Introduction to the WTOIntroduction to the WTO

Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) Agreement on Agriculture (AoA)

and and

State of Play of the State of Play of the

Doha Agriculture NegotiationsDoha Agriculture Negotiations

CUTS/WTO Regional Outreach WorkshopCUTS/WTO Regional Outreach Workshop

Nairobi, 29-30 April 2009Nairobi, 29-30 April 2009

2

Why the Agreement on Agriculture?Why the Agreement on Agriculture?

Agriculture in GATT but...

• exemptions for agricultural products (import

restrictions, domestic support, export subsidies –

allowed)

• market access difficult

Research - inefficiency of policies

Trade tensions and disputes

Punta del Este

Declaration

(1986)

Uruguay Round

Negotiations

(7.5 years)

Agreement on

Agriculture

3

Structure of the AoAStructure of the AoA

Market access Domestic support Export competition

Other rules:

S&D, Peace Clause, commitment to reform, NFIDC Decision

Three Pillars - Interlinkages

4

Long-term ObjectiveLong-term Objective

Uruguay Round reform programme Major achievements but also some unfinished business

Mandate for further reform - Article 20

“... establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading

system ... ”

Committee on Agriculture• role to monitor implementation of UR commitments

- matters raised under Article 18.6

- review of notifications

• preparatory work – analysis/exchange of information• mandated negotiations - Special Sessions (since 2000)

5

Market Access – Tariff Only RegimeMarket Access – Tariff Only Regime Tariffication (of non-tariff measures) Tariffs – bindings & reduction commitments (or

ceiling bindings) Tariff quota commitments

Prohibition not to maintain, resort or revert to:Quantitative Restrictions Variable Levies Minimum Import Prices Discretionary Import Licensing NTMs Maintained Through STEs Voluntary Export Restraints Similar Border Measures [...]

BUT Annex 5 – Special Treatment

6

Special Safeguard – Article 5Special Safeguard – Article 5

Volume-Based SSG Import surges – volume trigger Trigger volume depends on:

•Market Penetration•Change in Domestic Consumption

Extra duty: 1/3 of applied rate

Price-based SSG Price falls – price trigger Extra duty depends on price

Temporary addition tariff duty

Only for tariffied products

Only for products in schedules with “SSG”

Notification of volume and price triggers

Can’t apply to in-quota imports

4 countries used the Special Safeguard provisions (3) to restrict imports of rice during the implementation pd (Japan, Korea, Philippines) and Israel for sheepmeat, wholemilk powder and certain cheeses. Chinese Taipei gave special treatment to rice in its first year of membership, 2002.

7

No/minimal effects on trade or

production

Development programmes

Production limiting

programmes

Green Box Art. 6.2 Blue Box Amber Box

Categories of Domestic SupportCategories of Domestic Support

Subject to reduction

commitments

All other support

De minimis

8

Green BoxGreen Box No, or at most minimal, trade-distorting

effects or effects on production

Assistance: Provided through publicly funded government programme Not involving transfers from consumers Not resulting in price support to producers

Basic criteria

measures freely used as long as they meet Annex 2 criteria can be introduced new, and modify old, programmes continuous obligation to ensure that all programmes are,

and remain, Green

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Green Box – ScopeGreen Box – Scope

General services, including:• research• pest and disease control• training• extension/advisory services• inspection• marketing and promotion• infrastructural services

• Public stockholding for food security

• Domestic food aid

Direct payments, including:• decoupled income support• income insurance and income

safety-net• relief from natural disasters• structural adjustment

assistance – producer retirement– resource retirement– investment aids

• environmental programmes• regional assistance

programmes

10

Policy-specific “decoupling”Policy-specific “decoupling”

Amount of payments

not linked to:

X

X

Type of production Volume of production

Domestic prices International prices Factors of production

In any year after the

base period

11

Blue BoxBlue Box

based on fixed area and yields; or

made on 85% of base level of production; or

livestock payments are made on a fixed number of head

Direct payments under production-limiting programmes exempt from reduction if:

12

Article 6.2Article 6.2

Development programmes exempt from reduction:

investment subsidies generally available to agriculture

input subsidies generally available to low-income or resource poor producers

support to encourage diversification from growing illicit narcotic crops

Examples of notified Article 6.2 programmes: • Bangladesh – 2% interest rebate for repayment of loan on schedule• Thailand – Farming input assistance programme• Brazil – Production credit; Investment credit; Debt rescheduling

