Writs (Cases)

7/23/2019 Writs (Cases)

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1. Tapuz vs. del rosario

DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M. ASUNCION,

LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA, EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN

TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS,

Petitioners,

- versus -

HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC

Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON DELA CRUZ, in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC, THE

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE stationed in BoracayIsland, represented by the PNP

STATION COMMANDER, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CEBU

18th

DIVISION, SPOUSES GREGORIO SANSON & MA.LOURDES T. SANSON,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 182484

Promulgated:

June 17, 2008

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

Before us for the determination of sufficiency of form and substance ( pursuant to Sections 1 and 4 of

Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; Sections 1 and 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo ;[1]

and Sections 1 and

6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data[2]

) is the petition for certiorari and for the issuance of the writs

of amparo and habeas data filed by the above-named petitioners against the Honorable Judge Elmo del

Rosario [in his capacity as presiding judge of RTC Br. 5,Kalibo], Sheriff Nelson de la Cruz [in his capacity as

Sheriff of the RTC], the Philippine National Police stationed in Boracay Island, represented by the PNP Station

Commander, the Honorable Court of Appeals in Cebu, 18th

Division, and the spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma.

Lourdes T. Sanson, respondents.

The petition and its annexes disclose the following material antecedents:

The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson (the “ private

respondents”), filed with the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court ofBuruanga-Malay, Aklan (the “MCTC ”) a

complaint[3]

dated 24 April 2006 for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of

preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga,

Liberty M. Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga, Everly TapuzMadriaga, Excel Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz and

Marian Timbas (the “ petitioners”) and other John Does numbering about 120. The private respondents allegedin their complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners under TCT No. 35813 of a 1.0093-hectare parcel of

land located at Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag, Boracay, Malay, Aklan(the “disputed land ”); (2) they were the

disputed land’s prior possessors when the petitioners – armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and

together with unidentified persons numbering 120 - entered the disputed land by force and intimidation,

without the private respondents’ permission and against the objections of the private respondents’ security

men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.

In their Answer[4]

dated 14 May 2006, the petitioners denied the material allegations of the

complaint. They essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2)

on the contrary, the private respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private respondents’ certificate of title

to the disputed property is spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a

counterclaim for damages.

The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2 January 2007 a decision[5]

in the private respondents’

favor. It found prior possession – the key issue in forcible entry cases - in the private respondents’ favor, thus:

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/june2008/182484.htm#_ftn2




















“The key that could unravel the answer to this question lies in the Amended

Commissioner’s Report and Sketch found on pages 245 to 248 of the records and the evidence

the parties have submitted. It is shown in the Amended Commissioner’s Report and Sketch that

the land in question is enclosed by a concrete and cyclone wire perimeter fence in pink and

green highlighter as shown in the Sketch Plan (p. 248). Said perimeter fence was constructed by

the plaintiffs 14 years ago. The foregoing findings of the Commissioner in his report and sketch

collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that after they acquired the land in question on May 27,

1993 through a Deed of Sale (Annex ‘A’, Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, p. 276, rec.), they caused

the construction of the perimeter fence sometime in 1993 (Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, pp.271-275, rec.).

From the foregoing established facts, it could be safely inferred that the plaintiffs were in

actual physical possession of the whole lot in question since 1993 when it was interrupted by

the defendants (sic) when on January 4, 2005 claiming to (sic) the Heirs of

Antonio Tapuz entered a portion of the land in question with view of inhabiting the same and

building structures therein prompting plaintiff Gregorio Sanson to confront them before BSPU,

Police Chief Inspector Jack L. Wanky and Barangay Captain Glenn Sacapaño. As a result of their

confrontation, the parties signed an Agreement (Annex ‘D’, Complaint p. 20) wherein they

agreed to vacate the disputed portion of the land in question and agreed not to build any

structures thereon.

The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the incident of January 4,

2005 when the plaintiff posted security guards, however, sometime on or about 6:30 A.M. of

April 19, 2006, the defendants some with bolos and one carrying a sack suspected to contain

firearms with other John Does numbering about 120 persons by force and intimidation forcibly

entered the premises along the road and built a nipa and bamboo structure (Annex ‘E’,

Complaint, p. 11) inside the lot in question which incident was promptly reported to the proper

authorities as shown by plaintiffs’ Certification (Annex ‘F’, Complaint, p. 12) of the entry in the

police blotter and on same date April 19, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Office of

the LupongTagapamayapa of Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan but no settlementwas reached as shown in their Certificate to File Action (Annex ‘G’, Complaint, p. 13); hence the

present action.

Defendants’ (sic) contend in their answer that ‘prior to January 4, 2005, they were

already occupants of the property, being indigenous settlers of the same, under claim of

ownership by open continuous, adverse possession to the exclusion of other (sic)’. (Paragraph 4,

Answer, p. 25).

The contention is untenable. As adverted earlier, the land in question is enclosed by a

perimeter fence constructed by the plaintiffs sometime in 1993 as noted by the Commissioner in

his Report and reflected in his Sketch, thus, it is safe to conclude that the plaintiffs where (sic) in

actual physical possession of the land in question from 1993 up to April 19, 2006 when they

were ousted therefrom by the defendants by means of force. Applying by analogy the ruling of

the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Molina, et al. vs. De Bacud, 19 SCRA 956, if the land

were in the possession of plaintiffs from 1993 to April 19, 2006, defendants’ claims to an older

possession must be rejected as untenable because possession as a fact cannot be recognized at

the same time in two different personalities.

Defendants likewise contend that it was the plaintiffs who forcibly entered the land in

question on April 18, 2006 at about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon as shown in their Certification

(Annex ‘D’, Defendants’ Position Paper, p. 135, rec.).

The contention is untenable for being inconsistent with their allegations made to the

commissioner who constituted (sic) the land in question that they built structures on the land in

question only on April 19, 2006 (Par. D.4, Commissioner’s Amended Report, pp. 246 to 247),

after there (sic) entry thereto on even date.

Likewise, said contention is contradicted by the categorical statements of defendants’

witnesses, Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez

and EdgardoPinaranda, in their Joint Affidavit (pp. 143- ‘144, rec.) [sic] categorically stated ‘that



on or about April 19, 2006, a group of armed men entered the property of our said neighbors

and built plastic roofed tents. These armed men threatened to drive our said neighbors away

from their homes but they refused to leave and resisted the intruding armed men’.

From the foregoing, it could be safely inferred that no incident of forcible entry

happened on April 18, 2006 but it was only on April 19, 2006 when the defendants overpowered

by their numbers the security guards posted by the plaintiffs prior to the controversy.

Likewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and other structures depicted in their picturesattached as annexes to their position paper were not noted and reflected in the amended report

and sketch submitted by the Commissioner, hence, it could be safely inferred that these

structures are built and (sic) situated outside the premises of the land in question, accordingly,

they are irrelevant to the instant case and cannot be considered as evidence of their actual

possession of the land in question prior to April 19, 2006[6]

.”

The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the Regional Trial Court ( “RTC,” Branch 6

of Kalibo, Aklan) then presided over by Judge Niovady M. Marin (“ Judge Marin”).

On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents’ motion for the issuance of a writ of

preliminary mandatory injunction through an Order dated 26 February 2007, with the issuance conditioned on

the private respondents’ posting of a bond. The writ[7]

– authorizing the immediate implementation of the

MCTC decision – was actually issued by respondent Judge Elmo F. del Rosario (the “respondent Judge”) on 12

March 2007 after the private respondents had complied with the imposed condition. The petitioners moved to

reconsider the issuance of the writ; the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition.

The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration and to Defer

Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in an Order dated 17 May 2007

[8]

.

Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition.[9]

The respondent Judge nevertheless

issued via a Special Order[10]

a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriff’s written

notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the private respondents to effectively

take actual possession of the land.

The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, a Petition for

Review[11]

(under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and

Order of Demolition of the RTC of Kalibo, Br. 6 in Civil Case No. 7990 .

Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition

on 19 March 2008.[12]

It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present petition last 29 April 2008. The

petition contains and prays for three remedies, namely: a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised

Rules of Court; the issuance of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data; and finally, the

issuance of the writ of amparo under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners present factual positions

diametrically opposed to the MCTC’s findings and legal reasons. Most importantly, the petitioners maintain

their claims of prior possession of the disputed land and of intrusion into this land by the private

respondents. The material factual allegations of the petition – bases as well of the petition for the issuance of

the writ of amparo – read:




























“29. On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m. armed men sporting 12 gauge shot guns

intruded into the property of the defendants [the land in dispute]. They were not in

uniform. They fired their shotguns at the defendants. Later the following day at 2:00 a.m. two

houses of the defendants were burned to ashes.

30. These armed men [without uniforms] removed the barbed wire fence put up by

defendants to protect their property from intruders. Two of the armed men trained their

shotguns at the defendants who resisted their intrusion. One of them who was identified as

SAMUEL LONGNO y GEGANSO, 19 years old, single, and a resident of Binun-an, Batad, Iloilo,fired twice.

31. The armed men torched two houses of the defendants reducing them to ashes. [...]

32. These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON were reported by one of

the HEIRS OF ANTONIO TAPUZ [...]. The terrorists trained their shotguns and fired at minors

namely IVAN GAJISAN and MICHAEL MAGBANUA, who resisted their intrusion. Their act is a

blatant violation of the law penalizing Acts of Violence against women and children, which is

aggravated by the use of high-powered weapons.

[…]

34. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent and unlettered

petitioners continue because the private respondents Sansons have under their employ armed

men and they are influential with the police authorities owing to their financial and political

clout.

35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the lot in dispute by

defendants and the atrocities of the terrorists [introduced into the property in dispute by the

plaintiffs] are attested by witnesses who are persons not related to the defendants are therefore

disinterested witnesses in the case namely: Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac,Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Penarada. Likewise, the affidavit of Nemia T. Carmen is submitted

to prove that the plaintiffs resorted to atrocious acts through hired men in their bid to unjustly

evict the defendants.[13]

”

The petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint for forcible entry that

the private respondents filed below. Citing Section 33 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended

by Republic Act No. 7691,[14]

they maintain that the forcible entry case in fact involves issues of title to or

possession of real property or an interest therein, with the assessed value of the property involved

exceeding P20,000.00; thus, the case should be originally cognizable by the RTC. Accordingly, the petitioners

reason out that the RTC - to where the MCTC decision was appealed – equally has no jurisdiction to rule on the

case on appeal and could not have validly issued the assailed orders.

OUR RULING

We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally defective, both in

substance and in form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally

defective with respect to content and substance.

The Petition for Certiorari

We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition forcertiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed out of time. It is not lost on us that the petitioners

have a pending petition with the Court of Appeals (the “CA petition”) for the review of the same RTC orders

now assailed in the present petition, although the petitioners never disclosed in the body of the present

petition the exact status of their pending CA petition. The CA petition, however, was filed with the Court of

Appeals on 2 August 2007, which indicates to us that the assailed orders (or at the very least, the latest of the

interrelated assailed orders) were received on 1 August 2007 at the latest. The present petition, on the other

hand, was filed on April 29, 2008 or more than eight months from the time the CA petition was filed. Thus, the

present petition is separated in point of time from the assumed receipt of the assailed RTC orders by at least











eight (8) months, i.e., beyond the reglementary period of sixty (60) days[15]

from receipt of the assailed order or

orders or from notice of the denial of a seasonably filed motion for reconsideration.

We note in this regard that the petitioners’ counsel stated in his attached “Certificate of Compliance with

Circular #1-88 of the Supreme Court”[16]

(“Certificate of Compliance”) that “in the meantime the RTC and the

Sheriff issued a NOTICE TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION not served to counsel but to the petitioners who sent

photo copy of the same NOTICE to their counsel on April 18, 2008 by LBC.” To guard against any insidious

argument that the present petition is timely filed because of this Notice to Vacate, we feel it best to declare

now that the counting of the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65 cannot start from theApril 18,2008 date cited by the petitioners’ counsel. The Notice to Vacate and for Demolition is not an order that exists

independently from the RTC orders assailed in this petition and in the previously filed CA petition. It is merely a

notice, made in compliance with one of the assailed orders, and is thus an administrative enforcement medium

that has no life of its own separately from the assailed order on which it is based. It cannot therefore be the

appropriate subject of an independent petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the context of this

case. The April 18, 2008 date cannot likewise be the material date for Rule 65 purposes as the above-

mentioned Notice to Vacate is not even directly assailed in this pet ition, as the petition’s Prayer patently

shows.[17]

Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been guilty of willful and

deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least, of forum shopping.

By the petitioners’ own admissions, they filed a petition with the Court of Appeals (docketed as CA – G.R.

SP No. 02859) for the review of the orders now also assailed in this petition, but brought the present recourse

to us, allegedly because “the CA did not act on the petition up to this date and for the petitioner (sic) to seek

relief in the CA would be a waste of time and would render the case moot and academic since the CA refused to

resolve pending urgent motions and the Sheriff is determined to enforce a writ of demolition despite the defect

of LACK OF JURISDICTION.” [18]

Interestingly, the petitioners’ counsel - while making this claim in the body of the petition - at the same

time represented in his Certificate of Compliance[19] that:“x x x

(e) the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals to question the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY

INJUNCTION copy of the petition is attached (sic);

(f) the CA initially issued a resolution denying the PETITION because it held that the ORDER TO

VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION OF THE HOMES OF PETITIONERS is not capable of being the

subject of a PETITION FOR RELIEF, copy of the resolution of the CA is attached

hereto; (underscoring supplied)

(g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2007 but up to this date the same

had not been resolved copy of the MR is attached (sic).

x x x”

The difference between the above representations on what transpired at the appellate court level is

replete with significance regarding the petitioners’ intentions. We discern -- from the petitioners’ act of

misrepresenting in the body of their petition that “the CA did not act on the petition up to this date” while

stating the real Court of Appeals action in the Certification of Compliance -- the intent to hide the real state of

the remedies the petitioners sought below in order to mislead us into action on the RTC orders without

frontally considering the action that the Court of Appeals had already undertaken.

At the very least, the petitioners are obviously seeking to obtain from us, via the present petition, the

same relief that it could not wait for from the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02859. The petitioners’ act of

seeking against the same parties the nullification of the same RTC orders before the appellate court and before

us at the same time, although made through different mediums that are both improperly used, constitutes

willful and deliberate forum shopping that can sufficiently serve as basis for the summary dismissal of the

petition under the combined application of the fourth and penultimate paragraphs of Section 3, Rule 46;

Section 5, Rule 7; Section 1, Rule 65; and Rule 56, all of the Revised Rules of Court. That a wrong remedy may






















(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened

with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or

violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances,

and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct

of the investigation, together with any report ;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate orwhereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act

or omission; and

(f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.”[22]

The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts

determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat

to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.

The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual allegations heretofore

quoted,[23]

that are essentially repeated in paragraph 54 of the petition. These allegations are supported by the

following documents:

“(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena B. Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac,

Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, supporting the factual positions of the petitioners, id .,

petitioners’ prior possession, private respondents’ intrusion and the illegal acts committed by

the private respondents and their security guards on 19 April 2006;

(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal acts (firing of guns,etc.) committed by a security guard against minors – descendants of Antonio Tapuz;

(c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, essentially

corroborating Nemia’s affidavit;

(d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Jackson Jauod regarding the

incident of petitioners’ intrusion into the disputed land;

(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Allan R. Otis, narrating the

altercation between the Tapuz family and the security guards of the private respondents,

including the gun-poking and shooting incident involving one of the security guards;

(f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza, narrating that a house

owned by Josiel Tapuz, Jr., rented by a certain JorgeBuenavente, was accidentally burned by a

fire.”

On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the overriding involvement of

property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed by

the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the

extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is

alleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments implied from the presence of “armed men bare tothe waist” and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits

compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is

continuing.

A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them – the statements

of Nemia Carreon y Tapuz and Melanie Tapuz are practically identical andunsworn. The Certification by Police

Officer Jackson Jauod, on the other hand, simply narrates what had been reported by one

Danny Tapuz y Masangkay, and even mentions that the burning of two residential houses was “accidental.”











As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its decision in the forcible entry case

which rejected all the petitioners’ factual claims. These findings are significantly complete and detailed, as they

were made under a full-blown judicial process, i.e., after examination and evaluation of the contending parties’

positions, evidence and arguments and based on the report of a court-appointed commissioner.

We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the backdrop of a dispute (with

incidents giving rise to allegations of violence or threat thereof) that was brought to and ruled upon by the

MCTC ; subsequently brought to the RTC on an appeal that is still pending; still much later brought to the

appellate court without conclusive results; and then brought to us on interlocutory incidents involving a plea forthe issuance of the writ of amparo that, if decided as the petitioners advocate, may render the pending RTC

appeal moot.

Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima facie existence of the

ultimate facts that would justify the issuance of a writ ofamparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a

continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be

purely property-related and focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and

hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary

criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.

Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings, as our action may carry theunintended effect, not only of reversing the MCTC ruling independently of the appeal to the RTC that is now in

place, but also of nullifying the ongoing appeal process. Such effect, though unintended, will obviously wreak

havoc on the orderly administration of justice, an overriding goal that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo does not

intend to weaken or negate.

Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at this point the indicators, clear

and patent to us, that the petitioners’ present recourse viathe remedy of the writ of amparo is a mere

subterfuge to negate the assailed orders that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify before the appellate

court because of the use of an improper remedial measure. We discern this from the petitioners’

misrepresentations pointed out above; from their obvious act of forum shopping; and from the recourse itselfto the extraordinary remedies of the writs of certiorari and amparo based on grounds that are far from

forthright and sufficiently compelling. To be sure, when recourses in the ordinary course of law fail because of

deficient legal representation or the use of improper remedial measures, neither the writ of certiorari nor that

of amparo - extraordinary though they may be - will suffice to serve as a curative substitute. The writ

of amparo, particularly, should not issue when applied for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or

when it will inordinately interfere with these processes – the situation obtaining in the present case.

