Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No. 18350

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

BOLIVIA

AGRO-EXPORT DEVELOPMENT PROJECTCr. 2322-BO

August 3, 1998

Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Sector UnitCountry Unit: Bolivia, Paraguay, PeruLatin America and Caribbean Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in theperformance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed withoutWorld Bank authorization.

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Currency Unit = Bolivianos

Average Exchange Rate:(as of February 9, 1998)

1 US$ = 5.35 Bolivianos

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

Metric System

FISCAL YEAR OF THE BORROWER

January 1 - December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADP - Agricultural Development ProjectAEDP - Agro-Export Development ProjectBEF - Bolivian Export FoundationCOSUDE - Swiss Development CooperationGOB - Government of BoliviaICR - Implementation Completion reportSAR - Staff Appraisal ReportSDR - Special Drawing Rights

Vice-President: Shahid Javed BurkiCountry Director: Isabel GuerreroSector Director: Maritta Koch-WeserTask Manager: Pierre Werbrouck

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYIMPLLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

BOLIVIAAGROYEXPORT DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(Cr. 2322-BO)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EVALUATION SUMMARY............................................................................................... ii

PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT

Introduction ......... 1A. Project Objectives .1B. Achievement of Project Objectives .2C. Implementation Record and Major Factors

Affecting the Project .5D. Project Sustainability and Continuity .6E. Bank Performance .7F. Borrower Performance .8G. Assessment of Outcome .8H. Future Operation .9I. Key Lessons Learned .9

PART II: STATISTICAL ANNEX

1. Summary of Assessments .122. Related Bank Loans/Credits .133. Project Timetable .134. Credit Disbursement .135. Key Indicators for Project Implementation .146A. Project Cost ........................... 156B. Project Financing ........................... 157. Status of Legal Covenants ........................... 168. Bank Resources: Staff Inputs ........................... 209. Bank Resources: Missions ........................... 21

APPENDICES

A. Mission Aide-Memoire ........................... 22B. Borrower Contributions to ICR ........................... 25C. Executive Summary Final Report ........................... 29

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in theperformance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed withoutWorld Bank authorization.

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

BOLIVIA

AGRO-EXPORT DEVELOPMENT PROJECTCr. 2322-BO

Preface

1. This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Agro-ExportDevelopment Project in Bolivia, for which Credit 2322-BO in the amount ofSDR 16.6 million (US$22.5 million equivalent) was signed on March 4, 1992 and madeeffective on November 9, 1992. The project was co-financed by the Government of theNetherlands for 16.4 million guilders (US$8.9 million equivalent) and by the Governmentof the Swiss Federation for 4.5 million Swiss Francs (US$3.2 million equivalent).

2. The credit was closed on December 31, 1997. The final disbursement took placeon February 19, 1998. The balance of US$7 million was canceled.

3. The ICR was prepared by Mr. Pierre Werbrouck (Sr. Agricultural Economist) andMr. Michel Buyckx (Private Sector Specialist-Consultant), Environmentally and SociallySustainable Development Sector Unit, Latin American and the Caribbean Region. TheICR was reviewed by Ms. Deborah Bateman (Bolivia - Resident Representative) andMr. Jonathan Parker (LCC4C). The ICR was forwarded to the co-financiers whocommented on the report: The Royal Dutch Embassy in La Paz, Bolivia and COSUDE(Swiss Federation), La Paz, Bolivia. The Borrower provided comments included asAppendix B to the ICR.

4. Preparation of the ICR started during the Bank's completion mission in February1998. It is based on materials in the project file and interviews with local stakeholders,including representatives of the co-financiers, members of BEF's Board of Directors andmanagers of investment enterprises. The Borrower contributed to the preparation of theICR by providing opinions reflected in the mission's Aide Memoire attached asAppendix A and the project final report, the executive summary of which is attached asAppendix C.

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

AGRO-EXPORT DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(Cr. 2322-BO)

BOLIVIA

EVALUATION SUMMARY

Introduction

1. The project evolved out of the Agricultural Development Project financed by theDutch Government. The Bolivia Export Foundation (BEF) was created in September1991. The project involved financing by two donors: IDA (16.6 million SDRs orUS$ 22.5 million) and the Netherlands (16.4 million guilders or US$8.9 millionequivalent). An amount of 8.2 million SDRs were considered as a grant to BEF and8.4 million SDRs as a loan from the Government to BEF and to be reimbursed over aperiod of 25 years at a rate of 7 percent per annum. The project became effective onNovember 9, I1992. The Government of the Swiss Federation entered in co-financing inDecember 1993 for an amount of 4.5 million Swiss Francs (US$3.2 million equivalent).In total, BEF disposed of about US$35 million dollars to implement the Agro-ExportDevelopment Project (AEDP). The project was closed on December 31, 1997. Anamount of US$7 million was canceled.

A. Project Objectives

2. The Agro-Export Development Project's objectives were to: (i) expandproduction and improve quality and price competitiveness of agricultural goods forexports; (ii) create institutional capacity to help entrepreneurs and investors selected byBEF develop agro-based export/import enterprises; (iii) identify and import technology toassist such entrepreneurs and investors to further develop their production and exportcapacity; (iv) increase market opportunities for the exportation of agro-industrialproducts; and (v) create employment and generate capital accumulation in order toimprove the incomes and standards of living of farmers, women's groups and urban andrural laborers by expanding and developing new agricultural and agro-processingenterprises.

3. Comments on Project Objectives. The project objectives as stated in the CreditAgreement are a mixture of development objectives (production expansion, increase inliving standards), project outputs (institutional capacity) and activities (import oftechnology, creation of enterprises). There was no ranking of the objectives. The projectobjectives as stated in the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) put more emphasis on thecreation of institutional capacity which would sustain the operation. The timetable toreach most objectives was too short.

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B. Implementation Experience and Results

4. The results of the Project are evaluated as unsatisfactory. BEF has developed intoan organization, independent from Government, capable of monitoring the investrnentportfolio and re-invest the funds. The cost, however, has been very high. The totalmanagement and operating costs over the project period amount to US$5.5 million andafter an investment of US$19.6 million, BEF owns a portfolio with a market valueestimated between US$8 to 12 million only. Since most investments are very new, theportfolio value, however, may grow.

5. Key factors that affected the performance of the Project were: (i) nearly two yearswere lost in the beginning of the project because of a poor performing internationalmanagement team and poor monitoring by the Bank; and (ii) BEF never had asufficiently qualified management team to avoid erroneous investments and to monitor itsportfolio.

C. Summary of FindingsSustainability

6. Sustainability is likely. There remain some risks inherent to the value of thefuture portfolio and the process of desinvestment. At present, the portfolio value issufficient to reimburse the government loan and for continuous re-investment. Co-operation with the private sector should be sought to ensure that BEF keeps on playing arole in agro-business development.

Bank and Borrower Performance

7. Overall Bank performance is rated as unsatisfactory, for'the following reasons.The project design lacked prioritization of project objectives and was wrong in proposingto start up five new companies from scratch. The SAR had no clear project output andimpact monitoring indicators. People involved in the project preparation and supervisionhad a professional profile typical for donor-based operations, while the project was purebusiness and needed experienced business people. And during the first two years of theProject, the Bank was not decisive enough to speed up the project-startup and limit theoperational costs.

8. The Borrower performance is satisfactory. The Government has respected theindependent structure of BEF. The performance of the management team is marginallysatisfactory and has improved over the last years. The teamn has now the capacity tofollow-up the portfolio and to re-invest the funds, but it did not perform well enough toavoid financial losses and over-evaluations of some investments. The performance of theBoard of Directors is rated as satisfactory but it decision-making has been slow.

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D. Future Operations

9. The Bank and other donors should keep a link with BEF in order to secure BEF'sindependence and image and to assist with some punctual advice when importantbusiness decisions will have to be taken. Such an intervention could be very cost-effective compared to the funds invested in BEF.

E. Key Lessons Learned

10. Bureaucrats should stay out of business. The principal lesson that can bedrawn from project implementation is that top entrepreneurial management is necessaryto invest and monitor the use of such a large portfolio. A business operation managed bypeople with a public service or development aid profile is likely to underperform.

11. Business strategy. The three following lessons are less important during startupbut eventually decisive for the success of BEF:

(i) Step by step investments: each company has its own development capacityand over-capitalization can be as disastrous as lack of capital. Especially incase of less experienced enterprises, it is important to limit the risk of failure,invest step by step and allow for increasing knowledge and market build-up;

(ii) BEF should avoid creating new companies from scratch, unless it concernssmaller enterprises were no alternatives are available and/or other criteria,like social impact, are principal; and

(iii) When investing in companies, BEF should introduce immediately ownmnanagement and accounting procedures, allowing it to monitor thecompany's performance on a daily basis.

12. Need for a competent local partner. The combination of local businessrelations, understanding of the local business realities and private money (the businessdrive) could have been obtained by including from the beginning a local private financialinstitution as partner in BEF.

13. Legal framework. In a legal framework where contracts can not be enforcedthrough courts, formal business is hard to carry out. Companies in Bolivia are mainlyfamily businesses that enforce contracts by using multiple compliance strategies (throughfamily relations and other business ties). An organization such as BEF does not have thistype of informal relationships and has difficulty working in such environment.

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

AGRO-EXPORT DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(Cr. 2322-BO)

BOLIVIA

Introduction

1 The Bolivian Export Foundation (BEF) and the Agro-Export DevelopmentProgram (AEDP) were created out of the Agricultural Development Project (ADP)financed by the Dutch Government (1987-91). ADP evaluated the production and exportpotential of 47 agricultural and livestock products for a cost of US$3.8 million. ADPidentified five companies with export potential in four sectors (brazil nuts, cochenilla,angora wool and flowers). ADP's finding were that Bolivia lacked export experience andthat small and medium-sized companies in the rural sector had little access to investmentcapital. In 1991, the Bank started preparation of the Agro-Export Development Projectwhich would be modeled on the Fundaci6n Chile.'

2. The Bolivia Export Foundation was created in September 1991. The projectinvolved financing by two donors: IDA (16.6 million SDRs or US$ 22.5 million) and theNetherlands (16.4 million guilders or US$8.9 million equivalent). An amount of 8.2million SDRs of the IDA credit was considered as a grant to BEF and 8.4 million SDRsas a loan from the Government to BEF to be reimbursed over a period of 25 years at arate of 7 percent per annum. The project become effective on November 9, 1992. TheGovernment of the Swiss Federation entered in co-financing in December 1993 for anamount of 4.5 million Swiss Francs (US$3.2 million equivalent). BEF disposed of a totalof US$35 million to implement the Agro-Export Development Project. The project wasclosed on December 31, 1997. An amount of US$7 million equivalent of the IDA creditwas canceled.

