World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013
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Transcript of World Bank Washington, DC, June 6, 2013
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Fiscal Policy, Poverty and Redistribution in Latin America
Nora Lustig Tulane University
Nonresident Fellow CGD and IAD
World BankWashington, DC, June 6, 2013
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Commitment to Equity Assessments (CEQ) for Latin America
• Comprehensive standard fiscal analysis of current systems
• No behavior and no general equilibrium effects• Harmonizes definitions and methodological
approaches to facilitate cross-country comparisons• Uses income per capita as the welfare indicator• Allocators vary => full transparency in the method
used for each category, tax shifting assumptions, etc.• Mainly average incidence; a few cases with marginal
incidence
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• Government transfer or market income?– No agreement in literature for pay as you go
systems• CEQ Benchmark– Contributory pensions are part of market income– Contributions to pensions are not subtracted
• CEQ Sensitivity Analysis– Contributory pensions are a government transfer– Contributions to pensions are subtracted like tax
Contributory Pensions
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Market Income
• In addition to the uncontroversial wages and salaries, income from capital and private transfers (e.g., remittances), it includes:– Auto-consumption (with some exceptions)– Imputed rent for owner’s occupied housing– Contributory pensions from individualized accounts– Benchmark: Contributory pensions from social
security
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Net Market Income• Start with market income• Subtract direct taxes– individual income taxes– corporate taxes (when possible); NOT IN CURRENT VERSIONS– property and other direct taxes (when possible)
• Subtract contributions to social security– Benchmark: contributions going to pensions are NOT
subtracted; all the other contributions are– Sensitivity Analysis: all contributions to social security are
subtracted• If survey reports after tax and cash transfers income, go
backwards to construct net market and market income
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Disposable, Post-fiscal, Final Income
• Disposable income– Add direct transfers– Includes cash transfers and food transfers– Sensitivity analysis: pensions are a direct transfer
• Post-fiscal income– Add indirect subsidies– Subtract indirect taxes
• Final income– Add in-kind transfers from free or subsidized public services in
education, health, housing– Currently, government cost method is used to value these
services
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Scaling Up
• Household surveys understate “true” income–Underreporting– Lack of adequate questions– Society’s richest not captured by survey
• HOWEVER, No scaling up for poverty measures (no corrections for under-reporting)
• Scaling up for inequality and distributional measures to avoid overstating impact of in-kind transfers
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Tax Shifting and Tax Evasion Assumptions
• Burden of direct personal income taxes is borne by the recipient of income
• Burden of payroll and social security taxes falls entirely on workers
• Consumption taxes are assumed to be shifted forward to consumers
• Individuals who do not participate in the contributory social security system assumed not to pay income or payroll taxes
• Depending on the country, purchases in informal sector establishments or in rural areas assumed not to pay consumption taxes
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Valuation of Public Services: Education and Health
• Valuation of public spending on education and health followed is the so-called ‘government cost’ approach.
• Uses per beneficiary input costs obtained from administrative data as the measure of marginal benefits.
• This approach—also known as ‘classic’ or ‘nonbehavioral approach’—amounts to asking the following question: how much would the income of a household have to be increased if it had to pay for the free or subsidized public service at full cost?
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Indicators
• Inequality and poverty• Incidence• Concentration shares and concentration
coefficients• Coverage and leakages of programs• Fiscal mobility National; Rural/urban; By race/ethnic group; and, working on by gender
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Gini Before and After Taxes, Transfers, Subsidies and Free Government Services
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Headcount: Before and After Cash Transfers
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Headcount Ratio Before and After Indirect Taxes
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Incidence of Taxes and Cash TransfersNet Change in Income after Direct and Indirect Taxes and Transfers by Decile
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
BoliviaBrazilMexicoPeruUruguay
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ProgressivityKakwani Index for Taxes: Red= regressive
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ProgressivityConcentration Coefficients for Transfers
Green= progressive in abs terms
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Coverage of Direct Cash Transfers
Bolivia Brazil Peru0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
90.0%
100.0%
87.7%93.3%
57.7%
83.2%
73.1%
41.9%
67.8%
29.2%
15.5%
Poor<2.5 2.5<=Poor<4
Non poor
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Distribution of Direct Cash Transfers(Percent going to poor and nonpoor)
Bolivia Brazil Peru0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
25.2%16.8%
46.9%
12.8%
9.7%
24.0%
62.0%
73.5%
29.1%
Non poor2.5<=Poor<4Poor<2.5
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ImpoverishmentFiscal Mobility Matrix for Brazil
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Mexico: Conc. Coeff. By Item
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THANK YOU