While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for rules on the

institution of separate actions,[24]

for the effect of earlier-filed criminal actions,[25]

and for the consolidation of

petitions for the issuance of a writ of amparo with a subsequently filed criminal and civil action .[26]

These rules

were adopted to promote an orderly procedure for dealing with petitions for the issuance of the writ

of amparo when the parties resort to other parallel recourses.

Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and

the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a

writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security –

the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the

danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a

proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the

co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.

The Writ of Habeas Data

Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of ultimate

facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:

“(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;















(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life,

liberty or security of the aggrieved party ;

(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;

(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in

charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known;

(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression ordestruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent .

In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of;

and

(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.”

Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that:

“1. [ … ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that the PNP

may release the report on the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts of violenceemployed against them by the private respondents, furnishing the Court and the petitioners

with copy of the same;

[ … ]

66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the Philippine National

Police [PNP] to produce the police report pertaining to the burning of the houses of the

petitioners in the land in dispute and likewise the investigation report if an investigation was

conducted by the PNP.”

These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus

rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful

violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not

alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police authorities other than

those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ,

based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum,

the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the “fishing expedition” that this

Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data - had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of

habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas

data is fully in order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present petition OUTRIGHT for deficiencies

of form and substance patent from its body and attachments.

SO ORDERED.

2. Castillo vs. Cruz

P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO, POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS, RUPERTOBORLONGAN, EDMUNDO DIONISIO, RONNIE MORALES, ARNOLD TRIA, and

GILBERTO PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL P. MILLAN, ENGR. REDENTOR S. DELA

CRUZ, MR. ANASTACIO L. BORLONGAN, MR. ARTEMIO ESGUERRA, “TISOY,”

and JOHN DOES,

Petitioners,

G.R. No. 182165

- versus -

DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and FERDINAND T. CRUZ, Promulgated:



Respondents. November 25, 2009

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J .

Petitioners[1]

, employees and members of the local police force of the City Government of Malolos,

challenge the March 28, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Branch 10 in a petition for

issuance of writs of amparo and habeas data instituted by respondents.

The factual antecedents.

Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz),

leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the property,

despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province) which intended to utilize it for

local projects.

The Province thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the Spouses Cruz before the then

Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bulacan, Bulacan.

By Decision of September 5, 1997, the MTC rendered judgment against the Spouses Cruz, which

judgment, following its affirmance by the RTC, became final and executory.

The finality of the decision in the ejectment case notwithstanding, the spouses Cruz refused to vacate the

property. They thereupon filed cases against the Province[2] and the judges who presided over the

case.[3]

Those cases were dismissed except their petition for annulment of judgment lodged before Branch 18

of the RTC of Malolos, and a civil case for injunction 833-M-2004 lodged before Branch 10 of the same RTC

Malolos.

The Spouses Cruz sought in the case for injunction the issuance of a permanent writ of injunction to

prevent the execution of the final and executory judgment against them.

By Order of July 19, 2005, the RTC, finding merit in the Spouses Cruzes’ allegation that subsequent events

changed the situation of the parties to justify a suspension of the execution of the final and executory

judgment, issued a permanent writ of injunction, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated

August 10, 2004 is hereby GRANTED. Order dated August 10, 2004 is

herebyRECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Further, the verified petition dated November 05, 2002

are hereby REINSTATED and MADE PERMANENT until the MTC-Bulacan, Bulacan finally resolves

the pending motions of petitioners with the same determines the metes and bounds of 400 sq.

meters leased premises subject matter of this case with immediate dispatch.

Accordingly, REMAND the determination of the issues raised by the petitioners on the issued

writ of demolition to the MTC of Bulacan, Bulacan.

SO ORDERED.[4]

(Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

Finding that the fallo of the RTC July 19, 2005 Order treats, as a suspensive condition for the lifting of the

permanent injunction, the determination of the boundaries of the property, the Province returned the issue

for the consideration of the MTC. In a Geodetic Engineer’s Report submitted to the MTC on August 31, 2007,

the metes and bounds of the property were indicated.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/november2009/182165.htm#_ftn2

















The MTC, by Order of January 2, 2008, approved the Report and ruled that the permanent injunction

which the RTC issued is ineffective. On motion of the Province, the MTC, by Order of January 21, 2008, thus

issued a Second Alias Writ of Demolition.

On receiving notice of the January 2, 2008 MTC Order, the Spouses Cruz filed a motion before Branch 10

of the RTC for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) which it set for hearing on January 25, 2008on which date, however, the demolition had, earlier in the day, been implemented. Such notwithstanding, the

RTC issued a TRO.[5]

The Spouses Cruz, along with their sons-respondents Nixon and Ferdinand,

thereupon entered the property, placed several container vans and purportedly represented themselves as

owners of the property which was for lease.

On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were deployed by

the City Mayor in compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing him to

“protect, secure and maintain the possession of the property,” entered the property.

Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that the RTC July

19, 2005 Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners,

forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of

light threats.

Respondents later filed on March 3, 2008 a “Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ of Amparo and Habeas

Data,” docketed as Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008, which was coincidentally raffled to Branch 10 of the

RTC Malolos.

Respondents averred that despite the Permanent Injunction, petitioners unlawfully entered the property

with the use of heavy equipment, tore down the barbed wire fences and tents,[6]

and arrested them when they

resisted petitioners’ entry; and that as early as in the evening of February 20, 2008, members of the Philippine

National Police had already camped in front of the property.

On the basis of respondents’ allegations in their petition and the supporting affidavits, the RTC, by

Order of March 4, 2008, issued writs of amparo and habeas data.[7]

The RTC, crediting respondents’ version in this wise:

Petitioners have shown by preponderant evidence that the facts and circumstances of the

alleged offenses examined into on Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data that there have been an

on-going hearings on the verified Petition for Contempt, docketed as Special Proceedings No.

306-M-2006, before this Court for alleged violation by the respondents of the Preliminary

Injunction Order dated July 16, 2005 [sic] in Sp. Civil Action No. 833-M-2002, hearings were held

on January 25, 2008, February 12 and 19, 2008, where the respondents prayed for an April 22,

2008 continuance, however, in the pitch darkness of February 20, 2008, police officers, some

personnel from the Engineering department, and some civilians proceeded purposely to the

Pinoy Compound, converged therein and with continuing threats of bodily harm and danger and

stone-throwing of the roofs of the homes thereat from voices around its premises, on a pretext

of an ordinary police operation when enterviewed [sic] by the media then present, but at 8:00

a.m. to late in the afternoon of February 21, 2008, zoomed in on the petitioners, subjecting

them to bodily harm, mental torture, degradation, and the debasement of a human being,

reminiscent of the martial law police brutality, sending chill in any ordinary citizen,[8]



















rendered judgment, by Decision of March 28, 2008, in favor of respondents, disposing as follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commitment Orders and waivers in Crim. Cases

Nos. 08-77 for Direct assault; Crim. Case No. 08-77 for Other Forms of Trespass; and Crim. Case

No. 08-78 for Light Threats are hereby DECLARED illegal, null and void, as petitioners were

deprived of their substantial rights, induced by duress or a well-founded fear of personal

violence. Accordingly, the commitment orders and waivers are hereby SET ASIDE. The

temporary release of the petitioners is declared ABSOLUTE.

Without any pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.”[9]


Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, pursuant to Section 19[10]

of The Rule on the Writ

of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC),[11]

which is essentially reproduced in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas

Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC).[12]

In the main, petitioners fault the RTC for

… giving due course and issuing writs of amparo and habeas data when from the allegations of

the petition, the same ought not to have been issued as (1) the petition in [sic] insufficient in

substance as the same involves property rights; and (2) criminal cases had already been filed and

pending with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, City of Malolos. (Underscoring

supplied)

The petition is impressed with merit.

The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement

of constitutional rights.[13]

In view of the heightening prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced

disappearances, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued and took effect on October 24, 2007 which

coincided with the celebration of United Nations Day and affirmed the Court’s commitment towards

internationalization of human rights. More than three months later or on February 2, 2008, the Rule on the

Writ of Habeas Data was promulgated.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person

whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful

act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall

cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis and

underscoring supplied)

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person

whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or

omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the

gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and

correspondence of the aggrieved party. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)






















From the above-quoted provisions, the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life,

liberty and security. And the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.

Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo[14]

teaches:

As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of “extralegal

killings” and “enforced disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these

two instances or to threats thereof. “Extralegal killings” are “killings committed without dueprocess of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.” On the other hand,

“enforced disappearances” are “attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention

or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals

acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to

disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the

deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.[15]

(Underscoring

supplied, citations omitted)

To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold requirement thattheir right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the

present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial Government and

respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its effect on respondents’

right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners’ entry into the

property.

Apropos is the Court’s ruling in Tapuz v. Del Rosario:[16]

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response tothe extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the

perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is

intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an

extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as

a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are

purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and

uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo – in line with the

extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands –

requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying

allegations of fact, to wit:

x x x x

The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the

ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how

and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the

aggrieved party was or is being committed.[17]

(Emphasis and italics in the original, citation

omitted)

Tapuz also arose out of a property dispute, albeit between private individuals, with the petitioners

therein branding as “acts of terrorism” the therein respondents’ alleged entry into the disputed land with

armed men in tow. The Court therein held:

On the whole, what is clear from these statements – both sworn and unsworn – is the

overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical

possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to

life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past


















violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent

of the treats and harassments implied from the presence of “armed men bare to the waist” and

the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits

compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is

imminent or continuing.[18]


It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or continuing

threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations that petitioners “in unison, conspiracy and in contempt

of court, there and then willfully, forcibly and feloniously with the use of force and intimidation entered and

forcibly, physically manhandled the petitioners (respondents) and arrested the herein petitioners

(respondents)”[19]

will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue

confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day

after their arrest.[20]

Although respondents’ release from confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication for the writ

of amparo, absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and continuingrestraint on their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right

to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be justified.

That respondents are merely seeking the protection of their property rights is gathered from their Joint

Affidavit, viz:

x x x x

11. Kami ay humarang at humiga sa harap ng mga heavy equipment na hawak hawak angnasabing kautusan ng RTC Branch 10 (PERMANENT INJUNCTION at RTC ORDERS DATED February

12, 17 at 19 2008) upang ipaglaban ang dignidad ng kautusan ng korte, ipaglaban ang prinsipyo

ng “SELF-HELP” at batas ukol sa “PROPERTY RIGHTS”, Wala kaming nagawa ipagtanggol ang

aming karapatan sa lupa na 45 years naming “IN POSSESSION.” (Underscoring supplied)

Oddly, respondents also seek the issuance of a writ of habeas data when it is not even alleged that

petitioners are gathering, collecting or storing data or information regarding their person, family, home and

correspondence.

As for respondents’ assertion of past incidents[21]

wherein the Province allegedly violated the Permanent

Injunction order, these incidents were already raised in the injunction proceedings on account of which

respondents filed a case for criminal contempt against petitioners.[22]

Before the filing of the petition for writs of amparo and habeas data, or on February 22, 2008, petitioners

even instituted a petition for habeas corpus which was considered moot and academic by Branch 14 of the

Malolos RTC and was accordingly denied by Order of April 8, 2008.

More. Respondent Amanda and one of her sons, Francisco Jr., likewise filed a petition for writs

of amparo and habeas data before the Sandiganbayan, they alleging the commission of continuing threats by

petitioners after the issuance of the writs by the RTC, which petition was dismissed for insufficiency and forum

shopping.

It thus appears that respondents are not without recourse and have in fact taken full advantage of the

legal system with the filing of civil, criminal and administrative charges.[23]



























It need not be underlined that respondents’ petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are

extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in

a property dispute.

AT ALL EVENTS, respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have

been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante

delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112[24]

of the Rules of Court. Validity of the

arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and

not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data. The reliefs afforded by the writs may, however, be

made available to the aggrieved party by motion in the criminal proceedings.[25]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged March 4, 2008 Order of Branch 10 of the Regional

Trial Court of Malolos is DECLARED NULL AND VOID, and its March 28, 2008 Decision is REVERSED and SET

ASIDE. Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

3. Roxas vs. Arroyo

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF

MELISSA C. ROXAS, MELISSA C. ROXAS,

Petitioner,

-versus-

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME

VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ. GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA,

PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO LACADIN, AND CERTAIN PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 189155

Promulgated: September 7, 2010

D E C I S I O N

PEREZ, J .:

At bench is a Petition For Review on Certiorar i [1]

assailing the Decision[2]

dated 26 August 2009 of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA — a petition that was commenced jointly under the Rules on

the Writ of Amparo ( Amparo Rule) and Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule). In its decision, the Court of Appeals

extended to the petitioner, Melissa C. Roxas, the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data but deniedthe latter’s prayers for an inspection order, production order and return of specified personal

belongings. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. This Court hereby grants

Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.

Accordingly, Respondents are enjoined to refrain from distributing or causing the

distribution to the public of any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers






http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/189155.htm#_ftn1












relative to Petitioner’s Melissa C. Roxas, and/or Melissa Roxas; alleged ties to the CPP-NPA or

pertinently related to the complained incident. Petitioner’s prayers for an inspection order,

production order and for the return of the specified personal belongings are denied for lack of

merit. Although there is no evidence that Respondents are responsible for the abduction,

detention or torture of the Petitioner, said Respondents pursuant to their legally mandated

duties are, nonetheless, ordered to continue/complete the investigation of this incident with the

end in view of prosecuting those who are responsible. Respondents are also ordered to provide

protection to the Petitioner and her family while in the Philippines against any and all forms of

harassment, intimidation and coercion as may be relevant to the grant of these reliefs.

[3]

We begin with the petitioner’s allegations.

Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent.[4]

While in the United States, petitioner enrolled in

an exposure program to the Philippines with the groupBagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America

(BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member.[5]

During the course of her immersion, petitioner toured various

provinces and towns of Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to join members of BAYAN-

Tarlac[6]

in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical mission.[7]

In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet with Fifteen Thousand Pesos

(P15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard

disk, IPOD,[8]

wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines.[9]

After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions, Juanito Carabeo (Carabeo) and

John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr. Paolo)

in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac.[10]

At around 1:30 in the afternoon, however,

petitioner, her companions and Mr. Paolo were startled by the loud sounds of someone banging at the front

door and a voice demanding that they open up.[11]

Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside and ordered

petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground face down.[12]

The armed men were all in civilian clothes

and, with the exception of their leader, were also wearing bonnets to conceal their faces.[13]

Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men ganged up on her and tied her

hands.[14]

At this juncture, petitioner saw the other armed men herding Carabeo and Jandoc, already

blindfolded and taped at their mouths, to a nearby blue van. Petitioner started to shout her name.[15] Against

her vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged petitioner towards the van—bruising her arms, legs and

knees.[16]

Once inside the van, but before she can be blindfolded, petitioner was able to see the face of one of

the armed men sitting beside her.[17]

The van then sped away.

After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped.[18]

Petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc were ordered to

alight.[19]

After she was informed that she is being detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the

Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA), petitioner was separated from her companions and was escorted to

a room that she believed was a jail cell from the sound of its metal doors.[20]

From there, she could hear the

sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and landing and some construction bustle.[21]

She inferred that

she was taken to the military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.[22]

What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with torture.[23]

The thrust of the

interrogations was to convince petitioner to abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to “the

fold.”[24]

The torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and suffocating the

petitioner.[25]































































































Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in blindfolds even in her

sleep.[26]

Petitioner was only relieved of her blindfolds when she was allowed to take a bath, during which she

became acquainted with a woman named “Rose” who bathed her.[27]

There were also a few times when she

cheated her blindfold and was able to peek at her surroundings.[28]

Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn the names of three of her

interrogators who introduced themselves to her as “Dex,” “James” and “RC.” [29] “RC” even told petitioner that

those who tortured her came from the “Special Operations Group,” and that she was abducted because her

name is included in the “Order of Battle.”[30]

On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncle’s house in Quezon

City.[31]

Before being released, however, the abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone with a SIM[32]

card, a

slip of paper containing an e-mail address with password,[33]

a plastic bag containing biscuits and books,[34]

the

handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes.[35]

Petitioner was also sternly warned not to report the

incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will happen to her and her family.[36]

Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC via the cellular phone given to

her.[37]

Out of apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family,

petitioner threw away the cellular phone with a SIM card.

Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of any existing

government files or records linking her to the communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of

Amparo and Habeas Data before this Court on 1 June 2009.[38]

Petitioner impleaded public officials occupying

the uppermost echelons of the military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was

government agents who were behind her abduction and torture. Petitioner likewise included in her suit “Rose,”

“Dex” and “RC.”[39]

The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1) respondents be enjoined from harming or even

approaching petitioner and her family; (2) an order be issued allowing the inspection of detention areas in the

7th

Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3) respondents be ordered to produce documents

relating to any report on the case of petitioner including, but not limited to, intelligence report and operation

reports of the 7th

Infantry Division, the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)and its subsidiaries or branch/es prior to, during and subsequent to 19 May 2009; (4) respondents be ordered

to expunge from the records of the respondents any document pertinent or connected to Melissa C. Roxas,

Melissa Roxas or any name which sounds the same; and (5) respondents be ordered to return to petitioner her

journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch,

sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, medicines and her P15,000.00 cash.[40]

In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued the desired writs and referred the case to the Court

of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action.[41]

The Resolution also directed the

respondents to file their verified written return.[42]

On 18 June 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Return of the Writ s[43]

on behalf of the

public officials impleaded as respondents.