13

Amber Box – Current Total AMSAmber Box – Current Total AMS

Non-product-specific support

For example • Market price support• Non-exempt direct payments(e.g. loan deficiency payments, grants, compensatory payments)• Other non-exempt measures• All product-specific EMS

For example • Water subsidies• Fertilizer subsidies• Crop insurance• Subsidized credits

Product-specific support

+

Current Total AMSCurrent Total AMS

De minimis allowance

Any form of domestic support not included in either the Green or Blue Boxes or under Article 6.2

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Export SubsidiesExport Subsidies

Article 1(e): Subsidies contingent upon export performance, including the export subsidies listed in Article 9

Definition

Legal Framework General prohibition under Article 3.3 of the AoA, except:

• If listed in a Member’s Schedule – subject to reduction commitments (volume and budgetary outlays)

• Roll-over provisions (now expired)

• S&D: Article 9.4 - subsidies for marketing and internal transport (during the implementation period – now

expired)

Anti-circumvention provisions

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Subsidy Coverage - Article 9.1Subsidy Coverage - Article 9.1

Direct subsidies contingent on export performance

Sale or disposal for export by governments or their agencies of non-commercial stocks at prices below domestic market price

Payments on exports financed by government action (including producer financed subsidies)

Subsidies to reduce cost of marketing, including handling, upgrading, international transport and freight

Favourable internal transport and freight charges on export shipments

Subsidies on agricultural products contingent on their incorporation in exported products

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Subsidy Circumvention – Article 10Subsidy Circumvention – Article 10 Other forms of export subsidies

Export credits, insurance and guarantees

• develop internationally agreed disciplines

• but ... negotiations with no result - OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits does not cover agriculture

Food aid

• specific criteria, Food Aid Convention, FAO

• but ... is it always genuine aid or dumping?

17

Uruguay Round Reduction CommitmentsUruguay Round Reduction Commitments

Developed Developing

Time period 6 years (1995-2000) 10 years (1995-2004)

Market access

Tariff reduction 36% average, 15% minimum 24% average, 10% minimum

Domestic support

Total AMS reduction

De minimis

S&D exemption

20%

5%

13.3%

10%

Article 6.2 (investment, input and diversification subsidies)

Export competition

Export subsidy reduction

S&D exemption

36% value, 21% volume 24% value, 14% volume

Article 9.4 (transport and marketing subsidies)

No reduction commitments for least-developed countries

Doha Agriculture NegotiationsDoha Agriculture NegotiationsState of PlayState of Play

(TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4) Revised Draft Modalities for (TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4) Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, 6 Dec. 2008Agriculture, 6 Dec. 2008

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Big meetings, small meetings

Negotiating Processconcentric circles

‘Inclusive’: all coalitions represented in consultations‘Transparent’: reps. report back to coalitions

‘Green Room’- Informal small group consultationsKey players,- reps. of all groups

- hard bargaining, drafting

Formal plenary- Full membership- Speeches/consensus decisions

Informal, heads of delegations- All members, no record, reports from consultations, /reactions

Bilateral, very small group consultations

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G–90

G-10

G-33

ACP

LDCs

Cairns Group

G-20

Recentnew

African Group

EU G-27

TROPICAL PRODUCTS

(Bolivia) (Colombia)

(Costa Rica) (Ecuador)

El Salvador (Honduras)

(Guatemala) (Nicaragua)

(Panama) (Peru)

(Venezuela)

ChadBurkina FasoBurundi  Togo

Central African RepDjibouti    DR Congo

Mali   Gambia   Guinea  Guinea Bissau    Lesotho   

Malawi  Mauritania  NigerSierra Leone    Rwanda   

BeninMadagascar

SenegalUgandaZambiaTanzania

BelizeBarbadosAntigua/BarbudaDominica DominicanRepGrenada    GuyanaSt Vincent/GrenadinesTrinidad/TobagoJamaica   Suriname

