The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an  intergovernmental organization which

regulates international trade. The WTO officially commenced on 1 January 1995 under

the Marrakech Agreement, signed by 123 nations on 15 April 1994, replacing the General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which commenced in 1948. The WTO deals with

regulation of trade between participating countries by providing a framework for negotiating

trade agreements and a dispute resolution process aimed at enforcing participants' adherence to

WTO agreements, which are signed by representatives of member governments and ratified by

their parliaments. Most of the issues that the WTO focuses on derive from previous trade

negotiations, especially from the Uruguay Round (1986–1994).

The WTO is attempting to complete negotiations on the Doha Development Round, which was

launched in 2001 with an explicit focus on developing countries. As of June 2012, the future of

the Doha Round remained uncertain: the work programme lists 21 subjects in which the original

deadline of 1 January 2005 was missed, and the round is still incomplete. The conflict between

free trade on industrial goods and services but retention of protectionism on farm subsidies to

domestic agricultural sector (requested by developed countries) and the substantiation of fair

trade on agricultural products (requested by developing countries) remain the major obstacles.

This impasse has made it impossible to launch new WTO negotiations beyond the Doha

Development Round. As a result, there have been an increasing number of bilateral free trade

agreements between governments. As of July 2012, there were various negotiation groups in the

WTO system for the current agricultural trade negotiation which is in the condition of stalemate.

The WTO's current Director-General is Roberto Azevêdo, who leads a staff of over 600 people

in Geneva,Switzerland  A trade facilitation agreement known as the Bali Package was reached

by all members on 7 December 2013, the first comprehensive agreement in the organization's

history.

History

The WTO's predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was

established after World War II in the wake of other new multilateral institutions dedicated to

international economic cooperation – notably the Bretton Woods institutions known as the World

Bank and the International Monetary Fund. A comparable international institution for trade,

named the International Trade Organization was successfully negotiated. The ITO was to be a

United Nations specialized agency and would address not only trade barriers but other issues

indirectly related to trade, including employment, investment, restrictive business practices, and

commodity agreements. But the ITO treaty was not approved by the U.S. and a few other

signatories and never went into effect.

In the absence of an international organization for trade, the GATT would over the years

"transform itself" into a de facto international organization.

The Uruguay round of GATT (1986-93) gave birth to World Trade Organization. The

members of GATT singed on an agreement of Uruguay round in April 1994 in

Morocco for establishing a new organization named WTO.

It was officially constituted on January 1, 1995 which took the place of GATT as an

effective formal, organization. GATT was an informal organization which regulated

world trade since 1948.

Contrary to the temporary nature of GATT, WTO is a permanent organization which

has been established on the basis of an international treaty approved by

participating countries. It achieved the international status like IMF and IBRD, but it

is not an agency of the United Nations Organization (UNO).

Structure:

The WTO has nearly 153 members accounting for over 97% of world trade. Around

30 others are negotiating membership. Decisions are made by the entire

membership. This is typically by consensus.

A majority vote is also possible but it has never been used in the WTO and was

extremely rare under the WTO’s predecessor, GATT. The WTO’s agreements have

been ratified in all members’ parliaments.

The WTO’s top level decision-making body is the Ministerial Conferences which

meets at least once in every two years. Below this is the General Council (normally

ambassadors and heads of delegation in Geneva, but sometimes officials sent from

members’ capitals) which meets several times a year in the Geneva headquarters.

The General Council also meets as the Trade Policy Review Body and the Disputes

Settlement Body.

At the next level, the Goods Council, Services Council and Intellectual Property

(TRIPs) Council report to the General Council. Numerous specialized committees,

working groups and working parties deal with the individual agreements and other

areas such as, the environment, development, membership applications and

regional trade agreements.

Secretariat:

The WTO secretariat, based in Geneva, has around 600 staff and is headed by a

Director-General. Its annual budget is roughly 160 million Swiss Francs. It does not

have branch offices outside Geneva. Since decisions are taken by the members

themselves, the secretariat does not have the decision making the role that other

international bureaucracies are given.

The secretariat s main duties to supply technical support for the various councils and

committees and the ministerial conferences, to provide technical assistance for

developing countries, to analyze world trade and to explain WTO affairs to the public

and media. The secretariat also provides some forms of legal assistance in the

dispute settlement process and advises governments wishing to become members

of the WTO

Functions

Among the various functions of the WTO, these are regarded by analysts as the most important:

It oversees the implementation, administration and operation of the covered agreements.