We now turn to the defenses interposed by the public respondents.









































































The public respondents label petitioner’s alleged abduction and torture as “stage managed.”[44]

In

support of their accusation, the public respondents principally rely on the statement of Mr. Paolo, as contained

in the Special Repor t [45]

of the La Paz Police Station. In the Special Report , Mr. Paolo disclosed that, prior to the

purported abduction, petitioner and her companions instructed him and his two sons to avoid leaving the

house.[46]

From this statement, the public respondents drew the distinct possibility that, except for those

already inside Mr. Paolo’s house, nobody else has any way of knowing where petitioner and her companions

were at the time they were supposedly abducted.[47]

This can only mean, the public respondents concluded,

that if ever there was any “abduction” it must necessarily have been planned by, or done with the consent of,

the petitioner and her companions themselves.[48]

Public respondents also cited the Medical Certificate[49]

of the petitioner, as actually belying her claims

that she was subjected to serious torture for five (5) days. The public respondents noted that while the

petitioner alleges that she was choked and boxed by her abductors—inflictions that could have easily produced

remarkable bruises—her Medical Certificate only shows abrasions in her wrists and knee caps.[50]

For the public respondents, the above anomalies put in question the very authenticity of petitioner’salleged abduction and torture, more so any military or police involvement therein. Hence, public respondents

conclude that the claims of abduction and torture was no more than a charade fabricated by the petitioner to

put the government in bad light, and at the same time, bring great media mileage to her and the group that she

represents.[51]

Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be genuine, the public respondents insist on

the dismissal of the Amparo and Habeas Data petition based on the following grounds: (a) as against

respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in particular, because of her immunity from suit ,[52]

and (b) as

against all of the public respondents, in general, in view of the absence of any specific allegation in the petition

that they had participated in, or at least authorized, the commission of such atrocities.[53]

Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not been remiss in their duty to ascertain the truth

behind the allegations of the petitioner.[54]

In both the police and military arms of the government machinery,

inquiries were set-up in the following manner:

Police Action

Police authorities first learned of the purported abduction around 4:30 o’clock in the afternoon of 19 May

2009, when Barangay Captain Michael M. Manuel came to the La Paz Municipal Police Station to report the

presence of heavily armed men somewhere in Barangay Kapanikian.[55]

Acting on the report, the police station

launched an initial investigation.[56]

The initial investigation revolved around the statement of Mr. Paolo, who informed the investigators of

an abduction incident involving three (3) persons—later identified as petitioner Melissa Roxas, Juanito Carabeo

and John Edward Jandoc—who were all staying in his house.[57]

Mr. Paolo disclosed that the abduction

occurred around 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon, and was perpetrated by about eight (8) heavily armed men who

forced their way inside his house.[58]

Other witnesses to the abduction also confirmed that the armed men

used a dark blue van with an unknown plate number and two (2) Honda XRM motorcycles with no plate

numbers.[59]

At 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, the investigators sent a Flash Message to the different

police stations surrounding La Paz, Tarlac, in an effort to track and locate the van and motorcycles of the

suspects. Unfortunately, the effort yielded negative results.[60]






































































On 20 May 2009, the results of the initial investigation were included in a Special Repor t [61]

that was

transmitted to the Tarlac Police Provincial Office, headed by public respondent P/S Supt. Rudy Lacadin (Supt.

Lacadin). Public respondent Supt. Lacadin, in turn, informed the Regional Police Office of Region 3 about the

abduction.[62]

Follow-up investigations were, at the same time, pursued.[63]

On 26 May 2009, public respondent PC/Supt. Leon Nilo Dela Cruz, as Director of the Regional Police

Office for Region 3, caused the creation of Special Investigation Task Group—CAROJAN (Task Group CAROJAN)

to conduct an in-depth investigation on the abduction of the petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc.[64]

Task Group CAROJAN started its inquiry by making a series of background examinations on the victims

of the purported abduction, in order to reveal the motive behind the abduction and, ultimately, the identity of

the perpetrators.[65]

Task Group CAROJAN also maintained liaisons with Karapatan and the Alliance for

Advancement of People’s Rights—organizations trusted by petitioner—in the hopes of obtaining the latter’s

participation in the ongoing investigations.[66]

Unfortunately, the letters sent by the investigators requesting for

the availability of the petitioner for inquiries were left unheeded.[67]

The progress of the investigations conducted by Task Group CAROJAN had been detailed in the

reports[68]

that it submitted to public respondent General Jesus Ame Verzosa, the Chief of the Philippine

National Police. However, as of their latest report dated 29 June 2009, Task Group CAROJAN is still unable to

make a definitive finding as to the true identity and affiliation of the abductors —a fact that task group

CAROJAN attributes to the refusal of the petitioner, or any of her fellow victims, to cooperate in their

investigative efforts.[69]

Military Action

Public respondent Gilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of National Defense, first came to know about the

alleged abduction and torture of the petitioner upon receipt of the Resolution of this Court directing him and

the other respondents to file their return.[70]

Immediately thereafter, he issued a Memorandum

Directive[71]

addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP, ordering the latter, among others, to conduct an inquiry

to determine the validity of the accusation of military involvement in the abduction.[72]

Acting pursuant to the Memorandum Directive, public respondent General Victor S. Ibrado, the AFP Chiefof Staff, sent an AFP Radio Message

[73] addressed to public respondent Lieutenant General Delfin N. Bangit (Lt.

Gen. Bangit), the Commanding General of the Army, relaying the order to cause an investigation on the

abduction of the petitioner.[74]

For his part, and taking cue from the allegations in the amparo petition, public respondent Lt. Gen. Bangit

instructed public respondent Major General Ralph A. Villanueva (Maj. Gen. Villanueva), the Commander of the

7th

Infantry Division of the Army based in Fort Magsaysay, to set in motion an investigation regarding the

possible involvement of any personnel assigned at the camp in the purported abduction of the petitioner.[75]

In

turn, public respondent Maj. Gen. Villanueva tapped the Office of the Provost Marshal (OPV) of the 7th

Infantry

Division, to conduct the investigation.[76]

On 23 June 2009, the OPV of the 7th

Infantry Division released an Investigation Repor t [77]

detailing the

results of its inquiry. In substance, the report described petitioner’s allegations as “opinionated” and thereby

cleared the military from any involvement in her alleged abduction and torture.[78]

The Decision of the Court of Appeals








































































In its Decision,[79]

the Court of Appeals gave due weight and consideration to the petitioner’s version that

she was indeed abducted and then subjected to torture for five (5) straight days. The appellate court noted the

sincerity and resolve by which the petitioner affirmed the contents of her affidavits in open court, and was

thereby convinced that the latter was telling the truth.[80]

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals disregarded the argument of the public respondents that the

abduction of the petitioner was “stage managed,” as it is merely based on an unfounded speculation that only

the latter and her companions knew where they were staying at the time they were forcibly taken .[81]

The

Court of Appeals further stressed that the Medical Certificate of the petitioner can only affirm the existence of

a true abduction, as its findings are reflective of the very injuries the latter claims to have sustained during her

harrowing ordeal, particularly when she was handcuffed and then dragged by her abductors onto their van.[82]

The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of an ongoing threat against the security of the

petitioner, as manifested in the attempts of “RC” to contact and monitor her, even after she was

released.[83]

This threat, according to the Court of Appeals, is all the more compounded by the failure of thepolice authorities to identify the material perpetrators who are still at large.

[84] Thus, the appellate court

extended to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo by directing the public respondents to afford

protection to the former, as well as continuing, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, their existing

investigations involving the abduction.[85]

The Court of Appeals likewise observed a transgression of the right to informational privacy of the

petitioner, noting the existence of “records of investigations” that concerns the petitioner as a suspected

member of the CPP-NPA.[86]

The appellate court derived the existence of such records from a photograph and

video file presented in a press conference by party-list representatives Jovito Palparan (Palparan) and Pastor

Alcover (Alcover), which allegedly show the petitioner participating in rebel exercises. Representative Alcover

also revealed that the photograph and video came from a female CPP-NPA member who wanted out of the

organization. According to the Court of Appeals, the proliferation of the photograph and video, as well as any

form of media, insinuating that petitioner is part of the CPP-NPA does not only constitute a violation of the

right to privacy of the petitioner but also puts further strain on her already volatile security.[87]

To this end, the

appellate court granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data mandating the public respondents to refrain

from distributing to the public any records, in whatever form, relative to petitioner’s alleged ties with the CPP -

NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture.[88]

The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court of Appeals was not convinced that the military or

any other person acting under the acquiescence of the government, were responsible for the abduction and

torture of the petitioner.[89]

The appellate court stressed that, judging by her own statements, the petitioner

merely “believed” that the military was behind her abduction.[90]

Thus, the Court of Appeals absolved the

public respondents from any complicity in the abduction and torture of petitioner.[91]

The petition was likewise

dismissed as against public respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in view of her immunity from

suit.[92]

Accordingly, the petitioner’s prayers for the return of her personal belongings were

denied.[93]

Petitioner’s prayers for an inspection order and production order also met the same fate.[94]

Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.

AMPARO



































































A.

Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving the public respondents from any

responsibility in her abduction and torture.[95]

Corollary to this, petitioner also finds fault on the part of Court

of Appeals in denying her prayer for the return of her personal belongings.[96]

Petitioner insists that the manner by which her abduction and torture was carried out, as well as the

sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes that she heard while in detention, as these were detailed in her

two affidavits and affirmed by her in open court, are already sufficient evidence to prove government

involvement.[97]

Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invokes the doctrine of command responsibility to implicate

the high-ranking civilian and military authorities she impleaded as respondents in her amparo petition.[98]

Thus,

petitioner seeks from this Court a pronouncement holding the respondents as complicit in her abduction and

torture, as well as liable for the return of her belongings.[99]

Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings

It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command

responsibility as the justification in impleading the public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally

inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes

liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in

an amparo petition.[100]

The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo,[101] which was the first to examine command responsibility in the context

of an amparo proceeding, observed that the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico notes that:[102]

The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of

laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its

simplest terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate

members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or

domestic conflict."[103]

In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal

complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command

responsibility,[104]

f oreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for

the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over

them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal

liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates

for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators[105]

(as opposed to crimes he ordered).

(Emphasis in the orginal, underscoring supplied)

Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is

more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a

summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself:

The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the

appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific

violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security.[106]

While the principal

objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal

killing or threats thereof had transpired—the writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance,

killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive



















































law.[107]

The rationale underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo writ has been, in turn, clearly set forth in

the landmark case of The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo:[108]

x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that

requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it

is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or

liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility

requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings .[109]

(Emphasis

supplied)

It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in

an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the

ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In

which case, commanders may be impleaded—not actually on the basis of command responsibility—but rather

on the ground of their responsibility, or at leastaccountability. In Razon v. Tagitis,[110]

the distinct, but

interrelated concepts of responsibility and accountability were given special and unique significations in

relation to an amparo proceeding, to wit:

x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence

to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a

measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate

criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on

the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who

exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their

complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge

relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who

carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation ofthe enforced disappearance.

Responsibility of Public Respondents

At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the petitioner in impleading the

public respondents is to ascribe some form of responsibilityon their part, based on her assumption that they,

in one way or the other, had condoned her abduction and torture.[111]

To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to show that it was government agents who were

behind her ordeal. Thus, the petitioner calls attention to the circumstances surrounding her abduction and

torture—i.e., the forcible taking in broad daylight; use of vehicles with no license plates; utilization of

blindfolds; conducting interrogations to elicit communist inclinations; and the infliction of physical abuse —

which, according to her, is consistent with the way enforced disappearances are being practiced by the military

or other state forces.[112]

Moreover, petitioner also claims that she was held inside the military camp Fort Magsaysay—a

conclusion that she was able to infer from the travel time required to reach the place where she was actuallydetained, and also from the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes she heard while thereat.

[113]

We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire

reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel and that she was detained at Fort

Magsaysay.

First . The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with those

surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to































exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of liability are not determinable in a mere

summary amparo proceeding.[118]

But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the fact that

a person’s right to be restituted of his property is already subsume d under the general rubric of property

rights—which are no longer protected by the writ of amparo.[119]

Section 1 of the Amparo Rule,[120]

which

defines the scope and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of property rights.

B.

The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the Court of Appeals of her prayer for an

inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.[121]

Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military involvement in petitioner’s

ordeal, this Court finds no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in denying an inspection of the military

camp at Fort Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate court that a contrary stance would be equivalent tosanctioning a “fishing expedition,” which was never intended by the Amparo Rule in providing for the interim

relief of inspection order.[122]

Contrary to the explicit position[123]

espoused by the petitioner, the Amparo Rule

does not allow a “fishing expedition” for evidence.

An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner

in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision .[124]

A basic requirement before

an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable

from the allegations of the party seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule does not require that the place to

be inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an

inspection order that the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima

facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner failed to do.

Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough to make out a prima

facie case that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered. An

inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful.

HABEAS DATA

As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas

data, by enjoining the public respondents from“distributing or causing the distribution to the public any

records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers” relative to the petitioner’s “alleged ties with

the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture.” Though not raised as an issue in this appeal,

this Court is constrained to pass upon and review this particular ruling of the Court of Appeals in order to

rectify, what appears to Us, an error infecting the grant.

For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the Court of Appeals in granting the privilege of the

writ of habeas data, We quote hereunder the relevant portion[125]

of its decision:

Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the records, intelligence reports and

reports on the investigations conducted on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas be produced and

eventually expunged from the records. Petitioner claimed to be included in the Government’s

Order of Battle under Oplan Bantay Laya which listed political opponents against whom false

criminal charges were filed based on made up and perjured information.
































Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner could testify before Us, Ex-

army general Jovito Palaparan, Bantay party-list, and Pastor Alcover of the Alliance for

Nationalism and Democracy party-list held a press conference where they revealed that they

received an information from a female NPA rebel who wanted out of the organization, that

Petitioner was a communist rebel. Alcover claimed that said information reached them thru a

letter with photo of Petitioner holding firearms at an NPA training camp and a video CD of the

training exercises.

Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioner’s denial that she was the person in said video,there were records of other investigations on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas which violate

her right to privacy. Without a doubt, reports of such nature have reasonable connections, one

way or another, to petitioner’s abduction where she claimed she had been subjected to cruelties

and dehumanizing acts which nearly caused her life precisely due to allegation of her alleged

membership in the CPP-NPA. And if said report or similar reports are to be continuously made

available to the public, Petitioner’s security and privacy will certainly be in danger of being

violated or transgressed by persons who have strong sentiments or aversion against members of

this group. The unregulated dissemination of said unverified video CD or reports of Petitioner’s

alleged ties with the CPP-NPA indiscriminately made available for public consumption without

evidence of its authenticity or veracity certainly violates Peti tioner’s right to privacy which must

be protected by this Court. We, thus, deem it necessary to grant Petitioner the privilege of theWrit of Habeas Data. (Emphasis supplied).

The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most

especially the right to informational privacy of individuals.[126]

The writ operates to protect a person’s right to

control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such information is being collected

through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.

Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is theshowing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life,

liberty or security of the victim.[127]

This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do.

The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually no evidence on

record that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy of the

petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public respondents that would have violated or

threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and other reports about

the petitioner’s ties with the CPP-NPA, was not adequately proven—considering that the origin of such records

were virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate court from the video and

photograph released by Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press conference. No evidence on

record even shows that any of the public respondents had access to such video or photograph.

In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining the public

respondents from “distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports,

documents or similar papers” relative to the petitioner’s “alleged ties with the CPP-NPA,” appears to be devoid

of any legal basis. The public respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something that, in the

first place, it was not proven to have.

Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to be actually responsible for the

abduction and torture of the petitioner, any inference regarding the existence of reports being kept in violation

of the petitioner’s right to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature.

For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege of

the writ of habeas data.











DISPOSITION OF THE CASE

Our review of the evidence of the petitioner, while telling of its innate insufficiency to impute any form of

responsibility on the part of the public respondents, revealed two important things that can guide Us to a

proper disposition of this case. One, that further investigation with the use of extraordinary diligence must be

made in order to identify the perpetrators behind the abduction and torture of the petitioner; and two, that

the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), pursuant to its Constitutional mandate to “investigate all forms of

human rights violations involving civil and political rights and to provide appropriate legal measures for the

protection of human rights,”[128]

must be tapped in order to fill certain investigative and remedial voids.

Further Investigation Must Be Undertaken

Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason why the petitioner was not able to adduce

substantial evidence proving her allegations of government complicity in her abduction and torture, may be

attributed to the incomplete and one-sided investigations conducted by the government itself. This“awkward ” situation, wherein the very persons alleged to be involved in an enforced disappearance or

extralegal killing are, at the same time, the very ones tasked by law to investigate the matter, is a unique

characteristic of these proceedings and is the main source of the “ evidentiary difficulties” faced by any

petitioner in any amparocase.[129]

Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule placed a potent safeguard—requiring the

“respondent who is a public official or employee” to prove that no less than “extraordinary diligence as

required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.”[130]

Thus, unless

and until any of the public respondents is able to show to the satisfaction of the amparo court that

extraordinary diligence has been observed in their investigations, they cannot shed the allegations of

responsibility despite the prevailing scarcity of evidence to that effect.

With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence, as required by the Amparo Rule, was not fully

observed in the conduct of the police and military investigations in the case at bar.

A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by Task Group CAROJAN shows modest effort on the

part of the police investigators to identify the perpetrators of the abduction. To be sure, said reports arereplete with background checks on the victims of the abduction, but are, at the same time, comparatively silent

as to other concrete steps the investigators have been taking to ascertain the authors of the crime. Although

conducting a background investigation on the victims is a logical first step in exposing the motive behind the

abduction—its necessity is clearly outweighed by the need to identify the perpetrators, especially in light of the

fact that the petitioner, who was no longer in captivity, already came up with allegations about the motive of

her captors.

Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their investigations solely on the cooperation or non-

cooperation of the petitioner—who, they claim, was less than enthusiastic in participating in their investigative

efforts.[131]

While it may be conceded that the participation of the petitioner would have facilitated the

progress of Task Group CAROJAN’s investigation, this Court believes that the former’s reticence to cooperate is

hardly an excuse for Task Group CAROJAN not to explore other means or avenues from which they could obtain

relevant leads.[132]

Indeed, while the allegations of government complicity by the petitioner cannot, by

themselves, hold up as adequate evidence before a court of law—they are, nonetheless, a vital source of

valuable investigative leads that must be pursued and verified, if only to comply with the high standard of

diligence required by the Amparo Rule in the conduct of investigations.






















Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task Group CAROJAN’s reports still failed to explain

why it never considered seeking the assistance of Mr. Jesus Paolo—who, along with the victims, is a central

witness to the abduction. The reports of Task Group CAROJAN is silent in any attempt to obtain from Mr.

Paolo, a cartographic sketch of the abductors or, at the very least, of the one who, by petitioner’s account, was

not wearing any mask.