St Kitts/Nevis     St Lucia

GabonGhana

Namibia

    Honduras MongoliaNicaragua

          Panama  Sri Lanka   Turkey

El Salvador

NigeriaZimbabwe

BotswanaCameroon

CongoCôte d’Ivoire

KenyaMozambique

EgyptTunisia Morocco

AngolaSwaziland

Mauritius

R Korea

Iceland  Israel  Japan   Liechtenstein  Norway

SwitzerlandCh Taipei

AustriaBelgium     Bulgaria

Cyprus CzechR DenmarkEstonia Finland   France

Germany Greece Hungary Ireland        Italy       LatviaLithuania  Luxembourg MaltaNetherlands Poland Portugal

 Romania  SlovakiaSlovenia   Spain

Sweden   UK

Mexico

IndiaChinaVenezuela

FijiPapua New Guinea

IndonesiaPakistanPhilippines

Peru

Cuba

Haiti

Australia Canada Colombia

Costa Rica Guatemala

  Malaysia  N Zealand

ChileBrazil

BoliviaUruguay

 Thailand Paraguay

Argentina

BangladeshCambodia

Maldives  MyanmarNepal

HongKongCh MacaoCh Singapore Qatar UAE Brunei Kuwait Bahrain

S Africa

Solomon Islands

USG–1

AlbaniaArmenia Cape Verde

(China) Croatia Ecuador FYR- Macedonia (Georgia)

Jordan KyrgyzR Moldova (Mongolia) Oman (Panama)

Saudi-Arabia (Ch Taipei)Viet Nam Tonga

21

2000 Agriculture talks start – Built-in Agenda (Art 20 of the AoA)

2001 Doha Negotiations launched (DDA)

2004 “July Framework”

2003 Cancún Ministerial – failure to conclude modalities

July 2006 – draft modalities (W/3) – negotiations suspended

Agriculture Negotiations – TimelineAgriculture Negotiations – Timeline

2005 Hong Kong Ministerial

Late 2006 – “Quiet diplomacy”

Fall 2007 – intensive negotiations

March 2003 - Modalities deadline missed

Early 2007 – Resumption of negotiations

Feb - May 2008 - revised draft modalities W/4/Rev.1, Rev.2 & Rev.3

Dec 2008 – W/4/Rev.4 draft modalities

Aug 2007 – revised draft modalities (W/4)

July 2008 – failure to conclude modalities

2009??

The future:conclude modalities;

scheduling; legal drafting; &

DDA conclusion

22

PositionsPositions All issues are important but relative difference

depending on Member and issue All Members have offensive & defensive positions across the negotiations Members form alliances – but often groups are

not homogenous, including within developing countries

For LDCs all defensive interests have already been met through S&D

Key to success – finding convergence

23

Doha Negotiating MandateDoha Negotiating Mandate

Comprehensive negotiations aimed at:• substantial improvements in market

access• reductions of, with a view to phasing

out, all forms of export subsidies• substantial reductions in trade-distorting

domestic support S&D - integral to negotiations and outcome Non-trade concerns to be taken into account

24

TIERED FORMULA

Tariff escalation (list)

Tropical products (list)

Minimum average cut (Developed)

SVE flexibility

Maximum average cut (Developing)

LDC flex

SENSITIVEPRODUCTS

SPECIALPRODUCTS (Developing)

RAMs SP flexibility

SVEs SP flexibility

Commodities (case by case)

MARKET ACCESSMARKET ACCESS

SSG SSM(Developing)

LDC products

VRAMs and small low-income RAMs flexibility

RAM flexibility

Preference erosion

25

TIERED FORMULA

Developed countries

Threshold/Tier/Band (tariffs) Cuts

0-20% 50%

20-50% 57%

50-75% 64%

>75% 70%

THE TIERED FORMULATHE TIERED FORMULA

Overall minimum average cut of 54%

26

Developing CountriesSVEs RAMs*

Threshold/Tier/Band

(tariffs)

Cuts(2/3rds Developed

cuts)

Cuts Cuts

0-30% 33.3% 23.3% 25.3%*

30-80% 38% 28% 30%

80-130% 42.7% 32.7% 34.7%

>130% 46.9% 46.9% 38.9%

THE TIERED FORMULATHE TIERED FORMULA

Overall maximum average cut of 36%(Venezuela 30%, S&D for Bolivia & Suriname)

*No cuts if tariff less than or equal to 10%Very recent RAMs and small low-income RAMs with economies in transition exempt from reduction commitmentsLonger implementation period, 10 years