It provides a forum for negotiations and for settling disputes.

Additionally, it is the WTO's duty to review and propagate the national trade policies, and to

ensure the coherence and transparency of trade policies through surveillance in global economic

policy-making. Another priority of the WTO is the assistance of developing, least-developed and

low-income countries in transition to adjust to WTO rules and disciplines through technical

cooperation and training.

1. The WTO shall facilitate the implementation, administration and operation and further

the objectives of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, and shall

also provide the frame work for the implementation, administration and operation of the

multilateral Trade Agreements.

2. The WTO shall provide the forum for negotiations among its members concerning their

multilateral trade relations in matters dealt with under the Agreement in the Annexes to

this Agreement.

3. The WTO shall administer the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the

Settlement of Disputes.

4. The WTO shall administer Trade Policy Review Mechanism.

5. With a view to achieving greater coherence in global economic policy making, the WTO

shall cooperate, as appropriate, with the international Monetary Fund (IMF) and with the

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and its affiliated

agencies. The above five listings are the additional functions of the World Trade

Organization. As globalization proceeds in today's society, the necessity of

an International Organization to manage the trading systems has been of vital

importance. As the trade volume increases, issues such as protectionism, trade barriers,

subsidies, violation of intellectual property arise due to the differences in the trading

rules of every nation. The World Trade Organization serves as the mediator between the

nations when such problems arise. WTO could be referred to as the product of

globalization and also as one of the most important organizations in today's globalized

society.

The WTO is also a center of economic research and analysis: regular assessments of the global

trade picture in its annual publications and research reports on specific topics are produced by

the organization. Finally, the WTO cooperates closely with the two other components of the

Bretton Woods system, the IMF and the World Bank.

Objectives:The important objectives of WTO are:

1. To improve the standard of living of people in the member countries.

2. To ensure full employment and broad increase in effective demand.

3. To enlarge production and trade of goods.

4. To increase the trade of services.

5. To ensure optimum utilization of world resources.

6. To protect the environment.

7. To accept the concept of sustainable development.

  

WTO Agreements:The WTO’s rule and the agreements are the result of

negotiations between the members. The current sets were

the outcome to the 1986-93 Uruguay Round negotiations

which included a major revision of the original General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI).

GATT is now the WTO’s principal rule-book for trade in

goods. The Uruguay Round also created new rules for

dealing with trade in services, relevant aspects of

intellectual property, dispute settlement and trade policy

reviews.

The complete set runs to some 30,000 pages

consisting of about 30 agreements and separate

commitments (called schedules) made by individual

members in specific areas such as, lower customs

duty rates and services market-opening.

Through these agreements, WTO members operate a

non-discriminatory trading system that spells out their

rights and their obligations. Each country receives

guarantees that its exports will be treated fairly and

consistently in other countries’ markets. Each country

promises to do the same for imports into its own

market. The system also gives developing countries

some flexibility in implementing their commitments.

(a) Goods:

It all began with trade in goods. From 1947 to 1994,

GATT was the forum for negotiating lower customs

duty rates and other trade barriers; the text of the

General Agreement spelt out important, rules,

particularly non-discriminations since 1995, the

updated GATT has become the WTO s umbrella

agreement for trade in goods.

It has annexes dealing with specific sectors such as,

agriculture and textiles and with specific issues such as,

state trading, product standards, subsidies and action taken

against dumping.

(b) Services:

Banks, insurance firms, telecommunication companies, tour

operators, hotel chains and transport companies looking to

do business abroad can now enjoy the same principles of

free and fair that originally only applied to trade in goods.

These principles appear in the new General Agreement on

Trade in Services (GATS). WTO members have also made

individual commitments under GATS stating which of their

services sectors, they are willing to open for foreign

competition and how open those markets are.

(c) Intellectual Property:

The WTO’s intellectual property agreement amounts to

rules for trade and investment in ideas and creativity. The

rules state how copyrights, patents, trademarks,

geographical names used to identify products, industrial

designs, integrated circuit layout designs and undisclosed

information such as trade secrets “intellectual property”

should be protected when trade is involved.

(d) Dispute Settlement:

The WTO’s procedure for resolving trade quarrels under

the Dispute Settlement Understanding is vital for enforcing

the rules and therefore, for ensuring that trade flows

smoothly.

