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IN THE SUPREME COURTOF THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA
In the matter of an application in terms of
Article 121 read with Article 120 of theConstitution to determine whether the Billtitled Appropriation or any part thereof isinconsistent with the Constitution.
1. Centre for Policy Alternatives (Guarantee)Limited,No.24/2, 28thLane, Off Flower Road,Colombo 7.
2. Dr. PaikiasothySaravanamuttuNo. 03, Ascot Avenue, Colombo 5.
Petitioners
S.C. (S.D.) No. 19/2013 - VS -
The Attorney General,Attorney Generals Department,Colombo 12.
Respondent
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TO: THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND THEIR LORDSHIPS THE OTHER HONOURABLEJUDGES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTREPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
1. The instant Application was filed, impugning certain clauses of the Bill titled
Appropriation (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the Bill) was
published in the Gazette of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
Part II of October 04, 2013issuedon07.10.2013on the order of the Minister of
Finance and Planning and placed on the Order Paper of Parliament on 22nd
October 2013.
2. The Petitioners main grounds of challenge have been that:
Clause 2(1)(b) dealing with the power to raise loans is inconsistent with
the provisions of Articles 148, 4(a) and 3 of the Constitution;
Clause 5(1)dealing with the power to transfer money within Heads is
inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 151, 148, 4(a) and 3 of the
Constitution;
Clause 6(1)dealing with the power to transfer money OUTSIDE a given
Head is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 152, 151, 148, 150, 4(a)
and 3 of the Constitution;
Clause 7(b) dealing with the power to withdraw monies allocated is
inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 148, 4(a) and 3 of the
Constitution.
These submissions also deal with the inconsistency and / or violation of
Article 76(1).
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3. When this matter was taken up before in Court on the 4thof November 2014,
Your Lordships Court indicated that H.E the President had made a reference
in terms of Article 129 of the Constitution which in effect queried the
constitutionality of the same provisions of the Appropriation Bill which are
impugned in the instant Application.
4. As submitted to Your Lordships Court, neither the Petitioners nor their
Counsel were aware and / or took part in the proceedings in the said
Reference.
5. It is further respectfully submitted that the Reference made in terms of Article
129 and the opinion of Court thereon, will not be binding on Your Lordships
Court with regard to the instant Application, inasmuch as the instant
application is in terms of Article 121 of the Constitution intended to examine
the Constitutionality of the provisions of a Bill and can only take place once a
bill has been Gazetted and placed on the Order Paper of Parliament.
6. Therefore the full exercise of such right of a citizen to invoke such jurisdiction
should not be curtailed due to the invocation by the President of an alternate
jurisdiction. It is respectfully submitted that an Opinion under Article 129
cannot be binding on the instant Application for a Special Determination, and
that to hold otherwise, in effect, would amount to a deprivation of the right of
the Petitioners to effectively invoke Article 121 of the Constitution.
7. Article 120 to Article 124 of the Constitution clearly sets out the mechanisms
by which the constitutionality of a bill may be examined by the SupremeCourt. A plain reading of the provisions of Article 124 of the Constitution
makes it clear that the constitutionality of a Bill or any part thereof cannot be
examined in any other proceedings otherwise than as set out in Article 120 to
Article 122 of the Constitution.
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Article 124 provides that:
Save as otherwise provided in Articles 120,121and 122, no court or tribunal
created and established for the administration of justice, or other institution,
person or body of persons shall in relation to any Bill, have power or
jurisdiction to inquire into, or pronounce upon, the constitutionality of such Bill
or its due compliance with the legislative process, on any ground whatsoever.
8. In fact the Supreme Court recently, when determining the Constitutionality of
a Private Members Bill titled The Twenty First Amendment to the
Constitution (SC SD 17 / 2013), referring to Article 124 stated that:
The Article makes it patently clear that the Supreme Court exercises its
jurisdiction in regard to Bills only to the extent as is assigned to it in terms
of Article 120, 121 and 122. If jurisdiction to inquire into or pronounce upon
the constitutionality of a Bill or its due compliance with the legislative process
bestowed with the Supreme Court or any Court for that matter, the
Constitutionality of the Bill or its due compliance with the legislative process
cannot be pronounced upon any ground whatsoever (emphasis added)
Court had previously stated (in the same determination):
It is a basic tenet of law that court must be clothed with jurisdiction as any
assumption of jurisdiction would render a decision devoid of legal effect and
null and void
9. Therefore it is respectfully submitted that since the Court has stated, in the
aforesaid Special Determination, that the jurisdiction to pronounce on the
Constitutionality of a Bill is limited to situations covered in Articles 120 122,
a pronouncement in terms of Article 129 (on the Constitutionality of a Bill) inany event, will have no binding effect on the instant Application.
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10. The main submissions on behalf of the Attorney General appeared to be
based on practicality - rather than Constitutionality - that there are adequate
checks and balances already in place (and those arguments will be more fully
dealt with in the course of these submissions).
11. Additionally it was sought to be argued, on behalf of the Attorney General,
that Your Lordships Court has dealt with identical provisions in previous
Special Determinations.
However, the instant Application is made in terms of Article 120 read with
Article 121(1) of the Constitution to determine any question as to whether
any Bill of any provision thereof is inconsistent with the Constitution . It
is respectfully submitted that Court will ascertain whether the provisions of the
Bill are Constitutional, and not be unduly concerned with the so-called
precedents, which it is respectfully submitted are not judgments and are thus
not binding.
In any event these previous determinations are distinguishable, and in some
cases have not considered the Constitutional provisions / arguments urged
before Court in this Application.
FURTHER, and WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the above, in any event, whereConstitutional rights and the Sovereignty of the People is involved
"circumstances may arise which would render it a lesser evil for a court to
override its own legal opinion, clearly shown to be wrong, than
indefinitely to perpetuate its error. Habib Motan v. Transvaal
Government [(1904) T. S. 404 at 413](cited in Bandahamy v. Senanayake
62 N.L.R. 313, 326)
In Moosajee v. Carolis Silva70 N.L.R. 217, 229 Lord Dennings dictum in
Ostime v. Australian Provident Society (1959) 2 A. E. R. 245 at 256was
cited with approval - "The doctrine of precedent does not compel your
Lordships to follow the wrong path until you fall over the edge of the
cliff. As soon as you find that you are going in the wrong direction, you
must at least be permitted to strike off in the right direction, even if you
are not allowed to retrace your steps."