The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a comparative material to the sketches included in

petitioner’s offer of exhibits that, it may be pointed out, were prepared under the direction of, and first

submitted to, the CHR pursuant to the latter’s independent investigation on the abduction and torture of t he

petitioner.[133]

But as mentioned earlier, the CHR sketches remain to be unidentified as of this date.

In light of these considerations, We agree with the Court of Appeals that further investigation under the

norm of extraordinary diligence should be undertaken. This Court simply cannot write finis to this case, on the

basis of an incomplete investigation conducted by the police and the military. In a very real sense, the right to

security of the petitioner is continuously put in jeopardy because of the deficient investigation that directlycontributes to the delay in bringing the real perpetrators before the bar of justice.

To add teeth to the appellate court’s directive, however, We find it fitting, nay, necessary to shift the

primary task of conducting further investigations on the abduction and torture of the petitioner upon the

CHR.[134]

We note that the CHR, unlike the police or the military, seems to enjoy the trust and confidence of

the petitioner—as evidenced by her attendance and participation in the hearings already conducted by the

commission.[135]

Certainly, it would be reasonable to assume from such cooperation that the investigations of

the CHR have advanced, or at the very least, bears the most promise of advancing farther, in terms of locating

the perpetrators of the abduction, and is thus, vital for a final resolution of this petition. From this perspective,

We also deem it just and appropriate to relegate the task of affording interim protection to the petitioner, also

to the CHR.

Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further investigation, as follows—

1.) Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation regarding the

abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the norm of extraordinary

diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the

cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue anyother leads relevant to petitioner’s abduction and torture.

2.) Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his successor, and the

incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation

of the CHR, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the

time of the petitioner’s abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the

Constitution and existing laws.

3.) Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court

of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their

recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90)

days from receipt of this decision.

4.) Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt

of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and















to (b) provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the

Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court.

Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the Court of Appeals, for the purposes of monitoring

compliance with the above directives and determining whether, in light of any recent reports or

recommendations, there would already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents

responsible or, at least, accountable. After making such determination, the Court of Appeals shall submit its

own report with recommendation to this Court for final action. The Court of Appeals will continue to have

jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its tasks under this decision.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. We hereby render a decision:

1.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer for the return of her personal belongings;

2.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort

Magsaysay.

3.) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without prejudice, however, to any

modification that this Court may make on the basis of the investigation reports and recommendations

submitted to it under this decision.

4.) MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be undertaken, as follows—

a. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as the lead agency tasked with conducting

further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the

Commission on Human Rights shall, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue

to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches

submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads

relevant to petitioner’s abduction and torture.

b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, and the

incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or his successor, to extend

assistance to the ongoing investigation of the Commission on Human Rights, including but notlimited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioner’s

abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and

existing laws.

c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, to

furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of

the reports of its investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are already

part of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.

d. Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights (a) to furnish to the Court of Appeals

within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation

and its corresponding recommendations; and (b) to provide or continue to provide protection to

the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be

determined by this Court.

5.) REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of Appeals for the following purposes:



a. To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken by the PNP, AFP, and the CHR;

b. To DETERMINE whether, in light of the reports and recommendations of the CHR, the

abduction and torture of the petitioner was committed by persons acting under any of the

public respondents; and on the basis of this determination—

c. To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of the report and recommendationof the Commission on Human Rights—its own report, which shall include a recommendation

either for the DISMISSAL of the petition as against the public respondents who were found not

responsible and/or accountable, or for the APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL MEASURES, AS MAY BE

ALLOWED BY THE AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA RULES, TO BE UNDERTAKEN as against those

found responsible and/or accountable.

Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this petition to answer for any

responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies.

Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 26 August 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-

WRA that are not contrary to this decision areAFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

4. Rodriguez vs Arroyo

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN

FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioner,

- versus -

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA,

LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G.

TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an officer named

MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the name “HARRY,”

ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN “BONG” PASICOLAN and VINCENT CALLAGAN,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 191805

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN

FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, POLICE DIR. GEN. JESUS A. VERSOZA, P/SSUPT.

JUDE W. SANTOS, BGEN. REMEGIO M. DE VERA, 1ST

LT. RYAN S. MATUTINA, LT. COL.

LAURENCE E. MINA, ANTONIO C. CRUZ, ALDWIN C. PASICOLAN and VICENTE A.

CALLAGAN,

Petitioners,

- versus -

NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 193160

Promulgated:

November 15, 2011

D E C I S I O N

SERENO, J.:



Before this Court are two consolidated cases, namely, (1) Petition for Partial Review on Certiorari dated

20 April 2010 (G.R. No. 191805), and (2) Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 19 August 2010 (G.R. No.

193160).[1]

Both Petitions assail the 12 April 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive portion of

which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data is GRANTED.

Respondents Gen. Victor S. Ibrado, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Z. Ochoa,

PCSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, PSSupt. Jude W. Santos, Col. Remigio M. De Vera, Lt. Col. LaurenceE. Mina and 1Lt. Ryan S. Matutina, or their replacements in their official posts if they have

already vacated the same, are ORDERED to furnish this Court within five (5) days from notice of

this decision, official or unofficial reports pertaining to petitioner – covering but not limited to

intelligence reports, operation reports and provost marshal reports prior to, during and

subsequent to September 6, 2009 – made by the 5th

Infantry Division, Philippine Army, its

branches and subsidiaries, including the 17th

Infantry Battalion, Philippine Army.

The above-named respondents are also DIRECTED to refrain from using the said reports

in any transaction or operation of the military. Necessarily, the afore-named respondents

areORDERED to expunge from the records of the military all documents having any reference topetitioner.

Likewise, the afore-named respondents, as well as respondents Police Director General

Jesus Ame Versoza, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicente Callagan are DIRECTEDto ensure

that no further violation of petitioner’s rights to life, liberty and security is committed against the

latter or any member of his family.

The petition is DISMISSED with respect to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on account

of her presidential immunity from suit. Similarly, the petition is DISMISSED with respect to

respondents Calog and George Palacpac or Harry for lack of merit.

Petitioner’s prayer for issuance of a temporary protection order and inspection order

is DENIED.

Noriel Rodriguez (Rodriguez) is petitioner in G.R. No. 191805 and respondent in G.R. No. 193160. He is a

member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang

Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).

On the other hand, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (former President Arroyo), Police Director General (PDG.)

Jesus A. Verzosa, Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSupt.) Jude W. Santos, Brigadier General (Brig. Gen.)

Remegio M. De Vera, First Lieutenant (1st

Lt.) Ryan S. Matutina, Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. Col.) Laurence E. Mina,

Antonio C. Cruz (Cruz), Aldwin C. Pasicolan (Pasicolan) and Vicente A. Callagan (Callagan) are respondents in

G.R. No. 191805 and petitioners in G.R. No. 193160. At the time the events relevant to the present Petitions

occurred, former President Arroyo was the President of the Philippines. PDG. Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, Brig.

Gen. De Vera, 1st

Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina were officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP). Cruz,

Pasicolan and Callagan were Special Investigators of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in Region II.

Antecedent Facts

Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya,making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

[2]

On 6 September 2009, at 5:00 p.m., Rodriguez had just reached Barangay Tapel, Cagayan onboard a

tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos (Carlos), when four men forcibly took him and forced him into a

car. Inside the vehicle were several men in civilian clothes, one of whom was holding a .45 caliber pistol.

Subsequently, three more persons arrived, and one of them carried a gun at his side. Two men boarded the

car, while the others rode on the tricycle.[3]















The men tied the hands of Rodriguez, ordered him to lie on his stomach, sat on his back and started

punching him. The car travelled towards the direction of Sta. Teresita-Mission and moved around the area until

about 2:00 a.m. During the drive, the men forced Rodriguez to confess to being a member of the New People’s

Army (NPA), but he remained silent. The car then entered a place that appeared to be a military camp. There

were soldiers all over the area, and there was a banner with the word “Bravo” written on it. Rodriguez later on

learned that the camp belonged to the 17th

Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.[4]

Rodriguez was brought to a canteen, where six men confronted him, ordering him to confess to his

membership in the NPA. Due to his exhaustion, he unintentionally fell asleep. As a result, the men hit him on

the head to wake him up. After the interrogation, two of the men guarded him, but did not allow him to

sleep.[5]

In the morning of 7 September 2009, the men tied the hands of Rodriguez, blindfolded him and made him

board a vehicle. While they were in transit, the soldiers repeatedly hit him in the head and threatened to kill

him. When the car stopped after about ten minutes, the soldiers brought him to a room, removed his blindfold,

and forced him to confess to being a member of the NPA. During the interrogation, the soldiers repeatedly hit

him on the head. Thereafter, he was detained inside the room for the entire day. The soldiers tied his stomach

to a papag, and gave him rice and viand. Fearing that the food might be poisoned, he refused to eat anything.He slept on the papag while being tied to it at the waist.

[6]

On 8 September 2009, the men forced Rodriguez into a vehicle, which brought them to Bugey and

Mission. While passing houses along the way, the men asked him if his contacts lived in those houses. When

he failed to answer, a soldier pointed a gun to his head and threatened to kill him and his family. Because he

remained silent, the soldiers beat him and tied him up. The vehicle returned to the military camp at past 1:00

p.m., where he was again subjected to tactical interrogation about the location of an NPA camp and his alleged

NPA comrades. He suffered incessant mauling every time he failed to answer.[7]

At dawn on 9 September 2009, soldiers armed with rifles took Rodriguez and made him their guide ontheir way to an NPA camp in Birao. Accompanying them was a man named Harry, who, according to the

soldiers, was an NPA member who had surrendered to the military. Harry pointed to Rodriguez and called him

a member of the NPA. He also heard Harry tell the soldiers that the latter knew the area well and was

acquainted with a man named Elvis. The soldiers loaded Rodriguez into a military truck and drove to Tabbak,

Bugey. While he was walking with the soldiers, he noticed a soldier with the name tag “Matutina,” who

appeared to be an official because the other soldiers addressed him as “sir.”[8]

Upon reaching Birao on foot, the soldiers looked for and was able to locate a certain Elvis and told him

that Rodriguez had identified his whereabouts location. The soldiers forced Rodriguez to convince Elvis to

disclose the location of the NPA camp. They brought the two to the mountains, where both were threatened

with death. When the soldiers punched Elvis, Rodriguez told them that he would reveal the location of the

NPA camp if they let Elvis go home. They finally released Elvis around 3:00 p.m. that day. The soldiers and

Rodriguez spent the next three nights in the mountains.[9]

On 12 September 2009, the soldiers again hit Rodriguez and forced him to identify the location of the

NPA camp. He was blindfolded and warned to get ready because they would beat him up again in the military

camp. Upon arrival therein, they brought him to the same room where he had first been detained, and two

soldiers mauled him again. They repeatedly punched and kicked him. In the afternoon, they let him rest and

gave him an Alaxan tablet. Thereafter, he fell asleep due to over-fatigue and extreme body pain. The soldiers,however, hit him again. After giving him a pen and a piece of paper, they ordered him to write down his

request for rice from the people. When he refused, the soldiers maltreated him once more.[10]

On 13 September 2009, the soldiers forced Rodriguez to sign documents declaring that he had

surrendered in an encounter in Cumao, and































that the soldiers did not shoot him because he became a military asset in May. When he refused to sign the

document, he received another beating. Thus, he was compelled to sign, but did so using a different signature

to show that he was merely coerced.[11]

The soldiers showed Rodriguez photographs of different persons and asked him if he knew the men

appearing therein. When he told them that he did not recognize the individuals on the photos, the soldiers

instructed him to write down the name of his school and organization, but he declined. The soldiers then wrote

something on the paper, making it appear that he was the one who had written it, and forced him to sign the

document. The soldiers took photographs of him while he was signing. Afterwards, the soldiers forced him

down, held his hands, and sat on his feet. He did not only receive another beating, but was also electrocuted.

The torture lasted for about an hour.[12]

At 11:00 p.m. on 15 September 2009, the soldiers brought Rodriguez to a military operation in the

mountains, where he saw Matutina again. They all spent the night there.[13]

In the morning of 16 September 2009, the soldiers and Rodriguez started their descent. When they

stopped, the soldiers took his photograph and asked him to name the location of the NPA camp. Thereafter,

they all returned to the military camp. The soldiers asked him to take a bath and wear a white polo shirt

handed to him. He was then brought to the Enrile Medical Center, where Dr. Juliet Ramil (Dr. Ramil) examined

him.[14]

When the doctor asked him why he had bruises and contusions, he lied and told her that he sustained

them when he slipped, as he noticed a soldier observing him. Dr. Ramil’s medical certificate indicated that he

suffered from four hematomas in the epigastric area, chest and sternum.[15]

Back at the camp, the soldiers let Rodriguez eat with several military officials and took pictures of him

while he was eating with them. They also asked him to point to a map in front of him and again took his

photograph. Later, they told him that he would finally see his mother.[16]

Rodriguez was brought to another military camp, where he was ordered to sign a piece of paper statingthat he was a surrenderee and was never beaten up. Scared and desperate to end his ordeal, he signed the

paper and was warned not to report anything to the media.[17]

Around 6:00 a.m. on 17 September 2009, the soldiers instructed petitioner to take a bath. They gave him

a pair of jeans and perfume. While he was having breakfast, the two soldiers guarding him repeatedly

reminded him not to disclose to the media his experience in the camp and to say instead that he had

surrendered to the military.[18]

At 9:00 a.m. on the same day, the mother and the brother of Rodriguez arrived surrounded by several

men. His mother, Wilma Rodriguez (Wilma), talked to Lt. Col. Mina. Rodriguez heard one of the soldiers tellWilma that he had surrendered to the military and had long been its asset. His brother, Rodel Rodriguez

(Rodel), informed him that the men accompanying them were from the CHR, namely, Pasicolan, Cruz and

Callagan. Upon seeing Rodriguez, Cruz instructed him to lift up his shirt, and one of the CHR employees took

photographs of his bruises.[19]

A soldier tried to convince Wilma to let Rodriguez stay in the camp for another two weeks to supposedly

prevent the NPA from taking revenge on him. Respondent Calog also approached Rodriguez and Rodel and

asked them to become military assets. Rodel refused and insisted that they take Rodriguez home to Manila.

Again, the soldiers reminded them to refrain from facing the media. The soldiers also told them that the latter

will be taken to the Tuguegarao Airport and guarded until they reached home.[20]

Rodriguez and his family missed their flight. Subsequently, the soldiers accompanied them to the CHR

office, where Rodriguez was made to sign an affidavit stating that he was neither abducted nor

tortured. Afraid and desperate to return home, he was forced to sign the document. Cruz advised him not to

file a case against his abductors because they had already freed him. The CHR personnel then led him and his

family to the CHR Toyota Tamaraw FX service vehicle. He noticed that a vehicle with soldiers on board followed

them.[21]














































The Tamaraw FX pulled over and respondent 1st

Lt. Matutina boarded the vehicle. Upon reaching a mall in

Isabela, Rodriguez, his family, Callagan, 1st

Lt. Matutina and two other soldiers transferred to an orange Toyota

Revo with plate number WTG 579. Upon reaching the boundary of Nueva Ecija and Nueva Viscaya, 1st

Lt.

Matutina alighted and called Rodriguez to a diner. A certain Alan approached Rodriguez and handed him a

cellphone with a SIM card. The latter and his family then left and resumed their journey back home.[22]

Rodriguez reached his house in Sta. Ana, Manila at 3:00 a.m. on 18 September 2010. Callagan and two soldiers

went inside the house, and took photographs and a video footage thereof. The soldiers explained that the photos

and videos would serve as evidence of the fact that Rodriguez and his family were able to arrive home safely.

Despite Rodriguez’s efforts to confront the soldiers about their acts, they still continued and only left thirty minutes

later.[23]

On 19 September 2009, Dr. Reginaldo Pamugas, a physician trained by the International Committee on

Torture and Rehabilitation, examined Rodriguez and issued a Medical Certificate stating that the latter had been a

victim of torture.[24]

Around 7:00 a.m. on 3 November 2010, Rodriguez and his girlfriend, Aileen Hazel Robles, noticed that

several suspicious-looking men followed them at the Metro Rail Transit (MRT), in the streets and on a

jeepney.[25]

On 7 December 2009, Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for

the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents

and Personal Properties dated 2 December 2009.[26]

The petition was filed against former President Arroyo,

Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino,

P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st

Lt. Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac (Palacpac), Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.

The petition prayed for the following reliefs:

a. The issuance of the writ of amparo ordering respondents to desist from violating Rodriguez’sright to life, liberty and security.

b. The issuance of an order to enjoin respondents from doing harm to or approaching

Rodriguez, his family and his witnesses.

c. Allowing the inspection of the detention areas of the Headquarters of Bravo Co., 5th

Infantry

Division, Maguing, Gonzaga, Cagayan and another place near where Rodriguez was brought.

d. Ordering respondents to produce documents submitted to them regarding any report on

Rodriguez, including operation reports and

provost marshall reports of the 5th

Infantry Division, the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces

of the Philippines (AFP), prior to, on and subsequent to 6 September 2009.

e. Ordering records pertinent or in any way connected to Rodriguez, which are in the custody

of respondents, to be expunged, disabused, and forever barred from being used.[27]

On 15 December 2009, we granted the respective writs after finding that the petition sufficiently

alleged that Rodriguez had been abducted, tortured and later released by members of the 17 th Infantry

Battalion of the Philippine Army.[28]

We likewise ordered respondents therein to file a verified return on the

writs on or before 22 December 2009 and to comment on the petition on or before 4 January 2010 .[29]

Finally,

we directed the Court of Appeals to hear the petition on 4 January 2010 and decide on the case within 10 days

after its submission for decision.[30]

During the initial hearing on 4 January 2010, the Court of Appeals required the parties to submit

affidavits and other pieces of evidence at the next scheduled hearing on 27 January 2010.[31]











































On 8 January 2010, respondents therein, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed their

Return of the Writ, which was likewise considered as their comment on the petition.[32]

In their Return,

respondents therein alleged that Rodriguez had surrendered to the military on 28 May 2009 after he had been

put under surveillance and identified as “Ka Pepito” by former rebels.[33]

According to his military handlers,

Corporal (Cpl.) Rodel

B. Cabaccan and Cpl. Julius P. Navarro, Rodriguez was a former member of the NPA operating in Cagayan

Valley.[34]

Wanting to bolt from the NPA, he told Cpl. Cabaccan and Cpl. Navarro that he would help the military

in exchange for his protection.[35]

Upon his voluntary surrender on 28 May 2009, Rodriguez was made to sign an Oath of Loyalty and an

Agent’s Agreement/Contract, showing his willingness to return to society and become a military asset.[36]

Since

then, he acted as a double agent, returning to the NPA to gather information .[37]

However, he feared that his

NPA comrades were beginning to suspect him of being an infiltrator.[38]

Thus, with his knowledge and consent,

the soldiers planned to stage a sham abduction to erase any suspicion about him being a double

agent.[39]

Hence, the abduction subject of the instant petition was conducted.[40]

Meanwhile, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan filed a Consolidated Return of the Writ dated 15 January

2010,[41]

alleging that they had exercised extraordinary diligence in locating Rodriguez, facilitating his safe

turnover to his family and securing their journey back home to Manila. More specifically, they alleged that, on 16

September 2009, after Wilma sought their assistance in ascertaining the whereabouts of her son, Cruz made

phone calls to the military and law enforcement agencies to determine his location.[42]

Cruz was able to speak

with Lt. Col. Mina, who confirmed that Rodriguez was in their custody.[43]

This information was transmitted to

CHR Regional Director Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga. He, in turn, ordered Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan to accompany

Wilma to the 17th

Infantry Division.[44]

When the CHR officers, along with Wilma and Rodel, arrived at the 17th

Infantry Battalion at Masin,

Alcala, Cagayan, Brigade Commander Col. de Vera and Battalion Commander Lt. Col. Mina alleged that

Rodriguez had become one of their assets, as evidenced by the Summary on the Surrender of Noriel Rodriguez

and the latter’s Contract as Agent.[45]

The CHR officers observed his casual and cordial demeanor with the

soldiers.[46]

In any case, Cruz asked him to raise his shirt to see if he had been subjected to any maltreatment.

Cruz and Pasicolan did not see any traces of torture. Thereafter, Rodriguez was released to his family, and they

were made to sign a certification to this effect. During the signing of the document, herein CHR officers did not

witness any threat, intimidation or force employed against Rodriguez or his family. [47]

During their journey back to the home of Rodriguez, the CHR officers observed that he was very much

at ease with his military escorts, especially with 1st

Lt. Matutina.[48]

Neither was there any force or intimidation

when the soldiers took pictures of his house, as the taking of photographs was performed with Wilma’s

consent.

During the hearing on 27 January 2010, the parties agreed to file additional affidavits and position

papers and to have the case considered submitted for decision after the filing of these pleadings.[50]

On 12 April 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision.[51]

Subsequently, on 28 April 2010,

respondents therein filed their Motion for Reconsideration.[52]

Before the Court of Appeals could resolve this

Motion for Reconsideration, Rodriguez filed the instant Petition for Partial Review on Certiorari (G.R. No.

191805), raising the following assignment of errors:

a. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for temporary

protection order.

b. The Court of Appeals erred in saying: “(H)owever, given the nature of the writ

of amparo, which has the effect of enjoining the commission by respondents of violation to

petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security, the safety of petitioner is ensured with the issuance



















































































of the writ, even in the absence of an order preventing respondent from approaching

petitioner.”

c. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that respondent Gloria Macapagal Arroyo

had command responsibility.[53]

On the other hand, respondents therein, in their Comment dated 30 July 2010, averred:

a. The Court of Appeals properly dropped then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a

party-respondent, as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual

incumbency.

b. Petitioner had not presented any adequate and competent evidence, much less

substantial evidence, to establish his claim that public respondents had violated, were violating

or threatening to violate his rights to life, liberty and security, as well as his right to privacy.

Hence, he was not entitled to the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data or to the

corresponding interim reliefs (i.e. inspection order, production order and temporary protection

order) provided under the rule on the writ of amparo and the rule on the writ of habeas data.[54]

On 19 August 2010, PDG. Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, BGen. De Vera, 1st

Lt. Matutina, Lt. Col. Mina, Cruz,

Pasicolan and Callagan filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking the reversal of the 12 April 2010

Decision of the Court of Appeals.[55]

They alleged that Rodriguez –

Has not presented any adequate and competent evidence, must less substantial

evidence, to establish his claim that petitioners have violated, are violating or threatening with

violation his rights to life, liberty and security, as well as his right to privacy; hence, he is not

entitled to the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data and their corresponding interim

reliefs (i.e., inspection order, production order and temporary protection order) provided underthe Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.

[56]

In ascertaining whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in issuing its assailed Decision

and Resolution, the following issues must be resolved:

I. Whether the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after the writs

of amparo and habeas data have already been issued in his favor.

II. Whether former President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent on the basis of thepresidential immunity from suit.

III. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data

cases.

IV. Whether the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez were violated or threatened by

respondents in G.R. No. 191805.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the writs of amparo and habeas data were promulgated to

ensure the protection of the people’s rights to life, liberty and security .[57]

The rules on these writs were issued

in light of the alarming prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.[58]

The Rule on the Writ

of Amparo took effect on 24 October 2007,[59]

and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data on 2 February 2008.[60]

The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it

partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and

permanent reliefs available to the petitioner.[61]

It is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof

beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative

responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings .[62]

Rather, it











































serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced

disappearances.[63]

It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these

offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading

to subsequent investigation and action.[64]

Meanwhile, the writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a person’s right to control

information regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such information is being collected through

unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.[65]

As an independent and summary remedy to protect the

right to privacy – especially the right to informational privacy[66] – the proceedings for the issuance of the writ

of habeas data does not entail any finding of criminal, civil or administrative culpability. If the allegations in the

petition are proven through substantial evidence, then the Court may (a) grant access to the database or

information; (b) enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in case the database or information contains erroneous

data or information, order its deletion, destruction or rectification.[67]

First issue: Grant of interim reliefs

In the petition in G.R. No. 191805, Rodriguez prays for the issuance of a temporary protection order. It

must be underscored that this interim relief is only available before final judgment. Section 14 of the Rule on

the Writ of Amparo clearly provides:

Interim Reliefs. – Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment , the

court, justice or judge may grant any of the following reliefs:

Temporary Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu

proprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediatefamily be protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or private institution

capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an organization, association or

institution referred to in Section 3(c) of this Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers

involved.

The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend

temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the

immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall issue.

The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and

conditions that may be imposed by the court, justice or judge.

(a) Inspection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after

due hearing, may order any person in possession or control of a designated land or other

property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing

the property or any relevant object or operation thereon.

The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported

by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced

disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.

If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of

the information, the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the

merit of the opposition.

The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the

aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated.

The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the

inspection and the date, time, place and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe























other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall expire five (5)

days after the date of its issuance, unless extended for justifiable reasons.

(b) Production Order. – The court, justice, or judge, upon verified motion and

after due hearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control of any designated

documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, or objects

in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or

the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of

the movant.

The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged

nature of the information, in which case the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in

chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.

The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional

rights of all the parties.

(c) Witness Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu

proprio, may refer the witnesses to the Department of Justice for admission to the Witness

Protection, Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981.

The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other government agencies, or

to accredited persons or private institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety.

(Emphasis supplied)

We held in Yano v. Sanchez[68]

that “[t]hese provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it

arrives at a judicious determination of the amparopetition.” Being interim reliefs, they can only be granted

before a final adjudication of the case is made. In any case, it must be underscored that the privilege of the writ

of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since we grant petitionerthe privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary protection order independently of the

former. The order restricting respondents from going near Rodriguez is subsumed under the privilege of the writ.

Second issue: Presidential immunity from suit

It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability

in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or

accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing. As we held in Razon v. Tagitis:[69]

It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance;rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for

purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the

disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by

substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced

disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to

file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper

courts. Accountability , on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be

addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing

the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed

with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure;or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the

investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of

Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the

victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.[70]

(Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, in the case at bar, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision[71]

found respondents in G.R. No. 191805 – with

the exception of Calog, Palacpac or Harry – to be accountable for the violations of Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty

and security committed by the 17th

Infantry Battalion, 5th

Infantry Division of the Philippine Army.[72]

The Court of






















Appeals dismissed the petition with respect to former President Arroyo on account of her presidential immunity

from suit. Rodriguez contends, though, that she should remain a respondent in this case to enable the courts to

determine whether she is responsible or accountable therefor. In this regard, it must be clarified that the Court of

Appeals’ rationale for dropping her from the list of respondents no longer stands since her presidential

immunity is limited only to her incumbency.

In Estrada v. Desierto,[73]

we clarified the doctrine that a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity

from suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure. We emphasize our ruling therein that courts

should look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for

truth or impairs the vindication of a right, to wit:

We reject [Estrada’s] argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he

must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner

Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of

the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83

“Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio.” Since the Impeachment Court is

now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached

and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar

against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him ina better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment

proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the

Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become

moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be

filed against him, viz:

“xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been

filed against the President, for example, and the President resigns before judgment of conviction has been rendered by the impeachment court or by the

body, how does it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily

dropped?

Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one

from office, then his resignation would render the case moot and academic.

However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may continue in

the ordinary courts.”

This is in accord with our ruling in In Re: Saturnino Bermudez that “incumbent Presidents

are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency

and tenure” but not beyond. xxx

We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-

sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They

involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these

crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of

immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing

the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from

liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful

acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the Stateand the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any

other trespasser.

Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial

disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or

impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon, US President Richard Nixon, a

sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and documents relating to his

conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixon's associates were facing

charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice and other offenses which were committed in a burglary







of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's Watergate Hotel during the 1972

presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named an unindicted co-conspirator.

President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among others, that the President

was not subject to judicial process and that he should first be impeached and removed from

office before he could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the

US Supreme Court. It concluded that “when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed

materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in

confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair

administration of criminal justice.” In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the US Supreme Courtfurther held that the immunity of the President from civil damages covers only “official acts.”

Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton

v. Jones where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for money damages arising

out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.[74]

(Emphasis supplied)

Further, in our Resolution in Estrada v. Desierto,[75]

we reiterated that the presidential immunity from

suit exists only in concurrence with the president’s incumbency:

Petitioner stubbornly clings to the contention that he is entitled to absolute immunity

from suit. His arguments are merely recycled and we need not prolong the longevity of thedebate on the subject. In our Decision, we exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity

in our jurisdiction and its bends and turns up to the present time. We held that given the intent

of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the

petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal

acts committed while a sitting President. Petitioner's rehashed arguments including their thinly

disguised new spins are based on the rejected contention that he is still President, albeit, a

President on leave. His stance that his immunity covers his entire term of office or until June 30,

2004 disregards the reality that he has relinquished the presidency and there is now a new de

jure President.

Petitioner goes a step further and avers that even a non-sitting President enjoys

immunity from suit during his term of office. He buttresses his position with the deliberations of

the Constitutional Commission, viz:

“Mr. Suarez. Thank you.

The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in

the draft proposal the immunity provision for the President. I agree with

Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out this

second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit

under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a

restoration of at least the first sentence that the president shall be immune from

suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind of an

immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigations, as the President-in-

exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations almost daily?

Fr. Bernas:

The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in

present jurisprudence that during his tenure he is immune from suit.

Mr. Suarez:

So there is no need to express it here.

Fr. Bernas:

There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made

by the 1973 Constitution was to make that explicit and to add other things.











Mr. Suarez:

On the understanding, I will not press for any more query, madam

President.

I thank the Commissioner for the clarification.”

Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and tenure. The term means the

time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after

which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term duringwhich the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons

within or beyond the power of the incumbent. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is

clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his

term.[76]

(Emphasis supplied)

Applying the foregoing rationale to the case at bar, it is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the

presidential immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the

context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.

Third issue: Command responsibility in amparo proceedings

To attribute responsibility or accountability to former President Arroyo, Rodriguez contends that the

doctrine of command responsibility may be applied. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo ,[77]

command

responsibility pertains to the “responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of

the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic

conflict.”[78]

Although originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command responsibility doctrine

has also found application in civil cases for human rights abuses.[79]

In the United States, for example,

command responsibility was used in Ford v. Garcia and Romagoza v. Garcia – civil actions filed under the Alien

Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act.[80] This development in the use of command

responsibility in civil proceedings shows that the application of this doctrine has been liberally extended even

to cases not criminal in nature. Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may likewise find application in

proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo. As we held in Rubrico:

It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold

military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats,

may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility

doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in

accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution.

… … …

If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it

should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for,

and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to

enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to

protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination

should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal

prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing

administrative issuances, if there be any.[81]


Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether

respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable

the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from applying

the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and accountability in

extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. In this regard, the Separate Opinion of Justice Conchita

Carpio-Morales in Rubrico is worth noting, thus:



























That proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil

or administrative liability should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of command

responsibility. Taking Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo and Razon v. Tagitis in proper

context, they do not preclude the application of the doctrine of command responsibility to

Amparo cases.

Manalo was actually emphatic on the importance of the right to security of person and

its contemporary signification as a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government. It

further stated that protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of thegovernment apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced

disappearances, or threats thereof, and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of

justice.

Tagitis, on the other hand, cannot be more categorical on the application, at least in

principle, of the doctrine of command responsibility:

Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were

the ones who were remiss in their duties when the government completely failed

to exercise the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires. We hold

these organizations accountable through their incumbent Chiefs who, under thisDecision, shall carry the personal responsibility of seeing to it that extraordinary

diligence, in the manner the Amparo Rule requires, is applied in addressing the

enforced disappearance of Tagitis.

Neither does Republic Act No. 9851 emasculate the applicability of the command

responsibility doctrine to Amparo cases. The short title of the law is the “Philippine Act on

Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against

Humanity.” Obviously, it should, as it did, only treat of superior responsibility as a ground for

criminal responsibility for the crimes covered. Such limited treatment, however, is merely in

keeping with the statute’s purpose and not intended to rule out the application of the doctrineof command responsibility to other appropriate cases.

Indeed, one can imagine the innumerable dangers of insulating high-ranking military and

police officers from the coverage of reliefs available under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The

explicit adoption of the doctrine of command responsibility in the present case will only bring

Manalo and Tagitis to their logical conclusion.

In fine, I submit that the Court should take this opportunity to state what the law ought

to be if it truly wants to make the Writ of Amparo an effective remedy for victims of extralegal

killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. While there is a genuine dearth of

evidence to hold respondents Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon

accountable under the command responsibility doctrine, the ponencia’s hesitant application of

the doctrine itself is replete with implications abhorrent to the rationale behind the Rule on the

Writ of Amparo.[82]


This Separate Opinion was reiterated in the recently decided case of Boac v. Cadapan ,[83]

likewise

penned by Justice Carpio-Morales, wherein this Court ruled:

Rubrico categorically denies the application of command responsibility in amparo cases

to determine criminal liability. The Court maintains its adherence to this pronouncement as faras amparo cases are concerned.

Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command

responsibility in amparo cases to instances of determining

the responsible or accountableindividuals or entities that are duty-bound to abate any

transgression on the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.

If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these

proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first











instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and

harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial

measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered

by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should

not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal

prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under

existing administrative issuances, if there be any.

In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in

order to identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement

whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court does

not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best

position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.

Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a

preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further

investigation by the appropriate government agency. (Emphasis supplied.)

As earlier pointed out, amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the actors have

been established by substantial evidence to haveparticipated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an

enforced disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those

(i) who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to

the level of responsibility defined above; or (ii) who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced

disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the

burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. Thus, although there is

no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may

nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within these foregoing definitions.

a. Command responsibility of the President

Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings, it

must now be resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or

accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. We rule in the affirmative.

To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must

obtain:

a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and

the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;

b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been

committed; and

c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal

acts or punish the perpetrators thereof .[84]

The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces,[85]

necessarily possesses control over

the military that qualifies him as a

superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine. [86]

On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply a strict

standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be established through circumstantial

evidence.[87]

In the Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and superiors may be charged with constructive

knowledge. This view is buttressed by the enactment of Executive Order No. 226, otherwise known as

the Institutionalization of the Doctrine of ‘Command Responsibility’ in all Government Offices, particularly at all

Levels of Command in the Philippine National Police and other Law Enforcement Agencies (E.O. 226).[88]

Under

E.O. 226, a government official may be held liable for neglect of duty under the doctrine of command























responsibility if he has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed, is being committed, or has been

committed by his subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he

did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during, or immediately after its

commission.[89]

Knowledge of the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when (a) the

acts are widespread within the government official’s area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been repeatedly or

regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his immediate staff or office personnel

are involved.[90]

Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as the commander-in-

chief of the armed forces, the president has the power to effectively command, control and discipline the

military.[91]

b. Responsibility or accountability of former

President Arroyo

The next question that must be tackled is whether Rodriguez has proven through substantial evidence

that former President Arroyo is responsible or accountable for his abduction. We rule in the negative.

Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis of the “Melo Commission” and

the “Alston Report,” respondents in G.R. No. 191805 already had knowledge of and information on, and should

have known that a climate of enforced disappearances had been perpetrated on members of the

NPA.[92]

Without even attaching, or at the very least, quoting these reports, Rodriguez contends that the Melo

Report points to rogue military men as the perpetrators. While the Alston Report states that there is a policy

allowing enforced disappearances and pins the blame on the President, we do not automatically impute

responsibility to former President Arroyo for each and every count of forcible disappearance.[93]

Aside from

Rodriguez’s general averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish her responsibility or

accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she should have known

about the violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent

it.