Countries bring disputes to the WTO if they think their

rights under the agreements are being infringed. Judgments

by specially appointed independent experts are based on

interpretations of the agreements and individual countries’

commitments.

The system encourages countries to settle their differences

through consultation. Failing that, they can follow a

carefully mapped out, stage-by-stage procedure that

includes the possibility of the ruling by a panel of experts

and the chance to appeal the ruling on legal grounds.

Confidence in the system is bourne out by the number of

cases brought to the WTO, around 300 cases in eight years

compared to the 300 disputes dealt with during the entire

life of GATT (1947-94).

(e) Policy Review:

The Trade Policy Review Mechanism’s purpose is to

improve transparency, to create a greater understanding of

the policies that countries are adopting and to assess their

impact. Many members also see the reviews as constructive

feedback on their policies.

History

The idea of replacing agricultural price support with direct payments

to farmers decoupled from production dates back to the late 1950s,

when the twelfth session of the GATT Contracting Parties selected a

Panel of Experts chaired by Gottfried Haberler to examine the effect

of agricultural protectionism, fluctuating commodity prices and the

failure of export earnings to keep pace with import demand in

developing countries.

The 1958 Haberler Report stressed the importance of minimising the

effect of agriculture subsidies on competitiveness and recommended

replacing price support with direct supplementary payments not linked

with production, anticipating discussion on green box subsidies. Only

more recently, though, has this shift become the core of the reform of

the global agricultural system.

Historical context

By the 1980s, government payments to agricultural producers in

industrialised countries had caused large crop surpluses, which were

unloaded on the world market by means of export subsidies, pushing

food prices down. The fiscal burden of protective measures increased,

due both to lower receipts from import duties and higher domestic

expenditure. In the meantime, the global economy had entered a cycle

of recession, and the perception that opening up markets could

improve economic conditions led to calls for a new round of

multilateral trade negotiations.[2] The round would open up markets in

services and high-technology goods, ultimately generating much

needed efficiency gains. In order to engage developing countries,

many of which were “demandeurs” of new international disciplines,

agriculture, textiles, and clothing were added to the grand bargain.[1]

In leading up to the 1986 GATT Ministerial Conference in Punta del

Este, Uruguay, farm lobbies in developed countries strongly resisted

compromises on agriculture. In this context, the idea of exempting

production and "trade-neutral" subsidies from WTO commitments was

first proposed by the United States in 1987, and echoed soon after by

the EU. By guaranteeing farmers continued support, it also neutralised

opposition. In exchange for bringing agriculture within the disciplines

of the WTO and committing to future reduction of trade-distorting

subsidies, developed countries would be allowed to

retain subsidies that cause "not more than minimal trade distortion" in

order to deliver various public policy objectives.

Three pillars

The three Pillars under the Agreement on Agriculture

1. Market Access: trade restrictions confronting imports of agricultural products (tariff and

NTBs).

2. Domestic Support: subsidies and other programmes in favour of agricultural producers,

including those that raise or guarantee farmgate prices and farmers' incomes.

3. Export Competition: include export subsidies and other methods used to make exports of

agricultural products artificially competitive.

The Agreement on Agriculture has three pillars—domestic support,

market access, and export subsidies.

Domestic support

The first pillar of the Agreement on Agriculture is "domestic support".

The WTO Agreement on Agriculture negotiated in the Uruguay

Round (1986–1994) includes the classification of subsidies into

"boxes" depending on their effects on production and trade: amber

(most directly linked to production levels), blue (production-limiting

programmes that still distort trade), and green (minimal distortion).

[3]While payments in the amber box had to be reduced, those in the

green box were exempt from reduction commitments. Detailed rules

for green box payments are set out in Annex 2 of the AoA. However,

all must comply with the "fundamental requirement" in paragraph 1,

to cause not more than minimal distortion of trade or production, and

must be provided through a government-funded programme that does

not involve transfers from consumers or price support to producers.

The Agreement on Agriculture's domestic support system currently

allows Europe and the United States to spend $380 billion a year on

agricultural subsidies. The World Bank dismissed the EU and the

United States' argument that small farmers needed protection, noting

that more than half of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy subsidies

go to 1% of producers while in the United States 70% of subsidies go

to 10% of its producers, mainly agribusinesses. These subsidies end

up flooding global markets with below-cost commodities, depressing

prices, and undercutting producers in poor countries, a practice known

as dumping.

