World Bank Document · C149.2S (1987); Completion Year Average (1988) - C1?8.57-iv - PROJECT...

Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFCIAL USE ONLY

Report No. 8765

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

GHANA

VOLTA REGION AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(CREDIT 1009-GH)

JUNE 18, 1990

Agriculture Operations DivisionWestern Africa DepartmentAfrica Regional Office

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GLOSSARY OF A3B1EVIATIONS

ASRP Agricultural Services Rehabilitation ProjectBPP Bovine Pleurisy ProgrammeCIDA Canadian International Development AssociationCFO Chief of Field OperationsCRI Crop Research InstituteCSIR Commission for Social and Industrial ResearchFASCOM (VR) Farmers Services Company (Volta Region)FAO Food and Agricultural OrganizationFSC Farmers Services CentreGOO Government of GhanaGIMPA Ghana Institute of Management and Public AdministrationIDA International Development AssociationIDA (Ghana) Irrigation Development AuthorityIFAD International Fund for Agricultural DevelopmentIITA International Institute for Tropical AgricultureMOA Ministry of AgricultureM&E Monitoring and EvaluationODA Overseas Development AdministrationPPMED Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Department (MOA)RAC Regional Agricultural Co-ordinatorRMWA Resident Mission to West AfricaREVIEW In-Depth Review Mission (IDA/IFAD)SAR Staff Appraisal ReportT&V Training and Visit SystemUST (Kumasi) University of Science and TechnologyVORADEC Volta Regional Agriculture Development Executive CommitteeVORADEP Volta Region Agricultural Development Project

FOR OFFCAL UR OLYTHE WORtL DANK

Washmgtou, D.C. 20433USA.

Oht. d DOmtor-G.tutO0*Mm twiglm

June 18. 1990

MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOzS AND THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Ghana - Volta RegionAtricultural Develoyment Pro4ect (Credit 1009-GH)

Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled"Project Completion Report on Ghana - Volta Region Agricultural DevelopmentProject (Credit 1009-GH)" prepared by the Government of Ghana, with anoverview memorandum prepared by the Africa Regional Office. No audit ofthis project has been made by the Operatiors Evaluation Department at thistime.

Attachment

This document has a retrictd distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their oMicia duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without Wodd Dank authrntion.

FOR OFFCiL US ONLY



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

Preface .......................... ........................... iBasic Data Sheet .iiEvaluation Summary. iv

IDA OVERVIEN OF THE PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT .ix


I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND. 1II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION. 2

IIT. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION .. ............................... 10IV. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE .19

V. AGRICULTURAL IMPACT .26VI. ECONOfIC RATE OF RETURN ................ 31

VII. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT .35VIII. SPECIAL ISSUES .43

TABLES

COST AND BENEFIT TABLES:

1. Administration .................. , . , . . 492. Land Use Planning .503. Agricultural Research .514. Roads Program .525. Boreholes/Water Supply .536. Extension Services .547. FASCOM. 558. Livestock Activities .569. Fisheries Development .........................., 5710. VORADEP .58

1. Rate of Return, Data and Assumptions. 592. Research and Extension .643. Input Supply .''.. ''.... '.. 814. Livestock and Fisheries ............................,. 945. Rural Infrastructure .996. Monitoring and Evaluation .117

ATTACHMENT I - Comments from the Ministry of Agriculture .119MAPS

1. IBRD Map 12798R2. IBRD I(ap 128023. IBRD Map 12805

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof ther official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.


GHANAVOLTA REGION AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(CREDIT 1009-G0l

PREF-ACE

This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Volta RegionAgricultural Development Project in Ghana, for which Credit 1009-GH in theamount of US$29.5 million was approved on April 22, 1980. The loan wasclosed on December 31, 1988, three years behind schedule after cancellationof US$0.7 million. The last disbursement was in June 1989.

The PCR consists of a main report prepared by the Government ofGhana, supplemented by an Overview prepared by the Agriculture OperationsDivision of the Western Africa Department, Africa Regional Office. The PCRis based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report; the Credit Agreement;supervision reports, correspondence between the Bank and t1he Borrower; andinternal Bank memoranda.

This PCR was read by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED).The draft PCR was sent to the Borrower and IFAD for comments and theyare attached to the Report (Attachment I).

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GHANA

VOLTA REGION AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(Ci.rdlt 1009-GHA)

BASIC DATA SHEET

KEY PROJECT DATA

Appraisal Actual or Actual asEstimate Estimated X of

Project Cost (Cadis million) 137.1 975.6 712XProject Cost (US$ million) 40.7 43.8 90XCredit Amount (U8} million) 29.6 28.8 06XDate of Board Approval 04/22/80Date of Effectiveness 03/31/81Closing Date 12/31/85 12/31/88Economic Rate of Return (X) 16 16 1OOXNumber of Direct 8eneficiarios 60,000 90,000 1S6X

(farm households)

Cumulative Disbursements

FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY8S FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89

Appraisal Estimate(US$ million) 4.8 13.1 20.2 24.7 29.5

Actual (US$ in) 0.1 0.7 3.2 4.0 6.7 / 7.8 14.4 17.5 28.8

Actual as X ofEstimate 2.1 6.3 15.8 16.9 22.7

Date of FinalDisbursement (arous d June, 30, 1989)

STAFF INPUTS (Staff Weeks)

FYM7 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY8S FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89

Prappraisal 40*

Appraisal 34-

Negotiations 8*

Supervision 3.4 9.2 17.6 31.S 10.5 6.9 10.6 7.9 2.0

TOTAL

*Thes are estimates. Actual date are not available.

1/Sourco: Supervision Report of 7/3/89

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MISSION DATA

Darte Number of Mondays Specielizations Performance Trend Types ofMission (mo/yr) Persons in Fi-ld Represented c/ Rating cl Problems /

Identification ?/V6 1 6 a _ _ _Preappraleal 1-2/77 6 150 a,b,c - - -ApprAisal 1-2/79 8 170 a,b,d,-,t,g _ - -Supervision 1 12/80 1 3 * 2 1 0Supervision 2 4/81 2 14 *,b 1 2 0Supervision 3 7-8/81 1 7 b 2 2 O,1Supervision 4 12/81 1 6 a 2 2 M,FSupervision 6 7/82 2 10 *,- 2 2 P,lSupervision 8 2/83 4 52 a,b,-,h 2 2 M,PSupervision 7 C/88 2 14 *,h 2 3 M,0Supervision 8 2/84 4 44 *,o,f,i 3 2 M,O,FSupervision 9 10/84 2 14 a,o 3 2 M,F,OSupervision 10 4/86 1 4 a 3 1 M,F,OSupervision 11 11/86 2 12 a,. q 3 SSupervision 12 9/88 2 S a,* 3 3Supervision 13 4/87 2 18 a,0 2 2Supervision 14 11/8? 1 6 2 2Supervision 15 11/88 1 S * 2 2

o/a r Agriculturist, b = Economist, c ^ Livestock Specialist, d = Extension Specialist,f = Engineer, 9 a Loan Officer, h = Operations Assistant, I = Fisheries Specialist.

b/l - problem free or minor problem; 2 moderate problms; 3 = major probims.c/i 1 improving; 2 = stationary.iff f Financial; M = Management; T = Technical; 0 a Othtr; P = Politica.i;,No data available.V/New Form 690 in use that shows rating for ovorall status (year 198S).

OTHER PROJECT DATA

Borrower - Republic of GhanaExecuting Agency - Volta Region Ministry of Agriculture (MOA)

and Farmers' Servi;es Company (Volta Region)(FASCOI - VR)

Fiscal Year of Borrower - January 1 - December 31- July 1 - June 30 (before 1983)

CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATES

Name of Currency (Abbreviation) - Cedi (C)Appraisal Year Average - US11.00 2 C2.75Intervening Y-ors Average - Cl.1(19?7); C1.S2(1978);

C2.79 (1979-1982); C3.45 (1983);C12.0S (1984); C64.1 (1985); C89.3 (1988);C149.2S (1987);

Completion Year Average (1988) - C1?8.57

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VOLTA REGION AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(CREDIT 1009-GH)

Evaluation Summary

Introduction

1. This is the eighth lending operation for the development of

Ghana's Agricultural Sector. The Volta Region Project followed in concept

and design the Upper Region agricultural development project financed by

the IDA in 1976. The project included agricultural services, input

supplies, rural infrastructure and training components.

Objectives

2. In the late seventies, the Government of Ghana (GOG) introduced

policy changes, (e.g., reduction of fertilization subsidies and increase in

producer prices for cocoa), decentralized agricultural development planning

and implementation, and reaffirmed the importance of smallholder

development. In support of these changes, the project sought to increase

agricultural production, farm incomes and welfare, particularly of the

smallholders in the Volta Region, thtough the provision of a basic

agricultural services package, concentrating primarily on major field

crops. About 60,000 farm families each cultiviting about 2.1 ha farm on

the average were to be directly benefitted from the project. The project

includeds improved extension services, credit and training for farmers;

livestock and fisheries development; the construction of 65 farm service

centers for the distribution of farm inputs, staff housing and project

offices; construction and improvement of about 650 km of access and feeder

roads; rural water supply; strengthening of the MOA's Regional Office; and

consultant services.

Implementation Experiences

3. The pxoject was expected to be completed in five years in i985,

but it took three more years to complete. The project start-up was very

slow -- it was effective in March 1981, but it was not until a year later

that most of the key staff, including the international staff, were

recruited. The position of the Civil Engineer was not filled until March

1982, and this contributed to the poor implementation of the Civil Works

component during the first three years. The project period coincided with

a period of political changes and serious economic and budgetary

difficulties. Adverse weather conditions during 1983-84 also hindered the

prog-ess of the project. During the early years, adequate and timely

release of Government funds and fertilizer allocation for the project posed

problems. In addition, staff inadequacies and low morale, lack of clear

definition of some components (e.g. livestock and fisheries) and inadequate

working arrangements with agencies in other sectors (e.g. Ghana Water

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Supply Company and Ghana Highway Authority) for the water and roadcomponents resulted in project performance in the first three years wellbelow expectations at appraisal.