A. Project Objectives

3. AEDP's objectives were to: (i) expand production and improve quality and pricecompetitiveness of agricultural goods for exports; (ii) create institutional capacity to helpentrepreneurs and investors selected by BEF develop agro-based export/importenterprises; (iii) identify and import technology to assist such entrepreneurs and investorsto further develop their production and export capacity; (iv) increase market opportunitiesfor the exportation of agro-industrial products; and (v) create employment and generate

l Fundaci6n Chile was created to promote local agro-business, was sponsored by the United StatesGovernment and received technical assistance from ITT Inc. There is not much comparison betweenboth foundations: Fundaci6n Chile's capital and human resources base was much more importantand it took much more time to develop business than in the Fundaci6n Bolivia Exporta.

2

capital accumulation in order to improve the incomes and standards of living of farmers,women's groups and urban and rural laborers by expanding and developing newagricultural and agro-processing enterprises. The Staff Appraisal Report clarifies point(ii) as follows: to develop BEF as a private, autonomous, self-financing organization,which would form financially sound, agro-based subsidiaries and joint ventures withsmall- and medium-scale entrepreneurs.

4. The project had three components: (i) the operations of BEF, including itsenterprise investment program, which initially was based on five identified companies inthe following four sectors: brazil nuts, cochenilla, angora wool and flowers; (ii) theemployment of an internationally recruited management team to run BEF at the start-upand train a Bolivian team to take over the management; and (iii) provision by BEF oftechnical assistance to its investment enterprises in marketing, financial management andexport.

5. Comments on the project objectives and design: The project objectives asstated in the Credit Agreement are a mixture of development objectives (productionexpansion, increase in living standards), project outputs (institutional capacity) andactivities (import of technology, creation of enterprises). There was no ranking in theobjectives. The timetable to reach some objectives was too short. However, at the end ofthe project no substantial new enterprise investment projects were in the pipeline andfunding was no longer needed.

6. During project implementation some design flaws came to the surface: (i) noguidelines were given on the type and the size of the investment enterprises in which BEFwas going to invest--this resulted in disagreements amongst donors on the type of BEF'sinvestments; and (ii) BEF had no explicit financial objectives and monitoring indicatorsfor the investment enterprises--as a result no clear guidelines were available for internaland external monitoring of BEF or its portfolio.

B. Achievement of Project Objectives

7. As no development objective monitoring indicators were established, it isimpossible to fully measure the achievement of the objectives.

8. Increased agricultural output: The incremental output of the investmententerprises in the period 1994-97 is as follows:

Amount (US$ '000) PercentageBrazil Nut Sector 7,682 11%Garlic 216 279%Wood doors 2,431 78%Other 94 80%Total 10,423

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This may be considered low compared to the investment amount, but most of the exportexpansion has still to be realized. BEF has contributed substantially to the developmentof the brazil-nut sector in the Amazon region.

9. Building BEF's capacity: BEF has developed into a government independentorganization, capable of evaluating business opportunities with export potential,negotiating investment agreements with sometimes aggressive business partners andfollowing-up their investments in these private companies. At the same time BEF haslearned how to setup and guide pilot projects. Given its know-how of the Bolivian agro-business, BEF could further play a role in the formation of rural investment enterprises.

10. Introduction of technical improvements: This objective has also been reached.BEF financed for US$6.5 million technological improvements and studies in theinvestment enterprises--this represents one third of the total amount invested. State of theart technology has been acquired in the international market.

11. Increased employment: Employment in the investment enterprises has grown byonly 300 permanent positions. This is a low figure, which may however increase overtime when the portfolio is mature. Indirect employment is more difficult measure, butincludes seasonal jobs in the amazon, in the meat sector and forest sector.

Performance evaluation of BEF

12. Portfolio. BEF invested US$19.6 million in 30 investment enterprises in thefollowing sectors: brazil nuts, garlic, fish, flowers, wood working, and food production(see Tables 1 and 2). This portfolio is well distributed nationwide. Of this amount onlyUS$12.3 million are still active investments in eight investment enterprises. The losses(failures) in investment enterprises to date are estimated at US$3.5 million. The totalamount spent on pilot projects is US$1.5 million.

Table 1: Evolution of the Enterprise Investments of BEF

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 TOTAL % US$ I %____________ _____ '~~~ ~~~~000

Startup* 3 1 5 10 11 30 100 21,766 100%

Operational 1 2 5 8 27% 12,266 56%

Temporary** 6 5 11 37% 5,330 25%

Closed*** 3 1 1 1 6 20% 715 3%

Failures 3 2 5 17% 3,455 16%

* The total of US$21.8 million includes US$2.2 million of reinvested money (coming fromtemporary and closed interventions)

* * Temporary means short term interventions, mainly in the brazil nut sector***"" Closed means positively concluded

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Table 2: Distribution of Active Investments per Sector

Sector Number of US$ '000projects l

Brasil nut processing 1 3,501 27%Garlic production 1 879 6%Fish production 1 1,343 10%Wood working 2 1,581 12%Food processing 1 4,420 34%Flower production 3 1,427 11%Total 9 13,151 100

13. Pilot projects. Within the short period of active investment, BEF has focused onsustainability rather than on pilot initiatives, which are inherently more time consumingand bear more but smaller risks.

14. Management and Operating Costs. Putting BEF's management cost in relation tothe value of the portfolio makes no sense for the first five years, since a large part of theseexpenditures could be considered as start-up costs and learning money. But once theportfolio volume is stable, monitoring of the ratio management cost/portfolio return willbe a very good performance measure in the future. At present, the forecasted revenuefrom investments (US$500,000) covers the estimated operating expenditures. The yearlyreturns combined with the increase in the portfolio value, however, should increaserapidly to US$1.6 million per year (16 percent of the estimated average portfolio value).

Table 3: Management and Operating Cost of BEF

Calendar Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998IManagement and OperatingCosts (US$'000) 382 1,163 956 898 674 1,112 487

Notes: 1992: only three months of operation; 1992-94: international management team; 1997: includedrestructuring costs; 1998: forecast.

15. Portfolio Performance. It has been a difficult and costly process to achieve theactual portfolio of nine investments. The portfolio value is not yet completely stable (atleast one subproject can be considered as a high risk, two subprojects as low risks andfive as medium risks). Most investments are only one or two years old and two moreyears are needed to see if these investments will make it or not. The portfolio is wellprotected through the fact that there is a lot at stake for the business partners of BEFthemselves. It is difficult to value this portfolio, but taking in account the net profits ofthe last three years, combined with the projected net profits for the years 1998 - 2000, theportfolio value at 31 December 97 is estimated between US$8 and US$12 million.

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16. Financial ratios: The SAR does not specify factors permitting to measure theperformance of the portfolio. The financial and economic rates of return mentioned inthe SAR were entirely based on the financial projections for the five enterprises identifiedin the SAR. The overall financial rate of return of AEDP was projected at 20 percentcalculated over 15 years (and as such included a high degree of uncertainty). This valuewas surely optimistic and at the end of the project it was not possible to give a reliableprognosis of the Financial Rate of Return. Taking into account the amount (US$19.6million) put into investment enterprises (excluding pilot projects) and the cost of capital(17 percent)2, the actual value of the portfolio should have been about US$19.5 million.This compares with the estimated portfolio value of US$8-12 million.

C. Implementation Record and Major Factors Affecting the Project

17. Despite a very generous investment budget, an expensive team of fourinternational professionals, the direct availability of studies worth US$3.8 million and thepermanent presence of a Bank representative solely dedicated to the project, the first twoproject years of implementation were a failure. Apart from a few pilot initiatives, noinvestments took place. Most attention went to market studies and the establishment ofthe five investment enterprises in the SAR as BEF solo operations without partners. Thisproved to be impossible, as most solo enterprises would have also created competitionwith the established private sector.

18. In its second year, BEF invited proposals from the public. The analysis of 256(mostly badly prepared) proposals by international professionals took a year. The donors(in particular the Bank and the Dutch Government), lacking business experience, gotdeeper and deeper involved in BEF's daily management. This provoked a badrelationship between the international management team on the one hand, and BEF'sboard of directors and the Bank's representative on the other hand. As a result, in May1994 the international management team was reduced to two people and a Bolivianmanagement team took over.

19. At the mid-term review (May 1995), two important changes had a direct impacton operations and strategies: (i) the international management team is completelyreplaced by a Bolivian team; and (ii) permanent monitoring by the Bank is replaced bytwo supervision missions per year. From mid-95 onwards BEF changed its strategyfocusing on sustainability. It identified medium-size enterprises with export potential andcompanies with potential for financial return. The bulk of the investments took placeduring the last 18 months of the project.

20. It is also during this period that the proper procedures for evaluation and follow-up have been installed. A simple set of accounting, financial and management thumb

2 Average cost of capital in the agro-industry of Bolivia was estimated in 1996 by the Fundacion Chileat 17%.

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rules should have been implemented from day one, introduced in the investmententerprises and be adjusted while BEF was getting experience. The first professionalfinancial follow-up reports on the investment enterprises of the BEF portfolio appear onlyin December 1996 (based on the financial reporting manual elaborated in September1996). This lack of follow-up and financial reporting has allowed two investmententerprises to use investment enterprise funds for other purposes.

21. In 1997, BEF got involved into a desinvestment court case. BEF's managementhandled the case through the weak and poorly guided judicial system, but failed torecover much of the money. The judicial case took up significant management time,caused enormous stress and had an adverse impact on BEF's morale. Although it showedthe BEF managers' courageous determination to make its partners honor theirobligations, it also demonstrated that business partners need more lines of defense than agovernment-sponsored entity can assemble.3 It also illustrates how difficult it is for anagency such as BEF to make its partners honor their agreements in the Bolivian businessenvironment.

D. Project Sustainability and Continuity

22. Sustainability. BEF's sustainability is likely. BEF and the Government haveagreed on June 8, 1998 on a debt repayment plan. Debt payments to the Government canbe made with the income from planned desinvestments. Some level of riskiness remainssince no analysis has been made of possible scenarios to obtain cash through repaymentof equity (management buy-out, sale to third parties, introduction on the future BolivianStock Exchange). Operational costs can be covered by income from financial operationsand dividends from the investment enterprises. Most likely dividends and desinvestmentswill be sufficient to cover operational costs and to reimburse the government loan.

23. Continuity of the Project. The design of the project supposed that BEF wouldcontinue investing in enterprises with the funds recovered from desinvestments anddividends. This continuity seems unlikely at least for the near future, since there are nonew investment enterprises in the pipeline (besides some investment extensions inexisting joint-ventures).

24. In the next five years the following three main scenarios are possible:

Best: BEF reimburses its debt on schedule (through desinvestments) and canattract new private or donor money because of its capacity to run thisFoundation. In this case, BEF will turn into a dynamic entity and allproject objectives will have been reached.

3 Private business partners cover their agreements with family and other business ties, which BEF doesnot have.

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Modest: BEF reimburses on schedule but turns into a dormant stage in whichBEF only supervises its existing portfolio. The result of this scenariowill be that some investment enterprises will have been able to growthanks to BEF's investments.

Worst: Some large investments appear to be lame ducks and the snow ball effectwill pull down the value of the portfolio. It may then not be possible tofully reimburse the Government.

E. Bank Performance

25. Overall Bank performance is rated as unsatisfactory.

(i) Preparation and design. The project design lacked prioritization of projectobjectives and was wrong in proposing to start up five new companies fromscratch. The SAR had no clear monitoring indicators. There was aninherent hybrid element in the design which got never resolved duringimplementation: people involved in the design and management of theproject had a typical professional profile of development aid operations,while BEF's implementation required real business people.4

(ii) Implementation. During the first project years, monitoring by the Bank wasless then satisfactory. The Bank should have put a staff member,experienced in business, as project supervisor. Moreover, as an efficientproject supervisor, the Bank should not have permitted that its representativein the project had such an open and paralyzing conflict with BEF'smanagement team during 2.5 years. In the second half of the project, theBank gave clear guidelines and accelerated approval of investments. Itemphasized: (i) effective control of the portfolio; (ii) strengthening of themanagement team; and (iii) sustainability. It neglected, however, toemphasize the need for pilot operations and pipeline development.

26. Other Donors Performance. The Dutch and Swiss Governments had a sharedresponsibility with the Bank for project implementation. They were members of the BEFBoard5 and were very much involved in project management at start-up. Despite theirdisagreements with strategic issues, they have provided the Bank with continuoussupport.

4 This was understood by the people who first designed the project in 90-91 and who asked for a setupin which the initial management team would be required to invest US$1.5 milion in the fund. Thiswas finally not done.

The Dutch government withdrew as a voting member in 1996.

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F. Borrower Performance

27. Government Performance. Government performance has been satisfactory. TheGovernment has respected BEF's structure as an independent private organization withlittle government involvement. There was, however, a high turn over of Governmentrepresentatives on BEF's Board.

28. Management Performance: Management performance is marginally satisfactory.It is questionable whether the delay in investments during the first years of the projectwere caused by the low quality of the international management team or were inherent tothe project design and as such unavoidable. The facts are that: (i) part of the same teamwas already working on the ADP project during nearly two years before the project start-up; (ii) their conflict with the Bank and the BEF Board of Directors put the brakes onmany of their proposals; and (iii) for the same cost of one of the international managers, aBolivian top private manager could have been recruited. This could have created a totallydifferent relationship between the Board and the management and would have moved theproject forward much faster. At the departure of the international team, the Bolivian teamhad yet to start with the learning process and few operational investment procedures wereavailable.

29. The Bolivian team performed better. The team has invested US$21 million in2.5 years. It has learned to manage BEF, but also at a high cost. The team has now thecapacity to follow-up the portfolio, but it did not perform well enough to avoid financiallosses and overvaluations of some of its investments. Follow-up of the well justifiedrecommendations of the different Bank supervision missions has been slow andincomplete. It is possible that, now that BEF has to take full responsibility for itsperformance and can not longer rely on Bank supervision, the team will become morepro-active and efficient. There remains, however, still a need for an in-house person withreal business feeling and experience.

30. BEF Board of Directors Performance. Decision-making at the Board has beenslow. With the operational and financial structure inherent to this project and without theDirectors having a financial stake in BEF, it will be hard to compose a more efficientBoard of Directors. Dedication to the Board has not been equal between the differentdirectors.

G. Assessment of Outcome

31. The overall outcome of the project is unsatisfactory. Although the institutionalproject objectives have been met, BEF's impact on the overall agro-export sector hasbeen small and its financial performance is at present unsatisfactory. The value of theportfolio has declined by about 25 percent over 2.5 years. Project implementationshowed important shortcomings in the portfolio monitoring which has allowed financiallosses. BEF's sustainability is likely now that a definitive agreement on the debt level

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with the Government has been reached. BEF's ultimate financial performance willdepend on the performance of some key investments.

H. Future Operation

32. The project has been shielded from government interference and private sectorabuse by the presence of the donors. As donors are withdrawing, some investmentpartners already want BEF to desinvest in their enterprises because they fear that, oncethe donors have left, the Government could become their partner instead of BEF.Therefore it could be very efficient (comparing cost to possible impact) if BEF couldcontinue to use its relationship with the Bank and the other donors. This relationshipcould be given the form of a special fund to finance about 4 weeks of supervisory andadvisory services per year for two years following the end of the project to allow theportfolio to mature.

33. A SociedadAnonima (corporation) to be created with the funds that could beavailable at the end of 1998, together with the shares of one or two of the biggest and bestinvestments of the portfolio, would permit BEF to attract private money and act as avehicle for the more aggressive business operations. BEF as such could continue to workon smaller pilot projects. The Swiss Government is showing interest in participating insuch corporation.

I. Key Lessons Learned

34. Bureaucrats should stay out of business. The principal lesson that can bedrawn from project implementation is that top entrepreneurial management is necessaryto invest and monitor the use of such a large portfolio. A business operation managed bypeople with a public service or development aid profile is likely to underperform.

35. Business Strategy. The two following lessons are less important during startupbut eventually decisive for the success of the foundation:

(i) Step by step investments: each company has its own development capacityand over capitalization can be as disastrous as lacking capital. Especially incase of less experienced enterprises, it is important to limit the damage offailure, invest step by step and allow for increasing knowledge and marketbuild-up;

(ii) BEF should not create new companies from scratch, unless it concernssmaller enterprises were no alternatives are available and/or other criteria,like social impact, are principal; and

(iii) When investing in companies, BEF should introduced immediately ownaccounting and financial management procedures, allowing it to monitor thecompany's performance on a daily basis.

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36. Need for a competent local partner. The combination of local businessrelations, understanding of the local business realities and private money (the businessdrive) could have been obtained by including from the beginning a local private financialinstitution as partner in BEF.

37. Legal framework. In a legal framework where contracts can not be enforcedthrough courts, official business is hard to carry out. Companies in Bolivia are mainlyfamily businesses which can enforce contracts using multiple contract compliancestrategies (through family relations and other business ties). An organization such asBEF does not have this type of business relationships and has difficulty working in suchenvironment.

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PART II - STATISTICAL ANNEX

Table 1: Summary of Assessments

Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credits

Table 3: Project Timetable

Table 4: Credit Disbursement: Cumulative Estimated and Actual

Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation

Table 6A: Project Costs

Table 6B: Project Financing

Table 7: Status of Legal Covenants

Table 8: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs

Table 9: Bank Resources: Missions

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Table 1: Summary of Assessments

A. Achievement of objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not l

Macro policies X

Sector policies X

Financial objectives X

Institutional development X

Physical objectives X

Poverty reduction X

Gender issues X

Other social objectives X

Environmental objectives X

Public sector management X

Private sector development X

NGO involvement X

B. Project sustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain

xC. Bank performance Highly Satisfactory Deficient

Satisfactory

Identification X

Preparation Assistance X

Appraisal X

Supervision X

D. Borrower performance Highly Satisfactory DeficientSatisfactory

Preparation X

Implementation X

Covenant compliance X

E. Assessment of outcome Highly Satisfactory Unsatisfactory HighlySatisfactory Unsatisfactory

x

13

Table 2: Related Bank Credits

Loan/credit title Purpose Year of Statusapproval

Preceding operations

Private Enterprise Development Privatization of services 1990 ClosedTechnology Development Research and Extension 1991 ClosingRegulatory Reform and Capitalization Privatization 1995 ActiveCapitalization Program Privatization 1996 ActiveRural Communities Development Rural Infrastructure 1995 ActiveProject

Table 3: Project Timetable

Steps in project cycle Date planned Date actualIdentification j 1987Preappraisal Mission Dec-90Executive Project Summary Mar-91Staff Appraisal Mission | Nov-91Project Agreement Mar-92 Mar-92Dutch Agreement May-92 May-92Swiss Agreement Dec-93Project completion Dec-97 Dec-97

Table 4: IDA Credit Disbursement: Cumulative Estimated and Actual(US$ thousands)

FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98Appraisal Estimate 3,200 5,900 9,500 14,000 18,500 22,500Actual 2,505 2,505 6,776 10,980 14,340 16,312Actual as % of estimate 78% 42% 71% 78% 78% 74%Date of Final Disbursement February

_ 19, 1998 l l l l

14

Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation

Actual Achievements*

First Second Third Fourth FifthItem Appraisal Targets Year Year Year Year Year

A. BEF's 1. Effective supervision of theBoard management in setting up

administrative and operational 2 2 2 3 3system.

2. Ensure that the management 3 3 2 2 2prepares realistic Annual BusinessPlan.

3. Ensure that management prepares 3 3 2 2 2high quality feasibility studies.

4. Supervise implementation of theAnnual Business Plan. 2 3 2

B. 1. Establish the BEF office and setManagement up all administrative and operational 3 2 1 2 2

system.

2. Complete the review of the 1 2 2 2 2feasibility studies.

3. Prepares Annual Business Plan. 5 3 2 2 2

4. Act to implement therecommendation of the Annual 5 3 2 3 3business Plan.

5. Review and supervise theimplementation of the Annual 5 3 2 3 3Business Plan. I lI

* Achievement ranking on scale of "1" (excellent) to "5" (very poor).

15

Table 6. A: Project Cost Summary Table

Planned Actual Percentage ofUS$ million US$ million planned

Enterprise Investment 19.6 18.6 94%Management and Operating Costs 3.8 5.5 145%Research & Development 8.1 1.5 19%

Price contingencies 3.1TOTAL 34.6 25.6 74%

Table 6. B: Project FinancingUS$ '000

IDA Netherlands COSUDE TotalInvestments 15,909 2,548 1,624 20,081Operational Costs 403 5,070 -- 5,473Total Disbursed 16,312 7,618 1,624 25,554Total Planned 22,500 8,900 3,201 34,601

Table 7: Status of Legal Covenants

Legal Covenant Report: Latest status of Covenant Compliance OD 13.05 - ANNEX D5LCR - Latin America & Caribbean Region Page: 1LCC6C - Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru CMU Run Date: 06/11/98 at 13.55.00

Form 590 Date: 05/04/1998

Project ID: BO-PE6153 - AGRO EXPORT DEV PROG

Original RevisedCovenant Fulfill FulfillClass(s) Status Date Date Description of Covenant Comments

Agreement: CREDIT Credit Number: IDA -23220

Text Reference: 3.01 (b)02 C 02/28/1994 10/13/1994 Transfer funds to BEF. None

Text Reference: 3.02 (i)(ii(iii)05 C Coordination of export program. None

Text Reference: 3.03 (a)(b)05 C Improve local conditions and safeguard None

environment.

Text Reference: 4.0101,02 C 06/30/1995 Audit report. Final audit report received on April 30, 1998

Text Reference: Schedule I (para. 3)09 C Approval of projects by Bank. None

Agreement: PROJEC Credit Number: IDA -23220

Text Reference: 2.06 (a)05 C Not to change Operational Manual None

Text Reference: 2.06 (a)05 CP Not to change Operational Manual. FBE following a modified manual.

Status:c - Complied withCD - Compliance after DelayN -Not Complied withSOON - Compliance Expected in Reasonably Short TimeCP -Complied with PartiallyNYD - Not Yet Due

Legal Covenant Report: Latest status of Covenant Compliance OD 13.05 - ANNEX D5LCR - Latin America & Caribbean Region Page: 2LCC6C - Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru CMU Run Date: 06/11/98 at 13.55.00

Form 590 Date: 05/04/1998

Project ID: BO-PE-6153 - AGRO EXPORT DEV PROG

Original RevisedCovenant Fulfill FulfillClass(s) Status Date Date Description of Covenant C Comments

Text Reference: 2.07 (i)05 C 11/30/1995 11/15/1997 Provision of Annual Business Plan. Presented during supervision mission

Text Reference: 2.07 (ii)09 C Provision of Progress Report. Final report prepared in February 1998

Text Reference: 2.08 (a)(i) and (ii)05 C Retain Management firm for three years. . aManagement firm replaced

Text Reference: 2.08 (b)05 C DHVA not to replace staff. e Same as above

Text Reference: 2.08 (c)05 C Inform IDA of any change. None

Text Reference: 2.09 (a)(b)(c) and (d)05 C 04/30/1995 Carry out Mid-term Review. None

Text Reference: 2. 10 (a) and (b)06 C Improve social conditions and safeguard Environmental assessment done for sensitive

environment. projects

Text Reference: 2.1 109 CD 05/31/1993 Put monitoring system into operation. Monitoring system improved.

Text Reference: 2.1202 C BEF not to lend or provide financial guarantee. None

Status:C - Complied withCD - Compliance after DelayNC -Not Complied withSOON - compliance Expected in Reasonably Short TimeCP - Complied with Partially

:NYD -Not Yet Due

Legal Covenant Report: Latest status of Covenant Compliance OD 13.05 - ANNEX DSLCR - Latin America & Caribbean Region Page: 3LCC6C -Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru CMU Run Date: 06/11/98 at 13.55.00

Form 590 Date: 05/04/1998

Project ID: BO-PE-6153 - AGRO EXPORT DEV PROG

Original RevisedCovenant Fulfill FulfillClass(s) Status Date Date Description of Covenant Comments

Text Reference: 3.0405 CP BEF to maintain qualified Directors. Some Directors are not interested in running of

FBE

Text Reference: 4.0202 C BEF to maintain a debt to equity ratio not None

greaterthan 70 to 30.

Text Reference: Schedutle 2 (para. 1)10 C Approval of projects by Bank. None

CO

Status:C - Complied withCD - Compliance after DelayNC - Not Complied withSOON - Compliance Expected in Reasonably Short Time

CP - Complied with PartiallyNYD - Not Yet Due

Legal Covenant Report: Latest status of Covenant Compliance OD 13.05 - ANNEX D5Full Text of General Covenant Classification Run Date: 06/11/98 at 13.55.00

Covenant Class

1 Accounts/audit2 Financial performance/generate revenue from beneficiaries3 Flow and utilization of Project funds4 Counterpart funding5 Management aspects of the Project or of its executing agency6 Environmental covenantsI Involuntary resettlement8 Indigenous people9 Monitoring, review and reporting10 Implementation11 Sectoral or cross-sectoral budgetary or other resource allocation12 Sectoral or cross-sectoral regulatory/institutional action13 Other

Table 8: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs

_._ ___ STAGE OF PROJECT CYCLE _. ._ _ _ STAGE OF PROJECT CYCLE

FiscalYear Preparation|Appraisal |Negotiations Supervisior Completion TOTAL Preparation Appraisal Negotiations |Supervision Completion TOTAL

______ __ -------------- ------------- st affweeks--- ------------ -_---- _-- @ o- .U$00--------

1987 0.1 _ _ 0.1 0

1988 21.5 _' _ ._ 21.5 45.6 45.6

1989 _ _ 17.7 17.7 44.8 44.8

1990 58.3 58.3 109.8 109.8

1991 43.7 l 12 55.7 a/ 90.4 58.9 149.3 a/

1992 9.6 3.2 6.3 19.1 b/ 30.8 9.9 19.5 _ 60.2 bl ' -

1993 _ . __ 23.6 23.6 ci _7__ .___ __ 75.5 75.5 o1994 . 36.0 36.0 d/ 120.2 ___...__ 120.2 d/

1995 46.8 46.8 e/ _____ __ . __ _. 158.8 158.8 .1

, 1996 . 28.2 _ 28.2 f/ , 102.1 102.1 f/

1997 ___ ___ 24.2 24.2 g/ 81.4 81.4 g/

_ ._._ = 1998 --. =-T 4.0 _ 5.0 9.0 h/ _ 17.7 16.5 H 34.2 h/

TOTA'L 141.3 21.6 ' 3.2 169.1 5.0 340.2 290.6 89.7 9.9 .: 5752 16.5: S981.9 i/

a/ Of Which 8.1 staffweeksiof preparation were paid out of the Dutch Trust Fund. Oa/f which $23,600 was paid from the Dut:hd Trust F indJ __l_l

b/ Of which 1.9 sw of supervision. werepaid out of the Dutch Trust Fund b/ Of which $6,000 was paid from the Dutth--Trust Fuii d.'!

c/ Of which 20.8 sw of supervision.were paid out of the Dutch Trust Fund. c/Of which $66,700 was paid from the DutcliTrust F nd_

_____ d/ Of which 30.2 sw of supervision were paid out of the Dutch Trust Fund _ d/ Of which $100,800 was paid from the Df3tch Trust lurd. -- __..

=e/ f Which 36.9 sw of supervision were paid out of the Dutch Trust Fund e/ Of which $120,300 was paid from the Datth Trust lurkii.

_ f/Ohf Which 8 sw of supervision werepaidoiut of the Dutch TrLust Fund. f/ Of which $33,100 was paid from the Dutch.,Trust Fu nd.

_____ g/ Of Which 15 sw of supervision were paid out of the Dutch I rust Fund. g/ Of which $41,400 was paid from the Dutch Trust Fl nd.

h/ Of which 2 sw were paid out of the Dutch Trus Fund. _ h/ Of which $6,000 was paid from the Duttrh.frust Fu d.

----- ___ -- I--_- i/ Of which $397,900 was paid from the Dutcih Trust l und.

21

Table 9: Bank Resources: Missions

Performance ratingStage of Month Number Days Specialized Types of

project cycle / of in staff skills problemsyear persons field represented

Imple- Developmentation ment

status objecti-ves

Through appraisal

Appraisal through NA NABoard approval

Supervision 92-95 1 3 00 2 Slow Imple-years mentation

4/94 5 14 OO,PO,EC, S U Slow Imple-BA mentation

Mid-Term Review 4/95 5 14 AE, S S Implemen-PO,EC,BA tation

capacity,portfolio risk

Supervision 2/96 3 14 AE, EC, SE S S PortfolioMission management

Supervision mission 7/96 3 14 AE,EC,SE U S PortfolioMonitoring

Supervision PortfolioMission 3/97 4 14 AE, EC, SE, U S Monitoring

ACSupervision OrganizationMission 12/97 2 14 AE, SE U S structure

Completion 2/98 2 14 SE, AE

00 Senior Operations Officer AE = Sr. Agricultural economistPO = Principal operations Officer BA = Business Administration SpecialistEC = Economist SE = Small Enterprises SpecialistAC = Accountant

22 Appendix A

BOLIVIA

PROYECTO DE DESARROLLO DE AGRO-EXPORTACIONESCr 2322-BO

Ayuda Memoria de la Misi6n FinalInforme de Ejecuci6n del Proyecto (ICR)

1. La misi6n final del Banco Mundial, constituida por los seinores Pierre Werbrouck(Jefe de misi6n) y Michel Buyckx (consultor) se ha realizado en Bolivia del 27 Enero al 9de febrero de 1998. Previamente el Sr. Buyckx ha estado en Washington del 22 al 26 deenero 1998 revisando todos los documentos vinculados al Proyecto. En Bolivia, lamisi6n recibi6 un apoyo del Gobierno de los Paises Bajos. La misi6n se ha contactado alPresidente de la Fundaci6n Bolivia Exporta (FBE) y sus principales ejecutivos; losgerentes de las empresas Mabet, Dillman, Flobolsa, Titikaka y Pairumani Foliage; laembajador de los Paises Bajos en Bolivia y el representante de la Agencia Suiza para elDesarrollo y la Cooperaci6n (COSUDE). La misi6n ha participado tambien en la reuni6nde Directorio de la FBE, el dia 7 Febrero 1998. La misi6n agradece a todas lasautoridades y personas responsables entrevistadas por su colaboraci6n y por las sesionesde trabajo muy productivo.

Introducci6n

2. La FBE ha sido creada en marzo de 1992. Este proyecto fue financiado por IDAcon 16.6 millones de DEGs (equivalente a US$22.5 millones) y el Gobiemo de los PaisesBajos 16.4 millones de florines holandeses (equivalente a US$ 8.9 millones). Un montode 9.8 millones de DEGs en forma de credito y un monto de 6.8 millones de DEGs enforma de donaci6n fueron transferidos del Gobiemo de Bolivia a la FBE para serreembolsados en 25 anios a una tasa de interes del 7%. El Proyecto fue aprobado por elBanco Mundial el 9 de septiembre de 1992. El Gobiemo de la Confederaci6n Suiza seintegr6 como co-financiador en diciembre de 1993 por un monto de 4.5 millones deFrancos Suizos (equivalente a US$3.2 millones). En total la FBE contaba con un montode US$35 millones para implementar el proyecto de agro-exportaciones. El proyecto hasido concluido el 31 de diciembre de 1997, quedando un saldo no utilizado de US$10.3millones.

A. Objetivos del Proyecto

3. Los objetivos del proyecto son: (i) expandir la producci6n, la calidad y lacompetitividad de los productos agricolas; (ii) crear una capacidad institucional paraayudar a los empresarios e inversionistas seleccionados por la FBE; (iii) identificar eimportar tecnologias para brindar asistencia a tales empresarios e inversionistas; (iv)incrementar las oportunidades de mercado para la exportaci6n de productos

1

23

agroindustriales; (v) crear empleo y generar acumulaci6n de capital para mejorar losingresos y los niveles de vida de los agricultores.

B. Implementaci6n y Resultados

4. La misi6n final concluye que los resultados del proyecto son insatisfactorios. Apesar de que la FBE se ha desarrollado como una organizaci6n capaz de invertir y deejecutar el seguimiento de su portafolio de inversiones, los costos han sidoextremadamente altos (US$5.5 millones de costos operacionales en cinco afios) y el valordel portafolio ha disminuido considerablemente debido a algunas inversiones queresultaron en perdidas importantes. La FBE ha invertido un monto total de US$19.6millones cuyo valor actual de mercado se estima entre US$8 y US$12 millones.Finalmente cabe recalcar que como gran parte de estas inversiones son nuevas, el valordel portafolio puede cambiar en el futuro.

5. Dos factores claves afectaron el desempefno del proyecto: (i) casi dos afios fueronperdidos al inicio del proyecto por causa de una gesti6n inadecuada del equipo gerencialintemacional y de una supervisi6n deficiente de parte del Banco Mundial; y (ii) la FBEnunca tuvo un equipo de gesti6n suficientemente calificado para bien evaluar el riesgo enlas inversiones y monitorear adecuadamente su portafolio.

C. Resumen de la Evaluaci6n Final

6. Debido a la incertidumbre vinculada al valor futuro del portafolio y al procesode desinversi6n, es dificil estimar o predecir si la FBE tendra problemas de liquidez en elfuturo. No obstante se estima que en la actualidad el portafolio es suficiente para honrarla deuda con el Gobierno de Bolivia.

7. La preparaci6n y el seguimiento del Banco Mundial no han sido satisfactorios:(i) el disefio del proyecto no contemplaba prioridades en sus objetivos y estrategias deejecuci6n; (ii) se considera un error la concepci6n de arrancar con cinco nuevas empresas;(iii) la mayoria de las personas involucradas en la preparaci6n y gesti6n del proyecto atodos los niveles (Banco Mundial, FBE, co-financiadores) no tenian experiencia nihabilidad para los negocios ya que tenian el perfil de tipo bur6crata; y (iv) durante los dosprimeros afios la supervisi6n del Banco Mundial no fue capaz de acelerar el arranque delproyecto ni de limitar los gastos operativos.

8. Por su parte, la contribuci6n del Gobiemo fue satisfactoria habiendo respetado laestructura independiente de la FBE.

9. Con respecto a la gesti6n de la Fundaci6n, se la puede calificar comomarginalmente satisfactoria: (i) el equipo internacional no consigui6 realizar inversiones,tampoco introdujo sistemas de evaluaci6n y seguimiento; (ii) el equipo Boliviano realiz6bastantes inversiones en un corto periodo, pero falt6 de experiencia en evaluaci6n yseguimiento de inversiones.

2

24

10. Finalmente, el rol del Directorio de la FBE fue marginalmente satisfactorio, porfalta de toma de decisiones y de seguimiento a la gerencia.

D. Operaciones Futuras

11. Se recomienda que el Banco y los financiadores bilaterales continuien su relaci6nformal con la FBE para asegurar su independencia e imagen y para apoyar de manerapuntual en algunas etapas importantes de las decisiones empresariales.

12. Se recomienda que la FBE cree una sociedad an6nima para asegurar susostenibilidad (seguimiento de inversiones y captaci6n de nuevos recursos financieros).De esta manera la Fundaci6n podra continuar con sus objetivos, principalmente degenerar proyectos piloto (incubadoras de empresas).

E. Principales Lecciones

13. Este tipo de proyectos de inversiones de riesgo, requiere contar con una estructurade tipo empresarial muy calificada. Se debera tener en cuenta en los proyectos deinversi6n que estos requieren de un proceso de inversi6n paso a paso y con empresas quehayan mostrado experiencia.

F. Varios

14. La misi6n ha recibido un borrador del informe final del Proyecto, elaborado por laFBE. La versi6n final sera presentada antes del 28 de febrero de 1998.

15. El informe de auditoria extema sera enviado al AIF antes del 31 de Marzo de1998.

La Paz, el 9 de febrero de 199Q->

- Sefe de Misi6n

3

25

Appendix B

REPUBLICADEBOLIVIA Borrower Contributions to ICRMINSTER10 DE HACIENDAViccainixt,fio de Invensi6n NbIica

Y Fianaiamiento Externo

La Paz, 15 JUL. 199VIPFE/DGFE/NEG-037 1 1998

SefiorPierre WerbrouckLider SectorialBANCO MUNDIALWashington, D.C.

Ref: CONVENIO DE CREDITO 2322-B0-PROYECTODE DESARROLLO AGROEXPORTADOR

De mi consideracidn:

Hago referencia a su nota del 12 de junio pasado, a trav6s de la cual solicitalos comentarios de este Viceministerio en relaci6n a! informe de conclusl6ndel proyecto de referencia.

Al respecto, me permito comunicarle las siguientes observaciones sobre elcitado documen to:

• En relaci6n a la sostenibilidad del proyecto (punto 6.J, deberfa aclararsecon mayor detalle bajo que premisas esta sostenibilidad puede serfactible, considerando que inicialmente el proyecto estaba destinado aincrementar los niveles de ingreso de camnpesinos y grupos de mujeres,sin embargo las inversiones de la Fundacidn Bolivia Exporta (FBE) han sfdodirigidas a empresas comerciales.

* En lo referente a intervenciones temporales (p unto 12.) se deberfa eclararhasta que punto dstas intervenciones, que en faorna conjunta llegaron a5,3 millones de d6lares, han tenido un impacto permanente en losdistintos sectores productivos, particularmente en la produccidn yexportaciKn de castafia (brazilian nuts).

----.. --.........

AN BANCO

j N 11 N D I A L

7 JUL. 1928

i1¢r bl8 A

26

REPUBUCA DE BOLIVIAMlNlSTERIO DE HACIENDAVWceminitaio de Invezi6n Nblica

Y Fianciani.uo Extmo

* Con relacion al punto 24, el mejor escenario posible esta basado enfuertes premisas, sin embargo algunos donantes, como Holanda handecidido no continuar con el proyecto. Asimismo, se menciona que atravds de la captaciones de recursos privados, la FBE podrba convertirseen una entidad dinalmica, sin embargo dichos recursos podrdn serOnicamente captados si existen altos retornos a la inversion, y esteobjetivo, no necesariamente coincide con los objetivos iniciales delproyecto.

Con este motivo, saludo a usted atentamente.

MIGUL LO B ICV Eil WNIS Of INVEON PULICA

V RIANU4IEANO WERMOINISIEi at ACIENDA

, t' N LACON 27

II.-

COMENTARIOS DE LA FUNDACION BOLIVIA EXPORTAB1O L I V I A

E X P 0 R T A AL INFORME DE CIERRE DE PROYECTO (ICR)

DEL BANCO MUNDIAL

1. El comportamiento de la FUNDACION BOLNIA EXPORTA (FBE), en todos los6rdenes, a saber: el institucional, econ6mico, financiero, social y medio ambiental asi comolas calificaciones descritas en el Informe de Cierre de Proyecto (ICR) del Banco Mundial,deben ser objeto, y creemos que asf lo son, del analisis de las bases de su creacion ysobretodo del marco legal en que se desenvuelve, es decir sus estatutos y los acuerdossuscritos entre los diferentes participantes (Gobierno de Bolivia; Gobiernos de Suiza yHolanda; Banco Mundial y Fundaci6n Bolivia Exporta).

En este entendido, el presente documento de comentarios al ICR, es fruto de lalectura de ese marco legal y refleja el punto de vista del Directorio, a partir de susresponsabilidades y de su propio origen, por lo que se limitara a observar aspectos que nohayan sido expuestos en nuestro Informe Quinquenal presentado al Banco Mundial el 25de febrero de 1998.

2. Dado el cronoorama demasiado corto (5 affos) para alcanzar los objetivos delProyecto, periodo de tiempo insuficiente en cualquier parte, los resultados del proyecto, nopueden ser anticipadamente evaluados como satisfactorios ni insatisfactorios. Lacaracteristica institucional del proyecto, el valor de las inversiones y el tiempo demaduraci6n de las mismas, sittia al mismo como un proyecto en pleno desarrollo. (Punto 4;B; Evaluation Summary).

3. Compartimos el juicio sobre las imperfecciones del diseno del proyecto (punto 6; A;Project Objectives; Part I) y ampliamos el mismo, dado que la FBE tuvo que rediseflar elproyecto con el apoyo de las Misiones del Banco Mundial.

4. Es importante sefalar, que la actividad prioritaria de la FBE, fue la inversi6n deriesgo en empresas del sector agricola y agroindustrial y por lo tanto su existencia y loscompromisos contraidos, han sido objeto de preocupaci6n para alcanzar su sostenibilidad,la misma que de no mediar acontecimientos de fuerza mayor es plenamente factible.

5. La principal lecci6n a nuestro juicio, es la validez del modelo institucional y lamodalidad de participaci6n con inversi6n de riesgo, lo que permiti6 que la FBE como enteprivado capitalice empresas en el sector productivo, privado. Estas capitalizaciones,generaron transferencia de tecnologla; alianzas estrat6gicas; formalizaci6n de empresas;metodos de valoraci6n, evaluaci6n y preparaci6n de proyectos; generaci6n de empfeodirecto e indirecto; generaci6n de valor agregado y toma de conciencia del manejomedioambiental.

Calkc 16 eeuina Julio C. PaUto N' 8085, Calacdo o TcIF&.: 770342 - 770343 -790411 -770322 -770494 * Fax: (591-2) 770315 * Casilla 473 * E*mail: fbezceibo entclneLbo La Paz- bolivia

28

Siguiendo esta experiencia y tomando en cuenta las fallas de la misma en el disefio,este modelo institucional garantiza el logro de objetivos y su sostenibilidad. Actualmente laFBE genera sus propios recursos para su funcionamiento y tiene aproximadamenteUS$.1.500.000.oo en manejo financiero, recursos que a diciembre de 1998 ascenderan aUS$.4.000.000.oo. (t)

6. La metodologia de valoraci6n del portafolio de la FBE que aplica el Banco Mundial yque se explica en el punto 15 de la Secci6n B, Part I, supone empresas sin expectativa decrecimiento y aplica un factor constante (costo relevante de capital=10%) a la utilidadoperativa del periodo corriente, o en su caso un promedio de los ultimos periodos, lo quesignifica niveles no representativos del potencial futuro. En opini6n de la FBE, este metodode valoraci6n no es el apropiado para el portafolio de la FBE y tiene como resultado unasubvaloraci6n econ6mica del mismo.Fruto de la reciente capitalizaci6n por parte de la FBE, en todos lo casos se verifica unproceso de maduraci6n financiera de las inversiones y consecuentemente expectativas decrecimiento futuras de los flujos de caja libre.

7. Las recomendaciones sobre la permanencia de los financiadores en el seno de laFBE, expresadas en el punto 32, Secci6n H, Part I, son compartidas y necesarias, ellopermitira un seguimiento del accionar de la instituci6n, de manera de poder realizarulteriores evaluaciones y acompaflar la evoluci6n de la FBE al ritmo que le exija lamagnitud de actividades (bisqueda de nuevas fuentes de financiamiento; desinversionesen las empresas; diversificaci6n de sus actividades; creaci6n de un ente netamentemercantil y trabajos en proyectos piloto).

° La instituci6n es objeto de dos tesis de grado en la Universidad Catolica de Bolivia y sus personeros hansido invitados por universidades del pais a explicar el modelo institucional y sobretodo la metodologia devaloraci6n de empresas. Por otra parte, la principal raz6n de no ser comparable con Fundaci6n Chile, esque segun los propios personeros de Fundaci6n Chile, sus sostenibilidad se basa en gran parte en elrendimiento financiero de los fondos (US$.50.0 millones) desde un inicio en calidad de fideicomiso y no asien el rendimiento de sus inversiones.

29Appendix C

PROfCTO DE AGROEXPORTACIORESFURDACIOR BOLWIA EXPOFTA

IRESUMU LJECUTIVO

INFOiME QUINQUENAL1993 - 1997

LA PAZ, EEO DM 1996

30

DATOS GENERALES

FUENTES DE FINANCIAMIENTO

Asociaci6n Internacional de Fomento 16.6 millones de Derechos Especiales deGiro

Gobierno de Holanda 16.3 millones de Florines Holandeses

Gobierno de Suiza 4.5 millones de Francos Suizos

MIEMBROS DEL DIRECTORIO

Hugo Castellanos PresidentePeter McFarren Vice-PresidenteTomislav Kuljis DirectorMarcos lberkleid DirectorCharles Bruce DirectorAlicia Vargas DirectorJuan Demeure DirectorPius Wennubst Director Representante del Gobiemo

SuizaAlexander Bartelink Director Representante del Gobierno

HolandaMinisterio de Comercio Exterior Director Representante del Gobiernoe Inversiones de Bolivia.

31

La FUNDACION BOLIVIA EXPORTA (FBE), fue creada el 20 de septiembre de 1991, como unaentidad de derecho privado, cuya fuente de recursos financieros provenie del Convenio deCredito y Donaci6n, de la Asociaci6n Internacional de Fomento (AIF) y los Gobiernos de losPafses Bajos y Suiza respectivamente. Sus areas exclusivas de desenvolvimiento son laagropecuaria y la agroindustria, debiendo las inversiones a realizarse en estos sectores cumplirbasicamente con objetivos de impacto en el desarrollo econ6mico social y ecol6gico del pals.

Su objetivo general es el incremento y diversificaci6n de las exportaciones no tradicionales.

Su objetivo especifico es desarrollar y ampliar empresas productivas de transformaci6n y/ocomercializaci6n en el area agropecuaria y agroindustrial.

I. MARCO INSTITUCIONAL

La FBE tiene su oirigen en el Proyecto de Desarrollo Agropecuario (PDA), ejecutado porDHV/Consultores, con el objeto de estudiar el potencial agroexportador del pals. Este proyectoque tuvo una duracikn de dos aflos, elabor6 cinco estudios de factibilidad (Castafla; Cochinilla;Pelo de angora, Aceites esenciales y Flores) y una propuesta institucional, documentos base delStaff Appraisal Report (SAR) de la AIF.

La FUNDACION BOLIVIA EXPORTA (FBE), esta regulada por las siguientes disposicioneslegales:

1) RESOLUCION SUPREMA 209621: Norma legal de 20 de septiembre de 1991 porla que se otorga personalidad juridica a la Fundaci6n Bolivia Exporta, como entidad dederecho privado sin fines de lucro.

2) CONVENIO DE CREDITO 2322-BO (CC): Convenio suscrito el 4 de marzo de1992, entre la Republica de Bolivia y la Asociaci6n Internacional de Fomento, por el quese establece el objeto y condiciones de un credito de 16.6 millones de DerechosEspeciales de Giro, para la ejecuci6n de Proyecto de Desarrollo de Agroexportaciones.

3) ACUERDO DE PROYECTO (AP): Acuerdo suscrito el 4 de marzo de 1992, entre laFundaci6n Bolivia Exporta y la Asociaci6n Internacional de Fomento, por el que seestablecen las condiciones de participaci6n de la Asociaci6n Internacional de Fomento enel Convenio de Credito 2322-BO con la Repuiblica de Bolivia y las condiciones en que laFundaci6n Bolivia Exporta debera ejecutar el Proyecto.

4) LEY DE LA REPUBLICA 1346: Norma legal de 15 de septiembre de 1992, queaprueba el Convenio de Credito 2322-BO a la Republica de Bolivia y a la Fundaci6nBolivia Exporta como ente ejecutor del Proyecto de Desarrollo de Agroexportaciones.

5) CONTRATO DE ADMINISTRACION: Contrato suscrito el 28 de septiembre de1992, entre la Fundaci6n Bolivia Exporta y la Empresa Administradora, por el que secontrata los servicios de administraci6n del Consorcio DHV/HVA, bajo t6rminos y

32

condiciones satisfactorias para la Asociaci6n Internacional de Fomento, por un tiempo detres aflos, renovable por otros dos afos adicionales.

6) CONVENIO DE ADMINISTRACION DE RECURSOS: Convenio suscrito el 20 deoctubre de 1992, entre la Republica de Bolivia y la Fundaci6n Bolivia Exporta, por el quese establecen los tKrminos y condiciones de transferencia de los recursos provenientesdel Credito 2322-BO a la Fundaci6n Bolivia Exporta.

II. RESPONSABILIDADES

7) Si bien el 6rgano de maxima decisi6n de acuerdo a los estatutos de la FBE, es suDirectorio, el origen y tenencia de los recursos y los compromisos establecidos, hacenque las responsabilidades sean compartidas por el Directorio y los Financiadores.

8) La AIF por su parte, al contar con los recursos tanto del cr6dito como de losdonantes y tener un rol supervisor en el envfo de fondos a trav6s del Banco Central deBolivia y de acuerdo a una metodologla y cronograma de desembolsos y descargos, tenlaconocimiento pleno de los proyectos, de manera de contar con los instrumentossuficientes que resguarda su responsabilidad al dar su "no objecion" o "su objeci6n", esdecir aprobar o no un proyecto y su desembolso, ain si el proyecto hubiera sido aprobadopor el Directorio de la F.B.E.

9) El diseflo del proyecto tenfa como condici6n previa de aprobaci6n del cr6dito de laAIF, la contrataci6n de una empresa internacional que gerente la FBE y capacite alpersonal nacional. La FBE contrata los servicios del consorcio de Consultores DHV/HVAde Holanda, en el entendido que era la empresa mejor calificada, dada la experiencia deesta empresa en la eiecuci6n del PDA.

10) Si bien la misma empresa DHV-Consultores fue la que elabor6 los estudios delPDA, los profesionales que arribaron a Bolivia en calidad de Gerentes de la FBE, no eranlos mismos que trabajaron en la primera etapa y este nuevo equipo tenla comunicaci6nmuy precaria con su empresa matriz (DHV-Holanda). Por otra parte, el equipo gerencialcontratado, no tenia una contraparte de direcci6n nacional y no eran dependientes delDirectorio de la FBE, ya que su contrato de trabajo fue firmado directamente conDHV/HVA, quien a su vez, tenla una relaci6n contractual con la F.B.E.

11) Estos factores y el desconocimiento de la realidad econ6mica y social de Bolivia,pueden explicar en parte, el que no se hayan ejecutado proyectos los primeros aflos deexistencia de la FBE, aflos que se dedicaron mas bien al analisis de nuevos proyectos;conocimiento del pals y revisi6n de los estudios del PDA. Los proyectos elaborados en elperlodo PDA 1989-1991, por diversas razones hablan perdido ventajas cualitativas ycuantitativas.

12) En este contexto, el rol de la AIF ha sido vital para la instituci6n, principalmente porel acompaflamiento en todas las actividades y decisiones de la FBE. Debemosdiferenciar dos etapas y actitudes en estos cinco aflos. Una primera etapa 1993-1995, enla que se insisti6 en la elaboraci6n de sistemas y una etapa posterior, 1995-1997 que se

33

caracteriz6 por ser operativa, es decir se prioriz6 la ejecuci6n de proyectos, dando a laFBE mayor autonomla.

ill. VIGENCIA Y ESTADO DE,SITUACION

13) El Acuerdo del Proyecto concluye en la fecha en que el Convenio de Cr6ditoconcluya. El Convenio de Credito, establece el 31 de diciembre de 1997 como fecha de.cierre o una fecha posterior establecida por la AIF, que esta OlItima notificara a laRepublica de Bolivia.

14) En noviembre de 1992, la AIF comunica su no objeci6n al Convenio de Cr6dito yla FBE inicia sus actividades en el marco establecido en el Programa 2 del Convenio deCredito, el mismo que describe los objetivos y sus componentes, a saber: proyectos deinversi6n; fortalocimiento institucional e investigaci6n y transferencia de tecnologla.

15) El Convenio de Credito establece en su Programa 1, categorlas de financiamientoque asignan montos y porcentajes de los gastos elegibles a ser financiados por elConvenio de Cr6dito, segUn los objetivos del proyecto.

16) Durante la vigencia del Acuerdo de Proyecto y Convenio de Credito, se hanefectuado las siguientes modificaciones: i) Reprogramaci6n de los montos y porcentajesde financiamiento segun categorlas (adendums 1 y 2 al Convenio de Credito); ii)Rescisi6n del Contrato de Administraci6n firmado con la firma administradora en unafecha anterior a la prevista.

17) El Convenio de Administracion de Recursos (CAR), por los fondos obtenidos de laA.l.F. y que ascienden a DEG's 16.600.000, establece los siguientes t6rminos ycondiciones: i) 8.4 millones de DEG's en forma de cr6dito y 8.2 millones de DEG's enforma de donaci6n; ii) una tasa anual de inter6s por los montos obtenidos como cr6dito de7%; iii) cinco aflos de gracia para el pago de intereses y 10 aflos de gracia para el pagode capital; iv) pago de cuotas similares de forma semestral y un plazo total de 25 aflos.Este sistema permite a la FBE, que al cabo de los 25 aflos complete el pago de los 16.6millones de DEG's a la Republica de Bolivia.

18) Al 31 de diciembre de 1997, la AIF y los Gobiernos de Holanda y Suiza, handesembolsado el equivalente de US$.25.263.262 distribuidos de acuerdo a lasCategorlas y montos asignados en el Convenio de Credito (Anexo 1). A esta fecha hanquedado montos no utilizados que ascienden al equivalente de US$.10.346.435.-

IV. DIRECCION-GESTION Y SEGUIMIENTO

19) El Directorio esta compuesto en su mayorla por personalidades del sector privadoy su representaci6n es a titulo personal. Este Directorio ha sido designado por invitaci6nde los Gobiernos de Bolivia y Holanda y por una selecci6n previa a trav6s de unaconsultorla contratada para el efecto por la AIF.

34

20) El Directorio tiene como marco de acci6n los siguiente instrumentos: (i) Plan Anualde Trabajo; (ii) Memoria Anual de Gesti6n; (iii) Auditorla Externa Anual; (iv) Informe deEvaluaci6n de las Misiones de la AIF.

21) El Directorio luego de evaluar la gestion internacional del Consorcio DHV/HVA,decidio en junio de 1994, rescindir el contrato de administraci6n, dado que los costos dedicha administraci6n eran extremadamente elevados para los rendimientos quemostraban las gestiones de 1993 y 1994, que no lograron cumplir las metas propuestasen los Planes Anuales de Trabajo. Los pagos realizados por la FBE al ConsorcioDHV/HVA ascienden a US$.1.885.865.-

22) Los proyectos aprobados por el Directorio se procesaron en las siguientesinstancias: (i) Comit6 de Gerencia; (ii) Comit6 de Directorio; (iii) Directorio y (iv) NoObjeci6n de la AIF.

23) A partir de la sustituci6n de la empresa administradora por personal ejecutivonacional, se tiene una sustancial reducci6n en los gastos de funcionamiento, deUS$.3.399.990 gestiones 1993/1995, a US$.1.785.682 en las gestiones 1996 y 1997.(ver Anexo 1- Gastos Categorla 2 Add.1 - Funcionamiento FBE).

V. PORTAFOLIO DE INVERSIONES

24) La FBE contaba como referencia para sus actividades, con estudios de factibilidadde: castafia, flores, cochinilla, aceites esenciales y pelo de angora, asl como un listado de47 productos susceptibles de potenciar su producci6n exportable.

25) La FBE al tercer aflo de actividades, elabor6 estrategias sectoriales que lepermitlan buscar proyectos y no esperar que estos lleguen a la instituci6n, habiendodefinido centrar sus actividades, en los siguientes sectores/productos: castafla;manufacturas de madera; manufacturas de cuero; alimentos envasados; hortalizasfrescas y flores.

26) Se defini6 que los proyectos de investigaci6n y transferencia de tecnologla deblanser financiados con la participaci6n conjunta de otras instituciones especializadas yserlan ejecutadas solo cuando se llegue a un portafolio de inversiones que garantice lasostenibilidad de la instituci6n.

27) La FBE en cinco aflos de actividad, invirti6 en Proyectos de Inversi6n,US$.18.093.340; en Proyectos Piloto de Investigaci6n y transferencia de tecnologla,Categorla 3, US$.1.584.250.-; Gastos de funcionamiento de la instituci6n - Categorla 2Add. 1 US$.5.185.672; Anticr6tico oficina - Categorla 4, US$.400.000.-; habiendoejecutado un total de US$.25.263.262.

28) A la fecha la FBE cuenta con un portafolio de: a) 10 proyectos en ejecuci6n:FLOBOLSA - flores en Cochabamba; PAIRUMANI - baby blue en Cochabamba;DILLMANN - alimentos en Cochabamba; PERASPAMPA - flores en Sucre; PROTISA -truchas en el lago Titikaka en La Paz; MABET - puertas y ventanas de madera en La Paz;TAHUAMANU - beneficiado de castafla en Cobija; AJO - Producci6n y Comercializacion

35de Ajo en Tairija; BOSQUES DEL NORTE - marcos de madera en La Paz; TAHUAMANU- Sociedad Accidental para acopio de castafla en la Zafra 1997-1998.

b) 16 Proyectos Concluldos: SAN SILVESTRE - acopio de castafla; BCP AlpacaDesigns - prendas de alpaca en La Paz, COCHINILLA; STEVIA; BIT - ComercializadoraLa Paz; ZOOMUNDO Trading - peces ornamentales en Trinidad; BENEFICIADORAHarold CLAURE - 95-96; 96-97; BENEFICIADORA Waldemar BEZERRA - 95-96; 96-97;BENEFICIADORA JABIEX 95-96; HECKER HNOS. S.A. - 95-96; TAHUAMANU SRL-95-96; 96-97; CARBEN SRL - estudio de mercado para prendas de vestir; SAITAM -estudio factibilidad para instalar una fabrica de aceite soya.

c) 4 proyectos con acciones legales y en proceso de desinversi6n y/o liquidaci6n;TRICOM - puertas de madera en La Paz; AMERICA - beneficiado de castafla enRiberalta; GRANEL - aceite de soya en Santa Cruz.; LIRA - Producci6n de urnasfunerarias.

29) La aplicaci6n de recursos por la ejecuci6n de los proyectos durante los primeros 5afos de vida de la F.B.E fue de 3% el 1993; 0% el 1994; 24% el 1995; 22% el 1996 y51 % el 1997.

VI. VENTAJAS Y LIMITACIONES

30) El aprovechamiento de los financiamientos concesionales y las donacionesexternas, estan en funci6n del tipo de proyecto que sera financiado. La FBE por suconcepcion, es con seguridad un modelo que obliga a tener sostenibilidad y por lo tantoes un proyecto que obliga a que las contrapartes, en este caso el sector privado, asumaresponsabilidades y no se limite a la recepci6n de ayuda externa, o a la obtenci6n decr6ditos de fomento, las mismas que una vez agotadas no generan impactos positivos niIa continuidacl del proyecto en el tiempo.

31) En este sentido, el modelo FBE tiene ventajas en su estructura global, y laslimitaciones son menores y de orden operativo. Estas limitaciones pueden ser superadasen el diseflo del proyecto, como por ejemplo incluyendo en la preparaci6n del proyecto aquienes se haran cargo de su ejecuci6n posterior.

32) En el orden estructural, la inversi6n en el sector agroexportador supone un procesoamplio de investigaci6n previa y en general el sector productor/exportador no redituaresultados en el corto plazo. Las exigencias del mercado externo y las limitaciones delpals, en el orden de calidad del producto y su manejo post-produccion (transporte-mercado) requieren de politicas publicas que incorpore la inversi6n en infraestructura. Enese sentido, la FBE es un proyecto modesto, pero que jug6 un rol importante al tratar dedefinir estrategias y generar impactos.

33) La FBE trat6 de rescatar las experiencias de Fundaci6n Chile, por lo que visit6 adicha instituci6n y se adaptaron muchos de sus conceptos. No obstante a diferencia deFundaci6n Chile, la FBE no tenla un fondo fiduciario disponible que le permita generarrecursos desdle su inicio. Aun con esta limitaci6n, comprensible si tenemos en cuenta el

36

origen de los recursos de la FBE, la instituci6n muestra potencial y sostenibilidadoperativa en el tiempo.

UN EJEMPLO

- La FBE realiz6 en 1995 inversiones en Sociedades Accidentales, las mismas queestan previstas en el C6digo de Comercio y que constituyen "joint-venture" aut6nticos.Esta experiencia era in6dita en el pals.

- Estas Sociedades Accidentales que precisaban recursos para capital operativo, enel caso concreto del sector de la castafia, tuvieron efectos positivos, sobre todo porqueson proyectos en los que la banca comercial no interviene, dado que la garantlas en laregi6n amaz6nica no satisfacen a nuestro sistema financiero.

- No obstante el exito que se obtuvo en estas sociedades, que tenian rendimientosripidos y relativamente altos, la FBE no pudo obtener de la AIF que estas sociedadessean en todos los casos financiadas por nuevos desembolsos, habiendo por lo tanto, laFBE utilizado sus recuperaciones y dividendos para replicar estas experiencias (verAnexo 2).

VII. LECCIONES

34) A la fecha, la FBE puede considerarse como el primer y unico fondo de capital deriesgo en Bolivia. No obstante, no se ha podido lograr el desembolso del total de losrecursos originalmente comprometidos, debido a que entre otras causas, las areas deacci6n de la FBE (agropecuaria y agroindustrial), son sectores de larga maduraci6n, bajosretornos y altos riesgos.

35) El hecho de haber invertido capital de riesgo, ha dado satisfactorios resultadosfinancieros en algunos casos y dificultades en otros. Sin embargo, de no haber priorizadola inversi6n y postergado los proyectos piloto, los fondos no utilizados al 31 de diciembrede 1997, con seguridad hubieran sido mucho mayores.

36) Por la estructura de aplicaci6n de los recursos del Convenio de Cr6dito, estos sondestinados a: Inversiones; Gastos de Funcionamiento y Proyectos Piloto. Este esquemaesta concebido para generar la fuente de repago de los compromisos de la FBE, medianteun sistema de inversi6n; captaci6n de rendimientos; desinversi6n e inversiones ennuevos proyectos. Solo se ha cumplido este ciclo en las Sociedades Accidentales ytodavla no se ha iniciado con las Sociedades estables (Sociedades An6nimas).

37) Las inversiones realizadas han tenido efectos positivos en el crecimiento ydiversificaci6n de las exportaciones; generaci6n de empleo; medio ambient. yformalizaci6n de las empresas. (Ver Anexo 3).

38) El hecho de no haber ampliado el proyecto y haber quedado un remanente dedinero no desembolsado de US$.10.346.435 ( en gran parte recursos de donaci6n), enprimer termino representa un perjuicio para el pals y en relaci6n a la FBE debilita su

37

sostenibilidad institucional, ya que su actividad como Fondo de Capital de Riesgo, solopodra continuar hasta que logre captar nuevos recursos financieros.

39) Por todas las caracteristicas del Proyecto FBE, este tuvo una evoluci6n que suscreadores no tenfan prevista, sin embargo y debido a su magnitud, sobretodo por serinedito en su genero para la AIF y el pals y estar orientado al sector agricola yagroindustrial, ameritaba que se prevea un tiempo mayor a cinco afos, que es el tiempode vigencia del Acuerdo de Proyecto y Convenio de Cr6dito.

40) Los proyectos de inversi6n con participaci6n de la FBE, que han entrado en unproceso crftico en el orden financiero y legal, tienen como denominador comin la malacalidad del socio y la gesti6n, factores que auln con evaluaciones exhaustivas esta fuerade control. Otro factor que se identific6 en el fracaso de proyectos, fue el enfoque noapropiado de los proyectos, los mismos que eran demasiado inmaduros en tema degesti6n y sobre todo de mercado para invertir en capital de riesgo y mas bien debieronhaber sido orientados como proyectos piloto.

41) Requiere especial menci6n el proceso legal de desinversi6n, en la empresaAMERICA S.A, beneficiadora de castafla, que por graves deficiencias de gesti6nadministrativa, ha determinado acciones que para la FBE fueron traumaticas. Esteproceso lievado adelante por la Gerencia de la FBE, cont6 en todo momento con el apoyodel Banco Mundial y sin embargo de haber opacado la imagen de la instituci6n, tambi6nha servido como aviso de alerta y un precedente para gestores de otros proyectos queconsideran que los recursos aportados por la FBE, pueden ser distraidos.

Vll. PERSPECTIVAS

42) Actualmente el Directorio de la FBE se encuentra analizando estrategias yopciones para garantizar los objetivos y la continuidad de la FBE. Una vez que se haconcluido la relaci6n con el Banco Mundial, las opciones institucionales que se estanestudiando son la creaci6n de un ente mercantil (Sociedad An6nima) con participacion dela FBE e instituciones financieras nacionales y extranjeras.

43) Es necesario desde el punto de vista de la FBE, que continue la participaci6n de laAIF, aun si este organismo ya no se constituye en fuente de financiamientos de la FBE.Esta necesidad obedece a que se requiere de un paraguas que le permita mantener suautonomla de gesti6n e imagen, tanto de la instituci6n como de sus empresas asociadas.

44) Si bien el Proyecto de la FBE ha concluido para la AIF el 31/12/97, es importanteque los Gobiernos de Holanda y Suiza puedan analizar la continuidad del proyectootorgando para ello los fondos remanentes de sus donaciones al 31 de diciembre de1997, y aun si esto no es posible, la presencia de estos financiadores en el seno delDirectorio, creemos que es de importancia para la FBE.

ANEXO 11.1. AMBITO FINANCIERO AL 31 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1997

CATEGORIZACION CATEGORIZACION MONTOS SALDO NOCATEG. CONCEPTO ORIGINAL (1992) REFORMULADA EJECUTADOS UTILIZADO

USS. (1997) USS. USS. USS.1-2a. Inversiones 14.862.685.04 21.254.759 18.093.340 3.161.4192ad. I Gastos 5.714.285.71 5.713.883 5.185.672 528.211

Funcionamiento3 Proyectos Piloto 10.272.226.04 7.864.129 1.584.250 6.279.8794 Anticr6tico 542.168.67 570.740 400.000 170.7405 No asignado 3.108.634.54 206.186 206.186

TOTAL 34.500.000.001 35.609.697 25.263.262 10.346.435(1) 1 (2) L (3) , (4)

(1) Originalmento las asignaciones de recursos a las diferentes categorias de gastos valuadas a tipos de cambio vigentes al 311X11192 representaban USS.34.500.000 ycorrespondian a:

AIF Convenio de Credito 2322-BO DEG's 16.600.000.- US$. 22.500.000.-Gob. de Holanda Convenio de Donaci6n 0521955 BO FL.H. 16.380.000.. USS. 9.000.000..Gob. de Suiza Convenio de Donacion 1403270 BO Fr. S. 4.500.000.- USS. 3.000.00.-

USS. 34.500.000.-

12) Como resultado de la vaviation tde los tipos de cambio del dMar estadounidense respecto a las monedas originales, de los Convenios de Credito y Donacion IDEG's, FL.H. yFr.S.) este monto al cierre de la gestion 1997 se incrementa a US$.35.609.697.- lo que genera una diferencia positiva en dWlares recibidos o a recibir por la F.B.E. de USS.1.109.697..Adicionalmente y con comunicaci6n de 12 de diciembre de 1997, se informa a la F.B.E. sobre la redistribucion de los recursos no asignados y Ide los recursos en las diversascategorias de gastos.

(3) Del procesamiento de las diversas solicitudes de reembolso presentadas al Banco Mundial, se determina que las inversiones y gastos efectuados por la F.B.E. al 31112197ascienden a USS.25.263.262.

(4) Los fondos no utilizados a la fecha de cierre de esta primera fase de la F.B.E. ascienden a US$.10.346.435.- y cormesponden a tipos de cambio de cierre a los siguientes saldospor tinanciador.

AIF Convenio de Credito 2322-.0 DEG's 5.269.976.- USS. 7.117.683.-Gob. de Holanda Convenio de Donacion 0521955 BO FL.H. 2.762.540.-. US$. 1.368.904.-Gob. de Suiza Convenio de Donacion 1403270 50 Fr. S. 2.706.080.- USS. 1.859.848..

USS10.346.435..

La Paz, enero de 1998

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ANEXO 2

RENDIMIENTO EN SOCIEDADES ACCIDENTALES

la. ExperienciaInversi6n Utilidad Observaciones

. ~~~~ ~~US$. US$..

. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ u s .ss ._ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _

TAHUAMANU 181.050 14.400 Ejecutado y concluldo en 1995 conProyecto San Silvestre _ fondos del Banco Mundial.TOTAL 181.050 14.400

2a. Experiencia - Campania 1996197

W.BEZERRA 250.000 91.212 Financiamiento con fondos B.M.H.CLAURE 150.000 37.665JABIEX 170.000 32.844HECKER HNOS.SA 350.000 69.836TAHUAMANU SRL 600.000 56.000 TOTAL 1.520.000 287.557 1 __.

3a. Experiencia - Campafna 1997198

W.BEZERRA 400.000 67.338 Financiamiento con fondos F.B.E.H.CLAURE 150.000 11.703 Financiamiento con fondos B.M.TAHUAMANU SRL 1.000.000 170.000 Financiamiento con fondos F.B.E.TOTAL 1.550.000 249.041

4a. Experiencia - Campafna 1998199

Bosques del Norte 180.0001 39.409 Financiamiento con fondos Banco MundialTAHUAMANU SRL 2.000.000 320.000 Financiado 50% Banco Mundial U$.1.000.000

_ _ Financiado 50% F.B.E U$.1.000.000.-TOTAL 2.180.000 359.409TOTAL GENERAL 5.431.050 910.407

EXPORTACIONES(en d6lares estadounidenses) ANEXO 3

i_________ 1995 1996 1997Val.Export Exp. Nal. %/Exp.Nal. Val.Export. Exp. Nal. %WExp.Nal. Val.Export. Exp. Nal. %/Exp.Nal.

Tahuamanu 1,720,451 16,427,240 10.47% 3,649,299 28,315,185 12.89% 4,867,843 33,386,036 14.58%

Ajo 57,000 114,963 49.58% 150,700 114,963 131.09% 215,600 180,000 119.78%

Titikaka 76,642 88,146 86.95% 5,949 6,443 92.33% 14,361 36,400 39.45%

Mabet 1,364,758 6,234,868 21.89% 1,868,421 7,246,584 25.78% 2,431,219 11,536,943 21.07%

Dillmann

Flobolsa 230,050 823,064 27.95% 251,822 956,977 26.31% 50,000 689,528 7.25%

Pairumani o

Peras Pampa 160,000 823,064 19.44% 170,000 956,977 17.76% 30,000 689,528 4.35%

Castafleras 5,201,771 16,427,240 31.67% 7,828,485 28,315,185 27.65% 2,815,449 33,386,036 8.43%

TOTAL 8,810,672 24,511,345 35.95% 13,924,676 37,597,129 37.03% 10,424,472 46,518,434 22.41%

(1) Fuente: SECRETARIA NACIONAL DE INDUSTRIA Y COMERCIO (Departamento de Sistemas)

EMPLEO(en nOmero de empleos anuales) ANEXO 3.1

1995 1996 _ 1997Imp. Dir. Imp. Ind. Total Imp. Dir. Imp. Ind. Total Imp. Dir. Imp. Ind. Total

Tahuamanu 203 1017 1220 264 1320 1584 277 1467 1744

Ajo 121 35 156 84 32 116 148 54 202

Titikaka 25 12 37 31 15 46 45 21 66

Mabet 88 120 208 99 144 243 128 170 298

Dillmann 302 80 382 361 75 436 408 83 491

Floboisa 94 40 134 139 60 199 172 70 242

Pairumani 0 0 0 8 40 48 12 20 32

Peras Pampa 50 15 65 50 20 70 85 25 110

Castafferas 632 3136 3768 232 1551 1783

TOTAL 1515 4455 5970 1268 3257 4525 1275 1910 3185