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A. APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION
12. Artic le 148 of the Constitut ionmandates that:
Parliament shall have FULL CONTROL over public finance. No tax, rate or
any other levy shall be imposed by any local authority or any other public
authority, except by or under the authority of a law passed by Parliament or of
any existing law.
13. Artic le 3 of the Constitutionrecognizes the pre-existing fact that:
In the Republic of Sri Lanka sovereignty is in the people and is inalienable.
Sovereignty includes the powers of government, fundamental rights and the
franchise.
14. Artic le 4(a) of the Constitut ionstates that:
The Sovereignty of the People shall be exercised and enjoyed in the following
manner:-
(a) The legislative power of the People shall be exercised by Parliament,
consisting of elected representatives of the People and by the People at a
Referendum;
15. Artic le 76(1) of the Constitut ionmandates that:
Parliament shall not abdicate or in any manner alienate its legislative power,
and shall not set up any authority with legislative power.
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16. Art icles 150(1) and (2)of the Constitution mandate that:
(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in paragraphs (3) and (4) of this
Article, no sum shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Fund except
under the authority of a warrant under the hand of the Minister in charge of
the subject of Finance.
(2) No such warrant shall be issued unless the sum has by resolution of
Parliament or by any law been granted for specified public services for the
financial year during which the withdrawal is to take place or is otherwise
lawfully, charged on the Consolidated Fund.
17. Artic le 151 of the Const itut ionprovides that:
(1) Notwithstanding any of the provisions of Article 149, Parliament may by
law create a Contingencies Fund for the purpose of providing for urgent
and unforeseen expenditure.
(2) The Minister in charge of the subject of Finance, if satisfied-
(a) that there is need for any such expenditure, and
(b) that no provision for such expenditure exists,
may, with the consent of the President, authorize provision to be made
therefor by an advance from the Contingencies Fund.
(3) As soon as possible after every such advance, a Supplementary Estimate
shall be presented to Parliament for the purpose of replacing the amount
so advanced.
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18. Artic le 152 of the Const itut ionprovides that:
No Bill or motion, authorizing the disposal of, or the imposition of charges
upon, the Consolidated Fund or other funds of the Republic, or the imposition
of any tax or the repeal, augmentation or reduction of any tax for the time
being in force shall be introduced in Parliament except by a Minister, and
unless such Bill or motion has been approved either by the Cabinet of
Ministers or in such manner as the Cabinet of Ministers may authorize.
19. In the Determination (made by a bench of seven judges of the Supreme
Court) related to the Bill titled the 19th Amendment to the Constitution
(SC SD Nos. 11 40 / 2002) Court interpreted what is meant by FULL
CONTROL as envisaged in Article 148.
These principles were affirmed in the Determination related to the
Appropriation Bi ll 2008(SC SD 3 & 4 of 2008) where it was stated that:
According to that Determination in terms of Article 4(a) of the Constitution,
Parliament is the sole custodian of legislative power of the People and will
exercise that power in trust for the People in whom sovereignty is reposed.
Legislative power includes the full control over public finance as stated in
Article 148 cited above, which in our opinion is also a vital component of thebalance of power firmly established by the Constitution in relation to the
respective organs of government.
One important check on the exercise of executive power is that finance
required for such exercise remains within the full control of Parliament the
legislature. There are three vital components of such control in terms of the
Constitution viz:
(i) Control of the source of finances , i.e. imposition of taxes, levies,
rates and the like and the creation of any debt of the Republic;
(ii) Control by way of allocation of public finances to the respective
departments and agencies of Government and setting of limits of such
expenditure;
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(iii) Control by way of continuous audit and checkas to due diligence in
performance in relation to (i) and (ii).
Determination related to the Appropriation Bil l 2008
(SC SD 3 & 4 of 2008) at page 3
...an Act lacking in such transparency or being an alienation of control by
Parliament would be inconsistent with Article 148 of the Constitution.
Determination related to the Appropriation Bil l 2008
(SC SD 3 & 4 of 2008) at page 4
20. Thus, any legislation affecting Public Finance must ensure that Parliament
continues to exercise ALL of the following:
(i) Control of the SOURCE of finances, including with regard to
creation of any debt of the Republic;
(ii) Control by way of ALLOCATION of public financesto the respective
departments and agencies of Government and setting of limits of such
expenditure;
(iii) Control by way of continuous AUDIT and CHECK (which is IN
ADDITION to the above aspects of Control)
21. The reasoning in the Determination related to the Development Counci ls
Bill (SC SD 4 of 1980) suggests that a violation of Article 148, could also
amount additionally to an abdication of the legislative power, and thus
contravene Article 76(1) and in turn Article 3 of the Constitution.
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22. In the course of these submissions, it will be contended that the Appropriation
Bill sought to be enacted will result in Parliament NOT having FULL
CONTROL over foreign loans to be raised, or the allocation of funds, since
the Bill attempts to place an absurdly high limit, and within that supposed
limit, grant wide and unfettered decision making powers to Public Officers.This is turn could facilitate corruption / mismanagement, at enormous financial
cost to the People.
23. There is NO CONTROL or REVIEW by Parliament but Parliament would
simply be (post-fact) INFORMED of these transactions in terms of OTHER
laws (and these laws too it is noted may be subject to repeal thus denying
Parliament even the INFORMATION related to these transactions).
24. With regard to ALL the clauses, it is submitted that the Fiscal Management
(Responsibility) Act No. 3 of 2003 does NOT facilitate Parliamentary
Control. It only provides a reporting requirement, and Parliament is NOT able
to PREVENT undesirable transactions.
Thus the existence of the Fiscal Management (Responsibility) Act is not a
justification for a lack of Control in the impugned Bill.
FURTHER, Parliament may at any time repeal the Fiscal Management
(Responsibility) Actand in such event there would NOT even be a reporting
to Parliament.
There is no justification for the total absence, abdication and alienation of
Parliamentary Control which the impugned Appropriation Bill seeks to permit.
25. While Public Officers may be held accountable by other mechanisms should
they engage in corrupt or reckless conduct in the exercise of those powers,
this will not serve the Public, who will be left to foot the bill, since it is
unlikely that losses could be recovered from those Public Off icers.
