Land Warfare Studies Centre

Working Paper No. 137

CoNteStiNg the NeutraL SPaCe:a thematiC aNaLySiS of

miLitary humaNitariaNiSm

by Lieutenant Colonel richard Barrett

april 2010

© Commonwealth of Australia 2010

This work is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of study, research, criticism or review (as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968), and with standard source credit included, no part may be reproduced by any process without written permission.

National Library of australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entryAuthor: Barrett, Richard, 1973-

Title: Contesting the neutral space : a thematic analysis of military humanitarianism / Richard Barrett.

ISBN: 9780642297235 (pbk.)

Series: Working paper (Land Warfare Studies Centre (Australia)) ; 137.

Notes: Includes bibliographical references.

Subjects: Integrated operations (Military science)

Peacekeeping forces--Iraq--Safety measures.

Peacekeeping forces--Iraq--Evaluation

Humanitarian assistance--Iraq--Safety measures.

Humanitarian assistance--Iraq--Evaluation.

Neutrality--Iraq.

Other Authors/Contributors:

Land Warfare Studies Centre (Australia)

Dewey Number: 363.88309567

Land Warfare Studies Centre Working PapersISSN 1441-0389

Study papers produced by the Land Warfare Studies Centre are vehicles for progressing professional discussion and debate concerning military strategy, particularly the application of land warfare concepts and capabilities to the security of Australia and its interests. Study papers are intended to provide comprehensive treatment of their subject matter at the time of publication.

Series Editor: Michelle Lovi

Land Warfare Studies Centre

The Australian Army established the LWSC in July 1997 through the amalgamation of several existing staffs and research elements.

The charter of the LWSC is to promote the wider understanding and appreciation of land warfare; provide an institutional focus for applied research into the use of land power by the Australian Army; and raise the level of professional and intellectual debate within the Army. The LWSC fulfils these roles through a range of internal reports and external publications; a program of conferences, seminars and debates; and contributions to a variety of professional, academic and community forums. Additional information on the centre may be found on the Internet at <http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc/>.

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DisclaimerThe views expressed are the author’s and not necessarily those of the Australian Army or the Department of Defence. The Commonwealth of Australia will not be legally responsible in contract, tort or otherwise for any statement made in this publication.

about the author

Lieutenant Colonel Richard Barrett is currently serving as the Chief Instructor of the Royal Military College (RMC) Duntroon. Lieutenant Colonel Barrett is an Infantry officer with regimental experience at 1 RAR, 2 RAR and 6 RAR and instructional experience at RMC. He has recently returned from a posting with the United States Marine Corps, including an operational tour to Southern Helmand Province, Afghanistan, with the Marine Expeditionary Brigade. Lieutenant Colonel Barrett holds a Masters of International Affairs from the Australian National University and a Masters of Strategy and Planning from the University of New South Wales. This paper was originally submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Masters of Strategy and Planning.

introduction

In a 2007 presentation to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), General John Abizaid, former commander of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) and commander of coalition forces in Iraq, stated that Iraqi insurgents were threatening the humanitarian ‘neutral space’.1 He indicated that insurgents and terrorists were increasingly targeting humanitarian aid workers in an attempt to polarise participants in the conflict. The pressures on the neutral, or humanitarian space, however, do not only originate with insurgents, but also with military strategies designed at least in part to deal with them.

This paper will analyse how military contributions to humanitarian crises have influenced the nature of the neutral space. Specifically, the paper identifies three themes that characterise the recent history of ‘military humanitarianism’. The first theme, drawing on examples from the early 1990s, indicates that during this period, military contributions were primarily designed to enable the provision of humanitarian aid. The second theme identifies that in the late 1990s military forces increasingly became a provider of humanitarian aid, an approach that began to create a level of competition with humanitarian actors. The third and final theme describes a new phenomenon, whereby military forces manipulate humanitarian aid in order to achieve tactical and political objectives. These three themes depict a trend towards the polarisation of military, humanitarian and threat actors, and a politicisation of the humanitarian space. In conclusion, the paper predicts that militant groups are likely to continue to target humanitarian actors in order to confine or destroy the neutral space. As a result, both military and non-government organisations (NGOs) will need to analyse how the recent trend of military humanitarianism will have an impact on the future viability of the neutral space.

1 General J Abizaid, Presentation to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Australian Defence Force Academy, 15 May 2007.

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the Neutral Space

The concept of the neutral space originated with Jean-Henri Dunant’s establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1863, and the subsequent development of the Geneva Conventions. The neutral space is defined as the literal and conceptual space where humanitarian actors can provide aid to the suffering.2 In 1991 the United Nations (UN) stated that the ICRC’s principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality must govern the provision of humanitarian aid.3 The concept of the humanitarian space has a long history in international law; however, since the end of the Cold War, several humanitarian crises have demonstrated that this neutral space is becoming increasingly contested.

The humanitarian space is being contested by three parties. The first group, traditionally the guardians of the humanitarian space, is a diverse group that includes international bodies like the ICRC as well as NGOs such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Care, Oxfam and Save the Children.4 These organisations exist to provide aid to those in need, and operate in accordance with the three core humanitarian principles. The second group of actors are military forces. For the purpose of this paper, these groups will be classified as uniformed, professional forces responsible to and representative of national governments. These bodies engage in humanitarian crises on behalf of their governments and operate according to the directives of those governments rather than pure humanitarian principles. The third group comprises a diverse set of players inclusive of warlords, insurgents or terrorists, which, for the sake of simplicity, will be referred to as militants, or a derivation thereof. These groups are motivated by power, money, religious ideals or deep-seated ethnic or sectarian hatreds. Unfortunately, a detailed analysis of the motivations of each of these groups is beyond

2 B M Roggo, ‘After the Kosovo conflict, a genuine humanitarian space: A utopian concept or an essential requirement?’, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 837, 2000, p. 31, <http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/57jqcm>.

3 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/RES/46/182, ‘Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations’, United Nations, 19 December 1991.

4 NGO groups considered in this paper will be those that directly provide humanitarian aid. It will not include other organisations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch or other groups not directly contributing to humanitarian aid.

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the scope of this paper, and as a result, the paper will focus on how their tactics and procedures have influenced the nature of the neutral space.5

Following the end of the Cold War, the sanctity of the neutral space became more contested by militant groups targeting humanitarian aid. This militant tactic altered the nature of the neutral space and forced NGOs and militaries to develop new operating procedures. The dynamic relationship that resulted from the interaction of military, humanitarian and militant groups ensured that since the early 1990s the neutral space has been in a continual state of change and evolution. Further, recent humanitarian crises have illustrated that these three actors are operating in competition. This current trend threatens a three-way collision that may have fundamental implications for the delivery of humanitarian aid.