Market access

Market access refers to the reduction of tariff (or non-tariff) barriers to

trade by WTO members. The 1995 Agreement on Agriculture

required tariff reductions of:

36% average reduction by developed countries, with a minimum

per-tariff line reduction of 15% over six years.

24% average reduction by developing countries with a minimum

per-tariff line reduction of 10% over ten years.

Least developed countries (LDCs) were exempt from tariff reductions,

but they either had to convert non-tariff barriers to tariffs—a process

called tariffication—or "bind" their tariffs, creating a ceiling that could

not be increased in future.

Export subsidies

Export subsidies are the third pillar. The 1995 Agreement on

Agriculture required developed countries to reduce export subsidies

by at least 36% (by value) or by 21% (by volume) over six years. For

developing countries, the required cuts were 14% (by volume) and

24% (by value) over ten years

CriticismThe Agreement has been criticised by civil society groups for

reducing tariff protections for small farmers, a key source of income

in developing countries, while simultaneously allowing rich countries

to continue subsidizing agriculture at home.

The Agreement was criticised by NGOs for categorizing subsidies into

trade-distorting domestic subsidies (the "amber box"), which have to

be reduced, and non-trade-distorting subsidies (blue and green boxes),

which escape discipline and thus can be increased. As efficient

agricultural exporters press WTO members to reduce their trade-

distorting "amber box" and "blue box" support, developed countries’

green box spending has increased.

A 2009 book by the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable

Development (ICTSD) showed how green box subsidies distorted

trade, affecting developing country farmers and harming the

environment. While some green box payments only had a minor effect

on production and trade, others have a significant impact. According to

countries’ latest official reports to the WTO, the United

States provided $76 billion (more than 90% of total spending) in green

box payments in 2007, while the European Union notified €48 billion

($91 billion) in 2005, around half of all support. The EU's large and

growing green box spending was decoupled from income support,

which could lead to a significant impact on production and trade.

Third World Network stated, "This has allowed the rich countries to

maintain or raise their very high subsidies by switching from one kind

of subsidy to another...This is why after the Uruguay Round the total

amount of subsidies in OECD countries have gone up instead of going

down, despite the apparent promise that Northern subsidies will be

reduced." Moreover, Martin Khor argued that the green and blue box

subsidies can be just as trade-distorting—as "the protection is better

disguised, but the effect is the same".

At the 2005 WTO meeting in Hong Kong, countries agreed to

eliminate export subsidy and equivalent payments by 2013.

However, Oxfam reported that EU export subsidies account for only

3.5% of its overall agricultural support. In the United States, export

subsidies for cotton, a mere 10% of overall spending, were removed,

which did not "address the core issue of domestic payments that have

been proven to distort trade and facilitate dumping".

Mechanisms for developing countries

During the Doha negotiations, developing countries have fought

to protect their interest and population, afraid of competing on the

global market with strong developed and exporting economies. Many

have large rural populations composed of resource-poor farmers with

limited access to infrastructure and few employment alternatives.

Thus, these countries are concerned that domestic rural populations

employed in import-competing sectors might be negatively affected

by further trade liberalization, becoming increasingly vulnerable to

market instability and import surges as tariff barriers are removed.

Several mechanisms have been suggested in order to preserve those

countries: the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) and treatment of

Special Products (SPs).

Special Safeguard Mechanism

A Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) would allow developing

countries to impose additional safeguard duties in the event of an

abnormal surge in imports or the entry of unusually cheap imports.

[9]Debates have arise around this question, some negotiating parties

claiming that SSM could be repeatedly and excessively invoked,

distorting trade. In turn, the G33 bloc of developing countries, a major

SSM proponent, has argued that breaches of bound tariffs should not

be ruled out if the SSM is to be an effective remedy. A 2010 study by

the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable

Development simulated the consequences of SSM on global trade for

both developed and developing countries.

Special Products

At the 2005 WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, members

agreed to allow developing countries to "designate an appropriate

number of tariff lines as Special Products" (SPs) based on "food

security, livelihood security and rural development".

Introduction to Market Access in Trade in Goods in the WTO

OBJECTIVES

Get acquainted with the notion of market access in the WTO;

Get an overview of the disciplines related to tariffs;

Get an overview of the disciplines related to non-tariff measures.

