Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Repor No. 9152

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

ZAMBIA

SOUTHERN PROVINCE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(CREDIT 1193-ZA)

DECEMBER 3, 1990

Agriculture Operations DivisionCountry Department VIAfrica Regional Office

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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CURRENCY EOUIVALENTS

Currency Unit - Zambia Kwachs (ZK)

ZKIUSS1981 0.81982 0.81983 1.21984 1.71985 2.01986 7.51987 8.0

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AFC Agricultural Finance CorporationART Adaptive Research Planning TeamEPADP Eastern Province Agricultural Development ProjectCSRT Commodity and Specialist Research TeawDCA Development Credit AgreementDDP Dairy Development ProjectDOA Department of AgricultureFAO/CP Food and Agriculture Organization/World Bank/

Cooperative ProgramGRZ Government of the Republic of ZambiaIDA International Development AssociationIFAD International Fund for Agricultural DevelopmentMAWD Ministry of Agriculture and Water DevelopmentNAMBOARD National Agricultural Marketing BoardNWADP IFAD-assisted Northwestern Agricultural Development

ProjectPAO Provincial Agricultural OfficerPCR Project Completion ReportPCU Provincial Cooperative UnionsPCW Provincial Commissioner of WaterPPC Provincial Project CoordinatorPPS Provincial Permanent SecretaryPPU Provincial Planning UnitPVO Provincial Veterinary OfficerSAR Staff Appraisal ReportSEC Supervisory and Evaluation CommitteeSMC Subject Matter SpecialistSPADP Southern Provinice Agricultural Development

ProjectSPCMU Southern Province Cooperative Marketing UnionT&V Training and Visit System of ExtensionZADB Zambian Agricultural Development Bank

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 to December 31

FO OFFCL UU£ ONLYTHE WORLD BANK

Washsnton, D.C. 20433U.S.A.

Oe do Ofector.GmwtaOpmtatow, Evaktsitm

December 3, 1990

MEMORANDUI TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Zambia Southern ProvinceAnricultural DeveloDment Proiect (Credit 1193-ZA)

Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled"Project Completion Report on Zambia - Southern Province AgriculturalDevelopment Project (Credit 1193-ZA)" prepared by the Africa RegionalOffice with Part II of the report contributed by the Borrower. No audit ofthis project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at thistime.

Attacbment

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authoriution.

FOR OFmFCIAL USE ONLY

ZAMBIA

SOUTHERN PROVINCE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(Credit 1193-ZA)

PROJECT COMPLETION REPOR

TABLE OF CONIENTS

P-ea

Preface iEvaluation Summary iii

PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE 1Project Identity 1Background 1Project Objectives and Description 2Project Design and Organization 3Project Implementation 4Project Results 5Project Sustainability 6Bank's Performance 7Borrower's Performance 7Lessons Learnt 8Consulting and Contracting Services 8Project Documentation and Data Collection 8

PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE 9Introduction 9Background 9Project Objectives 9Project Design and Organization 10Project Implementation 11Project Results 12Project Sustainability 12Bank's Performance 12Borrower's Performance 13Lessons Learnt 13Statistical Information 13Conclusion 13

PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION 14Table 1: Related Bank Credits/Loans 14Table 2: Project Timetable 14Table 3: Credit Disbursements 14

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance Iof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

Table 4: Project Implementation 15

Table 5: Project Costs, Financing and Allocetion ofCredit Proceeds 16

Table 6: Project Results 17Table 7: Status of Main Covenants 18Table 8: Use of Bank Resources 21

MAPS: IBRD 15604: Project AreaIBRD 15606: Existing and Proposed Agricultural Stations and Camps

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zomI

SOUTHERN PROVINCE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPENRT PROJECT

PROJECT CONPLETION REPORT

PREFACZ

This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Southern ProvincoAgricultural Development Project (SPADP) in Zambia, for which IDA Credit 1193-ZA in the amount of US$18.0 million was approved on December 12, 1981. TheCredit was suspended in May 1987 when Zambia's withdrawal rights were suspendeddue to arrears on Bank loans. At closing, the Credit showed an undisbursedbalance of about US$12.7 million. The last disbursement was made in May 1988.

The Evaluation Summary and Parts I and III of the PCR were preparedby the staff of the Agriculture Operations Division, Southern Africa Department,Africa Regional Office. The PCR is based on a draft PCR prepared by FAO/CP afterexamination of project files, discussions with Bank staff involved in projectappraisal and supervision, consultation in Zambia with Central Government andSouthern Province Authorities and existing project staff. Part II of the PCRwas prepared by the Borrower.

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.ZAM

SOUTHERN PROVInC AMRICULTU AL DEVELOPNT PROJECT

PROJECT COKPLETION REPORT

VALUATIOf SA31RY

Obiectives

1. The project objectives were to increase crop and livestock production andthus raise farm incomes within the traditional farm sector in the SouthernProvince. This was to be achieved through improving extension services alongthe T&V system and providing greater access to credit; expanding input and cropstorage facilities; and upgrading veterina%7 services to control livestockdiseases. The project also aimed at strengtze-ning the planning and projectimplementation capability of the Provincial PlannLng Unit (PPU) through technicalassistance. The project objectives were sound, given the low productivity insmallholder agriculture in the province and the Government policy to decentralizeagricultural planning and project implementation functions to the provinces.

Implementation Exierience

2. Implementation progress was very slow throughout the project period. At.he closing date, only about 29Z of the IDA funds had been disbursed. Severalproblems contributed to the overall poor implementation of the project: toofrequent changes in key local staff assigned to the project underminedappreciation of project objectives; difficulties in providing start-up localfunds, with a consequent inability to establish a project account, delayedproject effectiveness for seven months; problems in the appointment of key localstaff, which were only alleviated through technical assistance financed by FAOunder trust funds, hampered initiation of various project's activities; and lackof incentives for local project staff contributed to low morale and motivation.Total actual project costs were about 'JS$6.9 million compared to Appraisalestimate of US$23.8 million. The shortfall in actual costs was due to the factthat project's physical inputs fell far short of SAR targets.

3. Implementation of the extension comonent was considerably limited byseveral factors: a severe drought faced by the country during the first threeyears of the project; inadequate budgetary allocations for the local counterpartfunds relative to requirements; cumbersome and bureaucratic procurementprocedures; poor selection and supervision of contractors, thus slowing progressin the construction of staff houses, agricultural stations and camps; lack ofeffective linkages between extension and research services which reduced theimpact of extension staff; and a demoralizing rivalry between the PPU and theoffice of the Provincial Agricultural Officer (PAO) which resulted in poorimplementation of the T&V system. For the livestock component, formation of user

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committees and introduction of user charges, which were conditions ofdisbursement for the renovationiconstruction of dip tanks, were not fulfilleduntil the last year of the project, resulting is poor operation and maintenanceof the available dip tanks. Construction of storaae facilities wassatisfactorily carried out but utilization of the facilities was hamperedthroughout the project period by lack of a clear delineation of marketing andstorage responsibilities between the National Agricultural Marketing Board(NAMBOARD) and Southern Province Cooperative Marketing Union (SPCMU). The creditfunds of about US$ 0.4 million channelled through Zambia Agricultural DevelopmentBank (ZADB) were utilized but none of the US$2.7 million earmarked for credit-in-kind through SPCMU was utilized as other national and bilateral funds wereavailable.

Results

4. Overall, the project achieved little relative to its objectives. The onlymajor components that met their targets were technical assistance, andconstruction of storage facilities and livestock crush pens (Table 6, A.). Anawareness of the T&V system of extension services was developed, butimplementation of the system was minimal due to various problems (para 1.12).Civil work; related to the construction of extension staff houses, agriculturalstations and camps fell far short of the appraisal targets (Table 6, A).Although the storage component met its targets, utilization was limited byadministrative difficulties (para 1.14). Most of the funds intended for creditto farmers remained unutilized (para 1.15). While notable success was achievedin controlling livestock diseases unrelated to ticks, the achievements werenegated by outbreak of tick-borne diseases due to poor dipping facilities (para1. 18). With exception of strengthening of PPU's capability, the project achievedlittle regarding institution-building objectives (para 1.19). Although lack ofdata prevents quantitative assessment of the project's impact on production,indications suggest that it had negligible impact and that rates of return arelikely to be substantially below appraisal estimates due to poor performance ofthe extension and credit components, with minimal effect on crop production;under-utilization of storage facilities; and outbreak of tick-borne diseases(para 1.20).

Sustainability

5. The project is not sustainable. Extension services based on the T&V systemcalls for high levels of recurrent expenditures which Zambia will find difficultto sustain because of budgetary constraints. Although the recent establishmentof user committees and introduction of user charges will help to improveoperation and maintenance of dipping facilities for livestock, availability ofveterinarian drugs and dipping chemicals will continue to be limitad by foreignexchange constraint. The amount of funds provided by the project for credit tofarmers is likely to be increasingly eroded by high inflation and low repaymentrate. The storage component involves relatively simple structures which arereadily sustainable. Achievements in strengthening the capability of PPU willbe difficult to sustain in view of the country-wide shortage of qualifiedmanpower and frequent transfer of civil servants.

Findinas and Lessons Learnt

6. The main lessons that can be learnt from the implementation of this projectare detailed in paras 1.26 and 1.27. The lessons suggest thats (a) T&V systemshould be modified to reflect conditions and constraints specific to the country;(b) it is important to ensure effective linkages between extension and researchservices; (c) project design needs to allow a realistic implementation period;(d) implementation responsibility and authority over project resources shouldbe properly matched; and (e) care should be taken in the selection of technicalassistance personnel and such personnel shnuld be placed preferably in anadvisory capacity rather than in line positions.

1

SOUTHERN AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(Credit 1193-ZA)

PROJECT COMPLETIOg REPORT

PART Is PROJECT REVIZW amOK ,AN' PECsPECTIVE

Project Identity

1.1 Name I Southern Province Agricultural DevelopmentCredit No. 1193-ZARVP Africa RegionCountry t Republic of ZambiaSector Agriculture

Background

1.2 Zambia, a l-andlocked country covering some 760,000 sq. km, has apopulation of about 7 million which is growing at 3.41 per annum. Some 401 ofthe population lives in urban areas. The economy is heavily dependen'- )ncopper which, with other minerals, accounts for about 951 of the country'sexports. Since 1975, the economy has been steadily worsening, with seriousfiscal and balance of payments problems. Shortage of foreign exchangeresources and budgetary constraints have led to increasing delays inimplementation of projects and a deterioration of basic infrastructurethroughout the country.

1.3 As copper deposits are expected to be exhausted over the next 15-20 years, the Government's policy is to diversify the economy. To this end,the agricultural sector, with its vast unexploited resources, offers the bestpotential. The sector provides a living for about 601 of the population,employs 671 of the labor force but contributes only 171 of GDP. It ismarkedly dualistic with a small modern subsector of about 800 farmers, and atraditional subsector, comprising 600,000 subsistence-oriented farmhouseholds. During the 1980s, agriculture grew at about 2.81 per annum, whichis considerably less than the population growth rate, and self-sufficiency instaple food grains declined to 851 from 971 in the 1960s. The SouthernProvince is an area of high potential, with 351 of the marketed maize surplusand over 40Z of the national cattle herd.

1.4 In recognition of the fact that agriculture has to replace miningas the lead sector in the economy, the Government at the turn of the decadeinitiated four projects, supported by the Bank and other donors, to increaseagr.cultural growth through improved support services to traditional farmers.The Southern Province Agricultural Development Project (SPADP) was the second

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of four projects, all ongoing more or less simultaneoualy. The first was theEastern Province Agricultural Development Project (EPADP) in 1981, and thethird was the IFAD-assisted Northwestern Agricultural Development Project(NWADP) in 1983. The fourth project was the Bank-supported Dairy DevelopmentProject (DDP) which sought to expand milk output and sales in the Southern andCentral Provinces.

1.5 The project which is the subject of this completion report wasidentified by the Bank in September/October 1978. Project preparation workwas initiated by FAO/CP in July 1979 and, after basic data had been assmbledby the Planning Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development(MAWD), preparation was completed by PAO/CP in August 1980. Appraisal warcarried out by the Bank in November 1980. The project was to be implementedover a period of five years, 1982-83-1986/87, at an estimated cost of US$23.8million. IDA var to finance US$18.0 million or 76Z of the total costs andthe borrower US$5.8 million or 24Z of the total costs.

1.6 The Government wanted the project to be extended for a furtherperiod of three years. The suspension of Zambia's withdrawal rights since May1987 precluded extension of the project period.

Prolect Obiectives and Descrittion

1.7 Proiect Obiectives: The project aimed at IvTcreasing crop andlivestock production and raising farm incomes within the traditionalagricultural sector in the Southern Province. The project sought to achievethese objectives mainly through reorganizing extension services along the T&Vsystem together with improving transport and field facilities, upgradingveterinary services, constructing crop and inputs storage, and providingcredit to farmers. It also aimed at strengthening the planning and projectimplementation capability of the Southern Province secretariat.

1.8 Project Description: The project provided funds for:

a) improving extension services through: technicalassistance to reorganize extension services along theT&V system; recruitment of 48 incremental extensionstaff; constructicn of two new agricultural stations,48 agricultural extension camps, and 30 new staffhouses; renovation of 127 staff houses; procurement of24 four-WD vehicles, 62 motorcycles, and 2 mobile vansfor home economics; and a training program for allextension staff.

b) upgrading veterinary services through:construction/renovation of 80 crush pens and 50 cattledip tanks; procurement of supplies forvaccination/immunization campaigns; and tsetse controlin the Gwembe Valley.

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c) constructing 36,000-ton capacity of storage facilitiesfor crops and inputs, and procuring handlingequipment;

d) providing credit for inputs-in-kind, totalling US$2.7million through the Southern Province CooperativeMarketing Union (SPCMU) for its members; andincremental seasonal credit, totalling US$375,000through ZADB, for non-SPCHU members; and

e) providing technical assistance for strengthening theplanning and project implementation capability of theProvincial Planning Unit (PPU).

Proiect Desian and Oreanization

1.9 In view of its provincial focus, the project was designed as anarea-based operation. The selection of the project components Wasappropriate, given the constraints facing smallholders in the province. Thedesign, however, suffered from several flaws. First, experience shows that,to achieve sustainable results, a project of this nature needs a much longerimplementation period than the five years envisaged at appraisal. Second, noprovision was made for linkages between extension and research services, thusweakening the effectiveness of the extension staff. Third, no account wastaken of credit funds available from other sources through SPCMU. As aresult, project's credit funds through SPCMU were never used since SPCMU wasable to meet credit demand among its members from funds made available bynational a.d bilateral sources at more favorable terms compared to theproject's credit funds. Fourth, no provisions were made for short-termfellowship which proved necessary and had to be provided later in the projectperiod.

1.10 The project organizational arrangements placed tle overallimplementation responsibility under the office of the Provincial PermanentSecretary (PPS). These arrangements were appropriate at the t'ma ofappraisal, given the Government policy to decentralize planning and projectimplementation functions from the central agencies in Lusaka to the provincialoffices. However, the arrangements created implementation difficultiesarising from separation of responsibility and authority over projectactivities. Whereas the provincial office was held responsible for projectimplementation, project's operation staff remained answerable to theirrespective headquarters in Lusaka. The project depended critically ontechnical support from the headquarter of Ministry of Agriculture and WaterDevelopment (MAWD). The fact that MAWD was not accountable for implementationfunctions led to low interest on the part of MAWD in the project asexemplified by the fact that MAWD never carried out the required monitoringand evaluation work. However, it is also true that, with four ongoingprojects (para 1.4), MAWD was overwhelmed by new responsibilities which madeit difficult to direct enough attention to all of them. Anotherorganizational feature that adversely affected project implementation isthat the project center, where all the agricultural staff were located, issome 200 km from tne provincial office. Moreover, because of the multiple

4

duties of the PPS and the constantly changing of the office-holder (fourseparate holders of the post during implementation), a management vacuum wascreated. This vacuum was filled by technical assistance personnel vito, whilewell qualified in their own professions, had little skills in management.

Proiect Implementation

1.11 General: Implementation progress was very ̂ low throughout theproject period. At the closing date, only about 29% ot the IDA funds had beendisbursed. In addition to the design and organizational deficienciesindicated in paras 1.9 and 1.10 above, several other problems generallycontributed to the poor implementation progress. Too frequent changes in keylocal staff assigned to the project undermined appreciation of projectobjectives. Difficulties in making provision for start-up local funds, with aconsequent inability to establish a project account, delayed projecteffectiveness for seven months. Problems were encountered over theappointment of key local staff and these problems were only alleviated throughtechnical assistance financed by FAO under a trust fund arrangement. Lack ofincentives for national project staff contributed to low staff morale andmotivation. Total actual project costs were about US$ 6.9 million compared toappraisal estimate of US$ 23.8 million. The decline in actual costs was dueto the fact that, except for the technical assistance and storage components,the project's physical inputs (including credit through SPCMU) fell far shortof t\9 appraisal targets. Also, devaluation of the kwacha reduced local costsin terms of foreign exchange.

1.12 Extension: Notable achievements were made in creating awarenessof the T&V system. However, implementation was considerably limited byseveral factors. The country experienced a severe drought during the firstthree years of the project. Budgetary allocations for the local counterpartfunds were always much less than the amounts needed to ensure proper vehicleoperation and maintenance and to cover the required field travel allowances.Cumbersome and bureaucratic procurement procedures made it impossible toprovide extension staff with the required vehicles for the first three years.Inability of the office of the Provincial Commissioner of Works (PCW) toensure proper selection and supervision of contractors contributed to slowprogress in the construction of staff houses, agricultural stations and camps(Table 6, A). Contractors were often selected with little regard to theircapability to carry out the expected civil works. As noted above, lack ofeffective linkages between extension and research services reduced the impactof extension staff. A further contributing factor to the poor implementationof the T&V system was a demoralizing rivalry between the PPU and the office ofthe Provincial Agricultural Officer (PAO).

1.13 Livestock Development: Formation of user committees andintroduction of user charges, which were conditions of disbursement for therenovLtion/construction of dip tanks, were not fulfilled until the last yearof the project. This resulted in poor operation and maintenance of theavailable dip tanks. Upgrading of veterinary stations and construction of diptanks were far below the appraisal targets (Table 6, A). Because of the abovefactors, coupled with inadequate budgetary funds, the livestock componentsuffered rrom cumulative deterioration of the physical dipping facilities and

5

lack of dipping chemicals. The project, therefore, was unable to help incontrolling outbreak of tick-borne diseases.

1.14 Storage Comnonent: Construction of storage facilities wassatisfactorily carried out. One of the main reasons for the success in thisregard is that implementation of this component fell entirely under SPCMU andwas thus not hampered by the cumbersome process that apply for civil worksprocured through the Provincial Tender Board. The other reason is that thevolume of work was large enough to attract large and well equipped contractorsbased in Lusaka. However, utilization of the facilities was hamperedthroughout the project period by lack of a clear delineation of marketing andstorage responsibilities between the National Agricultural Marketing Board(NANBOARD) and SPCNU.

1.15 Credit ComDonent: After a long delay due to institutionalproblems associated with the merging of the Agricultural Finance Corporation(AFC) and Zambia Agricultural Development Bank (ZADB), the credit funds ofabout US$ 0.4 million channelled through ZADB were utilized. None of theUS$2.7 million earmarked for credit-in-kind through SPCMU was utilized asother national and bilateral funds were available (para 1.9).

1.16 Prolect Administration. A number of factors weakened projectadministration and management. Some of the management difficulties arose fromthe fact that project administration was located in Livingstone while projectactions and operation personnel were centered around Choma, some 200 km. Aproject coordinator was not appointed until late in 1986. The PlanningOfficer/Team Leader of the technical assistance team assumed projectmanagement but, in line with his professional skills, concentrated hisattention on planning functions of the PPU and allowed unnecessary conflictsto develop between the PPU and other provincial departments to the detrimentof the project. There was a serious lack of management skills and the styleof management involved mostly imposition of time consuming regulations whichwere aimed at controlling project activities with little regard to developmentobjectives.

1.17 A project review carried out in 1985 recommended severalcorrective measures which lead to the appointment of a Project Coordinator andsome restructuring of extension services. It also helped to initiate effortsto establish linkages between extension and research services through creationof an Adaptive Research and Planning Team (ARPT) from the MAWD's Department ofAgriculture. However, little progress was made in the implementation of therecommendations as project funding virtually ceased in May 1987 when the Banksuspended Zambia's withdrawal rights due to arrears on Bank loans and credits.

Proiect Results

1.18 Project's physical results were generally poor and far belowappraisal targets (Table 6, A). For the extension component, only thetechnical assistance inputs came close to the appraisal targets. Civil workswere carried out for less than half of the originally envisaged staff housesand none for agricultural camps. For the livestock component,construction/renovation of crush pens was up to expectation and good progress

6

was made in tsetse control but less than half of the envisaged veterinarystations and dip tanks were constructed. The progress made in animal healththrough vaccination/immunization program was negated by outbreak of tick-borne fever as a result of poor conditions of dipping facilities. The storagecomponent was implemented virtually up to appraisal targets. However, thehard standing facilities were not well distributed nor sufficient for averageannual grain yields.

1.19 Institutional results fell short of appraisal expectations. Asnoted above, little progress was made in introducing the T&V system ofextension services. Also, the discipline implied by such a system was notsignificantly institutionalized. User comittees for dip tanks wereestablished and user charges introduced toward the end of the project buttheir effectiveness remains to be seen. With regard to storage facilities,institutional problems between SPCMU and NAMBOARD continued to restrictutilization of these facilities. Notable progress was made in strengtheningthe planning capability of PPU but PPU still lacks adequate skills and clearguidelines for project management and implementation.

1.20 Since the monitoring and evaluation requirements were notimplemented, there are no empirical data to assess project's results in termsof rates of return and production impact. However, general observationssuggest that the rates of return are likely to be substantially belowappraisal estimate of a 27% economic rate of return. Increase in cropproduction was expected to come mainly from expanded adoption of improvedtechnological packages as a result of better extension services, coupled withcredit to farmers, and reduced storage losses. For livestock, productiongains were expected to come from eradication of diseases. Because of the poorperformance of the extension and credit components, 'inder-utilization of thestorage facilities, and outbreak of tick-borne diseases, the impact of theproject on production is bound to be little relative to appraisalexpectations. Moreover, actual costs shifted considerable toward technicalassistance personnel, with such costs taking nearly 50% of IDA funds comparedto the appraisal figure of 10%. Given that the performance of the technicalassistance personnel was poor, this shift in actual costs means that a muchlarger proportion of project resources was directed into less productive usesthan envisaged at appraisal.

Prolect Sustainabilitv

1.21 The project is not sustainable. Extension services based on theT&V system call for high levels of recurrent expenditures which Zambia willfind difficult to provide because of budgetary constraints. The Government ismaking efforts to maintain project activities to the extent possible and has,since project completion, obtained some assistance under UNDP/PAO project,with a duration of 32 months, to strengthen technical support to theagricultural extension service in the province. Although the recentestablishment of user committees and introduction of user charges will help toimprove operation and maintenance of dipping facilities, availability ofveterinarian drugs and dipping chemicals will continue to be limited byforeign exchange constraint. Tsetse re-infestation is already happening insome areas. The amount of credit fund provided by the project is likely to be

7

increasingly eroded by high inflation and low repayment rate. The storagecomponent involves relatively simple structures which are readily sustainable.Achievements in strengthening the capability of PPU will be difficult tosustain in view of the country-wide shortage of qualified manpower andfrequent transfer of civil servants.

Bank's Performance

1.22 Two important issues raised within the Bank at the Issues Meetingand through the Decision Memorandum were not fully addressed in the finalStaff Appraisal Report (SAR). One of these issues relates to the Borrower'scapacity to implement the project, considering the heavy workload imposed onMAWD by several projects going on more or less at the same time (paza 1.4),the weak project monitoring capability of the MAWD's Planning Unit, andbudgetary constraints. The other issue relates to the need to ensure adequateadaptive research in the Province to support extension services. These issuescaused serious difficulties in project implementation.

1.23 The Bank fielded three supervision missions before effectivenessand nine during the five-year implementation period. In total, 13 staffmembers visited the project for a total of 31.5 staff weeks, under fiveseparate mission leaders. Lack of continuity in mission leadership andcomposition contributed to poor rapport between visiting missions and theproject staff and led to frequent divergence of views between Bank missionsand especially the technical assistance team. The transfer of projectsupervision responsibility from Washington to the Bank office in Nairobi in1985 slowed implementation of the mid-term review.

Borrower's Performance

1.24 The Borrower failed to ensure coordination between the Ministriesof Agriculture and Water Development, Finance and Cooperatives and theProvincial Authorities. This led to a delay in the establishment of theproject account and project effectiveness; it also generally contributed todifficulties in project implementation. Although the Planning Unit of MAWDperformed well during the preparation phase, 't took no further part inproject activities during implementation. The performance of the project wasalso worsened by frequent transfer of counterpart staff and failure to providelocal staff to understudy the expatriate planning and financial officers.Moreover, incomplete implementation of the borrower's decentralization policycontinued a situation in which project implementation responsibility was placeunder the provincial office while authority on project's operation staffremained with the central agencies in Lusaka.

1.25 The Borrower did not complied with some of the covenants stated inthe Development Credit Agreement (Part III, Table 7). Non-compliances whichsignificantly affected project results were failure to employ a researchofficer by MAWD for project monitoring, provide adequate local counterpartfunds, and establish user committees and introduce user charges for dip tanks.Annual plans of work and budget, quarterly action plans and reports were

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carried out as required. Auditing requirements, although initially slow, werealso complied .4.th, including final clearance for the special foreign exchangeaccount in the Bank of Zambia at project completion. The borrower prepared acomprehensive draft Project Completion Report (old guidelines) which was notofficially released. There was full cooperation with project, provincial andcentral Government authorities in thu collection of data for this PCR.

Lessons Learnt

1.26 An important lesson is that, to be effective in a country likeZambia, the conventional T&V system needs to be modified to reflect the widelyscattered households, budgetary constraints, transport difficulties, shortageof qualified staff, and considerable uncertainty over input availability. Thesystem also needs to be complemented with effective links between extensionand research services, and a research ?rogram to develop area-specificcultivars. Local cultivars of maize in the Southern Province, with droughtresistance, better storage, disease resistance, and low management inputs haveall but disappeared. This has led to dramatic yield fluctuations as a resultof too much dependence on hybrid cultivars, requiring high inputs and average,or above average, rainfall, under the uncertain weather patterns in SouthernZambia.

1.27 Other important lessons include the need to ensure that: theproject design allows for a realistic implementation period, taking intoaccount the local capability in terms of manpower and budgetary resources;project implementation responsibility is properly matched with authority overproject resources; and techlnical assistance personnel is properly selected andplaced preferably in an advisory capacity rather than in line positions.

Consultigg and Contracting Services

1.28 Technical assistance was expected to play a major role in projectimplementation, planning, financial control, farm management and extersionreorganization. A short-term component was also provided to SPCHU fordesigning and supervising storage construction. The performance of thetechnical assistance team was unsatisfactory. The team leader, with littlemanagement skills, assumed project management responsibilities andcoordination functions in the absence of a 1 onal Project Coordinator. Farmmanagement survey and reorganization of exte -on were poorly executed, mainlydue to incompetence and internal dissension within the technical assistanceteam. Local contractors for civil work related to livestock and extensioncomponents performed very poorly. On the other hand, the use of short-termarchitectural consultancy enabled SPCMU to complete its construction programin a timely manner.

Proiect Documentation and Data Collection

1.29 Project documentation was well done from identificacion stage tothe date of effectiveness. Supervision reports were also well prepared.Little was done to collect baseline data in a systematic wa;. The requiredproject monitoring system was never implemented. Because of lack of baseline

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data and non-implementation of the monitoring system, it has been difficult toemperically assess the project's impact on production and farm incomes.

Part II: PROJECT REVIEW F!OM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

2.1 This report represents a brief summary of a larger report which isstill under preparation by the Planning Division of the Ministry ofAgriculture on the Southern Province Agricultural Development Project (SPADP).The summary is intended to comment and elaborate on Parts I and III which wereprepared by the World Bank. In so doing, it has avoided duplicating the Bank'sparts.

Background

2.2 The Government in its statements of development objectives hasconsistently highlighted the priority to rural development and the importanceof increased agricultural production to achieve higher levels of self-sufficiency in staple foods, the provision of raw materials for domestic agro-processing industries, the exploitation of export potentials and a reductionin urban-rural income disparities. As copper ores are expected to beexhausted over the next 15-20 years, the need to diversify the economy awayfrom copper becomes even more crucial.

2.3 It is this growing recognition that agriculture had to replacemining as a lead sector in the economy which led the Government of theRepublic of Zambia (GRZ) to seek donor assistance in its efforts to improveagricultural policies, institutions and productivity. The Southern Provincehas always played an important role in producing surplus maize and cattle. Ithas produced on average some 30-45Z of the country's marketed maize and 40-45% of marketed beef. It is estimated that 65% of all families in theprovince own cattle and that about 882 of these cattle are owned in thetraditional sector where they are also an important source of draught power.

Pro act Obiectives

2.4 The objectives which were aimed at increasing the lowproductivity of the smallholder as well as increasing rural incomes were soundand acceptable to GRZ but the inputs necessary to achieve these objectivesshould have included credit for hammer mills and haulage trucks for farmersand farmer organizations in the province to help in the decentralization ofthese services. Hummer mills for maize milling was especially important forrural food processing since there was the possibility of maize-meal subsidywithdrawal - a policy reform which the Bank had advocated for years. Anotherserious omission in the project objectives is the lack of provision for post-

10

graduate training of Zambians in management skills to run the project on thedeparture of the international technical assistance team.

Proiect Desitn and Organization

2.5 The project design seemed to have adopted a "top-bottom"approach. The beneficiaries of the project were not given the opportunity tocontribute project ideas to the design. This was probably an oversight of theMinistry's Planning Division which collected and assembled basic data for theproject. Except for the omission of credit for hammer mills for localprocessing of maize, training for Zambians in higher management skills (therewere some training initiated by the FAO Team Leader) and credit for crophaulage, the selection of the project components and inputs were appropriate.Another project design omission was the lack of provision for a systematiclink between extension and research services. The project should have put inplace an ARPT team to carry out province specific research to support theextension program by developing province-specific technical messages andpackages. The terms of the project's credit funds were less favourable thanothers available to members of the SPCMU. There should have been enoughflexibility in the project design to change such a situation. Since there wasno such flexibility, the amount of credit available to the SPCMU was neverutilized.

2.6 The project organization arrangements placed the implementationresponsibility under the Provincial Permanent Secretary (PPS). This was amajor error and adversQly affected project implementation. The PPS's officehas multiple duties and cannot be normally tied down to supervise a project ofthis size. The PPU on which the PPS might have relied for the project'simplementation was ill-equipped to do so. It was completely under staffed andlacked project management experience and skills. The PPU also had multipleduties and ended up directing the project on part time basis instead ofmanaging it. The project preparation mission should have recognized thepeculiarity of Southern Province where Choma is the Provincial Agriculturalheadquarters while Livingstone is the provincial administration headquarters.To reduce this problem, all Technical Assistance (TA) personnel should havebeen in Choma where the major components of the project centred. Splitting upthe team between Choma and Livingstone was ill-advised. There was never anappreciation, by the office in Livingstone, of the field problems encounteredby the staff at Choma.

2.7 Another major weakness of the project was the fact that a capable,highly qualified coordinator was not appointed from the beginning to run theproject. The TA personnel whose terms of reference as senior planning officerwas to help train and develop the PPU's project management, evaluation andmonitoring capacity, became a de facto coordinator of the project, approvingpurchases and budgets. Project monitoring and evaluation was non existentthroughout the life of the project. The appointment of a project coordinatorlate in 1986 came too late. The position was filled with a retired veteranagriculturist who was good in his area but had no skills in managing a projectof this size. To make matters worse he was based in Choma but was stripped ofall powers with regards to financial decision making. He had virtually nopowers as a project coordinator.

11

2.8 The extension component which was to absorb 23Z of the totalproject costs had no provision for adaptive research linkages. There shouldhave been an ARPT located in one of the research stations, probably inMochipapa to conduct research specific to the province and provide technicalpackages for extension which are specific and economical. The exclusivedependence on the TA Farm Management expert Was not enough to provideeffective linkages.

2.9 The credit needs of the province was not fully appreciated by theproject. The credit fund of $2.7 million available to SPCMU for inputs tomembers was not utilized. Credit needs for hamner mills, haulage trucks etc,were not recognized by the project.

Project Implementation

2.10 General implementation performance was poor. The project failedto achieve most of its targets. One of the major factors contributing to poorimplementation was the delay in procurement of vehicles. The project failed toprocure vehicles for the first three years as a result of the cumbersome andbureaucratic purchasing procedures as well as possible special interests inthe type of vehicles. The type of landrovers which was acclaimed as the best4x4 proved most disastrous when these vehicles finally arrived. They justcould not cope with the road conditions of the project area. There were nospares with the purchase and procuring spares was another nightmare.

2.11 GRZ was unable to provide the necessary counterparts tounderstudy the TA personnel. This was mainly due to the lack of incentivesfor the national project staff. The performance of the internationaltechnical assistance team was weak as a result of internal dissension andpetty quarrels. More attention should be paid in future to the selection oftechnical assistance staff. Preference should be given to qualified Zambiansand other African nationals. The selection of the TA team did not showsensitivity to inter-personnel relationship and team work.

2.12 Disbursement was also slow for both GRZ and World Bank funds.This is a chronic problem mostly because of the cumbersome procedure.

2.13 Extension: GRZ agrees with the Bank that notable efforts weremade to create awareness of extension services along the lines of the T & Vsystem. However, the delay in the procurement of vehicles, the lack of base-line survey, and the constant implementation conflicts between the PPU and theoffice of the PAO made it impossible for much to be achieved. There was noappreciation of field problems by the PPU in Livingstone some 200 km. away.The PPU undertook little supervision or monitoring of the project and ran theproject on a remote control basis.

2.14 Livestock Development: The provincial officials were satisfiedwith the assistance that was provided by the project before suspension. Theprovince remained relatively free of livestock diseases during the projectperiod except for seasonal occurrence of malignant theileriosis and anoutbreak of foot and mouth disease from June 1987 to December 1987. The

12

vaccination and inoculation program did help in preventing serious outbreakof the endemic diseases.

Proiect Results

2.15 Project results are difficult to estimate. That the projectfailed to achieve most of its targets is without debate. Only $6.9 millionout of the total projected expenditure of $23.8 million was utilized. Thiswill indicate minimal project results. Although there are no empirical datato assess the benefits derived by farmers in the project area, it is difficultto say there were substantial impacts on productivity and incomes during theproject life time. The severe drought during the first three years of theproject compounded this difficulty.

2.16 There was some awareness of the T & V system of extension but thelate delivery of transport, lack of staff incentive, complex procedures forrecovery of allowance and lack of province specific technical packages madethat awareness unproductive. For the livestock component, considerablesuccess was achieved with disease control. Input and crop storage wasconstructed although they were not well distributed nor sufficient for averageor above average annual grain yields. The PPU capacity of the provincialadministration was improved but it still lacks project managemint skills andis understaffed.

Proiect Sustainabilitv

2.17 As implemented, the project is not sustainable. The majorcomponents of the project which were to build the necessary infrastructure forsustained development were not achieved. Training of Zambian manpower wasweak under the project and makes continued project implementation difficultwithout more technical assistance input. GRZ continues to fund the projectand some of the construction work is being completed. Fund flows are howeverslow and erratic. The lack of an ARPT for the project continues to weaken theextension base.

Bank's Performance

2.18 The SAR was weak in the project design and organization. Thesplitting up of the TA team in Choma and Livingstone, the planning ofimplementation responsibility on the PPS and the absence of a highly capableproject coordinator show lack of understanding of the Zambian situation. Thelack of provision for project monitoring and evaluation, training of Zambiansand an ARPT was short sighted.

2.19 The Bank fielded three supervision missions before effectivenessand nine during the five-year implementation period under five separatemission leaders. The missions gave the impression of lack of continuity andappreciation of previous visits. There were a great deal of contradictoryguidelines to project staff from one mission to another. Each missionformulated new conditionalities for project implementation and contributed tothe slow disbursement of funds for the project's main components. Themissions never clearly addressed the question of why the project's

13

implementation was so slow.

Borrower's Performance

2.20 GRZ is in agreement with the Bank that a major weakness of GRZ'sperformance was the complete lack of coordination between the centralMinistries, Agriculture, Finance and Cooperatives and the ProvincialAuthorities. There was a complete aloofness from the Ministry ofAgriculture's Planning Division. The project desk officer did not haveauthority on project matters. The Ministry failed to provide the necessarycounterparts to work with the TA personnel. There was a constant shortage oflocal funding throughout implementation and this adversely affpacted projectperformance. Government procurement procedures were and still are toocumbersome and bureaucratic.

Lessons Learnt

2.21 GRZ's beneficiary ministries should be involved fully in projectpreparation and appraisal in order to ensure better understanding andappreciation of the project's implementation. This process is gradually beingadopted by the Planning Division which now attaches full time counterparts toconsultants and multilateral, bilateral experts on project preparation, andappraisal.

2.22 The selection of projects staff should begin with placingqualified national staff to line positions. Such staff should be supportedwith internationally recruited advisers where necessary, giving firstpreference to candidates from African countries to the extent possible.

Statistical Information

2.23 The statistical information provided in part III of the Bank'scompletion report are in close agreement with GRZ's own estimates.

Conclusion

2.24 If GRZ's withdrawal rights are restored, a second phase of SPADPshould be prepared to take into account all the constraints enumerated in thisreport. Southern Province is an important agricultural area which needs astrengthened infrastructure and institutional development for sustainedagricultural development and a second "corrective" SPADP should contribute tothat.

14

PART III

STATISTICAL INFORMATION

1. Related Bank Credits/Loans

None

2. Proiect Timetable:

Planned. Revised and Actual Proiect Timetable

Activity Planned Date Revised Date Actual Date

Identification 09/1978 -Identification/preparation 06/1979 - -Preparation 07/1980 - -Appraisal 01/1980 - -Negotiation 09/1981 - -President's Report 11/1981 -Board Approval 12/1981 - -Date of Effectiveness 04/1982 07/1982 11/1982Project Completion 06/1987 12/1987 12/1987Credit Closing 12/1987 06/1988 06/1988

Comment: Some of the technical assistance staff were extended up to June1988 to help wind-up project accounts and prepare CompletionReport. The Government requested a 3-year extension but thiscould not be done because of the suspension of Zambia's withdrawalrights in May 1987.

3. Credit Disbursements

Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements (US$ million)

Bank FY 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988

Appraisal estimate 1.4 5.4 9.8 14.2 17.5 18.0Actual 0.3 2.1 3.7 4.4 5.1 5.2Actual as Z of estimate 20 39 38 31 29 29

Comment: The low disbursement of IDA funds is mainly due to the slow projectimplementation progress. Devaluation of the kwacha is also acontributing factor as it reduced local costs in terms of foreignexchange.

15

4. Proiect ImDlementation

Planned ActualCompletion Completion Months of

Component Date Date Delay

Extension and TrainingTech. assistance 06/1987 12/1987 6Vehicles & equipment 06/1984 Not completedHousing 06/1986 Not completedOther Civil Works 06/1987 Not completed

Livestock DevelopmentVehicles & Equipment 06/1984 09/1986 26Dips 06/1966 Not completedCrush Pens 06/1986 06/1986

StorageVehicles & Equipment 06/1984 06/1984 0Civil Works 06/1986 12/1986 6

Credit Development 06/1987 Not completed

Project AdministrationTech. assistance 06/1987 06/1988 12Vehicles & Equipment 06/1987 Not completed

Comments: Most of the civil work were uncompleted by the time the projectended. The main causes of the poor performance were weakmanagement, cumbersome procurement procedures, and weakcapability of local constructors.

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5. Project Costs. Financing and Allocation of Credit Proceeds

A. Pro1ect Costs (US$ Million)

Estimated Costs Actual Cost

Local Foreign Local ForeignCate.orv Costs Cost IgI O CostsCo*t Total

Extension & training 5.0 2.4 7.4 0.6 1.5 2.1Livestock development 2.5 1.9 4.4 0.5 0.5 1.0Storage 3.5 5.8 9.3 0.7 1.3 2.0Credit 1.0 0.1 1.1 0.5 0.1 0.6Project administration 0.6 1.0 1.6 0.4 0.8 1.2Total 12.6 11.2 23.8 2.7 4.2 6.9

Comments: Actual costs are based on figures obtained from project files inthe field. Total actual project costs are less than estimatedcost due to the fact that, except the technical assistance andstorage components, the project's physical inputs (includingcredit through SPCMU) fell far short of the appraisal targets.Also, devaluation of the kwacha reduced local costs in terms offoreign exchange.

B. Proiect Financing (US$ Million)

PlannedSource of Funds Rer SAR FinalIDA 18.0 5.2Borrower 5.8 1.7Total 23.8 6.9

C. Allocation of Credit Proceeds

Original ActualItem Allocation Disbursement

...*.. (SDR million)........

Civil Works 4.42 1.68Vehicle & Equipment 1.95 0.63Veterinary Supplies 1.06 0.15Credit 2.92 0.14Tech. Asst. & Training 2.12 2.08Salaries & 0'erating Costs 2.65 0.36UDallocated 0.78 0.00

Total 15.90 5.04

Comments: Actual disbursement is based on Bank's records and allocation ofSpecial Account funds as estimated by field project staff.

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6. Proiect Results

A. Direct Benefits

Indicator# Apiprainal Actual attimate Closing Date

Extension- Housing (No.) 30 13- Renovate Housing (No.) 27 12- Camp Improvement (No.) 100 0- Office/Store (No.) 2 1- Tech. Assistance (/rm) 117 100

Veterinarv- Upgrade Veterinary Stations 19 0- Construction/Renovate Crush Pens 80 80- Construction/Renovate Chief Tanks 50 13- Cool Room - 1

InRut Delivery- Storage Sheds 60 60

Produce Storage- Hard Standings 12 11

Prolect Administration- Technical Assistance (m/m) 120 124

Comments: Out of 10 local contractors employed for house building, 6abandoned their construction sites, 1 partially completed, and 3completed their work. Contributory factors were poorsupervision and lack of transport. A breakdown of the actuallyprocured vehicles and equipment is not available.

B. Economic Imoact

AppraisalEstimate Actual

Economic Rate of Return 27.01 Not available

Comment: With less than 301 of total project funds utilized, coupled withlack of data, no attempt has been made to re-estimate economicrate of return at completion.

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7. Status of Main Covenants

Development Credit Agreement (DCA)

Section Activity Comment

The Borrowershall:

provide funds, facilities Partially complied3.01 (a) and other resources with. Local

required., counterpart fundswere alwaysinadequate.

3.01 (b) cause SPCMU & ZADB to Partially compliedperform in accordance with with. SPCMU did notthe provisions of the distribute credit-Project Agreement.... in-kind.

3.03 assign to the PPS the Complied with.responsibility for day-to-day supervision of allproject activities;

(a)i. reviews and consolidates Complied with.annual work program and budget;

ii. prepares eacv year a Cz:mplied with.consolidated action planand budget.

iii. send copies of the above Copxled with.promptly to the Associationfor comment.

(b) cause the PPS to prepare a Complied with.consolidated projectreport.

ii. cause the PPS to senvi a Generally compliedcopy of such report to the with.Association.

3.10 (a) cause the Provincial Not complied withVeterinary Office (PVO) in until last year ofthe Southern Province to the projectensure participating implementation.farr-ers pay a fee adequateto sustain routine dip tank

19

maintenance andreplenishment ofacaricides.

3.10 (b) ensure that fees so Not complied with.collected be deposited inan account to beadministered on terms andconditions acceptable tothe Borruwer and theAssociation.

4.01 (a) cause the PPS to maintain Complied with.separate projectaccounts....

(b) cause the PPS to have Complied with butproject accounts ..... for with frequently longeach fiscal year delays.audited ..... by independentauditors acceptable to theAssociation.

4.03 i. commencing January 1, 1982, Not complied with.increase annual recurrent Recurrent budgetbudget, in real terms, for allocations wereexpenditure in respect of always below projectResearch and Extension in requirements.the Southern Province,taking into account theadditional cost resultingirom the project; and

4.03 ii. commencing Januaary 1, 1982, Not complied with.progressively transfer fromits development budget toits recurrent budget alloperating costs ofExtension Services,Veterinary Services, TsetseControl and ProjectManagement so that at thetime of completion ofProject all allocations forsuch operating costs willhave been transferred toits recurrent budget.

4.05 employ a research officer Not complied with.in the Planning Unit of theMAWD.

20

Proi ectAareement

2.02 (a) SPCHU shall employ Complied with.consultant...

(b) SPCHU shall employ, not Complied with.later than May 1, 1982, amanager for its CreditDepartment....

7. Use of Bank Resources

Stff Irouts (Nan-Weeks)

Activity 197B 1979 1980 1961 1982 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 Xotal

Identification ' - - 4.0

tdantification/Preparation 24 - - - - - - 24.0

Prepcration - 16 - - - - - - - 16.0

Apprisat - - 40 - - - - - - - 40.0

Negotiation - - - 5 - - - - 5.0

Supervision - - - 7 4 3 6 3 8.5 5 40.5

Project Completion Report - - - - - - 7 7.0

Total 219

. Mission DteNonth/Yeer Number of Total Staff Specialization Status Trwnd Problte

Stag of Project Cycle Persons Days Represented

Identificatfon 9-10/78 2 14 A,E - -

Preparation 7/79 3 84 A,L,E - -

Appraisal 7-8/80 5 100 A,F,L,E,E - - -

Supervision 1 21/8 1 7 A 3 -FNO I

* 11 6/82 3 18 A,L,F 3 1 N

III 10/82 3 21 A,E,L 3 1 N

IV 4/83 2 18 A,E,F 2 1 NF

V 9/83 2 12 A,F 2 3 NF

* VI 3/84 2 16 A,P 2 2 0

* VIl 10/84 1 7 E 2 2 0

* VIII 4/85 3 36 E,A,F 2 2 OF

New Re porting Procedure Availeble Project DOwtop nt OverallFurPWods Ntegnt lIpact Status

Supervision IX 10/85 1 4 A 2 2 4 3

* X 2/86 1 22 A,F 1 3 4 3

U Xi 4/87 1 8 A 3 2 2 3

* XII 10/87 3 51 E.A,f 1 2 3 2

Project Completion Preparation 8/89 1 13 A - -A

Soacislization: A * Agricultural, E * Economist, F a Financial Anslyst, * Livestock Specialist

Problens: s N Ngmnt, F * Financiolt, 0 Others

Status: 1 no significant problems; 2. moderate problens; 3 major problems which are being addressed adbquately; 4. mejor problems, not being addressed

adequatelyTrend: 1 improving; 2astationary; 3= deteriorating

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