Wp04 Eu and the Israel Palestine Conflict

8/8/2019 Wp04 Eu and the Israel Palestine Conflict

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Working Papers Series

inEU Border Conflicts Studies

The EU and the Israel\Palestine

Conflict:

An Ambivalent Relationship

David Newman and Haim Yacobi

Department of Politics and Government

Ben Gurion University, Beer Sheva, Israel

No. 4

January

2004


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A. Introduction

In the summer of 2002, following renewed and continuing violence betweenIsrael and the Palestinians, the Israeli government began the construction of a

security barrier separating Israel from large sections of the West Bank. This

barrier, composed in part of a concrete wall and in other areas of parallel rows

of barbed wire has recently been relabeled the terror prevention fence. The

'fence', or as also named "the wall" produced an intensive debate concerning

the route of the wall which annexes 2,800 acres of Palestinian land (Gush

Shalom brochure, 2003), the abuse of human rights (B'tselem, 2003; World

Bank Report, 2003), the ecological damage (PENGON Report, 2003) and the

(in)ability and limitations of the wall in protecting Israeli citizens (Sagie and

Sher, 2003). However, one of the significant results of the construction of the

wall is the tangible demarcation of the Israeli territory - the unilateral

production of a clear borderline - between Israel and the Palestinian authority,

deviating from the Green Line, the boundary which was created in 1948-49

and which marks the territorial extent of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,

those areas which were conquered by Israel from Jordan and Egypt in the

1967 war.

This act of bordering, we propose, cannot be seen as an autonomous

reaction rooted solely in the securitization discourse. Rather, it is also a result

of the long history of discussions concerning the territorial nature of Israel and

its spatio-political relations with the Arab world. This paper explores the

historical background that shaped the border conflicts between Israel and its

Arab states neighbours during the past century. This historical description

allows us to explore the main themes that have shaped Israel border

discourse over time. This discourse does not only relate to the issue of

demarcation and territorial configurations of political entities, but also relates

to the significance of borders for the nature of the relations between Israel and

her neighbours in general, and more specifically between Israel and the

Palestinians.

We will argue that the dispute over land and borders lies at the heart of


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the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As in other cases of nation building this

embodies political and social aspects as well as questions concerning identity,

class formation and the symbolic production of space (see: Passi, 1999; Agnew

and Corbridge, 1995; Smith, 1985; Anderson, 1983). Notions of political

homeland, the symbolic and mythical territory which constitute a central part

of national identity and attachment, are central to our understanding of the

way in which Israelis and Palestinians formulate their respective border and

territorial discourses. Nonetheless, in this paper we aim to limit the discussion

to the way in which the borders and territorial dispute has been shaped,

transformed and reproduced at specific political junctions. We do not aim to

present here a comprehensive and detailed historical analysis here. Rather, we

focus on those events which have shaped the main contours and

transformations of the conflict through the different phases which have been

identified in the theoretical framework of this project, namely: conflict

episode, issue conflict, identity conflict and power conflict.

Beyond the description of the major shaping events of the conflict, the

paper will also discuss and critically analyse the involvement of the EU in the

Israel\Palestine conflict. We will present the development of EU role andpatterns of intervention, as well as the merits and disadvantages of the EU

constituting an honest broker with a significant third party role in the process

of conflict resolution. In this context we argue that Europes role in general,

and that of the EU in particular, is of major significance, both because of the

historic role of European countries in the region - especially the respective

British and French mandates awarded by the League of Nations following the

break up of the Ottoman Empire and the post World War I control of the region

- as well as the geographic proximity and cultural influence of Europe within

the wider Levant region.

At the same time, we will demonstrate that, despite the long historical

relationship between Europe and Israel/Palestine, and despite the substantial

economic involvement in both Israel (in terms of trade and cultural relations)

and the Palestinian Authority (in terms of major financial assistance and aid

packages) neither of the actors perceive the EU as playing a significant role in


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the process of conflict resolution. This is particularly the case with respect to

Israel, where there is a deep-rooted and, in recent years, growing mistrust of

European intentions towards the region. Israeli attitudes towards Europe have

always been harsher and more critical than attitudes towards the USA, even

when the respective USA and EU leaders make similar statements about the

need to establish a Palestinian State, end the occupation of the West Bank and

Gaza and bring an end to settlement activity.

Responding to statements of this nature emanating from the White

House, Israeli leaders make conciliatory noises about this being no more than

a dispute amongst close friends which can be sorted out in the next visit of an

Israeli Prime Minister to the Oval Office. A similar statement emanating from

London, Berlin or Paris is often greeted with a howl of rage and a statement to

the effect that this is just another example of European pro-Palestinian bias

and, in some cases, reflects latent European anti-Semitism. The fact that anti-

Semitic activity has been on the increase in some European countries during

the past decade, has only served to strengthen the socially constructed feeling

amongst a growing number of Israelis that Europe is not to be trusted and that

it does not have Israeli interests at heart in its own foreign policy making.Israeli ambivalence towards Europe in general has been a common

theme in foreign policy making ever since the establishment of the State in

1948. On the one hand, Europe was the place in which the holocaust took

place, on the other hand, nearly all of the State founder generation were

European, saw European culture and traditions as being the cornerstones on

which a modern State of Israel should be founded, and given the proximity in

geographical location, saw in Europe an ally against a hostile Islamic Middle

East. Nearly half of Israels Jewish population derives its direct ancestry from

Europe within the past 2-3 generations. Moreover, an increasing number of

Israelis now lay claim to EU citizenship and passports. With the enlargement of

the EU in 2004, and in particular the addition of Poland and Hungary (two

countries with particularly large Jewish populations prior to World War II) to

the member states, it is estimated that nearly one third of the countrys

population will be entitled to EU passports, through their parents or


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grandparents prior citizenship.

B. Historical Background and Border Conflict Landmarks

Let us open the following section with chronological and discursive description

of the debate around Israel borders. In our analysis we have broadly identified

the following phases that mark changes in the formation of boundaries:

1917-1947: the British mandate on Palestine 1947-1949: the separation plan and the outcome of the 1948 War The consequence of the 1967 War Between the 1973 war and the 1979 peace agreement with Egypt The period between 1980-2002 2002-today The Security Fence\Separation Wall

The British Mandate in Palestine

In May 1916, during the World War I, an agreement negotiated by Sir MarkSykes of Britain and Georges Picot of France, was signed with the assent of

Russia. In the core of the Sykes-Picot agreement was the dismemberment of

the Ottoman Empire and the division of Turkish-held Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and

Palestine into various French and British-administered areas. Obviously in this

stage the Jewish-Arab conflict was not a major component that affected the

decision making.

Towards the end of the World War I, in November 1917, the British

Minister of Foreign Affairs Lord James Balfour has sent declaration to the

Zionist Federation (ZF) stating that the British Government supports the idea

of the Jewish people to establish their national home in 'Eretz Israel'. Yet, no

territorial indications or border definitions were mentioned:

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine

of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best


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endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly

understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and

religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the

rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country".

To some extent through this declaration the conflict can be seen as a conflict

episode; the dispute was quite low and parties express their disaccord.

In 1919 the ZF presented for the first time a map that pointed on their

territorial ambitions. This map expressed political goals but also relied on

geographical principles, and quite often referred to spatial characteristics. The

territory the ZF demanded included around 45,000 sq\km. It is important to

note that the 1919 map was the largest territory that the ever demanded

formally (after 1967 Israel control 90,000 sq\km). This map was based on

some internal drafts circulated within the ZF, and it can be seen as the map of

the Zionist aspiration, which was shaped without any meaningful public

debate. Yet, the wide territorial definition that included the Transjordan has

been presented later as the territory that was "taken" from the Zionist national

home. This proposal expresses another level of conflict in which not solely theterritorial aspect is epitomized, but rather identity is also a central attribute.

The 1919 proposal was consciously blind to the other side of the conflict,

claiming for the whole territory from both sides of the Jordan.