INTRODUCTION

Market access for goods in the WTO stands for the totality of government-imposed conditions under which a product may enter a country under non-discriminatory conditions. It is often, but not exclusively, determined by border measures, such as tariffs, tariff rate quotas (TRQs), and quantitative restrictions (QRs). Most WTO Agreements have rules on market access that apply to both, agricultural products (defined in Annex 1 of the Agreement on Agriculture) and to non-agricultural products (all other products). As you certainly imagine, there is a wide variety of measures which influence market access for goods. The two main categories of barriers to market access for goods are: (1) Tariffs; and, (2) Non-tariff barriers (NTBs). The progressive reduction of tariff and NTBs, together with non-discrimination and transparency, constitute one of the main objectives of the WTO. The aim of multilateral trade negotiations has been to make market access more liberal, as well as more

predictable. We will first examine the main issues relating to tariff barriers. We will start by presenting tariff and tariff schedules. We will, then, study how tariff barriers are dealt within the GATT/WTO framework, by introducing the outcome of the Uruguay Round on tariff negotiations (reductions of tariffs and tariff ''bindings'') and elaborating the relevant WTO rules on tariffs (in particular Article II of the GATT 1994 - Schedules of Concessions). We will, finally, explain some of the main issues surrounding the concept of NTBs, with a focus on QRs. The Committee on Market Access, established by the General Council in January 1995, is the WTO Body in charge of monitoring market access related issues for goods.

II. IN BRIEF: TRADE IN GOODS: MARKET ACCESS WITH RESPECT TO WTO

Market access for goods in the WTO stands for the totality of government-imposed conditions (tariff and non-tariff measures) under which a good may enter into a Member. Most WTO Agreements have rules on market access that apply to both, agricultural products (defined in Annex 1 of the Agreement on Agriculture) and to non-agricultural products (all other products)1. The Agreement on Agriculture (explained below) includes provisions on market access applicable only to agricultural products. II.A. TARIFF BARRIERS Under the WTO, tariffs are regarded as the most common and widely used barriers to market access for goods. The WTO does not prohibit the use of tariffs. However, Members recognise that tariffs often constitute serious obstacles to trade. Tariffs are subject to negotiations, which have led

to successive reductions of tariffs. Tariff negotiations should be conducted on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis, whereas developing country and LDC Members are not required to make full reciprocal concessions as made by developed country Members. Nevertheless, the concessions granted by a Member must be extended on a MFN basis, that is, to all WTO Members immediately and unconditionally. Members had also agreed to bind their tariffs at reduced levels and to record such tariff bindings in their Schedules of concessions, which represent their legal commitments on tariffs under the WTO (Article II of the GATT 1994). WTO Members may apply a tariff which is lower than the bound level, however they cannot exceed the bound levels specified in their Schedules of concessions. Therefore, the applied tariff of a particular product (as reflected in a Members' national tariff schedule) can be different – lower — than the bound tariff rate for that product as specified in the Members' WTO Schedule of concessions. A negotiated tariff binding may become too onerous to maintain over time due to changing circumstances. WTO Members are allowed to modify the concessions in their Schedules by using the renegotiation procedures outlined in the GATT 1994, provided that they compensate those Members holding special rights. The value of tariff concessions is also protected through the operation of other GATT provisions – including Article III of the GATT 1994 (national treatment on internal taxation and regulation) and the other multilateral Agreements on trade in goods included in Annex 1A of the Agreement Establishing the WTO (explained below). II.B. NON TARIFF BARRIERS (NTB) Besides tariffs, various forms of non-tariff measures may constitute obstacles to market access for goods. There is no agreed definition of what constitutes a NTB. They include, in principle, all measures other than tariffs used to protect a domestic industry. 1 These include manufacturing products, fuels and mining products,

In July 2004, WTO Members formally agreed to launch negotiations on trade facilitation, which should be completed under the overall DDA timeline. Negotiations on trade facilitation are directed to clarify and improve some of the provisions on non-tariff barriers contained in the GATT 1994 (freedom of transit, customs fees and formalities and publication of trade regulations). These negotiations are widely seen as a necessary complement to broader liberalization efforts. The negotiations also aim at enhancing trade-related technical assistance and capacity building on trade facilitation to enable developing countries and LDC Members to fully participate in and benefit from the negotiations. Moreover, the results of the negotiations shall take fully into account the principle of special and differential treatment for developing country and LDC Members. Negotiations on the reduction of tariffs in agriculture and non-agricultural market access (NAMA) are part of the mandates in the current Doha Round of negotiations. As set out in the Doha Ministerial Declaration, the current negotiations on NAMA aim "to reduce or as appropriate eliminate tariffs, including the reduction or elimination of tariff peaks, high tariffs, and tariff escalation as well as NTBs in particular on products of export interest for developing countries". The negotiations shall take fully into account the special needs and interests of developing and LDC Members, including through less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments.