5 An analysis of the motivations of each of these groups would be critical to fully understanding the complexities of each situation.

enabling humanitarian aid

Following the end of the Cold War the international community became increasingly concerned with the humanitarian effects of internal and inter-state conflicts. Highlighted by unprecedented media penetration into conflict situations, the international community demanded more involvement from the United Nations and regional organisations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Throughout the 1990s, issues of internal crises continued to have important implications for regional stability, but media portrayal of the graphic realities of these humanitarian situations began to focus attention on the relatively new concept of ‘human security’ and prompted the development of peace-enforcement operations.6 This approach was significant in that armed intervention in sovereign states was justified under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (peace-enforcement) in order to solve ‘humanitarian crises’.7 These operations required military forces to counter militant activities, restore law and order, and create a secure environment to enable the provision of humanitarian aid.

SomaliaBy 1992, years of civil war in Somalia and the subsequent disruption of agriculture created a humanitarian crisis that demanded the attention of the international community. Despite the presence of a significant number of international NGOs, humanitarian aid was not reaching the majority of the population due to continued conflict between rival warlords. These warlords targeted the delivery of humanitarian aid in order to increase their own resources and exert control over the local population. In response, the UN Security Council (UNSC) met to consider the implications of the crisis and declared in Resolution 794 that the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the internal conflict constituted a threat to international peace and stability.8 As a result, the UNSC authorised a military intervention under Chapter VII of the UN

6 G King and C J L Murray, ‘Rethinking Human Security’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 116, No. 4, 2001–02, p. 585.

7 Ibid.

8 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 794 S/RES/794 (1992) Somalia, 3 December 1992.

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Charter and tasked it with the creation of a secure environment to enable humanitarian relief operations.9

In December 1992, the US-led United Task Force (UNITAF) deployed into Somalia to stop the theft of aid and halt the intimidation of humanitarian actors. The UNITAF mandate required military forces to provide a safe environment for NGOs, but also allowed for the provision of logistic assistance as well the protection of humanitarian personnel. UNITAF deployed up to 28,000 soldiers10 and in close consultation with the UN’s World Food Program and the ICRC, transported thousands of tonnes of humanitarian relief supplies from Kenya into Somalia.

Despite the massive troop deployment into the area, the militant tactic of targeting humanitarian aid continued. This persistent threat subsequently forced military forces and NGOs to begin a process of dialogue and cooperation in order to improve the safety of personnel and the delivery of aid. In response, UNITAF established a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) to coordinate how the military could contribute to humanitarian activities. The establishment of the CMOC enabled NGOs and UN agencies to cooperate with one another as well as with military units on humanitarian and security issues.11 The establishment of the CMOC facilitated a level of cooperation and coordination that was to be crucial to the delivery of large amounts of humanitarian aid, but military forces and NGOs were to come into considerable conflict over how military forces should create a safe environment for the provision of aid.12

The disagreement that developed between UNITAF and humanitarian organisations would prove to be an enduring one relevant to most situations where military forces and humanitarian organisations operate. NGOs consistently demand that in situations of complex humanitarian crisis, military forces should focus on the underlying societal issues of violence and instability rather than addressing their symptoms. NGOs generally believe that addressing these more fundamental issues inevitably leads to the establishment of a more secure environment and creates the space for humanitarian action. In the Somalian example, NGOs insisted that UNITAF should achieve this by

9 Ibid.

10 R B Oakley and D Tucker, Two Perspectives on Interventions and Humanitarian Operations, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 1 July 1997, p. 5.

11 Ibid.

12 The establishment of a CMOC is now one of the first tasks for most military missions when deployed to areas that share operating space with civilian actors and NGOs (therefore almost all operations). The CMOC concept was one of the major lessons of the Somalia campaign.

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comprehensively disarming the total population. In doing so, humanitarian groups reasoned that military and aid organisations groups would be able to carry out their tasks in separate but complementary ways, as the removal of weapons would eliminate the armed threat towards the delivery of aid. US forces disagreed with this approach and indicated that such a comprehensive campaign would inevitably lead to violent confrontation between armed Somalis and UNITAF personnel. Military commanders also stated that such a task would require a level and duration of commitment that was deemed unacceptable by US forces intent on downsizing and transitioning to a new UN mandate.13

In the face of an armed and desperate population, one of the outcomes of this difference in opinion was the requirement for many NGOs to provide their own routine security. The decision to employ armed guards for the protection of personnel, compounds and aid convoys is one that most NGOs undertake only under extreme duress. Humanitarian actors believe that the use of armed guards or the presence of weapons in or around NGO premises should be avoided wherever possible, as it risks undermining perceptions of neutrality.14 Further, the hiring of local armed guards also may have unintended consequences on the balance of power between rival militant factions by providing such groups with resources, prestige and legitimacy.

The issue of local protection proved to be a constant sticking point in NGO–military relations in Somalia, as the reliability and loyalties of armed guards was continually challenged by UNITAF staff. The former US Ambassador to Somalia, appointed as the President’s Special Representative, Mr Robert Oakley, illustrated the dilemma that the issue of armed guards posed for NGOs, the United Nations and military forces.

The NGOs and United Nations had, for some time, inadvertently been building up Somali warlord Mohammad Farrah Aideed by leasing over 500 pieces of property in his part of Mogadishu and using his militia as guards, thus assisting him financially and putting themselves in a vulnerable position.15

13 R F Baumann, L A Yates and V F Washington, My clan against the world: US and coalition forces in Somalia, 1992–1994, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, 2004, p. 35.

14 Inter-Agency Standing Committee Reference Paper, Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Geneva, 28 June 2004, p. 16.

15 Oakley and Tucker, Two Perspectives on Interventions and Humanitarian Operations, p. 11.

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The control of weapons proved to be a central theme throughout the Somali campaign. After disregarding the concept of disarming the total population, US forces and subsequently UNOSOM II selectively targeted gang leaders and warlords who had stockpiled large amounts of weapons. This tactic influenced the nature of the security situation in Somalia, and eventually resulted in an undeclared war between US and UN forces and warlords, especially Aideed. Consequently, as warlords fiercely defended their territories in and around Mogadishu, the nature of the military contribution in Somalia changed from the facilitation of humanitarian aid, to a fierce urban conflict.

