Wright. Vladimir Solovyev and Max Scheler

Vladimir Solovyev and Max Scheler: Attempt at a Comparative Interpretation by HelmutDahm; Kathleen WrightReview by: Joseph L. NavickasStudies in Soviet Thought, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Oct., 1977), pp. 253-257Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20098750 .Accessed: 09/10/2014 16:29

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REVIEWS

Helmut Dahm, Vladimir Solovyev and Max Scheler: Attempt at a Compara tive Interpretation, trans, by Kathleen Wright.

D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland, 1975, 324 pp.

The gradual rise of interest in Marxism and in contemporary Soviet thought in recent years has somehow overshadowed and bypassed the Russian philo sophy of the prerevolutionary period. There are, of course, exceptions, and

perhaps the most striking one is Nicolai Berdyaev. In addition to the trans lations of Berdyaev's original works, we have a handful of books, articles, and dissertations dealing with the various aspects of his thought. But we are still

facing an overwhelming dearth of material on the thought of L. Lopatin, N. Lossky, S. Frank, L. Shestov, and V. Solovyov

? to mention but a few. Helmut Dahm's Vladimir Solovyev and Max Scheler, recently translated by Kathleen Wright, brings a feeling of relief and promises to be a solid contri bution towards filling an onerous gap.

We have before us a complex scholarly work and a penetrating constructive

study. It is safe to say that the work is too intricate for the beginner and, of

course, too difficult for the uninitiated. But it might be a real gold-mine for advanced graduate students, especially for those interested in Scheler and

Solovyov.

H. Dahm's work is a comparative study with the intent of isolating the

points of contact in the thought of two original and important thinkers. The idea of such a comparison is not new, since similar projects have been attemp ted before by both Russian and Western scholars. For example, almost three decades ago Professor Ludolf M?ller of Marburg made an attempt to compare Solovyov, Nietzsche, and Scheler (Cf. Zeitschrift f?r philosophische Forschung, Band I, Heft 4, 1947), but the work by Dahm is much more systematic and thorough both in structure and scope.

There is a sense in which this single volume may be regarded as containing two relatively independent studies. The first one comprises the first five

chapters and ends with Chapter Six, entitled Retrospect. The three subsequent chapters form a novel study, transcending the original theme and the task of

comparison. These additional chapters deal with the history of Russian philo sophy from Shestov to Solovyov, the Soviet re-examination of Solovyov, and the constructive Soviet evaluation of Max Scheler, respectively. Clearly, this latter part of the work is more critical and more historical than the compara tive one. Although the second portion of the book is no less important than

Studies in Soviet Thought 17 (1977) 253-257. All Rights Reserved Copyright ? 1977 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland


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the first, in this brief review I shall concentrate on the first chapters and the

problematic issues contained therein. The work begins with a discussion of the idea of philosophy, and this issue

leads to the question of the relation of religion and metaphysics. When Dahm

speaks of the 'essential inadequacy' of metaphysics for guaranteeing the unconditional credibility of absolute truth, he is asserting that for both

Solovyov and Scheler philosophy and religion are two distinct and separate spheres. This might be true for Max Scheler, for he makes a rigorous distinc tion between knowledge of salvation (Erl?sungswissen) and knowledge of essence (Wesenswissen). However, it is unlikely that Solovyov, the philosopher of total-unity and reconciliation, would cling to such a formal distinction.

Already in his early work, The Crisis of Western Philosophy, Solovyov sugges ted that science, philosophy proper, and theology should be dialectically integrated and internally unified, thus giving rise to a system of supreme and

ultimate wisdom.

To clarify Solovyov's position on this point, we have to re-examine his notion of faith. It seems to me that Solovyov has borrowed his notion of faith from Khomyakov. Now, it should be noted that for this Slavophile thinker faith is not a strictly and specifically religious act, but a natural

cognitive apprehension by unaided human reason. In his letter to Yuri

Samarin, Khomyakov clearly and unequivocally states that he "gave the name

faith to that faculty of reason which apprehends actual (real) data and makes them available for analysis and awareness by the understanding (Verstand)". (Russian Philosophy, ed. by J. M. Edie, Vol. I, p. 251). Solovyov's idea of faith is rooted in precisely the same outlook and position. And there is no reason to suppose that he had any intention to distinguish between philo sophical faith and religious faith, as Dahm seems to suggest. For Solovyov, faith is an indivisible act revealing with an apodictic evidence the reality of the Absolute Being. Still, faith is not determined by the subject's inward decision and relation to the Absolute Being. Faith, like truth, cannot be

merely decision or relation, but it is also that which is given in that relation.

Now, that which is given in the act of faith is the unconditioned reality of the Absolute Being. Accordingly, this apprehension of the Absolute Being is the fundamental condition of the possibility of true cognition, for the meaning of truth presupposes absolutely unconditioned reality. Thus, when Solovyov talks of the trustworthy character of sense knowledge, he is assuming that

ultimately its justification is grounded in the primordial act of faith. Evidently,


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neither sense powers nor reason can function for him in isolation and indepen dently of the supreme cognitive insight of faith. Therefore, the emphasis on faith is never misplaced.