Fourth issue: Responsibility or accountability of respondents in

G.R. No. 191805

The doctrine of totality of evidence in amparo cases was first laid down in this Court’s ruling

in Razon,[94]

to wit:

The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced intheir totality , and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be

admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our

rules to the most basic test of reason – i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand

and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can

be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.[95]


In the case at bar, we find no reason to depart from the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, the

same being supported by substantial evidence. A careful examination of the records of this case reveals

that the totality of the evidence adduced by Rodriguez indubitably prove the responsibility and accountability

of some respondents in G.R. No. 191805 for violating his right to life, liberty and security.






























a. The totality of evidence proved by substantial

evidence the responsibility or accountability of

respondents for the violation of or threat to Rodriguez’s

right to life, liberty and security.

After a careful examination of the records of these cases, we are convinced that the Court of Appeals

correctly found sufficient evidence proving that the soldiers of the 17th


Infantry Division

of the military abducted Rodriguez on 6 September 2009, and detained and tortured him until 17 September

2009.

Rodriguez’s Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 4 December 2009 was a meticulous and straightforward

account of his horrific ordeal with the military, detailing the manner in which he was captured and maltreated

on account of his suspected membership in the NPA.[96]

His narration of his suffering included an exhaustive

description of his physical surroundings, personal circumstances and perceived observations. He likewise

positively identified respondents 1st

Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina to be present during his abduction,

detention and torture,[97]

and respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan as the CHR representatives who

appeared during his release.

[98]

More particularly, the fact of Rodriguez’s abduction was corroborated by Carlos in his Sinumpaang

Salaysay dated 16 September 2009,[99]

wherein he recounted in detail the circumstances surrounding the

victim’s capture.

As regards the allegation of torture, the respective Certifications of Dr. Ramil and Dr. Pamugas validate

the physical maltreatment Rodriguez suffered in the hands of the soldiers of the 17th

Infantry Battalion,

5th

Infantry Division. According to the Certification dated 12 October 2009 executed by Dr. Ramil,[100]

she

examined Rodriguez in the Alfonso Ponce Enrile Memorial District Hospital on 16 September 2009 and arrived

at the following findings:

FACE

- 10cm healed scar face right side

- 2cm healed scar right eyebrow (lateral area)

- 2cm healed scar right eye brow (median area)

- 4cm x 2cm hematoma anterior chest at the sternal area right side

- 3cm x 2cm hematoma sternal area left side

- 6cm x 1cm hematoma from epigastric area to ant. chest left side

- 6cm x 1cm hematoma from epigastric area to ant. chest right side

- Multiple healed rashes (brownish discoloration) both forearm

- Multiple healed rashes (brownish discoloration)

- both leg arm

- hip area/lumbar area[101]

Dr. Pamugas performed a separate medical examination of Rodriguez on 19 September 2009, the

results of which confirmed that the injuries suffered by the latter were inflicted through torture. Dr. Pamugas

thus issued a Medical Report dated 23 September 2009,[102]

explicitly stating that Rodriguez had been tortured

during his detention by the military, to wit:

X. Interpretation of Findings

The above physical and psychological findings sustained by the subject are related to

the torture and ill-treatment done to him. The multiple circular brown to dark brown spots

found on both legs and arms were due to the insect bites that he sustained when he was forced

to join twice in the military operations. The abrasions could also be due to the conditions related

during military operations. The multiple pin-point blood spots found on his left ear is a result of

an unknown object placed inside his left ear. The areas of tenderness he felt during the physical

examination were due to the overwhelming punching and kicking on his body. The occasional































difficulty of sleeping is a symptom experience (sic) by the subject as a result of the psychological

trauma he encountered during his detention.

XI. Conclusions and Recommendations

The physical injuries and psychological trauma suffered by the subject are secondary to

the torture and ill-treatment done to him while in detention for about 11 days. The physical

injuries sustained by the subject, of which the age is compatible with the alleged date of

infliction (sic).

[103]


In assessing the weight of the Certifications, the Court of Appeals correctly relied on the medical finding

that the injuries suffered by Rodriguez matched his account of the maltreatment inflicted on him by the

soldiers of the 17th


Infantry Division of the Philippine Army. Further, the kind of injuries

he sustained showed that he could not have sustained them from merely fal ling, thus making respondents’

claim highly implausible.

Despite these medical findings that overwhelmingly supported and lent credibility to the allegations of

Rodriguez in his Sinumpaang Salaysay , respondents in G.R. No. 191805 still stubbornly clung to their argumentthat he was neither abducted nor detained. Rather, they claimed that he was a double agent, whose

relationship with the military was at all times congenial. This contention cannot be sustained, as it is far

removed from ordinary human experience.

If it were true that Rodriguez maintained amicable relations with the military, then he should have

unhesitatingly assured his family on 17 September 2009 that he was among friends. Instead, he vigorously

pleaded with them to get him out of the mil itary facility. In fact, in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 4 December

2009[104]

Wilma executed, she made the following averments:

18. Na nang Makita ko ang aking anak ay nakaramdam ako sa kanya ng awa dahil samukha syang pagod at malaki ang kanyang ipinayat.

19. Na niyakap ko sya at sa aming pagkakayakap ay binulungan nya ako na wag ko

syang iiwan sa lugar na iyon;

xxx xxx xxx

23. Na sinabihan ako ng mga sundalo na kung pwede daw ay maiwan muna ng dalawang

linggo sa kampo ako at si Noriel para daw matrain pa si Noriel sa loob ng kampo;

24. Na hindi ako pumayag na maiwan ang aking anak;

xxx xxx xxx

33. Na sa kasalukuhan, hanggang ngayon ay nag-aalala pa ako sa paa (sic) sa kaligtasan

ng aming buong pamilya, lalo na kay Noriel; xxx[105]

Also, Rodel made the following supporting averments in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 3 December

2009:[106]

24. Na nang makita ko si Noriel, hindi sya makalakad ng diretso, hinang-hina sya, malaki

ang ipinayat at nanlalalim ang mga mata;

25. Na nang makita ko ang aking kapatid ay nakaramdam ako ng awa dahil nakilala ko

syang masigla at masayahin;

26. Na ilang minuto lang ay binulugan nya ako ng “Kuya, ilabas mo ako dito, papatayin

nila ako.”

















27. Na sinabihan kami ni Lt. Col. Mina na baka pwedeng maiwan pa ng dalwang linggo

ang aking kapatid sa kanila para raw ma-train sya.

28. Na hindi kami pumayag ng aking nanay; xxx[107]

Moreover, the Court of Appeals likewise aptly pointed out the illogical, if not outrightly contradictory,

contention of respondents in G.R. No. 191805 that while Rodriguez had complained of his exhaustion from his

activities as a member of the CPP-NPA, he nevertheless willingly volunteered to return to his life in the NPA to

become a double-agent for the military. The lower court ruled in this manner:

In the Return of the Writ, respondent AFP members alleged that petitioner confided to

his military handler, Cpl. Navarro, that petitioner could no longer stand the hardships he

experienced in the wilderness, and that he wanted to become an ordinary citizen again because

of the empty promises of the CPP-NPA. However, in the same Return, respondents state that

petitioner agreed to become a double agent for the military and wanted to re-enter the CPP-

NPA, so that he could get information regarding the movement directly from the source. If

petitioner was tired of life in the wilderness and desired to become an ordinary citizen again, it

defies logic that he would agree to become an undercover agent and work alongside soldiers

in the mountains – or the wilderness he dreads – to locate the hideout of his alleged NPA

comrades.[108]


Furthermore, the appellate court also properly ruled that aside from the abduction, detention and

torture of Rodriguez, respondents, specifically 1st

Lt. Matutina, had violated and threatened the former’s right

to security when they made a visual recording of his house, as well as the photos of his relatives, to wit:

In the videos taken by the soldiers – one of whom was respondent Matutina – in the

house of petitioner on September 18, 2009, the soldiers even went as far as taking videos of the

photos of petitioner’s relatives hung on the wall of the house, as well as videos of the innermost

part of the house. This Court notes that 1Lt. Matutina, by taking the said videos, did not merely

intend to make proofs of the safe arrival of petitioner and his family in their home. 1Lt.

Matutina also desired to instill fear in the minds of petitioner and his family by showing them

that the sanctity of their home, from then on, will not be free from the watchful eyes of the

military, permanently captured through the medium of a seemingly innocuous cellhpone video

camera. The Court cannot – and will not – condone such act, as it intrudes into the very core of

petitioner’s right to security guaranteed by the fundamental law.[109]


Taken in their totality, the pieces of evidence adduced by Rodriguez, as well as the contradictory

defenses presented by respondents in G.R. No. 191805, give credence to his claim that he had been abducted,

detained and tortured by soldiers belonging to the 17th


Infantry Division of the military.

It must be pointed out, however, that as to respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan, there was no

substantial evidence to show that they violated, or threatened with violation, Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty

and security. Despite the dearth of evidence to show the CHR officers’ responsibility or accountability, this

Court nonetheless emphasizes its criticism as regards their capacity to recognize torture or any similar form of

abuse. The CHR, being constitutionally mandated to protect human rights and investigate violationsthereof ,

[110] should ensure that its officers are well-equipped to respond effectively to and address human

rights violations. The actuations of respondents unmistakably showed their insufficient competence in

facilitating and ensuring the safe release of Rodriguez after his ordeal.



















b. The failure to conduct a fair and effect investigation

amounted to a violation of or threat to Rodriguez’s rights

to life, liberty and security.

The Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly states that the violation of or threat to the right to life, liberty

and security may be caused by either an act or anomission of a public official.[111]

Moreover, in the context

of amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to the participation of the respondents, by action

or omission, in enforced disappearance.[112]

Accountability, on the other hand, may attach to respondents who

are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or

those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the

enforced disappearance.[113]

In this regard, we emphasize our ruling in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo[114]

that the right to

security of a person includes the positive obligation of the government to ensure the observance of the duty to

investigate, viz:

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the

government. In the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the

right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to

security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity)

under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the

policy that the State “guarantees full respect for human rights” under Article II, Section 11 of the

1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the

Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered

ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are

under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the

government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced

disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of

justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation inthe Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz:

(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and

not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must

have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step

taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his

family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by

the government.

xxx xxx xxx

Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the “right to

security” not only as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a

positive duty on the State to afford protection of the right to liberty. The ECHR interpreted the

“right to security of person” under Article 5(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights in

the leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey . In this case, the claimant's son had

been arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since. The family's requests for

information and investigation regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The claimant

suggested that this was a violation of her son's right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:

... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in

conformity with the substantive and procedural rules of national law but mustequally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the

individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual it is

incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this

reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective

measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a

prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been

taken into custody and has not been seen since.[115]

(Emphasis supplied)






















In the instant case, this Court rules that respondents in G.R. No. 191805 are responsible or accountable

for the violation of Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security on account of their abject failure to conduct a

fair and effective official investigation of his ordeal in the hands of the military. Respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG.

Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Col. De Vera and Lt. Col. Mina only conducted a perfunctory

investigation, exerting no efforts to take Ramirez’s account of the events into consideration. Rather, these

respondents solely relied on the reports and narration of the military. The ruling of the appellate court must be

emphasized:

In this case, respondents Ibrado, Verzosa, Bangit, Tolentino, Santos, De Vera, and Mina

are accountable, for while they were charged with the investigation of the subject incident, the

investigation they conducted and/or relied on is superficial and one-sided. The records disclose

that the military, in investigating the incident complained of, depended on the Comprehensive

Report of Noriel Rodriguez @Pepito prepared by 1Lt. Johnny Calub for the Commanding Officer

of the 501st

Infantry Brigade, 5th

Infantry Division, Philippine Army. Such report, however, is

merely based on the narration of the military. No efforts were undertaken to solicit petitioner’s

version of the subject incident and no witnesses were questioned regarding the alleged

abduction of petitioner.

Respondent PDG Verzosa, as Chief of the PNP, is accountable because Section 24 ofRepublic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the “PNP Law,” specifies the PNP as the

governmental office with the mandate “to investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of

criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution.” In this case, PDG

Verzosa failed to order the police to conduct the necessary investigation to unmask the mystery

surrounding petitioner’s abduction and disappearance. Instead, PDG Verzosa disclaims

accountability by merely stating that petitioner has no cause of action against him. Palpable,

however, is the lack of any effort on the part of PDG Verzosa to effectively and aggressively

investigate the violations of petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security by members of the

17th


Infantry Division, Philippine Army.[116]


Clearly, the absence of a fair and effective official investigation into the claims of Rodriguez violated his

right to security, for which respondents in G.R. No. 191805 must be held responsible or accountable.

Nevertheless, it must be clarified that Rodriguez was unable to establish any responsibility or

accountability on the part of respondents P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Calog and Palacpac. Respondent

P/CSupt. Tolentino had already retired when the abduction and torture of Rodriguez was perpetrated, while

P/SSupt. Santos had already been reassigned and transferred to the National Capital Regional Police Office six

months before the subject incident occurred. Meanwhile, no sufficient allegations were maintained against

respondents Calog and Palacpac.

From all the foregoing, we rule that Rodriguez was successful in proving through substantial evidence

that respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st

Lt.

Matutina, and Lt. Col. Mina were responsible and accountable for the violation of Rodriguez’s rights to life,

liberty and security on the basis of (a) his abduction, detention and torture from 6 September to 17 September

2009, and (b) the lack of any fair and effective official investigation as to his allegations. Thus, the privilege of

the writs of amparo and habeas data must be granted in his favor. As a result, there is no longer any need to

issue a temporary protection order, as the privilege of these writs already has the effect of enjoining

respondents in G.R. No. 191805 from violating his rights to life, liberty and security.

It is also clear from the above discussion that despite (a) maintaining former President Arroyo in the list

of respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and (b) allowing the application of the command responsibility doctrine

to amparo and habeas data proceedings, Rodriguez failed to prove through substantial evidence that former

President Arroyo was responsible or accountable for the violation of his rights to life, liberty and property. He

likewise failed to prove through substantial evidence the accountability or responsibility of respondents Maj.

Gen. Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.







WHEREFORE, we resolve to GRANT the Petition for Partial Review in G.R. No. 191805 and DENY the

Petition for Review in G.R. No. 193160. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH

MODIFICATION.

The case is dismissed with respect to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt.

Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and

Vicent Callagan for lack of merit.

This Court directs the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to

take the appropriate action with respect to any possible liability or liabilities, within their respective legal

competence, that may have been incurred by respondents Gen. Victor Ibrado, PDG. Jesus Verzosa, Lt. Gen.

Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Ochoa, Brig. Gen. Remegio De Vera, 1st

Lt. Ryan Matutina, and Lt. Col. Laurence

Mina. The Ombudsman and the DOJ are ordered to submit to this Court the results of their action within a

period of six months from receipt of this Decision.

In the event that herein respondents no longer occupy their respective posts, the directives mandated

in this Decision and in the Court of Appeals are enforceable against the incumbent officials holding the relevant

positions. Failure to comply with the foregoing shall constitute contempt of court.

SO ORDERED.

5. Manila Electric Co. vs. Lim

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A. SAPITULA,

Petitioners,

– versus –

ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 184769

Promulgated:

October 5, 2010

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The Court is once again confronted with an opportunity to define the evolving metes and bounds of the

writ of habeas data. May an employee invoke the remedies available under such writ where an employer

decides to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted therein ─ imputing to

her disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave, which imputation it investigated but fails to inform

her of the details thereof?

Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric

Company (MERALCO).

On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the

Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing

respondent. The letter reads:

Cherry Lim:



MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON

NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG

GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA

LOOB….[1]

Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it, respondent

reported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police.[2]

By Memorandum[3]

dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s Human

Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as “A/F

OTMS Clerk,” effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of “… reports that there were accusations and

threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and

security.”

Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President and

Head of MERALCO’s Human Resource Administration, appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so

she could voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the “punitive” nature of the transfer

amounted to a denial of due process. Citing the grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang

and back entails, and violation of the provisions on job security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA),

respondent expressed her thoughts on the alleged threats to her security in this wise:

x x x x

I feel that it would have been better . . . if you could have intimated to me the nature

of the alleged accusations and threats so that at least I could have found out if these are

credible or even serious. But as you stated, these came from unknown individuals and theway they were handled, it appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be

[sic] highlysuspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.

Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the alleged threats exist as the

management apparently believe, then my transfer to an unfamiliar place and environment

which will make me a “sitting duck” so to speak, seems to betray the real intent of

management which is contrary to its expressed concern on my security and safety . . . Thus, it

made me think twice on the rationale for management’s initiated transfer. Reflecting further,

it appears to me that instead of the management supposedly extending favor to me, the net

result and effect of management action would be a punitive one.

[4]

(emphasis andunderscoring supplied)

Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer pending resolution

of the issues she raised.

No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition[5]

for the issuance of a

writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, docketed as SP. Proc.

No. 213-M-2008.

By respondent’s allegation, petitioners’ unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued failure

and refusal to provide her with details or information about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly

received concerning threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life,

liberty and security, correctible by habeas data. Respondent thus prayed for the issuance of a writ

commanding petitioners to file a written return containing the following:

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/october2010/184769.htm#_ftn2




















a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the report

purportedly received by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and security; the

nature of such data and the purpose for its collection;

b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such data or

information; and

c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained.

Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining

petitioners from effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.

By Order[6]

of August 29, 2008, Branch 7 of the Bulacan RTC directed petitioners to file their verified

written return. And by Order of September 5, 2008, the trial court granted respondent’s application for a TRO.

Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on the grounds that, inter alia,resort to a petition for writ of habeas data was not in order; and the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case

which properly belongs to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).[7]

By Decision[8]

of September 22, 2008, the trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the

issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondent’s

transfer until such time that petitioners comply with the disclosures required.

The trial court justified its ruling by declaring that, inter alia, recourse to a writ of habeas data should

extend not only to victims of extra-legal killings and political activists but also to ordinary citizens, like

respondent whose rights to life and security are jeopardized by petitioners’ refusal to provide her with

information or data on the reported threats to her person.

Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rule on

the Writ of Habeas Data[9]

contending that 1) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case and cannot restrain

MERALCO’s prerogative as employer to transfer the place of work of its employees, and 2) the issuance of the

writ is outside the parameters expressly set forth in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.[10]

Maintaining that the RTC has no jurisdiction over what they contend is clearly a labor dispute,

petitioners argue that “although ingeniously crafted as a petition for habeas data, respondent is essentially

questioning the transfer of her place of work by her employer”[11]

and the terms and conditions of her

employment which arise from an employer-employee relationship over which the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters

under Article 217 of the Labor Code have jurisdiction.