4. In early 1984, an IDA/IFAD mission was requested by the GOG tomake an In-Depth Review of the situation. The major revisions proposed bythe mission were accepted by the GOG. These included increase in thetarget group to 90,000 farm households and addition of a *semi-improved'category of farm practices within a higher target area. Input supply wasto be offered to all farmers in the Region, and extension staff was to beincreased. The infrastructure and the livestock programs were modified inthe light of project experience and reassessment of needs. These changesand the replacement of the expatriate staff by a team recruited through aconsulting firm revitalized the project and gave it a new momentum. Withgreater availability of fertilizers and other inputs and availability ofGovernment budgetary funds for the project, implementation greatly improvedin the later years.

5. The PCR points out that evaluation of the projects' financia'.history in terms of appraisal expectations is difficult due to the changesin the mix of activities following the 1984 in-depth review, delays inimplementation in early years, and major variations in the exchange rateand domestic inflation. In general terms, however, the actual monetaryexpenses denominated in cedis have been much greater than envisaged, due todomestik inflation, and in dollar terms these have been more than offset bythe decline in the value of the cedi. Government contribution wasbasically available, except in the early years when, partly due to thegeneral economic situation and partly due to difficulties in the release ofcapital funds in Accra, there were shortfalls. Consequently, thecontractors were unwilling to undertake VORADEP works, and the projectfunded some expenditures through the operation oGf a local account. Ingeneral, loan and local funds were efficiently administered, and budgetingand reporting functions were satisfactory, except in the case of PASCOMwhere performance varied considerably from one year to the next. Delays,however, occurred with the auditing of accounts by the locally appointedauditors, due to pressure of work. The PCR concludes that the projectrepresented a considerable degree of decentralization of financialautonomy, which appeared workable.

6. The organizational and management performance was generallysatisfactory. A degree of structural flexibility was allowed to meetchanging needs. The PCR, however, mentioned that the IDA/IFAD supervisorymissions dealt more with the Project Management; VORADEC, the Committeeresponsible at the regional level for overseeing the project, and thepolicy makers at the ministerial level in Accra had less direct exposure tothe recomiendations of the missions which apparently lost useful leverage.Review of the Supervision Reports and Aides Memoire, however, show that themissions had regularly met with the concerned ministers and seniorofficials on policy and other major issues affecting the project, and thatat least one mission attended an emergency meeting of the VORADEC. It wasappropriate for the missions, however, to let the Project Manager formallydeal with the higher echelons, particularly at the Regional level, to laythe foundations for effective management capacity, cosuunication andproblem resolution procedures.

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7. Within the crop development program, the Adaptive ResearchComponent was successful in realizing its main objectives. Usefulcollaboration concerning on-farm trials with the Ghana Grain DevelopmentBoard for maize led to recommendations on the best variety suited for theproject area; the Research Department started prodicing these varieties ofseed maize for sales to farmers. The extension and training part of theproject achieved impressive results, especially since the introduction of aunified T&V System. This enabled the project to increase the targetpopulation by fifty percent and attain a more favorable extensionworker/farmer ratio around 1:500 (1:900 pre-project). Home extension,incorporated with the main extension service, achieved substantial resultsthrough its programs focussing on women and youth. The input supplythrough FASCOH, a new organization, has been erratic due to operationaldifficulties, particularly transport, timely availability of fertilizer andsufficient seeds, and conflict between the intention to let FASCOM operateas a commercial company and the Government's control of input prices andprocurement. The divergence between target and actuals of sales offertilizer and improved seeds was quite marked. This was partly due tosupply problems and timing; SAR estimates of fertilizer usage and cropareas may also have been optimistic. GOG is now committed to privatizationof fertilizer sales and removal of subsidy.

8. The livestock and fisheries developments were vaguely specifiedin the SAR and little progress was made in the first two years. After theorganizatioual and technical changes following the 1984 Review,implementation of both these items registered major improvements, thoughrelatively less for the fisheries compone:st. Coverage of cattle by anti-rinderpest vaccination increased from 69 percent in 1984 to nearly 90percent in 1985-86, and with the completion of 12 dips in 1987, the dippingprogram target was reached. In fisheries, overall fish pond constructionand stocking in commercial and household sectors was satisfactory.Following two consultants' studies under the project, a pilo*: project waszecommended for determining the feasibility of brackish warer aquaculture.On the infrastructural side, ach.evement was mixed. With the completion ofthe expanded road program, better access and communications wil. benefitthe farming population. The building program was very much delayed withattainment of about 83 percent of middlelsenior level staff housing and 15percent of junior staff housing. The office building program (50 percentachievement) has improved working conditions and the 34 village FSCs willimprove input distribution. The project has drilled 246 successful wellswhich account for about one-third of all wells currently in the Region (78percent of wells in the Northern Zone). The program has contributed tohealth and welfare through improved rural water supply. The SAR proposalsfor the irrigstion component was over-optimistic, since a long time isrequired for planning and design of irrigation systems. The projectachievement has been data collection and design of 7 pilot irrigationschemes, against a target of completion of 10 such schemes during theproject period.

Results

9. At appraisal, the main direct benefits of the project wereexpected to be derived from crop yield increases. Reliable data on yield

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increases with or without the project were, however, not collected. Basedon sample survey by the monitoring and evaluation department in 1986, itappears that for maize for which the estimates are reasonably firm,significant yield improvement resulted fL3m fertilizer application. The1986 survey showed maize yield well above the appraisal estimate. This canbe attributed to the concentration of the extension services on maizecomponent of the crop program and its success. The best estimates forother crops under the project appear favorable when compared with Appraisalyields. The project experience demonstrated the contribution of certaincultural practices in generating increases in yields over and above thatobtained by improved seed and fertilizer application.

10. The PCR estimates the benefits derived from the crop developmentprogram. The largest single source of benefit arises from incrementalmaize production. Additional benefits are estimated for several componentee.g., roads, boreholes, FASCOM,, livestock and fisheries development. Theproject is estimated to have a 16 percent internal economic rate of return,which is the same as the rate of return calculated at appraisal in 1980.The returns well exceed the real opportunity cost of capital. However, thePCR points out that the nature cf benefits realized is different from thoseprojected at appraisal, both with regard to the extent of benefits from thecrop development program, and to the range of returns from othercomponents.

Sustainability

11. The project sustainab.lity involves the question of whether theimproved agricult'tral productivity, farm incomes and the ruralinfrastructure would be maintained and enhanced in future years. In orderto ensure continued focus on overall developments in the region, VORADEC,the overseeing inter-agency committee for the project, may need to bemaintained. A composite approach to budgeting in the Region will also beessential as returns from crop development depend upon investmentscontinuing to be made in extension as well as in rural infrastructure. Thefinancial and administrative responsibilities regarding feeders roads.boreholes and water supply maintenance are in the process of being handedover to the respective sector authorities, which presently have thefinancial and technical resources to sustain them. For the criticalconstraints to agricultural development-research, extension services andcollection and management o. _nformation for planning, and policy making, aprovision of $1.2 million of external financing has been made for the VoltaRegion under the IDA financed Agricultural Sector Rehabilitation Projectfor three years. This would ensure continued funding for activities whichhave shown good results, until VORADEP becomes fully integrated into theGovernment's overall extension, research and M&E Systems.

Finding and Lesslons

12. Some of the main lessons to be learned from the VORADEP experienceare:

(a) Detailed institutional and staffing arrangements for theexecution and coordination of area development projects shouldbe worked out at Appraisal-Negotiations stage;

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(b) A mid-term project review is essential for all projects. Itstiming. particularly for a large multi-purpose regionaldevelopuent project, is to be judiciously determined-

(c) For coverage by extension services and impact on production, itshould be recognized that the farmers will adopt improvedcultural practices and make input application at varying speedsand at different levels; this is important to the setting ofrealistic targets in the first place; and

(d) It is difficult, if not impossible, for the government tooperate even semi-autonomous services (e.g. input supply),simultaneously based on commercial and developmentconsiderations which often do not coincide.

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GHANA

VOLTA REGION AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(Credit 1009-GH)

IDA Overview of the Project Completion Report

1. The Completion Report was prepared by consultants for theGovernment of Ghana (GOG) for the Volta Region Agricultural DevelopmentProject (VORADEP), covering the period 1981-88. The report is in onevolume and includes six annexes covering various aspects of the project.The main report provides a good overall coverage of the project, is wellstructured, compares achievements in each section with the expectations ofthe staff appraisal report and offers an analysis of lessons learned foreach major component. Taking into account the limitatior. of data, theannexes covering all the components are well prepared. Since adequatecoverage of project performance is provided in the PCR, this overview willfocus on those areas which impinge upon future preparation and execution ofagricultural projects in Ghana. These include the project design andorganization; implementation experience and project review; extension andinput supply; IDA and Borrower performance; and project sustainability andfuture development. From these areas, some lessons will be drawn forfuture IDA projects in the country.

Proiect Design and Organization

2. In the late seventies, GOG started to accord higher priority toagriculture and by 1980, it accounted for about 8 percent of the totalbudget, compared to only 3 percent in 1971. GOG policy changbs at the sametime, recognized the key role of smallholders, allowed increase in producerprices for cocoa and a beginning was made to reduce fertilizer subsidies.Measures were also initiated to decentralize agricultural developmentplanning and implementation. The project, seeking to support these policychanges, was prepared by the Bank's Regional Mission for West Africa. Itwas designed on the pattern of a similar IDA financed regional agriculturaldevelopment project in the Upper Region of Ghana. The project was *-ased onthe premises that the technology to be applied for agriculturalimprovements was si.ple and well tested under local conditions, and withextension work and input availability, the adoption rate of the farmerswould be high. Also, the Ministry of Agriculture's Regional Officestaffing was adequate for project implementation, and coordination withother related Government Agencies (e.g. Ghana Water Supply Company and theGhana Highway Authority) could easily be ensured. Expatriate staff andconsultants would be needed, however, in selected disciplines within theproject management. For input procurement and distribution, a new Farmers'

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Services Company (FASCOM) was to be set up in the Region, as was done for

the project in the Upper Region. The project was to be Jointly financed by

the IDA, International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Government

and Banking institution.