The bitter reality of fighting in Mogadishu was that combatants seldom operated as discrete elements. Indeed, on the contrary, they typically welcomed the presence of noncombatants, seeking protection in the knowledge that American ROE emphasized avoiding casualties ... On this day, to relieve the pressure on the fellow UNOSOM forces, the aircraft opened fire with 2.75mm rockets and 20mm cannons, killing a large but undetermined number of Somalis. The repercussions in the global press cast growing doubt over the common sense of a mission that had begun with lofty humanitarian objectives and had devolved into an apparently senseless, bloody turf battle in Mogadishu.16

The crisis in Somalia was the first post-Cold War example of a contested humanitarian space and demonstrates how the nature of military contributions can quickly change shape and focus. Warlords drew military forces into conducting operations in the centre of a large and hostile town. They used the urban environment and the presence of civilians as a means of camouflage and protection, and forced an escalation of conflict that was not in the interests of the UN and its contributing nations. Militant forces had also achieved success in targeting the delivery of humanitarian aid and used it as a means of controlling the civilian population. Militant action had thus made the neutral space a dangerous place, prompting NGOs to make compromises to ensure their security and forcing the withdrawal of the world’s remaining superpower. The Somalian campaign was to have direct effects on the nature and willingness of Western governments to deploy military forces to facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid.

16 Baumann, Yates and Washington, My clan against the world, p. 123.

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rwandaThe 1994 Rwandan conflict provides another example of a military deployment tasked with facilitating humanitarian action. Unlike Somalia, the Rwandan crisis occurred not as a result of militant groups taking advantage of a humanitarian situation, but because these groups aimed to create a humanitarian crisis.

In April 1994 Hutu militia groups began a widespread campaign of genocide that targeted ethnic Tutsis and moderate Hutus. The ethnic cleansing that occurred not only ignored the concept of a humanitarian space, but specifically targeted civilians regardless of position, age or gender. Due to the history of conflict between Hutu and Tutsi groups, the United Nations initially authorised a military deployment to monitor a cease-fire between warring factions that had been brokered in August 1993.17 As events unfolded, however, this UN mandate became entirely irrelevant, as militant groups ignored all previous discussions and began a widespread campaign of genocide. Subsequent UNSC Resolutions recognised the change in the nature of the conflict, and authorised military forces to:

Contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and • civilians at risk in Rwanda including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas.Provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and • humanitarian relief operations.18

Despite these amendments to UNSC Resolutions, the Rules of Engagement (ROE) remained restrictive and ensured that military forces were largely unable to stop any of the violence. Despite the obvious and overwhelming nature of the humanitarian crisis, the limited number of troops and the constraints on the use of force severely undermined the ability of military forces to ensure a safe environment for the provision of aid. The restricted yet vague mandates and slow bureaucratic responses by the United Nations to changed situations undermined the effectiveness of the military deployment, eroded NGO respect and drove many military commanders to the point

17 The Arusha Accords final agreement was signed on 4 August 1993, ‘Rwanda – UNAMIR Background’, United Nations website, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirFT.htm> accessed 24 June 2007.

18 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 965 S/RES/965 (1994) Rwanda, 30 November 1994.

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of frustration and despair.19 Further, the methods by which militant groups conducted the genocide, with primitive weapons such as machetes, functionally dislocated the conventional strengths of deployed military forces. As the genocide was conducted not by armed, uniformed militant groups, but by large elements of Hutu society, the ability for these military forces to identify, isolate and destroy these actors, even if they had the mandates to do so, would have been impossible.

From the humanitarian perspective, the nature of the conflict created massive social upheaval resulting in enormous refugee movements. The fact that tribal groups began a process of ethnic cleansing ensured that NGO access to civilians in need was largely restricted to refugee camps. The nature and composition of these camps would also highlight another humanitarian challenge. Fiona Terry, an MSF worker in Rwanda at the time, wrote that by April 1994 it had become clear that these refugee camps had become sanctuaries where other militant groups could receive sustenance, recruit new personnel and conduct some form of training.20 Terry identified that this situation created a moral dilemma for NGO workers, as in some instances the provision of humanitarian aid to these camps in part contributed to the continuation of the humanitarian crisis.

The nature of the humanitarian space in Rwanda was challenged by the totality of the militant aims. The strategy of genocide polarised all participants according to race, and as a result, militant groups had no interest in respecting neutrality. Consequently, humanitarian organisations were largely reduced to the provision of aid to refugee camps, often in neighbouring countries such as Zaire, and struggled with the concept that the provision of that aid may have contributed to the continuation of the crisis. At the same time, the enormity and brutality of the situation frustrated UN and international decision-making, fundamentally undermining the military force’s ability to provide a secure humanitarian space.

19 Major General Romeo Dallaire, UNAMIR Force Commander, describes his experiences and frustrations in his book Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, Random House, Canada, 2003.

20 F Terry, Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action, Cornell University Press, London, 2002, p. 156.

Providing humanitarian aid

As a result of the experiences in Somalia and Rwanda, as well as other crises throughout the world, by the end of the 1990s Western governments had become increasingly hesitant to deploy military personnel to internal conflicts. Despite thousands of military personnel deployed to Somalia, US and UN forces proved unable to create a secure environment for the provision of aid and suffered an unacceptable number of casualties for a conflict that did not directly affect national interests. In Rwanda, bureaucratic failures disempowered any military ability to provide a safe working environment for humanitarian action. As a result, by 1999 Western governments, and particularly the US Government, were reticent to commit large amounts of personnel and considerable national resources to become involved in the societal issues that resulted in humanitarian emergencies. The situation in Kosovo in 1999, however, resulted in a NATO deployment that demonstrated a new approach to military humanitarianism.

In 1999 Serbian military forces began a process of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo that targeted Albanians and aimed to crush an armed rebellion against Serbian rule. Due to the risk of instability within Europe, NATO launched a campaign to halt Serbian incursions, enable the return of refugees and displaced persons and put an ‘end to the violence and human suffering in Kosovo’.21

In order to achieve this mandate, NATO engaged in a relatively unique campaign whereby military forces simultaneously conducted warfighting operations and humanitarian relief. In order to avoid costly and time consuming ‘nation building’ activities such as those in Bosnia and reluctant to risk ‘friendly’ casualties as experienced in Somalia, NATO forces conducted an aerial campaign that targeted military facilities in Kosovo and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At the same time, NATO forces provided considerable amounts of humanitarian aid to thousands of refugees fleeing into neighbouring Macedonia and Albania.

During the period 23 March – 10 June 1999 the intensity of the NATO air campaign undermined the security of international aid workers and forced the majority of them

21 ‘NATO’s role in relation to the conflict in Kosovo’, NATO website, 15 July 1999, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm> accessed 20 June 2007.