III. AGRICULTURE

While the volume of world agricultural exports has substantially increased over recent decades, its rate of growth has lagged behind that of manufactures, resulting in a steady decline in agriculture's share in world merchandise trade. Among the agricultural goods traded internationally, food products make up almost 80 per cent. The other main category of agricultural products is raw materials. Since the mid-1980s, trade in processed and other high value agricultural products has been expanding much faster than trade in the basic primary products such as cereals. Agricultural trade remains an important part of overall economic activity in many WTO Members. Furthermore, agriculture plays an important role in the development of many Members. For a large number of developing countries and LDCs, agriculture makes a significant contribution to their economies, including to gross domestic production, export

revenue and employment, as well as to rural development and livelihood security. The Agreement on Agriculture allows governments to support their rural economies, but preferably through policies that are less "trade-distorting". A measures is considered to cause "distortions" when it shifts the market price of a product above or below what it would be if the product was traded in a competition market. The three "pillars" to which the rules and commitments as set out in the Agreement on Agriculture apply are: (i) market access; (ii) domestic support; and, (iii) export competition. The Agreement covers "agricultural products" as defined in Annex 1 of the Agreement. It allowed some flexibility in the way commitments were implemented by developing countries, which did not have to cut their subsidies or lower their tariffs as much as developed countries, and had extra time to implement their obligations. Least-Developed Countries were exempted from such reduction commitments.

The market access rule for agricultural products is "tariffs only". Before the Uruguay Round, some agricultural imports were restricted by non-tariff border measures which were mainly in the form of quantitative import restrictions or import quotas. All these non-tariff measures were to be either removed or to be replaced by tariffs, reflecting substantially the same level of protection. Members committed to set tariff bindings to agricultural products and assumed reduction commitments on tariffs. Each WTO Member has a "Schedule" of tariff concessions covering all agricultural products. Besides tariffs, the Agreement allows the application of TRQs (explained above). The rules on market access for goods also allow the imposition of a special safeguard for agricultural products, subject to certain requirements. This mechanism is available only for those Members that reserved the right to use it and complied with some conditions. It is different from the general safeguard provided in Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards

Under the Agreement on Agriculture, all domestic support in favour of agricultural producers is subject to rules. The Agreement distinguishes between two categories of domestic support: (i) support with no, or minimal, distortive effect on trade, not subject to reduction commitments; and, (ii) trade-distorting support, subject to limits/''bindings'' and reduction commitments (often referred to as "Amber Box" measures). The first category (support with no, or minimal, distortive effect on trade) includes: 1. green box measures (government service programmes such as research, disease control and food safety - as long as some criteria are met by each measure concerned); 2. blue box measures (certain direct payments to farmers under production limiting programmes); 3. measures of assistance adopted by developing countries; and, 4. domestic support that is de minimis. All domestic support measures

considered to distort production and trade, with the exceptions mentioned above, fall into the "Amber Box". Domestic support measures falling into the "Amber Box" should not exceed the commitment levels specified in Members' Schedules and were subject to reduction commitments specified in Members' Schedules. Export subsidies are presumed to have trade-distorting effects since they allow exporters benefited with such subsidies to sell below the cost of production and thus, reduce world prices; undercutting unsubsidised exporters in other countries. The Agreement on Agriculture allows the use of export subsidies only in two situations: (i) if a Member has reserved the right to use export subsides in their respective Schedules, subject to the limits and reduction commitments specified in the Schedule; or, (ii) if developing countries provide export subsidies consistent with the special and differential treatment provisions. In all other cases, the use of export subsidies for agricultural products is prohibited. Agricultural products are also subject to other WTO Agreements. However, according to Article 21 of the Agreement on Agriculture, the provisions of the GATT 1994 and of other multilateral Agreements on trade in goods (Annex 1A) shall apply subject to the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture. In addition, Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures prohibits export and import-substitution subsidies except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture. Members agreed to initiate negotiations for continuing the reform process in agricultural trade one year before the end of the implementation period, i.e. by the end of 1999. These talks have now been incorporated into the broader negotiating agenda set at the 2001 Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar.