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Huei-ying Kuo

Nationalism Against Its People? Chinese Business and Nationalist Activities in Inter-War Singapore, 1919-1941

Working Papers Series No. 48

July 2003

The Southeast Asia Research Centre (SEARC) of the City University of Hong Kong publishes SEARC Working Papers Series electronically. ©Copyright is held by the author or authors of each Working Paper. SEARC Working Papers cannot be republished, reprinted, or reproduced in any format without the permission of the paper's author or authors. Note: The views expressed in each paper are those of the author or authors of the paper. They do not represent the views of the Southeast Asia Research Centre, its Management Committee, or the City University of Hong Kong. Southeast Asia Research Centre Management Committee Professor Kevin Hewison, Director Professor Joseph Y.S. Cheng Dr Vivienne Wee, Programme Coordinator Dr Graeme Lang Dr Zang Xiaowei Editor of the SEARC Working Paper Series Professor Kevin Hewison Southeast Asia Research Centre The City University of Hong Kong 83 Tat Chee Avenue Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong SAR Tel: (852) 2194 2352 Fax: (852) 2194 2353 http://www.cityu.edu.hk/searc email: [email protected]

Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Papers Series, No. 48, 2003 1

NATIONALISM AGAINST ITS PEOPLE? CHINESE BUSINESS AND NATIONALIST ACTIVITIES IN INTER-WAR SINGAPORE, 1919-19411

Huei-ying Kuo2 Dept. of Sociology

State University of New York at Binghamton [email protected]

Abstract: This paper examines the rationale and impact of accelerating Chinese-led anti-Japanese nationalist activities in Singapore from the late 1920s within the context of Chinese sub-ethnic cleavages and business networks in Southeast Asia. More specifically, despite the fact that leading Chinese business elites were mobilized by the nationalist calls to confront Japanese interests, not only Japanese agents but also some Chinese were targeted. I further point out that within Singapore’s Chinese business communities the division between those who led the nationalist campaigns and those importing Japanese goods fell into Chinese sub-ethnic categories. The term ‘sub-ethnic economic nationalism’ is advanced to interpret these relationships.

Introduction

From late spring to autumn of 1928, several Chinese stores trading Japanese goods announced that ‘due to the current economic depression, we must cease business activities for the time being’ (NYSB, 24 September 1928) 3 . Any Chinese business carrying Japanese goods that did not close, would be condemned publicly or, in the worst cases, their stores would be destroyed (NYSB, 2 October 1928).

1 An earlier version of this paper was presented in the joint seminar of the Southeast Asian Research Centre and the Department of Applied Social Science, City University of Hong Kong, on 27 March 2003. The author acknowledges the exchanges with scholars in the seminar, particularly those from Professor Kevin Hewison and Dr Vivienne Wee. The research is partially assisted by the Small Grant Program of the China and Inner Asian Council of the Association for Asian Studies (2002-2003) (funds provided by the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation). Materials on Japanese intelligence reports were collected during my visit in the Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, Taipei, under the guidance of Professor Ka Chih-ming. Acknowledgment also goes to professors from the Department of Sociology of Binghamton University, particularly the comments and encouragement from Professor Mark Selden, Dale Tomich and Frederic Deyo 2 The author is a Visiting PhD Fellow at the Southeast Asia Research Centre, City University of Hong Kong. 3 Note on romanization: Most of the Chinese terms are romanized in Mandarin pinyin with several exceptions: First, terms of Chinese sub-ethnic groups are written in according to their most familiar English spellings. For example, Hakka [Mandarin: Kejia], Hokkien [Mandarin: Fujian], Cantonese [Guangdong ren]. Second, for some famous names that have recorded according to the pronunciation in their particular dialect, I will follow the conventional records. For example, Tan Kah Kee [Chen Jiagen in Mandarin pinyin], Dr. Sun Yat-sen [Sun Zhongshan in Mandrin pinyin].


These were among the responses to the surging anti-Japanese boycotts of 1928. From early May, when news of China's military clashes with the Japanese army in Jinan (the Jinan Incident) were confirmed, anti-Japanese sentiments spread throughout the Chinese communities in Singapore. Chinese hostility against Japan led to the development of anti-Japanese boycotts, causing a heavy slump in Japanese exports to British Malaya in general and Singapore in particular. In the first month of the strike, Japan's exports to British Malaya plummeted to 81% of the amount in the previous year. As the boycott continued, Japan's trade with British Malaya reached to its lowest in July and August 1928, that is, only 16% and 20% of Japan's exports during the same periods last year.4

The 1928 anti-Japanese boycott was far from the first nationalist activity organized in Singapore. Neither was it the last one prior to World War II. Throughout the inter-war period, Chinese nationalist sentiment surged whenever relationship between China and Japan was in a collision course, such as during the 1919 May Fourth Movement, the 1928 Jinan Incident, the 1931 Manchurian Incident, the 1932 Shanghai Incident and after the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937 untill Japan's occupying Singapore in December 1941 (TTK, 1942).

But the 1928 anti-Japanese boycott was a watershed for both Chinese nationalist activities and Sino-Japanese business connections in Singapore. In contrast to previous anti-Japanese activities, the 1928 event was directly backed by Chinese elites through their organizing of and subscribing to nationalist fund-raising campaigns. Although these campaigns did not directly carry out economic boycotts, they mad up the institutional framework to channel and reinforce Chinese discontent against the Japanese.

Why were Singapore Chinese provoked so profoundly by the distant affairs of China? Why did anti-Japanese boycotts accelerate from the late 1920s onward? Why did Chinese business elites respond enthusiastically to the nationalist events? To answer these questions, the rest of this paper will center on two recurring themes. First, rhetoric of Chinese nationalism strategically boosted some Chinese businesses, although at the same time damaging other Chinese

4 Japan's exports to British Malaya from May through August 1927 as well as the amounts for the same period in 1928 are as follows: May 1927 $ 2,782,293 Straits Dollars, May 1928 $ 2,254,738 June $ 2,626,516 June $ 1,148,154 July $ 2,773,540 July $ 443,490 August $ 2,521,169 August $ 501,852

These figures are based on surveys conducted by the ad hoc organization of Japan's business expansion in Singapore, the Japanese Commercial Museum of Singapore. This institute was founded in 1918, managed under the Singapore Branch of the South Seas Association (the Nanyô Kyokai). The South Seas Association was the most critical intelligence institute erected for Japan's business expansion in Southeast Asia. It was financially supported by the Office of the Government-General, Taiwan, and the Department of Commerce and Industry of Japan (based on my survey of the monthly reports of the South Seas Association, the Nanyô Kyokai Zashi [NKZ], 1915-1942. The figures above are cited from NKZ: V. 15, N. 7: 41-42. For an introduction to Japan's intelligence works in Southeast Asia, see Chong (1998; 1999).


businesses. Second, divergent positions toward Chinese anti-Japanese activities were, to a certain extent, attributable to Chinese sub-ethnic cleavages. These sub-ethnic cleavages, characteristic of trans-national Chinese business networks, evolved during China’s long-term maritime activities between the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries.

The concept of ‘sub-ethnic economic nationalism’ set forth in my conclusion emerges from revisiting the previous literature on Singapore Chinese nationalism as well as my interpretations of nationalist activities during the inter-war period. The economically motivated nationalist appeals shaped the patterns of nationalist activities, taking the form of economic boycotts. These boycotts involved not only Chinese against the foreign business competitors but also conflicts among Chinese sub-ethnic business networks. The overlap between Chinese sub-ethnic cleavages and conflicting positions toward Chinese-led anti-Japanese boycotts is explained by the diverse Chinese sub-ethnic business networks that emerged over a long historical perspective.

Rationale of Chinese Nationalist Activities in Singapore

Ardent supporters of Chinese nationalist activities in early twentieth-century Singapore have caught the attention of scholars on pre-war Southeast Asian Chinese societies. The correspondence between the surges of Chinese nationalist sentiment in mainland China and those in Singapore suggests that Singapore Chinese nationalist activities were ‘implanted’ by mainland intellectuals and partisans (Yen 1976; 1986; 1989; Wang 1976; Yong 1987; Yong and McKennon 1990). But compared with the overall nationalist development in China, one may well query why Singapore was free from significant anti-British strikes during the inter-war period.5 Nationalist calls and Chinese partisans obviously carried much weight with Singapore Chinese, but the latter had their own rationale for subscribing to Chinese nationalist movements. This rationale is revealed by an analysis of the leadership structure of dominant Chinese nationalist activities.

Most leaders of well-accepted Chinese nationalist activities in Singapore from the late 1920s had close ties with either the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce (SCCC), the Chinese Advisory Board (CAB), or both. The SCCC was an association that mediated local business affairs and labor disputes, as well as channeling grievances to either the local British regime or the Chinese government and other Chinese chambers afar (Liu 2000). The SCCC officers were considered as both leaders in Singapore Chinese communities and important consultants to the British Straits Settlements regime that then governed Singapore, Penang and Malacca. As consultants, they were appoint-ed by the British regime to the CAB, an institution set up by the Chinese 5 For example, during the mid-1920s, overall anti-British riots and boycotts took place in Central and South China. The strikes later triggered to a ten-month strike in the Guangzhou-Hong Kong area (with Hong Kong as the primary target), but no related event followed in Singapore. This contrast was firstly noted by Ku Hung-ting (1994), but Ku does not speculate on why there was a difference. On anti-foreign strikes in inter-war China, see Remer (1933) and Chesneaux (1968).


Protectorate for British ‘indirect rule’ of the Chinese communities. Figure 1 shows that chairs and vice-chairs of the SCCC were mostly members of the CAB. And the SCCC chairmanship in the 1930s all subscribed to Chinese nationalist campaigns.

Figure 1: The SCCC Chairmanship, 1911-1940, and their Other Communal Services

Chair-persons The SCCC Other Communal Services NAME1 Years of

Birth and Death2

Sub-ethnic Background2

Note: Profession2 Serving Presidency in SCCC1

Serving Vice-presidency in SCCC1

Appointment of the CAB between 1921 and 19403

Office-bearers in Nationalist Campaigns in 1928, 1932 or 19374

Liau Chia Heng [Liao Zhengxing]

1874-1934 China-born Teochew

Import-export trade (Western piece-goods)

1911, 1912, 1914

1910, 1913 1921-34 N

Lim Peng Siang [Lin Bingxiang]

1872-1948 Straits-born Hokkien

Banking, shipping, parboiled rice, oil mill, cement, coconut business

1913, 1915, 1916

1914 1921-41 N

Tan Teck Joon [Chen Derun]


Import-export trade (Western piece-goods and Siam-ese goods), banker (Four Seas Bank)

1917 1915, 1916 - N

Tan Sian Cheng [Chen Xianzhong]

?-1937 China-born Hokkien

Banking business - 1912, 1917, 1918

1921-37 N

Tan Jiak Ngoh [Chen Ruoyu]


Garment store, Siamese rice trade and bank.

1918 1919 - N

See Tiong Wah [Xue Zhonghua]

1886-? Straits-born Hokkien

Banker (Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank)

1919, 1920, 1923-1924

- 1921-41 N

Tan Keng Tong [Cheng Jing Tang]


Pepper and gam-bier, harbour dredg-ing (in Johore)

- 1920, 1923-24

- N

Lim Nee Soon [Lin Yishun]

1879-1936 Straits-born Teochew

Rubber, pineapple, banking, insurance and general commission business

1921-22, 1925-1926

- - N

Lim Chwee Chian [Lim Twe Chian]

1864-1923 China-born Hokkien

Shipping, mining and plantation

- 1921-22 1921-23 N

See Boon Ih [Shi Wu Yuan]

N/A Hokkien Rubber and banking business

1927-28 1925-26, 1929-30

1922-33 N

Lee Wee Nam [Li Wei Nam]


Banker, import-export trade

1929-30 1927-28 1930-41 1937

Yeo Chan Boon [Yang Zunwen]


Garment store - 1931-32 - 1932, 1937

Lee Choon Seng [Li Juncheng]

1888-1966 China-born Hokkien

Biscuit, rubber and banking business

1931-32 - - 1932

Lum Boon Thin [Lin Wen Tian]

1873-1943 China-born Cantonese (Siyi)

Pawnshop owner, hospital manager

1933-34 1935-36, 1939-40

1931-41 1937


Lim Keng Lian [Lin Qingnian]

N/A China-born Hokkien

Tea trade, rubber plantation, GMD member, graduate from the Beijing University.

1935-36 1937-38 1933-35, 1939-41

1937

Tan Chin Hian [Chen Zhenxian]

1893-? China-born Teochew

Banker (the Four Seas Bank)

1937-38 - 1937-39 1937

Lee Kong Chian [Li Guangqian]

1893-? China-born Hokkien

Manufacturer (rubber, pineapple), printing business, banker

1939-40 - 1935-1941 1937

Sources: 1 List of Chairmanship of the SCCC: Souvenir Issue of the Opening Ceremony of the Newly Completed Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce Building, 1964; Yao Nan et al. 1940: 933-937. 2 Personal backgrounds (ethnic groups and professions) are based on Song ([1923] 1967); Su Xiaoxian (eds.) (1948), Pan (1950), Koh (1965) and Yong (1977). 3 Service in the CAB is based on my documentation of SSGG, 1921: No. 269; 1922, No. 843, p. 703; 1923, No. 164; 1924, No. 207; 1925, No. 234; 1927, p. 194; 1928, No. 517, p. 418; 1929: No. 324, p. 454; 1930: No. 245; 1931, No. 750, p. 727; 1933: No. 1296; 1935: No. 3230; 1939: No. 1899. Please note that the list of the CAB members was no longer released annually after 1932. Only replacement of old members or appointments of new members was posted in the gazettes. 4 Lists of Office-bearers in 1928 campaign is based on NYSB, 19 May 1928; 1932 campaign: NYSB, 25 February 1932; 1937 campaign: Yong (1989: 205).

But Japan's invasions in China did not always motivate Singapore’s Chinese business elite in general, or the SCCC in particular, toward a nationalist move. In the 1919 May Fourth Movement, the first ‘mass movement’ in China as most literature on the event has concluded (see for example, Remer 1933; Chesneaux 1968), Singapore Chinese business elite remained aloof from anti-Japanese riots.

In that event, anti-Japanese strikes in Singapore were sporadic riots referred to by Chinese media as conflicts and misunderstandings between Cantonese and people from Fujian. According to an editorial statement in Lat Pau, a Chinese newspaper, titled ‘Please Do Not Confuse the Cantonese’, what happened then can be summarized as follows: Cantonese attacked rickshaws belonged to people from Fujian for revenge because Cantonese properties had been ruined by Fujian people under the guise of anti-Japanese boycotts. But in fact, those who attacked the Cantonese were Hokkien people from southern Fujian, while those making their livings as rickshaw coolies were Hokchia and Hokchiu people from northern Fujian. Hokkien and Hokchia all came from the same Fujian province in China, but they stood on different social and economic footings in Singapore (LP, 21 June 1919).6 To be sure, how effective the anti-Japanese boycotts were in 1919 is doubtful. Advertisements of Japanese commodities continued posted in the newspapers until 20 June 1919 when sporadic anti-Japanese riots were running high (LP, 20 June 1919).

6 Hokkien held the highest position in Singapore in terms of wealth and power, while Hokchia and Hokchiu were mostly manual laborers. The difference can be explained by the timing of overseas migration. For a study on the Hokchia, Hokchiu, and other Chinese immigrants from northern Fujian, see Warren (1986).


Perhaps provoked by the lukewarm manner of the SCCC, over-enthusiastic nationalists sent bombs packed in biscuit tins to two of its key members to express their discontent. 7 In contrast, leading Chinese elites including the SCCC officers organized a counter-movement to check the surge of anti-Japanese strikes (NKZ, Vol. 5, N. 9: 39-49).

The relationship between the Chinese business elite and Japan remained amicable till the mid-1920s. For example, the SCCC organized a fund-raising campaign, the 1923 Singapore Chinese Relief Fund for Earthquake Victims in Japan, for the victims of the earthquake in Tokyo in September 1923.8 In the following year, the Singapore Japanese Association organized a relief fund committee to assist victims of China's floods (NYSB, 11 September 1924). On 4March 1928, two months before the Jinan Incident, Japanese business groups invited officers of the SCCC along with other Cantonese and Hokkien business people for a banquet (NYSB, 5 March 1927). But the friendship was disrupted by the outbreak of the Jinan Incident on 3 May 1928. Some Chinese guests at the banquet later became organizers of anti-Japanese nationalist campaigns.9

But the 1928 Jinan Incident motivated Singapore’s Chinese elite to take a stern anti-Japanese position. As soon as news of Sino-Japanese military action was confirmed, the Chinese General Consulate in Singapore issued a statement. It reads,

All overseas Chinese should keep calm and be patient. The Chinese government will work for justice. As for economic boycotts, we believe that these are spontaneous, patriotic and peaceful activities. People undertake them out of conscience. But except for economic boycotts, please do not over-react and do not violate law and order (NYSB, 9 May 1928).

This statement legitimized anti-Japanese boycotts while warning against violence. This paved the way for the development of non-violent nationalist activities, such as fund-raising campaigns led by business elite.

The 1928 Shandong Relief Fund became the first and foremost business-led anti-Japanese nationalist campaign. Its primary goal was to collect funds to help Chinese victims of the Sino-Japanese warfare. Fund-raising campaigns later 7 These bombs were addressed to See Tiong Wah (also documented as See Teong Wah and See Tong Wah) (1886-?) and Lim Chwee Chian (1864-1923). See chaired the SCCC during 1919, 1920, 1923, and 1924. Lim became the vice-chair of the SCCC in 1921 and 1922. Based on: Supplement to SSGG 1919, ‘Annual Report on the Straits Settlement Police Force and on the State of Crime for the Year 1919’, Section of ‘Secret Societies, etc’ (p. 14). 8 Major SCCC members in the movement included Liau Chia Heng, president of the SCCC in 1911-12; Lim Peng Siang, president oin 1913, 1915-16; and See Tiong Wah, president in 1919-20, 1923-24 (NYSB, 28 September 1923). 9 Among the SCCC guests in the March banquet, Lim Kim Tian and Wooi Woo Yan later became treasurers of the 1928 Shangdong Relief Fund (NYSB. 26 September 1928, p. 8). Lim was also a committee member of 1932 China Relief Fund, an organization aimed at collecting donations to support Chinese victims of Japan's attacks in Manchuria (starting on September 18, 1931) and Shanghai (28 January 1932) (NYSB, 25 February 1932). See also Figures 1 and 2.


became the standard Chinese business response to the accelerating Sino-Japanese conflict. Another similar organization, the China Relief Fund Committee, was founded after the Manchurian Incident in September 1931 and the Shanghai Incident in January 1932. In addition, the Singapore China Relief Fund Committee was organized after the 1937 Marco Bridge Incident.

Scholars have documented how the 1928 Shandong Relief Fund ‘swept Singapore's Chinese communities like a brush fire’ (Yong 1987: 186; see also Yen 1989). The campaign appealed to all ranks of Chinese people, including shop-owners, teachers, students, cooks, and coolies who donated toward the nationalist cause. Total donations amounted to 134 million Straits Dollars by January 1929 (Yong 1987: 186), of which 104 million Straits Dollars were collected in the first four months of the campaign (NYSB, 26 September 1928).

But the 1928 campaign and similar organizations actually functioned as more than charities. These campaigns also served to organize China-oriented business elite in Singapore, where economic achievements were regarded as crucial to becoming communal leaders.10 And their mobilization led Chinese nationalism to spread to the Chinese communities at large.

The 1928 campaign was composed of the SCCC officers and the ‘millionaire club’ of well-to-do Chinese, the Ee Ho Hean Club.11 Right after the statement of the Chinese Consulate on the Jinan Incident was issued, the Ee Ho Hean Club took the initiative in calling Chinese people to a meeting in the SCCC Office to respond to the ‘national tragedy’ (NYSB, 11 May 1928). It is worth noting that many office-bearers of the 1928 campaign were connected to the 1923 Singapore Chinese Relief Fund for Earthquake Victims in Japan or those who had attended the Japanese banquet a few months ago (see Figure 2).

This campaign was chaired by Tan Kah Kee (1874-1964). Tan’s social influences reached beyond his Hokkien group. He and his inner-circle friends of various sub-ethnic backgrounds were the backbone of the Ee Ho Hean Club and the SCCC experienced a constitutional reform under his guidance at the turn of the 1930s (Yong 1987: 145-7; see also Tan's reform proposal in NYSB, 4 February 1929). Moreover, before turning to the Chinese Communist Party in the early 1940s, Tan's embrace of Chinese nationalism and his commitment to the British status quo accounted for his rise to the leading position in Chinese nationalist activities. Tan was appointed as a Justice of Peace (J. P.) in 1924 (SSGG, 4 June 1924: 953) and from then on he served on the Chinese Advisory Board as a Hokkien representative (SSGG, 1 February 1924: 176).

10 In an immigrant society like Singapore, social hierarchy was based on economic achievement rather than intellectual capability as on the Chinese mainland (Wang 1981: 162; Yen 1986: Ch. 5). 11 For the significance of the Ee Ho Hean Club in Singapore from 1911, see the introduction in Lin Xiaosheng (1986: 79-90).


Figure 2: Major Office-bearers of the 1928 Shandong Relief Fund and their Backgrounds

Major Committee Officers 1

Posts in the SCCC Officers during 1927-28 2

EEH Members 3 Singapore Chinese Relief Fund for the September 1923 Tokyo Earthquake 4

President: Tan Kah Kee

[Chen Jiageng]

-

E

Honorable President

Vice President: Tan Chiew Cha [Chen Qiucuo]

Treasurer

E

Honorable President

Chief-Treasurer: Lee Cheng Tien

[Li Zhendian]

-

E

Honorable President

Treasurer: Chia Thian Hock

[Xie Tianfu]

-

E

-

Treasurer: Lim Kim Tian [Lin Jindian]

-

E

Honorable President

Treasurer: Ng Sing Phang

[Wu Shengpeng]

Treasurer

E

Honorable President

Treasurer: Low Peng Ser

[Liu Bingsi]

-

-

-

Treasurer: Wooi Woo Yan

[Huang Youyuan]

Treasurer

E

Honorable President

Sources: 1 Here I only list the positions of president, vice president and treasurer. The list is based on NYSB, May 19, 1928. 2 Positions in the SCCC during 1927-1928 (the 16th. board), see NYSB, Feb. 5, 1927. 3 Member list of the Ee Ho Hean Club is from Yong (1987: 183). 4 List of the Singapore Chinese Relief Fund for the September 1923 Tokyo Earthquake is cited from NYSB, Sept. 28, 1923.

But British support of Tan was far from unconditional. In November 1931, Tan publicly circulated a brochure attacking Japan's military ambition.12 The Straits Settlements was then under the administration of Sir Cecil Clmenti (1930-34). Due to his experiences while governing Hong Kong during the ten-month anti-British strike in 1925-26, Clementi was sensitive to anything with anti-imperialist rhetoric, even if the concern here was the Japanese imperialism. He con-strained Tan to keep a low political profile. It was then that the Manchurian and Shanghai incidents broke out (Turnbull 1984; Lin 1986: 85-86; Yong 1987: 166-7).

12 The brochure, the Tanaka Memorial, discloses Japan's military plan to advance into north China in 1927. Tan sought to arouse Chinese people to act against the ambitions of Japanese imperialism. He circulated the information in the Nanyang Shangbao (Chinese Commercial Daily), the newspaper founded by Tan Kah Kee (NYSB, 19 November 1931).


With Tan retreating from the front line, the 1932 nationalist campaign was chaired by the president of the SCCC, Lee Choon Seng (1888-1966). Lee was also a GMD (Guomindang; the Chinese Nationalist Party) member. Under his leadership, many influential GMD partisans subscribed to the campaign, including Teo Eng Hock (1871-1958), a pioneering GMD member who had backed Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary campaign before 1911 (Song [1923] 1967: 473; Yong and McKenna 1990: 9-15). Although this campaign was operated by Chinese partisans who were dissatisfied with the British, it received wide support from Singapore Chinese communities. By 10 September 1932, when Singapore had not yet recovered from the economic downturn of the depression, the campaign collected 200 thousand Straits Dollars plus 56,701 Chinese currency (NYSB, 10 September 1932).

For the British, the GMD was a more threatening force than Tan. The success of the 1932 campaign made the British appreciate all the more Tan's non-partisan leadership style. Therefore, they encouraged Tan to lead nationalist activities in response to the accelerating Sino-Japanese conflicts after the 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident (Yong 1987: 189-93; 195-6; 203-5). Under Tan's leadership, the 1937 campaign later developed into a region-wide nationalist organization influencing Chinese in Southeast Asia (Akashi 1970; Leong 1976: Ch. 5; Yong 1987: 189-93; 202-6).

Interplay between Chinese Business and Nationalist Activities

Thus, Tan Kah Kee and Teo Eng Hock can be viewed as two representative fig-ures in the anti-Japanese nationalist campaigns. Before analyzing what motivat-ed Singapore Chinese business elites to join these activities, an outline of Tan and Teo's business activities can illuminate the interplay between Chinese business and nationalist activities during the research period.

Teo and Tan were contemporaries. Their life trajectories followed a similar pattern: both witnessed China's transition from an Empire to a republic in the 1910s, reaped their economic successes in the 1910s and 1920s, liquidated their rubber manufacturing interests in the early 1930s, and from then on retired from the business sphere and turned to become fully committed to China’s affairs. Last but not least, though Tan was a China-born Hokkien and Teo a Straits-born Teochew, their families were connected by marriage: Tan's daughter married a son of Teo's nephew's, Lim Nee Soon (Yong 1987: 111-2).13

Both the Tan Kah Kee & Co. and Teo Eng Hock's People's Rubber Goods Manufactory were successful Chinese-owned manufacturing companies in the 1920s. In the production of rubber shoes for example, it was estimated that Tan's company contributed to 91% local produced shoes, Teo's another 6%.14 13 Lim Nee Soon (1979-1936) was also a notable Chinese businessperson and nationalist who chaired the SCCC during 1921-22 and 1925-26. On Teo and Lim’s family networks and careers, see Song (1967: 34; 516-7; Leung 1994; Yen 1994). 14 The other 3% of rubber shoes manufactured locally came from the Nanyang Manufacturing Company, another Chinese-owned rubber manufacturer. Productivity of local rubber manufacturers is cited from NKZ, V. 19, N. 3: 9-17.


Their success can be understood in terms of their commitment to important technological innovations, unlike most Chinese businesspersons. In 1922, Teo obtained a patent on a rubber vaccination shield (SSGG: Jan. 13, 1922, p. 60, see Plate 1). Two years later, Tan was granted sixteenth years of exclusive rights for his improved methods of manufacturing rubber tires and shoes (SSGG: April 11, 1924; May 17, 1924). Unfortunately, both men’s companies had to be liquidated in 1933 and 1934.

Before closing their businesses, Tan and Teo's rubber shoe companies were regarded as the most formidable competitors with Japanese shoes in the Southeast Asian markets. Rubber shoes were popular commodities for middle and lower-class people in Singapore. Particularly after 1927 when global rubber prices slumped and an ordinance was enacted in Singapore prohibiting people walking barefoot in urban streets. Had people all followed the ordinance, the market might have expanded another 40%.15

But the expanding market might benefit Japanese shoes as well as any others. Market shares of Japanese rubber shoes among all imported shoes in the early 1930s were: 81.3% in 1930, 82.85 in 1931, 60.3% in 1932, 77.63% in 1933 and 78.7% in 1934 (Figure 3). Unfortunately, no statistics are available to compare these Japanese imports with domestic-made Chinese rubber shoes. But Japanese intelligence reports document the retail prices for rubber-soled canvas shoes of different makes. We can therefore gauge the competitive niche of the Japanese product (Figure 4). Shoes of Singapore Chinese manufacturers could not cut their prices as sharply as could the Japanese, whereas according to the report figures rubber shoes made in China and Hong Kong were cheaper. The conventional perspective was that products from mainland China and Hong Kong were not durable as Japanese shoes at the higher price (NKZ, V. 20, N. 4: 37-47).

To be sure, Japanese imports not only dominated the market of rubber shoes in British Malaya. From the late 1920s, Japan replaced the British as the major supplier of textiles. If Japan's growing business power in this region accounted for, at least partially, the acceleration of Chinese-led anti-Japanese nationalist activities, the British transition from a free-trade policy to a colonial preference system after 1932 was another (and more aggressive) strategy to countermand the Japanese imports. The system was aimed at stimulating trade among different British territories. In the trade of rubber-soled canvas shoes for example, new tariffs imposed on the importation of Japanese shoes of 50 cents each pair; but British products were only subject to 10 cents per pair. From 1934, a quota ordinance was enacted to limit textiles imported from non-British countries to British territories including Singapore, with Japan's imports as the primary target of discrimination (Shinya and Guerrero [eds.] 1994; Howe 1996:

15 A survey conducted in the late 1920s suggested that 40% of the population in British Malaya did not have the habit of wearing shoes. Compared to easily broken cloth shoes or expensive rubber shoes, rubber shoes became ordinary people's first pair of footwear (NKZ, V. 17, N. 5: 47-52).


201-231). In this regard, as long as no anti-imperial rhetoric was involved, Chinese-led anti-Japanese boycotts suited the British interests.

Plate 1: Teo Eng Hock's Patent of Rubber Vaccination Shield

Source: SSGG, 13 January 1922, p. 60 (section of Miscellaneous).* *The plate is annotated in the gazette as follows:

‘Notice is hereby given that The PEOPLE'S RUBBER GOODS MANUFACTORY of No. 119, North Bridge Road, Singapore, are the Sole Manufacture of the Rubber Vaccination Shield as shown above this notice and that a patent for same is being applied for. TEO ENG HOCK.’

Chinese business groups in general distanced themselves from direct anti-imperialist rhetoric. What involved in dominant nationalist discourses were commercial advertisements or trademarks colored with nationalist propaganda. For business elites like Tan Kah Kee, to manage a successful enterprise was the same as committing to Chinese nationalist activities. This can be understood by the then popular slogan, ‘save the nation by developing business and industry’ (shi ye jiu guo), the idea being that China's current problems could be overcome by developing ethnic Chinese enterprises. Advertisements of Tan Kah Kee & Co. called for Chinese customers to buy his products in order to save the nation and the national economy (Plate 2).


Figure 3: Market Shares of Rubber Shoes Imported from Japan, Hong Kong, China, America and Britain in British Malaya

Japan Hong Kong China America Britain Total (Straits Dollars)

19271 248,936 (34.51%)*

134,738(18.68%)

90,289(12.52%)

162,440 (22.52%)

54,360 (7.54%)

721,274

19281 318,731 (46.14%)

129,485(18.74%)

61,933(8.96%) 106,949

(15.48%)

27,237

(3.94% )

690,860

19291

282,259 (53.38%) 103,368

(19.55%)

5,603(1.06%) 102,853

(19.45%)

17,163

(3.25%)

528,814

19301 556,018 (81.34%) 92,213

(13.49%)

10,130(1.48%) 8,838

(1.29%)

4,437

(0.65%)

683,558

19312 421,964 (82.84%) 39,518

(7.76%)

25,574(5.02%)

6,552 (1.29%)

2,689

(0.53%)

509,380

19323 235,666 (60.30%) 95,954

(24.55%)

28,440(7.28%)

- 1,124

(0.29%)

390,807

19333 327,650 (77.63%)

- - - - 422,079

19344 649,925 (78.73%)

- - - - 825,481

*Parentheses indicate percentage of the imports in total market shares.

Sources: 1 Data on 1927-1930: compiled from NKZ, V. 18, N. 3, pp. 11-12; 2 1931: compiled from NKZ, V. 19, N. 3:13; 3 1932-1933, from NKZ, V. 20, N. 4: 38-39; 4 1934: NKZ, V. 22, N. 4: 24-25.

Figure 4: Estimation of Retail Prices of Rubber-Soled Canvas Shoes by Production Areas

Singapore China Survey

Year Tan Kah Kee & Co.

People's Rubber Shoes Manufactory

Nanyang Manufacturing Co.

Japan* Hong Kong

19311 95 cents 65 cents 80 cents 63 cents 39 cents N/A 19342 25/50 cents** *** N/A 31 cents 30 cents 23 cents

* Based on the prices of the most popular trademarks: ‘Washington’, ‘Moon & Stars’, ‘3 Heroes’ and ‘B. B. B.’ ** 50 cents for a pair of white shoes; 25 cents for a pair of black or other color shoes. *** The People's Rubber Shoes Co. was out of business by autumn 1933. Sources: 1 Data on 1931: NKZ, V. 17, N. 5: 48-50 2 Data on 1934: NKZ, V. 20, N. 4: 37-47


Plate 2: Advertisement of the Tan Kah Kee & Co.: Woollen Hats But what is ‘national economy’ for a naturalized British subject like Tan who established his fortunes in a British colony? A commercial for his rubber shoes, titled ‘national economy’, illustrated Tan's perspectives explicitly (Plate 3). The dialogue in the advertisement can be translated as follows:

A student asked a teacher, ‘What does national economy mean?’

The teacher replied, ‘National economy means people only purchase products made by their own nation. Are you wearing shoes made by Chinese?’

All students said, ‘Sure! All are products of the Tan Kah Kee & Co.’

The teacher cheerfully said, ‘That is exactly what national economy means. All products of Tan Kah Kee & Co. are national goods.’ (Posted in NYSB 1930)

In Tan's accounts, a Chinese product means a product made by ethnic Chin-ese. To purchase ‘national products’ is to encourage national businesses, which were crucial to prosper and empower China. Tan argued that though his com-pany was founded overseas, all employees were ethnic Chinese.16 In addition,

16 This is supported by official statistics. It documents that Tan Kah Kee & Co. hired 4,088 employees in the beginning of 1929, and all of them were ethnic Chinese (Supplement to SSGG, Friday, 11 July 1930, Annual Report on the Working of the Labor Department for the year 1929, Appendix F).

Source: NYSB, 20 January 1927.


profits of Tan Kah Kee & Co. were contributed to education in China (especially the Amoy University and Jimei School that he founded in 1918 and 1921) (NYSB, 3 November 1927; 21 March 1930; 1 April 1930; 18 August 1930; 6 December 1930).

Plate 3: Advertisement of the Tan Kah Kee & Co.: Rubber Shoes

Source: NYSB, January 1930.

Tan once believed that the Chinese nationalist regime would protect nationalist businesses like his. From the late 1920s, he tried to request tariff deductions for the commodities he exported to China, as its newly achieved tariff autonomy imposed heavy customs on all foreign imports including those made by overseas Chinese. Disappointedly his demands were never approved (NYSB, 7 June 1934).

Tenacious Growth of Chinese Sub-ethnic Conflicts in Nationalist Activities

The above discussion highlights the rapid growth of Japan's business power in the region that underlined the operations of Chinese-led anti-Japanese boycotts. This evidence supports the existing research framing Chinese nationalist activities in inter-war Singapore as ‘economic nationalism’ (for examples, see Akashi 1968; 1970; Ku 1994; Horimoto 1997). But my argument here is: not only Japanese but also some Chinese were targeted in the Chinese ‘economic nationalism’. Whenever anti-Japanese sentiments were stirred, even Chinese merchants handling Japanese stock would be ruined.

Existing studies have concluded that ‘ethnic division of labor’ (in W. G. Skinner's terms) can be used to define the overlap between Chinese sub-ethnic boundaries and economic pursuits in Singapore (and British Malaya in general) (Purcell 1968; Lee 1978; Yen 1986; among others). I further elaborate on how different economic interests led to divergent positions toward Chinese-led anti-Japanese nationalist activities. More concretely, nationalist activities were led


by officers of the SCCC which was dominated by two Chinese sub-ethnic groups (the Hokkien and the Teochew) throughout most of the research period, while targets of these activities were Chinese agents involved in Japanese trade. The latter were mostly Cantonese in the Kôbe-Singapore business networks. In other words, Chinese nationalist activities could be framed, to a certain extent, as conflicts between Cantonese and Hokkien as well as Teochew.

The SCCC and Hokkien-Teochew Dominance

The board of directors of the SCCC was composed of about thirty-two members with each major sub-ethnic group represented on the basis of a quota. 17 Election of the SCCC’s chairperson and vice chairperson was as follows: one position had to be selected from people from the Fujian province and one from the Guangdong province. Geographically speaking, Hokkien (southern Fujian), Hokchia (northern Fujian) and Hakka (western Fujian) could all be considered as candidates for the Fujian representative, while the representative of Guangdong could be selected from Cantonese (the Pearl River Delta), Teochew (the eastern coast of Guangdong), and Hakka (the mountainous northeastern Guangdong). But as a matter of fact, from its establishment in 1906 till 1941, chairmanship of the SCCC was mostly shared by Hokkien (on behalf of the Fujian groups) and Teochew (on behalf of the Guangdong groups). Only one Cantonese broke the pattern (Yao Nan et al. 1940: 933-937; see also sub-ethnic backgrounds of the SCCC’s chairmanship from Figure 1).

The influence of the Hokkien was understandable because they were the largest Chinese sub-ethnic group. But why were the Teochew the other dominant group? To be sure, the Teochew had been the second largest group in the nineteenth century, but after the twentieth century their numbers were less than the Cantonese (Figure 5). The growth of the Cantonese population in Singapore, however, was not reflected in the SCCC. In the 1930s, Teochew's participation in the SCCC was larger than that of the Cantonese (Figure 6).

How do we explain the sustaining Teochew influence in the SCCC vis-à-vis Cantonese in inter-war Singapore? Power structures of Chinese communities in early twentieth-century Singapore can be understood within the framework of Singapore as a British port-city since the nineteenth century. The Hokkiens and Teochews shared the highest level of Singapore’s economy: the Hokkien dominated shipping and finance, and controlled most opium farms and alcoholic sales in the nineteenth century; while the Teochew controlled the pepper and gambier farms (Jackson 1968; Lee 1978; Mak 1981: 41-44; Turnbull 1989). Together these two sectors constituted the British chartered revenue farming

17 Between 1914 and 1930, the board was composed of the following fixed quotas: thirteen Hokkien, five Cantonese, nine Teochew, three Hakka and two Hainanese (compiled from Yao Nan et al. 1940: 934; NYSB: 5 February 1927; 27 February 1929). After the 1930s, quota for each sub-ethnic group was contingent upon the members subscribed to the association. The Hokkiens assumed thirteen to fifteen positions in the board, Teochew eight to nine members, Cantonese one to four and another one or two seats for Hakka. Chinese immigrants from the Yangzi River Delta were first permitted to register for membership in the name of the Sanjiang from 1930. They were arranged for one person in the board (SCCC 1964: 174-176).


system (Trocki 1990). But why did the Hokkiens and Teochews but not others attain these lucrative opportunities in the first place? The nineteenth century differences had to be traced back to the history of China’s long-term migration and sea-borne activities in Southeast Asia.

Figure 5: Population of Major Chinese Sub-ethnic Groups in Singapore

China-born Chinese Census Years

Straits-

born Chinese

Hokkien Teochew Cantonese Hakka Hainanese Chinese Popul-ation Total

18811 25,268 (14%)*

46,476 (27%)

42,132 (24%)

28,231 (16%)

15,891 (9%)

15,591 (9%)

174,327

18911 34,757 (15%)

74,759 (33%)

43,791 (19%)

42,008 (18%)

16,736 (7%)

15,938 (7%)

227,989

19112 43,883 (12%)

94,549 (26%)

37,507 (10%)

48,739 (13%)

12,487 (3%)

10,775 (3%)

369,843

19212 79,686 (16%)

136,823 (27%)

53,428 (11%)

78,959 (16%)

14,572 (3%)

14,547 (3%)

498,547

19313 180,108 (45%)

82,405 (20%)

94,742 (23%)

19,317 (5%)

19,896 (5%)

403,952

* Percentage in the parentheses indicates percentage of the sub-ethnic group in total Chinese population. Sources: 1 Censuses 1881 and 1891: Merewether (1892: Section on Chinese population in Straits Settlements). 2 Censuses 1911 and 1921: Nathan (1922: 77-83). 3 Census 1931: Tufo (1949: 77). Figure 6: Members of the SCCC by Sub-ethnic Groups, 1934, 36, 38, 40

Sub-ethnic Groups 1934 1936 1938 1940 Hokkien 221 362 330 348 Teochew 152 218 202 201 Cantonese 82 97 93 103 Hakka 32 53 35 40 Haianese 12 21 26 23 Sanjiang 13 19 16 24 Commercial Group 14 17 14 22 Others 4 3 3 0 Total 530 790 719 761

Source: Compiled from the SCCC, 1964: 174-177.

When booming economic opportunities were introduced to Malacca, Penang and Singapore by Dutch and British powers in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, not only Chinese from South China but also those Chinese who had settled overseas were attracted. The latter relocated them-selves from the Mekong Delta, Riau, Java or Malacca. These were among the earliest Chinese sea-borne traders active in the intra-Asian trade during the


sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, when Chinese silk was the most sought-after commodity in the world market.

The intra-Asian trade accounted for large-scale Chinese sea borne migration and business practices, navigating junks from either Amoy (the Hokkien dialect-group) or Swatow (a mostly Teochew group). These junks stopped at major Western footholds in maritime Asia, such as Dutch Formosa (in present-day southwestern Taiwan), Dutch Batavia (present-day Jakarta), Spanish Manila, and French Cochin-China to trade Chinese silk for Western and Japanese silver. Later, these trade spots became Chinese settlements overseas (Ts'ao 1972; Ng 1983; Blussé and Gaastra [eds.] 1981; Blusse 1986; Li Tana and Reid [eds.] 1993; Ptak 1999). This is best illustrated by Leonard Blussé in his classical accounts of Dutch Batavia. In his words, between 1619 (the year that Dutch settlement was established) and 1740 (when a large-scale Chinese massacre occurred), Batavia was ‘economically speaking, basically a Chinese colonial town under Dutch protection’ (1988: 74). In addition, from the seventeenth century onward, concomitant with the lifting of the maritime ban, rice trade between Siam (Thailand) and China became another booming industry. It led to the establishment of Sino-Thai communities in the Mekong Delta, with Teochew the primary Chinese immigrants to Thailand (Cushman 1993).

In the nineteenth century, Chinese immigrants assimilated with local people. They were thus designated as ‘Baba’ (for male), ‘Nonya’ (for female) or ‘Malacca Chinese’ in Malaya, ‘mestizos’ in the Philippines and ‘perenaka’ in Java, and ‘Thai-assimilated Chinese’, among others. Collectively, these earlier Chinese immigrants from the sixteenth century forward are framed by W. G. Skinner (in Reid [ed.] 1996) as ‘creolized Chinese’. In general, they formed closer contacts with the British than any other Chinese (Turnbull 1989).

These ‘creolized’ Hokkien and Teochew were crucial to their co-ethnic new immigrants. New immigrants from China looked for assistance or cooperation from people they could trust. And, considering that most Chinese immigrants could only communicate with people who shared the same dialect, Chinese sub-ethnic boundaries were established along dialect ties (Purcell 1948; Lee 1978; Yen 1986). Once group boundaries were demarcated, each group was organized to secure their economic interests and to protect them from the encroachment of the others (Mak 1981). Under these circumstances, Hokkien and Teochew immigrants from China had the greatest opportunities to ‘step out’. Not only because they came in greater numbers, but also because they could easily plug into the business and social networks established by their co-dialect pioneers. Though boundaries between ‘creolized’ and new arrivals existed, mutual marriages between these two groups reduced differences: in Song Ong Siang's (1967) One Hundred Years’ History of the Chinese in Singapore, one finds that it was common practice for a Hokkien or Teochew immigrant to marry one or mare ‘creolized’ Chinese women.

However, when China-born immigrants rose to power, they in turn pressured ‘creolized’ Chinese to re-sinify’. From the mid-nineteenth century, many Malay-assimilated ‘creolized’ Hokkien associated themselves with China-born Hokkien,


for example by donating to a Hokkien temple of their traditional faith. This was considered a strategy to cultivate ‘trust’ for business purposes (Lee 1978: 45-47). Finally, after the 1921 census, Straits-born Chinese were classified as their China-born counterparts in the same ‘Hokkien’ category (PuruShotam 1998: 71).

On the other hand, Teochew who had settled earlier were challenged by China-born Teochew in the early twentieth century. It can be seen in the replacement of the Seah family in the Ngee Ann Kongsi by other China-oriented Teochew as leaders of the Singapore Teochew community. In 1845, the Ngee Ann Kongsi was founded by China-born Teochew Seah Eu Chin (1805-1883), who was regarded as a pro-British Teochew due to his fine British connections and his marriage ties with a ‘creolized’ Chinese family. The Seah family dominated the association till the 1930s, when a group of China-oriented Teochew (most also officers of the SCCC) forced it to reorganize as a corporation subject to public monitoring (SSGG, Sept. 23, 1932 [No. 1800 of 1932]; Song 1967: 50-51; Pan 1950: 46; Leung 1994: 828-30; Yen 1994: 687-688; Zhou 1995).

Although the golden age of both the Teochew’s pepper and gambier economy and the Hokkien’s opium trade ended in the early twentieth century, their broad power base facilitated the extension of their economic and social influence to another phase. The Hokkiens reaped the most profits from the early twentieth-century rubber boom of any other Chinese sub-ethnic group while the Teochew group sustained their economic influences on import and export trade between China and Southeast Asia (Pan 1950; Skinner 1957: 315-7; Cheng 1972; Brown 1994; Chen Shuzen 1994; Cui 1994: 653-654).

Cantonese Middlemen Trade

Why, then, did the Cantonese become targets of the Chinese-led anti-Japanese strikes? In Singapore, most Chinese agents importing Japanese goods were Cantonese. These Cantonese merchants were part and parcel of the trans-national Cantonese business networks in maritime Asia. Though pioneering Cantonese immigrants had conducted tin mining and other labor-intensive pursuits in the Malay Peninsula from the eighteenth century, they did not obtain a sufficiently formidable power to attract British regime cooperation (Yen 1986: 42-43; 121-22; 200-2). Development of the Cantonese community in Singapore hinged upon support and connections from the outside.