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SENSITIVE PRODUCTS

Tariff quota expansion as a % of domestic consumption (per Sensitive

Product)

Deviation from otherwise

applicable tiered formula

4% of Tariff Lines Developed1/3rd more for Developing

Possibility for additional 2% of Tariff Lines but with additional

tariff quota expansion(only for extra Tariff Lines)

Developed Developing Developed Developing

2/3 4 2/3rds Developed

Countries tariff quota

expansion

4.5 2/3rds Developed Countries Tariff quota expansion1/2 3.5 4

1/3 3 3.5

FLEXIBILITIES FROM THE TIERED FORMULAFLEXIBILITIES FROM THE TIERED FORMULA

Developing Countries provided with non-tariff quota expansion possibilities Tariff cap -100% for Developed Countries & 150% for Developing Countries outside of Sensitive Products (maybe some exceptions to cap)

28

FLEXIBILITIES FROM THE TIERED FORMULA

SPECIAL PRODUCTS (Developing Countries)

Treatment

Tariff Lines Cut

12% Average Special Product cut of 11%

Including 5% no cut

SVEs Special Products flexibility: apply moderated tiered cuts + Special Products provision

or, simply meet an average cut target of 24%

RAMs Special Products flexibility

Entitlement Treatment

13% Tariff Lines Overall average cut of 10%

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Special Agricultural Safeguard

Developed countries – reduce coverage to 1% of schedule tariff lines on 1st day of implementation

Remaining SSG coverage eliminated after 7 years

Developing countries – reduce coverage to 2.5% on 1st day of implementation

SVEs – reduce coverage to 5% of tariff lines over 12 years

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SSM – Volume-based

Thresholds

(para 134)

Remedies[1]

110%-115% 25% current bnd tariff OR 25 percentage points

115%-135% 40% current bnd tariff OR 40 percentage points

>135% 50% current bnd tariff OR 50 percentage points

[1]

Basis of rolling average of imports over 3 preceding years

Exceeding pre-Doha bindings - LDCs, SVEs and Developing C TN/AG/W/7 suggests 2 triggers & remedies for exceeding pre-

Doha bindings(i) 120% - 140% - 1/3rd of current bound or 8

percentage pts whichever is the higher(ii) >140% - ½ of current bound or 12 percentage

pts whichever is the higherOther Issues Length of remedy Cross-check (not normally applicable if domestic price falling) Limitation on scope (2.5% Tariff Lines?)

31

SSM – Price-based

Trigger

(para 136)

Remedy

(para 137)

85% of three year monthly average

85% of difference between trigger price and import price

max duty current bound duty

Applied on a shipment-by-shipment basis Not normally take recourse if import volumes manifestly declining

(cross-check)

32

Tropical Products & Preference Erosion

Considerable progress made in July 08 mini-Ministerial

A lot depends on the outcome of the banana agreement

Chairman wanted to record progress in latest draft modalities text but due to “certain material changes” which occurred post July, the Chairman was unable to modify the draft modalities text

Existing text:

Tropical products – essentially seeking greater tariff reductions than under the tiered formula

Preference erosion – normally tariff reductions but greater implementation period

33

Other Market Access ElementsOther Market Access Elements Tariff escalation (the problem of higher tariffs on processed

products than on raw materials, which hinders processing for export in the country producing the raw materials).

Commodities – inter alia, if tariff escalation not eliminated, Members to engage with commodity-dependent producers to find satisfactory solution

Tariff simplification- conversion of complex tariffs to their ad-valorem equivalents

Tariff quotas

• reductions in bound in-quota tariff rates

• tariff quota administration)

LDCs – inter alia, duty- and quota-free access for at least 97 percent of products at a tariff line level

Cotton market access - duty- and quota-free for cotton exports from LDCs

34

Domestic SupportDomestic Support

Main issue – size of reductionsMain issue – size of reductions

Green Box

Product-Product-specific limitsspecific limits

Cotton

de minimisOverall trade-distorting

domestic support

Amber Box/AMS

10% VoP(Avg 95-00)

Blue Box

S&D

35

Reductions in Overall Trade Distorting Reductions in Overall Trade Distorting Domestic Support (OTDS)Domestic Support (OTDS) Tiered reduction formula – higher cuts for higher levels

of OTDS

Developed Countries with high relative levels of OTDS in the second tier (≥ 40% of Value of Production) to undertake additional 5% effort (Japan)