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to leave Kosovo. Many of these NGOs redirected their efforts to refugee camps in neighbouring countries, but several other groups were also quick to return at the end of the bombing campaign. Thus, the period surrounding the air campaign provides an interesting example of how the nature of the humanitarian space changes relative to the level of conflict. Prior to the air campaign, a humanitarian space existed in Kosovo where NGOs could provide essential services. During the air campaign, the level of conflict threatened the security of humanitarian staff, forcing many of them to relocate to neighbouring countries. As these NGOs shifted their operations, a new and different humanitarian space developed. Finally, as NGOs returned to Kosovo, a new and dynamic relationship developed between humanitarian actors, NATO troops, militant forces and local populations.

On their return to Kosovo, many NGOs were particularly concerned about how local communities would view the return of international aid workers following the end of the air campaign. Consequently, many humanitarian organisations were particularly cautious about any possible damage to perceptions of impartiality and neutrality regarding the co-location of NGO compounds with or near military bases.22

After the battle, reconstituting humanitarian operations became more subject to political considerations by host and donors alike. Moreover, the efforts of some humanitarian agencies to distance themselves from the political context of NATO’s involvement were largely unsuccessful. For example, some agencies such as Médecins Sans Frontières chose not to accept funding from NATO states, while others tried to demonstrate that they worked with both sides of the conflict by establishing offices with region-wide responsibilities. Yet, despite their efforts, these agencies did not receive a greater welcome by the Serbian authorities whose attempts to frustrate humanitarian access were seen to be evidence of political backlash.23

NGOs emphasise the importance of the humanitarian principles not only on an idealistic basis but as a fundamental mechanism for ensuring their security in dangerous

22 M McKew, ‘Pratt head of spy network’, 7.30 Report, 13 April 1999, <http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/stories/s21690.htm> accessed 29 June 2007.

23 C Gourlay, ‘Partners Apart: Managing Civil-Military Cooperation in Humanitarian Interventions’, Disarmament Forum Peacekeeping: Evolution or Extinction? No. 3, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Switzerland, 2000, p. 35.

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environments. In April 1999 Steve Pratt, a former Australian Army officer and the head of CARE Australia’s Kosovo mission, and co-worker Peter Wallace, were arrested by Yugoslav authorities on charges of spying. Irrespective of whether they provided information to military authorities or were subject to a propaganda stunt, the incident highlighted the politicisation of humanitarian action. The suspicion of humanitarian personnel providing information to military authorities or pursuing political objectives was illustrated in Kosovo, but was to be considerably more significant in future conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

The simultaneous air campaign and the provision of humanitarian relief challenged traditional approaches towards the division of responsibilities in humanitarian emergencies. Unlike in Somalia and Rwanda, NATO forces in Kosovo pursued the political imperatives of halting Serbian aggression, but also directly involved themselves in providing aid to those displaced by the conflict. The duality of the NATO mission came to be identified as a critical milestone for NGO objections to military participation in humanitarian relief.

Although, in some circumstance, the use of military assets to help hundreds of thousands of refugees was widely welcomed, it raised concerns about the ‘militarization’ of humanitarian aid. Moreover, it caused fears that it would set in a precedent of allocating resources for military relief efforts at the expense of those intended for civilian institutions and distribution channels.24

The NATO delivery of humanitarian supplies challenged the established norms of what were appropriate tasks for military and humanitarian actors. By the end of May 1999, NATO troops had delivered more than 4500 tons of food and water, 4325 tons of other goods, 2624 tons of tents and nearly 1600 tons of medical supplies to refugees and others in need.25 As a result, military forces learnt that they could provide a level of humanitarian aid independent of NGOs, and further, that such tasks carried with it positive media coverage and generated goodwill amongst the refugee population.

24 M Studer, ‘Civilian-military relations and cooperation in humanitarian emergencies, View from the International Committee of the Red Cross’, Workshop organised by the Swiss Development Agency, Bern, 26 January 2001, <http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/ htmlall/57JQVA?OpenDocument&View=defaultBody&style=custo_print> accessed 28 May 2007.

25 ‘NATO’s role in relation to the conflict in Kosovo’.

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Significantly, the direct involvement of military forces in the provision of humanitarian aid proved to be a landmark in the post-Cold War trend of military humanitarianism. In both Somalia and Rwanda military forces became involved in internal conflicts to enable humanitarian action, but in the Kosovo example, NATO became one of the providers of humanitarian aid. Thus, it is from this period that the humanitarian space is pressured not only by militant forces, but by military groups directly involving themselves in the delivery of aid.

manipulating humanitarian aid

The nature of military humanitarianism in the new century has proven to be significantly different to that experienced in the 1990s. The rise of international terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism has changed the global security environment and has altered the nature of the humanitarian space. Fundamental Islam’s rejection of Western culture and the US-led ‘War on Terror’ have resulted in conflicts throughout the globe that combine military, political and religious objectives. These new conflicts are significant in that they increasingly reject established principles of humanitarian law and create a ‘with us or against us’ approach. The polarising character of these recent conflicts has had a fundamental impact on the nature of the neutral space and the relevance of the humanitarian principles.

iraqThe 2003 Coalition invasion of Iraq to overthrown Saddam Hussein provides a fundamentally different example of how military forces approach the provision of humanitarian aid. Unlike the previous examples, military participation in Iraq did not occur in response to a significant humanitarian crisis, but was a conventional war initiated by military forces on the order of their political leaders. Consequently, after the successful overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime, the US-led Coalition, and notably, the US Department of Defence, assumed many of the responsibilities of an occupying power.26 As Coalition forces aimed to exert control and establish a secure environment throughout Iraq, authority to enter the country and conduct humanitarian operations needed to be authorised by US Government and military personnel. To this extent, the Coalition administration retained the power to dictate the type, number and intended function of humanitarian agencies.

The nature of the US-led Coalition also influenced the behaviour of militant actors. After the end of conventional operations in May 2003, the situation in Iraq changed from a traditional warfighting environment to one that became more characteristic

26 Fourth Geneva Convention, Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Adopted on 12 August 1949, cited in Amnesty International, Iraq: Responsibilities of the Occupying Powers, International Secretariat, London, 16 April 2003.

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of an insurgent conflict or civil war.27 As a result, the number and variety of militant actors operating in Iraq was considerably more diverse than that of other conflicts. Militant groups in Iraq included former Ba’athist Party members, private militias loyal to Shi’ite or Sunni clerics as well as international terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda.28 Understanding the aims and objectives of these disparate groups remains particularly challenging; however, what is clear is that the tactics of these groups had a fundamental impact on the nature of humanitarian operations and the concept of the neutral space.

The multifaceted competition and conflict between different militant groups, Coalition forces and almost all other actors within Iraqi society created an inherently chaotic security environment. In this dangerous and uncertain state very little room existed for a recognised, respected middle ground where neutral, independent humanitarian organisations could operate. The complexity of the Iraqi environment was made even more convoluted by the emergence of a relatively new set of players, the private security, logistics and reconstruction companies.29 The activities of these groups continue to influence the nature of the neutral space as the distinction between military and humanitarian tasks becomes even more blurred.