In 1920 Britain was assigned a mandate for Palestine and Transjordan,

approved by the League of Nations in 1922. This included a specific task of

preparing a Jewish national home in Palestine (in accordance with the Balfour

declaration). It is worth mentioning here that the border between Palestine

under the British control and Syria under the French control was negotiated by

the two powers and concluded in 1923, establishing the northern border of

Palestine. The eastern border of Palestine was determined the same year.

However, Transjordan was separated from Palestine, established within the

mandate as an autonomous area under the rule of Emir Abdullah.

Following the violent events in the 1930's between Jews and Arabs, the

Pill Committee started its mission in October 1936, collecting witnesses from


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both Arab and Jewish representative concerning the tension and violence in the

area. In July the committee published its conclusions: (a) the Mandate in

Palestine is not operational and (b) the Jewish-Arab conflict can be solved only

through political solution of dividing the territory. Indeed, the 1937 debate and

the decision followed it can be seen as a turning point; this was the first time

that the ZM was forced to relate to the territorial aspect of the future Jewish

state. According to Galnoor (1994:301) it was followed, for the first time, with

an extensive public debate that focused on territorial issue.

The main logic behind this proposal was 'territories for sovereignty' and

it challenged the maximalists approach of 'everything or nothing' and

demanded for a more pragmatic attitude. However, the actual influence of the

ZM was limited and it hardly affected the final decision. The 1937 British

proposal was so unattractive and most Zionist leaders' reaction was negative.

The 'deniers' rhetoric included slogans such as 'the entire Eretz Israel', 'two

banks to the Jordan river', 'the promised land' and 'the fathers land', while the

supporters arguments advocated 'peace for territory', 'state now' and 'Eretz

Israel as the desire of soul only'.

Despite the disagreements with the British, the importance of the 1937proposal lays in the principal of partition since the advantages of territorial

sovereignty were seen as more important than the territorial loss. This

instrumental approach in the ZM created the basis for 'step to step' policy

towards implementation of territorial sovereignty of the ZM. This stage can be

seen as an issue conflict; both sides voiced disagreement about the other

parties' statement yet the arguments (at least from the Jewish side) were

focused on territory and borders, living the identity issue aside. Furthermore,

from this stage disaccord became the expected communication style.

The Pill proposal was formally out of the agenda in 1938, but the idea of

partition was still the basis for negotiations between the British Government

(Winston Churchill) and Haim Weitzman. In May 1942, the Baltimore

Declaration announced in the US Zionist Committee, called for (a) Eretz Israel

as a Jewish commonwealth linked to the democratic world structure, and (b) to

open the gates for unlimited migration of Jews. This decision was also


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authorised by the Vaad Hapoel HaZioni and the Jewish Agency Executive and

was considered as the 'maximalists' victory within the ZM. Nonetheless, this

declaration has not marked any territorial aspects or borders but it was

perceived as the return of the Jewish people to their entire land. The

characteristics of issue conflict are also relevant to this case; from the Arab's

side the reaction was the completion with national antagonism between Jews

and Arabs that cannot be settled (Shapira, 1992:385).The Anglo-American Committee published its report in April 1946,

suggesting to establish a 'trust regime' and not to divide Palestine between

Jews and Arabs. They also proposed to enable 100,000 Jews to emigrate from

Europe. This contradicted the part of the ZM motivation that official demanded

by the Jewish Agency as: (a) to transform Eretz Israel into a Jewish

commonwealth and (b) to enable Jewish migrants to come. Any formal

discussion of the territorial dimension was absent from the Jewish side, but as

Galnoor notes (1994:307) some representative discussed it unofficially with

the Anglo-American pro-Zionist members and advocated partition. Raising the

importance of Jewish migration to Palestine, clearly signify a shift towards an

identity conflict.In an emergency meeting of the Zionist Agency in August 1946 an

important decision was taken; the executive agreed to discuss the

establishment of sustainable Jewish state in a proper area of Eretz Israel

(Heller, 1987: 436 in Galnoor, 1994:308). This was a reaction to the British

scheme to establish a "Provincial Autonomy Plan" known as the Morrisson-

Greaidy, inspired by the Anglo-American recommendations published in July

1946. According to this plan Palestine will be divided to four areas: (1) a

Jewish territory, (2) an Arab territory, (3) the Jerusalem enclave and (4) the

Negev. This was the last British initiative to satisfy the Jews the Arabs and the

US that also ended in failure.

At the Jewish Agency conference in Paris (1946), a new initiative was

raised that rejected the Morrisson-Greaidy plan and suggested a compromise

(at least from the Zionist point of view); i.e., partition for Jewish state. This

was the first time that a formal decision was taken advocating the partition of


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Palestine. The principle was to have maximum Jewish land with minimum Arab

population, while Jerusalem will be under international rule, Jaffa will be an

Arab enclave and the Negev will also be part of the Jewish State.

In December 1946, the 22 Zionist Congress in Bazel claimed for

establishing in Eretz Israel a Jewish state articulated in the world's democratic

structure. This declaration is important since other proposals that were

rejected by the majority asked to include in the decision terms such as: "the

entire undivided Eretz Israel" (Galonoor, 1994:310).

1947-1948: the separation plan and the outcome of the 1948 War

A significant shift in the border conflict is marked in the partition plan of 1947.

Integrating identity into the conflict was clear in this stage; the discussion

around Israeli territory a Jewish state - and borders cannot be separated

from the wider context. The end of the World War II and the tragic

circumstances of the holocaust are important as background. Yet, it is

important to note that while the international community changed its attitude

towards the Zionist project, the Jewish Arab conflict in general and withinMandatory Palestine was still dominant. Additionally, the need to find solution

to the Jewish refugees in Europe and the struggle of breaking off the British

Mandate policy were articulated in the ZM demand to encourage the migration

of Jews.

The core of this proposal is to stop the British Mandate of Palestine and

to establish a Jewish and an Arab separated states, with economic shared

sphere, while Jerusalem will be under a trust regime managed by the UN. The

area of the Jewish state was 16,000 sq\km and it included more than 500,000

Jews and more than 40 percent Arabs (380,000). The Arab state included

700,000 Arabs and only 10,000 Jews (less than 2 percent). The Arab

leadership rejected this plan and the Arab league decided to prepare itself for a

war. For the ZM such proposal was perceived as a victory and indeed in the

Vaad HaPoel HaZioni in September 1947 a vast majority supported it. In

November 1947 two thirds of the UN members voted for this plan, while


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limiting the area of the Jewish State from 16,000 sq\km to 14000 sq\km (the

Western Negev was given to the Arab state). Yet, the Arab world rejected the

plan, and the 1948 began.

The 1948 war was a clear example of power conflict. It was based on

violence as the main communication style; physical force was an acceptable

means of dealing with the other side. For the Israeli side the war marked the

independence of the new Jewish state while for the Palestinians it is the Al

Nakbe (the disaster). At the conclusion of the 1948 all of the Arab countries

signed a cease-fire agreement with Israel, starting with Egypt on February 24,

1949 and concluding with Syria on July 20. These agreements specified the

interim borders between Israel and the Arab states (the "1949 Armistice Line"

that became known as the "Green Line") as the following:

In the south: the border with Egypt was restored to its previous line,including the Gaza Strip

In the north: the border with Lebanon and Syria were brought back to itsprevious line

In the East: Jordan retained control of the West Bank (Judea andSamaria) as well as to the Old City of Jerusalem.

To some extent, from this stage until 1967 the conflict remained in the

identity conflict phase. Yet, the Sinai Operation in which Israel defeated Egypt

and conquered the Sinai Peninsula for the period from November 1956 to

January 1957 noted the return to the power conflict. Yet Israel withdrew to its

old border, and a new UN involvement for maintaining the peace on this line

was created, i.e., the UN Emergency Force (UNEF).