Minimum overall commitment

Tier Threshold (US$ billion) Cuts

1 > 60 (EC) 80%

2 10-60 (US and Japan) 70%

3 < 10 (all other DDC) 55%

36

Reductions in OTDSReductions in OTDS

Special & Differential Treatment Developing Countries reduction

2/3rds of Developed C cuts in the third tier (37%)

BUT

Developing Countries exempt from OTDS reductions if:

don’t have Amber box commitments;NFIDCs ;very recent RAMs and small low-income RAMs

with economies in transitionvery recently acceded Members

37

Reductions in Final Bound AMS – Amber Reductions in Final Bound AMS – Amber Box Box

Tiered reduction formula – higher cuts for higher levels of AMS

support (most distorting, with direct links to prices & production)

Developed Countries with high relative levels of AMS (≥ 40% of Value of Production) to undertake additional effort ½ difference between tiers

(Japan, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland)

Tier Threshold (US$ billion) Cuts

1 > 40 (EC) 70%

2 15 - 40 (US and Japan) 60%

3 < 15 (all other Developed Countries)

45%

38

Reductions in Final Bound AMS- Amber BoxReductions in Final Bound AMS- Amber Box

Special & Differential Treatment Developed Countries - 2/3rds of Developed Countries

cuts in the third tier

BUT

Developing Countries exempt from AMS reductions: If present AMS ceilings <= US$100 millionNFIDCs;Very recent RAMs and small low-income RAMs

with economies in transition

Continued access to provisions of Article 6.2 (development programmes)

39

Product-Specific AMS LimitsProduct-Specific AMS Limits

Current situation:

Total AMSNew product-specific

AMS limits

sugar

beef

dairy

rice

wheat

dairy

beef

rice

wheat

sugar

limit

Beef limit

Rice limit

40

De minimisDe minimisDeveloped Countries Reduce by at least 50% but more if necessary to meet OTDS

Special and Differential Treatment Reduce by at least 2/3rds of Developed Countries but more if

necessary to meet OTDS commitment RAMs with de minimis of 5 percent reduce by at least 1/3rd

Developed Countries reduction Longer implementation period

(i) Developing with no Final Bound Total AMS;

(ii) Developing with AMS but which allocate almost all that support to subsistence and resource poor producers;

(iii) NFIDCs as list in G/AG/5/Rev.8;(iv) Very recently acceded Members;(v) Small low-income RAMs with economies in transition

Exempt from reductions

41

Blue BoxBlue Box

Additional criteria – expansion of policy coverage to include

direct payments that do not require production Overall cap on Blue Box – 2.5% of average total value of

agricultural production, 1995-2000 (i.e. reduction from 5% vop to

2.5%) but if BB more than 40% of trade-distorting support,

reduce by level of AMS cut Product-specific limits Special and Differential Treatment Blue box cap at 5% of the average total value of agricultural

production, either over the period 1995-2000 or 1995-2004 Flexibilities with respect to determining the product-specific

limits

42

Final Bound Total AMS

10% value of Ag. production

Higher of: avg. Blue Box payments

OR5% val. Ag. prod

Base Overall

OTDS

Lower Blue Box Limit

Reduced AMS

Reduced de minimis

Tiered

reductions

Tiered

reductions

Final OverallOTDS

Reductions in Overall Trade-Distorting Reductions in Overall Trade-Distorting Domestic SupportDomestic Support

+

+

S&D for Developing Countries

43

Green Box – ProposalsGreen Box – Proposals

Possible amendments to Annex 2, including:

expand coverage of para.2 to specifically cover the special needs of developing country Members

Additional flexibility when accounting for the acquisition of stocks for foodstuffs for food security purposes under para 3

tighten provisions related to base period update (paras. 6, 11 & 13)

fine-tune eligibility criteria in para 8, base periods and an allowance for payments in the event of destruction of animals or crops to control/prevent pest and diseases

exempt developing country Members from the condition that disadvantaged regions must constitute a clearly designated

contiguous geographical area with a definable economic and administrative identity

44

CottonCotton Reductions in support

• AMS support for cotton reduced according to the following formula:

Rc = Rg + (100 - Rg) * 1003 * Rg

Rc = Specific reduction applicable to cotton as a percentageRg = General reduction in AMS as a percentage

• Base value of cotton support average over 1995 to 2000• Blue Box cap for cotton - 1/3 of the product-specific cap

that would otherwise have resulted • Reductions in OTDS implemented over 1/3 of the

implementation period

S&D• Developing Countries with AMS and Blue Box

commitments for cotton shall make a reduction that is 2/3rds of the reduction for DDCs and shall implement it over a longer time period

45

Export CompetitionExport Competition

Parallel elimination of all forms of export subsidies by 2013

Food AidMain issues – definition of

safe box, monetisation

Exporting STEsMain issue – monopoly

powers

Export creditsMain issue -self-financing

Export subsidiesMain issue – phasing

Special and differential treatmentSpecial and differential treatment

46

Export Subsidy EliminationExport Subsidy Elimination

Developed Country Members

Developing Country Members

Elimination End of 2013 End of 2016

(no reductions for LDCs)

Budgetary Outlays

50% by the end of 2010 and remaining by end 2013

Equal annual instalments

Quantity levels

Standstill at actual average 2003-05 levels – not to be

used to new markets

Equal annual instalments

Article 9.4 NA 2021

(5 years after the end-date for elimination of export subsidies)

47

Export Credits – Key ElementsExport Credits – Key Elements Forms and providers subject to disciplines Maximum repayment term: 180 days

Must be self-financing:When premium rates charged over a previous 4 year (6yrs for Developing Countries ) rolling period are

adequate to cover the operating costs and losses of the programme during the same period

Still subject to provisions of other Agreements, including the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM)

If an export subsidies within the meaning of Item (j) of Annex I of the ASCM, also deemed not to be self-financing

Repayment period between 360 & 540 days for LDCs and NFIDCs. Additional time in exceptional circumstances

48

Agricultural Exporting State Trading Agricultural Exporting State Trading Enterprises (STEs)Enterprises (STEs)

Provisions applicable to any exporting STEs meeting the definition set out in the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII

Elimination of:• Export subsidies• Government financing of STEs• Government underwriting of losses• Monopoly powers – except if have small share of

trade, so-called de minimis

S&D – provisions for Deveoping Countries, including SVEs and LDCs to maintain or use monopoly powers

49

-International Food Aid- -International Food Aid-

Possible new Article 10.4 of the AoA Commitment to maintain adequate levels of food aid

General disciplines for all food aid transactions:• Needs driven; provided in fully grant form; Not tied to commercial exports of goods or

services; Not linked to market development objectives of donors; Not re-exported (with exceptions)

Food aid to take into account local market conditions of the same or substitute products Donors encouraged to procure food aid from local or regional sources Encourage the shift towards cash-based food aid Food Aid permitted both in emergencies and in other situations:Emergency Food Aid (Safe Box): Emergency declaration or emergency appeal, In both

cases must have an assessment of need by relevant UN Agency (e.g. WFP); No monetisation in the Safe Box except for LDCs for the purpose of transport and delivery; If meets requirements, deemed in conformity with Food Aid provisions; If in conformity, may be provided for as long as necessary

Non-Emergency Food Aid: Based on a targeted assessment of need; Provided to redress food deficit situations – targeted to meet nutritional requirements; Provided with the objective of preventing or at least minimising commercial displacement; Monetisation prohibited except under certain circumstances

50

Other IssuesOther Issues

Cotton Developed Country export subsidies for cotton

prohibited• Developing Countries to comply with prohibition

by end of the 1st year of implementation period Any new or additional obligations from export

credits, STEs and food aid shall be implemented:• on 1st day of implementation for Developed

Countries• by the end of the 1st year for Developing

Countries

Export Prohibitions and Restrictions Strengthened disciplines

51

What is at Stake?What is at Stake? Tariff reductions – continued reform process with a high

level of ambition

Improved possibility for developing countries to increase trade with developed countries but also other developing countries

Flexibility for developing countries to protect their sensitive sectors

Reduction of trade-distorting domestic support and elimination of export subsidies for improved competition, both on domestic and international markets

No new concessions for LDCs but duty- and quota-free access for 97 percent of tariff lines

Way Forward?

Maria.Perez-Esteve@wto.orghttp://www.wto.org