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26. This is exactly why Parliament needs to retain Full Control merely relying on
other mechanisms to prosecute / deal with Public Officers will not result in
adequate protection of Public Finances. In any event, the abdication of
Parliamentary Control over public finance, as is sought to be done,
contravenes the Constitutional provisions, as more fully setout
hereinafter.
27. In the Determination related to the Appropriation Bill 1986, only Clause 7
thereof was challenged (similar to the present clause 8, which is not
challenged). In that Determination Court recognized that The issue in this
matter is more the question of the extent of Parliamentary control over
national Finance that one of delegation of legislative power simpliciter.Incidentally it would be anomalous for Parliament which has to exercise
financial control over expenditure by the Executive to delegate that
power to the very authority which it has to supervise without devising
suitable checks to control the use of that power. In our view some
amount of direct and actual control however nominal has to be retained
by Parliament in this matter. The effect of our determination is to restore to
Parliament the right to exercise a power which rightly belongs to it. (Page 35)
28. In the Determination related to the Appropriation Bi ll 2012(As reported in
the Hansard of 6thNovember 2012) in reference to the importance of FULL
CONTROL of public finance as a check on Executive Power the court stated
that; Another perhaps less explicit but dominant control is enshrined in Article
148 of the Constitution, which mandates that all Public Finance,
including the cont rol of the spring or source of the finance whether it
be through taxes etc, and the control of the allocation of public finance
pass through and only through the eye of Parliament
In practice, fiscal accountability can only be assured by a process where
Parliamentary control is exercised in full in a transparent manner where
matters are placed in the public domain, enhancing the credibility of the
process through patent disclosures and public debate on implications
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B. CLAUSE 2(1)(b) AND THE POWER TO RAISE LOANS
29. For the reasons set out hereinafter it will be submitted that clause 2(1)(b)dealing with the power to raise loans is inconsistent with the provisions of
Articles 148, 4(a) and 3 of the Constitution.
30. Clause 2(1)(b)states:
(1) Without prejudice to any other law authorizing any expenditure and
subject to the provisions of subsection (4) of this section, the expenditure
of the Government which is estimated will be rupees one thousand fivehundred and forty two billion two hundred and fifty two million five
hundred and eighteen thousand for the service of the period beginning
on January 1, 2014 and ending on December 31, 2014 (in this Act
referred to as the financial year 2014), shall be met
(b) from the proceeds of loans which are hereby authorized in terms of
relevant laws to be raised whether in or outside Sri Lanka, for and
on behalf of the Government, so however that the aggregate of
such proceeds does not exceed rupees one thousand one hundred
billion and the details of such loans shall be incorporated in the final
Budget Position Report which is required to be tabled in Parliament
under section 13 of the Fiscal Management (Responsibility) Act, No.
3 of 2003.
31. Clause 2(1) recognizes that:
the expenditure estimated will be approximately Rs. 1542 BILLION;
loans authorized should not exceed Rs. 1100 BILLION
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32. It is therefore clear that clause 2(1)(b) attempts to grant a blanket
authorization to raise Rs. 1100BILLION as loans during the year 2014.
This is OVER 71% of the (First Schedule) expenditureof Rs.1542 Billion!
33. What is shocking is that clause 2(1)(b) does not require Parliamentary
authorization / review of the individual loans. Thus theoretically the WHOLE of
Rs. 1100 Billion may be raised at foreign loans, at an exorbitant interest rate.
34. This is all the more serious considering Head 249 on page 39 of the
Appropriation Bill which suggests that during the year 2014 the following sums
are authorized as expenses in respect of loans:
Recurrent Rs.421 BILLION
Capital Rs.551 BILLION
Total Rs.972 BILLION
That is to say, in ADDITION to the First Schedule expenses ANOTHER
Rs.972 BILLION (approximately equal to 63% of the First Schedule
expenses) is authorized as loan related payments, during the year 2014.
35. When so much money is spent on Loan repayments (interest and capital) it is
respectfully submitted that Court will interpret the Constitutional requirements
strictly, and not permit vague clauses such as clause 2(1)(b), which leave
much room for abuse / mismanagement.
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36. In this regard it is respectfully submitted that the principles of
Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law REQUIRE that power be viewed with
suspicion. In other words, one cannot charitably assume that public officers
will act properly. One MUST assume that they may, or will, act negligently,
recklessly and / or wrongfully and thus in accordance with the principles ofConstitutionalism, place the maximum controls in place to ensure the
eradication (to the maximum extent possible) of such reckless and / or
wrongful acts.
37. EVEN IF there were executive checks and balances, such could NOT
SUBSTITUTE the checks and balances Constitutionally mandated, vizthat
Parliament shall have FULL CONTROL over Public Finance.
38. In the past Sri Lanka has faced mismanagement problems such as the Petrol
Hedging Saga where it was alleged that Public Officers misused their
powers. The People of Sri Lanka are left to foot the b ill.
39. In fact recently during the debate in Parliament on the report tabled by the
Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE) a Member of Parliament pointed out
that a loan was obtained in 2007 from the Export Import Bank of China (Exim
Bank) for US$ 306 Billion at an interest rate of LIBOR+0.9% (which at the time
worked out to an interest rate of 6.9%) however with the LIBOR rate
plummeting the loan was renegotiated for a fixed rate of 6.3% p.a. According
to the members speech if the earlier arrangement was in place at present Sri
Lanka would only be paying an interest rate of 1.26% p.a. (See
Parliamentary Debates, Volume 219 No 11, Friday 11thOctober 2013at
p. 1374) considering that the loan amount is US$ 306 Billion this, it is
submitted, is a large financial burden which has been imposed on the people
of the country.
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40. It is respectfully submitted that the mere fact that Sri Lanka has an excellent
loan repayment record cannot be used as a justification for the unnecessary
imposition of such a burden on citizens, especially when such imposition is
sans Parliamentary approval.
41. It is respectfully submitted that this clause will not be permitted to be enacted
as it is, as there is grave risk of abuse / mismanagement, and a serious
violation of the relevant Constitutional provisions.
42. It is respectfully submitted that what is sought to be enacted would amount to
ABDICATION and ALIENATION of control. Parliament is seeking to authorize:
Raising of loans with a ceiling of Rs. 1100 BILLION;
The Executive to decide on the TERMS of the loan (including period and
interest).