The consequence of the 1967 War

In May 1967 the Egyptian army entered Sinai, a move that perceived by Israel

as a threat to its existence. After the international community failed to resolve

the crisis, Israel went to war on 5 June. The Egyptian army was defeated in

two days, and in 4 days Israeli forces stood on the eastern bank of the Suez

Canal. Jordan joined the war a few hours after Egypt, and was likewise


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defeated and the whole West Bank and the Old City of Jerusalem were

conquered. A war with Syria followed, and in 2 days the Israeli army also

conquered the Golan Heights.

The 1967 War caused many significant changes in Israeli social, political

and cultural reality. This power conflict phase involved many issues of identity

and historical belonging supported by religious, often messianic, arguments. In

the context of this paper it is important to mention the territorial aspect: i.e.,

vast territories were now under Israeli control including Jerusalem, and

demographically, i.e., a large Arab-Palestinian population became under Israeli

rule. Most of these changes were not seen as permanent by the Israeli

government. After long deliberations for a number of days the Israeli

government accepted a decision (which was kept secret) in which Israel was

ready to give back the Sinai and the Golan heights in return for a peace

agreement. The question of the West Bank remained open.

However a summit meeting of the Arab states in Khartoum in August

1967 established three No's: no peace, no recognition and no negotiations with

Israel, and support of the claims of the Palestinians. Indeed, such declaration

support the categorisation of this stage as power conflict characterised by theattempt of each party to 'break the will' of the other side. The UN actively

attempted a solution, and in November 22, 1967 the UN Security Council

passed its Resolution 242 which called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from

Arab territories, and the right of all states in the Middle East, including Israel,

to live in peace within secure and recognised borders.

Finally, following the annexation of the territories an intensive process of

colonisation (in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Height)

encouraged by the different Israeli government, using security discourse and

often religious reasons for justifying it. The results of this policy are visible; the

West Bank, for instance, is broken up by Jewish settlements, Israeli controlled

roads and large tracts of Israeli controlled land designated as military areas or

nature reserves. Colonisation, indeed, must be seen as a violent act that

radically interferes into a previously accepted autonomy of identities.


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Between the 1973 war and the 1979 peace agreement with Egypt

The October 1973 War developed rapidly, and the coordinated Egyptian-Syrian

offensive caught Israel by surprise. In the early days of the war, the Israeli

army suffered heavy losses as Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal and

overran Israeli strongholds, while Syrians marched deep into the Golan

Heights. Israel launched its counteroffensive first against the Syrian front, and

only when it had pushed the Syrians back well east of the 1967 cease-fire line

did Israel turn its attention to the Egyptian front. In ten days of fighting, Israel

pushed the Egyptian army back across the canal, and the Israeli forces made

deep incursions into Egypt. On October 24, with Israeli soldiers about one

kilometre from the main Cairo-Ismailia highway and the Soviet Union

threatening direct military intervention, the UN imposed a cease-fire.

After several months of negotiations, during which sporadic fighting

continued, Israel reached a disengagement agreement in January 1974,

whereby the Israeli army withdrew across the canal and Israeli and Egyptian

troops were separated in the Sinai by a UNEF-manned buffer zone. Israel

signed a similar agreement with Syria on May 31, 1974, whereby Israelwithdrew to the 1967 cease-fire line in the Golan Heights and a United Nations

Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) occupied a buffer zone between

Israeli and Syrian forces. On September 4, 1975, after further negotiations,

the Second Sinai Disengagement Agreement was signed between Egypt and

Israel that widened the buffer zone and secured a further Israeli withdrawal to

the east of the strategic Gidi and Mitla passes.

In 1978 the Camp David Accords were taking place between Israel and

Egypt with the mediation of the US. The Israel-Egypt peace agreement was

signed by Anuaar Sadat and Menachem Begin in Washington on March 26,

1979, and it was the first time that Israel and any of its Arab neighbours

agreeing on territorial and border issues. The Israel-Egypt peace treaty

contains nine articles, a military annex, an annex dealing with the relation

between the parties, agreed minutes interpreting the main articles of the

treaty, among them Article 6, the withdrawal schedule, exchange of


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ambassadors, security arrangements. An agreement relating to the autonomy

talks was contained in a letter addressed by President Sadat and Prime

Minister Begin to President Carter.

Following this agreement Israel withdrew to the border delineated in

1906 (this line was shaped in 1906 by Lord Cromer, the British administrator

of Egypt who ruled the country, and was worried by the possibility of Turkish

military forces being deployed in the Sinai peninsula. In 1892 he therefore

proposed a borderline to bring the Sinai under British control. After some years

and some negotiations the Turkish government agreed in 1906 to the British

modified proposal. This borderline was not changed after World War I, and

remained the border between the British mandate in Palestine and Egypt).

However, the Gaza Strip remained under Israeli rule. The agreement also

included giving up military bases, settlements, roads and other infrastructure

as well as the Sinai oil fields. Moreover, a process of normalisation began,

including exchange of diplomatic representatives and mutual agreements in

the areas of trade, economy, tourism and mail. Yet, it must be noted that

these relationships are very fragile and influenced by the dynamics of Israeli-

Palestinian conflict.

The period between 1980-2002

Officially called the "Declaration of Principles," the Oslo accords were

negotiated secretly by Israeli and Palestinian delegations in 1993 in Oslo,

Norway, guided by Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jorgen Holst. They were

signed at a Washington ceremony hosted by U.S. President Bill Clinton on

September 13, 1993, during which Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin shook hands. From territorial point of view, the

Oslo accords included gradual withdrawal of Israel from the Gaza Strip and the

West Bank, and the Palestinians' right to self-rule in those territories.

On September 28, 1995 Israelis and Palestinians signed another deal

known as the "Interim Agreement" or "Oslo 2" which enabled for a second

stage of autonomy for the Palestinians, giving them self-rule in the cities of


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Bethlehem, Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya, Ramallah, Tulkarm, parts of Hebron and

450 villages, while allowing Israeli-guarded Jewish settlements to remain. In

1998, U.S. President Bill Clinton hosted Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at a nine-day summit at Wye Mills,

Maryland, that ended with an October 23 signing ceremony in Washington of a

land-for-security peace deal, which included:

A security plan to crack down on violence by terrorists. Israeli troop redeployment from an additional 13.1 percent of

West Bank land, to take place over a 90-day period.

A 14.2 percent transfer of West Bank land from joint Israeli-Palestinian control to Palestinian control.

The revocation of clauses in the Palestinian National Charter thatare hostile toward Israel.

The guarantee of two corridors of safe passage between Gaza andthe West Bank.

Israeli commitment for third-phase troop redeployment from theWest Bank.

The release of 750 Palestinian prisoners in three phases. The opening of a Palestinian airport in Gaza.

Yet, Netanyahu froze the deal two months after signing it, saying that

the Palestinians failed to meet their security commitments.

On September 13, 1999, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak - who

defeated Netanyahu on a promise to move ahead with peace talks - signed a

deal with Arafat to implement a modified version of the Wye accords. The

agreement set a September 13, 2000, deadline for a final peace treaty.

Generally speaking, this phase which was very dynamic transformed the

conflict to issue conflict trying to focus on the tangible dimension of the

conflict (territory and sovereignty) while putting aside symbolic aspects that

related to both sides identities (the right of return, Jerusalem).

The last initiative, raised b the Quartet and the US, the 'road map',

aimed to present phases, timelines, target dates and benchmarks for progress

through reciprocal steps by the two parties in the political, security, economic,


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humanitarian, and institution-building fields. The idea is that, with the help of

the 'Quartet' (the USA, the EU, UN and Russia), Israel and the Palestinians

should agree on a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian

conflict by 2005 in the form of two-state solution. The Palestinian side was

demanded to act against terror and to create a working democracy based on

tolerance and liberty. The Israelis are demanded to do what is necessary for a

democratic Palestinian state to be established. Both sides would accept the

principle of a negotiation process. This initiative was a result of the US and the

European Quartet as noted by the European Council:

"3. The Council reiterated the importance of the Quartet's Road Map for

the re-establishment of a positive political perspective in the region. It

called on both parties to seize the opportunity offered to put the Middle

East Peace Process back on trackTime is of the essence; concrete action

and results are needed now.

4. The European Union is ready to step up its co-operation with the United

States and its other Quartet partners to advance confidence building

between the parties and to assist the implementation of the road map,including by helping to establish an effective and credible monitoring

mechanism" (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med).

2002-today The Security Fence\Separation Wall

In parallel to the diplomatic efforts of implementing the road map, which at the

time of writing this paper seems as another failure, a different reality is on the

ground. In summer 2002, during an intensive period of attacks on Israeli

civilians, the Israeli Government started the construction of the "security

fence". The International community demanded a report concerning the impact

of this wall on Palestinian livelihoods as well as on the humanitarian aspects of

such project. The report was written for the US government as well as for the

Norwegian and EU (World Bank Report, 2003).


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The first phase of the wall passes through the north-westerngovernorates of Jenin, Tulkarem, Qualqiliya and Salfit. It is important to note,

in the context of this paper, that the wall's alignment does not coincide with

the green line; in some points the wall is located six km inside the West Bank

and as a result, 12,000 Palestinians in 15 villages will find themselves on the

western "Israeli" side of the wall, disconnected from the rest of the WB. The

report also states that when the construction of the wall will end 95,000

Palestinian will live between the wall and the green line. In the second phase

the wall is extended towards the east to Salem checkpoint. Additionally, the

wall is also constructed in the Bethlehem and Jerusalem area. The cost of such

project is 6.5 milliard shekels and when it will end the length of it will be

around 600 km (twice the length of the green line) (Haartez, 30/4/2003). The

reaction of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the findings of the report

emphasised the need for such wall in order to protect Israeli citizens from

terror attacks that originating in the West Bank.

Politically speaking, building a "fence" through the West Bank effectively

creates facts on the ground. However, in Israeli discourse the term "fence" is

widely use, while in reality a system of fortifications that is currently beingerected on Palestinian lands in the West Bank is constructed combined of an

eight meters high concrete wall, wire fences and electronic sensors, a path to

reveal footprints, an area into which entry is forbidden, a two-lane road for

army patrols, and watchtowers and firing posts every 200 meters along the

entire length.

The consequences of constructing a "security wall" are highly political; it

creates facts on the ground that will define the borders of the future

Palestinian state to be dictated in the framework of the road map: three

enclaves completely cut off from each other, without the Jordan Valley, without

part of the agricultural lands between Jenin and Qalqilyah and without

metropolitan Jerusalem. But beyond the political aspects of such one sided act,

the wall separates thousands of people in towns and villages along the route

from their lands, from the nearest city and from neighbouring villages (World

Bank Report, 2003; B'tzelem, 2003). Thousands of Palestinians have lost their


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lands, their livelihood and their savings, which had been invested in

greenhouses, reservoirs, or houses for their children, because of these

fortifications.

The reaction of the US and the EU towards the construction of the wall is

quite severe, as noted by the commission:

"The Council underlined the importance of a clear commitment by the

Government of Israel on the implementation of the Quartet road map as

early as possible. The envisaged talks of Prime Minister Sharon with

President Bush will be an important opportunity in that respect. The

Council continues to be alarmed at the ongoing illegal settlement activities

and land confiscations for the construction of the so-called security fence,

which are an obstacle to peace by threatening to render the two-State

solution physically impossible"

(http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations).

Indeed, the EUs position on the current situation in the Middle East

conflict has not changed. It continues to call on Israel to withdraw its militaryforces and stop extra-judicial killings, to lift the closures and all restrictions

imposed on the Palestinian people, and to freeze settlement activities:

"A lasting peace settlement can only be based on respect for international

law, including resolutions 242 and 338 of the Security Council of the

United Nations. As the European Council has declared, such a settlement

requires full recognition of the right of Israel to live in peace and safely

inside internationally recognised borders, as well as the creation of a

viable, independent and democratic Palestinian state and the end of the

occupation of Palestinian Territories"


This phase, indeed, points on the shift of the situation from power

conflict into a phase of identity conflict; the responsibility for disaccord is


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attributed to and identified with the other side. This "justifies" Israel's one-

sided act of bordering which obviously embodies a potential of returning to the

power conflict stage.

But beyond the problematic nature of this specific project, we would

suggest that it reflects the very notion of historical process described above. It

tangibly produces a separation between Israel and the territories. The notion of

separation was pushed forward to the Israeli public discourse supported by

academics (Schueftan, 1999) as well as by different organisations who tried to

depoliticise this action, using a securitisation discourse, such as the "Gader

LaHaim" (A Fence for Life), neutralising identity dimension and transforming it

to an issue conflict:

"... The separation plan does not include the withdrawal of military or

moving population, and it does not mean withdrawal from the territories.

There is no fear that such act will be understood as a weakness of Israel.

The opposite; from an international perspective Israel will win from

implementing the plan... It will neutralise the ability of the Palestinians

and the terror organisations to damagefreely Israelis... It will shape their[the Palestinian] consciousness that the only way is to sit around the

negotiation table" (Gader LaHaim brochure).

A different statement by Prof. Yuli Tamir, a Knesset Member, who published a

brochure that advocates 'drawing a line', uses the demographic argument as

part of the (Jewish) identity political discourse:

"The biggest challenge is to draw a line that will protect on the Jewish

majority: the best border is the one that will include the maximum

number of Israelis and the minimum number of Palestinian inhabitants"

To this line of argument, a group of academics, politicians and ex-military

commanders joined, under the umbrella of the Van Leer institute (Sagie and

Sher, 2003:34-35):


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"The proposed plan is grounded in a temporary boundary indicated

on the attached map. In the first phase the transition phase

Israel will bear responsibility for security in the Palestinian areas,

the erection of a physical barrier along the boundary will be

completed, planning for the transition of Israeli towns and villages

to permanent communities according to broad national policy

planning will be concluded, and the role of the international

community in reconstructing Palestinian institutions of government

will be defined".

Yet, this group relates to the 'physical barrier' as a first stage and in the

second phase, they suggest that the 'resettlement effort will be completed,

infrastructures will be separated, and an effective border regime between

Israel and the Palestinian areas will be established. With international

coordination and Israeli consent, an international military-civilian force with a

defined mandate may deploy in the Palestinian areas'. Their attitude, we would

suggest, can be seen as a continuous line of the historical discussion, as they

state (our notes in brackets and Italics):

"The Policy Plan proposed here is not just another separation

plan. The distinctiveness of the Position Paper is three-fold: In

the proposed initiative, proactive separation [the notion of

separation as a borderline] is not an end in itself, but the means for

ensuring the national aim of the State of Israel as a Jewish and

democratic state [identity]. Its underlying logic is primarily value-

based, diplomatic, social and demographic [national border as an

ethnic definition] and also takes full account of security

concerns Unlike other plans that focus mainly on the security

aspects of unilateral disengagement, this policy initiative also

includes other vital components that have not yet become part of

the public debate. These include the importance of the demographic

component, the issue of Jerusalem, an international force, and


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pointing out the need to deal expeditiously and adequately with the

issue of the Arab minority living in the State of Israel [multi-layered

identities, ethnicity]" (Sagie and Sher, 2003).

This new initiative - beyond its "separation-securitisation" hypothesis

faces the very core questions of the conflict such as: the right of return, the

demographic balance and the status of Jerusalem. These issues are very

controversial and sensitive to both Palestinians and Israelis, and we would

suggest that they often provide the justification on the part of political leaders

as the basis for the securitisation of the arguments and the continuation of the

conflict.

Finally, at the time of writing this paper, a draft, known as the Geneva

Accord is to be signed between Israelis and Palestinians politicians. The Geneva

Accord, phrased by Israelis and Palestinians relates to some of the most

sensitive issues in the conflict, such as the right of return for Palestinian

refugees and the Palestinian sovereignty over the Temple Mount. The

agreement is based on Beilin-Abu Mazen document, signed in October 1995.

In Article 4 which deals with the territorial boundaries of the Israel and thefuture Palestinian state, it is noted that the international borders will be shaped

in accordance with UNSC Resolution 242 and 338, the border between the

states of Palestine and Israel shall be based on the June 4th 1967 lines with

reciprocal modifications on a 1:1 basis. This initiative also demands that both

sides will recognise the border as the permanent, secure and recognised

international boundary between them, recognising respectfully "each other's

sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, as well as the

inviolability of each others territory, including territorial waters, and airspace".

Furthermore, the 1967 territorial expansion of Israel which has been linked to

issues of identity has been tackled in this proposal which propose that "the

state of Israel shall be responsible for resettling the Israelis residing in

Palestinian sovereign territory outside this territory".

Yet, according to a survey conducted by the Palestinian Center for Public

Opinion, 51.4 percent of the respondents expressed opposition to the Geneva


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Understandings, while only 32 percent expressed support (Al-Ayyam

Palestinian newspaper, in: www.memri.org). Moreover, The Peace Index

survey for October, which was conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center for

Peace Research shows that despite the fact that majority of the Israeli public

have heard of the Geneva initiative, only small numbers believe this has any

chance of being realised. This findings are interesting since this research points

on the fact that among the Israeli Jewish public there is a concern that if Israel

will not withdraw from the occupied territories no solution based on the

principle of 'two states for two peoples' is found to the conflict, and the

Palestinians will become a majority west of the Jordan and a de facto

'binational' state will emerge(http://spirit.tau.ac.il).

B. European Positions on the Israel/Palestine Conflict

Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 and the parallel creation

of the Palestinian refugee problem (for a detailed analysis see: Morris, 1987),

Europe has attempted to maintain its influence as a power broker and

mediator in the region, although its overall impact has been minimal. During

much of this period, there was not a single European policy towards the region,

with different countries changing their stances according to specific political

and time contexts. In recent years however, the EU has come close to

adopting a single policy towards the conflict, unlike its position on other conflict

regions, such as in the case of Iraq.

Following the establishment of the State of Israel, it was Germany and

Britain who were the bete noir for most Israelis, the former because of the

holocaust, the latter because of their attempts to prevent the establishment of


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the State and refuse entry to refugees and immigrants in the period between

1945-1948. During the first decade of statehood, France was an important ally

of Israel and was seen by foreign policy makers as being the closest European

ally. By the time of the 1956 Sinai campaign, France and Britain were working

together with Israel against the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal,

while Germany remained beyond the pale of normal diplomatic relations

(Aridan, 1994).

This situation changed by the 1960s, when Germany had began to

develop relations with the State of Israel, partly through the leadership of

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and the implementation of a major reparations

package to holocaust victims and their families. During the past forty years, it

has been Germany which gradually taken on the role of being Israels closest

European ally, although Israeli leaders never lose the opportunity of exerting

the guilt complex on German governments when their leaders utter statements

which may be interpreted as being too pro-Palestinian and not sufficiently pro-

Israeli.

The Six Day war in 1967 can be seen as a turning point not only in the

Israel\Palestine conflict (see: our paper that deals with the historicalbackground), but also in the European approach to the region. European

support for Israel became more tenuous, while the continuation of the

occupation and the building of settlements has switched much European

support for the pre-1967 underdogs (Israel) to the post-1967 underdogs (the

Palestinians). In particular Israeli French relations have undertaken a

significant turn for the worse, while Israeli British relations continue to

experience ups and downs. Ye'or (2003:2) notes that during this immediate

post-1967 period, France became "the instigator of a European anti-Israel

policy" and voted in international forums in favour of "Arab anti-Israel"

resolutions and backed the 1969 unilateral boycott of arms sales to Israel.

The tension between Israel and the European states continued

throughout the 1970s. This was expressed mainly after the 1973 war and the

Arab oil embargo, which has been used as a tool to put pressure on the

Europeans. Some analysts conceive this as the basis for understanding the re-


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shaping of European policy in the area:

"Panicked, the nine countries of the European Economic Community

(EEC) immediately met in Brussels on November 6, 1973 and

tabled a joint Resolution based on their dependence on Arab oil"

(Ye'or, 2003:2)

Adopting this critical (though simplistic) perspective led Bat Ye'or to conclude

that the Arab world exploited the economy "as a radical means to make the

EEC an instrument in a long-term political strategy targeting Israel, Europe and

America" (2003:11). This Arab attitude was clearly expressed by one of the

Arab delegates, Dr. Ibrahim A. Obaid, Director-General, Ministry of Petroleum

and Mineral Resources in Riyad, at a meeting of the Euro-Arab cooperation

organization in Amsterdam in 1975:

"Together and as equals, the Europeans and the Arabs can through

a "strategy of inter-dependence" forge ahead to remove the thorn

from their sides the Israeli problem and attend to the Herculeantask ahead of them" (cited in Bat Ye'or, 2003:11).

Farouq Al-Qaddoumi, head of the PLO political bureau and secretary general of

Fatah's Central Committee, elaborated this approach in a recent interview, in

which he stated:

"Question: "How can Europe be pressured to take a more

aggressive and active stand?"

Al-Qaddoumi: "By using the weapon of oil. That is, by raising its

price so that the people will feel the pressure, will be angry at their

leadership, and will force it to play a more active role" (Kul Al-

Arab, January 3, 2003 published in Israel in:

memri.org/bin/articles.cgi).


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Over time, the EU has taken on a common policy with respect to

Israel/Palestine (see: Alpher 2000). On March 26, 1999, the EU published its

"Berlin Declaration" which supports an independent Palestinian state. The

"Berlin Declaration" opens the possibility of European recognition in an

independent Palestinian state, even if this state is declared unilaterally,

following a failure in the bilateral negotiations. In this context, the British

General Consul in Jerusalem, in a ceremony in Ramallah said that "the EU is

ready to recognize the Palestinian State if it is declared" (Al-Hayat Al-Jadida,

April 4, 1999, in: memri.org/bin/articles). These changes in the EU positions

were seen as constituting a form of reward paid by the West to the Palestinian

leadership for having postponed the intended unilateral declaration of a

Palestinian State on May 4, 1999. The EUs position on the current situation in

the Middle East conflict has not changed. It continues to call on Israel to

withdraw its military forces and stop extra-judicial killings, to lift the closures

and all restrictions imposed on the Palestinian people, and to freeze settlement

activities:

"A lasting peace settlement can only be based on respect forinternational law, including resolutions 242 and 338 of the Security

Council of the United Nations. As the European Council has

declared, such a settlement requires full recognition of the right of

Israel to live in peace and safely inside internationally recognised

borders, as well as the creation of a viable, independent and

democratic Palestinian state and the end of the occupation of

Palestinian Territories"


Given these statements, Israeli leaders do not view Europe as

constituting an honest broker, favouring increased American assistance and

intervention over that of Europe. This situation is also recognised by the French

writer Dominique Moisi who argues that the primary responsibility of the

international community, and particular the Europeans is to re-establish trust


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between Europe, Israel and Palestine:

"... Europe needs to hold out a more tempting carrot - and wield a

tougher stick. It should offer the Palestinians better-planned and

properly delivered economic aid. For the Israelis, Europe should

hold out the prospect of a "privileged partnership", which would

create stronger ties with the European Union" (The Financial Times,

2 July 2001, in: www.sfcg.org).

More specifically, Moisi details what must be demanded from both sides. On

the Palestinian side, he proposes, "beyond the calculated manipulation of

violence, what is unacceptable is the absence of the rule of law, the corruption,

if not stopped, and the continuing use of educational texts filled with hatred".

As for the Israeli side, he stresses that "continued building of settlements on

disputed land is unacceptable and should lead to trade sanctions, implemented

by the EU".