The deteriorating security situation in Iraq was graphically illustrated by the bombing of the UN headquarters on 19 August and ICRC headquarters on 27 October 2003. These incidents underlined the fact that militant groups associated the activities of UN and NGO groups with political objectives. Like previous experiences in Kosovo, suspected complicity with Coalition forces threatened the security of NGO personnel and led many militant groups to believe that foreign aid workers were legitimate targets. By May 2007 the NGO Coordinating Committee in Iraq estimated that at least eighty-eight aid workers had been deliberately killed by militant groups.30 From as early 2003,

27 J D Fearon, ‘Iraq’s Civil War’, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2007, p. 2.

28 K M Pollack, ‘After Saddam: Assessing the Reconstruction of Iraq’, Foreign Affairs, 12 January 2004, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2004/01 iraq_ pollack/20040107.pdf> accessed 29 June 2007.

29 The scope of this paper does not allow for a detailed examination of the impact that the emergence of these Private Security Companies (PSCs) will have on the nature of the humanitarian space; however, the last part of the paper does suggest that these groups may provide NGOs with options for how they can ensure their own security in a future contested space.

30 NGO Coordinating Committee in Iraq, Rising to the Humanitarian Challenge in Iraq, Oxfam Briefing Paper 105, 30 July 2007, <http://web.mit.edu/humancostiraq/reports/oxfam_iraq.pdf> accessed 26 June 2007.

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however, many international organisations were forced to withdraw from the country on the basis of the security threat to their personnel.

During the past few years it has been sufficiently demonstrated that the concept of impartial, neutral and independent humanitarian assistance is no longer recognized or respected by a variety of armed groups involved in the conflict in Iraq. The result is that MSF can only operate on the periphery of the areas affected by the violence.31

The security situation in Iraq prompted many NGOs to withdraw, to limit the scope of their operations or to increasingly cooperate with Coalition forces in order to achieve an element of security. For the ICRC, the situation prompted it to limit the scope of many of its activities to such things as tracing missing persons and delivering medical stores.32 For MSF, who withdrew international workers in 2004, the situation forced it to develop new methods to provide medical supplies to hospitals in Iraq as well as establishing bases outside of the country to aid refugees. Other organisations such as Save the Children have increasingly aligned themselves with the Coalition authority in order to access humanitarian and reconstruction funds and to guarantee security.33

to work in Iraq and other countries the US government deems vital to its interests, NGOs will have to either redefine how much operational independence they need, or stay home.34

The nature of the Coalition authority in Iraq fundamentally altered the relationship between military forces, NGOs and militants. The Coalition authority to choose the type and number of NGOs wanting to work in Iraq established an entirely different power

31 E Van Der Borght, ‘As violence climbs in Iraq, the need for some kind of humanitarian action re-surfaces’, Medecins Sans Frontieres webpage, 16 May 2007, <http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?component=article&objectid=93F4F127-15C5-F00A-25E5DE3DF7A59220&method =full_html> accessed 27 June 2007.

32 International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 2003, External Resources Division, Geneva, 2004, p. 263.

33 L Minear, ‘NGOs & UN face pressure over Iraq’, Alertnet, 7 July 2003, <http://www.alertnet.org/thefacts/reliefresources/minearview.htm> accessed 20 June 2007.

34 Ibid.

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relationship between these two actors. In part due to this relationship, militant groups identified that aid workers were legitimate targets due to their perceived complicity with Coalition forces. Finally, the rise of private companies willingly providing a range of services to the Coalition also began to create a level of competition for humanitarian actors. The combination of these factors significantly influenced the nature of the humanitarian space and established a fundamentally different relationship between military forces, NGOs and militant groups.

afghanistanThe nature of military operations in Afghanistan is significantly different to those in Iraq. Like Iraq, however, military operations were initiated not in response to a humanitarian crisis, but as a result of the political objective to remove the Taliban regime and destroy al-Qaeda training bases. From 2001 Coalition and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) personnel deployed into Afghanistan and conducted military operations ranging from full-scale conventional conflict, counterinsurgency warfare, peacekeeping activities and humanitarian aid. The objectives of Coalition forces are to provide a safe and secure environment, facilitate the reconstruction of Afghanistan’s infrastructure and provide support to the Afghanistan Government. ISAF and Coalition deployment of tens of thousands of soldiers obviously affected the Afghan population, but also had significant effects on the nature of humanitarian action.

Despite frequent periods of internal conflict, humanitarian organisations have operated in Afghanistan for more than twenty-five years. Throughout Soviet occupation, civil war and Taliban rule, NGOs had become the primary providers of basic services to the Afghan community.35 In 2001, however, the deployment of Coalition and ISAF personnel changed the nature of this humanitarian space. As a part of its wider security and reconstruction efforts, Coalition and ISAF forces conducted significant humanitarian operations designed to both aid suffering and gain the support of the local population. To achieve these tasks, Coalition and ISAF forces established small groups of military and civilian personnel called Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). These PRTs were tasked with delivering humanitarian aid and providing reconstruction and development assistance to local communities.

35 C Karp, ‘Leading By Example: Australia’s Reconstruction Task Force and the NGO Civil-Military relationship in Afghanistan’, Security Challenges, Vol. 2, No. 3, October 2006, p. 2.

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Although only a relatively small part of the overall campaign, the conduct of humanitarian activities by military forces in Afghanistan has come under intense criticism from humanitarian actors. Also referred to as ‘Hearts and Minds’ missions, these activities have tactical as well as humanitarian objectives.

‘Hearts and minds’ tactics—the exchange of material rewards for information, cooperation and political support—have a long history in military practice. For military planners, these activities are deemed to have force protection benefits. However, they remain deeply contentious from the perspective of the impartiality of humanitarian assistance. In Afghanistan, the military’s delivery of assistance in civilian clothing and the conditionality placed on military aid in return for intelligence have been particularly controversial. These practices are seen as challenging the distinction between humanitarian and military action required by international humanitarian law (IHL), a distinction viewed as integral to the safety of humanitarian workers.36

Humanitarian actors denounce these activities as a manipulation of humanitarian aid that threatens the security of NGO personnel. On 2 June 2004 five MSF personnel were ambushed and killed while driving a clearly marked NGO vehicle. In a statement nine days later, a Taliban spokesman accepted responsibility and justified the attacks on the basis that ‘MSF work for American interests, are therefore targets and would be at risk of further attacks’.37 Tragically, an MSF statement released two months before the attack condemned the Coalition tactic of using humanitarian aid for tactical purposes.

