scattered in the hills from

3 to 25 miles from Port Moresby; the roads were poor till 1944; most cargo

was stored in the open; and lack of storage space at the waterfront, com

bined with shortage of trucks, limited the rate of unloading and crowded

the harbor with vessels and craft awaiting their turn at the discharge

docks. In March 1943 about 400 Australian and 177 American trucks were

available, of which from 20 to 30 percent were usually deadlined. As late

as the middle of 1943 there was no floating heavy-lift equipment; there

were only about 12 barges or lighters, none powered; and the supply of

wire, rope, nets, slings, and other unloading equipment was chronically

short. Turnaround for ships from Townsville to Port Moresby was from 11

to 13 days, including from 5 to 7 for discharging or awaiting discharge*

The operations of the port were most critically important during 1942,

when 125 vessels were worked during the period from May to November in

spite of 85 air-raid warnings. In 1942 the docks were deliberately spared

by the Japanese, who expected to secure them intact for their own use and

later were unable to inflict any great damage. Cordial relations existed

between the U. S. Army and the Australian forces, who originally carried

the whole burden of operations at Port Moresby. After 1942 the military

use of the port steadily declined. Drydock facilities were entirely lack

ing; only minor repairs could be made, by small machine shops; and only

emergency stores could be supplied to visiting vessels. In September 1945,

after 42 months of operation, the U. S. Army withdrew from Port Moresby

and full control reverted to the Australians.9

Milne Bay. 10 miles wide and 35 miles long, at the eastern extremity

8X9934 ()—r»0—

of New Guinea, was approached from the open sea "by a difficult and danger

ous channel among coral reefs. At the beginning of the war it had only

one small jetty, where luggers of not more than seven feet of draft loaded

copra. The only roads were native trails; most of the hinterland was mud

and swamp. The only supplies procurable locally were fresh fruits; every

thing else had to be shipped from Australia*

The first American troops arrived in Milne Bay in July 1942 and assisted

the Australians* The first wharves were made of empty oil drums connected

with stringers and covered with planks. Only jeeps, with four-wheel drive,

were able to move through the mud. Cargo was stacked in the open. Aus

tralian and American forces, with 1,200 Papuan natives, began at once, in

spite of heavy rains, to construct piers, roads, buildings, and airfields.

A Japanese attack in the last week of August 1942 ended with the almost

complete destruction of the attacking force in an ambush at Turnbull Air

strip. By the end of 1942 there were three docks, unloading most of the

KPM ships and small British vessels. Barges and other small boats began

to arrive in December 1942. Eventually three ports were developed in the

Bay — Gili G-ili, operated mainly by the Australians (2 docks); Ahioma, 15

miles west (10 docks); and Waga Waga, 10 miles across the bay from Ahioma

and not accessible by land (2 docks). There was also an oil jetty. Base

Headquarters was at Ahioma, the other ports being regarded as sub-bases.

Most of the docks were in water 35 or 40 feet deep. A typical dock (the

tenth dock at Ahioma) was formed by a planked platform on piles, 400 feet

long and 25 feet wide, 100 feet from shore, parallel to it, and connected

with it at each end and in the center by ramps wide enough to permit pas

sage of two trucks, so that trucks entered and left the facility without

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turning around. Apparently no storage space was provided on any of the

wharves; trucks shuttled the cargoes to storehouses and open dumps, usually

several miles from shore, and speed of unloading was limited by availabil

ity of trucks. Since each service had its own storage area, the cargoes

were segregated at the piers according to the services for which they were

destined. The trucks were assigned on 5 December 1943 to a Base Motor Pool

under the Base Service Commander, and on 23 February 1944 the pool was desig

nated as a separate Base Motor Command. As late as June 1943 no drydock,

machine shop, diver or diving gear, or floating heavy-lift equipment was

available; but a year later some of these deficiencies had been remedied

by a 60-ton (Navy) and a 30-ton (Army) floating crane, a floating drydock,

and the "Little Detroit" assembly plant (established in November 1943 to

assemble knocked-down vehicles). Other port equipment eventually available

included 17 cargo barges of 45 feet or more, 3 tugs, a number of LCMs, 4

10-ton caterpillar cranes, 6 cold-storage boxes with 6,000 cubic feet of

refrigerated space, and tanks and hose for supplying fresh water to berthed

ships.

These facilities were gradually transferred to forward ports where the

need for them was greater; and as the Army proceeded farther and farther

to the northwest along the New Guinea coast, Milne Bay was left too far in

the rear to give the most efficient support to combat forces. Milne Bay

was essentially a point of storage and transshipment, where cargoes from

Australia and later from the United States were transferred from Liberty

ships and other large vessels to smaller vessels for movement to Oro Bay,

Lae, and intervening coasts. Its main usefulness ended when the port of

Pinschhafen wae sufficiently developed to replace it. By April 1945 several

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of the piers at Milne Bay were becoming unserviceable, partly by disinte

gration of their wooden materials and partly by damage occasioned by col

lisions with inexpertly handled Liberty ships; and the declining volume of

traffic did not warrant extensive repairs. The last U. S. Army forces

withdrew from Milne Bay on 14 October 1945, leaving its facilities to the

Australians.

Pro Bay. 211 miles from Milne Bay, was entered by a channel from half

to three quarters of a mile wide and from 6 to 8 fathoms deep. The bay

provided anchorage for 6 to 8 ships in about 15 fathoms. It was the best

available port for the support of the Buna-Gona campaign, being some 15

miles from Buna Village. Fishing boats, luggers, and other small craft

began to operate toward Oro Bay from Milne Bay in October 1942, moving only

at night, picking their way through reefs and mud flats, and landing food,

supplies, and equipment in small bays and inlets, to be carried to the com

bat troops by native labor. Under command of Maj. Carroll K. Moffatt, an

advance party of the Lilliput Task Force, ordered to deliver 8 landing

barges at Oro Bay, arrived at destination 14 December 1942, followed by

the KPM vessel Karsik on 14 December, the KPM vessel Jaoara on 20 December,

and the KPM vessel Bantam on 24 December, Tanks, jeeps, pontoons, ammu

nition, and other supplies and equipment were landed on barges in the dark,

and the jeeps were instantly employed to move supplies over jungle trails.

Within a f ew months the Engineers had built 72 miles of road, going

inland from Oro Bay as far as Dobodura Airstrip, Considerably more than

50 air raids during the first 6 months of operations failed to destroy any

vehicles. Building of wharves was begun in the middle of 1943, and 8 docks

had been completed by 1 August 1943, Dock H was able to accommodate one

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Liberty ship; the others received cargo from trawlers and targes. A

machine shop was established in a 102-foot steel barge, which served also

as living quarters for maintenance and repair personnel. Other personnel

was quartered in huts built on piles in the swamp. Dock I was completed,

and Docks H and I were extended to accommodate additional Liberties. A

marine slipway, constructed of logs, was able to handle craft up to 50 tons

in weight, * pier, pipelines, and storage tanks for oil tankers were com

pleted in April 1944. By August 1944, when tonnage discharged reached a

peak total of 133,055 weight tons, the largest wharf had been formed — a

wooden structure on piles, 1,500 feet long, having 4 connections with shore

and able to berth 4 Liberties at the same time. Eventually the port was

provided with a floating dock, facilities for minor underwater repairs, a

supply of fresh water, 66,500 cubic feet of refrigerated space, and an

ample number of floating cranes, caterpillar cranes, powered and unpowered

barges, tow motors, slings, bridles, and other equipment. Most of these

had been lacking as late as September 1943. No storage facilities were

available in the port area, and all cargo was trucked to storehouses and

dumps from 5 to 20 miles distant. Heavy rains washed bridges away and

flooded supply dumps. By April 1945 the wharves, like those of Milne Bay,

were in great need of repairs. Already the port was far in the rear of

the combat forces, now centered in Luzon. All U. S. forces had withdrawn

by 31 October 1945, and Oro Bay reverted to Australian control.

Lae was less a harbor than an unsheltered beach on the open sea, with

deep water a quarter of a mile from shore. An anchorage area a mile long

and 300 yards wide was unprotected. O?he 9th Australian Division landed

at Lae on 4 September 1943; Nadzab Airfield, 30 miles inland, was taken

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the next day by U. S. paratroopers and the 7th Australian Division; and

the mopping up of Lae was completed on 18 September. An advance detach

ment of the Base Port Command, consisting of Lt. Frank D. Persons and 15

enlisted men, had arrived on an LST on 15 September, and the main body of

the 23d Port Headquarters arrived with Maj. John S. Fahnestock on 19 Sep

tember. The only facilities on hand were two rickety jetties, unable to

support a truck, and a trail through the mud. The first cargo was brought

in by LSTs and discharged on the beach during the nights between eleven

o'clock and four, usually in heavy rain, and was trucked to Nadzab during

the day. Small ships were later discharged by DUKWs, LCMs, and lighters.

Movement was impeded by bomb craters, twisted gun emplacements, barbed-

wire entanglements, and the wrecks of Japanese landing barges. A 30-ton

floating crane was towed in to clear the harbor, and the first vessel of

considerable size to visit Lae, the Barbara C.. arrived soon after with a

complete load of lumber.

In October 1943 Major Fahnestock assembled steel pontoons at Oro Bay

into sectional units, loaded them with Quartermaster and Engineer equip

ment (some units carrying 300 weight tons), installed a Murray Tregartha

motor on each unit, and brought the assemblage under its own power to Lae,

where the cargo was discharged and the units were moored into place to

make the first pontoon dock successfully operated in New Guinea. This

facility was removed to Finschhafen in December 1943, and in February

1944 another was assembled at Lae. In May 1944 a severe storm broke the

second facility adrift from its moorings and separated it into sections,

but these were salvaged and reassembled, and the dock was put back into

operation. Dock No. 1, a full-size Liberty dock, was completed by the

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Engineers on 19 December 1943 but was destroyed on 10 June 1944 by a sub

terranean disturbance that shifted the harbor bed. It was replaced by a

floating structure, which was washed away by a storm on 5 August 1944 but

was replaced before the end of the month. A small ship jetty and a series

jf dolphins were nearly destroyed by a storm in July 1944. With these and

a number of other facilities that were eventually constructed it never be

came possible to work more than five or six large ships at a time, and

cargo handling was made difficult at all times by heavy swells from the

sea.

The principal mission of the Port Command was not, like that of other

New Guinea bases, to supply forward areas but to support the Air Corps

installation at Nadzab. Bombs, ammunition, spare parts, and hundreds of

other items were moved continuously day and night directly from the docks

to the Air Corps dumps over the longest truck haul in Hew Guinea. The

road, completed in December 1945, was sometimes impassable during storms.

Gasoline was delivered to Nadzab by pipeline. In spite of its disadvan

tages the port handled a quantity of cargo far in excess of its estimated

capacity, and in June 1944 was exceeded in the Southwest Pacific Area only

by Brisbane in tonnage moved. Volume decreased rapidly thereafter. Aus

tralian reoccupation of Lae was delayed till August 1945, and the last

12American caretaking detachment remained till December 1945.

Finschhafen. on the blunt eastern extremity of the Huon Peninsula,

consisted of three ports — Finsch Harbor, entered from the north and in

closed on the other three sides by a narrow, hook-shaped peninsula; Lange

mak Bay, a long, narrow inlet entered from the east and lying south of

Finsch Harbor; and Dreger Harbor, an anchorage still farther south, pro

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tected from the open sea "by islands. The 9th Australian Division landed

at Finschhafen 22 September 1943; Finschhafen fell on 2 October and Sat

telberg, some miles inland, on 25 November; and the first service troops

to "be stationed in the area, the 8O8th Engineer (Aviation) Battalion,

began construction of an airstrip on 22 October.

A small amount of cargo was handled in October, but the first dock,

able to accommodate vessels with a maximum draft of 12 feet, was finished

in Dreger Harbor in November. The first TO unit (the 608th Port Co.)

arrived 17 November. A pontoon unit towed from Lae was installed in Dreger

Harbor, and the first Liberty ship docked at it on 20 December 1943. A

second floating unit assembly was completed on 18 January 1944. Operations

were interrupted by more than 100 air-raid warnings in January 1944 and 90

in February, which caused little direct damage but much loss of time. By

July 1944 the 3 ports had a total of 12 Liberty docks and 2 small-ship docks,

most of which were formed by wooden structures on piles, parallel to shore.

The largest number of vessels berthed at one time was 35. In the first 2

months of operation, before docks were available, cargo had been unloaded

by LSTs and LCTs; and extensive use continued to be made of barges, landing

craft, and amphibian trucks. As late as January 1945 a total of 10 LCMs,

33 LCVPs, and 50 DUKWs was operated day and night. In March 1944 no float

ing heavy-lift equipment was available, but in July 1944 there were 2

floating cranes (35 tons and 50 tons) and in January 1945 there were 3.

In July 1944 the ports possessed 2 small drydocks of 15-ton capacity and

a 1,000-ton Navy drydock; these were still on hand in April 1945. Other

facilities available by July 1944 included a marine railway, a portable

machine shop, two repair shops on 250-foot barges, and a number of small

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portable refrigerator units. In January 1945 there were 19 5-ton cater

pillar cranes and 1 20-ton caterpillar crane, a fuel barge, and 2 water

barges, but no refrigerated barges. Before April 1944 the 3 ports were

not connected by land, and cargo and personnel were moved between them

on barges and LCMs. In that month a system of roads was begun by the Engi

neers, joining storage areas scattered along the coast for a distance of

25 miles. Steep mountains hemmed in the narrow plain behind the beach and

prevented expansion inland. The coral base of this plain permitted good

drainage, gave comparative freedom from mud, and provided satisfactory

hardstandings, but heavy rains from April to November damaged roads, de

stroyed bridges, and even washed away the approaches to docks.

As late as March 1944 little or no covered storage space was provided;

the deficiency was partly remedied by the erection of a 1,000-foot store

house in July 1944. The supply of trucks was never more than adequate,

and unloading was sometimes delayed by shortage of trucks clearing cargo

from the dock areas. A decline in volume of traffic handled began in Decem

ber 1944; by April 1945 the wooden wharves were in need of repair; and

gradual transfer of equipment and personnel to the Philippines continued

through 1945. The last U. S. Army forces, except a small caretaking unit,

withdrew from Finschhafen on 30 April 1946, leaving the port to the Austra

13 lians after 18 months of operation by the i\rmy.

The Port of Hollandia proper afforded anchorage to a large number of

deep-sea vessels, and permitted a limited number to be berthed at Army- and

Navy-constructed piers. The port is contained in Humboldt Bay, which in

cludes two protected anchorages, Imbi Bay and Challenger Cove. A third pro

tected anchorage, restricted to vessels not exceeding 15 feet draught, is

afforded in Jautefa Bay, inland arm of Humboldt Bay. Tanahmerah Bay, 35

miles west of Eumboldt Bay by water and 42 miles from Hollandia by road,

could accommodate two large tankers, and comprised the gasoline and fuel

14 oil storage facility for Hollandia and Sentani Airfield. In the whole

area the mountains descended steeply almost to the beach; storage areas

near the docks required leveling with bulldozers; the nearest flat area

of considerable extent, used by all the services for open storage, was a

former coconut plantation, 8 miles inland; the airfield was 26 miles from

Hollandia; and trucks were hampered by tortuous roads, steep grades, and

almost continuous mud. In the planning of Hollandia the location of dumps

was decided after aerial reconnaissance, and "a real effort was made to

keep the supplies out of the mud"; but it was learned, too late to change

the plan, that several of the dump locations were on the tops of mountains*

Hollandia had been developed, however, as the chief Hew Guinea base for

mounting the invasion and supply of the Philippines. Studies of the facil

ities and personnel required for the establishment of a major supply base,

port, and staging area for 80,000 troops were begun early in March 1944 by

a group of TC officers assigned to 2d Port Headquarters; assembly of per

sonnel and equipment for Hollandia operations was begun at Finschhafen in

April; and on 6 April 1944 the Sixth Army decided to organize a TC task

force "to accompany combat troops for the first time in the history of the

Southwest Pacific Area." The force was attached to I Corps, forming the

RECKLESS Task Force Transportation Team, commanded by Lt. Col. Reeford P.

Shea, with Lt. Cols. Harold C. Nervick and Webster V, Clark as Assistant

Transportation Officers and Maj« Harry D. Richards as Executive Officer.

A beach landing against enemy fire was made on 22 April 1944; the 532d

Engineer Shore and Boat Regiment, with LCTs allocated by the Navy, was

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placed under the operational control of the Task Force five days later;

cargo was discharged by LCTs, LCMs, and LCVs; and congested beaches were

gradually cleared as storage areas and roads were constructed. The Task

Force was disbanded on 7 June 1944, when Base G was established with several

officers of the former Task Force assigned to the Base Port Command.

By the end of 1944 the U. S. Army at Hollandia was provided with 5

Liberty docks (a pontoon dock and 4 wooden wharves and approaches on piles),

4 small-ship jetties, 2 fuel jetties, 12 LST ramps, 22 80-foot steel flat

top barges, 4 LCMs, 2 LCVs, 2 crane barges, 1 refrigerated barge, and a

variety of other equipment. Apparently the port (including Tanahmerah

Bay) was never able to berth more than 8 deep-sea vessels at one time. It

was equipped by January 1945 with 85 harbor vessels and craft, a number

that had fallen to 52 by September 1945. The first repair ship in SWPA,

the William Pitch, manned by the 801st Army Marine Ship Repair Co., arrived

at Hollandia in August 1944, and was followed by the James M. Davis, manned

by the 805th AMSR Co.; both vessels were transferred to the Philippines in

September 1945. A 250-ton Navy drydock was stationed at Hollandia from

April to September 1945. As late as March 1945 available closed storage

space did not exceed 43,000 cubic feet in the port area, and little had been

done to remedy the extreme dispersion and remoteness of storage areas.

The maximum activity of Hollandia coincided with the preliminaries

and the early stages of the Philippine campaign. From September to Decem

ber 1944 the harbor was crowded with vessels awaiting call forward to Tac

loban and Lingayen Gulf. Vast quantities of equipment and supplies were

accumulated at Hollandia and transferred to the Philippines in a series of

towing operations. Drainage of trained personnel to the Philippines led

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to an almost kaleidoscopic turnover of TC units. Volume of traffic began

to decline in January 1S45; and thereafter, till the "base was inactivated

on 23 January 1946, effort was centered on "rolling up the rear." Equip

ment and supplies needed "by the Army were forwarded to the Philippines as

fast as they could "be received; other materiel was reported to the Foreign

Liquidation Commission or, with base installations, sold or given to the

Netherlands East Indies Government. According to Brig. Gen. Robert H. Wylie,

Assistant Chief of Transportation for Operations, who visited Hollandia 8

April 1945, "It appears that all hands agree that it was a mistake to have

established so large a base at Hollandia. Undoubtedly had it been known

that they could go forward as rapidly from New Guinea as was the actual

15 case, they would never have put such a large establishment at Hollandia.

Biak. fringed with reefs and islets, was the largest of the Schouten

Islands, off the north coast of New Guinea near its western extremity.

Army facilities were located at the village of Sorido (on the southeast

shore of the island) and on the adjacent islets of Owi and Mios Woendi.

The weather was described as "much more livable" than that on the main

land of New Guinea, the temperature rising in December (the middle of sum

mer) only to about( 124°//and being lowered almost every evening by rains.