Despite the emergent single European voice concerning Israel\Palestine,Israel continues to pay careful attention to the statements of the three big

players Britain, Germany and France. Statements emanating from other

countries, such as the Belgium attempt to put Ariel Sharon on trial as a war

criminal, or the Norwegian discussion concerning a boycott on Israeli goods,

are seen as being part of a wider European anti-Israel policy, but are not

considered as being of importance in the wider picture. It is the policies of the

three key European players which determines Israels attitude towards Europe

in general. In this respect, Israel has displayed a hot-cold relationship with

each of the big three, changing over time in line with the political realities and

the change in respective governments.

An example of these dynamics is the visit of former Deputy Foreign

Minister David Mellor, during the 1990s, to the Gaza Strip and his harsh

comments towards Israeli policy brought relations between Britain and Israel

to a new low, while the unquestioned support of British prime Minister Tony


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Blair for the war in Iraq in 2003 (a war which was supported throughout Israel)

was an important factor bringing the two countries closer to each other.

Sharons decision to visit London in July 2003 was, partly, an attempt to say

thank you to Blair for supporting American policy in the global war against

terror and in the downfall of Saddam Hussein.

At the same time, Israel sees the USA as being the major, perhaps the

sole, third party country whose intervention in the conflict is of any

importance. Ambassadorial appointments to many EU countries have not been

considered important by the Israeli Foreign Ministry. These positions are often

used as means of filling the eleven political appointee slots allowed an Israeli

Foreign Minister, rather than the appointment of professional career diplomats.

In recent years, Britain has experienced a list of political appointees three in

a row - while the positions in both Belgium and France have been filled by

appointees who have been rewarded for their political services to a particular

Israeli Prime Minister or Foreign Minister, despite the fact that hey possess few

diplomatic or explanatory skills. This is viewed with much alarm in European

countries that see this as an indication of the low esteem in which they are

held by successive Israeli governments, although they continue to see theIsrael posting as one of the more important in terms of the wider Middle

Eastern policy. Israel damages its own cause in many European countries by

sending non-professional political appointees to these countries, both in terms

of their ability to put over Israels case in public forums and in the way that the

host governments relate to them.

C. Are There Carrots and Sticks?

In other cases of contemporary conflict such as Cyprus, the Balkans, Turkey

the EU has been able to offer the much-desired carrot of eventually

belonging to the EU as a reward for conflict resolution and political stability.

The inclusion of Slovenia in the next round of EU enlargement was a clear

indication to the other Balkan states that they too could be part of the EU in


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years to come, while the accession of Cyprus, and desired for accession by

Turkey, are closely linked to political demands on the part of the EU.

Although there has been some discussion concerning Israels future

membership of the EU (see: Veit, 2003; Tovias 2003; Matern, 1997 in Stetter,

2003), this is seen as a highly unlikely scenario. Despite all cartographic

ingenuity, this part of the Levant cannot be defined as constituting part of the

European continent even at its broadest geographical or cultural definitions

and delimitations. In this context Primor (2003) notes that Israel is unable or

not interested in meeting even 60 percent of the commitments required before

joining the EU. The example he gives relates to the need to annul the law

granting Jews the Right of Return, which contradicts the EU's principle of

freedom of movement within the union (www.haaretz.co.il, July 23, 2003).

Yet, Israel already enjoys associate member status in the EU and

benefits from a preferred trading Agreement; it is important to note that it is

the only country to have preferred trading status with both the USA and the EU

at one and the same time. For a time this provided a back door entry for

European and USA entrepreneurs into each others markets, although this was

later restricted. Based on figures for 2001, Israeli exports to the EUrepresented 31% ($6.9 billion) of total Israeli exports and Israeli imports from

the EU 41% ($11.4 billion) of total Israeli imports. The breakdown of trade

flows by main sectors, excluding diamonds, is the following: Israel's main

exports to the EU are electrical machinery and equipment (39%); chemical

products (17%), plastics and rubber (9%) and optical measuring and medical

instruments (8%). Its major imports from the EU are electrical machinery and

equipment (35%), chemicals (13%) and base metals (6%). Indeed, EU-Israel

trade is increasing in importance as a share of the EU's trade. The total trade

in services between the EU and Israel increased from 1996 to 1998 (last data

available). In 1998 the services balance was slightly in favour of the EU, which

that year imported around 1500 million Euro and exported 1743 million Euro

(http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/bilateral/israel/index_en.htm).

Though, the attempt to separate economic relations from political

positions is impossible as the following example demonstrates; in the last five


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years the EU demanded from Israel that that any goods that were produced in

the occupied territories will not be labeled "made in

Israel". This is obviously an expression of the EU policy claim that the

territories are not part of Israel, and goods produced there are therefore not

eligible for the customs reductions that Israeli goods enjoy under the free-

trade pact with Europe. It is important to note that the export to

Europe from the territories is not significant while Israel's total export to

Europe, which is about 120 million dollar per year, out of a

total of some 18 billion (www.haaretz.com, November 25, 2003).

However, Israel refused until November 2003 to distinguish between

goods made in Israel and goods made in the territories. The argument, which

stands behind it, is that since the EU recognized the Paris Agreement that

created a customs union between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, there

are no grounds for treating products made in the territories differently from

products made in Israel. These days Israel agreed to adopt a compromise

solution of including the city of origin on the label. Yet, Ehud Olmert, the

Industry Minister, stressed that the agreement in no way implies a change in

Israel's political positions or a willingness to concede those parts of theterritories that the government insists must remain part of Israel under any

future agreement (www.haaretz.com, November 25, 2003).

The economic collaboration between the EU and Israel is also expressed

through enabling the European Investment Bank (EIB) to grant loans for Israeli

projects related to the Barcelona Process, including infrastructure and

environmental projects. The Agreement thus institutionalized the ties between

Israel and the Bank.

Israel is also a member of many other European cultural, educational

and sports organizations, not least because of the refusal of the Asian and

Middle Eastern countries to allow Israel to become a full regional participant.

This is also reflected in the geopolitical self images of many Israelis who see

themselves as belonging to a western and European ecumene, as contrasted

with a Middle Eastern milieux, and who are not prepared to give up these

regional affiliations even if the conflict was to be resolved and Israel were to be


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invited to participate in the Middle Eastern and Asian cultural and sporting

associations (Newman, 2000).

Another context is that provided by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was established at a Conference of

Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in Barcelona on November 27-28, 1995. Its

final Declaration - the Barcelona Declaration - is a far-reaching document,

reflecting the joint initiative by 27 partners:

a) 15 EU Member States: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,

Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, the

United Kingdom, Spain and Sweden.

b) 12 Mediterranean Partners: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon,

Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. This

partnership aims "to create peace, stability and development in a region, which

is of vital strategic importance for Europe"

(http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/israel)

More specifically, EU intervention focuses on three objectives. The first is

the creation of "an area of peace and stability based on the principle of human

rights and democracy; this is "Basket I" - the political and security partnership.The second is the creation of "an area of shared prosperity through the

progressive establishment of free trade between the EU and its Mediterranean

partners and amongst the partners themselves", namely "Basket II" - the

economic and financial partnership. Finally the EU aims to focus on the

improvement of "mutual understanding among the peoples of the region and

the development of a free and flourishing civil society", this is "Basket III" -

which deals with cultural, social and human partnership


Notwithstanding, beyond this corporation and unlike other conflicts in

which the EU plays a third part role, neither Israel or the future Palestinian

State are perceived as being future members of the EU and, as such, the EU

"carrot or stick" policy is limited to these countries as a reward for bringing

violence to an end and implementing a conflict resolution agreement (for a

wider discussion of these themes see: Dessus et al, 2000). This view was


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cynically expressed in "Nekudah", a popular journal among the Israeli settlers,

reflecting the anti-European and anti-external interventionist positions of the

Israeli right:

"An international pressure - if at all occurs - will be expressed in

two dimensions: the denial of American financial support, and

economic embargo from the Europeans countries and some

others... Apparently, a European economic embargo is more

problematic... but economic interests will always be stronger than

political interests. Belgium already called to excommunicate

commercial relations with Israel. France, on the other hand, avoids

calling an embargo on Israel from the European Common Market

side. What is the different between the two? The French like us

more? - Definitely not. They just sell us more; Israelis like driving

Peugeot, Renault, Citroen and the French people will not give up

such a serious market. On the other hand, our commercial relations

with Belgium are negligible (Belgian chocolate is good, but "Elit"

chocolate [an Israeli chocolate firm] is not bad), and hence theBelgians can state such declarations. Israel imports from the

European twice that it exports, and economically speaking - Europe

has no interest to cancel its agreements with Israel" (Feiglin 2003:

34-35)

The nature of the trade and cultural relationships between the EU and Israel

are different to those between the EU and the Palestinian Authority. While EU

relations with Israel are based on trade cooperation between two highly

developed first world and modern economies (Ahiram and Tovias 1995), its

relations with the Palestinian Authority are mainly based on the provision of

significant financial assistance and aid packages. This, according to Stetter

(2003) is an attempt to stabilize the weak economic and political structures of

this nascent state. This policy is expressed in the fact that the EU has been the

biggest donor to the PA, and there is no other country in the world which has


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received a similar amount of assistance from the EU as Palestine (Brynen 2000

in Stetter, 2003:57). The political and cultural institutions of the PA benefited

from the substantial European funding and financial assistance, especially in

the post-Oslo period beginning in 1993.

The available data shows that from June 2001 to 2002 the EU provided

10 million Euro per month in direct budgetary assistance to the PA. The

support is directed towards the budget of the PA helping to secure

expenditures such as public service salaries, social, educational, health and

core functions of the PA. An additional 10 million Euro has been allocated to

the World Bank Emergency Services Support Programme to support

operational costs in the health sector; and a further 10 million Euro was

implemented in a special programme to support services at the level of the

municipalities (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations).

During the last 2 years of the Intifada, EU assistance has been aimed at

maintaining the daily existence of the PA and, at the same time, using their aid

packages to demand internal economic and democratic reform on the part of

the Palestinian leadership. Often in the face of sharp criticism at home and

abroad, the EU supported the PA with direct budgetary assistance at a timewhen its revenues were withheld by the government of Israel. According to

Chris Patten, External Relations Commissioner, without the EU assistance

"there would have been no Palestinian interlocutor for the negotiations now

under way" and he also added that "at every step, the EU's help was made

conditional on reforms that would make a viable Palestinian state a reality one

day and in the short term make the Palestinian territories a better, safer

neighbour for Israel" (The Financial Times, 17 July 2003).

However, these EU 'carrots' to the Palestinians are perceived negatively

inside Israel, best expressed in a recent paper by Bar Ilan University political

scientist, Gerald Steinberg who, in his criticism of the large budgets provided

by the EU, as well as by individual member states, to the PA and to Palestinian

NGOs, argues that:

" EU officials spoke repeatedly of Palestinian state-building while


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the funds went to the corrupt and anti-democratic elite. In the

absence of any controls, the money provided by the EUs taxpayers

was diverted into the pockets of and bank accounts of officials and

for the purchase of weapons" (Steinberg, 2004: 6-7).

The criticism of the way in which EU money is used by the Palestinian

leadership is not limited to Israel. Arab criticism of the misuse of funding has

also been aired, such as the report in the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Watan (June 7,

2002, in: memri.org/bin/articles):

"Yesterday, Al-Watan received documents from private sources in

the Cairo branch of an Arab bank showing that Yasser Arafat had

deposited in his name $5.1 million into a personal account.

According to sources, this is theft of Arab aid funds allocated to the

Palestinians through an arrangement between Arafat and his Cairo

office head Ramzi Khouri".

Thus the ability of the EU to use its leverage as a means of influencingthe process of conflict resolution is limited. Given the USA support of Israel

(see below), the fact that Israel is not a candidate for full membership of the

EU, and the significant trade between the two, the EU has as much to lose

from downgrading its current level of trading and cultural relations, as Israel

does. Neither side will benefit, while Israeli antagonism towards Europe would

only increase. Regarding the Palestinians, the EU does try to use its influence

to push for internal reforms but, at the same time, is aware that any significant

reduction in the amount of assistance afforded to the Palestinian Authority will

only serve to make a bad situation even worse. The EU perceives its future role

as an institution builder in a Palestinian State as of prime importance and does

not desire to lose this foothold, however precarious it may seem at present,

especially as they are able to counterbalance the American influence amongst

the Palestinians, something which will not happen with respect to Israel.


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D. Israeli and Palestinian Attitudes Towards the EU

Steinberg's critique of EU involvement in the Israel/Palestine arena expresses

much deeper-rooted sentiments amongst the Israeli (Jewish) public vis a vis

Europe in general. While the Palestinian Authority welcome direct EU

intervention as a means of balancing what they see as pro-Israel bias from the

USA, Israel has developed an ambivalent relationship towards the EU and, in

recent years, have become quite antagonistic towards Europe for what they

perceive as a pro-Palestinian bias. This is reflected in anti-European

statements from political leaders and anti-European articles in then main

media. Leading the way in recent years has been the right wing newspaper,

the Jerusalem Post, in continual editorial and leader articles, which

demonstrate a strong anti-European bias and polemic.

The deep-rooted anti-Europeanism stems from the historical and

emotional associations of most Israelis with the experiences of persecution and

holocaust we discussed earlier. Europe is perceived as being anti-Semitic, anattitude which has been strengthened in recent years with the growth of anti-

Semitic incidents against Jewish communities and synagogues throughout

Europe, especially France. This is expressed clearly in the right wing settler

magazine "Nekudah" in relation to the war in Iraq and the difference between

American and EU pressure on Israel:

"Before the war with Iraq started, the Americans, the British (and

the Spanish) explained the meaning of this war to Israel. Since

Israel is perceived as a central element in the conflict between the

Islamic-Arabic terror and the US and the West, the West tries to

moderate the anger it faces, by means of scarifying Israel's

interests. In the case of the US we are talking about simple

preference of its interests; in the European case, anti-Semitism is

integrated in its whole package of interest" (Feiglin, 2003:31).


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All policy statements on the part of European leaders, which are deemed

as being anti-Israel, or pro-Palestinian, are immediately translated into the

rhetoric of anti-Semitism. A recent example is the EU condemnation of the

Israeli law that prevents Palestinians married to Israelis from obtaining

residency permits in Israel as discriminatory. The European Commission envoy

to Israel, Giancarlo Chellavard, charged in a statement that the bill

"establishes a discriminatory regime to the detriment of Palestinians in the

highly sensitive area of family rights". The statement also said that the

Commission would study if the law contradicts international law and basic

human rights, in a gesture that Israel's relations with the EU might be affected

(Jerusalem Times newspaper, July 8, 2003, in: http://www.jerusalem-

times.net). These perceptions have strongly infiltrated the public image of

Europe, as can be seen in the questions\answers column in Haaretz daily

'leftish' newspaper where Adar Primor, the Foreign Editor, answered readers'

questions on Israel's relationship with Europe: (www.haaretz.co.il, July 23,

2003):

"Question: "I deeply distrust the EU, but even more their press that

reflects the anti-Semitism of the European population. How can this

persistent trend be changed?" Jorge Gross MD San Antonio, Texas

Answer by Primor: "To the best of my knowledge, the European

media, or at least the serious media, do not support anti-Semitic

propaganda, not directly or indirectly. It sometimes even illustrates

greater sensitivity to instances of anti-Semitism than the Israeli

media. In addition, when it needs to cover dark scandals in which

Jews are involved, the European media does so with kid gloves and

with great caution, due to the fear of offending Jews..."