From the mid-nineteenth century, in view of growing Cantonese collie immigrants overseas, trade agents based in Guangzhou started to set up branch offices in Hong Kong, Singapore and other major ports-of-call in Southeast Asia. Because most Chinese coolies were shipped from Guangdong (home region of the Cantonese), a new market for Cantonese-flavored goods and services was created overseas (XG 1953: 2). In addition, Cantonese business networks also developed into trans-national ‘middlemen’, the kind of international business that the Cantonese were noted for. In his study on China's rapid commercialization in the late nineteenth century, Hao Yen-p'ing points out that Cantonese ‘middlemen’ (‘compradors’ in his terms) spread their influence to Japan, Cochin China (present-day Vietnam), Bangkok, Rangoon,


Penang, Malacca, Singapore, Java and Manila (Hao 1970: 55). Under these circumstances, the Cantonese community rose to become the second largest sub-ethnic group in Singapore in the early twentieth century.

Development of Cantonese business networks in Singapore, the most important distribution center in Southeast Asia, can be attributed to Japan's industrialization beginning in the 1880s. The booming Japanese manufactures needed to develop overseas outlets. But Japan did not have the required trade skills and personnel to carry out overseas trade, as it had not yet recovered from its seclusion policy (1653-1857). In contrast, long-distance credit system had long been established among Chinese merchants. In conjunction with the development of Japan’s steamship transportation, a long-distance trade network linking up Japan, China and Southeast Asia was developed. In the 1880s, Cantonese in Kôbe dominated most of Japan's foreign trade (Yamaoka 1995: 20-22; Nagotani 2000: 70) while Singapore became the most important distribution center of Japanese goods in Southeast Asia (Post 1995; Horimoto 1997: Ch. 10; Shimizu and Hirakawa 1999: Ch. 3). According to a survey by the Japanese Commercial Museum, an intelligence arm of the Japanese state-sponsored Nanyô Kyokai (the South Seas Association) on High Street in Singapore where major dealers of Japanese goods concentrated, all Chinese agents were Cantonese except for one Hakka (NKZ, V. 26, N. 12: 127).

Significance of the Chinese/Cantonese agents in the trans-national Japan-Singapore trade can be gauged quantitatively: In 1914, on the eve of Japan's systematic business expansion in Southeast Asia, Chinese trade agents controlled 72% percent of the export of Japan's textiles to Southeast Asia, 97.6% of marine products and 34.6% of clothes (Post 1995: 162). Even though, until the 1930s, Japan tried to establish a ‘direct selling system’ to bypass these Cantonese middlemen, the Kôbe-Singapore Cantonese networks were nonetheless responsible for 30.6% of the importation of Japan's rubber shoes in 1931 (NKZ, V 18 N3: 26-8) and 33.3% of Japan's cotton piece-goods in 1934 (compiled from NKZ, V. 20, N. 8: 95).

Because of their business connections, these Cantonese merchants became targets of anti-Japanese nationalist activities operated by their Chinese counterparts. From the 1928 Jinan Incident, strikes against Japanese-associated merchants ‘upgraded’ into other systematic measures. According to Japanese intelligence reports, if a Chinese shop was found to be trading Japanese goods during the Sino-Japanese warfare, overzealous nationalists would charge the owner fines and for an apology. If the owner continued conducting the trade, the store would be destroyed. If none of the above threats could stop the business, the owner would be physically abused, having his/her ears cut off, or even murdered (NKZ, V. 23, No. 10: 113; No, 11: 105-7; NKZ, V. 24, N. 1: 108-116).

Finally, the outbreak of the 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident seemed to be the last straw for these merchants. Importation of Japanese cotton piece-goods in 1938 and 1939 fell to circa 50% of their assigned quotas (Figure 7). This indicates the ‘economic effectiveness’ of anti-Japanese boycotts.


Figure 7: Importation of Cotton Piece-Goods from China and Japan, Compared with Quotas

Clothes (made of Cotton or

Artificial Silk)

Cotton Underwear

Artificial-silk Underwear

Total From

Year

Quota Imports Quota Imports Quota Imports Quota Imports

Mid-1938

10,593 3,704

(35%)*381,845 209,869

(55%)28,102 15377

(55%)

420,540 228,950

(54%)

Japan

Mid-1939

10,593 5,617

(53%)381,845 200,809

(53%)28,102 19,276

(69%)

420,540 225,702

(54%)

Mid-1938

3,529 3,218

(91%)106,370 91,927

(86%)1,556 1,378

(89%)

111,455 96,523

(87%)

China

Mid-1939

3,529 3,140

(89%)106,370 101,068

(95%)1,556 1,348

(87%)

111,455 105,556

(95%)

Unit: Dozen * Parentheses indicate percentage of quota that was actually utilized. Source: Compiled from NKZ, V. 27, N. 4: 60-63.

Conclusion: ‘Sub-ethnic Economic Nationalism’

By the late 1930s, when the Marco Polo Bridge Incident broke out, Chinese nationalist sentiments had been mobilized to a fervent scale far greater than ever before. But Singapore Chinese communities did not unify under the nationalist cause.

The tenacious growth of Chinese sub-ethnic cleavages once puzzled scholars studying the development of Singapore Chinese nationalism. This puzzle is best framed by Wang Gungwu's citation of Tan Kah Kee’s comments at that critical moment, ‘As for the word 'unity', all the organizations of the overseas Chinese are mainly united in form only. Where substance is concerned, there is really very little worth talking about.... [They] talk emptily of unity when still like scattered sand...’ (Wang 1976: 46).18

Development of Chinese nationalist activities in inter-war Singapore, as well as the limitations of these movements, has been attributed to the ‘implantation’ of Chinese nationalism and political organs from mainland China (Wang 1976; Yen 1976; 1989; Yong and McKennon 1990). This paper, however, emphasizes local economic motivations (business competition between the Chinese and the Japanese in particular) that were underlying these activities. By analyzing the processes and confrontations during these nationalist upheavals, I point out that the cleavages within the Chinese communities could be delineated along sub- 18 The phase ‘scattered sand’ was originally coined by Dr. Sun Yat-sen to refer the lack of solidarity among Chinese.


ethnic lines. The various trans-national sub-ethnic business networks, which constituted the ‘substance’ of Singapore Chinese communities, were ‘scattered sand’ in view of Chinese nationalist leader however. It can therefore conclude that local economic interests, while motivating some Chinese business elite to subscribe to nationalist campaigns, constrained these activities to reach to all Chinese communities. Chinese-led anti-Japanese activities targeted their Chinese counterparts who were trading with the Japanese.

In sum, Chinese sub-ethnic ties, albeit transformed and challenged through time, were where the strength of Chinese business power lay, and the nascent Chinese nationalism could not override them. It was these trans-national sub-ethnic business networks that constituted the ‘substance’ of Singapore Chinese communities, and accounted for the metaphor of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s ‘scattered sand’.


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