Petitioners thus maintain that the RTC had no authority to restrain the implementation of the

Memorandum transferring respondent’s place of work which is purely a management prerogative, and that

OCA-Circular No. 79-2003[12]

expressly prohibits the issuance of TROs or injunctive writs in labor-related cases.

Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data directs the issuance of the writ

only against public officials or employees, or private individuals or entities engaged in the gathering, collecting

or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved party’s person, family or home; and that MERALCO (or

its officers) is clearly not engaged in such activities.




























The petition is impressed with merit.

Respondent’s plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCO’s Memorandum directing her

reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession

of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person

whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act

or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the

gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and

correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image,

privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to

enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees

of a person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology.

It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the

lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and

enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security

as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.[13]

Castillo v. Cruz[14] underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario[15] that the writs of

amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purelyproperty or commercial concerns nor when the

grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.[16]

Employment constitutes a

property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution.[17]

It is evident that

respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern respecting the terms and

conditions of one’s employment - are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data.

Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.

In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed

any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent’s right to privacyvis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or

security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats

to respondent’s safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact

trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10,

2008 letter as “highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all. ”[18]

And she even

suspects that her transfer to another place of work “betray[s] the real intent of management]” and could be a

“punitive move.” Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 22, 2008 Decision of the Bulacan RTC,Branch 7 in SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE. SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is,

accordingly, DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.


























6. Saez vs. Arroyo

G.R. No. 183533 September 25, 2012

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF

FRANCIS SAEZ, Petitioner,

vs.

GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO RAZON, 22ND MICO,

CAPT. LAWRENCE BANAAG, SGT. CASTILLO, CAPT. ROMMEL GUTIERREZ, CAPT. JAKE OBLIGADO, CPL. ROMANITO QUINT ANA, PVT. JERICO DUQUIL, CPL. ARIEL FONTANILLA, A CERTAIN CAPT. ALCA YDO, A CERTAIN FIRST

SERGEANT, PVT. ZALDY OSlO, A CERTAIN PFC. SONNY, A CERTAIN CPL. JAMES, A CERTAIN JOEL, RODERICK

CLANZA and JEFFREY GOMEZ, Respondents.

For action by the Court is the Motion for Reconsideration1 dated September 26, 2010 filed by petitioner

Francis Saez of our Resolution2 dated August 31, 2010 denying the Petition for Review

3 he filed on July 21,

2008.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Comment4 thereon stating that it does not find cogent

grounds to warrant setting aside our decision.

Antecedent Facts

On March 6, 2008, the petitioner filed with the Court a petition to be granted the privilege of the writs

of amparo and habeas data with prayers for temporary protection order, inspection of place and production of

documents.5In the petition, he expressed his fear of being abducted and killed; hence, he sought that he be

placed in a sanctuary appointed by the Court. He likewise prayed for the military to cease from further

conducting surveillance and monitoring of his activities and for his name to be excluded from the order of

battle and other government records connecting him to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).

Without necessarily giving due course to the petition, the Court issued the writ of amparo commandingthe respondents to make a verified return, and referred the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) for hearing and

decision.The case before the CA was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00024 WOA.

In the Return of the Writ,6 the respondents denied the assignment in the units of Captains Lawrence

Banaag and Rommel Gutierrez and Corporal Ariel Fontanilla. The respondents also alleged that the names and

descriptions of "Capt. Alcaydo," "a certain First Sergeant," "Cpl. James," "Pfc. Sonny," and "Joel" were

insufficient to properly identify some of the persons sought to be included as among the respondents in the

petition.

On the other hand, respondents General Hermogenes Esperon, Jr. (Gen. Esperon), Capt. JacobThaddeus Obligado, Pvt. Rizaldy A. Osio (Pvt. Osio), Pfc. Romanito C. Quintana, Jr. and Pfc. Jerico Duquil

submitted their affidavits.

The CA conducted hearings with an intent to clarify what actually transpired and to determine specific

acts which threatened the petitioner’s right to life, liberty or security.

During the hearings, the petitioner narrated that starting April 16, 2007, he noticed that he was always

being followed by a certain "Joel," a former colleague at Bayan Muna. "Joel" pretended peddling pandesal in

the vicinity of the petitioner’s store. Three days before the petitioner was apprehended, "Joel" approached and

informed him of his marital status and current job as a baker in Calapan, Mindoro Oriental. "Joel" inquired if

the petitioner was still involved with ANAKPAWIS. When asked by the CA justices during the hearing if the

petitioner had gone home to Calapan after having filed the petition, he answered in the negative explaining

that he was afraid of Pvt. Osio who was always at the pier.

CA-G.R. SP No. 00024 WOA

On July 9, 2008, the CA rendered its Decision,7 denying on formal and substantial grounds the reliefs

prayed for in the petition and dropping former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a respondent. The CA

ratiocinated:

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_183533_2012.html#fnt1



























There was no attempt at all to clarify how petitioner came to know about Zaldy Osio’s presence

at their pier if the former had not gone home since the petition was filed and what Zaldy Osio was doing

there to constitute violation or threat to violate petitioner’s right to life, liberty or security. This Court

cannot just grant the privilege of the writs without substantial evidence to establish petitioner’s

entitlement thereto. This Court cannot grant the privilege of the writs applied for on mere speculation

or conjecture. This Court is convinced that the Supreme Court did not intend it to be so when the rules

on the writs of Amparo and Habeas Data were adopted. It is the impression of this Court that the

privilege of the writs herein prayed for should be considered as extraordinary remedies available to

address the specific situations enumerated in the rules and no other.

x x x x

Not only did the petition and the supporting affidavit x x x fail to allege how the supposed threat

or violation of petitioner’s [right to] life, liberty and security is committed. Neither is there any narration

of any circumstances attendant to said supposed violation or threat to violatepetitioner’s right to life,

liberty or security to warrant entitlement to the privilege of the writs prayed for.

x x x x

A reading of the petition will show that the allegations therein do not comply with the

aforestated requirements of Section 6 Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data of the pertinent rule. The

petition is bereft of any allegation stating with specific definiteness as to how petitioner’s right to

privacy was violated or threatened to be violated. He did not include any allegation as to what

recourses he availed of to obtain the alleged documents from respondents. Neither did petitioner allege

what specific documents he prays for and from whom or [sic] from what particular office of the

government he prays to obtain them. The petition prays "to order respondents to produce any

documents submitted to any of them in the matter of any report on the case of FRANCIS SAEZ, including

all military intelligence reports."

x x x x

Both the rules on the writs of Amparo and Habeas Data (Section 17, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and

Section 16, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC) provide that the parties shall establish their claims by substantial

evidence. Not only was petitioner unable to establish his entitlement to the privilege of the writs

applied for, the exigency thereof was negated by his own admission that nothing happened between

him and Joel after July 21, 2007. The filing of the petition appears to have been precipitated by his fear

that something might happen to him, not because of any apparent violation or visible threat to violate

his right to life, liberty or security. Petitioner was, in fact, unable to establish likewise who among the

respondents committed specific acts defined under the rules on both writs to constitute violation or

threat to violate petitioner’s rights to life, liberty or security or his right to privacy thereof.

x x x x

x x x The ruling in David, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et al. (G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006,

489 SCRA 160, 224) is aptly instructive:

"Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may

not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.

It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into

court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of

harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official

duties and functions. x x x."

x x x x

IV. The petition lacks proper verification in violation of Section 12, 2004 Rules on Notarial

Practice.8







On July 21, 2008, Petition for Review was filed assailing the foregoing CA decision with the following

issues submitted for resolution:

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISMISSING THE PETITION AND

DROPPING GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO AS PARTY RESPONDENT.

WHETHER OR NOT THE NOTARIAL OFFICER’S OMISSION OF REQUIRING FROM THE PETITIONER

IDENTIFICATION CARDS RELATIVE TO THE LATTER’S EXECUTION OF THE VERIFICATION AND

CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING JUSTIFIES THE DENIAL OF THE PETITION.

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED GROSS ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO

CONCLUDE FROM THE EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE PETITIONER THE FACT THAT BY BEING PLACED IN

THE ORDER OF BATTLE LIST, THREATS AND VIOLATIONS TO THE LATTER’S LIFE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY

WERE ACTUALLY COMMITTED BY THE RESPONDENTS.9

Court’s Resolution dated August 31, 2010

On August 31, 2010, the Court issued the Resolution10

denying the petition for review for the following

reasons, viz:

A careful perusal of the subject petition shows that the CA correctly found that the petition was

bereft of any allegation as to what particular acts or omission of respondents violated or threatened

petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security. His claim that he was incommunicado lacks credibility as he

was given a cellular phone and allowed to go back to Oriental Mindoro. The CA also correctly held that

petitioner failed to present substantial evidence that his right to life, liberty and security were violated,

or how his right to privacy was threatened by respondents. He did not specify the particular documents

to be secured, their location or what particular government office had custody thereof, and who has

possession or control of the same. He merely prayed that the respondents be ordered "to produce any

documents submitted to any of them in the matter of any report on the case of FRANCIS SAEZ, including

all military intelligence reports."

Petitioner assails the CA in failing to appreciate that in his Affidavit and Fact Sheet, he had

specifically detailed the violation of his right to privacy as he was placed in the Order of Battle and

promised to have his record cleared if he would cooperate and become a military asset. However,

despite questions propounded by the CA Associate Justices during the hearing, he still failed to

enlighten the appellate court as to what actually transpired to enable said court to determine whether

his right to life, liberty or security had actually been violated or threatened. Records bear out the

unsubstantiated claims of petitioner which justified the appellate court’s dismissal of the petition.

As to petitioner’s argument that the CA erred in deleting the President as party -respondent, wefind the same also to be without merit. The Court has already made it clear in David v. Macapagal-

Arroyo that the President, during his or her tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in

any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade

the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if the President can be dragged into

court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that the President be freed from any

form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable the President to fully attend to the performance

of official duties and functions.11

(Citation omitted)

Hence, the petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration.12

Petitioner’s Arguments

Contrary to the CA’s findings, it had been shown by substantial evidence and even by the respondents’

own admissions that the petitioner’s life, liberty and security were threatened. Military personnel, whom the

petitioner had named and described, knew where to get him and they can do so with ease. He also became a

military asset, but under duress, as the respondents had documents allegedly linking him to the CPP and

including him in the order of battle. The petitioner claims that the foregoing circumstances were not denied by

the respondents.


















The petitioner likewise challenges the CA’s finding that he was not rendered incommunicado as he was

even provided with a cellular phone. The petitioner argues that the phone was only given to him for the

purpose of communicating with the respondents matters relative to his infiltration activities of target legal

organizations.

The petitioner cites Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,13

which pronounced that "in the amparo

context, it is more correct to say that the ‘right to security’ is actually the ‘freedom from threat’".14

According

to the petitioner, his freedom from fear was undoubtedly violated, hence, to him pertains a cause of action.

Anent the quantum of proof required in a petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, mere substantialevidence is sufficient. The petition "is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond

reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative

responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings".15

Sadly, in the petitioner’s case, the court not only demanded a greater quantum of proof than what the

rules require, but it also accorded special preference for the respondents’ evidence.

The petitioner also cites a speech delivered in Siliman University by former Chief Justice Reynato Puno

who expressed that "the remedy of habeas data can be used by any citizen against any governmental agency or

register to find out what information is held about his or her person." The person can likewise "request the

rectification or even the destruction of erroneous data gathered and kept against him or her." In the

petitioner’s case, he specifically sought the production of the order of battle, which allegedly included his

name, and other records which supposedly contain erroneous data relative to his involvement with the CPP.

OSG’s Comment

In the respondents’ comment16

filed by the OSG, it is generally claimed that the petitioner advances no

cogent grounds to justify the reversal of the Court’s Resolution dated August 31, 2010.

The Court’s Disquisition

While the issuance of the writs sought by the petitioner cannot be granted, the Court nevertheless finds

ample grounds to modify the Resolution dated August 31, 2010.

The petition conforms to the

requirements of the Rules on the

Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data

Section 517

of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (Rule on the Writ of Amparo) and Section 618

of A.M. 08-1-16-SC

(Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data) provide for what the said petitions should contain.

In the present case, the Court notes that the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the writs of

amparo and habeas data is sufficient as to its contents. The petitioner made specific allegations relative to his

personal circumstances and those of the respondents. The petitioner likewise indicated particular acts, which

are allegedly violative of his rights and the participation of some of the respondents in their commission. As to

the pre-requisite conduct and result of an investigation prior to the filing of the petition, it was explained that

the petitioner expected no relief from the military, which he perceived as his oppressors, hence, his request for

assistance from a human rights organization, then a direct resort to the court. Anent the documents sought to

be the subject of the writ of habeas data prayed for, the Court finds the requirement of specificity to have been

satisfied. The documents subject of the petition include the order of battle, those linking the petitioner to the

CPP and those he signed involuntarily, and military intelligence reports making references to him. Although the

exact locations and the custodians of the documents were not identified, this does not render the petition

insufficient. Section 6(d) of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is clear that the requirement of specificity

arises only when the exact locations and identities of the custodians are known. The Amparo Rule was not

promulgated with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern for constitutional rights .19

Thus, despite the

lack of certain contents, which the Rules on the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data generally require, for as long

as their absence under exceptional circumstances can be reasonably justified, a petition should not be

susceptible to outright dismissal.






























reason for their non-presentation.This could have made a difference in light of the denials made by the

respondents as regards the petitioner’s claims.

The existence of an order of battle and inclusion of the petitioner’s name in it is another allegation by

the petitioner that does not find support on the evidence adduced. The Court notes that such allegation was

categorically denied by respondent Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Jr. who, in his Affidavit dated March 31, 2008, stated

that he "does not have knowledge about any Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) ‘order of battle’ which

allegedly lists the petitioner as a member of the CPP."24

This was also denied by Pvt. Osio, who the petitioner

identified as the one who told him that he was included in the order of battle.

25

The 2nd Infantry (JungleFighter) Division of the Philippine Army also conducted an investigation pursuant to the directive of AFP Chief

of Staff Gen. Esperon,26

and it was shown that the persons identified by the petitioners who allegedly

committed the acts complained of were not connected or assigned to the 2nd Infantry Division.27

Moreover, the evidence showed that the petitioner’s mobility was never curtailed. From the time he

was allegedly brought to Batangas in August of 2007 until the time he sought the assistance of KARAPATAN-ST,

there was no restraint upon the petitioner to go home, as in fact, he went home to Mindoro on several

instances. And while he may have been wary of Pvt. Osio’s presence a t the pier, there was no claim by the

petitioner that he was threatened or prevented by Pvt. Osio from boarding any vehicle that may transport him

back home. The petitioner also admitted that he had a mobile phone; hence, he had unhampered access to

communication and can readily seek assistance from non-governmental organizations and even government

agencies.

The respondents also belied the petitioner’s claim that they forced him to become a military informant

and instead, alleged that it was the petitioner who volunteered to be one. Thus, in his Sinumpaang

Salaysay28

executed on March 25, 2008, Pvt. Osio admitted that he actually knew the petitioner way back in

1998 when they were still students. He also stated that when he saw the petitioner again in 2007, the latter

manifested his intention to become a military informant in exchange for financial and other forms of

assistance.

The petitioner also harps on the alleged "monitoring" activities being conducted by a certain "Joel", e.g.,the latter’s alleged act of following him, pretending to peddle pandesal and asking him about his personal

circumstances. Such allegation by the petitioner, however, is, at best, a conclusion on his part, a mere

impression that the petitioner had, based on his personal assessment of the circumstances. The petitioner even

admitted in his testimony before the CA that when he had a conversation with "Joel" sometime in July 2007,

the latter merely asked him whether he was still connected with ANAKPAWIS, but he was not threatened "with

anything" and no other incident occurred between them since then.29

There is clearly nothing on record which

shows that "Joel" committed overt acts that will unequivocally lead to the conclusion arrived at by the

petitioner, especially since the alleged acts committed by "Joel" are susceptible of different interpretations.

Given that the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner failed to support his claims, thereliefs prayed for, therefore, cannot be granted. The liberality accorded to amparo and habeas data cases does

not mean that a claimant is dispensed with the onus of proving his case. "Indeed, even the liberal standard of

substantial evidence demands some adequate evidence."30

The President cannot be

automatically dropped as a

respondent pursuant to the doctrine

of command responsibility

In Noriel Rodriguez v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et al.,

31

the Court stated:

a. Command responsibility of the President

Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo

proceedings, it must now be resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can

be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. We rule in the

affirmative.



































To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements

must obtain:

a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior

and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;

b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been

committed; and

c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the

criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.

The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control

over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility

doctrine.

On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply a

strict standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be established through

circumstantial evidence. In the Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and superiors may be charged

with constructive knowledge. This view is buttressed by the enactment of Executive Order No. 226,

otherwise known as the Institutionalization of the Doctrine of ‘Command Responsibility’ in all

Government Offices, particularly at all Levels of Command in the

Philippine National Police and other Law Enforcement Agencies (E.O. 226). Under E.O. 226, a

government official may be held liable for neglect of duty under the doctrine of command responsibility

if he has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed, is being committed, or has been

committed by his subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility and, despite such

knowledge, he did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during, or immediately after

its commission. Knowledge of the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when (a)

the acts are widespread within the government official’s area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have beenrepeatedly or regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his immediate

staff or office personnel are involved.

Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as the

commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president has the power to effectively command, control

and discipline the military. (Citations omitted)

Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the

AFP, can be held liable for affront against the petitioner’s rights to life, liberty and security as long as

substantial evidence exist to show that he or she had exhibited involvement in or can be imputed withknowledge of the violations, or had failed to exercise necessary and reasonable diligence in conducting the

necessary investigations required under the rules.1âwphi1

The Court also stresses that rule that the presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence

with the president’s incumbency.32

Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president even

for acts committed during his or her tenure.33

Courts look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of

immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right.34

The petitioner, however, is not exempted from the burden of proving by substantial evidence his

allegations against the President to make the latter liable for either acts or omissions violative of rights against

life, liberty and security. In the instant case, the petitioner merely included the President’s name as a party

respondent without any attempt at all to show the latter’s actual involvement in, or knowledge of t he alleged

violations. Further, prior to the filing of the petition, there was no request or demand for any investigation that

was brought to the President’s attention. Thus, while the President cannot be completely dropped as a

respondent in a petition for the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data merely on the basis of the

presidential immunity from suit, the petitioner in this case failed to establish accountability of the President, as

commander-in-chief, under the doctrine of command responsibility.















Compliance with technical rules of

procedure is ideal but it cannot be

accorded primacy

Among the grounds cited by the CA in denying the petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and

habeas data was the defective verification which was attached to the petition. In Tagitis,35

supporting affidavits

required under Section 5(c) of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo were not submitted together with the petition

and it was ruled that the defect was fully cured when the petitioner and the witness personally testified to

prove the truth of their allegations in the hearings held before the CA. In the instant case, the defectiveverification was not the sole reason for the CA’s denial of the petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo

and habeas data. Nonetheless, it must be stressed that although rules of procedure play an important rule in

effectively administering justice, primacy should not be accorded to them especially in the instant case where

there was at least substantial compliance with the requirements and where petitioner himself testified in the

hearings to attest to the veracity of the claims which he stated in his petition.

To conclude, compliance with technical rules of procedure is ideal but it cannot be accorded primacy. In

the proceedings before the CA, the petitioner himself testified to prove the veracity of his allegations which he

stated in the petition. Hence, the defect in the verification attached to the petition. Hence, the defect in the

verification attached to the petition was deemed cured.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration is DENIED WITH

FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.

7. Gamboa vs. Chan

G.R. No. 193636 July 24, 2012

MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, Petitioner,

vs.

P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT.

WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte,

Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

SERENO, J.:

Before this Court is an Appeal by Certiorari (Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court) filed pursuant to Rule

191 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data,

2 seeking a review of the 9 September 2010 Decision in Special Proc.

No. 14979 of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Laoag City, Branch 13 (RTC Br. 13).3 The questioned

Decision denied petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data.4

At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa (Gamboa) was the Mayor of

Dingras, Ilocos Norte.5 Meanwhile, respondent Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was

the Officer-in-Charge, and respondent Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was the Chief of the

Provincial Investigation and Detective Management Branch, both of the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office.6

On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275

(A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the

Country."7 The body, which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa Commission,

8 was formed to investigate

the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May

2010 elections and dismantling them permanently in the future.9 Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the

Zeñarosa Commission released and submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report entitled "A

Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against Private Armies’ Report to the President" (the

Report).10




http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/jul2012/gr_193636_2012.html#fnt1










































Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP –Ilocos Norte) conducted a

series of surveillance operations against her and her aides,11

and classified her as someone who keeps a

PAG.12

Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP –Ilocos Norte forwarded the information

gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission,13

thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of

individuals maintaining PAGs.14

More specifically, she pointed out the following items reflected therein:

(a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion regarding the status of PAGs in the

Philippines.15

(b) The Report stated that "x x x the PNP organized one dedicated Special Task Group (STG) for each

private armed group (PAG) to monitor and counteract their activities."16

(c) Attached as Appendix "F" of the Report is a tabulation generated by the PNP and captioned as

"Status of PAGs Monitoring by STGs as of April 19, 2010," which classifies PAGs in the country according

to region, indicates their identity, and lists the prominent personalities with whom these groups are

associated.17

The first entry in the table names a PAG, known as the Gamboa Group, linked to herein

petitioner Gamboa.18

(d) Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on data from the PNP, to wit:

The resolutions were the subject of a national press conference held in Malacañang on March 24, 2010

at which time, the Commission was also asked to comment on the PNP report that out of one hundred

seventeen (117) partisan armed groups validated, twenty-four (24) had been dismantled with sixty-

seven (67) members apprehended and more than eighty-six (86) firearms confiscated.

Commissioner Herman Basbaño qualified that said statistics were based on PNP data but that the more

significant fact from his report is that the PNP has been vigilant in monitoring the activities of these

armed groups and this vigilance is largely due to the existence of the Commission which has continued

communicating with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and PNP personnel in the field to

constantly provide data on the activities of the PAGs. Commissioner Basbaño stressed that theCommission’s efforts have preempted the formation of the PAGs because now everyone is aware that

there is a body monitoring the PAGs movement through the PNP. Commissioner Lieutenant General

Edilberto Pardo Adan also clarified that the PAGs are being destabilized so that their ability to threaten

and sow fear during the election has been considerably weakened.19

(e) The Report briefly touched upon the validation system of the PNP:

Also, in order to provide the Commission with accurate data which is truly reflective of the

situation in the field, the PNP complied with the Commission’s recommendation that they revise their

validation system to include those PAGs previously listed as dormant. In the most recent briefingprovided by the PNP on April 26, 2010, there are one hundred seven (107) existing PAGs. Of these

groups, the PNP reported that seven (7) PAGs have been reorganized.20

On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of the Report

naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG.21

Gamboa averred that her

association with a PAG also appeared on print media.22

Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone who

maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded

to the Zeñarosa Commission.23

As a result, she claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the

enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also made her, as well as her

supporters and other people identified with her, susceptible to harassment and police surveillance

operations.24

Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa

filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their

capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.25

In her Petition, she prayed for the following reliefs: (a)

destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database; (b) withdrawal of all information

forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c) rectification of the damage done to her honor; (d) ordering respondents

to refrain from forwarding unverified reports against her; and (e) restraining respondents from making baseless

reports.26


































































The case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 14979 and was raffled to RTC Br. 13, which issued the

corresponding writ on 14 July 2010 after finding the Petition meritorious on its face.27

Thus, the trial court (a)

instructed respondents to submit all information and reports forwarded to and used by the Zeñarosa

Commission as basis to include her in the list of persons maintaining PAGs; (b) directed respondents, and any

person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist from forwarding to the Zeñarosa Commission, or to any other

government entity, information that they may have gathered against her without the approval of the court; (c)

ordered respondents to make a written return of the writ together with supporting affidavits; and (d)

scheduled the summary hearing of the case on 23 July 2010.28

In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that they had acted within the bounds of their mandate

in conducting the investigation and surveillance of Gamboa.29

The information stored in their database

supposedly pertained to two criminal cases in which she was implicated, namely: (a) a Complaint for murder

and frustrated murder docketed as NPS DOC No. 1-04-INQ-091-00077, and (b) a Complaint for murder,

frustrated murder and direct assault upon a person in authority, as well as indirect assault and multiple

attempted murder, docketed as NPS DOCKET No. 1-04-INV-10-A-00009.30

Respondents likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to comply with the following

requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data: (a) the manner in which the right to privacy was violated

or threatened with violation and how it affected the right to life, liberty or security of Gamboa; (b) the actions

and recourses she took to secure the data or information; and (c) the location of the files, registers or

databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or

information.31

They also contended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Data, being limited to cases of

extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, was not the proper remedy to address the alleged

besmirching of the reputation of Gamboa.32

RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9 September 2010, dismissed the Petition.33

The trial court

categorically ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, as published in the

Report, constituted a violation of her right to privacy, to wit:

In this light, it cannot also be disputed that by her inclusion in the list of persons maintainingPAGs, Gamboa’s right to privacy indubitably has been violated. The violation understandably affects her

life, liberty and security enormously. The untold misery that comes with the tag of having a PAG could

even be insurmountable. As she essentially alleged in her petition, she fears for her security that at any

time of the day the unlimited powers of respondents may likely be exercised to further malign and

destroy her reputation and to transgress her right to life.

By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is likewise undisputed that there was

certainly intrusion into Gamboa’s activities. It cannot be denied that information was gathered as basis

therefor. After all, under Administrative Order No. 275, the Zeñarosa Commission was tasked to

investigate the existence of private armies in the country, with all the powers of an investigative bodyunder Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987.

x x x x x x x x x

By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboa alleged as she accused

respondents, who are public officials, of having gathered and provided information that made the

Zeñarosa Commission to include her in the list. Obviously, it was this gathering and forwarding of

information supposedly by respondents that petitioner barks at as unlawful. x x x.34

Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br. 13 nevertheless dismissed the Petition on the ground that

Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that the subject information originated from

respondents, and that they forwarded this database to the Zeñarosa Commission without the benefit of prior

verification.35

The trial court also ruled that even before respondents assumed their official positions,

information on her may have already been acquired.36

Finally, it held that the Zeñarosa Commission, as the

body tasked to gather information on PAGs and authorized to disclose information on her, should have been

impleaded as a necessary if not a compulsory party to the Petition.37

Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal by Certiorari dated 24 September 2010,38

raising the following

assignment of errors:



















































1. The trial court erred in ruling that the Zeñarosa Commission be impleaded as either a necessary or

indispensable party;

2. The trial court erred in declaring that Gamboa failed to present sufficient proof to link respondents as

the informant to [sic] the Zeñarosa Commission;

3. The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;

4. The trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the Zeñarosa Commission to [sic] the PNP asalleged by Gamboa is an assumption;

5. The trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct to PNP as an agency.39

On the other hand, respondents maintain the following arguments: (a) Gamboa failed to present

substantial evidence to show that her right to privacy in life, liberty or security was violated, and (b) the trial

court correctly dismissed the Petition on the ground that she had failed to present sufficient proof showing

that respondents were the source of the report naming her as one who maintains a PAG.40

Meanwhile, Gamboa argues that although A.O. 275 was a lawful order, fulfilling the mandate to

dismantle PAGs in the country should be done in accordance with due process, such that the gathering and

forwarding of unverified information on her must be considered unlawful.41

She also reiterates that she was

able to present sufficient evidence showing that the subject information originated from respondents.42

In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data, this Court is

called upon to, first, unpack the concept of the right to privacy; second, explain the writ of habeas data as an

extraordinary remedy that seeks to protect the right to informational privacy; and finally, contextualize the

right to privacy vis-à-vis the state interest involved in the case at bar.

The Right to Privacy

The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized as a constitutional

right. This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc,43

thus enunciated:

The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a

long way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the provision on the periodical

submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to

privacy. There is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the constitutional sense

must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if

it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom." As a

matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the most comprehensiveof rights and the right most valued by civilized men."

The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his

personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. xxx.

x x x x x x x x x

x x x In the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas, speaking for five members

of the Court, stated: "Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in

the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition

against the quartering of soldiers ‘in any house’ in time of peace without the consent of the owner is

another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the ‘right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ The

Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which

government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: ‘The

enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others

retained by the people." After referring to various American Supreme Court decisions, Justice Douglas

continued: "These cases bear witness that the right of privacy which presses for recognition is a

legitimate one."























x x x x x x x x x

So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition

independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.

The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always

included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of

the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government.

Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute

state. In contrast, a system of limited government, safeguards a private sector, which belongs to theindividual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this

private sector — protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual — has become

increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age —

industrialization, urbanization, and organization — operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate

intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life

marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society."44

(Emphases supplied)

In Ople v. Torres,45

this Court traced the constitutional and statutory bases of the right to privacy

in Philippine jurisdiction, to wit:

Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized

and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly recognized in section 3 (1)

of the Bill of Rights:

Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except

upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed

by law.

Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz:

Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process oflaw, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects

against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be

inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to

be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the

complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be

searched and the persons or things to be seized.

x x x x x x x x x

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law

shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be

impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health as may be

provided by law.

x x x x x x x x x

Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private

sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be

abridged.

Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that

"every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and

other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into

the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for

damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of










letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of

secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of

privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and

the Intellectual Property Code. The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the

privacy of certain information.

Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental

right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is

justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. x x x.

46

(Emphases supplied)

Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or

constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks,47

this Court underscored that

the right to privacy is not absolute, viz:

With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to

state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution,

guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every

invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In

Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of the people to access information on matters of public

concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we

declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest.

Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement

of the individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in

this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions

adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose

constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed legislative investigation.48

Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective, the courts are

required to weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy

may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling.

The Writ of Habeas Data

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy,

honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right

to the truth and to informational privacy.49

It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding

oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order

to achieve unlawful ends.50

It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted,

there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security

on the other. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads:

Habeas data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to

privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public

official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of

data information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.

The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and jurisprudence. Considering

that even the Latin American habeas data, on which our own Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds

its origins from the European tradition of data protection,51

this Court can be guided by cases on the protection

of personal data decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Of particular note is Leander v.

Sweden,52

in which the ECHR balanced the right of citizens to be free from interference in their private affairs

with the right of the state to protect its national security. In this case, Torsten Leander (Leander), a Swedish

citizen, worked as a temporary replacement museum technician at the Naval Museum, which was adjacent to a

restricted military security zone.53

He was refused employment when the requisite personnel control resulted in

an unfavorable outcome on the basis of information in the secret police register, which was kept in accordance

with the Personnel Control Ordinance and to which he was prevented access.54

He claimed, among others, that

this procedure of security control violated Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights55

on the right

to privacy, as nothing in his personal or political background would warrant his classification in the register as a

security risk.56













































The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of information relating to the private life of

Leander, coupled with the refusal to allow him the opportunity to refute the same, amounted to an

interference in his right to respect for private life.57

However, the ECHR held that the interference was justified

on the following grounds: (a) the personnel control system had a legitimate aim, which was the protection of

national security,58

and (b) the Personnel Control Ordinance gave the citizens adequate indication as to the

scope and the manner of exercising discretion in the collection, recording and release of information by the

authorities.59

The following statements of the ECHR must be emphasized:

58. The notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, inparticular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see, inter alia, the Gillow judgment of

24 November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 22, § 55).

59. However, the Court recognises that the national authorities enjoy a margin of appreciation, the

scope of which will depend not only on the nature of the legitimate aim pursued but also on the

particular nature of the interference involved. In the instant case, the interest of the respondent State

in protecting its national security must be balanced against the seriousness of the interference with the

applicant’s right to respect for his private life.

There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of protecting national security, for

the Contracting States to have laws granting the competent domestic authorities power, firstly, to

collect and store in registers not accessible to the public information on persons and, secondly, to use

this information when assessing the suitability of candidates for employment in posts of importance for

national security.

Admittedly, the contested interference adversely affected Mr. Leander’s legitimate interests

through the consequences it had on his possibilities of access to certain sensitive posts within the public

service. On the other hand, the right of access to public service is not as such enshrined in the

Convention (see, inter alia, the Kosiek judgment of 28 August 1986, Series A no. 105, p. 20, §§ 34-35),

and, apart from those consequences, the interference did not constitute an obstacle to his leading a

private life of his own choosing.

In these circumstances, the Court accepts that the margin of appreciation available to the

respondent State in assessing the pressing social need in the present case, and in particular in choosing

the means for achieving the legitimate aim of protecting national security, was a wide one.

x x x x x x x x x

66. The fact that the information released to the military authorities was not communicated to

Mr. Leander cannot by itself warrant the conclusion that the interference was not "necessary in a

democratic society in the interests of national security", as it is the very absence of suchcommunication which, at least partly, ensures the efficacy of the personnel control procedure (see,

mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned Klass and Others judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 27, § 58).

The Court notes, however, that various authorities consulted before the issue of the Ordinance

of 1969, including the Chancellor of Justice and the Parliamentary Ombudsman, considered it desirable

that the rule of communication to the person concerned, as contained in section 13 of the Ordinance,

should be effectively applied in so far as it did not jeopardise the purpose of the control (see paragraph

31 above).

67. The Court, like the Commission, thus reaches the conclusion that the safeguards contained in

the Swedish personnel control system meet the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2).

Having regard to the wide margin of appreciation available to it, the respondent State was entitled to

consider that in the present case the interests of national security prevailed over the individual

interests of the applicant (see paragraph 59 above). The interference to which Mr. Leander was

subjected cannot therefore be said to have been disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.

(Emphases supplied)

Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific component of the right to

privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate state interest. In similar fashion, the determination of whether















the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this case entails a

delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and the relevant state interest

involved.

The collection and forwarding of information by the PNP vis-à-vis the interest of the state to dismantle

private armies.

The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not

recognized by the duly constituted authority.

60

It also provides for the establishment of one police force that isnational in scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police

commission.61

Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a

legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling

them permanently.

To enable the Zeñarosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with the powers of an

investigative body, including the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence

relevant to the investigation and use compulsory processes to produce documents, books, and records.62

A.O.

275 likewise authorized the Zeñarosa Commission to deputize the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the

National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the PNP, and any other law enforcement agency to

assist the commission in the performance of its functions.63

Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law to (a) enforce all laws and

ordinances relative to the protection of lives and properties; (b) maintain peace and order and take all

necessary steps to ensure public safety; and (c) investigate and prevent crimes.64

Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and functions

accorded to the Zeñarosa Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of

maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities.65 One of those individuals is hereinpetitioner Gamboa.

This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the Report

listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the

forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or

threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security.

The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body

specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the

Zeñarosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the former’smandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter.

Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that the PNP released information to

the Zeñarosa Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity

to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an

inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and investigation.1âwphi1 Additionally, Gamboa

herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which was used to update information on individuals

associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the situation on the field.66

Thus, safeguards were

put in place to make sure that the information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.

Pending the enactment of legislation on data protection, this Court declines to make any further

determination as to the propriety of sharing information during specific stages of intelligence gathering. To do

otherwise would supplant the discretion of investigative bodies in the accomplishment of their functions,

resulting in an undue encroachment on their competence.

However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established in existing law and

jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to caution these investigating entities that

information-sharing must observe strict confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be released exclusively to

the authorities empowered to receive the relevant information. After all, inherent to the right to privacy is the































freedom from "unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such

a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities."67

In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its confidential

nature.1âwphi1 That it was leaked to third parties and the media was regrettable, even warranting reproach.

But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible for this unintended

disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her

reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper.

Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her

inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment

and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations

conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials,

they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the

alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of

information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data

must be denied.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979

dated 9 September 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Laoag City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies Gamboa the

privilege of the writ of habeas data, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.





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