43. Article 148 mandates that FULL CONTROL of Public Finance be maintained
by Parliament. This includes, as recognized in the Determination related to
the Appropriation Bill 2008(SC SD 3 & 4 of 2008) at page 3
Control of the source of finances , i.e. imposition of taxes, levies,
rates and the like and the creation of any debt of the Republic;
44. Therefore, Parliament cannot DELEGATE this function, or ABDICATE or
ALIENATE its powers with regard to same. Parliament MUST maintain FULL
CONTROL. Therefore, clause 2(1)(b) would ONLY be Constitutional if the
clause were amended to require that PRIOR to any loan being obtained, theTERMS of such loan were made known to Parliament, and Parliament
approved same by way of Resolution.
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45. Merely INFORMING Parliament of loans (post fact) does NOT give Parliament
CONTROL. Control necessarily envisages the right to say NO or to
PREVENT the taking of a loan.
If this clause is allowed to pass into law Parliament will lose CONTROL and
the right to REVIEW loans it will merely be informed of the loans Even if
Public Officers act recklessly and are punished, the People will be left to
foot the (loan) bill, for generations to come.
46. Obtaining a foreign loan is a matter planned well in advance. The Learned
DSG on behalf of the Attorney General was heard to say that the Central
Bank studies the impact prior to obtaining such loans which was evinced by
the many reports referred to in the course of her submissions. Considering the
meticulous planning involved there is no difficulty in bringing the proposed
LOAN AGREEMENTS and TERM SHEETS before Parliament and securing
approval by way of a resolution, PRIOR to signing the Loan Agreement. Doing
so will not result in any administrative difficulties.
47. In the case of local Treasury Bills, it was contended on behalf of the Attorney
General that certain limits were imposed by Parliament. Similarly, there is noreason why TERM SHEETS cannot be brought before Parliament for prior
approval.
While there may be SOME situations in which certain terms such as interest
are finalized at the negotiating table, so to speak, EVEN in such situations,
there is no reason why prior Parliamentary approval cannot be obtained for
the terms of such loans (eg. interest not to exceed X%, loan repayment period
to be over Y months etc)
48. In terms of the Foreign Loans Act No. 29 of 1957as amended Parliament is
merely (post fact) NOTIFIED of Foreign Loans.
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49. Clause 2(1)(b) is thus a CLEAR violation of Article 148, and denies
Parliament Full Control over the SOURCE of Finances. It is an Abdication and
Alienation of Parliamentary Control. If enacted it will leave room for
irresponsible and / or fraudulent decisions to be made, resulting in a huge
financial burden on the People.
50. The principle stated in the Special Determination of 1986, related to the
Appropriation Bill, would be of equal application here: it would be
anomalous for Parliament which has to exercise financial control over
expendi ture by the Executive to delegate that power to the very authority
which it has to supervise without devising suitable checks to control the
use of that power. In our view some amount of direct and actual controlhowever nominal has to be retained by Parliament in this matter. The
effect of our determination is to restore to Parliament the right to exercise a
power which rightly belongs to it. (page 35)
51. In this regard, the Supreme Court in Re the Appropriation Bill (SC SD
15/2012)dealing with an almost identical clause, stated:
Only if such adequate information is provided prior to obtaining theseloans, would there be a comprehensive opportuni ty to Parliament to
scrutinize and exercise full control over public finance. This anomaly
could be rectified if the impugned clause is amended to read, that prior to the
obtaining of the loan, the terms of such loan must be approved by Parliament.
If not this Court is of the view that clause 2(1)(b) would be
unconstitutional as under its scheme, Parliament would fail to exercise
the due and ful l financial control envisioned under Article 148.
52. The Principle enunciated in Article 148 of the Constitution finds its roots in the
concept that persons should be taxed only with their own consent, given by
their Representatives.
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53. In the case of loans raised in accordance with Clause 2(1)(b) the citizens of
Sri Lanka (at a future date) will be called upon to repay such loans together
with interest. Therefore the necessary implication being that the people
through their representatives should have agreed to the terms of such
repayment if they are to be bound to repay same.
54. Furthermore whilst Parliament can obtain the assistance of technical experts
from the various departments and agencies of the Treasury and the Central
Bank, it is respectfully submitted that FULL CONTROL over public finance
would require that Parliament cannot abdicate the decision making to such
public officials and be content with merely being post-fact informed of such
decisions. The FULL CONTROL of public finance would only be satisfied ifthe spring or sources of finance, especially foreign debt, passes through
the eye of Parliament.
55. It is submitted that there is no reason to depart from the principle laid down in
Re the Appropriation Bil l (SC SD 15/2012)with regard to clause 2(1)(b).
56. The inclusion of post-fact reporting to Parliament, does not ensure Full
Control by Parliament, since the act would already have been given effect to.
As recognized in Re the Appropriation Bill (SC SD 15/2012) this anomaly
could be rectified if the impugned clause is amended to read, that prior to the
obtaining of the loan, the terms of such loan must be approved by Parliament.
If not clause 2(1)(b) would be unconstitutional
57. Further, it is respectfully submitted that the instant Application is one in whichYour Lordships Court is called upon to determine whether the impugned Bill
or any provision thereof is inconsistent with the Constitution.Court is not
called upon to consider whether extraneous circumstances (such as those
referred to in the Determinations concerning the Appropriation Bills of 2007
and 2008) warrant a violation of the applicable Constitutional provisions.
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58. It is further submitted that efficacy is not a sufficient ground for violating the
applicable Constitutional provisions.
59. Clause 2(1)(b) is thus inconsistent with and violates Articles 148, 76(1), 4(a)
and 3 of the Constitution.
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C. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF CLAUSE 5(1) TINKERING WITH
ALLOCATIONS
60. For the reasons set out hereinafter it will be submitted that clause 5(1) dealing
with the power of Public Officers to re-allocate allocations already made by
Parliament is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 151, 148, 4(a) and 3
of the Constitution.
61. If the Bill is passed into law, the expenses set out in the First Schedule would
be (as also submitted by the learned Deputy Solicitor General) those on which
Parliament has deliberated and voted. The deliberations would involve
Parliament being informed of what exactly is included within the figures
specified in each Head / Programme. For example teachers salaries Rs.