The incidence of malaria and dysentery was not high. Invasion of Biak by

Allied forces began in May 1944, and the island had not been entirely

cleared of Japanese at the end of the year, after months of bitter fight

ing; but sufficient control was secured within three months of landing to

permit the establishment of Base H on 20 August 1944. Port and supply

operations had been previously handled by the 542d Engineer Boat and Shore

Regiment. The first Port Command personnel arrived on 22 August.

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The earliest port facilities, established on Owi Island while fight

ing was in progress on the shore of Biak, included a Liberty dock, a jetty

for "barges, and approaches for landing craft, No anchorage was possible

at Owi, surrounded by water 1,500 feet deep; unloading was hampered by

rough water; and the dock and jetty were damaged by a storm in November

1944. Better facilities were available at Sorido, in a lagoon about 6

miles long, with anchorage inside the lagoon and on a wide shelf outside

its entrance, and with an ample level area on shore, having a coral base

and good coral roads. On 1 February 1945 the port facilities of Base H

included 5 Liberty docks (one of which was at Ovi and one at Mios Woendi),

7 jetties (including two oil jetties), 4 small drydocks, 2 floating 30-ton

cranes, 6 five-ton cranes on shore, 6 LCTs, 4 LCVPs, 6 LCMs, 2 refrigerated

barges, a water barge, 80,000 cubic feet of refrigerated space, and water

pipelines at each berth. The repair ship W« J. Conners. manned by the

804th AMSE Co., arrived in October 1944 and departed for the Philippines

10 February 1945. At the beginning of 1945 the port still lacked covered

storage space and was inadequately supplied with cranes and lighters.

As the only USASOS base between Hollandia and Tacloban, Biak shared

in the mounting and supply of the forces invading the Philippines; and its

responsibilities were increased in November 1944 when the western terminus

of Air Transport Command trans-Pacific flights was transferred from Nadzab

to Biak. The peak of Army cargo traffic at Biak was reached in February

1945, after traffic in all other New Guinea ports had begun to decline.

The last TC units at Biak were inactivated on 25 January 1946, and the

base was discontinued 20 April 1946, after its facilities and supplies had

been either transferred to the Philippines or sold or given to the Nether

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16lands East Indies Government.

In addition to the seven New Guinea ports described above, a number

of others discharged and loaded small amounts of Army cargo. On the south

coast, in Netherlands New Guinea, was Merauke, where U. S. forces were

stationed from early 1942 till the middle of 1944 to protect Torres Strait

On the north coast were Buna, controlled "by the Australians, a few miles

north of Oro Bay, with a one-way entrance among reefs, one Liberty dock,

muddy roads through a mangrove swamp, and almost no other facilities;

Morobe, operated by the Morobe-Salamaua Combined Operational Service Com

mand, April-September 1943, for the initial jump-off of tha 41st Division

against Salamaua, for staging the 2d Engineer Special Brigade preparing fo

Lae and Finschhafen operations, and for a hide-out of PT boats; Madang,

also controlled by the Australians, west of the Huon Peninsula, with a

large floating dock, two small wooden docks, and anchorage for six or eigh

vessels in early 1945; Aitape, about 100 miles east of Holl&ndia, an open

roadstead protected by-small islands, with anchorage for 15 or 20 vessels,

loaded and unloaded by landing craft and DUKWs; the Wakde Islands, west of

Hollandia, consisting of Insaemor and Insoemanai, two small, nearly flat

islands with an airstrip on the former, anchorage for one Liberty ship, on

small wooden dock, two subsurface oil tanks, and six small repair units in

August 1944; Maffin Bay or Sarmi, a few miles west of Vfakde, an open road

stead v/ith anchorage for four or five ships, where cargo was discharged in

to DUKWs and LCTs in the summer of 1944; Noemfoor, a coral-fringed island

a few miles west of 3iak (operated by the 1463d Engineer Boat Maintenance

Co.) with discharge at anchorage into landing craft and DUKWs, subject to

long interruptions by rough weather; and Sansapor, near the western extren

- 450

ity of New Guinea, with all vessels discharging in the stream to Middle

tourg and Amsterdam Islands or to the mainland at Sansapor Village. Ad

jacent to New Guinea on the east was Bell Beli, on Goodenough Island,

north-northwest of Milne Bay and designated during a few months in 1943

as the location of Base C. In September 1944 the port was entered through

a wide channel "between reefs inaccurately marked with buoys; the bay pro

vided anchorage for 20 or 25 vessels; and facilities included 2 Liberty

docks and a small-ship dock, a 30-ton floating crane and several cranes

on shore, and a dirt road leading into the jungle. Northwest of New Guinea

on the route to the Philippines, were the island and port of Morotai, with

a well-protected harbor, unlimited anchorage space, 3 docks (including 1

floating dock) in April 1945, several jetties, good roads, ample covered

storage close to the docks, 26 cranes, 14 LCTs, 14 LCMs, and other equip

ment, the port being in charge of the 93d Division under the Eighth Army.17

Ports in the Philippines (Exclusive of Manila)

The ports of New Guinea, with the exception of Port Moresby, were

little more than temporary creations of the Allied forces, and most of

them were destined to disappear when no longer needed for military oper

ations. The Philippine ports, on the other hand, had been fairly well

developed long before the war. The Philippine Archipelago, consisting of

7,083 islands and extending 1,152 miles north and south and 688 miles east

and west, was mainly dependent on ocean transportation. Only 11 of the

islands had an area greater than 1,000 square miles. Only in Luzon did

18rail and highway operations assume importance for military purposes.

Five Philippine ports — Tacloban, San Fernando, Manila, Batangas, and

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Cebu — were deemed sufficient for most needs of the Army. If the K-l

(Mindanao) operations had not been canceled, one or more additional ports

in the southern islands would probably have served the Army on a large

scale.

Tacloban was only one of a series of adjacent ports used by the Army

on the east coast of Leyte. facing San Pedro Bay. This nearly square bay,

with Leyte forming the west shore and Samar the east and north shores,

communicated at the northwest corner with the Samar Sea through a narrow

strait about 21 feet deep, having a 9-knot current in or out according to

tides. On the south the bay opened into Leyte Gulf. The ports, listed

from north to south, were Tacloban, the site of Headquarters, Base K, at

the entrance to the strait; White Beach; Red Beach; Violet Beach, at the

village of Tolosa; and Yellow Beach, at the village of Dulag, somewhat

south of the bay. The highway connecting these ports was 25 or 30 miles

long, with various installations scattered along most of its length.

Still farther south, 40 miles from Tacloban by water and 49 by highway,

was the beach of Abuyog. Behind the sand and coral beaches were heavy

woods and dense jungles. All these ports formed a single system, con

trolled by the Port Command, Base K, and the aggregate was sometimes loosely

designated as Tacloban. The bay provided anchorage for about 75 oceangoing

vessels. Navigation was impeded by shoals, reefs, and wrecks, which were

eventually marked with buoys or orange-painted oil cans; but groundings

were frequent in spite of these precautions. No part of the bay was pro

tected from heavy swells. All the ports were too shallow for convenient

operation.

The least unsatisfactory of the ports was Tacloban itself, with a

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harbor only 2,000 feet wide and with about 19 feet of water at the docks,

approached from the anchorage area by a buoyed channel 4 miles long and

about 27 feet deep. As late as February 1945, before dredging was under

taken, it was impossible for Liberty ships to reach Tacloban without pre

liminary partial unloading in the stream to reduce their draft to 18 feet.

Somewhat later it was possible for 4 Liberties with a maximum draft of 20

feet to discharge at one time at a concrete wharf at Tacloban. Three pon

toon units at Dulag were washed up on the beach by a typhoon, and there

after unloading was accomplished in the stream. Two Liberty docks at Abuyog

began operation in March 1945. Liberties of 25-foot draft could approach

to half a mile from shore at White Beach, Red Beach, and Violet Beach. At

all times a large part of the cargo handled by Base K was moved by LCTs,

LCMs, LCVPs, and DUXWs. The Port Command, Base K, which began operations

on 22 October 1944, 2 days after the first assault, struggled with these

and other difficulties. Discharge of the first Liberty ship to unload at

Tacloban was slowed by 56 air raids in 4 days; there were 203 air alerts

during the first 42 days of operation; and suicidal attacks from planes

crashing into vessels caused not only considerable casualties and damage

but much loss of time. Three typhoons during the first 3 months led to

further loss of time. A total of more than 33 inches of rain during the

same period impeded shore operations; supplies deteriorated in open stor

age; and roads disintegrated under excessive traffic in mud. Many storage

areas were so far from shore that DUEWs were obliged to move abnormally

long distances on land, producing congestion and mechanical failure.

Shortages of repair facilities and spare parts resulted in an accumula

tion of deadlined craft.

889954 O—50 31

Some of these difficulties were gradually removed with the improve

ment of roads, the construction of storehouses, and the receipt of added

equipment. On 1 March 1945 the facilities of the Port Command included 4

Liberty docks (l formed "by pontoons), 2 small-ship docks, 3 jetties, 2

30-ton floating cranes, 4 shore cranes (ranging from 3 to 30 tons), 375

DUKWs, 3 reefer barges, and other equipment. The repair ships Daluth

(802d Army Marine Ship Repair Co.) and James B. Houston and the 1111th

and 1112th TC Fort Marine Maintenance Companies reduced rapidly the back

log of deadlined equipment. The volume of traffic handled by Base K de

clined after bases were established elsewhere in the Philippines; the

congestion of the first three months, when Leyte contained the only Army

port north of Biak, was relieved; but the Port Command, Base K, was still

19 in operation as late as May 1947.

Port installations used by the TJ. S. Army were scattered along the

south and east shores of Lingayen Gulf. Luzon, for a distance of about 60

miles# Listed from south to north these installations included Red Beach

at Lingayen; Blue Beach at Dagupan (Sub-Base 2), at the mouth of the Dagu

pan River; White Beach No. 1 at San Fabian (Headquarters, Port Command,

till 21 April 1945); White Beach No. 2 (Sub-Base l); White Beach No. 3 at

Damortis; and San Fernando, La Union (Headquarters, Port Command, after 21

April 1945), 30 miles north of San Fabian. All these ports were unprotecte

roadsteads, where Liberty ships anchored in rough and potentially dangerous

water8 about half a mile from shore and discharged into landing craft, DUEW

and lighters.

By March 1945 one pier had been completed at San Fernando with 24

feet of water alongside, and by July 1945 the same port was provided with

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a pontoon wharf in 45 feet of water. Various docks and jetties received

cargo from the landing craft and lighters. Special difficulty was ex

perienced at Dagupan, where the mouth of the river was partly obstructed

"by a bar and the main dock was located some distance up the river. All

these installations except Lingayen were connected by rail; and at White

Beach No. 2, 110 miles from Manila, a rail jetty 750 feet long was com

pleted on 15 February 1945, on which cranes unloaded locomotives, tank cars,

and smaller rail equipment directly on the tracks from barges. The most

considerable port development was undertaken at San Fernando, where a north

harbor (San Fernando Bay) and a south harbor were separated by San Fernando

Point, the whole of which was occupied by Army storage areas and service

establishments. Both harbors were too shallow to receive Liberty ships

without dredging, but the north harbor offered partial protection to smal

ler vessels. Both harbors and their beaches were littered with Japanese

wrecks* The first Port Command personnel landed in Lingayen Gulf at Daga

pan on 11 January 1945, two days after the initial assault. The Transpor

tation Corps unloaded cargo with DUKWs and alligators, the Engineers (544th

Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, relieved 4 March 1945) with LCMs and

LCVPs, and the Navy with LSTs and LCTs. Operations were slowed by air

raids averaging one a day, muddy roads, shortage of trucks, lifting equip

ment, and spare parts, and lack of drydock facilities. These conditions

were gradually remedied to some extent, but elaborate port development of

Base M was not deemed necessary. Its utility decreased as the port of

Manila became available for Army use; and by 31 May 1946, with the inacti

vation of the 669th Medium Port, the port operations of the Army in Lin

gayen Gulf had decreased to very small volume in anticipation of the closing

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of Base U.20

Bataneas. on the southwest coast of Luzon, at a railway terminal 59

miles from Manila, was nearly intact when occupied without assault on 7

April 1945. Two sunken ships were removed from the harbor; and repairs

on a concrete pier, only slightly damaged, were completed in June. In

August the last of 5 additional Liberty piers was completed; these accom

modated vessels of from 25 to 32 feet of draft. Before 17 June 1945,

when the first Liberty ship was docked at Batangas, and to a large extent

thereafter, cargo was discharged on the beach by LCTs, LCMs, and DUKWs*

A large number of LCMs were removed when the 592d Engineer Boat and Shore

Regiment was transferred elsewhere in August 1945. Anchorage for 55 ves

sels was available not far from shore. The usual difficulties connected

with air alerts, mud, and shortage of equipment did not appear on a large

scale; but unloading was repeatedly affected by rough water and abnormal

tides. The port was decreasingly used after the middle of 1945, but it

was designated as the location for plants assembling knocked-down LCMs and

steel barges.

The port of Cebu* at Cebu City, occupied the southwest shore of Bohol

Strait, separating the island of Cebu from Mactan Island. Its peacetime

facilities included a long marginal wharf backed by a concrete highway and

a railway; 3 finger piers projecting from the marginal wharf, having covered

storage and overhead traveling cranes, with from 22 to 28 feet of water

alongside; the Hoa Hin Shipyard on Mactan Island, equipped to build and

repair small vessels; and anchorage for an unlimited number of large ships.

The adjacent country was fairly high and well drained. Shellfire and bomb

ings had damaged the city and the railway extensively, sunk 13 ships and

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barges in the harbor, unroofed the warehouses on the piers, and left 18

bomb craters, from 12 to 50 feet in diameter, on the piers and the wharf.

When the Port Command took over the port from the 542d Engineer Boat and

Shore Regiment in June 1945, many of these damages had already been repaired.

Part of the wharf, previously weakened by bombing, was removed to make a

landing place for DUKWs. The Army did not take over the railway. By the

end of 1945 the port was able to berth 9 Liberty ships at a time, but Army

need for it« services had nearly ended. The Army continued its use of the

Hoa Hin Shipyard till January 1947.22

Apart from Manila (to be discussed later) a number of Philippine

ports in which no USASOS base was established were used by the Army in

1945. Zamboanga, Mindanao, when observed in March 1945, was able to berth

2 Liberty ships, 2 Baltic coasters, and 2 FS boats, but anchorage in the

roadstead was only partly protected. The port, operated by the 543d Engi

neer Boat and Shore Regiment, was handling 500 tons a day. No repair facil

ities were available. Roads and buildings had been greatly damaged, but

30,000 feet of covered storage space was usable, and a water line to the

docks was nearly completed. Polloc Harbor, at Parang, Mindanao, north of

Cotobato, was being operated at the end of May 1945 by elements of the 533d

and 543d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiments and other troops. Discharge was

entirely amphibious. Plans were made to move all but a skeleton force, as

soon as immediate needs of combat units were met, to Cagayan, in Macajalar

Bay on the north coast, better connected by highway with Davao than Parang

was. Puerto Princesa, Palawan, operated in March 1945 by elements of the

532d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, could accommodate with difficulty

one Liberty ship at its single wharf. It handled about 650 tons a day,

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almost entirely with DUKWs and LCMs, and could safely anchor about 25

large vessels. Iloilo, on the south side of Panay, had concrete wharves

on "both sides of a channel "between an island and the main shore, able to

accommodate vessels of not more than 18 feet of draft, and in addition a

wharf outside the river able to accommodate one Liberty ship. Anchorage

room and covered storage were ample. San Jose, Mindoro, and the adjacent

Red, White, and Blue Beaches within 14 miles of San Jose, were operated by

elements of the 532d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, Anchorage was un

protected. Docks under construction in March 1945 were expected to accom

modate 3 Liberty ships at one time and permit discharge of 1,500 tons a day.

Oil and fresh water were available at a jetty. Use was made of 14 miles of

the 36 miles of track belonging to the narrow-gauge San Jose Railroad, which

moved 9,800 tons of Army cargo during March 1945. Other facilities were de

veloped at San Jose to supply 30,000 or 35,000 troops and to deliver supplies

by water to 5 supply points (Lubang Island, Calapan, Marinduque, Romblon,

and Cuyu) from 108 to 128 miles distant. All these ports of the southern

Philippines were under control of the Eighth Army and were operated only

temporarily for Army use while Japanese forces were cleared from the islands.

Plans to establish Base Q, in Palawan and Base T in Mindanao were not carried

into full effect, and little Army development of the ports was found neces

23 sary.

Two Philippine ports — Guiuan, Samar, and Calicoan, on Oalicoan

Island, both at the eastern entrance to Leyte Gulf — were Navy-controlled

supply points for Samar and received small amounts of Army cargo. Two

other ports — Mariveles, at the tip of the Bataan Peninsula, less than 3

miles from Corregidor and 35 miles by water from Manila, and Subic Bay

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(site of the Naval installation of Olongapo), at the western base of the

peninsula — were centers of Army towing and repair operations and in

effect served in 1945 and 1946 as supports at Manila.24

Ports in Okinawa

The one developed port in Okinawa was Naha, on an irregular "bay in

the southwest coast of the island. Before Naha was cleared of enemy forces,

moat cargo was discharged in the stream at Nakagusuka-Wan, renamed Buckner

Bay (anchorage for 316 vessels), and at Hagushi Beaches (anchorage for 186

vessels) ; and discharge at these points continued for some time after 7

June 1945, when operation of Naha was "begun. Harbor facilities at ITaha

had "been greatly damaged, a number of wrecks impeded navigation, and un

buried Japanese tainted the atmosphere. Action was taken at once to dredge

the channel to the inner harbor, raise and tow away the sunken vessels, and

build piers, roads, airfields, and storehouses. Heavy rains, shortage of

trucks and of cargo-lifting equipment, and excessive length of DUKW runs

from shipside to dump slowed discharge operations. The only oceangoing

vessel docked at Naha in 1945 was the C1-M-AY1 vessel Spar Hitch, which

arrived on 7 August. A typhoon on 16 September 1945 caused much damage

to port facilities. A second typhoon, on 9 October, resulted in "unbeliev

able" destruction. Vessels were driven ashore, pontoon units deposited on

dry land, roads washed out, tents and frame buildings blown away; and in

consequence most port facilities required reconstruction or replacement.

Dredging operations were continued, but proved to be more difficult than

those undertaken in other StfPA ports. The harbor bottom was hard coral

underlaid by blue shale, which could be loosened only by blasting. The

second oceangoing vessel to dock at Okinawa, the C1-M-AV1 Lanyard Knot.

began discharge at the main pier on 17 January 1946 and 8 days later com

pleted unloading of its cargo of 2,899 long tons, which could not have

"been discharged by lighterage in less than 25 days. Six piers were in

operation "by the end of April. The USAT Republic, which arrived 19 June

1946, was too large to enter the inner harbor; but care and ingenuity made

it possible to dock the USAT David 0. Shanks. 489 feet long, on 28 July

1946, and the tanker C-4 (Puenta Hills). 525 feet long, a few days later.25

The Port of Manila

Manila, the main port used by the Army in the Southwest Pacific Area,

had been extensively developed by the Army and the Navy during some forty

years before the war. Within a few months after its reoccupation by the

Army at the end of January 1945 the volume of its Army activities far ex

ceeded that of any other port in the area. The needs and capacities of

Manila dictated the rate at which the Army activity of other ports was re

duced and discontinued. After V-J Day the activities of the Army in the

former Southwest Pacific Area were increasingly directed from Manila, and

at last almost entirely centered there.