Coalition Forces in recent weeks have been distributing leaflets in Southern Afghanistan, demanding that people ‘pass on any information related to Taliban, Al Qaeda and Gulbaddin to the coalition forces’ saying that this is necessary ‘in order to have a continuation of the provision of humanitarian aid’.

36 V Wheeler and A Harmer (eds), Resetting the Rules of Engagement: Trends and Issues in Military-Humanitarian Relations, Humanitarian Policy Group, March 2006, p. 2.

37 MSF Press Release, ‘MSF Pulls Out of Afghanistan’, Medecins Sans Frontieres webpage, 28 July 2004, <http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?objectid=8851DF09-F62D-47D4-A8D3EB1E876A1E0D&component=toolkit.pressrelease&method=full_html>.

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The leaflets, which include a picture of an Afghan girl carrying a bag of wheat, are a clear attempt to use humanitarian aid for the military aims of the coalition and thereby represent an unacceptable assault on humanitarian principles.

MSF rejects any linkage between the provision of humanitarian aid and collaboration with the coalition forces. In keeping with humanitarian principles, we will seek to provide assistance to people in Afghanistan regardless of their political beliefs or their collaboration with any military or political groups.38

The current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated a new approach to military humanitarianism. In Iraq, the power of the Coalition authority enabled it to control the type and number of organisations that could enter the country and conduct humanitarian activities. In response, militant groups increasingly identified foreign aid workers as being complicit with the aims and objectives of US forces and therefore targeted them. Concurrently, the employment of private companies challenged the ‘market dominance’ of NGOs in the provision of aid, significantly increasing the levels of competition between humanitarian actors and private companies and further blurring the distinction between impartial NGOs and contracted civilian personnel. In Afghanistan the use of RTFs to conduct ‘hearts and minds’ activities threatened the nature of the humanitarian space as further blurring the line between military and political missions and independent humanitarian assistance. These crises illustrate a more controlling relationship with NGOs and a more manipulative approach to the provision of humanitarian aid.

38 Ibid.

the future Space

The current dynamic relationship between militants, militaries and humanitarian actors in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that the neutral space will continue to be hotly contested. The behaviour of militant groups in both theatres indicate that humanitarian aid workers will continue to be targeted by groups that aim to further polarise participants in the conflicts, and force organisations not sympathetic to their objectives from the area of operations. Concurrently, despite the protestations of numerous NGOs such as MSF, it appears unlikely that military forces will desist from conducting humanitarian activities such as quick impact projects aimed at securing the support of the local population. The convergence of these two approaches creates a real dilemma for humanitarian organisations. In the increasingly contested space, humanitarian actors will be forced to make decisions as to how they can continue to provide support to those in need while maintaining security for their personnel. Each of the possible outcomes will require painful compromises between principles and pragmatism.

As one human rights organisation coordinator put, there is ‘No empirical evidence that declaring yourself to be neutral actually enhances your security.’39

The first possible course of action is for NGOs to steadfastly stand by the principles of humanitarian action. In a chaotic and highly dangerous environment, this approach has often forced humanitarian actors from the area of operations. Numerous examples such as the ICRC’s partial withdrawal from Iraq in 2003 or MSF’s departure from Afghanistan in 2004 illustrate the ethical dilemma of ensuring the protection of humanitarian aid workers versus the risks to those in need.

39 P W Singer, ‘Humanitarian principles, private military agents: some implications of the privatised military industry for the humanitarian community’ in Wheeler and Harmer (eds), Resetting the Rules of Engagement: Trends and Issues in Military-Humanitarian Relations, p. 69, <http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2006/02defenseindustry_singer.aspx>.

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After having worked nearly without interruption alongside the most vulnerable Afghan people since 1980, it is with outrage and bitterness that we take the decision to abandon them. But we simply cannot sacrifice the security of our volunteers while warring parties seek to rage and kill humanitarian workers. Ultimately, it is the sick and destitute who suffer.40

The statement also indicated that MSF decided to withdraw not only because of the threat of militant attack, but in part because of ‘consistent efforts by the US-led coalition to use humanitarian aid to build support for its military and political aims’.41 Numerous MSF and ICRC statements protested the politicisation of the humanitarian space, and cite examples where Coalition forces have conditioned the continued delivery of aid on local people’s willingness to provide information about the Taliban and al-Qaeda.42 Ironically, despite consistent efforts on behalf of MSF to distance itself from Coalition forces and consistent criticism of their provision of humanitarian aid, Taliban forces frequently stated that NGOs were legitimate targets as they were working for US interests.

The withdrawal of humanitarian organisations such as MSF may serve the polarising objectives of some militant groups, but it is not in the interest of military and government forces left to assume the responsibilities of withdrawing NGOs. In the above example, prior to its withdrawal, MSF supplied basic medical care to more than 60,000 displaced people in refugee camps and provided clean water and sanitation services in thirteen provinces. On departure, MSF workers were required to transfer responsibility for these activities to the Afghan Ministry of Health, other NGOs and Coalition forces.43 As MSF asserts, the conduct of humanitarian activities by military

40 M Buissonnière, Secretary General of Medecins Sans Frontieres, ‘Afghanistan: MSF leaves country following staff killings and threats’, at a Kabul press conference announcing MSF’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, 16 December 2004, <http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm? objectid=F446039F-4965-4FB0-9D21CF4C695F80C9&component=toolkit.article&method=full_ html> accessed 26 June 2007.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 D Van Halsema, ‘Six days surrounding MSF’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan’, Medecins Sans Frontieres website, 1 August 2004, <http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?objectid=AA5AE5CF-05EA-4D43-8DB12C6450CBEA7C&component=toolkit.article&method=full_html&CFID=13703215&CFTOKEN =40859866> accessed 26 June 2007.

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forces undermined the security of the neutral space, endangered NGO workers and contributed to the withdrawal of humanitarian support.

The second course of action available to humanitarian actors is to increase the level of cooperation and coordination with military forces. Such a course of action threatens to undermine humanitarian operating principles, yet many NGOs in Afghanistan and Iraq are increasingly looking to military forces to provide protection for their personnel and humanitarian supplies. Institutional arrangements for cooperation, such as the UN-initiated NGO Civil-Military Working Group in Afghanistan, enable a level of coordination, but like the original CMOC established in Somalia, these structures continue to be challenged by differences in organisational aims and cultures.44

This course of action provides military and government forces an improved ability to cooperate and coordinate humanitarian affairs, and it increases the likelihood of manipulating humanitarian aid towards tactically important areas and improving levels of information sharing. Such an approach increases the possibility of military forces co-opting humanitarian aid and NGOs to achieve political and military objectives. Such a relationship would, however, inevitably increase the level of support and protection required by humanitarian personnel, as militants may identify such groups as legitimate targets.

The practice of some nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), private contractors and many governments doing ‘humanitarian’ work with a specific political aim causes confusion, and reduces the acceptance of the universal nature of humanitarian assistance. This contributes to a climate where groups opposed to any underlying political aim use confusion as an excuse to attack aid workers.45

A third option available to humanitarian actors may be the employment of an independent third party to provide security. The ever increasing market for Private Security Companies (PSCs) may provide NGOs with an option that guarantees personal

44 Karp, ‘Leading By Example’, p. 3.

45 R Gillies and M Buissonierre, ‘2006: The Year in Review’, Medecins Sans Frontiers website, 18 December 2006, p. 3, <http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?objectid=95488BEB-5056-AA77-6C269F33C7D254ED&component=toolkit.article&method=full_html> accessed 26 June 2007.

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security while maintaining independence from military forces. The moral and ethical implications of this approach remain relatively untested, yet the prevalence of PSCs in Iraq suggests that international NGOs and organisations such as the ICRC may be able to commission a PSC to provide protection to its staff. Numerous historical situations such as Somalia illustrate that the hiring of guards creates a suite of ethical dilemmas for humanitarian actors, but perhaps a well crafted contract between humanitarian actors and PSCs could avoid many of these conflicts of interest. To achieve this, the relationship between the NGO and PSC would need to be operationally and financially transparent and have clear lines of accountability to the NGO. Further, NGOs could demand that such a PSC makes a declaration stating that it is exclusively tasked with the protection of humanitarian aid workers. Thus, any contract between possible NGOs and PSCs could emphasise that the private company would also respect the universal humanitarian operating principles.

The freedom of action that such a security guarantee would provide would enable NGOs to deploy to conflict areas without a requirement for detailed liaison with military forces. In fact, such an NGO would be able to influence international opinion regarding the nature and seriousness of an emergency thereby adding pressure on national governments and the United Nations to intervene to address the underlying causes of such a conflict.46 An NGO with such a guarantee of security would then be free to conduct its affairs according to its own objectives, and the inherent flexibility and autonomy may enable it to conduct operations completely separate from those of military forces.

46 NGOs already influence international opinion regarding humanitarian crises by using the well established relationship with international media. This complex relationship is examined by Mirella von Lindefels, the media and audiovisual director of Amnesty International in ‘Communications and NGOs’, European Broadcasting Union website, <http://www.ebu.ch/CMSimages/ en/online_3_e_com_tcm6-11340.pdf> on 26 June 2007. Von Lindenfels succinctly states ‘Media coverage is the lifeblood of campaigning non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It’s what enables us to motivate large numbers of people, hold the few up to the public scrutiny of the many, shame the powerful into change. It’s what supports our recruitment of new members and income and creates the profile needed to make campaigns successful and to drive change on behalf of the people we represent.’ p. 1.

Conclusion

The concept of independent humanitarian aid began with the founding of the ICRC and the development of the Geneva Conventions. Since that time, the concept of the humanitarian or neutral space has guaranteed civil actors the freedom and protection to provide aid to those in need. In the last twenty years however, this neutral space has becoming increasingly contested, threatened by the actions of warlords, insurgents and terrorists, and encroached upon by military forces conducting humanitarian operations.

Since the end of the Cold War the international community has become progressively more concerned with the prevalence and impact of complex humanitarian emergencies. Unprecedented media coverage has made the humanitarian realities of these situations unavoidable for many Western governments. Globalisation has meant that conflicts in one country threaten the stability of the whole region. Instability and the failure of government services provide opportunities for sophisticated transnational crime and international terrorists.

During this period, the humanitarian imperative of these situations has remained constant, but militant and military reactions have altered the nature of the environment. As a result, in conflicts such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, terrorist or insurgent groups have increasingly seen humanitarian aid workers as either soft or legitimate targets. In highly charged political, social and religious conflicts, the efforts of humanitarian actors have at times been interpreted as representative of a specific cultural tradition, irrespective of their stated principles of neutrality, independence and impartiality.

Concurrently, the methods by which many Western militaries engage those societies experiencing humanitarian crises have further impinged upon the traditionally exclusive civilian domain of humanitarian aid. Motivated by political and security as well as humanitarian reasons, the delivery of humanitarian aid and the provision of essential services by armed forces has breached the traditional divide between military and humanitarian roles. This changed situation presents humanitarian actors with a dilemma. On the one hand, NGOs can continue to conduct operations as they always have done, to avoid or limit contact with military forces, and in doing so, risk becoming targeted by insurgents despite protestations of neutrality. Another option is to become

26

increasingly involved with military forces, receive the protection that they provide and aim to increase efficiency by limiting duplication, but undermine their principles of independence. A third option is to identify new approaches to the provision of aid while also guaranteeing the security of their personnel such as the employment of private security companies.

As demonstrated in Afghanistan, the neutral space has become a dangerous and contested space. Military forces and insurgents have changed their behaviours and tactics, and as a result the efficiency and security of humanitarian action is now threatened. Humanitarian actors are therefore confronted with a dilemma that may demand painful compromises between principles and pragmatism.

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Land Warfare Studies Centre

Publications

The General Sir Brudenell White Monograph Series

Schmidtchen, David, The Rise of the Strategic Private: Technology, Control and Change in a Network-Enabled Military, 2006.

Study Papers

301 Evans, Michael, Forward from the Past: The Development of Australian Army Doctrine, 1972–Present, August 1999.

302 Ryan, Alan, From Desert Storm to East Timor: Australia, the Asia-Pacific and the ‘New Age’ Coalition Operations, January 2000.

303 Evans, Michael, Developing Australia’s Maritime Concept of Strategy: Lessons from the Ambon Disaster of 1942, April 2000.

304 Ryan, Alan, ‘Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks’: Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Force East Timor, November 2000.

305 Evans, Michael, The Continental School of Strategy: The Past, Present and Future of Land Power, June 2004.

306 Evans, Michael, The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia’s Strategic Culture and Way of War, 1901–2005, February 2005.

307 Morrison, James C, Mechanising an Army: Mechanisation and the Conversion of the Light Horse, 1920–1943, June 2006.

308 Hopkins, Scott (ed.), Asymmetry and Complexity: Selected Papers from the 2005 Rowell Seminar and the 2005 Chief of Army’s Conference, February 2007.

309 Hopkins, Scott (ed.), 2006 Chief of Army’s Exercise Proceedings, March 2007.

310 Wegener, Andrew, A Complex and Changing Dynamic: Afghan Responses to Foreign Intervention, 1878–2006, April 2007.

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311 Stockings, Craig, The Making and Breaking of the Post-Federation Australian Army, 1901–09, July 2007.

312 Keating, Gavin, A Tale of Three Battalions: Combat Morale and Battle Fatigue in the 7th Australian Infantry Brigade, Bougainville, 1944–45, October 2007.

313 Hopkins, Scott (ed.), Chief of Army’s Reading List, November 2007.

314 Breen, Bob and Greg McCauley, The World Looking Over Their Shoulders: Australian Strategic Corporals on Operations in Somalia and East Timor, August 2008.

315 Palazzo, Albert, Moltke to bin Laden: The Relevance of Doctrine in the Contemporary Military Environment, September 2008.

316 Hoskin, Rupert, The Ghost in the Machine: Better Application of Human Factors to Enhance the Military Appreciation Process, March 2009.

Working Papers

101 Evans, Michael, The Role of the Australian Army in a Maritime Concept of Strategy, September 1998.

102 Dunn, Martin, Redefining Strategic Strike: The Strike Role and the Australian Army into the 21st Century, April 1999.

103 Evans, Michael, Conventional Deterrence in the Australian Strategic Context, May 1999.

104 de Somer, Greg, The Implications of the United States Army’s Army-After-Next Concepts for the Australian Army, June 1999.

105 Ryan, Alan, The Way Ahead? Alternative Approaches to Integrating the Reserves in ‘Total Force’ Planning, July 1999.

106 de Somer, Greg, The Capacity of the Australian Army to Conduct and Sustain Land Force Operations, August 1999, reprinted October 1999.

107 de Somer, Greg and David Schmidtchen, Professional Mastery: The Human Dimension of Warfighting Capability for the Army-After-Next, October 1999.

108 Zhou, Bo, South Asia: The Prospect of Nuclear Disarmament After the 1998 Nuclear Tests in India and Pakistan, November 1999.

109 Ryan, Michael and Michael Frater, A Tactical Communications System for Future Land Warfare, March 2000.

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110 Evans, Michael, From Legend to Learning: Gallipoli and the Military Revolution of World War I, April 2000.

111 Wing, Ian, Refocusing Concepts of Security: The Convergence of Military and Non-military Tasks, November 2000.

112 Ryan, Michael and Michael Frater, The Utility of a Tactical Airborne Communications Subsystem in Support of Future Land Warfare, April 2001.

113 Evans, Michael, From Deakin to Dibb: The Army and the Making of Australian Strategy in the 20th Century, June 2001.

114 Ryan, Alan, Thinking Across Time: Concurrent Historical Analysis on Military Operations, July 2001.

115 Evans, Michael, Australia and the Revolution in Military Affairs, August 2001.

116 Frater, Michael and Michael Ryan, Communications Electronic Warfare and the Digitised Battlefield, October 2001.

117 Parkin, Russell, A Capability of First Resort: Amphibious Operations and the Australian Defence Policy, 1901–2001, May 2002.

118 Blaxland, John, Information-era Manoeuvre: The Australian-led Mission to East Timor, June 2002.

119 Connery, David, GBAeD 2030: A Concept for Ground-based Aerospace Defence in the Army-After-Next, July 2002.

120 Beasley, Kent, Information Operations during Operation Stabilise in East Timor, August 2002.

121 Ryan, Alan, Australian Army Cooperation with the Land Forces of the United States: Problems of the Junior Partner, January 2003.

122 Evans, Michael and Alan Ryan (eds), From Breitenfeld to Baghdad: Perspectives on Combined Arms Warfare, January 2003.

123 Hoare, Mark, The Prospects for Australian and Japanese Security Cooperation in a More Uncertain Asia-Pacific, July 2003.

124 Ryan, Alan, ‘Putting Your Young Men in the Mud’: Change, Continuity and the Australian Infantry Battalion, September 2003.

125 Schmidtchen, David, Network-Centric Warfare: the Problem of Social Order, July 2005.

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126 Watson, James, A Model Pacific Solution? A Study of the Development of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, October 2005.

127 Brailey, Malcolm, The Transformation of Special Operations Forces in Contemporary Conflict: Strategy, Missions, Organisation and Tactics, November 2005.

128 Stevenson, Robert C, Not-so Friendly Fire: An Australian Taxonomy for Fratricide, April 2006.

129 Schmidtchen, David, Eyes Wide Open: Stability, Change and Network-enabling Technology, May 2006.

130 Stevenson, Robert C, The Human Dimension of the Hardened and Networked Army: The Lessons of Friendly Fire, June 2006.

131 Blaxland, John, Revisiting Counterinsurgency: A Manoueverist Response to the War on Terror for the Australian Army, July 2006.

132 Krause, Michael, Square Pegs for Round Holes? Current Approaches to Future Warfare and the Need to Adapt, June 2007.

133 Croser, Caroline, Organising Complexity: Modes of Behaviour in a Networked Battlespace, November 2007.

134 Kelly, Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan, Distributed Manoeuvre: 21st Century Offensive Tactics, June 2009.

135 Gray, Jeff (ed.), The Australian Army Counterinsurgency and Small Wars Reading Guide, September 2009.

136 Field, Chris, Asymmetric Warfare and Australian National Asymmetric Advantages: Taking the Fight to the Enemy, November 2009.

Books

Wahlert, G (ed.), Australian Army Amphibious Operations in the South-West Pacific: 1942–45, Army Doctrine Centre, Department of Defence, Puckapunyal, 1995.

Dennis, Peter and Jeffrey Grey (eds), From Past to Future: The Australian Experience of Land/Air Operations, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1995.

Horner, David (ed.), Armies and Nation Building: Past Experience—Future Prospects, Australian National University, Canberra, 1995.

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Dennis, Peter and Jeffrey Grey (eds), Serving Vital Interests: Australia’s Strategic Planning in Peace and War, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1996.

Malik, Mohan (ed.), The Future Battlefield, Deakin University, Geelong, 1997.

Smith, Hugh (ed.), Preparing Future Leaders: Officer Education and Training for the Twenty-first Century, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1998.

Evans, Michael (ed.), Changing the Army: The Roles of Doctrine, Development and Training, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Duntroon, 2000.

Evans, Michael and Alan Ryan (eds), The Human Face of Warfare: Killing, Fear and Chaos in Battle, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2000.

Evans, Michael, Russell Parkin and Alan Ryan (eds), Future Armies, Future Challenges: Land Warfare in the Information Age, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2004.

Parkin, Russell (ed.), Warfighting and Ethics: Selected Papers from the 2003 and 2004 Rowell Seminars, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Duntroon, July 2005.

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