XXXX, equipment Rs. YYYY etc
62. Clause 5(1)states:
5.(1) Any moneys which by virtue of the provisions of the First Schedule to
this Act, have been allocated to Recurrent Expenditure under any
Programme appearing under any Head specified in that Schedule, but
have not been expended or are not likely to be expended, may be
transferred to the allocation of Capital Expenditure within that
Programme or to the allocation of Recurrent Expenditure or Capital
Expenditure under any other Programme within that Head, by order of
the Secretary to the Treasury or by Order either of a Deputy Secretary
to the Treasury or the Director General of the National Budget
Department, who may be authorized in that behalf by the Secretary to
the Treasury.
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63. Clause 5(1)will thus permit:
The Secretary to the Treasury (or the other Public Officers named);
If they form a (subjective) opinion that money is not likely to be expended;
To transfer from Recurrent to Capital Expenditure within a Programme;
To transfer from Recurrent to Recurrent or Capital in other Programmes
within a Head
64. It is NOT submitted that Parliament should micro-manage everything within
the Economy. Such was not intended by FULL CONTROL.
HOWEVER, Parliament passed the Budget after deliberating and receiving
much information on what is included in Programmes/Heads. The details in
the Schedule can be described as a more macro-level allocation.
Since these figures contained in the Schedule are Macro-level details, and are
specifically approved by Parliament, and INCLUDED in the Act itself, Public
Officers should not be permitted to amend same without prior Parliamentary
approval.
If changes are to be made at this level, such should only be with
Parliamentary approval, since to recognise otherwise in effect permits the
Public Officers to amend the details in the Schedule, and thus to amend
a law!
65. The dangers of permitting such powers to be granted to Public Officers can be
illustrated by way of examples:
Page 21 of the Bill inter alia contains the following:
Head 126 Minister of Education Recurrent Capital
Programme 1 Operational Activities 595,850,000 78,200,000
Programme 2 Development Activities 23,871,916,000 11,714,816,000
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Page 22of 39
66. This means that Parliament having considered the requirements has decided
(if the Bill is passed) that Rs. 595,850,000 should be spent on operational
activities such as teachers salaries etc.
67. WITHIN the 595,850,000 the Public Officers concerned may legitimately make
certain changes (for example salaries can be increased and spending on
other operational expenses reduced, so that it remains within the 595,850,000
limit).
68. However the fact that 595,850,000 was voted for recurrent expenses means
that Parliament has made a MACRO-level decision on same. The MACRO
level (i.e. total) allocation of 595,850,000 should only be varied with
Parliamentary sanction. To hold otherwise would mean that Parliament was
effectively permitted to almost wash its hands off budgeted expenditure once
the Bill is passed.
69. Consideration must also be had of Sri Lankas social context, and the
prevalence of corruption / mismanagement must also be considered, towards
giving full effect to the Public Trust Doctrine and protecting the Sovereignty of
the People.
70. If Public Officers are permitted to reallocate finances, for example moving part
of the 595,850,000into Capital expenditure (where more tenders are involved,
and there is thus more room for corruption) there is more room for unchecked
decisions and resulting corruption.
71. There is no need for urgent decisions to be made. Finances would be planned
well in advance. If a MACRO-level decision is to be made changing an
allocation made by Parliament, such should ONLY be done with the PRIOR
APPROVAL of Parliament.
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72. As recognized in the Determination related to the Bill ti tled the 19th
Amendment to the Consti tution (SC SD Nos. 11 40 / 2002)and set out
in the Determination related to the Appropriation Bill 2008(SC SD 3 & 4
of 2008) at page 3, FULL CONTROL includes:
Control by way of allocation of public finances to the respective
departments and agencies of Government and setting of limits of such
expenditure;
73. To permit the clause to be enacted as is would violate Parliamentary control
at the macro-level, as mandated by Article 148.
74. Parliament CANNOT be permitted to sub-delegate, alienate or abdicate this
power. Delegatus non potest delegare a delegated authority cannot be re-
delegated, or in other words, one agent cannot lawfully appoint another to
perform the duties of agency. (N S Bindras, Interpretation of Statutes, 8th
Ed., page 145).
75. Bindra goes on to cite Cooleys Constitutional Limitations:
One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power
conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by
that department to any other bodyor authority. Where the sovereign power
of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; and by
constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the Constitution itself
is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom and patriotism this
high prerogative has been entrusted cannot relieve itself of the
responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall
be devolved (page146)
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76. The gross irrationality of the UNFETTERED power sought to be sub-
delegated, is highlighted by comparison with clauses 8 and 9. Those clauses
require maintaining FULL CONTROL with respect to a comparatively smaller
aspect, that of ADVANCES to Public Officers (set out in Schedule 3).
77. Although the sums set out in Schedule 3 are much smaller, limits cannot be
changed without the prior approval of Parliament.
78. That principle in the 1986 Determination is of equal application to clause
5(1): it would be anomalous for Parliament which has to exercise
financial control over expenditure by the Executive to delegate that
power to the very authority which it has to supervise without devising
suitable checks to control the use of that power. In our view some
amount of direct and actual control however nominal has to be retained
by Parliament . (page 35)
79. There is no justifiable reason why much larger EXPENSES (as opposed to
mere advances) can be unilaterally decided upon by the Executive sans
Parliamentary Control.
80. If this clause is allowed to pass into law Parliament will lose CONTROL and
the right to REVIEW transfers made with regard to MACRO-level
allocations it may merely be informed of the transfer Even if Public
Officers act recklessly and are punished, the People will be left to bear the
consequences.
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81. Additionally, this against amounts to the Public Officers varying details in the
Act / Schedule, and is thus tantamount to amending the Appropriation Act by
an Executive decision, and thus also contravenes Article 76(1)and would
deny the Public their Constitutional right under Article 121, since if the act
were done legislatively, it could be challenged by way of an Application for aSpecial Determination.
82. Clause 5(1) also violates Artic le 152, inasmuch as a Bill affecting Public
Finance such as the present can only be tabled by a Minister however, the
Public Officers are effectively granted power to AMEND the law, when EVEN
a Private Member cannot table such an amendment in Parliament.
83. It is respectfully submitted that the inconsistency with Article 152 was not
considered in the Special Determinations relating to the Appropriation Bills of
2002, 2007, 2008 or 2012.
