Worms – Code Red

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Worms – Code Red BD 480 This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by David Moore, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen C. Hayne

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Worms – Code Red. BD 480 This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by David Moore, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis. I have edited and added material. Dr. Stephen C. Hayne. Who gets Internet worms?. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Transcript of Worms – Code Red

Page 1: Worms – Code Red

Worms – Code Red

BD 480This presentation is an amalgam of presentations by

David Moore, Randy Marchany and Ed Skoudis.I have edited and added material.

Dr. Stephen C. Hayne

Page 2: Worms – Code Red

Who gets Internet worms?

Big question: who gets code red? Big companies? Home users? Web servers? People who know they aren’t running IIS?

Host infection plots show some slight diurnal behavior ==> people turning off their “web servers”

Looking deeper shows extreme diurnal behavior, masked in simple plots (1/3 to 1/2 machines turned on/off daily)

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What is the Code-Red worm?

Malicious program that connects to other machines and replicates itself

Exploits a vulnerability in Microsoft IIS Days 1-19 of each month

displays ‘hacked by Chinese’ message on English language servers

tries to open connections to infect 100 other randomly chosen machines

Day 20-27 launches a denial-of-service attack on the IP

address of www1.whitehouse.gov

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Code-Red Detection Data collected from a /8 network at

UCSD and two /16 networks at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratories (LBL)

1/256th of total address space monitored

Machines sending TCP SYN packets to port 80 of nonexistent hosts considered infected

Data spans 24-hour period from midnight UTC July 19th - midnight UTC July 20th

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Host Infection Rate 359,104 hosts infected in 24 hour

period Between 11:00 and 16:00 UTC, the

growth is exponential 2,000 hosts infected per minute at the

peak of the infection rate (16:00 UTC)

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Host Infection Rate

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Exponential Infection Rate

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Infection Rate over Time

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Host Deactivation Machines isolated, patched, and

rebooted throughout the day Host considered inactive after we

observe no further unsolicited traffic Because the Code-Red worm is

programmed to stop infecting new hosts at midnight on the 20th of every month, the majority of hosts stopped probing in the last hour before midnight UTC on July 20th

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Host Deactivation

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Host Deactivation Rates over Time

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Host Characterization: Country

The following graph shows the top ten countries of origin for all infected hosts

Surprisingly, Korea is the second most prevalent country, behind countries with more advanced network infrastructure

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Host Characterization:Country of Origin

0

20000

40000

60000

80000

100000

120000

140000

160000

Infected Hosts

USKoreaChinaTaiwanCanadaUKGermanyAustraliaJapanNetherlands

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Conclusions 359,104 hosts infected in less than 14

hours up to 2,000 hosts per minute infected Collateral damage: routers, switches,

printers, and DSL modems crashed, rebooted, or otherwise damaged

Unpatched, insecure machines put everyone at risk

Will we be prepared for the next major exploit?

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Patching Survey

Idea: randomly test subset of previously infected IP addresses to see if they have been patched or are still vulnerable

360,000 IP addresses in pool from initial July 19th infection

10,000 chosen randomly each day and surveyed between 9am and 5pm PDT

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Patching Rate

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Host Infections

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Conclusions

1/3 - 1/2 of hosts are coming and going on a daily cycle

DHCP effect can skew statistics, since the same host can have multiple IP addresses

Even with the “best” possible warning, the majority of IIS patching occurred after the start of the next round of CodeRed