The port of Manila, on the eastern shore of the almost landlocked

Manila Bay, consisted of three parts — the Pasig River, as far as Jones

Bridge, approximately a mile; North Harbor, the shore immediately north of

the entrance to the river; and South Harbor, the shore immediately south

of the entrance. North Harbor and South Harbor were naturally open to

storms sweeping across the bay, but each was protected for its whole length

by breakwaters. A short distance north of North Harbor was Navotas Island,

separated from the shore by a shallow channel; and at the entrance of the

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river, on the south side, was Engineer Island, the northern terminal of

the south breakwater, separated from shore by a channel that gave direct

communication between the river and South Harbor. Considerably south of

South Harbor, protected by a hook-shaped peninsula, was Oavite, a Uaval

base used to a minor degree by the Army. Complementary to Manila i tse l f

were Mariveles and Subic Bay.

Before the war South Harbor, comprising an anchorage of about 1,250

acres of Manila Bay, dredged to sufficient depth to accommodate large

oceangoing vessels , contained Piers 1 (5501 x 60'), 3 (6801 x 120'), 5

(7301 x 160'), and 7 (1,400' x 240'), each partly covered by a steel cargo

shed, and piped for fuel oi l and fresh water. Pier 7, reported to be the

largest finger pier in the world, included a cargo shed 1,235' x 160' and

could accommodate 7 oceangoing ships at the same time. North Harbor, s t i l l

under construction in 1941 and designed mainly to accommodate small craft

and coastwise shipping, contained Piers 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, and 14. Mar

ginal wharves lined the shores from which the piers projected. Both banks

of Pasig River were occupied by marginal wharves able to accommodate ship

ping with less than 18-foot draft. Engineer Island had well-developed

marine repair fac i l i t i e s , and civilian shipyards were located at Navotas

Island and elsewhere. On shore were machine shops, storehouses, paved

streets and highways, railways, and airfields, al l facilitating and depen

dent on the operations of the port, A railway ran directly to the shore

of North Harbor but none approached South Harbor,

Eestoration of these fac i l i t i e s called for what Commodore William A.

Sullivan, USN, in charge of rehabilitating Manila Harbor, described as

"the greatest salvage task in history." Having commanded salvage operations

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at Naples, Marseille, and Cherbourg, he predicted that the job at Manila

would "be greater than any in Europe. Systematic destruction by the.Japa

nese exceeded any accomplished "by the Germans. An estimated 300 ships

(an estimate later raised to 500) were resting on the bottom of Manila

Bay and the Pasig Hiver, some with upper decks protruding, others visible

only to divers* Some of the ships were in layers, one above another.

Wrecks ranged from barges sunk in the river to one 18,000-ton liner in

the bay. The entrance to South Harbor, between two breakwaters, was blocked

by two ships sunk bow to bow; the entrance to the river was obstructed by

sunken freighters; and the channel behind Engineer Island, connecting South

Harbor with the river, was closed by 21 sunken ships chained bow to stern.

The piers and wharves were lined with sunken craft. The harbor and the

shore were strewn with mines. Every one of the piers and wharves was badly

damaged, all the cargo sheds were unroofed and mangled, and Pier 7 was

dynamited in half by a 10-foot gap extending to water level. The harbor

and river had not been dredged since 1941. Streets, highways, and railways

were bombed to pieces, and movement was impeded by bomb craters filled with

muddy water. Most of the larger buildings in Itfanila were twisted skeletons

in mounds of rubble. Oil tanks and water reservoirs were destroyed, the

main pipe of the municipal water system was cut in several places, and city

power facilities were methodically dismantled. Trucks, buses, food supplies,

spare parts, lumber, and almost everything else capable of any kind of use

had been looted, burned, or blown up.

When the first Port Command personnel entered Manila, on 13 February

1945, much of the city was still in possession of the Japanese, and the

parts already occupied were contaminated with unburied bodies. Withdrawing

south across the Pasig River and destroying all bridges, the Japanese

made a last stand in the Intrarauros area, from which they were eliminated,

block by block, with shellfire, bombs, and bayonets. In the process almost

every building in this oldest part of the city was damaged or destroyed.

Until 11 March all military personnel in Manila was under orders to carry

arms and helmet when outside company areas as a protection against snipers.

On 11 March the curfew was changed from 2000 hours to 2300 hours, and the

wearing of arms was left to the discretion of company commanders. Japanese

snipers left aboard stranded ships to make suicidal attacks on approaching

craft were cleared out with hand grenades and flame throwers by the 129th

Infantry, 37th Division. The collection and burial of dead Japanese was

completed long before the harbor and bay had been cleared of mines, and

mine collisions occurred as late as May 1945.

When the Port Command arrived at Manila almost the only materiel on

hand that could be used for port operations was a quantity of rope, wire,

and blocks for making slings and nets. The only typewriters available

were brought in by civilians who had hidden them from the Japanese. Civil

ian carpenters made desks, filing cabinets, and messing facilities from

scraps of lumber. Candles and Coleman lanterns were used in the offices of

the Port Command until electricity became available on 14 March. Before

that date the lack of electricity had confined harbor operations to the

hours of daylight. Installation of electric lights on the piers was still

in -orogress as late as July 1945, after most of the necessary signal towers,

blinkers, and other guiding lights were in operation. By the end of March

about 40 percent of the telephones needed for communication between offices

and T>iers had been installed; previously messages had been delivered by

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walking*

The first cargo vessel — the FS-362 — entered Manila Harbor on 1

March 1945, followed on the same day by the first convoy of large ships —

the George Gershwin, the George W. Tucker, the Stephen W. Gambrill. the

Fred W. GaTbraith. the E. G. Hall, the Harry Barber, the Frank Evers.

the Frank G. Hewitt, the Delazon Smith, the Henry Barnard, and the A. B.

Hammond, "bringing general Army cargo as well as food and clothing for civil

ian relief. These supplies were required, among other purposes, for build

ing up the strength of Filipino employees who had nearly starved during the

Japanese occupation and were obliged to walk as far as eight miles a day to

and from their work. Cargo operations were rapidly accelerated while re

storation of the port was continued with the removal, salvaging, or demoli

tion of wrecks, the surveying, buoying, and dredging of the bay and river,

the repair and enlargement of piers and pier facilities, the clearing of

debris and rubble from wharves, streets, and storage areas, the repair and

hard-surfacing of streets, highways, and approaches to the water front, and

the installation of railroad tracks on three piers in North Harbor. The

city water system was restored, and in July 1945 several piers were piped

for water. As late as May the only watering facility had been a point on

the Pasig River where a single barge of 308-ton capacity received water for

distribution to vessels in harbor. Other water barges were acquired, and

during October 1945 the water ship Andrea., of the American President Line,

capacity 500 tons, delivered 11,996,879 gallons of water to ships in har

bor. Improvised fire stations were established in April, and a number of

extinguishers and the first fire boat became available in May. Improvements

in the port of Manila were continued after V-J Lay and were destined to be

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the work'of years.

The first floating equipment arrived at Manila c 28 February 1945 ~

1 30-ton crane, 15 barges, 8 tugs, and 10 LCMs. During the next 12 months

the Port Command had available the lighterage equipment listed in Appendix

40. Initial discharge operations were accomplished in the stream, when

approach of large vessels to wharves and piers was blocked by wreckage,

debris, and four years' accumulation of silt in the undredged harbor and

when the wharves and piers themselves had been bombed and dynamited. At

the end of March 1945 a total of 535 pieces of lighterage equipment was on

hand, of which 296 were serviceable. Eleven months later 462 pieces (241

serviceable) were on hand. A comparison of these totals suggests two

questions: (l) To what extent was Manila under Army operation prepared to

receive oceangoing vessels? (2) Were its maintenance and repair facilities

adequate?

^either question can be answered without qualification. Dredging and

pier repair made an increasing number of piers in South Harbor directly

accessible to vessels of Liberty size, and in April 1946, after releasing

a number of piers to civilian control, the Army still retained 5 piers,

accommodating at one time 12 vessels of over 1,000 deadweight tons and 8

of less than 1,000 deadweight tons. North Harbor, however, was designed

to handle mainly "second-hand tonnage," discharged in the stream and light

ered to the docks; and the Pasig River could not admit large ships. Figures

for cargo discharged in the stream and cargo discharged directly at the

docks are not available; but it is clear that a large proportion of cargo

continued to be lightered and that during the first few months of operation,

reported by OCT, "SWPA personnel who had worked all the way from Australia as

- 4S5

by lightering cargo or discharging into landing craft or DUKWs until facil

ities could "be developed for ship to shore discharge, were forced to con

tinue those methods, except on shallow draft vessels, at Manila."

With regard to the second question, many of the landing craft and DUKWs

used at Manila had suffered from hard use and lack of maintenance in the

campaigns of New Guinea, Leyte, and Lingayen G-ulf "before arriving at Manila.

They were primarily combat equipment, for which little demand existed out

side the Army and the Navy; and the expense of repairing those that wore

out seemed decreasingly justified after V-J Day, when the volume of military

traffic gradually diminished and when commercial shipping became able to

carry a growing proportion of military cargo. Repair facilities and per

sonnel were established at Manila soon after its reoccmpation. The repair

ship W. J. Connors, with the 804th Army Marine Ship Repair Co., arrived at

Manila on 19 March 1945, and when it departed in September 1945 was replaced

by the repair ship William F. Fitch (801st AMSR Co.), which continued oper

ations till 25 May 1946. The repair ship J. E. G-orman (803d AMSR Co.)

arrived 23 April 1945 and operated till the end of December 1945; and other

repair ships came later. A 1,000-ton Navy drydock was received in April

1945 and was still on hand in August 1946, with another drydock received

from Tacloban in June 1946. ^he 1113th Port Marine Maintenance Co. began

work at Santa Mesa Shipyard on 25 April 1945 and remained in Manila till

4 October; the shipyard reverted to its owner, the Luzon Stevedoring Co.,

in July 1946. Rehabilitation of Engineer Island, the facilities of which

had been totally destroyed by the Japanese, was begun 30 May 1945; and

Army operation continued till return of the island to civilian control in.

August 1946. Navotas Shipyard began operation for the Army 18 August 1945

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and was inactivated 15 December 1945. All these facilities, and others,

were unable to keep up with current demands, and the proportion of dead-

lined vessels and craft remained high.

During July, August, and September 1945 the following items of shore

lifting equipment were in use by the Port Command:

Jul Aug Sep

mobile crane 11 12 12 tractor crane 6 5 roustabout crane 9 8 hyster crane 1 crane master — 3 lumber hyster 2 7 17 fork lift 102 196 186 tow motor 80 108 97 gravity roller conveyor 1049 977 872 tractor 9 15 12 warehouse trailer 76 218 219 low-bed trailer _ 5 5 hand truck - 313 332 bulldozer — 2 2

Trucks were controlled by the Base Motor Command, coordinate with the

Fort Command*

The peak of Army operations at Manila came in November 1945, when the

main emphasis was placed on the most rapid possible return of Army person

nel to the United States; the peak of cargo-handling had already passed.

Release of port real estate and other facilities to civilians was well

under way before the end of December; civilian employees were increasingly

substituted for military personnel; and the proportion of Army traffic

handled by civilian shipping, which had grown from 10 percent in October

to 25 percent in November, continued to grow. In April 1946 the Army

studied a 5- to 15-year port development program, contemplating the port

of Manila as a semipermanent Army installation. One of the last actions

restoring the port to a peacetime status, with the U. S. Army and the

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civilian authorities in a relation similar to that which had existed be

fore the war, was taken when the Philippine Commonwealth Government restuned

control of pilotage service on 29 June 1946. In August 1946 the Army still

retained 5 piers.

Operations in the port of Manila were by no means confined to the Port

Command. In the first few months the Port Command was so closely associated

with the 4th Engineer Special Brigade that Brig. Gen. Henry Hatchings, Jr.,

Commanding General, 4th ESB, served also as Commanding General, Port Command,

from 6 to 20 April 1945. The 544th and 594th Engineer Boat and Shore Regi

ments remained under operational control of the Port Command till June 1945,

and other elements of the 4th ESB remained in Manila till August. In the

initial assault on Manila and at all times thereafter the Navy operated in

close conjunction with the Port Command.^

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Notes on Chapter VIII

1. The four ports are briefly discussed in Chap. II above.

2. (1) HTC .Australia, I, 88, 90. (2) Bad, GHQ, SWPA to TAG, 29 Apr 42, Cm-In 7768 (29 Apr 42). In OCT 565-900 SWPA. (3) Memo, Chief, Overseas Supply Div, SFPE (Col Abbott Boone), for CG SFPE, 11 Feb 43, sub: lgport of Visit to Pacific Bases. In OCT HB file, POA. (4) Australian Report, unsgd, evidently prepared by SOS, Jan 1943. In AS! Planning Div, policy file la - SWPA. (5) Lapham Bpt.

3. (1) HTC Australia, I, 72-76; II, 2. (2> Study by Lt Col Joseph S. Gorlinsfci for G-4, GSUSA, undtd. Atchd to note dtd 14 Jan 42. In GSUSA G-4, Transportation Br file, 000.900 Aastralia, Vol I. (3) Had, GHQ SWPA to TAG, cited in n. 2(2). (4) Report on Supply Operations in Australia, revised by Col F. A. Henning, addressee unnamed, 1 Aog 42. In AST Planning Div file, la-1 Joint Supply Program (SWP&SPA) IV, (5) Australian Report, cited in n. 2(4). (6) Lapham Rpt. (7) Information from Mariners, Rpt No. 132, compiled by Theater Grp, Collectidn Unit, Military Intelligence Div, 20 Dec 43. In OCT EB file, SWPA - Ports & Facilities. (8) Report of Intelligence Officer on SS William S. Ladd (2d Lt Burton A. Garlinghouse) to Director, Intelligence and Public Relations Div, SITE, 25 Jan 44. In OCT EB file, SWPA - Shipping.

4. (1) Rad, GHQ SWPA to TAG, cited in n. 2(2). (2) Henning Rpt, cited in n. 3(4). (3) Boone Rpt, cited in n. 2(3). (4) Australian Rpt, cited in n. 2(4). (5) Information from Mariners, Bpt No. 94, compiled by Theater Grp, Collection Unit, Military Intelligence Div, 13 Sep 43. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Ports & Facilities.

5. (1) Boone Bpt, cited in n. 2(3). (2) Lapham Rpt. (3) Undtd, unsgd rpt on harbor facilities of Cairns, secured from John Lindberg, Chief Officer of SS William B. Allison. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Ports & Facilities.

6. Lapham Rpt, pp. 16, 18*

7. (1) Memo, Director, Planning Div, ASF (Col Carter B. Magruder), for chiefs of services, 30 May 43, sub: Summary of Operations. In ASF Planning Div file, Projected Operations in S. Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, New Guinea, Marshall Is., Caroline Is. (17). (2) Extracts from Remarks by Maj Gen LeRoy Lutes, Director of Operations, ASF, at the WD Conference of Industry, Labor, and Newspaper Leaders, 28 Sep 43. In OCT HB file, SWPA Shipping.

8. Bpt No. 51, ASF Board, SWPA, by Col G. B. Troland, undtd (filed 5 Jun 44), sub: Notes on Army Engineer Operations in SWPA. In OCT 319.1 SWPA.

9. (1) HTC Hq, Supplement, 1942, pp. 1-4. (2) Boone Rpt, cited in

S89954O—50 32

n. 2(3). (3) Lapham Rpt, pp. 27-29. (4) Information from Mariners, No. 93, compiled by Collection Unit, Military Intelligence Service, 10 Sep 43. In OCT HB file, SWPA - New Guinea - Miscellaneous. Contains rpt from Master of SS Cape Newenham on Port Mores"by, visited 1-15 Jul 43. (5) Information from Mariners, No. 119, compiled by Theater Grp, Collection Unit, Military Intelligence Service, 23 Nov 43. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Ports & Facilities. Contains information from the Chief Officer, MS Cape Flaherty. (6) Rpt, Military Intelligence Officer, SFPE (Maj Martin S. Mitau), to Chief, Domestic Br, Collection Unit, Military Intelligence Div, 9 Feb 44, sub: Information from Mariners - Port Moresby, serial 2978. In OCT HB file, SWPA - New Guinea - Miscellaneous. Contains information from William Gornforth, Master, Clarence King, who visited Port Moresby 9 Nov 43. (7) Garlinghouse Rpt, cited in n. 3(8). (8) Memo, Chief, Overseas Supply Div, SFPE (Col Abbott Boone), for CG USASOS, 5 Dec 42, sub: Supplementary Report of Col. Abbott Boone. In OCT HB file, POA.

10. (1) HTC Hq., Supplement, 1942, pp. 4-6. (2) HTC New Guinea, 194244, pp. 10-22; 1945, pp. 4-8. (3) Milne Bay, New Guinea, as a Base from July 1942 to June 1944. Atchd to History of Base Section 7, April 1942 - October 1943. In SSUSA HD file, 780-12. (4) Information from Mariners, unnumbered, compiled by Theater Grp, Collection Unit, Military Intelligence Div, 13 Dec 43. In OCT HB file, SWPA - New Guinea - Miscellaneous. Contains information from Chief Officer, William B. Allison, who visited Milne Bay 26 Jun - 7 Jul 43. (5) Rpt, MI Officer, SFPE (Maj Martin S. Mitau), to Chief, Domestic Br, Collection Unit, Military Intelligence Service, serial 2726, 10 Dec 43, sub: Information from Mariners. Same file. Contains information from J. A. Kresser, Chief Mate, SS Cape Grieg, who visited Waga Waga 26 Aug 43. (6) Undtd, unsgd rpt on harbor facilities secured from 1st Lt George F. Cassill, formerly Cargo Security Officer, SS James K. Kelly, who visited Milne Bay in Sep and Oct 1943. Apparently compiled by Collection Unit, Military Intelligence Service. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Ports & Facilities. (7) Rpt, MI Officer, SFPE (Maj Martin S. Mitau), to Chief, Domestic Br, Collection Unit, Military Intelligence Div, 9 Feb 44, sub: Information from Mariners -Milne Bay, serial 2977. In OCT HB file, SWPA - New Guinea - Miscellaneous. Contains information from William Gornforth, Master, Clarence King, who visited Milne Bay 3 Oct 43. (8) Excerpt from boarding rpt, District Intelligence Office, 12th Naval Dist, San Francisco, 12 Oct 43, based on interview with an officer of the USAT Fred C. Ainsworth* Same file. (9) Information from Mariners, No. 104, compiled by Theater Grp, Collection Unit, Military Intelligence Service, 13 Oct 43. Same file. Contains information from Chief Officer, MV Torrens. (10) Extract from rpt, Cargo Security Officer, SS Ben T. Osborne. which was at Milne Bay 18 Nov - 5 Dec 43. Same file. (11) Sp-eech delivered by Lt Col R. C. Marshall, formerly Executive Officer, Port Command, Milne Bay, 20 Mar 44, sub: Operations of the Base A Port Command. Same file. Printed, somewhat edited, as "Milne Bay," in Army Transportation Journal. Vol I, No. 4 (May 1945), pp. 8-9, 34. (12) Positive Intelligence Bulletins Nos. 1 (11 Aug 44), 4 (31 Aug 44), and 6 (26 Sep 44), issued by OCT. In OCT HB file, SWPA - New Guinea, Pos. Intell. Bull. (13) Rpt, ACofT for Operations, ASF (Brig Gen Robert H. Wylie), addressee unnamed, undtd, sub: Notes on Trip from Washington to POA and SWPA, 19 March to 22 April 1945, pp. 15-16. In OCT HB, Wylie file, Pacific

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Reports of Visits. (14) Notes of interview with Lt Col R. C. Marshall, formerly Executive Officer, Port Command, Milne Bay, 25 Aug 44. In OCT HB, SWPA - Miscellaneous.