84. Further, it is respectfully submitted that the instant Application is one in which
Your Lordships Court is called upon to determine whether the impugned Bill
or any provision thereof is inconsistent with the Constitution.Court is not
called upon to consider whether extraneous circumstances (such as those
referred to in the Determinations concerning the Appropriation Bills of 2007
and 2008) warrant a violation of the applicable Constitutional provisions.
85. Therefore it is respectfully submitted that clause 5(1) violates Articles 148,
150(1), 150(2), 152, 76(1), 4(a) and 3 cannot be enacted into law by a simple
majority, UNLESS amended to require that PRIOR to any monies beingtransferred in the manner envisaged by clause 5(1) the reasons are made
known to Parliament, and Parliament approval by way of Resolution obtained.
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D. CLAUSE 6(1) AND THE POWER TO TRANSFER FUNDS TO OTHER
HEADS
86. Clause 6(1) states:
Any money allocated to Recurrent Expenditure or Capital Expenditure under
the Development Activi ties Programme appearing under the Head
Department of National Budget specified in the First Schedule, may be
transferred subject to guidelines stipulated in printed Budget Estimates
approved by Parliament for the relevant year, to any other Programme under
any other Head in that Schedule, by Order of the Secretary to the Treasury or
by Order either of a Deputy Secretary to the Treasury or the Director General
of the National Budget Department, who may be authorized in that behalf by
the Secretary to the Treasury. The money so transferred shall be deemed to
be a supplementary allocation made to the particular Ministry, and a report
containing the amount of money so transferred and the reasons for the
transfer, shall be submitted to Parliament within two months of the date of the
said transfer.
87. For the reasons set out hereinafter it will be submitted that clause 6(1) dealingwith the power to transfer moneys to OTHER HEADS is inconsistent with the
provisions of Articles 148, 150(1), 150(2), 151, 152, 4(a) and 3 of the
Constitution.
88. Clause 6(1)attempts to permit the Public Officers specified therein to:
Transfer any money allocated to Recurrent Expenditure or Capital
Expenditure under the Development Activities Programme - to any otherProgramme under any other Head
And the money so transferred shall be deemed to be a supplementary
allocation made to the particular Ministry
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89. The Public Officers specified are in effect sought to be given the power to
transfer monies NOT JUST WITHIN the Head, but to ANY HEAD. In effect
Parliament is seeking to establish a Contingency Fund of sorts within the
Budget.
90. The People, through the Constitution, have set out specific rules as to how
EVEN in an emergency, the Executive can deal with Public Funds. These are
set out in Article 151 of the Constitution.
These safeguards include:
That the money is to be used only for urgent and unforeseen expenditure
(an example may be an unforeseeable natural disaster such as a tsunami)
That the withdrawal should only be by the Minister of Finance with the
consent of the President
Thereafter the matter is to be reported to Parliament
91. Parliament however is seeking to create a Contingency Fund, calling it the
Development Activities Program, which will run EVEN if there is NO
emergency, and over which the Secretary to the Treasury (NOT the Minister)has full control.
92. In addition to violating the principle of Parliaments Full Control, this also
violates the provisions of Article 151 relating to the Contingencies Fund.
93. It is respectfully submitted that the argument that maintaining a
Contingency Fund is too expensive is NOT a justification for violating
the provisions of the Constitution!
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94. Sri Lanka HAS established a Contingencies Fund (vide the Contingencies
Fund Act No. 35 of 1979). IN ANY EVENT, IF the provisions of Article 151
are too difficult to comply, they must be amended in accordance with law.
They cannot be simply violated due to alleged practical difficulties!
95. It is not permissible for the legislature to create a second disguised
Contingencies Fund which will operate sans the safeguards mandated by
Article 151.
96. Consideration must also be had to Sri Lankas social context, and the
prevalence of corruption / mismanagement must also be considered, towards
giving full effect to the Public Trust Doctrine and protecting the sovereignty of
the People.
97. If Public Officers are permitted to change around finances to areas where
more Tenders etc are involved there is more room for unchecked decisions
and resulting corruption. As submitted previously, one cannot assume that
Public Officers will act properly. Constitutionalism requires that all power be
viewed with suspicion, and that constitutional safeguards be given maximum
effect, so as to minimize the potential for abuse.
98. As recognized in the Determination related to the Bill ti tled the 19th
Amendment to the Consti tution (SC SD Nos. 11 40 / 2002)and set out
in the Determination related to the Appropriation Bill 2008(SC SD 3 & 4
of 2008)page 3, FULL CONTROL includes:
Control by way of allocation of public finances to the respective
departments and agencies of Government and setting of limits of such
expenditure;
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99. If Parliament allocates funds to ONE HEAD, it is ABSURD to permit a Public
Officer to effectively override Parliament and allocate it to another Head.
100. Parliament CANNOT be permitted to sub-delegate, alienate or abdicate this
power. Delegatus non potest delegare.
101. The sheer absurdity of the UNFETTERED power sought to be sub-delegated,
is highlighted by comparison with clauses 8 and 9. Those clauses require
maintaining FULL CONTROL with respect to a comparatively smaller aspect,
that of ADVANCES to Public Officers (set out in Schedule 3).
102. Although the sums set out in Schedule 3 are much smaller, limits cannot be
changed without the prior approval of Parliament.
103. There is no justifiable reason why much larger EXPENSES (as opposed to
mere advances) can be unilaterally decided upon by the Executive sans
Parliamentary Control.
104. The principle in the 1986 Determination should be of equal application to
clause 6(1): it wou ld be anomalous for Parliament which has to exercise
financial control over expenditure by the Executive to delegate that
power to the very authority which it has to supervise without devising
suitable checks to control the use of that power. In our view some
amount of direct and actual control however nominal has to be retained
by Parliament in this matter. The effect of our determination is to restore to
Parliament the right to exercise a power which rightly belongs to it. (page 35)
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105. If this clause is allowed to pass into law Parliament will lose CONTROL and
the right to REVIEW transfers made with regard to MACRO-level
allocations it may merely be informed of the transfer Even if Public
Officers are punished, the People will be left to bear the consequences.
106. The attempt to deem the monies transferred to be a supplementary allocation
also violates Article 150(1) and (2), since it is an attempt to circumvent the
procedure by which monies should be withdrawn.