The major issue to have aroused the sense of anti-Europeanism

concerns the use of some of the EU assistance to the PA for the purchase of

arms, which were then used in terrorist attacks against Israeli citizens. The EU


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denied this, although they did admit that not all the funds were used in the

way intended and that there had not been an adequate system of control over

the use of these funds. The matter could have been resolved had the EU

Commission agreed to setting up a Committee to examine the accusations but

this was adamantly refused in the first instance by EU Commissioner for

External Affairs, Chris Patten. It took a formal request on the part of a large

group of EU members of Parliament for such a committee to be set up. Patten

himself did not succeeded in endearing himself to the Israeli public by his

continuous refusal to visit Israel, despite invitations on the part of the Foreign

Ministry and a number of Israeli universities which would have provided him

with a stage for delivering a statement on EU Israel relations and ironing out

some of the differences and misunderstandings which have developed over the

past few years.

Steinberg (2004) further argues that EU money has been used to

promote 'offensive political pamphlets that reflect a extremist 'post-Zionist

agenda', an expression which is used in a derogatory sense to describe any

pro-peace groups of the left.

"[The EU provided] funds (in secret) for Jeff Halpers housing

demolition protest group, EU officials ignore the evidence

demonstrating the political biases and inaccuracies in this groups

activities. And the interest group (lobby) Peace Now has also

received major funding from the EU, thereby greatly increasing its

visibility, if not impact. Radical NGOs in the Israeli-Arab sector,

which disseminate false allegations of discrimination and Israeli

human rights abuses, are also funded by the EU and the EMHRN"

(Steinberg, 2004:8-9).

The fact that the EU sponsors other pro-peace initiatives, be they grass roots

such as the People to People programs, or the Partnership for Peace programs,

or such groups as Bereaved parents or Rabbis for Human Rights, is only seen

by the right wing government and media as an expression of European pro-


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Palestinian sentiment and has been used as a weapon in winning over a

skeptical Israeli public during the past few years, especially since the return of

violence during the past three years.

But despite of the EU image as a pro-Palestinian entity, Palestinian

politicians are also critical of the EU positions, leading to disputes between the

PA and the EU. A recent example concerns the Palestinian rejection to the

European Parliament statement on refugees, which suggested that the

Palestinian refugees should return only to the Palestinian State with exceptions

that could be negotiated upon freely between the two sides (www.jerusalem-

times.net, October 30, 2003). A more detailed study of Palestinian attitudes

towards the EU will be the subject of the next research paper in the

Euroborders project.

It is the gap between the actual EU policy and statements towards

Israel\Palestine conflict and the 'anti-Semitic' image of Europe, which is part of

the ambivalent nature of the EU-Israel relationship. EU policy does not differ

greatly from the USA policy in terms of their demand for a two state solution, a

complete frieze on all settlement activity, the cessation of violence, the

cessation of unilateral construction of the separation fence, and the need forinternal economic and democratic reforms in the PA. The EU and the USA are

equal partners in the quartet (the other two being Russia and Nato) which

drew up the Road Map plan for peace and which was formally presented to

both the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships immediately following the Iraq war.

The EU has stated its preference for the establishment of a "democratic, viable,

peaceful and sovereign State of Palestine, on the basis of the 1967 borders, if

necessary with minor adjustments agreed by the parties" (Euromed Report,

June 25, 2002). But it seems as the EU policy makers are aware of their

limited ability to shape and mediate the conflict without American support:

"The European Union will work with the parties and with its

partners in the international community, especially with the United

States in the framework of the Quartet, to pursue every

opportunity for peace and for decent future for all the people of


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the region" (Euromed Report, June 25, 2002)

Indeed the complexity of the situation and the sensitivity of both sides in

the conflict to the EU involvement, forces the EU to phrase carefully its position

on the current situation in the Israel\Palestinian conflict which aims to

emphasise both sides' interests and responsibility:

"Israel is currently heavily affected by the Middle East conflict,

including acts of terrorism against Israeli citizens as well as a very

serious situation in the Palestinian territories. The EU firmly

believes in Israels right to live in peace and security. It has

condemned, in the clearest terms, terrorism and all acts of

violence. In this respect, the EU has pointed out the Palestinian

Authority's responsibilities in fighting terrorism"

(http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/israel).

At the same time the EU continues to call on Israel "to withdraw its military

forces and stop extra-judicial killings, to lift the closures and all restrictionsimposed on the Palestinian people, and to freeze settlement activities'

(http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/israel). Politically speaking, the

EU's position is based on international law, including resolutions 242 and 338

of the Security Council of the United Nations, mentioned in the first section of

the paper. It is also aims to base its policy on partnership and co-operation,

hinting on the "economic carrot":

"It is the EU's view that maintaining relations with Israel is an

important contribution to the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP).

The Association Agreements are the basis for EU-Israeli trade

relations as well as for the EU-Israel political dialogue. Keeping the

lines of communication open and trying to convince its interlocutors

is for the EU the right way forward"

(http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/israel).


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In this context Steinberg (2004:1) further argues:

"Europes policies towards Israel, in the Middle East peace efforts,

and in the broader EU Barcelona/Euromed framework have

produced few, if any successes. On the contrary, the evidence

demonstrates that Europes approaches and initiatives have been

highly unrealistic, and relations with Israel are marked by sharp

confrontation, including politically and ideologically motivated

boycotts. Indeed, Europe is accused of playing a leading role in the

international campaign to delegitimize Israel and Jewish

sovereignty".

Realising that the government had taken their anti-European sentiment

too far, current Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom stated, in his first public

statement on assuming office in February 2003, that he would make an effort

to improve relations between Israel and the EU, while Prime Minister Sharon

made a number of pro-European remarks on his visit to British Prime MinisterTony Blair in July 2003, although at the same time castigating European

leaders for continuing to make official visits to PA President Yasser Arafat even

after the new (already previous) Prime Minister Abu Mazen had been appointed

it take charge of peace negotiations. Sharon warned the European leaders that

by continuing to visit Arafat they were undermining the status of Abu Mazen

and, by association, undermining the continuation of the peace process. But,

as though to undermine all efforts at Israeli-European rapprochement, the EU

published the findings of a poll take in October 2003, in which the majority of

respondents stated that they saw Israel as the single greatest threat to global

stability, closely followed by an Italian poll which underlined some strong anti-

Israel sentiment on the part of the countrys population. No amount of public

statements to the contrary on the part of both French President Jacques Chirac

and Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi, went any way to resolving the growing

emotional antagonism between Israel and the EU. For most Israelis, the


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findings of these two polls demonstrated that anti-Israeli policies were akin to

anti-Semitism and that Europe was not to be trusted as a serious third party

player in the peace process.

E. The EU, the USA and Other Third Party Actors

The role of third parties in the Israel\Palestine arena is a complex one. Given

the importance of the area as the cradle of the three major monotheistic

religions, the location of Jerusalem and the holy sites, the history of the Jewish

people and so on, the region has always taken on great significance for world

powers over and above their obvious geopolitical interests in the regions oil

resources. Europe, because of its historical involvement in the region

mentioned above, and the USA, because of its geopolitical interests and its

feelings of responsibility towards the Jewish State, have continued to play a

major role in the region. This is reflected in generous packages of aid and

assistance on the one hand, and attempts to influence domestic and foreign

policy on the other.Since the onset of the Oslo Peace process in 1993, there has been

greater international harmony and agreement over the perceived resolution of

the conflict a two-state solution than ostensibly over any other major

foreign policy issue. This has become even clearer in the immediate post-Iraq

war situation, where Europe and the USA have come together over the

implementation of the Road Map aimed at bringing peace to the Middle East.

Israel has always played a double game with respect to third party

intervention in the Israel\Palestine conflict. It readily accepts the vast amounts

of assistance which come its way especially from the United States but is

adamant in its determination that its foreign and defence policies must be

independently decided and implemented without any external pressures or

influence. Israel also views third party active intervention in the conflict as

peace keepers with great suspicion, arguing that Israel must determine its own

policies and that it cannot rely on third party presence. In particular, as we


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noted in the previous section, Israel rejects both United Nations and European

active intervention, perceiving both as being non honest brokers.

The failed role of past United Nations peacekeeping forces in Sinai

prior to 1967

Wp04 Eu and the Israel Palestine Conflict

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Transcript of Wp04 Eu and the Israel Palestine Conflict