11. (1) HTC New Guinea, 1942-44, pp. 23-32; 1945, pp. 9-13. (2) Information from Mariners, No. 123, compiled by Theater Grp, Collection Unit, Military Intelligence Div, 30 Nov 43. In OCT HB file, SWPA - New Guinea - Miscellaneous. Contains rpt on Oro Bay, visited 12 Sep - 1 Oct 43 by officers of the SS Cape Constance- (3) Extract from intelligence rpt of 12th Naval Dist, 30 Nov 43, "based on interview with officers of SS Cape Constance. Same file. (4) Positive Intelligence Bulletins Nos. 4 (31 Aug 44), 6 (26 Sep 44), and 18 (27 Mar 45), issued by OCT. In OCT HB file, SWPA - New Guinea - Pos. Intell. Bull. (5) apt, Maj Mark C. Collarino, Overseas Operations Br, Planning Div, OCT, to ACofT for Operations, ASP, 1 May 45, sub: Notes on Trip from Washington to POA and SWPA, 19 March to 22 April. In OCT HB file, POA. (6) Interview with Lt Col Carroll K. Moffatt, formerly Port Commander, Oro Bay, 18 Mar 49, and notes by him on a draft of this paragraph. (7) History of Port Detachment E, 1 Jun 44, In possession of Col Moffatt.

12. (1) HTC New Guinea, 1942-44, pp. 33-41; 1945, pp. 14-17. (2) Base at Lae until March 1944. In SSUSA KD file, 780-18^ (3) USASOS Military History, pp. 71-73. (4) Rpt, MI Officer, SITE (Maj Martin S. Mitau), to Chief, Domestic Br, Collection Unit, Military Intelligence Service, 10 Dec 43, serial 2727, sub; Information from Mariners. In OCT HB file, SWPA - New Guinea - Miscellaneous. Contains information from J. A. Kresser, Chief Mate, SS Cape Grieg, at Lae 20 Oct 43. (5) Positive Intelligence Bulletin No. 8, issued by OCT, 18 Oct 44. In OCT HB file, SWPA - New Guinea - Pos. Intell. Bull. (6) "All Ashore at Lae," by Maj William P. Bell. In Army Transportation Journal* Vol I, No. 2 (Mar 1945), pp. 27, 39.

13. (1) HTC New Guinea, 1942-44, pp. 42-50; 1945, pp. 18-24. (2) HTC Hq, Apr 1946, p. 41. (3) USASOS Military History, p. 73. (4) Finschhafen, New Guinea, since Activation 1943 until April 1944. In SSUSA HD file, 780-19. (5) Rpt, Cargo Security Officer, James M. ^oodhue (2d Lt Charles A. Deedman), to Director, Intelligence and Public Relations Div, SEPE, 24 Mar 44, sub: Intelligence Report, In OCT HB file, SWPA - Shipping. (6) Positive Intelligence Bulletins Nos. 4 (31 Aug 44), 8 (18 Oct 44), and 18 (27 Mar 45), compiled by OCT. In OCT HB file, SWPA - New Guinea - Pos. Intell. Bull. (7) Wylie Rpt, cited in n. 10(13).

14. The first four sentences of the paragraph above were written by Col Russell V. Perry, formerly Port Commander, Hollandia, for insertion in this study.

15. (1) HTC New Guinea, 1942-44, pp. 51-58; 1945, pp. 25-52. (2) Base G at Hollandia from Pounding, March 1944, to May 1945. In SSUSA HD file 780-21. (3) Positive Intelligence Bulletins Nos. 1 (11 Aug 44), 5 (8 Sep 44), 8 (18 Oct 44), 10 (13 Nov 44), 14 (9 Jan 45), 18 (27 Mar 45), issued by OCT. In OCT HB file, SWPA - New Guinea - Pos. Intell. Bull. (4) Wylie rpt, pp. 13-14, cited in n. 10(13). (5) Interview with Col

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Russell V. Perry, formerly Port Commander, Hollandia, 16 May 49, and notes "by him on a draft of this paragraph. (6) Memo, Deputy Director, Storage Div, ASF (Col William C. Crosby), for Director of Supply, AS!, 12 Dec 44, sub: Report on Trip to Pacific Ocean Area and Southwest Pacific Area, par 21. App 2, Tab 4, to monograph, Appendices to Storage Operations, Dec 1941 - Dec 1945, prepared by Storage Div, ASP. In SSUSA HD file,

16. (1) HTC New Guinea, 1942-44, pp. 59-65; 1945, pp. 53-61, (2) Positive Intelligence Bulletins Nos. 6 (26 Sep 44), 9 (31 Oct 44), 12 (7 Dec 44), 16 (15 Feb 45), and 19 (ll Apr 45), issued by OCT, In OCT HB file, SWPA - New Guinea - Pos. Intell. Bull,

17. (1) Extracts from Boarding Report of 12th Naval Dist, 29 Dec 43, In OCT KB file, SWPA - New Guinea - Miscellaneous, Contains information from Master, SS Jo si ah Royce. in SWPA Jun-Nov 1943, (2) Information from Mariners, No, 131, compiled by Theater Grp, Collection Unit, Military Intelligence Div, 18 Dec 43, Same file* (3) Information from Mariners, No, 119, cited in n, 9(5), (4) Extract from Boarding Report of SS Junipero Serra. boarded at SFPE, 25 Oct 43. In OCT HB file, SWPA - New Guinea Miscellaneous, (5) Rpt, Maj Herbert H, Naught on, addressee unnamed, on Morotai, Apr 1945, Ref 6 to HTC Hq., Apr 1945, For identification see HTC Hq, Apr 1945, p, 4. (6) Positive Intelligence Bulletins Nos, 5 (8 Sep 44), 6 (26 Sep 44), 9 (31 Oct 44), 10 (13 Nov 44), 16 (15 Feb 45), 18 (27 Mar 45), 19 (11 Apr 45), issued by OCT, In OCT HB file, SWPA - ^ew Guinea -Pos. Intell. Bull. (7) HTC Hq, Mar 1945, p. 10. (8) Interview with Lt Col Carroll K. Moffatt, formerly Port Commander, Oro Bay, 28 Mar 49 (information on Mo robe).

18. Philippine Islands, Commonwealth of the Philippines, prepared by Foreign Economic Sec, Strategic Logistic Br, Planning Div, ASF, 6 Mar 45. Tab F to Logistic Study for Projected Operations, prepared by Planning Div, ASF, undtd, ASF-P-SL-5. In ASF Planning Div file.

19. (1) HTC Philippine Islands, Oct 1944 - Jan 1945, pp. 1-4; Feb 1945, p, 3; Mar 1945, pp. 2-6; May 1945, p, 11; Jun 1945, p, 13. (2) Positive Intelligence Bulletins Nos. 16 (15 Feb 45), 17 (l Mar 45), 21 (18 May 45), issued by OCT. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Philippines - Pos, Intell. Bull.

20. (1) HTC Philippine Islands, Oct 1944 - Jan 1945, pp. 12-15; Mar 1945, p. 6; Apr 1945, p. 15; May 1945, pp. 8-10. (2) Positive Intelligence Bulletins Nos. 21 (18 May 45), 25 (7 Jul 45), issued by OCT. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Philippines - Pos. Intell. Bull.

21. (1) HTO Philippine Islands, May 1945, pp. 14-16; Jun 1945, pp. 16-17; Jul 1945, pp. 9-10; Aag 1945, p. 12; Sep 1945, p. 12; Dec 1945, p. 28. (2) Positive Intelligence Bulletin No. 22 (26 May 45), issued by OCT. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Philippines - Pos. Intell. Bull. (3) AFWESPAC, Semi-Annual Report. 1 Jun - 31 Dec 45 (n.p., n.d.), p. 53. (4) Interview with Col Russell 7. Perry, formerly Port Commander, Batangas, 16 May 49.

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22. (1) HTC Philippine Islands, Jun 1945, pp. 18-19; Jul 1945, pp. 11-12; Aug 1945, p. 14; Sep 1945, p. 14; Oct 1945, p. 14; Dec 1945, pp. 29-32. (2) Rpt, Maj Herbert H. Naughton, addressee unnamed, on Cebu, -Apr 1945. Ref 8 to HTC Hi, Apr 1945. For identification see HTO Hq, Apr 1945, p. 4. (3) Positive Intelligence Bulletins Nos. 24 (23 Jun 45) and 26 (25 Jail 45), issued by OCT. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Philippines - Pos. Intell. Bull.

23. (1) Rpts "by Maj Herbert H. Naughton, addressee unnamed, Apr 1945, on Zamboanga, Puerto Princesa, and Mindoro. Befs 7, 9, and 10 to HTC Hq, Apr 1945. lor authorship and date see HTC Hq, Apr 1945, p. 4. (2) Positive Intelligence Bulletins Nos. 21 (18 May 45), 25 (7 Jul 45), issued by OCT. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Philippines - Pos. Intell. Bull.

24. (1) HTC Hq, Jan 1946, pp. 14-16. (2) Positive Intelligence Bulletins Nos. 18 (27 Mar 45), 21 (18 May 45), issued by OCT. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Philippines - Pos. Intell. Bull.

24a. No ready explanation of this fact is found. Probably the damage caused by two typhoons later in the year accounts for the absence of oceangoing vessels on and after 16 September.

25. (l) History of Transportation Activities on Okinawa from Inception through 1945. In OCT HB file, Okinawa. (2) HTC Hq, Jan 1946, p. 49; Apr 1946, p. 40: Jun 1946, p. 33; Aug 1946, p. 33. (3) Positive Intelligence Bulletins Nos. 26 (25 Jul 45), 27 (9 Aug 45), issued by OCT ASF. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Okinawa.

26. (1) HTC Philippine Islands, Mar 1945, pp. 10-24; Apr 1945, pp. 2-10; May 1945, pp. 1-7; Jun 1945, pp. 1-9; Jul 1945, pp. 1-3; Aug 1945, pp. 1-5; Sep 1945, px>. 1-5; Oct 1945, pp. 1-6; Nov 1945, pp. 1-10; Dec 1945, pp. 1-11. (2) HTC Hq, Jan 1946, pp. 34-40; Apr 1946, pp. 21-28; May 1946, p. 18; Jun 1946, p. 21; Jul 1946, pp. 17, 21; Aug 1946, pp. 27, 29. (3) MOVCJS, issued by Water Div, OCT ASP, Apr 1945. In OCT HB, organizational file, Water Div, Vessel Utilization Rpt. (4) M300 Sunken Craft Block Manila Bay," article in New York Times. 15 Mar 45. Atchd to ltr, Executive Asst, OCT ASP (C. C. Wardlow), to CG USASOS. In OCT HB file, SWPA Correspondence - Australia. (5) Monthly History for March 1945 from Office of the"Port Commander, Hq, PHIBSEC, to CG USASOS, 1 Apr 45. Incl 9 to Collarino Rpt, cited in n. 11(5). (6) Positive Intelligence Bulletin No. 25, issued by OCT ASF, 7 Jul 45. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Philippines - Pos. Intell. Bull.

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CHAPTER IX

The Handling of Cargo

Details presented in the preceding chapter appear to warrant the

following general statements, (l) Ports used by the U. S. Army in the

Southwest Pacific Area were districted over a distance of some 6,000

miles "between Melbourne and Naha. (2) More than half of these ports were

virtually creations of the U. S. Army and the U. S. Navy. (3) Only three

or four of the ports — Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane (to a limited degree),

and Manila — were well adapted to receive large oceangoing vessels directly

at wharves or piers. (4) A large proportion of cargo, not exactly computa

ble from available records, was necessarily handled in the stream* (5)

Stream operations required excessive use of lighterage equipment — barges

and tugs, landing craft (LSTs, LCTs, LCMs, LCVPs), and amphibian craft and

vehicles (particularly DDKVTs). (6) Swampy and muddy shores frequently

necessitated the location of supply dumps, storehouses, and airstrips at

excessive distances from the shore line, entailing excessive road construc

tion and excessive turnaround for trucks and DUKWs. (?) Heat and humidity,

heavy rainfall, and violent storms adversely affected the efficiency of

both operation and maintenance by the resultant rusting and rotting of

equipment, washing away of roads and bridges, reduction of working hours,

and exhaustion and illness of port personnel* (8) All these facts required

the Army to provide excessive quantities of equipment, and of personnel to

operate and maintain the equipment. (9) The quantities of equipment and

port personnel made available were not regarded as sufficient. (10) Be

cause of these conditions the Southwest Pacific Area could not discharge

and load cargo and personnel with a high degree of efficiency*

- 47-1

Port Equipment

The shortage of port equipment in SWPA required repeated decisions

in Washington as to allocation and shipping of the limited quantity pro

duced by American industry for use in all theaters. The need for large

quantities of port equipment in SWPA was obvious as soon as V. S. forces

arrived in Australia. On 2 February 1942 the War Department notified the

CG, USAPIA, that shipment would be made in late March and early April of

"the equipment you required in Australian ports" — 36 tractors, 325 trail

ers, 15 cranes, and 63 fork lifts. Similar requests were made by the Army

almost continuously till the end of the war. Equipment was needed also by

the Australian Government, which pointed out on 8 November 1942 that "water

front conditions in Australia are almost primitive and consequently delay

in the turnabout of Lend Lease vessels must continue unless adequate mechan

ical aid is available.M The U. S. Army in Australia had "every disposition"

to cooperate with the Australians but could spare no equipment. Australia

therefore requested earliest possible shipment of 40 mobile cranes, 25 fork

lift trucks, and 40 tractors and trailers, and noted in its requisition

that "owing to wharf and shed surfaces we stress necessity for rubber wheels,

good ground clearance, and very particularly manoeuverability of all (except

5 ton cranes) in crowded sheds with columns spaced usually less than 20 feet

apart." After correspondence with General MacArthur the War Department

decided that it could not divert these items from Army and Navy use, but

suggested that they could probably be procured by the Treasury Department.

Australian equipment was inadequate; but in New Guinea and the Philip

pines, when the U. S. Army arrived, there was virtually no equipment what

ever, and enormous requisitions were made upon the United States.

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late in the war the Army was unable to use the largest and heaviest equip

ment. On 17 March 1944 the War Department offered to General MacArthur a

crawler crane weighing 282,000 pounds and able to lift 100 tons. The thea

ter replied that this crane was too heavy to be supported by existing or

proposed docks and hardstandings, or to be moved from one island base to

another without almost complete disassembly, and that loads greater than 60

tons could be lifted by using together two floating cranes of 60-ton capa

city. Later, however, operations in Manila Harbor required a 150-ton float

ing crane. In April 1945 the heaviest floating crane available in the

theater, of 100-ton capacity, was in use by the Navy for clearing Manila

Harbor. Delivery of the 150-ton crane was delayed till November 1945.

The basis of the theater's requirements for cargo-handling equipment

was computed systematically in a manual issued by USASOS on 15 December 1944,

listing the following 16 items:

3 LCMs per hatch — 1 loading, 1 discharging, and 1 moving between ship and beach (a smaller number being insufficient to keep a hatch gang steadily at work)

3 barges per hatch for barges of 100 feet or less, lj barges per hatch for barges more than 100 feet long (able to discharge 2 hatches simultaneously) , or 9 barges of over 100 feet for a standard 5-hatch Liberty ship

LCTs, Marks 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, same "factor" (ratio per hatch) as for barges, with a higher "factor" for Mark 6

At least 3 DUKWs per hatch and 15 per Liberty ship, but preferably, if only 1 DUKW ramp is available to a 5-hatch unit, the whole 23 DUKWs assigned to a DUKW company

4 harbor tugs for each 5-hatch unit discharging into other than self-propelled lighterage equipment, and 1 harbor tug for each floating crane (to be used, while not placing the crane, to dock vessels)

1 floating crane (i.e., crane on a barge) for each 5 5-hatch units

5 mobile cranes for over-the-wharf discharge of a 5-hatch unit (when

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dumps are at dock or when local sorting is done there), or 10 for stream discharge not by DUKWs (l for each lighter berth or amphibious craft slot and 5 for the dumps), or 5 (at the dumps) for stream discharge "by DUKWs

2 20-ton low-bed trailers and 1 16-ton low-bed trailer for each 5-hatch unit (to move exceedingly heavy cargo and cases too large to fit standard 6-x-6 trucks), and 1 standard prime mover for each low-bed trailer

The trucks and personnel of 1 Q^ truck company, with driver augmentation under T/0 10-500, for each 5-hatch unit (experience in SWPA having shown that 1 company could clear a port of 1,000 MT per day)

2 complete sets of standard stevedore gear ("all the necessary slings, wires, ropes, shackles and spreaders necessary to discharge normal military cargo") for discharging over a wharf or by DUKWs (l set for the ship, 1 for the dump cranes), and 3 complete sets for stream discharge not by DUKWs (1 for the ship, 1 for the shore-side handling cranes, 1 for the dump cranes), special sets for particularly heavy lifts (such as locomotives) being requisitioned to accompany the article

200 4-x-6 pallets per 5-hatch unit

2 600-foot lengths of gravity conveyor sections per ship for over-thewharf and DUKtf discharge (200 feet for the ship's holds and 200 for the dump), and 3 600-foot lengths for stream discharge not by DUKWs (200 feet for the holds, 200 feet for the shore, and 200 for the dump)

7 fork-lift trucks for each Liberty berth, LCT (standing on the cargo deck of the LCT), LCM, or barge (standing on barge jetties or hard stands), to allow 5 fork lifts to be vorking while 2 are being repaired (50 percent of the fork lifts for handling weights from 3,000 to 5,000 pounds, 48 percent for handling weights fron 6,000 to 8,000 pounds, and 2 percent for heavier weights)

D-6 equipment crawler tractor to tow heavy equipment or haul low-bed trailers through sandy beaches to a point where they may be better drawn by prime movers

2 harbor craft (1 able to move enough men to operate a 5-hatch unit, 1 having a minimum speed of 12 knots), "for the purpose of moving gangs to and from ships working in the stream, for the accomplishment of ships' business, and for ready access for the purpose of supervision"

3 T-49 trailers (still in the experimental stage) per ship, to move unwieldy pieces of equipment such as piles, poles, pipe, and timber^

Except for fork-lift trucks these requirements made no allowance for

deadlined equipment, which in some ports might total from a quarter to more

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than three quarters of all that was on hand. Even the mininum require

ment for equipment was rarely available in ports of SWPA. ±Jvery port pre

sented a different combination of problems, depending on conditions such

as feasibility of over-the^wharf discharge, distance of dumps from water

side, exposure of anchorage and cargo-handling areas to rough water, rela

tive urgency of speed and of economy in cargo-handling operations, and

duration of contemplated Army use of the port. Every port was constantly

subject to the danger that part of its equipment and personnel, however

desperately needed where they were, would be suddenly transferred to another

port of which the needs were still more desperate; and most port commanders

could expect that sudden withdrawal of Navy, Engineering, and Quartermaster

equipment and personnel previously available would further reduce their

ability to perform their assigned tasks. The Army was obliged to operate

an excessive number of ports, separated by excessive distances, with in

sufficient equipment and personnel. Each port required a new and different

exercise of ingenuity.

Cargo-Handling Personnel

Both military and local civilian personnel were employed to load and

unload Army cargo in ports of the Southwest Pacific Area. In Australia,

for reasons to be set forth later, most port cargo was handled by civilians;

in Hew Guinea almost all was handled by the Army; and in the Philippines

both Army and civilian personnel v;as extensively employed.

The number of processes and the number and types of personnel required

depended on whether the ship was worked in the stream or in a dock and

whether dumps and storehouses were located at the shore or some distance

- 478

inland. Various combinations of the following processes were necessary:

(1) transferring cargo from the ship (a) into trucks, railroad cars, or other carriers at the dock, (b) directly to the surface of the wharf or pier or into storehouses located there, or (c) into barges, landing craft, or amphibian vehicles or craft in the stream

(2) moving cargo from the ship in the stream to a dock, jetty, or landing-craft slot by means of barges or landing craft

(3) transferring cargo from barges or landing craft into carriers or directly to the surface of the wharf, jetty, or beach

(4) transferring cargo deposited on the wharf, jetty, or beach to a carrier

(5) moving cargo from wharf, jetty, or beach to inland dumps or storehouses by means of trucks, railroad cars, animal-drawn vehicles, or animal or human carriers

(6) moving cargo from the ship to inland dumps or storehouses by means of amphibian craft or vehicles

(7) unloading cargo at inland dumps or storehouses

(8)-(l4) the same processes in reverse, beginning with the storehouse, dump, or other source of cargo on land and ending with the ship

Prom the point of view of transportation all these processes could

have been planned, coordinated, and controlled by the base port commander,

and the necessary equipment and personnel could have been assigned to him;

but after 1 January 1944 his control was usually limited to processes (l)

(4) and (6) and the reverse of these processes, process (5) and the reverse

being controlled by the base motor commander, and process (7) and the re

verse by the base service commander. This dispersion of control required

coordination either by liaison or by action of the base commander.

An inspector from Headquarters, ASF, recommended in December 1944

that a director of supply operations be appointed in each base to coordi

nate and supervise the operations of the port commander, the motor com

mander, and the service commander. The theater replied that a standard

- 479

supply control system in all bases was not desired, and that each base

must solve the problem as the "base commander thought best. At Hollandia

in late 1944 the base G-4 held a regular daily conference with the port

coramander, the motor officer, and the chief officer of each service; the

port commander stated what motor transport he expected to need during the

next twenty-four hours, and effort was made to adjust all movements be

tween ship and dump with minimum waste of time and labor. A similar sys

tem was in effect at Oro Bay. Former port commanders of both these typical

New Guinea ports are of opinion that the system worked satisfactorily and

2awould not have been improved by any change in organization.

Military -personnel

On 15 December 1944 USASOS explained in a manual the types and numbers

of personnel considered necessary at that time to load, unload, and move

Army cargo in ports. The following types were prescribed:

1 port company (expanded by 300 enlisted men) to discharge a 5-hatch unit, each shift working 6 hours and resting 12 hours

1 service company for each 5-hatch unit, to assist in discharge of trucks, operation of dump cranes, and technical supervision of dump-handling

harbor-craft companies to operate floating cranes, harbor launches, harbor tugs, barges, and LCMs; to be deployed with a particular port in mind, the requirement varying greatly with the type of work

port marine maintenance companies, required only in major ports to do heavy shop work and operate slipways

Army marine repair ship companies, operating repair shops on (l) Army marine repair ships, with ship and gans operated by a Coast Guard crew, and (2) repair barges, not self-propelled, operated by the Army marine repair ship companies

1 DUE)1/ company (amphibian truck company) to discharge a 5-hatch unit

1 headquarters and headquarters detachment, port battalion, for each 6

- 480

port companies; not to be provided in a station with fewer than 3 port companies

depot companies, TO, "deployed according to theater supply policy"

casuals, to "be employed as available and needed3

These types of units had gradually become available to SWPA in the

course of nearly three yeexs. The first U. 3. troops, which arrived in

Australia on 22 December 1941, included no port units. Col. Van S. Merle

Smith, U. S. military attache in Australia, immediately requested the dis

patch of Army port labor to Australia. On 5 January 1942 General Somervell,

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, GSUSA, recommended to the War Plans Division

the dispatch of a port battalion to Australia to accelerate unloading and

thus reduce turnaround and relieve a severe shipping shortage. On 25 Janu

ary War Plans Division concurred in this recommendation, but quoted the

Australian Embassy to the effect that the Australian Government would not

admit a negro unit to Australia and that a white port battalion should be

created. General Somervell accepted this condition but G-3, GSUSA, did

not. USAPIA had indicated that Australian authorities did not seriously

object to negro labor battalions, and urged that these be sent if no other

labor was available. Plans were made by 6 February 1942 to dispatch the

394th QJ-1 Battalion (Port), a negro unit, to Australia.4

General Marshall, Chief of Staff, in instructions transmitted on 6

February to Brig. Gen. Arthur R. Wilson, appointed to organize a supply

S7/-stem in Australia, emphasized the necessity of holding at a minimum the

service troops to be sent to Australia and of employing Australian civil

ians "to the fullest extent possible." General 'Jilson recommended, in

keeping with these instructions, that only skeletonised service organiza

- 481

tions be sent to Australia, to supply key men capable of supervising fill

ers procured locally. On 12 February G-4 rejected this recommendation and

urged (successfully) that service units destined for Australia be sent at

full T/0 strength. On 26 February, before any service troops arrived in

Australia, the Chief of Staff, USAFIA, reported that USAFIA was "in sad

need of all the S.O.S. troops which we have asked for, such as depot com

panies, maintenance companies, port battalions, port headquarters, etc."

He added that USAFIA required "thousands and thousands and thousands of

labor" and was trying to obtain labor from the Netherlands Bast Indies and

India. On 24 April Col. Thomas B. Wilson, Chief of Transportation Service,

USAFIA, reported to Brig. Gen. Arthur B. Wilson, Assistant Chief of Staff,

G-4, USAFIA, that the "stevedore and dock labor situation" was "deplorable"

and that inexperienced U. S. combat troops ana Australian soldier units de

tailed to the docks had not been found satisfactory. He therefore urged that

two stevedoring battalions (presumably in addition to those already sent)

be ordered by cable at once.^

On 1 July 1942 Gen. Arthur R. Wilson, after his return to the United

States, reported that there was "an honest difference of opinion" as to

whether port battalions should be sent from the United States. In obedi

ence to orders of Maj. Gen. Julian F. Barnes, Commanding General, USAFIA,

he had prepared the cables and the plans for the use of these battalions,

but he personally believed that civilian Australian stevedores and newly

organized stevedore battalions of the Australian Army (men from 44 to 54

years old) could furnish all necessary dock labor and that the two U. S.

white stevedore battalions already in Australia (the 387th, with 19 officers

and 925 enlisted men, and a provisional port battalion of 58 officers and 882

- 482

enlisted men) should be disbanded to furnish replacements for other units.

General Wilson asserted that General Barnes had not conferred with "a

representative cross-section of Australian official opinion" before in

forming the War Department that colored units would be acceptable in Aus

tralia. The presence of negro troops in "white Australia" had caused

"considerable trouble," in one instance "very serious riot bordering on

mutiny," developing when negroes were seen in the company of white women.

The 394th Port Battalion Cl9 officers, 925 enlisted men), colored, had

arrived at Port Moresby on 13 June 1942. So far as is known neither this

unit nor any other negro port organization was thereafter stationed in

Australia. On the other hand, no racial troubles were reported from New

Guinea, where eventually a large number of negro troops were employed.

According to a memorandum of the Plsus Division, SOS, 24 July 1942,

both the Plans Division, SOS, and the Operations Division, G-SUSA, were

"aware of the need for additional service troops in Australia," but

"practically all available units" were "earmarked for BOLERO," which had

higher priority. General MacArthur had. requested for first-priority ship

ment one truck regiment, white (less two battalions), and one port labor

battalion, white; for second priority, one port labor battalion and one

truck battalion, both white; for third priority, one truck battalion,

white, and two Aviation truck companies; and for fourth priority one truck

battalion, white (less one company).' None of these could be provided. In

the opinion of. the Plans Division, "The fundamental cause of the serious

shortage of service units is the inadequacy of the troop unit basis for

1942 and subsequent additions." Establishment of the troop basis was a

responsibility of G-3, GSUSA, which evidently disagreed with the Operations

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Division and the Plans Division in regard to the ratio of service troops

to combat troops,

By 1 August 1942 the shortage of service personnel in the theater was

described "by USASOS as "most acute." Two white port battalions had been

requisitioned for Melbourne, and Transportation Service, USAPIA, had recom

mended the requisitioning of two for Sydney and one for Brisbane. USASOS,

however, did not station such battalions in Australia, partly because of

opposition from Australian labor and the Australian Government and partly

because all units dispatched to the theater were more urgently needed in Q

Hew Guinea.

On 7 December 1942 General Somervell notified the Commanding General,

USASOS, that the Transportation Corps was able to furnish port battalions,

which "will normally be colored," for duty in SWPA, and suggested that the

Army coordinate its requirements with the Navy, whose construction battalions

(Seabees) included stevedore personnel. On 20 December General MacArthur

replied that the Navy had no construction battalions in SVJPA. He requested

four port battalions in addition to those previously requisitioned, "to be

shipped as space will allow without disrupting present priorities." At this

time the only U. S. port units actually in the theater were the 387th and

394th port battalions (each with authorized strength of 19 officers, two

warrant officers, and 870 enlisted men), and the 2d, 22d, and 23d Ports of

Embarkation which, as explained in Chapter II, were mere pools of personnel*

Shortage of port personnel continued throughout 1943, in spite of

several increments. To the 387th and 394th Port Battalions the 373d, the

489th, and the 491st had been added by June 1943; the 495th arrived in Sep

tember, the 496th and the 503d in November, and the 506th before the end

- 4 8 4

of the year; the 493d was en route at that time. With rapidly expanding

lighterage and small-boat operations the need for military units to carry

on these operations had "become acute by the beginning of 1943. On 31

December 1942 the theater was authorized to activate 10 QM boat companies

(T/0 10-497, 11 February 1942), each with a strength of 3 officers, 30

warrant officers, and 142 enlisted men. The 316th through the 325th QM

Boat Companies were activated effective 1 January 1943 from personnel

available in the theater and were assigned to the technical control of the

Chief of Transportation, USASOS. The first four companies were stationed

at Milne Bay, the 320th, 321st, and 322d at Port Moresby, and the remain

ing three (temporarily) at Townsville.11

These units proved insufficient to handle the rapidly growing volume

of traffic in the ports. In March 1943, when as yet only two U. S. Army

port battalions were available in SWPA, an observer from San Francisco re

marked that supervisors, foremen, and pier superintendents were "wanted

desperately," that young officers who knew how to operate pier terminals

and load and unload ships were lacking, that "the crying need in this country

is labour" (especially stevedores and truck drivers), that campaigns in New

Guinea could not be carried on without labor to unload cargo and haul it

away, and that commanders who would not permit their combat troops to handle

cargo were exnibiting "short-sighted stupidity." Only the 41st Division

had fully recognized the necessity of putting soldiers to work as stevedores.

In April 1943 the Superintendent of Army Transport Service, San Francisco

Port of Embarkation, after visiting SWPA, remarked, "The Army apparently

were slow to recognize the fact that service troops should go ahead of, or

at least accompany, combat troops into new «ro«-," He reported that the

889954O—50 33

Navy had furnished more and "better service units to SWPA than the Army-

had and that in many bases the Army had been "somewhat dependent11 on Navy

port and construction units* He found port officers overworked, and recom

mended relief for those who had worked too long without rest. In Mpy 1943

Lt. Cols. Alfred VI# Parry, Jr., and Rudolph G. Lehnau, from the Control

Division, ASF, reported that at nearly every place visited by them in SWPA

"the general complaint of officers was the lack of service personnel, re

quiring the use of combat soldiers for labor services, particularly in

connection with transportation." Parry and Lehnau attributed this deficiea

to priorities established by the theater, and suggested that "high priori

ties on service units would immediately remedy the situation." They dis

claimed intent to criticize the theater policy ol employing only civilians

in Australian ports, but suggested that only soldiers be employed at night

or that 50 percent of the dock labor be done by soldiers. They noted "a

general shortage of transportation officers, particularly junior officers,

for supervision of stevedoring, barge operation, truck operation, small

boat operation, etc." They found that "too long a tour of duty on these

tropical islands" tended to "burn out the men," and they recommended a

rotating replacement plan.^2

In September 1943 General Somervell, visiting SWPA, was informed by

the theater that service troops were "barely adequate for present and pro

spective operations. Limitation of available shipping has necessitated

that service troops be held to a minimum." The theater reported further

that temporary and emergency assignment of combat troops to service func

tions had produced no evident "deleterious effect on training, conduct of

operations, or morale," but that more TC units were "needed for efficient

_ AftA

operation." Shortage was attributed to lack of available shipping space

and to unavai.lability of needed units in the United States. Trained DUKW

companies were particularly needed; provisional companies organized in the

theater to operate DUKWs had not made efficient use of this new type of

equipment. General Somervell himself detected Na great need for service

troops" at every point that he visited in SWPA, and reported with satis

faction that GHQ, had recently lowered priorities on combat units in favor

of adding about 29,000 service troops 13

Attached to the theater's report to General Somervell was an unsigned,

unaddressed memoran. un of 16 September 1943, evidently prepared in the

theater, recommending that 29,000 additional service troops be included

in the troop basis for 1944 (among them 6 port battalions, strength 5,664).

The recommendation was Justified as follows:

Recent information received informally from the War Department indicates that Theater needs for troops must be stated accurately, conservatively, and definitely. Theaters are expected to live within their service necessities and to concentrate on bringing the war to an early successful conclusion rather than to insist on service units that will simply help to make life a little more pleasant. Strong agitation is underway in the War Department regarding economy in the use of forces and all requests for troops will be stringently scrutinized.14

The reports and correspondence quoted above appear to suggest disagree

ments both in the theater and in Washington with regard to service troops.

General Somervell and preceding ASP visitors from the United States reported

a serious, if not desperate, shortage of service personnel; and in the thea

ter Colonel Wilson, Chief of Transportation, as well as Colonel Chamberlain,

Chief of Staff, USAFIA, had been emphatic in their requests for service

troops. On the other hand, Gen. Arthur H. Wilson had perceived so little

need for service troops that he had recommended the disbanding of the port

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"battalions already in the theater; and 15 months later the unidentified

echelon in SWPA that prepared a report for General Somervell did not take

the occasion to represent the theater's need for service troops as urgent

or desperate. The theater, for reasons not stated, had preferred to con

tinue giving shipment priority to combat troops, which when received were

actually employed as service troops when needed. In Washington, G-3, in

opposition to ASF, was evidently disposed to hold the ratio of service to

combat troops at a minimum; but General Somervell's notification to USASOS

in December 1942 that TC troops were available, studied in conjunction with

the requisition submitted later in the month by the theater, suggests that

SWPA could have obtained more TC troops by giving them sufficient priority.

In July 1943 the theater requisitioned 4,400 "replacements" for the

10 0}l boat companies (a number sufficient not only to replace turnover but

to expand the companies), and on 12 August General MacArthur indicated his

need for a total of 5,200 men in such units by the end of 1943 and for

5,100 additional men during 1944, besides 1,800 replacements for 1944. On

1 September 1943 ASF reported that no replacements for the boat companies

would be available before December, since no provision had been made for

training such personnel in the United States; that four additional port

battalions (besides the 373d, 387th, 394th, 489th, and 491st, already in

the theater) would be available for SWPA by the end of the year; and that

if other forces were considered necessary the theater should submit the

necessary recosanendations with the priorities desired. These conditions

were transmitted to General MacArthur on 17 September 1943. On 22 Septem

ber ASP received an inquiry from the General Staff asking whether the 4,400

replacements requested by General MacArthur would be available in or after

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December, and was informed that 1,622 of the required total had already

been supplied and that the Military Personnel Division, ASF, stated that

the remaining 2,342 would be furnished by 1 January 1944. Training facil

ities for this personnel were lacking; the Training Division, ASF, mentioned

that the personnel required was not included in the current troop basis and

that the Transportation Corps was therefore not authorized to establish

training facilities; but GSUSA was expected to direct the action necessary

to meet General MacArthur's requirements. This directive was evidently

given, though documentary proof of the fact is not found. On 20 October

1943 the theater reported that "urgent need" still existed for all labor

units allocated to the theater on the basis of 1943 troop requisitions,

that the shortage of port battalions was "particularly acute," that the

boat companies had been "brought up to strength" at the expense of other

units, and that this procedure could not be continued. On 13 December ASF

reported that 600 TC replacements shipped in November and December completed

the boat-company replacements requested for 1943 and that of the 11 port

battalions requested for 1943 eight were in the theater or en route and

15the remaining 3 would be shipped in December.

Lack of records makes it impossible at present to trace in detail the

changes in the port personnel situation after 1943. & table compiled in

the theater indicates that the following 28 organizations utilized in port

operations were in the theater in April 1944:

Port battalions: 373d, 387th, 394th, 489th, 491st, 493d, 495th, 496th, 506th

Port comDanies: 154th, 314th-318th Amphibian truck companies: 464th-466th, 808th-813th Harbor craft companies: 365th-367th (formed 20 April 1944 by

disbanding the 10 C#i boat companies)10

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By the end of 1944, as shown in Appendix 41, the following 58 organiza

tions had been added:

Port battalions: 117th-120th (activated in the theater 15 December 1944), 476th (activated December 1944), 397th

Port companies: 123d-125th, 236th, 237th, 244th, 246th-249th, 266th, 293d, 296th, 427th-432d, 578th, 579th, 603d-607th, 610th, 611th, 620th, 621st, 623d, 636th-639th, 650th, 651st, 851st, 852d

Amphibian truck companies: 451st, 455th, 820th, 824th-826th

Harbor craft companies: 346th-350th, 370th, 394th

Since Appendix 41 is compiled from scattered and incidental references, it

is probable that other port organizations had arrived in the theater before

the end of 1944. Evidently the number of port organizations in the theater

was at least tripled during the year.

According to a memorandum of G-4, GHQ, SWPA, 28 August 1944, "Service

troops available to this theater, in proportion to combat troops, have

always been and still are below the desired number based on War Department

policy of service elements to combat elements* Expedients have been used

in the past, the principal one being the employment of combat troops for

labor details. This feature is common in this theater at all bases and

supply points,M To meet requirements for projected Philippine operations,

G-4 planned to train all personnel in port companies as winch operators

and hatch and hold foremen, and to augment the companies with combat troopsi

"not required for operational purposes at the time," to work under super

vision of the permanent port-company troops. The policy was designed to

be continued till Filipino labor became available to replace the combat

troops. According to the USASOS cargo-handling manual of 15 December 1944

the technical training necessary to qualify all port-company personnel for

supervisory duties was directed by the Commanding General, USASOS, in July

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1944, and required from two to three months. On completion of training a

company was augmented by 300 combat troops. Under the "expansion scheme"

each port company supplied more than twice the normal number of technicians

without increase in the number of technician grades. It was admitted that

technicians not given technician grades might become dissatisfied.17

During the first nine months of 1945, as shown by Appendix 41, the

number of port units in SWPA was greatly increased, not only by arrivals

from the United States but by transfers from the South Pacific Area and

from the European and Mediterranean theaters of operation. At the same

time the Army employed Filipino labor on a large scale for port operations.

In May the theater undertook to reorganize port companies in three platoons

of five hatch gangs each, to enable one company to work a five-hatch vessel

1 ftin three eight-hour shifts.

After V-J Day the volume of cargo-handling did not decline abruptly.

Months of work remained in "rolling up the rear" and in shipping cargo to

Japan and Korea or back to the United States. Departure of port units from

the theater, as shown by Appendix 41, began in October 1945 on a large

scale; and most of the units remaining were inactivated in the theater

during the first five months of 1946.

From details mentioned above or included in Appendix 41, it is apparent

that many port units were activated in the theater, with personnel assembled

from whatever sources were available, and that port units were augmented

with combat troops. These conditions required the theater to provide train

ing in port operations. Such training became extensive during 1943. The

Officer Candidate School, SWPA, was established on 15 November 1942, aad

TC instruction was first included in it in April 1943. Eventually the TC

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course of study was made up of classes in water operations, stowage, rig

ging, types of ships, air, rail, and motor transportation, Army administra

tion, Army supply, amphibious operations, armament, mathematics, cargo con

trol, transportation logistics, and troop movements; but the course in gen

eral was described as "a "broad training ... with an emphasis on water trans

portation*" By March 1944 230 men (including 15 negroes and 1 Filipino)

had been graduated from the TC course and commissioned as second lieuten

ants. Special courses for enlisted men were established in various ports

as required by local conditions. In the summer of 1945 the increasing

turnover within port units was expected to result in almost complete replace

ment of personnel within many units after V-J Day. A Training Division was

established in the Office of the Chief of Transportation, AJWESPAC, in July

1945 and was discontinued on 2 January 1946, when its functions were trans

ferred to the Personnel Division. The Training Division formulated doc

trine, prepared and reviewed materials for the organization and training

of TC units, and inspected training procedures at TC field installations.

During the first week in October 1945 a course in port operations for newly

assigned officers was conducted at Manila, including lectures on the organ

ization, functions, and missions of the port, the specific operations of

port divisions, the essentials of stevedoring and use of gear, and a tour

of port facilities. The 2d Major Port Harbor Craft School was activated

at Manila 5 October 1945 to train deck crews, engine crews, and mechanics

as replacements for departing harbor craft companies; the course, presented

on the concrete barge BCL 3065, consisted of one week of class work and

three weeks of shop training. The school was discontinued on 24 November,

after which date all replacement personnel in harbor craft companies was

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trained "on the job." T h e T r a a 8 i t A c c ( m n t i n g Brajlch S c h o o l f o p

checkers was opened in Manila in September 1945, and by 13 October had

graduated 80 men, who had received instruction in.use of disposition sheets,

booking lists, filling out cargo tallies, prevention of pilferage, and re

cognition of service color markings. By the end of October 1945 the Mater

ial Handling Equipment Division school for forklift operators had trained

about 450 enlisted men in addition to civilians. Other short-lived schools

were established at various times and places to meet temporary needs.19

The wide dispersion of ports in the theater, the comparatively small

volume of traffic in most of them (particularly in New Guinea), and the

rapid fluctuation of traffic in a port tended to change repeatedly the

number and identity of companies controlled by a battalion headquarters,

to necessitate the assignment of two or three companies to ports too small

to require a battalion headquarters, and even to bring about the assignment

of single platoons to ports remote from those in which their companies were

stationed* The theater reported on 13 January 1943 that a need was already

developing for "composite service units for assignment to small ports, so

equipped and organized as to enable one unit to perform the various supply

and service functions peculiar to any one service". This need was ulti

mately met by T/O&E 55-500, Transportation Corps Service Organization, 17

August 1943, authorizing the establishment of TC composite platoons, com

panies, and battalions, redesignated on 29 September 1944 as TC service

platoons, companies, and battalions. From this table the theater could

order whatever numbers, kinds, and combinations of large or small groups

were needed for the various requirements of different ports. Appendix 41

suggests that the theater made no use of these units before the middle of

- 493

1944, and that they were always outnumbered "by earlier types of units.

Frequently, however, port companies and amphibian truck companies, not

included in T/O&E 55-500, were assigned to service "battalions.

Only occasional comments are found concerning the performance of

particular units, and these comments are not consistent. In March 1943

one observer remarked that the actual strength of the 394th Port Battalion

at Port Moresby was reduced to about 300 by "sickness and jail#" The men,

in gangs of 20, worked in 6-hour shifts (6 hours on and 12 hours off)

around the clock. A ship's officer who visited Port Moresby found each

shift under a white captain, with a negro lieutenant and a negro sergeant

assigned to each gang, The sergeants worked in the holds and "appeared

to know their business*" The officer was informed that the enlisted men

were discouraged by rumors (later proved correct) that they would be kept

at their v/ork till the Japanese were defeated. •*•

Another visitor to Port Moresby (2d Lt. Burton A. Garlinghouse) re

ported in January 1944 that discipline and supervision were excellent, that

the men worked steadily, efficiently, and cheerfully, and that they seemed

to take considerable pride in their work. At Milne Bay the same observer

found the enlisted men "poorly organized, undisciplined, and untrained,"

with little interest in their work. At Oro Bay he noted that on ships dis

charging in the stream the men worked "intermittently and inefficiently"

and that the noncommissioned officers in charge "either made no effort or

were unable to control the men," who ignored suggestions from the ship's

officers and the cargo security officer. This observer commented as follows:

I found the morale in these groups rather low, a condition which is easily explained and understood. Living conditions, especially in Hew Guinea, are very unsatisfactory and there is the ever-present threat of

- 494

tropical disease. Cargo handling is heavy and monotonous work, and is especially taxing for white men unaccustomed to the climate. An indifferent, or even rebellious, "What-the-hell" attitude is very common, as are idling and slacking on the jot). There is ... more or less continuous petty pilferage of cargo ond ship's property. The military police make little serious effort to prevent this and only blatant and obvious offenses are likely to be reported by them. They are far more interested in gossiping with crew members and in getting hand-outs from the galley. Officers find threats of discipline and court martial ineffective, for, they say, there is a general feeling that no punishment can be much worse than regular duty under these conditions. Recreational facilities in the island ports are limited, especially for colored soldiers, and a work schedule of 6 hours on and 12 hours off, with routine military duties to be crowded into the off hours, leaves little or no time for recreation or for anything but sleeping and eating. Most discouraging of all for those who have been stationed in this area for a year or more is the expressed policy of the present high command which gives them no hope of being relieved before the end of the war, and their knowledge of the situation precludes any optimism on this subject.^-a

With regard to these charges a former port commander of Oro Bay re

marks that they appear to rest on limited observation and hasty general

ization. Instances of each of the conditions complained of could have

been found. Pilferage was not completely absent from this or any other

port. A few of the insufficient number of military police were lax and

required replacement. Some port workers, as in any other port, incurred

punishment for idling on the job. Units differed somewhat in efficiency,

according to their history and background. It was not true, however, that

threats of discipline and court martial were ineffective or that "morale"

was lacking. Tith regard to the two port units at Oro Bay referred to

above, the master of the Lewis Dyche, after several days in that port,

described the work of the 387th ana 491st Port Battalions as "excellent"

and above "many ports back in the States. The amount of tonnage handled

as well as the careful way of handling compares with any port in the

States.n2Vo

After visiting several New Guinea ports an observer from Washington

charged in December 1944 that "the maximum productive capacity is not

being obtained from the labor troops available.11 In a single base some

operations might have more labor than they needed while others were short.

There was confusion as to responsibility for supervision over casual labor.

The unit's officers frequently feel they have completed their responsibilities when they deliver their men to the dock or warehouse. Likewise the junior officer in charge in the warehouse or on the dock hesitates to supervise and order about strange men. ... There is the almost universal complaint as to the little work put out by certain labor troops. It is stated they are completely lacking in morals. They just won't work. Punishment means nothing. Their officers are afraid of them, etc. My observation would indicate that these complaints are only too well founded. Nevertheless, I don't believe that everything possible has been done to get the maximum out of these troops. No where did I see any attempt made to appeal to their spirit of pride, imagination or love of competition. No where did I see the men even told of their daily production or the production of the gang on the next dock. Daily posting of production figures, painted thermometers, showing output, take little effort. But the results may be astounding, particularly if the leading gang gets a few extra privileges or maybe an extra case of beer a month. ... We should not have to use such appeals on soldiers* But these men are not soldiers, they are civilians in uniform. Such methods do work with civilians.22

On the other hand, a cargo security officer who visited Tacloban in

November 1944 reported that the men "worked long hours, efficiently, and

frequently with real enthusiasm." Several months later another visitor

to Tacloban found the 6O8th Port Company "tired and worn out." At least

80 percent of the stevedores were combat troops "who had been returned

from Luzon for a rest at Tacloban." These men, supervised by and mingled

with a port company, seemed "tired, weary, and inexperienced in the busi

ness of handling cargo The combat troops worked with interest for

a day or two because of the novelty of the job, but slacked off later and

openly griped that they were not being given a fair deal."23 These cita

tions, like those that precede, suggest that ports and units varied among

themselves and at different times, and that sweeping judgments should be

avoided*

- 496

The assignment of port units to, and their transfer from, particular

ports occurred with such frequency, and available' records of such movements

are so fragmentary, that it is not feasible to consider the identity of

the units stationed at particular ports or to list the ports at which a

given unit was successively stationed. These deficiencies in information,

joined to lack of information regarding the uses actually made of the three

port headquarters (2d, 22d, and 23d) and the five port detachments (A, B,

C, D, and E), ignorance of the number and proportion of combat troops

employed at each port in handling cargo, and ignorance of the types of

work really done by each unit in each port, make it virtually impossible

at present to base any assertion regarding military port personnel in SWPA

on a foundation of solid and indisputable fact.

Civilian Port Labor

Available information concerning civilian labor handling U. S. Army

cargo in the Southwest Pacific Area, and concerning the pilferage of such

cargo by both civilian and military labor, is derived entirely from American

sources. Much of the information consists of reports of irritating inci

dents observed by cargo security officers and masters of vessels, with their

indignant comments. In the absence of any general or comprehensive study

of the subject by the U. S. Army, and of information from Australian and

Philippine sources, it would be injudicious to draw conclusions from the

data collected. On the other hand, the available evidence is so abundant

and consistent that it cannot be disregarded.

On 6 February 1942, as already mentioned, General Marshall, Chief of

Staff, stated the policy that as few service troops as possible should be

- 497

sent to Australia. He directed the Commanding General, USAFIA, to use

local labor "to the fullest extent possible" for stevedoring and all other

24purposes in which Australian labor could be substituted for soldiers.

This policy of the United States Army toward Australian labor was continued

throughout the war. In New Guinea, on the other hand, most stevedoring

necessarily was done by troops, for the native population was sparse and

untrained. In northern ports of Australia and particularly in New Guinea

the Australian Army assigned several of its units for such work. In the

Philippines the ports were operated by both civilians and service troops.

Yfages, hours, and working conditions of all labor in Australia were

controlled by the Commonwealth Government, which allocated labor among

competing military and civilian services. The U. S. Array accepted Austra

lian labor standards "to the extent compatible with United States laws and

regulations." When labor trouble developed at Melbourne in April 1942 the

Army proposed to import troops to handle American cargo in Australian ports,

but was assured by the Commonwealth C-overnment that the labor requirements

of the Army would be met. Australia appointed a Stevedoring Commission,

which formulated a "register control system" for stevedores and dock workers,

to coordinate the employment of such labor and to disqualify workers who

were inefficient or "belligerent." The Commission, in an administration

elected by organized labor, had no power to enforce policies rejected by

the unions. The longshoremen of Australia were organized in "a strong

militant, articulate union," the Waterfront Workers Federation. In April

1943 more than 4,000 members of the Federation went on strike at Sydney in

protest against new regulations of the Stevedoring Commission. According

to one observer there had been several occasions before March 1943 when

- 493

authorities at Canberra, receiving a complaint from the Waterfront Workers

Federation telephoned Headquarters, USASOS, within half an hour, demanding

corrective action.

The U. S. Army did not employ Australian labor directly "but dealt

with Australian stevedoring firms, which secured laborers from the unions.

In March 1943 there were from 4,000 to 5,000 registered long-shoremen at

Melbourne, from 2,500 to 3,200 (possibly 5,000) at Sydney, from 1,400 to

1,700 at Brisbane, 529 at Townsville, and 330 at Cairns — a total of from

8,700 to 12,500. They worked in gangs that differed in size from port to

port, averaging 17 men to the gang at Melbourne, 20 at Sydney, 15 to 20 at

Brisbane, 15 to 22 at Townsville, and about 17 at Cairns. The best man

power of Australia was in the Australian Army and Navy, and most of the

dock labor was "old, tired and physically unfit." Its rate of performance

was estimated in March 1943 at 6 or 8 weight tons per gang per hour (a gang

to a hatch) at Melbourne, 9 tons at Sydney, 10 at Brisbane, and 5 at Towns

ville. In April 1943 the average rate of performance at Brisbane, Sydney,

Townsville, Cairns, and Auckland (New Zealand) was estimated at 8 tons

per gang-hour, and the Army did not expect this rate to be exceeded by

Australian civilians. In May 1943 the rate was stated to be from 5 to 9

tons per hour, and in June 1944 Col. Thomas G. Plant, formerly Chief Trans

portation Officer, USASOS, declared that the average had fallen from 9 in

1942 to 5 in 1944. In contrast to these workers, untrained American sol

diers could unload as much as 25 tons per hatch per hour.2

The low rate of performance of Australian stevedores during the war

was not due entirely to their age or debility. They were described as

"casual, mercenary, and indifferent.» As long as Australia itself was

_ A QQ —

threatened with invasion they were not entirely unwilling to exert them

selves; but after the Battle of the Coral Sea the Hsocial-gains-must-be

kept, business-and-work-as-usual school" was dominant, and the flow of

Army and Navy cash, bringing unprecedented sums of money to Australia,

did not increase the efficiency of labor. Stevedores would not work in

the rain but drew pay for standing by. On 12 October 1942 the stevedores

left the Francis Lewis in Sydney Harbor because of rain* Two days later

the stevedores agreed to work in the rain if the Army would provide boots,

oilskins, and hatch tents. The Army promised these, but officials of the

union vetoed the agreement. Enlisted men went aboard the vessel and dis

charged it at almost twice the stevedores" rate. An Australian newspaper

compared the "conditions under which the stevedores would condescend to

work and those under which the soldiers of Australia were fighting at the

moment. "^7

This "Battle of Sydney" had no lasting effect, and the use of American

soldiers sometimes resulted in strikes. Australian stevedores repeatedly

refused to handle refrigerated cargo, and might unpredictably refuse to

handle other special cargoes. As late as September 1945, when the William

Leavitt arrived at Sydney with a cargo of sorghum seed, the stevedores

alleged that the cargo was infested with mites and demanded extra pay for

handling it. The Army refused; the stevedores struck for 7 days, and all

7essels in the port were delayed; the stevedores returned to work for half

a day and struck again for 5 days in objection to the use of mechanical

cargo-handling gear to load Army ships. By 28 September, when the strike

ended at Sydney., it had spread to other Australian ports and to Tasmania;

and stevedores in all ports refused to unload Dutch vessels on which

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Indonesian seamen were on strike. These and other strikes and walkouts

required the use of combat troops, American and Australian, on the docks,

and sometimes made it necessary to hold such troops in reserve to insure

the movement of urgent cargo. In April 1944, when immediate movement of

certain vessels was imperative, the Army held a passenger train in readi

ness to move troops to the docks at Sydney in case of rain.28

Wages for dock labor were set by a single contract for all of Aus

tralia, modified from port to port to suit local conditions. The basic

wage was from 65 to 75 cents an hour, but it had little meaning because

much of the work was done on overtime, premium, and penalty rates. In

October 1943 the hours from 8 A.M. to 5 P*M. were considered as ordinary

time, from 6 P.M. to 9 P.M. as ordinary overtime, and from 9 P.M. to 7

A.M. ss. extra overtime. Australian law required any vessel arriving in

Australia to be worked around the clock, with the result that a vessel

could not be unloaded without payment of overtime rates. Saturday after

noons, Sundays, and the numerous holidays (including 10 or 12 days at

Christmas and several at Easter) were treated as overtime. Premium and

penalty cargoes were defined by contract, and particular cargoes were

often so defined by the workmen who unloaded them. One effect of the high

wages resulting from this system was that workers often took vacations of

a week or 10 days after 3 or 4 weeks of work. Of the 529 registered long

shoremen at Townsville about 100 were always absent. In 1945 the Director

of Shipping, Commonwealth of Australia, with the concurrence of AWESPAC,

discontinued the loading and unloading of vessels on weekends, because

wharf laborers had become accustomed to working at double and triple rates

29 on weekends and refusing to work during the rest of the week.

- 501

Workers were not actually at work during all the hours for which

they were paid. As already mentioned, they did not work in the rain.

They waited in the morning until the gang was complete, one man who missed

a streetcar delayed 15 or 20 men who were idle till he arrived, and work

rarely started less than 45 minutes after a shift "began. A "smoke-o" of

15 minutes was allowed in the morning and i*a the afternoon, but usually

an hour elapsed before the last man returned. Another break in working

hours was required by the "tea-o.w The men quit work for lunch about

11:45 and returned about 1:15, and at the end of the shift they left from

10 to 20 minutes early. Colonel Plant estimated that the actual working

time of a shift was about 5 hours. Workers slept on the job, especially

at night, and there seemed to be no authority requiring them to keep awake.30

Such incidents and opinions as the following were frequently reported*

On one occasion the slowness of workers loading the Fred C. Ainsworth forced

patients consigned to the ship for return to the United States to wait in

ambulances on the dock as long as four hours, and when only five or ten

minutes1 work remained, all longshoremen went ashore for their "smoke-o"

while the patients continued to wait. Officers of the Cape Flattery.

docked at Townsville in May 1943, reported that an American Army sentry

standing guard in the sun over a cargo on a Townsville dock was baited by

eight dock workers resting in the shade with such remarks as "You are a

G-~ E — bloody fool- to be in the Army for $50 when you could be home safe

and sound in the shipyards and make lots of money." In spite of these and

other taunting remarks the sentry "kept a firm grip on his temper." Amer

ican officers walking the streets of Townsville alone at night were beaten

by the Australian Home Guard. Among families of Australian service men

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and middle-class Australians there was alleged to be "a concert of inter

ests and a determined hostility to the government which conciliates the

•wharfies1 and kindred slackers," as well as a belief that "throwing out

the Labor Government is not impossible by any means." By December 1943

"the laboring classes of Australia" were said to resent the presence of

Americans, and every American serviceman interviewed by officers of the

Fred C. Ainsworth was eager to leave Australia. It was complained that

Army personnel was not authorized to protect itself against the insolence

of vaterside workers, whose arrogance, inefficiency, and thievishness were

encouraged by "the conciliatory attitude of the U. S. Army high command."31

Before 17 July 1942 the Australian "orkers Federation had made an

agreement with the Australian Government that military labor would not be

used on the waterfront if civilian labor was "available and willing." The

Federation had also inquired of Mr. Harry Bridges whether the 385th QJ4

Battalion (Port), which included a number of men from the International

Longshoremen's and Y/arehousemen1 s Union, enlisted as volunteers, would re

place civilian longshoremen in Australia* Questioned on this point, the

San Francisco Port of Embarkation replied that military necessity would

32dictate where and how the unit would be used. No evidence is found that

this or any other American unit was employed in Australia without consent

of the Commonwealth Government.

The use of civilian stevedores was directed by General MacArthur in

keeping with the policy prescribed by General Marshall on 6 February 1942.

Lieutenant Colonels Parry and Lehnau, after visiting Australia in April

1943, disclaimed any intent to criticize the policy, "because it may be

absolutely necessary," but suggested that much greater use should be made

- 503

of service troops to speed turnaround. Lieutenant Colonel Lehnau reported

informally on 22 May 1943 that the labor situation was "as bad and worse

than the reports indicate" and that General MacArthur had refrained from

using port "battalions "by request of the Commonwealth Government. The Army

was obliged to keep "a delicate balance" in its joint use of Australian

resources and facilities, and to "hold itself on a tight rein" in its rela

tions with a government controlled by unions. No further discussion of

the reasons for this policy is found; but it may be pointed out that the

theater was unable to obtain sufficient port troops even for New Guinea

ports, and that the operation of such troops in the Australian Zone of

Interior against the wishes of a friendly government would have amounted

to an occupation by military force.^

Numbers of Chinese and Indonesian refugees collected in Australia.

Most of this foreign labor was segregated in Brisbane as a foreign colony,

and employed in the Army's repair and assembly plant there or as crews for

Army vessels. Little if any of such labor was engaged in stevedoring. On

2 February 1942 the Commanding General, USAFIA, proposed to import 25,000

laborers from the Netherlands Uar>t Indies, but evidently this plan was not

carried out.

iTative labor in New Guinea was described as limited in numbers,

totally unskilled, and "exceedingly low in the scale of civilization."

The available supply was controlled and allocated by the Australians

through MGAU (Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit) and was employed

chiefly as carriers on land. Use of native stevedoring was "negligible."

The Papuan natives, however, gave "loyal support and wholehearted cooper

ation" to the Allied forces, carrying heavy loads of supplies and ammunition

- 504

from the beach, loading barges for shipment, helping to build roads and

bridges, clearing brush, and acting as guides.34

Before the war an ordinary Filipino stevedoring gang consisted of 16

men — a £abo. (hatch foreman), a checker, 7 antiguos (men with more than

5 years of experience), and 7 modernos- The proportion of antiguos and

modernos, and the size of a gang could be changed when necessary. The hatch

gangs working a vessel were controlled by a capataz. and the checkers were

supervised by a head checker. A capataz was paid from 120 to 220 pesos a

month, a cabo 3.25 pesos a day, an antigao 2.25 pesos a day, and a mo demo

1.75 pesos a day. This pay scale was maintained by the Army during the

reconquest of the Philippines.

The Army, as the direct employer of Filipino stevedores, had various

responsibilities. The stevedores had been idle since the end of 1941 and

were weak from undernourishment. In Leyte, at the beginning of January

1945, 60.3 percent of the port laborers employed by the Army worked less

than a week and some worked only 1 day or less. The Army offered a bonus

of 10 pounds of rice to every man who worked every day in the week, and the

number of men working 7 full days increased from 241 for the week ending 20

January 1945, before the bonus was offered, to 487 for the following week,

when the bonus was in effect. At Manila, in March, the men walked several

miles to and from work and stayed on the job 12 hours a day. Two meals of

rice and canned fish were provided for each shift. The men worked on Sun

days and holidays without overtime pay. It was noticed that the men handled

cargo with great care, and on their own initiative would sew up torn bags

of rice. At Lingayen Gulf, in May, a diversion of the civilian labor sup

ply was threatened by owners of rice fields, who normally provided housing,

- 505

rations, and credit for seasonal workers. To keep the manpower required

for operating the port, the Army planned to provide tents, cots, "blankets,

mess gear, and regular meals.00

Considerable time passed before Filipino labor demanded concessions

such as had been made to labor elsewhere. At last, on 1 February 1946,

some 12,000 civilian stevedores and dock workers at Manila went on strike.

The majority were members of the Union de Obreros Estivedores de Filipinas,

which included not only stevedores but mechanics, drivers, and others.

They demanded a 50-percent bonus for overtime work, a 100-percent bonus

for work on Sundays and holidays and at night, and a doubling of normal

wages. They were joined in the strike by 100 employees of Santa Ana Ship-

ways on 2 February, by 5,000 employees of Quarterraaster depots on 6 Febru

ary , by 123 employees of Elizalda Rope Factory on 7 February, and by 3,000

employees of Engineer Island on 8 February. AFV/ESPAC operated the port

with troops and offered a 20-percent increase in pay, with time and a half

for hours above 40 a week and for Sundays and holidays. These terms were

rejected. On 12 February the Army turned over the work of unloading and

loading cargo to the Luzon Stevedoring Company, headed by Col. Edward M.

G-rimm. The company employed the striking workers at a 50-percent increase

in wages, and the strike ended on 14 February. Thereafter the Army dealt

37 through the Luzon Stevedoring Company and did not hire stevedores directly.

Pilferage

Property of the United States Army and of its personnel was constantly

stolen in ports throughout the Southwest Pacific, and no appreciable pro

gress was made in protecting property or punishing thieves. TC officers

- 506

tried to safeguard cargo for which they were responsible, but pilferage

was not checked.

It was particularly common in Australia. It VJP.S "rampant" at Mel

bourne in 1942, when military police, insufficient in numbers, untrained

and unarmed, uere unable to protect cargo, end the Army wc.s obliged to

ask the help of Commonwealth police "to control American personnel.'1 On

18 July 1942 an Ordnance officer at Melbourne reported that five trucks

equipped as maintenance and repair shops hod been "thoroughly and effi

ciently rifled"; all the tool kits had been opened; rust scratches showed

that some of the tool chests had been open for several days, r-nd new

scratches end freshly split v/ood indicated that others had been ran

sacked more recently, suggesting that the trucks hr.d been pillaged by

different persons and at different places; both American p.nd Australian

cigarette butts were found in the trucks; and stolen items included flash

lights, micrometers, calipers, screwdrivers, wrenches, steel tape rules,

chisels, pliers, and leather gloves. Fo guards hr.d been pieced on the

trucks. It was reported on 17 October 1942 that "extensive thefts" were

made at piers, in transit from piers, in warehouses, and on freight trains;

that "every effort" was made by the Army to reduce this pilferage, but

with "very inadequate cooperation" from civilian authorities; that more

gurrds were needed for Army property; and that a loss of from Ig- to 2 per

cent must be expected Min those classes of supplies which r-xe susceptible

of civilian use." Pilferage was described on 6 Mcxch 1943 as "heavy and

constant"; Australian labor would stop work or strike when prmed guards

were stationed to watch the handling of cargo; ?.nd an attempted theft of

articles worth fifty pounds would be punished with a fine of from three

- 507

to ten shillings.38

On 14 March 1943 USASOS issued a directive concerning the "serious

problem" of pilferage. U. S. Army supplies were stolen on ships and

wharves, in warehouses and post exchanges, in rail yards, and in motor

trucks and rail cars. Theft was encouraged "by lack of supervision, lack

of accurate tally sheets and failure to check tally sheets, lack of check

ers in warehouses and on wharves, failure to keep pilferable supplies in

locked containers, and employment of "criminal and irresponsible people.11

Base section commanders were directed to take several kinds of action,

(l) All losses were to be reported to provost marshals, who should act

promptly and if necessary should call upon the Australian military police,

the civilian police, and the customs officials. (2) Civilians should be

required before employment to sign an agreement that they would submit to

search at any time at their place of employment or upon entering or leav

ing it. (3) Employees detected in theft should be summarily dismissed

and, on sufficient evidence, reported for criminal proceedings. (4) Tally

sheets should be checked carefully, not perfunctorily. A load already

tallied out should be checked at suitable points in transit. Supplies

were often added after a load was dispatched and were removed before it

was delivered. Checking at the wharf entrance would prevent dropping of

supplies from the wharf or the ship to be picked up by small boats. (5)

Military police should be placed in each hatch as well as on the wharves

during unloading. (6) Broken packages and cases (perhaps broken inten

tionally) should be instantly tallied and removed to locked enclosures.

(7) Employees should eat outside their place of employment and not take

lunch baskets or lunch boxes into the warehouse or the ship. Otherwise

- 508

the baskets or boxes should be kept in a locked enclosure away from sup

plies, and should be inspected at proper times.39

Evidence accumulated that these instructions were not sufficient or

were not enforced. In October 1943 the transit depot area at Sydney was

inclosed with barbed wire, outer windows were covered with wire netting,

and four sentry boxes were installed; but these were manned by civilians

who were not closely supervised and did not wear arm bands or other marks

of authority. The theater reported on 3 October 1943 that "supply dis

cipline" was not good, particularly in smaller units of the Army. Unduly

large replacement requisitions were received for articles such as soap,

hand tools, stencil outfits, and mess outfits, which the Quartermaster,

USASOS, believed were finding their way into the "black market." On 1

November 1943 the Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, reported that pil

ferage of Air Force supplies was "very serious." By this time the Chief

of Transportation, ASF, had established a system of placing cargo security

officers aboard all vessels carrying a thousand tons or more of Army cargo

for all shipments originating at ports of embarkation.

Reports of the cargo security officers merely confirmed previous con

clusions. A cargo security officer who visited Brisbane on the Peter de

Smet, 10 October 1943, noted that military police guarding the wharves

were armed only with wooden billies because the Federal Waterside Workers

had threatened a general strike if the military police on wharves wore

firearms. The cargo security officer on the Fred 0. Ainsworth, which un

loaded at Brisbane in October and November 1943, referred to this threat

and to a strike called because a military policeman had struck a long

shoreman. Insufficient numbers of military police were stationed on the

- 509

dock and in the vessel. The cargo security officer did not see anyone

asked to show credentials at the pier entrance. Breakage, according to

this officer, was

heavy, deliberate and accompanied by much pilferage. One longshoreman told the informant that he already had his Christinas dinner hanging in his refrigerator, a ham and three ducks which he had gotten from some ship, A number of sacks of salvaged shoes were being loaded on the vessel but were first opened on the pier and the better ones retained by the workers. This was all done in the open and no attempt was made to stop this pilfering. These longshoremen seemed to have the idea that anything they handled was their property. The effects of all dead, plainly marked as such, were broken into and everything of value taken, including buttons and insignia.4^

The cargo security officer on the William S. Ladd. which docked at

Brisbane in November 1943, was informed that a shortage of military police

made it impossible to supply guards for hatches and gangplanks. Inspec

tion of credentials was "superficial and perfunctory." Theft was "prac

tically continuous," and the sale of stolen Army property was said to be

a profitable business in Brisbane. Stolen Army knives were offered for

sale publicly and displayed in Brisbane show windows as "Yankee jungle

knives." Customs authorities were "apathetic in their attitude" when

Australian laborers were involved. According to the Brisbane Courier-Mail

of 13 November 1943, the triennial conference of the Waterside Workers

Federation was about to request the Commonwealth Government to refrain

from action under the civil code against members guilty of pilfering, and

to delegate the punishment of all such members to the Federation, applying

its own disciplinary code. Offenders reported by ships' officers or the

cargo security officer were merely reprimanded and returned to work. In

the presence of the cargo security officer, when cases of secret radar

equipment were to be unloaded, dock workers and stevedores refused to work

- 510

until the soldiers guarding these cases were disarmed. The cargo security

officer protested but was informed by the superintendent of the Water Di

vision "that it was necessary for the time being to comply with these

demands." In a recent interview the superintendent referred to has con

firmed this remark. It was a literal statement of fact. Stationing of

Army personnel in the hatches, arming of military police on the wharves,

and searching of Australian laborers as they left the ships or the wharves

would have produced a strike, and this, when U. S. Army labor was not

available, would have halted all cargo operations in Brisbane.4**

The cargo security officer on the James D. Doty, which visited Bris

bane and Cairns in November and December 1943, reported that a watch was

stolen in the hold at Brisbane from a package of registered mail. Two

Australian stevedores were suspected, but the Union declined to give their

names, the civilian police declined to investigate (on the grounds that

"their presence aboard the vessel would precipitate a strike"), the two

men disappeared, and no search for them was made. No military police

"were available at any time" during the unloading. Transit sheds and

wharves were unguarded. Stevedores caught pilfering and taken to a civil

ian court escaped with a light fine. Crates were broken open in the un

guarded holds, stevedores carried away what they wanted in their clothes,

and empty crates were smashed and removed unnoticed in the dunnage. Men

exempted from conscription by reason of their longshore duties seemed to

be the worst offenders. The port of Cairns, according to this observer,

was better managed than that of Brisbane; armed military police were

43 "plentiful" and little thievery was accomplished.

On 4 June 1944, under the caption "Looters Hob Men War Cargoes —

- 511

Pillagingftives Bad Name to Queensland,M the Brisbane Sunday Mail stated

that on a Brisbane wharf were some hundreds of containers partly filled

with jungle rations intended for Hew Guinea, each container broken open

to remove ten cigarettes. Cases of whisky were dropped until bottles

broke and the contents were drained into cans. Men often became drunk

when working on liquor cargoes, and one entire gang had to be paid off

because too drunk to continue unloading a ship. Razor blades, candy, and

clothing were favorite objects of theft. The cargoes of single ships suf

fered losses by pillage in excess of £3,000. Shipping men recommended

that all persons convicted of pillaging should be jailed and that the

Waterside Employment Committee, composed of workers1 and employers1 repre

sentatives, should use its power to de-register such persons, depriving

them of the right to work at the waterfront anywhere in Australia. The

Army had recently formed a special guard to go into the holds as soon as

they were opened and to watch Army cargo closely until it was safely loaded

into transport vehicles. It is doubtful, however, whether this guard was

long permitted to function. Cargo continued to disappear Mat an alarming

rate."44

On 30 July 1944 USASOS planned to reissue the directive of 14 March

1943 with additions tending to transfer responsibility from USASOS to

ships1 officers and cargo security officers. The Chief Transportation

Officer, USASOS, in an accompanying memorandum to G-4, USASOS, observed

that the original directive had not been enforced, that the waterside

workers "appear to have won the day," and that "strong action by military

and civilian authorities alike" was required. The subject was "being

studied" in August 1944, when a "general tightening up" of supervision

- 512

was reported; but It is not clear that any new or effective action was

ever taken, or could have been taken, while the Army remained in Australia.45

Little complaint of pilferage came from New Guinea. Occasional theft

of post exchange supplies occurred at Port Moresby, but offenders were

severely punished. The military police, though "rather apathetic in their

attitude," examined passes and credentials conscientiously. At Oro Bay a

campaign against pilferage was carried on by transportation officers, but

no means was found of "arousing in the average EM any real feeling against

the practise on moral or patriotic grounds. Anything on a ship which is

portable is regarded as legitimate game — it is only wrong to be caught.

Ships visiting these ports must recognize this attitude and take the neces

sary precautions."^

Pilferage developed in the Philippines as soon as the Army arrived.

Military police were not usually provided to guard hatches or cargo at

Lingayen Gulf and Manila in the spring of 1945. In March 1945 a cargo

security officer at Lingayen Gulf procured the arrest of a merchant sea

man and four naval gunners who had pilfered cargo in their possession and

who said that stevedores of the 310th Port Company had given them 3^ tons

of supplies. These men, after three days of confinement on shore, were

released for "insufficient evidence." Philippine civilians would pay $5

a pound for sugar, $10 to $15 for cigarette lighters, and 50 cents to $1

a can for canned goods, and would barter their possessions for stolen

candy, food, or cigarettes. At this time cargo security officers could

not depend on ships1 officers or port company officers for "complete or

consistent assistance." Cargo security officers were urged to take prompt

and impartial action in every case of pilferage, however small; to remember

- 513

that they were not relieved of responsibility by the inaction of other

officers; and never to agree that even "a legitimately "broken case of

supplies" might "be appropriated for personal use, "Extensive pilferage11

of Army cargo was in progress in Manila Harbor in May 1945. No guards

were provided on ships, and the use of Filipino Scouts as guards was "not

particularly effective," It was "common practice" for men working in the

holds to break cartons of beer or candy and consume as much as they wanted.

Checkers on shipboard freely gave cases of beer to EUKW crews and recorded

the beer as "lost." The act of pilfering was "regarded as a joke rather

than a crime." The Filipinos, unlike the Americans, were inclined to break

into any boxes that they thought might contain rations, and often, being

unable to read the markings on boxes, would steal goods that were useless

to them. Stolen cigarettes were sold by storekeepers for about $7.50 a

. 47 carton.

Various measures were taken at Manila. On 20 October 1945 thfc 497th

Antiaircraft Gun Battalion was attached to Headquarters, APWESPAC, to dis

rupt "organized pilferage," which was still increasing. In December 1945

it was believed that gangs of armed thieves, called "snipers," were mingl

ing unrecognized with depot employees who feared to report them; and the

Provost Marshal opened a branch office in South Harbor. Routine arrests

were made throughout 1946. In October of that year, for instance, the

Provost Marshal arrested 210 persons, nearly all for theft of government

property, and recovered supplies worth 50,000 pesos.^

Volume of Army Cargo Handled

The only available statistics of volume of Army cargo loaded and un

- 514

loaded in ports of SWPA are tabulated in Appendices 42-46. Scattered

figures of earlier date than 1944 are found for a few ports, but are of

little value for comparative purposes. Examination of the tables indi

cates the following facts:

(1) The total tonnage of Army cargo handled in all ports of SWPA

varied little between February 1944 and January 1945, averaging less than

800,000 tons a month. The total exceeded 900,000 tons during each month

from February 1945 through October 1945, and exceeded 1,000,000 tons a

month during June, July, and August 1945, reaching a peak of 1,368,303

tons in August 1945. The total declined steadily after October 1945 ex

cept for a slight rally in January 1946. The first month in which the

total was less than that for February 1944 was December 1945. In February

1946 the total fell for the first time to less than half the total for

February 1944.

(2) Total tonnage handled in Australia reached a peak of 246,424 tons

in March 1944 and thereafter exceeded 200,000 tons only in April 1944 and

May 1945. It first fell below 100,000 tons in January and April 1945, and

remained below that total in all months subsequent to August 1945. Total

tonnage handled in New Guinea reached a peak of 693,111 tons in August 1944,

exceeded 500,000 tons in each month from March through December 1944, fell

abruptly in January and February 1945, remained without much change through

August 1945, fell again with extreme abruptness in September 1945, and

dwindled to 4,049 tons in April 1946. It exceeded the total tonnage handled

in Australia through August 1945, but in all except two months thereafter

was exceeded by Australia. Total tonnage handled in the Philippines and

Okinawa reached a peak of more than a million tons in July and August 1945,

- 515

and exceeded the comMned total of New Guinea and Australia in every month

subsequent to January 1945.