107. Additionally, this against amounts to the Public Officers varying details in the
Act / Schedule, and is thus tantamount to amending the Appropriation Act by
an Executive decision, thus contravening Article 76(1) and denying the
Public their Constitutional right under Article 121, since if the Act were done
legislatively, it could be challenged by way of a Special Determination
Application.
108. Clause 6(1) also violates Artic le 152, inasmuch as a Bil l affect ing Public
Finance such as the present can only be tabled by a Minister however,
the Public Officers are effectively granted power to AMEND the law,
when EVEN a private Member of Parliament cannot table such an
amendment in Parliament.
109. It is respectfully submitted that the inconsistency with Article 152 was not
considered in the Special Determinations relating to the Appropriation Bills of
2002, 2007, 2008 or 2012.
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110. Further, it is respectfully submitted that the instant Application is one in which
Your Lordships Court is called upon to determine whether the impugned Bill
or any provision thereof is inconsistent with the Constitution.Court is not
called upon to consider whether extraneous circumstances (such as those
referred to in the Determinations concerning the Appropriation Bills of 2007and 2008) warrant a violation of the applicable Constitutional provisions.
111. It is further submitted that efficacy is not a ground for violating the applicable
Constitutional provisions.
112. If the power of REVIEW is granted to Parliament that would ensure
Parliamentary Control.
113. Therefore it is respectfully submitted that clause 6(1) violates Articles 148,
150(1), 150(2), 151, 152, 76(1), 4(a) and 3 and cannot be enacted into law by
a simple majority, UNLESS amended to require that PRIOR to any monies
being transferred in the manner envisaged by clause 6(1) the reason for same
is made known to Parliament, and Parliamentary approval for same by way of
Resolution is obtained.
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E. CLAUSE 7(b) AND THE POWER OF THE MINISTER TO WITHDRAW
FUNDS ALLOCATED
114. For the reasons set out hereinafter it will be submitted that Clause 7(b)
dealing with the power of the Minister to withdraw funds is inconsistent with
the provisions of Articles 148, 4(a) and 3 of the Constitution.
This also includes contravention of Article 76(1) of the Constitution.
115. Clause 7states:
Where the Minister is satisfied
(a) that receipts from taxes and other source will be less than the amounts
anticipated to finance authorized expenditure; or
(b) that amounts originally appropriated for a particular purpose are no longer
required,
he may with the approval of the Government, withdraw in whole or in part any
amounts previously released for expenditure under the authority of a warrant
issued by him, from the Consolidated Fund or from any other fund or moneys
of or at the disposal of the Government, to meet any authorized expenditureand the details of all such withdrawals shall be incorporated in the Final
Budget Position Report which is required to be tabled in Parliament under
section 13 of the Fiscal Management (Responsibility) Act, No. 3 of 2003.
116. Clause 7(b) attempts to grant the Minister, with the approval of the
Government (i.e. the Cabinet) the power to withdraw in whole or in part any
amounts previously released for expenditure if HE is satisfied that amounts
originally appropriated for a particular purpose are no longer required.
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117. It is NOT submitted that Parliament should micro-manage everything within
the Economy. Such was not intended by FULL CONTROL.
HOWEVER, Parliament passes the Budget after deliberating and receiving
much information on what is included in Programmes/Heads. The details in
the Schedule can be described as a more macro-level allocation.
Since these figures contained in the Schedule are Macro-level details, and are
specifically approved by Parliament, and INCLUDED in the Act itself, the
MINISTER should not be able to change them around.
If changes are to be made at the macro-level, such should only be with
Parliamentary approval, since to recognise otherwise in effect permits the
MINISTER to amend the details in the Schedule, and thus to amend a law!
118. The dangers of permitting such powers to be granted to the Minister sans
Parliamentary Control can be illustrated by way of example:
Page 21 of the Bill inter alia contains the following:
Head 126 Minister of Education Recurrent Capital
Programme 1 Operational Activities 595,850,000 78,200,000
Programme 2 Development Activities 23,871,916,000 11,714,816,000
119. This means that Parliament having considered the requirements has decided
(if the Bill is passed) that 595,850,000should be spent on operational activities
such as teachers salaries etc.
120. The fact that 595,850,000 was voted for recurrent expenses means that
Parliament has made a MACRO-level decision on same. The MACRO level
(i.e. total) allocation of 595,850,000 should only be varied with Parliamentary
sanction. To hold otherwise would mean that Parliament was effectively
permitted to wash its hands offbudgeted expenditure once the Bill is passed.
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121. The impugned Clause 7(b) will permit the Minister (without
Parliamentary approval) to withdraw the Rs.595,850,000 allocated for
Education, Recurrent, Operational Activities at his discretion, on the
basis that he thinks it is not required!
122. There is no need for urgent, spur of the moment decisions to be made.
Finances would be planned well in advance. If a MACRO-level decision is to
be made changing an allocation made by Parliament, such should ONLY be
done with the prior APPROVAL of Parliament.
123. As recognized in the Determination related to the Bill ti tled the 19th
Amendment to the Consti tution (SC SD Nos. 11 40 / 2002)and set out
in the Determination related to the Appropriation Bill 2008(SC SD 3 & 4
of 2008) at page 3, FULL CONTROL includes:
Control by way of allocation of public finances to the respective
departments and agencies of Government and setting of limits of such
expenditure;
124. To permit the clause to be enacted as is would violate Parliamentary control
at the macro-level, as mandated by Article 148.
125. Parliament CANNOT be permitted to sub-delegate, alienate or abdicate this
power not even to a Minister. Delegatus non potest delegare.
126. The sheer absurdity of the UNFETTERED power sought to be sub-delegated,
is highlighted by comparison with clauses 8 and 9. Those clauses require
maintaining FULL CONTROL with respect to a comparatively smaller aspect,
that of ADVANCES to Public Officers (set out in Schedule 3).
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Page 35of 39
127. Although the sums set out in Schedule 3 are much smaller, limits cannot be
changed without the prior approval of Parliament.
128. There is no justifiable reason why much larger EXPENSES (as opposed to
mere advances) can be unilaterally decided upon by a Minister sans
Parliamentary Control.
129. The principle in the 1986 Determination should be of equal application to
clause 7(b): it wou ld be anomalous for Parliament which has to exercise
financial control over expenditure by the Executive to delegate that
power to the very authority which it has to supervise without devising
suitable checks to control the use of that power. In our view some
amount of direct and actual control however nominal has to be retained
by Parliament in this matter. The effect of our determination is to restore to
Parliament the right to exercise a power which rightly belongs to it. (page 35)
130. It is submitted by the learned Deputy Solicitor General that THE POWER OF
THE MINISTER TO WITHDRAW FUNDS ALLOCATEDWAS dealt with in the
Appropriation Bil l Special Determinat ion of 2002.
However a perusal of that Determination demonstrates that the matter was
settled by the inclusion of an amendment:
learned Deputy Solicitor General sought an adjournment and obtained
necessary instructions in the matter. Thereupon he submitted that specific
provision would be made to state that such funds would be utilized to meet
any authorized expenditure
Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that such an amendment would
remove the unconstitutionality submitted by the Petitioner.
On the foregoing basis, we make a determination in terms of Article 123(1) of
the Constitution, that neither the Bill nor any provisions thereof, is inconsistent
with the Constitution.
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Page 36of 39
131. The 2002 Determination does not consider the aspects which are urged in this
Application. As such it is not, in any event, precedent with regard to the
aspects now urged.
Further the Special Determination related to the Appropriation Bill in 2002
has been made without considering the principle established in the
Determination related to the Appropriation Bi ll 1986.
132. If this clause is allowed to pass into law Parliament will lose CONTROL and
the right to REVIEW transfers made with regard to MACRO-level
allocations it may merely be informed of the transfer
133. In this regard, the Supreme Court in Re the Appropriation Bill (SC SD
15/2012dealing with an almost identical clause, stated:
To permit the clause to be enacted as it is, would obstruct the exercise of full
Parliamentary fiscal control at the macro level, as mandated by Article 148,
and would clearly result in delegation and / or abdication of Parliamentary
control, relegating to the Minister of Finance the ability to override the dictates
of Parliament without its approval. It places an unfettered power in the hands
of the Minister of Finance which does not accord with the spirit and letter of
the Constitution which assures full control of public finance with Parliament.
The scope and ambit of this clause contrasts strongly with clauses 8 and 9 of
the Bill, which mandates that Parliamentary prior approval was needed even
for a relatively lesser and smaller category
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134. The Court thus concluded that:
Additionally this provision permits the Minister of Finance to have
unfettered power to vary details in the Appropriation Act and its Schedules,
which tantamount to amending the Appropriation Act by an executive
decision, sans any Parliamentary control, and the abrogation of powers over
public finance in contravention of Article 148 of the Constitution. This could be
cured if amended to read that it could only be done with Parliamentary
approval.
135. It is submitted that there is no reason to depart from the principle laid down in
Re the Appropriation Bil l (SC SD 15/2012)with regard to clause 7(b).
136. The clause thus also contravenes Article 76(1) and would deny the Public
their Constitutional right under Article 121, since if the executive act in
question were done legislatively, it could be challenged by way of a Special
Determination Application.
137. The inclusion of post-fact reporting to Parliament, does not ensure Full
Control by Parliament, since the executive act would already have been given
effect to. As recognized in Re the Appropriation Bill (SC SD 15/2012) this
could be cured if amended to read that it could only be done with
Parliamentary approval.
138. Therefore it is respectfully submitted that Clause 7(b) violates Articles 148,
76(1), 4(a) and 3 cannot be enacted into law by a simple majority, UNLESS
amended to require that PRIOR to any monies being withdrawn in the manner
envisaged by clause 7(b) the reason for same is made known to Parliament,
and Parliament approval for same by way of Resolution is obtained.
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CONCLUSION
139. It is respectfully submitted that while the existence of certain executive
checks and balances is desirable, the existence of such checks and balances
must be in addition to, and cannot substitute, the checks and balances
which the Constitution mandates i.e. Parliaments Full Control over Public
Finance.
140. For the reasons set out above, it is respectfully submitted that Your Lordships
Court will examine the impugned provisions of the Bill to determine as to
whether any Bill of any provision thereof is inconsistent with the
Constitution(Article 120), and that Your Lordships Court will be pleased to
Determine that:
(a) the provisions of Clause 2(1)(b)of the said Bill are inconsistent with and
/ or in contravention of the provisions of Articles 3, 4, 76(1) and 148 of
the Constitution and cannot be enacted into law except if approved by
the People at a Referendum in addition to a two-thirds vote of the whole
number of the members of Parliament in favour as required by Article
83(a) of the Constitution UNLESSthe Clause is amended and provision
is made requiring the prior approval of Parliament, prior to the obtaining
of the loans envisaged by Clause 2(1)(b);
(b) the provisions of Clause 5(1)of the said Bill is inconsistent with and / or
in contravention of the provisions of Articles 3, 4, 148, 150(1) & (2) and
152 (as well as Article 76(1)) of the Constitution and cannot be enactedinto law except if approved by the People at a Referendum in addition to
a two-thirds vote of the whole number of the members of Parliament in
favour as required by Article 83(a) of the Constitution UNLESS the
Clause is amended and provision is made requiring the prior approval of
Parliament, prior to the transfer of funds envisaged by Clause 5(1);
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(c) the provisions of Clause 6(1)of the said Bill are inconsistent with and / or
in contravention of the provisions of Articles 3, 4, 148, 150(1) & (2), 151
and 152 (as well as Article 76(1)) of the Constitution and cannot be
enacted into law except if approved by the People at a Referendum in
addition to a two-thirds vote of the whole number of the members of
Parliament in favour as required by Article 83(a) of the Constitution
UNLESS the Clause is amended and provision is made requiring the
prior approval of Parliament, prior to the transfer of funds envisaged by
Clause 6(1);
(d) the provisions of Clause 7(b)of the said Bill are inconsistent with and / or
in contravention of the provisions of Articles 3, 4 and 148 (as well as
Article 76(1)) of the Constitution) and cannot be enacted into law except
if approved by the People at a Referendum in addition to a two-thirds
vote of the whole number of the members of Parliament in favour as
required by Article 83(a) of the Constitution UNLESS the Clause is
amended and provision is made requiring the prior approval of
Parliament, prior to a withdrawal of funds envisaged by Clause 7(b).
On this 7thday of November 2013
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Registered At torney-at-Law for the Petitioners
Settled by:
Luwie Ganeshathasan
Suren Fernando
Attorneys-at-Law