Dahm, however, moves within a narrow and more fragmentary context,

and he quotes Solovyov to the effect that "truth is reality, but for us reality can only be guaranteed by immediate sense certainty", (p. 34). This statement

makes sense only when related to what Solovyov has to say about faith - as

follows:

That anything exists outside of ourselves and independently of ourselves - that we can

not know, because all that we know (actually), that is to say, all that we experience, exists within us, not outside of us (as our sensations and our thoughts); and what is not

within us, but is in its own self, is thereby beyond the limits of our experience and, con

sequently, outside of our actual knowledge; it can be asserted, thus, only by an act of the spirit which can reach beyond the boundaries of this reality of ours

-

and it is this act of spirit that is called faith. (Lectures on Godmanhood, trans, by P. Zouboff, pp. 105-106.)

In brief, our immediate sense certainty and our rational thinking derive their essential cognitive validity from the act of spirit

? faith.

Solovyov's conception of faith is essentially metaphysical and epistemic rather than phenomenological or theological. This is not to say, however, that he was no phenomenologist in any sense. My impression is that Solovyov's phenomenological genius manifests itself most distinctly in his attempts to elucidate the essence of love and the moral relevance of reverence, pity, and shame.

In his Meaning of Love, especially in the first chapter, Solovyov prefers illustrations from novels and great works of poetry to actual, dated love affairs,

seeing that they exhibit not isolated cases of love but pure, essential types. Thus, Werther's love for Charlotte and Romeo's love for Juliette yield a

deeper and richer understanding of the meaning of love than, say, Christopher Columbus' love for lady Beatrice Anreches. We don't have to make here any far-fetched congruencies between Solovyov and Scheler, for on the issue of

methodological investigation of essences they came close to one another.

Seeking to apprehend the nature of love in ideal, pure, and essential types, Solovyov came very close to Scheler's distinction between ens reale and ens

intentionale. Still, there is no complete congruence between Scheler's material apriori and Solovyov's experience of reverence, shame, and pity. It

is true, however, that one can relate Solovyov's acts of reverence, pity, and


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shame to Scheler's act of preference (Vorziehen), since the latter reveals and indicates both the height and the rank of the given value.

Indeed, Solovyov's acts of reverence, pity, and shame have to do with the

recognition of the objective hierarchy and scale of values. They reveal which values transcend the human level, which values manifest themselves within the human sphere, and which things are below man and remain inappropriate to human nature and behaviour. I do not think we can call them 'material apriori', but they are surely the discoverers of true values and our moral guides.

Another important point of contact lies in the phenomenon and problem of love. For Solovyov and Scheler, love is an essential act of the person with affectionate and cognitive implications. It is not surprising that this act should dominate the entire anthropological scene in both thinkers. Although H. Dahm recognizes the central role of love in the thought of both philos ophers, the abundant material in this area is not sufficiently explored. The author devotes only ten pages to the issue of love, and the comparison remains somehow very general and limited.

To say this does not imply that H. Dahm is a careless or a superficial in

vestigator. On the contrary, he is a cautious analyst. He would never press an

analogy of ideas into their identity, and he would never transform a hint into a fact. He knows only too well that a comparative study is in no way an

attempt at reduction and simplification. Nor does he succumb to the temp tation of verbal maneuvering. He patiently listens to his philosophers and lets them speak for themselves. He deserves solid praise in this respect.

The translator, the diligent Miss Kathleen Wright, has captured H. Dahm's

style and his striving for clarity and precision. She did an excellent job, and we are grateful to her for providing us with a much needed work. Perhaps her most difficult challenge was a technical one: the task of properly transliter

ating the Russian terms. She has chosen to adopt a modern transcription with

regard to properly philosophical terms, but she clung to a more traditional and less correct transliteration of Solovyov's name.

It is a well-known fact that the transcription of Solovyov's name among his translators and commentators is not uniform. Basic, perhaps, among the

reasons for this diversity of transliteration and transcription is that Solovyov's name is spelled with the letter ? and not with the regular e (pronounced 'yeh'). The ? is neither a well familiar 'e' nor an Umlaut, but a distinct and novel

sign, which is pronounced 'yoh'. To the English reader the transliterations

'Solov'ev', 'Solovyev', 'Soloviev' are simply misleading and incorrect, to say


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the least. Too long, indeed, we were ignorant and negligent of this simple and basic linguistic fact.

There are a few noticeable misprints and typographical errors in the work. If Plato's name appears as Plata, the error is well noticeable, easily detectable,

and forgivable. However, when Aleksandr Gizetti's name is printed as Aleksandra Gizetti (p. 15), that is not an easily recognizable error. But, again, errare humanum est. The reader will tolerate all these imperfections. Thus, in the final analysis, we can say with true confidence that the work is good and it is really to be welcomed.

Boston College JOSEPH L. NAVICKAS


Article Contentsp. [253]p. 254p. 255p. 256p. 257

Issue Table of ContentsStudies in Soviet Thought, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Oct., 1977), pp. 201-278Front MatterMarx, Engels, and the Relativity of Morals [pp. 201-224]Maurice Merleau-Ponty and the Problem of Self-Accusations [pp. 225-241]DiscussionThe Soviets and Other Marxists in 1976 [pp. 243-246]

ReviewsReview: untitled [pp. 247-249]Review: untitled [pp. 251-252]Review: untitled [pp. 253-257]Review: untitled [p. 259-259]Review: untitled [p. 261-261]Review: untitled [p. 263-263]Review: untitled [pp. 265-266]Review: untitled [pp. 267-272]Review: untitled [pp. 273-274]

Books Received [pp. 275-277]

Wright. Vladimir Solovyev and Max Scheler

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