(3) Milne Bay was the port handling the largest quantity of Army cargo

in February and March 1944. It was succeeded by Finschhafen (April - Novem

ber 1944), Leyte (December 1944 - January 1945), Lingayen Gulf (February

- March 1945), and Manila (April 1945 - June 1946). The low position of

Hollandia and Biak is particularly to be noted.

(4) The migration of cargo-hand ling activity is shown in the following

list of ports, indicating the earliest and the latest of the three- single

months in which each port handled the largest quantity of cargo:

Port Moresby January 1944 - April 1944 Milne Bay January 1944 - July 1944 Lae March 1944 - June 1944 Finschhafen June 1944 - September 1944 Oro Bay July 1944 - September 1944 Hollandia August 1944 - December 1944 Biak October 1944 - March 1945 Leyte December 1944- July 1945 Lingayen February 1945- August 1945 Cebu July 1945 - September 1945 Manila July 1945 - October 1945 Batangas July 1945 - October 1945

Okinawa November 1945- February 1946

(5) Separate figures for discharge and loading show that by May 1945

loading exceeded discharge in each of the Australian and New Guinea ports.

In the Philippines and Okinawa loading first exceeded discharge at Leyte,

Gebu, and Lingayen in November 1945, at Manila and Batangas in May 1946,

and at Okinawa in June 1946.

Volume of cargo in relation to efficiency of handling will be dis

cussed in the final chapter of this study. Comparable figures for number

of passengers (including military personnel) discharged and loaded are

not available.

- 516

i^otes on Chapter IX

1. (1) Had ( p a r ) , ACofS G-4 GSUSA (Somervell) to CG USiiPIA, 4 Apr 42. In OCT 451.01-460 SWPA. (2) Bad, t r i n e Minis ter ' s Dept, Canberra, to AOSTIMPBO, 8 Nov 42, sub: l.'hexf Equipment. In OCT 413.7-452.41 SWPA, (3) Had, CG SOS to CG USASOS, 16 Dec 42, Cm-Out 5758. In OCT 401-451 SWPA. (4) Had, CG USASOS to CG SOS, 29 Dec 42, Cm-In 12511 (29 Dec 43) . Same f i l e . (5) Memo, Sec, Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground), Washington (Lt Col George 01msted), for ACofT SOS, 19 Jan 43, sub: Cargo-Handling Equipment for Aus t r a l i a . In OCT 413.7-452.41 SWPA. (6) Lt r , Chief, Administrat ive Div, OCT ASP, to CG USAPPE, 17 Mar 44, sub: 100-Ton Capacity Crawler Crane, and 2d ind thereon, AG USASOS to CG USA8TS, 9 Apr 44 . In OCT 413.8 SWPA. (7) L t r , Chief, Water Div, OCT ASP (Col R. M. Hicks) 9 to Asst Deputy Administrator, WSA, 24 Mar 45. In OCT 565.4 SWPA. (8) Had, CG USABTE to WD, 23 Apr 45, Cm-In 21363 (23 Aor 45) . In OCT 413.8 SWPA.

2 . Manual for Use i n Computing Cargo Handling Requirements, prepared by Office of the CTO USASOS, 15 Dec 44. Incl 7 to Rpt, Maj Mark C. Coll a r i n o , Overseas Operation Br, Planning Div, OCT ASP, to ACofT for Operat i o n s , ASP, 1 May 45 , sub: Notes on Trip from Washington to POA and SWPA, 19 March to 22 A p r i l . In OCT HB f i l e , POA.

2a. ( l ) Rpt, Deputy Direc tor , Storage Div, ASP (Col William C. Crosby), to Director of Supply, ISP, 12 Dec 44, sub: Report on Trip to Pacif ic Ocean Areas and Southwest Pac i f ic Area, par 15, and Exhibit 2 , par 16. App 2, Tab 4 to monograph, Appendices to Storage Operations, Dec 1941 - Dec 1945, prepared by Storage Div, ASP. In SSUSA HD f i l e . (2) Interviews with Col Russel l V. Perry , formerly Port Commander, Hollandia, and Lt Col Carrol Z. Moffatt, formerly Por t Commander, Oro Bay, 23 May 49.

3 . Manual for Use in Computing Cargo Handling Requirements, c i ted i n n. 2 . Port marine maintenance companies and army marine repair ship compan ie s , concerned only with maintenance and r epa i r , and depot companies, TO, concerned only with the recept ion, s torage, and issue of TC cargo at depots and storehouses, w i l l be discussed in other connections.

4 . (1) Memo, ACofS G-4 GSUSA for ACofS W?D GSUSA, 5 Jan 42, sub: Lack of Labor for Loading and Unloading at X. In GSUSA G-4, Transportation 3r f i l e , 000.900 Aus t ra l i a , Vol I . (2) Memo, ACofS G-4 GSUSA for ACofS G-3 GSUSA, 26 Jan 42, sub: Dispatch of Port Bat ta l ion to Aust ra l ia . Same f i l e . (3) Memo, Chief, Planning Br, G-4 GSUSA (Col W. M. Goodman), for Asst Executive for Operations, Supply Br, Transportation Br, and Construct i o n Br, G-4 GSUSA, 6 Feb 42, sub: Movement of 394th (#1 Bn (Po r t ) . In OCT HB f i l e , SWPA - Shipping. (4) Memo, ACofS G-4 GSUSA for ACofS G-3 GSUSA, 7 Peb 42, sub: Radio from Melbourne re Colored Labor Ba t ta l ions . In GSUSA G-4, Transportat ion Br f i l e , 000.900 Aust ra l ia , Vol I .

5 . On 31 Jan 42 "previous piecemeal requ i s i t ions or ig ina l ly submitted were consolidated and resubmitted to the War Department." These included

889954 0—50 34 O 1 '

the following QM units: 1 Bn, Truck; 4 Light Maintenance Companies; 1 Gasoline Supply Co.; 2 Depot Companies; 1 Heavy Maintenance Co.; 2 Hail-head Companies; 3 Port Headquarters; and 1 Port Bn. Barnes Rpt, p. 30.

6. (l) Memo, Chief, Supply Br, 0-4 GSUSA (Col H. B. Holmes, Jr), for ACofS Cx-4 GSUSA, 12 Feb 42, sub: Tables of Organization for X. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Organization. (2) Ltr, CofS USAFIA (Col S. J. Chamberlain) to ACofS G-4 GSUSA, 26 Feb 42. In OCT 563.5 Statistical Data. (3) Memo, CofTS USAFIA (Col Thomas B. Wilson) for ACofS G-4 USAFIA, 24 Apr 42. Ilef 11(a) to HTC Australia, Vol I.

7. (l) HTC Hq, supplement, 1942, p. 2. (2) Memo, Brig Gen Arthur R. Wilson, formerly ACofS G-4 USAFIA for CG SOS, 1 Jul 42, sub: Report on Aus tralia, pp. 4, 11, 12. In OCT HB file, POA - Inspection Trips. (3) Memo, Chief, Planning Br, Plans Div, SOS (Col L. D. Flory), for Chief, Plans 6 Jul 42, sub: Present and Projected Strengths of Central and Southwest Pacific Bases. In ASF Planning Div, 7a troop unit file, SWPA.

8. Memo, same for same, 24 Jul 42, sub: Service Units for Australia. Same file.

9. Col >?. A. Henning, Report on Supply Operations in Australia Based on Questions Submitted by Headquarters SOS to Col Stevens and Answers as Revised by the Headquarters USASOS SWPA on August 1, 1942. In ASP Planning Div file, la-1 Joint Supply Program (SWP&SPA)IV.

10. (l) Rad, CG SOS to CG USASOS, 7 Dec 42. In OCT KB file, SWPA Miscellaneous. (2) Rad, OG SWPA to WD, 20 Dec 42, Cm-In 8976 (21 Dec 42). In OCT 319.2 - 378.5 SWPA. (3) Memo, Chief, Training Div, OCT ASP, for ACofS, Operations, SOS, 15 Jan 43, sub: Monthly Report on Service Units. In OCT 319.1 transportation Corps. Comparable reports, which would serve as a basis for statistical treatment, are lacking from the file.

11. (1) HTC Hq, Jan-Jun 1943, p. 7. (2) USASOS GO 6, 24 Jan 43, sub: Activation of Units. Ref 8 to HTC Hq, Jan-Jun 1943. (3) Memo, Deputy Director of Operations, ASP (Brig Gen F. A. Heileman), for ACofS G-4 GSUSA, 1 Sep 43, sub: G-4 Periodic Report, USAFFE, for Quarter Ending 30 June 1943, SPOPP 319.1 (14 Aug 43). In ASF Planning Div, 13b day file - SWPA. (4) App 41, this volume.

12. (l) Rpt, Lewis Lapham, SFPE, addressee unnamed, 6 Mar 43, pp. 20, 29. Atchd to memo, Lt Col Raymond C. Stone for Chief, Control Div, ASF, 13 May 43. In CCT KB file, POA - Inspection Trips. (2) Rpt, Supt of ATS, SFPE (Col Jv H. Mellom), to ACofT for Operations, 26 May 43, sub: Report of Trip, and General Survey or Inspection, Made in South and Southwest Pacific Areas by Colonel J. H. Mellom, TC, from March 28 to May 21, 1943. In OCT HB file, POA - Inspection Trips. (3) Rpt, Lt Cols Alfred W. Parry and Rudolph G. Lehnau, Control Div, ASF, for Chief, Control Div, ASF, 12 May 43, sub: Report on Inspection Trip, Southwest Pacific Area and South Pacific Area, March 16 to May 4, 1943, pp. 2, 6. In OCT HB file, SWPA Miscellaneous.

- 518

Somervel;i13;L ^ - questionnaire, questions 73, 74, 196, 202. (2) * n o . CG ASF for CofS ASP, 3 Oct 43. In ASF Planning Div file, Report of General Somervell, SWPA.

14. Memo atchd to Somervell questionnaire, question 73. The document does not explicitly state that port battalions cannot shorten the war and are of no use except Mto make life a little more pleasant." No evidence is found that any previous request of SWPA for service troops had not been "stringently scrutinized."

15. (1) Memo, Deputy Director of Operations, ASP, for ACofS G-4 GSUSA, 1 Sep 43, cited in n. 11(3). (2) Ltr, TAG to CG USAFFE, 17 Sep 43, sub: G-4 Periodic Report, United States Army Forces in the Far East, for Quarter Ending 30 June 1943, AG 319.1 (8 Sep 43). In ASF Planning Div file, 12c G-4 Reports - SWPA. (3) Memo for File 8a, SWPA, sgd A. W. Yereance, Maj, 03, 23 Sep 43, sub: QM Boat Companies and TC Composite Companies (T/0 55-500) for SWPA. Same file. (4) Rpt, G-4 USASOS, addressee not named, undtd, sub: G-4 Periodic Report, United States Army Services of Supply, Quarter Ending 30 September 1943. Atchd to Ltr, AG USAFFE to ACofS G-4 GSUSA, 20 Oct 43, sub: G-4 Periodic Reports. Same file.

16. ETC Hq, Mar-Jun 1944, tab after p. 5.

17. Memo, ACofS G-4 GHQ, SV/PA (Brig Gen L. J. Unit lock) for CofS GEi SWPA, 28 Aug 44, sub: Logistic Estimate, MUSKETEER Operations. In ASF Planning Div file, Musketeer Operations. (2') Manual for Use in Computing Cargo Handling Requirements, compiled by Office of the CTO USASOS, 15 Dec 44, cited in n. 2.

18. HTC Hq, May 1945, pp. 1-2.

19. Ibid., Jul 1943 - Feb 1944, pp. 12-14; Jul 1945, pp. 6-8; Oct 1945, p. 4; Kov 1945, pp. 9, 22; Dec 1945, p. 8.

20. G-4 Periodic Report, quarter Ending December 31, 1942 (except Air Corps Technical Supply), unsgd, addressee not named, 13 Jan 43. In ASF Planning Div file, 12c G-4 Reports - SV/PA. It is not clear whether the report was submitted by G-4 USASOS or G-4 USAFFE.

21. (l) Lapham Rot, p. 28. (2) Information from Mariners, Rpt No. 119, prepared by Theater Grp, Collection Unit, Military Intelligence Service, 23 y.ov 43. In OCT H3 file, SV/PA - Ports & Facilities.

21a. Rpt, Intelligence Officer, SS William S. Ladd (2d Lt Burton A. rrarlinghouse), to Director, Intelligence and Public Relations Div, SEP.S, 25 Jan 44, sub: Report of Intelligence Officer on S3 William St Ladd. In OCT KB file, SWPA - Shipping.

Plb (1) Interview with Lt Col Carroll K. Moffatt, formerly Port Cominander/oro Bay, 23 May 49. (2) Ltr, CO, Base B, USASOS (Col M. C. Lat

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timore), to officers and men of the 387th and 491st Port Bns, 18 Feb 44. Atchd to Historical Record, 387th Port Bn (TC), 25 Mar 42 - 31 Dec 43, in possession of Col Moffatt.

22. Crosby Rpt, Exhibit 2, par 8m, cited in n. 2a(l).

23. Positive Intelligence Bulletins Nos. 17 (l Mar 45) and 21 (18 May 45), issued by OCT. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Philippines - Pos. Intell. Ball.

24. Memo, Chief, Supply Br, G-4 GSUSA for ACofS G-4 GSUSA, 12 Feb 42, cited in n. 6(l).

25. (1) Somervell questionnaire, question 74. (2) HTC Australia, I, 80. (3) Memo, CofTS USAFIA (Col Thomas B. Wilson) for ACofS G-4 USAFIA, 24 Apr 42. Ref ll(a) to HTC Australia, Vol I. (4) "U. S.t Australian Soldiers Take Stevedore Duties during Strike." Clipping from Wire Service Bulletin, 8 Apr 43. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Clippings & Releases. This strike was not authorized by the union. (5) Lapham Rpt.

26. (1) Lapham Rpt. (2) Mellom Hpt, cited in n. 12(2). According to the Somervell questionnaire, question 196, stevedoring efficiency at Brisbane was close to that of ports in the United States, but this assertion is contradicted by all other references to stevedoring at Brisbane. (3) Notes of interview with Col Thomas G. Plant, formerly CTO USASOS, 16 Jun 44. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Miscellaneous. (4) Parry and Lehnau Bpt, p. 6, cited in n. 12(3).

27. (l) Garlinghouse Rpt, cited in n. 21(3). (2) lapham Rpt. (3) Rpt, Asst Intelligence Officer, Intelligence and Public Relations Div, SFPE (1st Lt Thomas William Sullivan, Jr), addressee unnamed, 9 Dec 43, sub: Observations of an Informant Stationed aboard the USAT Fred C. Ainsworth on Recent Trip to Australia from San Francisco, Beginning 15 October 1943 and Ending 27 November 1943. In OCT 319.1 SWPA. (4) Rpt, Boarding Officer, District Intelligence Office, 12th Naval Dist (Lt (jg) V. J. King), addressee unnamed, 2 Jul 43, sub: Boarding Report of the MS Cape Flattery. 0, A. Ford, Master, A14-1/QS-16/B-5, #1-422. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Ports & facilities.

28. HTC Australia, II, 137; III, 98; IV, 3.

29. (l) Lapham Rpt. (2) Somervell questionnaire. (3) HTC Australia, IV, 14.

30. (l) Lapham Rpt. (2) Plant interview, cited in n. 26(3). (3) Sullivan Rpt, cited in n. 27(3).

31. (1) Sullivan Rpt, cited in n. 27(3). (2) King Rpt, cited in n. 27(4). (3) Garlinghouse Rpt, cited in n. 21(3).

32. Ltr, CG SFPE to CofTS SOS, 18 Jul 42, sub: 385th Quart;ermaster Battalion (Port). In OCT 000-300 SWPA.

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y *"* ehnau cited in nI P - 1 2 ^ ) - (2) Laptiam Rpt, ham of interview with Lt Col Rudolph G. Lehnau, 22 May 43, sub:

southwest Pacific Command. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Miscellaneous.

33a. Memo, Chief, Supply Br, G«-4 GSUSA, for ACofS G-4 GSUSA, 12 Feb 42, cited in n. 6(l).

34. (l) Somervell questionnaire, questions 74, 196. (2) HTC New Guinea, 1942-44, p. 26.

35. HTC Philippine Islands, Oct 1944 - Jan 1945, p. 3.

36. Ibid., Oct 1944 - Jan 1945, p. 3; Mar 1945, pp. 18-19; May 1945, P. 10.

37. Ibic., Feb 1946, pp, 28-30.

38. (1) HTC Australia, I, 80-81. (2) Memo, CO, 704th Ordnance Co, APO 924 (1st Lt Allen F. Jones), to Capt Johnson, Air Force Supply, 18 Jul 42. In OCT 401-451 SWPA. (3) Memo, Chief, Overseas Supply Div, SFPil (Col Abbott Boone), for CG SFPE, 11 3Peb 43, sub: Keport of Visit to Pacific Bases. In OCT KB file, POA. (4) Lapham Rpt.

39. Ltr, CG USASOS to CGs, US Advanced Base and Base Sees 3 and 7, and COs, Base Sees 1, 2, and 4, 14 Mar 43, sub: Pilfering of U. S. Army Supplies. Ref 4 to HTC Hq, Jul 1944.

40. (l) HTC Australia, II, 133. (2) Somervell questionnaire, question 14. (3) 1st Ind, Chief, Control Div, OCT ASF (Lt Col Luketf. Finlay), to CG ASP, 9 ITov 43. In OCT 400-400.312 SWPA.

41. (l) Information from Mariners, No. 132, prepared by Theater Grp, Collection Unit, Military Intelligence Div, 2- Dec 43. In OCT HB file, SWPA - Ports and Facilities. (2) Sullivan Hpt, cited in n. 27(3).

42. (1) Garlinghouse Rpt, cited inn. 21(3). (2) Interview with Lt Col Cecil H. Davidson, formerly Supt of ATS, Brisbane, 15 Jun 49.

43. Ept, Interviewing Officer, Intelligence and Public Relations Div, SFPE (1st Lt J. V. Hamilton), addressee not nsjned, 7 Jan 44, sub: Report of Cargo Security Officer. In OCT 419.1 SWPA.

44. Sxcerpt from 3risbane Sunday Mail, 4 Jun 44. Ref 12-b to HTC

Australia, Vol III.

45 (1) Memo, CTO USASOS to G-4 USASOS, 30 Jul 44, sub: Pilfering of U. S. Army Supplies. In HTC Hq, Jul 1944. (2) HTC Hq, Aug 1944-, p. 6.

46. Garlinghouse Ept, cited in n. 21(3).

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47. (l) Technical Intelligence Kpt No. 236, prepared by Intelligence Br, Intelligence and Security Div, NOPE, 21 Apr 45, sub: Anti-Filferage Recommendations for Cargo Security Officers, (2) Same office, Technical Intelligence fipt Ho. 396, 8 May 45, sub: Pilferage at Manila. Both in OCT 000.3 SWPA.

48. HTC Hq, Oct 1945, p. 16; Dec 1945, p. 5; Oct 1946, p. 40.

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