3. The traditional part of the project design was the concept of

area development with a variety of components as diverse as crop

development, livestock and fisheries, irrigation and water supply. roads

and houses, nutrition extension, and training. Having the project

organization sttuctured within the Regional administrative framework (which

the Appraisal Mission considered adequate), and taking into account the

operational experience of the on-going regional project the mission was

sanguine about its implementation. The Mission's confidence was also

founded on the fact that the proposed technology was simple and would not

require major changes in the traditional farming system and institutions.

4. The inevitable question that arises in respect of the project

concept and design is whether the project should have concentrated on a few

and more directly related items. Undoubtedly, a diverse project, partly

depending on agencies in other sectors, imposes demanding management and

coordination responsibilities on the project entity. In addition to the

reasons in the previous paragraph, the IDA's decision to support an area

development project resulted froms (a) obvious Government desire to

improve the income and welfare of the Volta Region farm population,

particularly the smallholders. This could more easily be attempted through

an integrated approach; (b) replication of Upper-Region project

designlorganization. It is possible that political and regional pressures

on the Government would have precluded a more focussed and limited

agricultural project; (c) the project as designed would be more in line

with the Government's decentralization initiatives, including establishment

of the inter-agency Volta Region Agricultural Development Committee

(VORADEP), mainly a policy based committee, to oversee the project.

5. While the project concept and design was consistent with the

Government's and the IDA"s strategy at the time, the organizational and

staffing arrangements could have been better designed. The project was

presented to the IDA's Board on the basis of Government's assurance of

making satisfactory institutional arrangements for the execution of items

involving agencies outside the MOA (e.g. GWSC, GHA, and PWD).

Implementation experience later showed that delays in defining and agreeing

on respective roles hampered the progress of the project. It would have

been more prudent to get these arrangements worked out in detail at the

time of appraisalinegotiations or at least before the Board presentation.

The livestock and the fisheries components were not clearly worked out, and

the irrigation component was over-ambitious within the time-frame. Until

the 1984 modifications to the project, the progress in these components was

poor. On the staffing issue, the confidence of the Appraisal Mission with

regard to the MOA Regional Office strength for project implementation was

not justified because of the skill and experience mix required for the

project. Throughout the project implementation period, the supervision

missions highlighted the over-staffing of the MOA at lower levels and

shortage of competent and experienced staff at the Senior levels, with

obvious deleterious effect on the project's progress. The Credit's

effectiveness conditions included the appointment of the Chief of Field

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Operations and a permanent Regional Agricultural Coordinator; the positionof the Civil Engineer in the project was not a condition of effectiveness.Since delays in construction of expatriate and project staff housing.offices and service centers until later years of the project was a majorproblem affecting the efficiency and morale of both the expatriate andlocal staff, the Civil Engineer's availability from the beginning of theproject was critical. It would have allowed timely planning, design andtendering of the housing and other construction items, and obviatad thecost increases and the prolonged debate on what type of housing was to beconstructed (more traditional or the pre-fabricated wooden houses).

6. In retrospect, the design and organization of the project hadthe advantages of simplicity, tradition and Government support. However,during the appraisalinegotiation stage, some of the components were notclearly defined, and some of the detailed but critical implementationarrangements were not adequately dealt witb. These shortcomings adverselyaffected the project's execution.

Implementation Experience and Froject Review

7. The project was expected to be completed by December 31, 1985,with disbursements completed by June 30, 1986. However, the projectcontinued until December 31, 1988, with disbursements continuing untilJune, 1989. The long, but not unusual, delay in the execution of such aproject in a country at Ghana's stage of development was mainly due tostaffing problems (expatriate and local), delays by other agencies inundertaking the water and road components, financing problems involvingrelease of budgetary funds and foreign exchange availability, and erraticand insufficient procurement and distribution of fertilizer and otherinputs. Political changes and some uncertainty about continued commitmentto the project, serious economic and budgetary difficulties, and adverseweather conditions (1983-84) also hindered the progress of the project.

8. The local staffing and other agency problems have been mentionedpreviously. The expatriate staff in the Project Unit created specialproblems of relationship and team-work. Undoubtedly, they were needed forthe positions they were recruited for, as suitably qualified Ghanians werenot available. An impression is created that the four experts, recruitedindividually, were operating in separate compartments at their own speedand with scant regard for the role and direction of the (Ghanian) ProjectManager. The expatriate staff were generally unhappy about housing andgoods availability issues, and the local staff of the salaries andbenefits, including import privileges, of the expatriate staff. The IDAmissions could have exercised their supervisory and good office roles moreenergetically in the early stages with a view to resolving the issue.Instead, the matter was allowed to drag on. The missions also weresometimes, perhaps unfairly, drawn into this relationship problem.Considerable uncertainly persisted with regard to the responsibility andtenure of the expatriate staff, and a good part of the project managementproblems and lack of direction may be ascribed to this problem. Notsurprisingly, contracts of these individuals were not extended and a newteam of experts, recruited through a consulting firm, was put in place in1985. The coherence of this expatriate team, the general overseeing oftheir role by the consulting firm and greatly improved work relationships,

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particularly with the Project Manager, led to expeditious implemeniation ofthe project in the later years. The question that ALLses in tts respectis whether it would have been wiser in the first i-nit 1 anrecruitment through a consulting firm. At lea-t•from this instance, itappears that the benefits of experiences an4-6ack-up provided byexperienced consulting firms in recruitmeji and servicing of staff forprojects in developing countries, with he resultant coherence and teamwork, can far outweigh some extra cos that may have to be incurred.

9. The project risks relating to Government funding and foreignexchange allocation were correctly fentifed by the appraisal mission.The Credit conditions required ade ate and timely provision of funds andforeign exchange for importation farm inputs. During projectimplementation in the early yea (until 1984), there were frequent lapsesin this regard which caused slow execution of project works and inadequateprocurement and distribution of essential agricultural inputs. The fundingend foreign exchange allocation problems reflected the difficult economicconditions prevailing at the time. The fund availability problem wasfurther compounded by procedures in Accra for the release of budgetedresources. Inspite of this, and the tight Government budgetary situation,funds were made available for the development program to be carried out.Apart from the availability of direct funding for specific projectinvestments from the IDA/IFAD, the external financing of working capital(e.g. incremental inputs, research material and tools and equipment) wasdoubly beneficial. The counterpart funds, generated by the sale of theinputs and other supplies, were available to the VORADEP authorities in alocal account. These funds enabled the project to often substitute for theinadequacy and untimeliness in the Government's contribution to thecapital, as well as the recurrent expenditures, thus facilitating theexecution of the project.

10. The turning point in the project came when in early 1984 it wasagreed between the IDA-IFAD and the Government to undertake an In-DepthReview of the project and its problems. The project was faltering due tomanagement problems which held back.decisions and implementation of allother components at this time-and required an objective reassessment.Meanwhile, another change in the Goverqjnent had taken place, the expatriatestaff were about to leave in disharmony and the standing of the ProjectManager with the new Government became uncertain. The Review recommendedfundamentally sound and innovative decisions, both with regard to thecontent and organization of the project. The revised project envisagedlow-adoption farmer coverage by raising the number of the target group, avery practical move, and it decided to cover all fanmers with the services.In view of the imprecise definition and design of the animal husbandrycomponent, it was agreed to eliminate it. Support for veterinary serviceswas continued, with increase in prices of drugs and vaccines. It wasdecided to bring in a new expatriate team through a consulting firm with aChief Field Officer to coordinate the activities of the experts. The IDAand IFAD showed flexibility in agreeing to financing changes involvinggreater local cost financing by the donors. The Government's response toall the above was delayed somewhat but was positive. The project took adecisive turn for the better from this point onwards, with a distinctimprovement in the Government's performance of its obligations and that ofits agencies. The importance of the mid-term review and its contribution

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in revitalizing a problem project can not be over-emphasized. This is animportant lesson for other projects, particularly multi-purpose relativelylarge integrated regional development projects, which should incorporate amid-term review. Unlike the regular Bank supervision missions, It shouldinclude active participation of Government representatives, to ensurecontinued ¢overnment comnitment to a project going well, or to allowpractical restructuring and changes in projects with serious problems.

Extension and Input Supply

11. The project investments resulted in improvement in the output inthe Region. Implementation differed substantially from the design atappraisal and thus incremental benefits achieved differ from thoseoriginally envisaged (entirely from crop development). Also, the speed andextent of the farmers' attitudinal change and diffusion of technology underthe project were also below the appraisal expectations. Incremental cropproduction accounts for some 60-752 of estimated benefits in the earlyyears of the project; this proportion declines in later years as benefitsfrom other components (e.g. livestock, fisheries, roads, etc.) begin tocome on stream. Most focus of extension activity was on maize, consideringit was cultivated on only about half of the farms in the Region. Projectimpact on aggregate maize production is estimated to be in excess of 8000tons per annum after 1988. Between 1982 and 1987, the farmers' adoptionrate of recommended practices for maize increased significantly. By 1987,for example, 552 of farmers were adopting the recommended practices forfertilizer application on some of their maize, while 67Z were adopting theimproved seed varieties. Crop yield surveys conducted by the monitoringand evaluation department (M&E) suggest partial adoption of extensionrecommendations by most farmers: for example. using fertilizers to a lesserextent than recommended, or by using fertilizer on unimproved seed, or byplanting in lines but using only traditional material. Consequently,potential benefits from new technology extended to the target group areconstrained. Studies conducted for the Grain Board elsewhere in Ghanaconfirm the picture of partial adoption and indicate that most farmers willmove towards their production possibility frontiers, but at differentspeeds and at different levels, with only a relatively small proportionbecoming complete adopters. During the 1984 Review of the project, the*semi-improved* category of farm practices was recognized, with mostemphasis given to crop areas of such farmers by the extension services. Itwas a realistic measure and future extension programs would do well toprovide for the likely phenomenon of *semi-adopters* to achieve greaterimpact.

12. Input supply, through FASCOM and the VORADEP-constructed FarmService Centers (FSCs), significantly contributed to the rate ofagricultural change in the Region. From a supply level of 2000 tons offertilizers annually in 1982-83, the supply in 1987 rose to around 5500tons, plus seed, chemicals and small items of agricultural equipment. Therelative real cost of fertilizer had risen over the project period, and theagricultural credit availability in the Region was rather limited. FASCOMwas, however, able to dispose of its annual supplies of fertilizers. Itappears that usage is limited by supFiies and even ith rising prices, amuch larger quantity of fertilizer can be sold. FASCOM incurredsubstantial losses due to inadequate stocking, late delivery and lost

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sales, high transport costs and inappropriate capital structure. Theallocation and arrival timing of fertilizer were in the hands of theGovernment, and FASCOM was left with a short evacuation period from theport to meet the planting season. This factor, along with a policy ofself-sufficiency in transport capacity, led to FASCOM acquiring highdepreciation and interest costs. FASCOM operations also suffered from aconfusion between a commercial role and a developmental role, roles whichmay often conflicE. The consultancy study in 1987 by Coopers and Lybrandprovided a critical review of FASCOM operations. In the context of theoverall macro-economic objectives of Bank supported structural adjustmentefforts and the on-going Agricultural Services Rehabilitation Project(ASRP), the Government has decided to phase out fertilizer subsidies andintroduce privatization by 1990. The provision of farm inputs in futurewill thus depend on improvements in organization and operations of thesupplying companies which take over FASCOMI's responsibilities.

IDA and Borrower Performance

13. In all, fourteen supervision missions visited the project in amatter of seven years after its effectiveness, and thus the project wasadequately supervised. The missions persevered through the earlyfrustrating years of the project when a combination of adverse economic,financial, organizational, staffing and weather conditions hindered theprogress of the project. The PCR has raised two apparent deficiencies inIDA's supervision quality. These relate to (a) a rather late determination(in 1984) by IDA that a serious reappraisal of the project was essential inspite of the dismal early implementation; and (b) a failure by the missionsto deal more directly with the Regional Conmittee (VORADEC) for theproject, and the policy makers in the mlnistries in Accra. The Supervisionfiles indicate that the missions were fully aware of the difficulties ofthe project, which were partly due to design, management and institutionalproblems, but also due to inadequate provision of Government budgetaryfunds and foreign exchange. Through meetings at the regional and centralgovernment levels, aides memoire and follow-up letters and telexes, the IDAattempted to resolve the problems as they surfaced and often inanticipation. It was not until 1984, however, that it was consideredincumbent to conduct an In-Depth Review of the project. With the effortsand time spent in preparing, appraising and in obtaining the IDA and theGovernment's approval to the project, and the belief that the earlyimplementation delays were mainly due to teething troubles, which could beovercome, reappraisal and restructuring of the project naturally followedan assessment that the situation was indeed desperate. Concerning theinadequacy of IDA missions' attempts to resolve project issues l1cepricing, input procurement and budgetary allocations for the projectthrough its so-called leverage" with the policy makers, the files do notindicate any lack of efforts. It can be appreciated, however, that theGovernment's failure to provide adequate funds in a timely manner reflectedthe general economic difficulties. Regarding pricing and inputprocurement, the missions were particularly conscious that the project'srequirements should be accommodated within the national policy context.

14. The GOG's general support and attention to the project wereavailable throughcut, whether from the MOA or the Ministry of Finance andPlanning. In sensitive matters, like the expatriate staff situation and

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fertilizer pricing and input distribution arrangements (FAsCOM and/orprivatization), the GOG, both at the Regional and Central levels, showedrealism and flexibility of approach. The PCR found the workingrelationship between the IDA and VORADEP management to be normally good.Most reports and aides memoire reflect the extent to which VORADEPresponded positively to IDA's recommendations.

Sustainability and Future Development

15. With the termination of the project, VORADEP'S agriculturalactivities and institutions will be integrated into the main MOAorganization and structure. The responsibility for VORADEP'S non-agricultural components (water supply, roads. etc.) will revert to theappropriate line ministries. Maintenance and expansion of facilities whichcontributed to the project benefits are important to sustain the increasein agricultural production and rural income and welfare. A compositeapproach to budgeting for the Region will be essential, and it would beuseful to maintain an inter-agency committee (like VORADEC) to ensurecontinued focus and coordination of overall developments in the Region.The Government is of a slightly different view and maintains that, in linewith GOG's decentralization programme, all agricultural activities in theVolta Region should be implemented under the jurisdiction of the P'DCSecretary for Agriculture as is apparently the practice in other regions ofthe country. This would be acceptable provided such an arrangement is ablenot only to focus on the progress achieved hitherto under VORADEP, but alsoto continue the momentum of agricultural development in the Region. Forthis purpose it would be vital to make sure that project activities andsupporting services and infrastructure are well provided for in terms ofadequate funding and appropriate staffing under the umbrella of the MOA.Together with effective inter-ministerial coordination this will constitutethe key to project sustainability. With improved Government finances, anddonor support for sector programs like rural roads, it is believed thatrural infrastructure will be sustained. Concerning the MOA's directlyproductive areas of Crop Development, Livestock and Fisheries, essentialsupport services are being funded by IDA's on-going Agricultural ServicesRehabilitation Project (ASRP) which will provide $1.2 million forextension, research, and monitoring and evaluation over three years for theVolta Region. ThiL would allow the activities which had had a favorableimpact on project benefits to be sustained, until the VORADEP becomes fullyintegrated into the Government's structure and organization.

16. IDA's implied commitment to a second phase project should notnecessarily be narrowly construed to mean financing of a replication of theVORADEP over an extended time frame. Its objective waa and remains to besupportive of those developments which have contributed to positive farmerresponse while putting these within the national policy context. In doingso, attempts could be made to combine the distinct advantages of nationalprograms and regionally based projects. The PCR has pointed out that inthe VORADEP case, the benefits of regional collaboration between variousGovernment agencies were not fully realized. It has also emphasized theneed for regional project execution within a national policy framework.According to the PCR, the deficiencies in institutional aspects could havebeen anticipated and worked out at appraisal, and with greater efforts bythe IDA missions, the VORADEP execution could have been better linked with

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the central policy planning apparatus. In this context. the PCR concludedthat intensive geographically-based development projects have a role toplay in development strategy; such projects are not to be replaced bynational-level development programs.

17. Experience, however, indicates that there is no single frame forundertaking agricultural/regional development. A pragmatic strategy can aswell lead to a series of appropriately synchronized, national (or multi-regional) sub-sector projects. The design of such projects can provide fora regional focus on special characteristics, with varying emphasis ondifferent components, together with a decentralized coordination andexecution of projects. The benefits of such an approach, particularly fora region like Volta, where the foundations for area development havealready been laid, are: assurance of financial resources, management andtechnical expertise and stronger commitment from the Central Governmentministries/agencies; possibilities of varying the sub-sectoral programssuited to the particular regional needs and redeployment of technical andmanpower resources as necessary between the regions; decentralizedcoordination allowing a closer understanding of the regional problems andpriorities, and a composite view of the emerging changes. It thus appearspossible to innovate and reconcile the alternative approaches with regardto the content and the mechanism of future agricultural developmentprograms. This is a task which would require close attention andcollaboration of the Government and IDA in the near future.

18. Fid nd s and Lessons

Mi) Area Development Projects have their rightful place in thestages of economic development, but necessarily impose asevere managerial and inter-agency co-ordination burden. Ahigher-level regional inter-agency committee to overseesuch a multi-component project is useful. It is, however,essential to work out the detailed role andresponsibilities of concerned agencies through bilateral ormulti-lateral compacts/agreemeuts;

(ii) expatriate staff are often essential, but when recruitedindividually and placed within a new/weak managementstructure, it could create disharmony and slow down theproject's progress. IDA supervision missions have animportant responsibility, particularly during the earlystages, to effectively determine expert roles andfunctions. It may be prudent to consider recruitment of ateam of experts through an experienced consulting firm withback-up responsibilities;

(iii) project design for all components, including projectadministration, should be precisely worked out at appraisalstage, and all appointments critical for a smooth start-upshould be completed before credit effectiveness;

(iv) mid-term review of a project is essential. It should beapproached with pragmatism and flexibility, and involve the

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local government to ensure full-commitment to projectredesign. or changes:

(v) a balance needs to be struck between heavy IDA missioninvolvement with project execution and the necessity todevelop local management and official procedures forsustained future development. IDA mission inter-changewith the policy makers at the regional and centralgovernment levels is important for putting the regionalproject requirements within the national policy context;this should not, however, substitute for the regularofficial comaunication channels;

(vi) it is difficult, if not Impossible, for the government tooperate even semi-autonomous services (e.g. input supply)simultaneously based on coumercial and developmentconsiderations;

(vii) the extension services should recognize that relatively fewfarmers will completely adopt the new technology andpractices in the early years. Most farmers are likely toadopt the improved packages at varying speed and atdifferent levels of technology; and

(viii) project sustainability involves identification of thesuccess areas and the critical elements which brought theseabout. Once the foundations are laid, the benefits shouldbe sustained through national sector projects and/orintegrated within the regular government/institutionalstructure. Future regional development could combine theadvantages' of nationally-based sub-sector projects withthe central financial and technical support that thisapproach ensures, and the regional focus and involvementwith the selection and execution of project components.


GHANA


1: I D DUCTIOI AID BCKGRIOUND

introduction

1. Thi documen is the project completion report (PCR.) for the VOLTARGION PRCOIIIUCL TVeLaHT Ecr vering the period 1981-1988. Ithsb n prepared by taa of consultants provided by Landell HillsAssociates, in "asocitiQn wLth SEL of Accr, Cbha.

2. The document follows In broad terms the guidelines for the preparationof PCRJ set out in D op manuals. In addition, Arnexes hae beenprepard for ech of the major component activitie of the project. Theseprovide a nrrative of the devlopmt of the component during projectimplementtion.

3. VOAEP mm intended to benefit small-scale farmrs throughout theVolta Region. Volta Region covers about 20,500 sque kilomtres (just under9% of Ghana s area) and lies betwee latitude 5 dege*s 45 miutes and 8degrees 45 minutes North.

4. The project area population is now estimted at 145,000 fam familes,eacc.uing for a ru*a population In excsi of 900,000. The majority ofthese falies cultivate relatively small areas of ply subsisteecxops. Th project was designed to raise the welfare of thi target

* populato by -ringing about incrases in icme through grteragicultural prodtivity and p tow. S S to be acheved. thro&.th provisio of better agicultural other extenion advioe sorvices,

rov astrufaclties (paticularly roads ad rural watersupplies), input delivery ad generally Improvedltuladministration.

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11: PROECT IDENTIFICATION, DESCRITION, TARGETS A4D COLS

project Zdentlition and Prearatin

1. The project vas first identified by an MM Mission which visited Ghanain November, 1975. At the ed of 1976 term of reference wer prepared for7 basic working studi". A preparation mission comprising VW& and Ministryof Agrculture Staff visited a in erly 1977 and the drft prparationreport was submitted to thO Goverment Jn July 1977. Howevr, due to theeconomic sitution, the project Was not appraised until June, 1979.Following a Yorld Bank Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) In Magch 1980 (reportso. 2527-GH) and subsequeut approval of IDA credit of US 829.5 willion andIFAD loan of US $ 12.64 mllion, the project wa finally established inMarch 1981 and become operational ia June of that yer. However, thecalendar year of 1982 wa officially recognised as project year one.

Project ObjectIves

2. he primary objectives of the project were increaase in agriculturalproduction, ftam Incoms, welfare and standards of living of the f vaingPopulation*, pticularly small-holders, by into ducing and difwfuSngirve farumig technology, providing farm support services and developlngrural iafrastructure. This would be dome iu a mumnar which sustained adaclar ated sector gprowth for the lon rm. nproject w"L4 also

strngthen Ministry of Agricultur papabilities by providing training toextension and technical st and streamlining ezistint institutions In theproject area.

Project DJS4 ad S-trategy

3. Th project was dasigned as the first phase of a progrme ofagricultural development in Volta Region which woudv c entrae oun thodeelopment of major food crops, elated support service and,riuturalinfratruture* The emphasis was to be directed to simple cop productionmethods ibich would not require major changes In the existifg croppingpattern, farm sixes and lad teure. The Project would be iplementedmainly by existing Ins t utious and only fazr input distribution would beundertaken by a new orgpsation.

4. The proj ect, to be iplemented over a fve year period, woudlcomprise the following components.

mcrop deelopment; to improve farming practice via offective extenionadvice and provLsion of fam inputs; to establish on-farm trials andresearch; -u to Initiate low cost smell scal irrigation schebes.

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- lveLstock a" fbarles 4emelopment; to s th =A's Veterinazyand Fishries xtenio service ad to exted support to 1vestock farmaend fiLpond.

- iLfrastiurmtur; to contruct projet offics, workshop, staff qu send ISCs; rehabiltate (Oa's b1<ui 1 facilties and iprove famaccess and feeder roa6s.

- institutional; to strengthen Mos ReSional OffLce, by o_mtmanagemet and technical rets; eupand and improe staff training;cret a mm 1nstftuUoV4l calpUty for providing fam Input and otherservices.

- consultants srvi ces; to assit M In specific areas wher localexpertise ws not available or wher short ten support as required.

Targets and Goas - A Genera Assessment

S. During Projeact Implement considerable chbne were made to someof the main targets end goals specified at Apprisal for crop devlopmnt.Thi section takes account of these In the genral outli of progress thatfollows; a more detailed discusion is take up In Olapter UI onimplementation The main. focus of thbi section Is thecop dm lomprogr *sine it was eoYisged at Appraisa that all ptojt benfitswould be Seueated by thisce component.

6. The target pom for the co dsvelopment prgrame was specified byM as sfamer who grow cs py to mt sabste

needs. An etimated 60,000 far& familie (35% of te lRegina total),.cultvating a average 2.1 ha, would benefit directly.from the Project.Tis was; raised at Revltw to 90,000 farm failos, wth serious ltofor Project activitis, especially extenason and input suppies.

7. Surves undertake during the Project by the MonLtoring a lValuationDeccit sugpst that the avrag sire of tarpt famr' holding was asenvisaged at appraisal. The Contact Farme Suxvey of 1982 reporte a meanof 3.0 ha, when adjusted for e onal estiates In tw districts.

owever, thiL survey also tindcated a WIe rang aroun the mean, frm 1.5ha to 3.8 ha across the varios disticLts of the Region, with over 60% oft holdUin below 2 ba. oever, an mportnt cract t the mea

..size of th parels or ^fazms which cooprise the holdin; the parcel is themost meaningf concept as regards the adoptoan of imp d method andpractices. ere the mean siz of ^fam as 2.1 ha for the leon "a-awholo, ranging from 0.6 ba to 2.0 ha.

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8. A primary goal of the crop component wa to Increase production throughoffective extension of appropriate technological package to farmers who hadhitherto not adopted them. Packages were to be dvloped for the followingcrops and areas.

maize 1,o00 haCassava 12,000 haYam 2,400 haRie 1,100 haGroumdnuts 1,100 haSorghm 600 haVegetables 700 ha

9. At Review (1984) these originl targets were revised upwards mainly toreflect the fact of the partial adoption of the reommended package i.e. asemi-biproved category of uptake of the sodern ethods. Th1 re-appraisalplaced mosc empasis on the growth of the sem-faproved level of adoption.Rence for maizd-, the major crop, the Iproved target remaiod the sam, at11,000 ha, but the sem-Improved category was targeted at 29,000 ha.

10. One of the greatest problems facing the current assssment of Projectimplementation bas been the lack of data on key aspects of crop davelopment.No sytematic daca collection prograies were undertaken during the Projectto estimte crop area or yields. Heome, other less direct methods ofassssment ha"v had to be adopted, depending on fr-pentary, and sometimesderivative baes of cacuaion

1. Th table below assemble the avalAble otoand pre tscomparisos with ShR and Review targeto for the main Project ctops.

Crop Targets and EstimtedAre Crovpped bwr

IMrove, and Semi-improved #Mangement Levels

lmrowO Semi- ImDr d

TarMt Atul- Taxmet W

Hai"e 11o000 10,000 29,000 27,000Cassava 1,000 2,000 20,000 18,000Yam 2,400 3,000 0Groundt 100 200 2,400 2,300Rice 1,100 1,000 - -

Iorahm 200 300 1,000 900Cowpea 400 3,900k - -Vegetable 900 700 1.200 900

17,100 21,100 53,600 49,100

Source : VRADEP

Sea over for lote

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Note:

In the asenC of direct methods, the estimates of actual ae" were basedfor the most part. on seed ra fte gurs. This "sums tat seed rat normsare both ralistie anC feasible. It is felt that due to the shortage andpoor quality of "sd during the Projeot that farmo probably uswd less seeWr bctare thub recOmended. There is some evidwee fro the ExtensionImpact Survey 1987 to beer this out - about two thirds of contact and 40% ofnon-regirtered farmers adopted the seed rate reooendation.

12. It ma assumed at Appraisal that ceases In production woud beexected to arise more from substantil yield inrese than from IncreasesIn areas uwur cultivation. The expeted incases Ln yields were, by aystandards, drmatic - ranging frm 300% for maize to 60% for veptable.Such increas were to be gained by the adoption of a number of reodpractices, selled out in considerable detail In the Appraisal (Section VSAR).

13. Considerable emphais was placed on the mprovemet of productivity bythe adoption of a number of specific cutural practices. Subsequent surveyswithin the Project reveled a less than Pected rate of adoption of some ofthese practies, though the SAR did not precisely set requirod adoptionrates for their predicted yield t. iae wa the best documentedcrop In this respect and the available lrolts show that for adoption of

practies the picture Is erratic, the best adoption rate beingassociaed with recommended plancLug time, 63% for contact farmers. Lesthan balf non-regLstered farers however adopted thse practic". Otherpractles spelflsd In the Appraisal had much lower adoption rates. Ln mostcases belov 50%.

14. The Appraisal report postulated target yield rates for the major cropson the basis of the aumptions about the adoption of specifiedtechoologies. It has bee difficult to compe actual yields achieved with.thos predicted for rasons already explained. Estimates of actual yieldsin the following analysis therefore have to be.regarded as boadlyindicstLvo for most of the crops shown. The with-project yields ar alsobased on the assumption of adoption of full rc extension Packageswhereas in fact many farmers only adopted part packages - the somL-improvedcategory.

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Conarative Yield Utimates (SAR)(tonash)

CI22 ?re4rojsowt With-Poaect -Rsearch/TrialYield (1) Yield (2) Yield (3)

Maize 0.75 2.25 3.3C"aa 5.00 9.00 15.0Y_m 4.00 7.20 15.0Lice upland 0.50 1.30 , 2.0

C _o~~nurs 0.40 0.70 1.2Sorghum 0.50 0.80 2.8Vegetables 8.00 14.00

1. Pro-project yield is taken to be synonymus with tr oalleves of practice. It is therefore assumed that little or noproved seed or fertilUser were used by fszurs before Projoet

implemntton.

2. Aveag yield eaw ed In each project year.

3. Sources of estimtes are varios fostly from trials oan farmrs'

15. Informationon the actul yields acheved undr the Project isreaonably fim for maize oaly; -estiaes er produce bv a sampl surveycarrd out by the Monitoring and valuation Dcparvnt In 1986. Comparedwith Appraisa the'survy provided dta on a fa*rly wl" range of culturalpractice which wre desiged to identify criticl factors In yieldperformanc. Raults of th K & I Survey suggested that there is nosipifleant diffxence In the yield of farmes using local or ImprovedmAi- seed, if they both applied fertilLsers. Tbhi might be explained bythe l leel of fertilizer afpplcation. Howeve, for both improvd andlocal seed, there was a significant dfferene In the yields between field.with and Without fertililers.

16. The following aalysis gives survey yitld results for various@Cobintions of practices.

Comative Yields by Different PracticeComnbnations, 1986 season

Practice 'i ld (tonAh^)

Improd maize with fertilizer 2.61Improved maize without fertilizer 1.81

t tmped maize planted in lIne 2.31Improad maize not plntd In line 1.62

oved maize plated in 1lieWith fertilizer 2.83

Loma maize with fertilizer 2.00Local maaze without fertilizer 1.57Local maize plated in lines 1.85Loal aize not -plated in line 1.52Local maize plated in lines

with fertilizer 2.32

17. sAR predicted yield for maixe with project (this assues specificmaemt practices adopted as well as afoptio of Improved sed adfertilizer) compared with actua achievement in 1986 seaso is as follows.

BAR 2.25 tons/ha.Project survy 2.83 tosw/ha

The favorble reult of Project maize .famrs ea b ated to thesucces of the extenson services, which tendd to cn t on the maizecomponent of the crop progris.

18. Anothr Important aspect is the performance of loca maie vretiescompared with target yield. Local matze yiel with fertllser uso andadoption of plating in lnes mu altmt identica with the target yi14figure (2.3 tons/ha cmpared with 2.25 tons/ha).

19. clerly suggest that the resu2t of ragricultural practies when combind with use of ipr inputs Ca havfavourabe Impacts on maie yields.

20. Compa ox yields of othor crops is more diffiult to undertake.Sam idea am be obtained frm on-fam trials by the Rosearch Department,though dths assumes that the conditions prevailing In suh tials will berepLiated by farmers In the ormal field situation. Howver, best*st ates for other crops ar as follows:

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LMMroved Traditional/(local)

C"sava 15.00 3.00Yams 1.50 0.30Rice - uplad 2.00 0.90Cowpe 1.50 0.50Groundnut 1.20 0.50Swet potato 8.00 4.00Vegetables

- s*alots 5.00 3.5- tomatoes 7.00 4.00

21. The poor yields for yam ca be explaind by the 4lay in providingfarmers with improved planting materils which did not materialise until the1986 Season. Coupe. did not fore part of the Project until 1985/86 (it wasnot specified in the SAR but receives attention in the In-Depth Review 1984- see Chapter III 06). Cowpea cultivation requires fairly sophisticatedinputs.

22. Rice yields for the upland economy, at 2.0 tons/ha for the Improvedrgime, appear rather high by 1evels observed in other West Africancountries. (Typical upland rice yields under similar regimes In SierraLooe, for exampl , are around 1.5-1.6 tons/ba.) The Project has providedinputs to the Aflfe Rice Project, under irrigation, and developedapjropriate cultural rouendation for some 800 plus hectares ofcultivation. Yields bave ben impresive at around 3.5 tons/ha.

23. Thus compared with Appraisal yields. those es tated as being attainedby the Project apper to be favourable, especiUlly as regards maize. Uhathas been demonstrated-is.-that cortatn cultural practices, If adopted asrecomuded, can generate substantial ncreas In yieLds. over. and aboveyields obtaind by applying fertilLsers andor improvd seeds.

Ruzal Infrastrcture Components

24. Crop production goals were based on assumptions concerning the-development and improvemet of a rang. of agricltural support services;particularly extension, input supply, seed multiplication, applied researchand Irrigation.

25. For other directly productive agricultural activities - notably theLivestock and Fisheries components - SAR was far- less specific ia defininggoals and activities. As a conseqa nc the project never got to grips withstrategies and priorities necessary to the d vielam6t-of these componeuts.Recognising this failing, the Review 1984 made substantial adjustenats inthe targets for these components, especially for livestock activities.

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26. Tt Infrastructure coupouts were to provide facilities ad servicesto:

- ensure th succes of the crop developmnt program, by constructingfeeder ad far access road to alleviate Leput distbution and reduc*markting constraints to agricultural develop_mts.

* contribute to the effectivenes anA productivity of project staff, viathe office, workshop and housig construction proF.

- provide improved access for rual comnities to basic services,especially rual water suppU", bit also to a batter roa" networ.

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III: ROJlT UIO

Introduction

1. This soction pr ents an assessmet of the lpl ation performnceof the Project hlghlighting the progoss nd achievements of tho variouscomponents. Ulmre appropriate* some indieatio of imct is also Lve.

LU ectivenss

2. - Th conditions of the effectiveness of the IDA credit and FAD loanwere as follows

a) All conditions precedent to the effectiveuss of the proposed loha been fulfilled.

b) FASCON had boen established in a form atisfactory to IDA and osubsidiary financing agreement had been executed betwen COW andFASCOK.

c) A sepate bank account, with an Initial deposit of C 3.Om andGovernt-guaranted overdraft facilities of up to C. 3.0m, had beenopene by Volta RegioL EC with a come*cil bank in Ho.

d) VORDE had bee established with powers. functiogo edcopsiton satisfactory to IDA.

f) The RAC had bee appointed with qo and powrssatisfactory to IDA.

f) Tb. ChLef of Feld Operations adb bnappointed.

These conditions were subst ly satisfied- by 17 Jue 1981.

Start-up

3. The Projeet vas offLcially established In Narch 1981 and becameoperational In June 1981. Tbe- fLrst 6 months to end 1981 ma a period ofmoblisation of key staff, espsciaUy hoso on whose placement dependedcredit effectiveness.

4. Uhile most of the key staff, Includinit national staff . wererecruited in this period, oa key position, that of Civil Engineer, was notfilled untl March 1982. sr" is no doubt that thiS proble coA tut tothe delays In comncing the Clvll torb program and to he pooriplemstatio perfo c this compon_nt during the first two to threyears of the Project's life.

5. The ShZ assumed tt wvith the eption of a few senior adinteriediat level posts (largely consequential to the proposedrestucturitg of the RegLol )OA), the MOA' curent Regional establishmentLa large enou_ to meet overall Project manpower nees'. (SAR par, 4.08).In 1980 *A establlshmet In Volta Region n=bered 26 senior, 52Intermediate levl and 630 field staff. I a total of 708. This ma asubstantial underestimte of rel manpower needs. Actul Projectestabllshmet at the ond of 1981 was 1706, comprisin 18 NOA staff and 21other staff. It is suggeted that r ecuiteet of additional staff of theright calbre was difficf lt ad may have had an effect on the poor earlyimplementation performace .

6. FollowLag effectiveness a numbor of important revisions were proposedby the In-Depth Review carried out by IDA and IFAD in early 1964. It hadbocom clear, both to proj-et management snu GOO, that.project performanceLa the first three yers had been well below exp ctations at Appraisal. Inalmost all ares. An IDA/IFAD mission was thus requested by the GOG andVORADUP to review the situation. Consequently the Mission thoroughlyappraised both original targets and implementation problems and the reasonsfor the shortfalls.

7. The major revisions proposed by the Mision are suris ed below.

Crop -the, focus of the proj et would remaln small farm but input supply

shold be off red to all farmrs La the Region.

gare"s under Increased practices were revised upwards and recognitiongiven to the fact that many farmers were adopting only part of thepackage of Improved practices. A 6semL-Improvd c tegory was thusdesignated and areas to be cltivated were targeted.

- xatension staff were to be Incresed to 180 through aSmlgomting lowerlevel anlml busbandry staff. Th target group wans ccordingly rased to90,000 far. households.

- implemnat tion of the Resarch progra im was to be speeded up.

Infrastructure prograes were amended as follow:

- water supply; the nWuber of boreholes was raised to 50-60 in theNorthern Zone, sub-contracted to a "ermmn company, already operation 1SVolta legion.

- roads; procburemet of additional road equlpment was reoendedupgrading was ralsed to 250IS and monitoring raised to 1400hmkyear by 1986.

- buLldings; a cutback was reco aended In the buildings prograe.PrLorLty wouLd be given to village FSCs and staff housing.

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FASCOt - the organisation should be adjusted to include 11 farmers.

Organisation and a t

8. Impl tio performnce Is gretly influzeed by th effectivenessof the orga itLonal, manageent avd institutional structures desiLgd forthe Project. In this sectiov the various leels of organLsation are

"sessed in terms of their contribution to the rlasation of Projectobjectives and goals.

9. The SAR proposed the following organisational and managemet set-up forVORADEP :-

a) the MO, via its regioml office In Ho, vould have over4lresponsibillty for project Implementation. Hoveer, In line withGovornmant policies of decentralisation, all operationalresponsLbiltios, and financial, administrative and policy matterswould be delegated to the Regional level. L&iison with EOA in Accra onmatters of national agriculture policies and priorities would bemaintained.

b) within the above framework, the project orgnisation would consistof :-

Volta Regional Agricultural Development Committee (VO ZADEC)

* A restructured regional W&

- A Farmers' Services Campany (FASCON) *

10. VORADNC was to determine project policy, exercs budgetary andfinancial control, approve work programs, ensure coordination with varioussetoral and national institutions and to liase closely with KOA In Accraon matters affecting national priorities and policles. A RegionalAgricultural Coordinator (later the Regional Director of Agriculture) wouldhave the priSary responsibility for coordnataig all project activities; hewould also-be the project anager.

11. The organisation chart shown the cnfiguration of Project depar3entat various levls.. Thls was desiged to ensure the necssary adaptation andstream luning of the Regional EOA to organise and co-ordinate the Projectcomponents. Basically, there was to be a three-tier structure, comprising:-

CCentral Support Services; Administration and Personel; FLnance andProcurement; and Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation - to provide nocessaryadministatidve and planning support to the Regional Director/Project

anager.

- Tecbnical Support Services; under the co-ordinatin of a Chief ofFLld Operations (MFO) to implement VORADEP activities In the field.

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- Field Operations; organised and co-ordinated along Zonal and Districtlies.

12. While this was the intended organisation and management structure , anumber of changes were made at various times to facilitato more appropriateImplementation of activitis. The proposed changes were

* Training was merged with Extension.

- a Ry¶!drology and Rural 'ater Supplies Department was set up.

civil and mechanical engineering actlvities were separated, thoughboth ca_ undbr a Chief Engieer.

1.3 A numbsr of functional revisions were also effected, the most liportantbeing the incorporation of all extension services (Anl%al lnsbandry, PlantProtection, H6&I Extension) into an enLarged Extension and TrainingDepartment under the general operation of the T&V system.

14. As regards Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, the SAR was not veryclear about the planning responsibilities of this department. In fact, noplanning activities, so far have beon carried out by the deparcment,although at one stage the introduction of a planning dimension was proposed,either through the recruitment of planning personnel or by merging theRegional Economic Research and Planning Services unit Into VORADEP. Neltherwas realised.

sey of Perfomauce

15. On the whole the org nisational and managemnt performance bas beensatisfactory nd in line with project objectiv

16. As regards the higher ag t levl (VO2ADEC, Project Manager, etc)tke following aspects sbould bhe metion,as lessoA for the future

- it appers that VORADEC, as often happens with this type of body becametoo larg for effective decision-making. Perhaps this was inevitable sincethe intention was to kes VORADEC representative of all those organisationand institutions with development interests In Volta Region;

- oa the otber hand, the rra of the interests represented In VORADECensurd that the committee played a vital public relations and imag-makingtolc for the project;

- the regular metingp of VORADEC ensured continuity of supervision andgeneral co-ordination of proj3ct activities. owever, the all- importantsupervisory mAssions of IDA and IPAD tended to by-pass VORADEC and dealdirectly with the Proect Management. Decisions and recommendations made bythe Missions then had to be p aed on to the VORADEC by the PM, thuscreating a situation which could have caused difficulties end confliet.

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17. The Contral Support Services have carried out their responuibilities,despite difficulties in the first two or three years of the Project whenfinancial and procuremet problem vere enoutered.

18. The enal Support Service faced merous problem In the arlyperiod of the Proj ct. Thes are detailed in the compomet reviews, whichar annexd. However, the overall perforuance of tbeo services Improved asa result of the structural and fuctional changes Introduced duringImplemntatiSon (see pares 4 ad 5 above).

19. in princple, the orgstio and mplenttion of field operations,on a Zoanl ad District basis is saemd, and the concept of Zonal andDistrict co-ordination has muob to comend it. In practceo, bowever. anumber of -problem were *bouamtred:

- Zonal co-ordinators were crop specialists and tended to concentrate onextension activities inrsted of providing a co-ordtnation function withregard to Zon.l and District programes;

- there was also conflict between the essentially horizontal nature ofsuch co-ordination and the vertical loyalty of technical units to theirproject-basod department in Ho;

* the difficulty possibly lay In the failure to ensure that co-ordinators, especially at the Zonal levol, understood their t echnical rolesas well as their administrative and reporting responsibilities.

20. Hene, dplite diffiudlties in the UVpl ntat of organisational andmaagemet objectives, the Projoet dld mana to develop appropriatestructures consonant with planned objectives and goals. A substantialdegre of structural flexibility,was allowed In order to met. chaging.needs.

lmplementatiou performance - a esmry

21. This section prestens su ieats of the component reviews whicb aredetaIled In various Annex" to this report.

22. As.rpgards the crop development program, th Adaptive Rsarchcomponent has had increasing success in reallsing its main objectives,especially the carrying out of trials on farmer fields. Activities ha"v4oncestrate o0n cereals nd root crops. Useful collaboration on on-farmvarietal trials with CIDA/Ghana Grains Dvelopment Board for maize has ledto rcc---edtios on the varieties beat suited to the ecological zones ofthe Project area. Futhermore, the Research Department started producingthe rcomended varieties of seed umaze for sales to farmers.

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23. The most sisgLfiwmt achievements ln root crop research concerncassava, yam and sweet poto developments. Thee include progress incassava disoase control and Variety selection to Increase yieldssignlficantly, and the introduction of ya a ii-sett technlques, with acurrent adoption rate aong farmers of around 40.50 per cent. Selections ofhigh yi.dClng sweet potato varieties have produced Impressive results.Research on other crops (groundauts, cowpeas, rice, ate) has concentrated onvariety trials, mainly in conjunction with other national and internationalresarch bodies.

24. In the ares of extension and training the project has achieved somefundamental and Impressive results over its lifetim, especially since theintroduction of a unLfied T&V ystem. This enabled the detprtment toincrease the tarpet popUlation from 60,000 (SAR) to 90,000 (post-review) andto attain a more favourable extension worker/farmer ratio of around 1:500(1:900 pre Project). An iacrease in staff from 120 to over 250 allowed amore equitable distribution of field contact to farmers. Training under theT&V approach has been Intensified and made more responsive to farmers'needs. Theus improvements, coupled with more effective co-operation withResearch, have led to itprassive contact and Impact performances, achievedtbrough a wide diversity of extension motbods.

25. Comparisons between early Project (1982) and later Project (1987)extension performance reveal sgnificant improvements in all major measuresof extension progres and impat; namely, frequency of vsita by extensionstaff, increase in awarenes of Improved cultural practices for a variety ofcrops, and higher adoption rates of modern agronomic practices. Favourablediffusion effects from contact farzmrs to other groups are also beingachievd.

26. Rome exteaio, now a part of the Extension Depertuent, has achivedsubstantial results in the community via its progr as focussed on womn nand youth. The pxogress In lts varied programes has been commendabledespite sious transport problms, which had, In the first few years,iahibited its programmes ia rural areas and especially ia the Northern Zone.

27. The food production progres, in homs and schools, has concentratedon urbn h bom gardm, farm vgetable growing, and school gardens. With theimprovement ia the Depertet's transport situation, penetratlon iato ruralareas ba intensified. Total number of partieipants registered rose fromjust over 50OOO in 1982 (PYI) to over 20,000 in 1987 (PY6). On the basis ofaverage rural household size of betwen 5-6 members this aouns that theprogrames are ifluecing directly the welfare of some 110,000-120,000people i the Region. Demonstration effects would place the total numberInfluenced considerably above this.

28. Howeer, ther Is ow an urgent need to asses objectively the impactof the home extension programmes on the autritional status of thepopulation. ange in nutriional status often have fairly long gestationperiods; howevr, tbere is enough evidence to suggest that the programmsare Impiuntin favourably on goneral and nutritional welfare. Ths ought tobe documented as a basis for future program.es

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29. Igmt suLoly has been the responsibility t'f FASCOK, a ne*w1ycontitutedbody. The development of FASCONl's operations concerned with the supply offam inputs and other requirements ha bee affected by * nuber ofinhibiting factors, the more important of which are :

- an apparent conflict between the Intention that FASCOI( should operatoas a commercial company and the control of input prices and procurementpolicies and procedures by the Governent.

- certain organis- aonal and operational dlfficulties, especially asregaids FASCOM's transport activities vhich hav had adverse effects oncosts and msxgis.

- performances of its input supply programs has boen somehat erraticespecially for the two ma in 1iuts. fertillsers and seeds. Failure toensure tLtoly supplies of fsrtlliser and suffieLSnt quantities of s* d hasadversely affected farmer uptake of improved packages.

other factors of importance have been the slow implementation of theFSC programm, partly due to poor management of the outlets and partly todelays in the construction of the VORADEP purpose built District andV11age centrs. Furthermore, original crop recommendations were too inputintnsive and, coupled with transport problems and Laput price rises,explains why sale were often below expctations.

30. Given CON coltment to privatization of fettiliser sles and removalof subsidy, provision of farm inputs In fuure will depend on a wmber of:=proemens i ogi and operations of the supplying omopany (ies).If FVASCO contiusi theS role (and It clearly has advantages of anexisting supply network, adequate tranport facliLties, experience, *ec)improvements wll bave to be acheved and current constraints removed,especially in the areas of procuree and distribution (infrastructure andtransort). The present inconsistencies created by ts duel role ofcomercial company/devlopmet company will hav to be resolved andrflected in its organization and agnagemnt structure and performanc.

31. Llv_estk_develonmen sufferd from insufficiently clerspecifLcations ti the SAL Consequently, little wa achieved in the firsttwo yars of the Project. The Review of 1984 took a pragmatic view of ther quirets and recommendd soe achievable and relevat ch .

32. Finacial issues wre a key objective and two changes were made towardsthat end, amely, support from the poor psrforuac stations wawithdrawn, and drug subsidies withdran.

33. A major aprovaemt to the orgisation of livestock services wasachleved by the erger of anLmal husbandry extension staff into the generalExtenion and Training Department. For veterinay service, support v"scontLnued at the level of previous yers, drugs to be sold at a mark up withno subsidy on vccinatons. Vehicle avalabilLty vas also improved forvaccination campaigns.

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34. Progress in the livetock progre picked up after 1984, with thelaunch of a successful autt-Underpost campagln. Numbers of all livestockcategories recovered and increaed over the nxt few 7ears. Coverage ofcattle by sati-rinderpest vacinatian incrased dramatically, from 69% in1984 to nearly 90g to 1985 and 1986.

35. During 1986 and 1987 several improvements oc=s d, following therecoamendacione of the 1984 Review. Progress was made in the construction ofcattle crushes, dips and refrigeration of vaccine via * cold chain system.

36. Like livestock, fishbrioe developmt was only vaguely specified in theSAR After poor achievements in Its first two Projoct years# tbo Reviewrecomenmded far more specific and technical proposals for futurodevelopment. Fis soed production nd a demonstration fish farm were themain physical development iitiatives, while intensification of training "salso proposed. Th Fisherie Department's efforts were also to be augmntedby two consultancy studies.

37. The period 1982-86 witnessed an Impressive bulld up of fish pondconstruction and stocking.

38. New potential development areas, namly coastal lagoons, estuaries andswamps, were assesed by a consultant. A second study evaluated soilacidity and a pilot scheme was rscommended to determine the feasibility ofbrackish water aqua-culture. However, this recomm"edation as made too nearto the end of Project life to allow implemtation

39 The rural infrastructure prograsw were envisaged as ws tofacilitate the achievemnt of tOm nasic Project sims of Improving welfareand standards of living of the rural population. Programmes iuvolved therehabilitation and reconstruction of farm access and feeder road;improvement in domestic water supply; provision of housing and officebuildings for Project staff; assessmnt of small scale irrigation andImpl ntation of pilot scbhmes.

40. The acehvemets and Impacts of these various sub-comonnUOts can be summarised as follows :

R2NU« - when all contracts aef coyleted, by end 1988, the Project vill haverehabilltated 657 km of feeder roads and $41 km of trunk roads. bmpact, asyet, is difficult to assess, sine* Force Account progrmes did not identifylkely Impacts, and road benfits ae elusive and long term in generatin

beonfts. However, gSVen the scope and distribution of the road "schmes,there is no doubt that the better access and counlicatious t-nus achievedvill benefit both the target faming population through Improved access toimputs and markets. th Regional population in general iU also benefittbrough quality of life' nmnoumeit

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BYUldins d Houwing - the mot imrsive aem s of this copenetwere Ln the contrution of senior intermdiate staff houslng, with-ICO ed63% of targts reached. oweve.. only 15 of targeted junior staff housingws attained, and none of the FASCOK Regia al HQ, the District stores orZoal offices hae been built. The impact of the building programme on thewe1 being and productivity of Project staff has been ainlmised by the factthat completion of staff housing cam only at the end of the Project.Howver, the invcea in housing stock is a good investmet for the future.The 50% achievement In the regional office building program has definitelymproved the stadard of office aceomoation of VORADU staff, withconsonant benfits to working conditions, and; possibly, productivity.During 1987 and 1988, 34 village FSCI, will have been cmpleted ad thisshould hav favourable offect on the input ditribution progrs in theRoegon. MechanicAl services he" been plced on a better footing with thecompletion of the central workshop and the 3 zonal workops.

Rural Water Sumly - The wells programe was slow to Set off the ground,with little achievemet In physical terms dur"g the first 2 yeas. jgptswere revised by the Review Mission and the construction of the planed wellswere contacted to a compay with a good track record In the Region. TheProject bas drilled 246 successful wells In the Region, about 50% of thetotal of wells drilled by CGSC under a Geran aid progre in the samepriod. VODIP wells program ha accouted for about one third of allwells currently existing In the Region (CVSC is responsible for 44%). Intee Northern Zone VORDP wells account for 78% of wells currenly existing.Impacts of ral water suply programes ae difficult to assess sideImproved water iS only one component of many to helth andwelfar of the rual area. Given the scale and distribution of VORADPwels, hover, It Is reaonable to assum that the progrine hascontributed and dll inSrlengly contribute to iIpr tn halthsta . s, In tim, will, have favourable overspill, effects onagricultural production, etcational prfoc and the -quality of UfeTdimnuions of the ural population.

Central Worksho and Vehicle Ooeratiors - tbe estgblisbmet of a CentralWorkshop has Improved the Project's capacity La vehicle and equipaent_ai,ntnanceand repairs. Th intallation of 3 Zonal worlahps Us also

* tbute this capabilty thrughout the Region. Improvements in vehicleusag ad in the assessmet of vehcle operational costs have also beeintituted. F"rthermre the _echancal Sev sD r t has assifacors In clearing farmland (about 160 Ha betwen 1984-1988) andcostructig dug outs. Reeue from ths servics have ben paid into

*Jest accounts.

IrriSation - the SA1 proposals appear to have been over-optimUtic sinc thet of planning, design, constucetion and operation of an irrigatio schemeis a long and expenive. one. There was reasonable an planningad survey wock, but mh more progress would have bee made If therelationship betwee VOA and the Irrigation Development Authority (Da)had been more carefully plannd and devloped. The main ha beeIn the are of data collection and design for 7 pilot Irrigation sches.

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IV: FINACIA PERCNAI

1. it *w enwised at appraisal tbat the total coat of VOIADRactivities over a five yer period vould be *ome $48.7 millio. Thi emmtwould cover the rague of local ad foreign costs which would be Incurred,-A would be finSa from three main sources. Thes were to be theCovermnt of Chna, th It o lopment Ageny (IDA) am of the

Zuteruatinlt Bank for Rscouta uction-a- d Devlopmet (I=, or World ank)ad the tation md for Agricultural Devlopmt (IFAD). In addition.a amal amomt of capital wa to be provided by local bankinginstititution.

2. The prpse financing ple. ca be s:auisd thu:

(US $S nillion)

tems IDA IFAD Goa Total

Local 11.0 4.6 6.3 21.9FreinL 18.5 7.9 -.- 26.4

Total 29.5 12.5 6.3 48.3aa.... -aefbla..fl.ean n.... _ _.

Local bakg institations we" to provide $0.4 milio tOwards local costs(as equity to 1As00 for orking capiLtal), therefore bringing the totalprject cost to $48.7 mllion.

3. IDA-wa thus to fund 6% of ths project, VAD 26% ad the Gove.mentof*h aa 13e, with the remmai,in4 ls t*n is coming loca inetitatona. ML ad WAD wer to finance all t_ forig a costs ofVOmDu, (in b. ratio of 7:3). and 49% and 21% respetively of loalcosts.

4. Lsoa agremns ware therefo negotiated betwen Cove|meet of Ohaneand IDa ad hAD. The IDA loan of $29.5 millin cari stadad tame adconditions for such creits, and the DAD loan of $12. 5- mllion wanegotiated n c onazy te=& with respeet to snevice argws nd gracead repaymn. pertods. The usual arnent regading cemicomnt fee onundraw fouds apple, as did ts on procedue for th clain ofreim n from MD ad procedurs for prcemt 11ouicompetitive bidding. As regards tat part of teb IDA/AD loan ($3.9) oeby Goveromnt of Gbhma to FASCO= for ir n fam inpus, thi was to berepaid ovr o30 years, with a 7. ye a period. Tbhs loan becaeeffective in 1981, allowing the project a notial start date of March 31,1988. lecus of tbe delayed imto of the project, e-edture in19J1 ma minual, and project year 1 La regudd as calendar 1982. 1988e ditur is tebrefore inluded with that for 1982 in the tables whichfollo.

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Actual expenditures

5. A comparison of actual financial performance with that envlsaged atappraisal Ls beset with problems. Those problem. relate both to thooperations of the project itself .wd to the environment within which It hasbeen operating. In the first &is*, the actual mIz of activities vwech theprojoct has undertaken has d£fferred from those outlined at appraisal. Inpart thi has been the result of deliberate policy changes following the in-depth review of VORADiEP n 1984 and in part du to the project flndlng thatsom proposed activities were not feasible, and consquently redirecting itsefforts elsewhere. The relative importance of tdfferent project componentshas changed as a result, and therefore the overall cost structure of theproject has changed. The delays in implementation which occurred In thoearly years of the project also contributed to daviations betwoen expectedand actual financLal porformance. In the second case, the macroeconomicclimate in which VORADEP has operated has been subjoct to major variation,most notably with respect to the exchange rate and, (partly as a consequenceof this), the rato of domestLc inflation. Since the tim the project wasfirst appraised the exchange rate botween the US dollar and the Cedi haschanged by a factor of nearly 100; recent doamstic inflation has been of theorder of 40% per annum.

6. Given the above considerations, the evaluation of the project'sfinancLal history simply in term of appraisal expectations isextremelydifficult. What cam be sald, in the most general tems . however, Is thatsatual monetary expenses dLominated in Cedis have been much Sgreter. thaenvisaged due to the effects of domstic inflation, but that in overall,dollr ters these bave been more than offsot by the declin in tho value oftho. Cedl. This, plum the the relatively slow Initial Implementation of theproject ha smet that part of the loan funds available hav not beenutised. (in erly 1986 =nRs situation wa revlewed -at the tim Itappekred that as 'muh as $24 million of loan funds would be unspent at theend of project year 5 - and lt was decided to extend the life of the projectby one year, with an additional 6 maonths iwLnd-diown' timb to the end of1988. Ivan so, lt is ulikely that all committed funds will used by the endof the period.)

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7. A breakdown of project expenditue by source of funding over the perioddemonstrates these feture:

Actual Project Expanditure by Source, 1982 - 1987

TlM Go CG DA IFAD(Cedi a) (U8$ a) (S$4 a)

* nee.--. o-…- -…- -. .....

1982 34.73 *2.69 1.15

1983 24.80 0.99 0.42

1984 36.98 0.88 0.38

1985 145.24. 3.37 1.45

1986 229.92 4.16 1.78

1987 353.86 7.19 3.08,...............................

TOTAL 825.53 19.28 8.26~~~~,,O,,T , ............... __...*---

DUMT 28.4 29.5 12.5

Total Cedi monetary expenditure to the perW eqding Decebmbr 1987 Ls shownto be roughy 50 ties 8greter than enwisagd -tt appraisal. At tbs. xobaeate of 18$ 1 - CeAL 2.75 In 1980 Governmet of na e itu wa to be

the equivalent of US$ 6.3 millin, or Cedi 17.4 =Illion. Using recentaution rate for forign exhag of aound lS$ 1 - Coed 200, ral Cediexpnditure In V8$ tar.s has actuaily been bilow tavrgt, only about two-

tirds of allocated reel funds bhaing been utiised. Howevr, using anominal figure to reflect the weighted average ehanpg rate wer theperiod, Covenoment Cm otributions rin excess of theos envisaged, largelydue to unanticipatd staff costa.

Si ? Au 4 SAR for Cedi Anuual Goverrment FinancingAnnze 6 tUA for ID and IhAD

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Us* ot lom fiads

8. Ts tscm of lon funds use and re.af.g the sitution (to the end of1987) is shown beow by IBRD categories of expenditure:

IDAFAD Di Stuation (to Dece_er 31, 1987)

* to cc..... cc~.. --c -.-- co..... .ce ..........

CAXOK DESCIPTION ALOACTIED DlSJUSlD UIDISBUISID(US$ a) S$ a) (US$ a)

......... e.............................. ------- ee........

1 CIIL gRKS/

MAZUIALS 12.50 7.41 5.09

2 MQIMKEUT/vuICLu &SPARE PARTS 8.00 10.75 (2.75)

3 FARx nnPuTS 4.72 4.71 0.00

4 Ualto G&

* SALARIES 5.00 4.41 0.59

5 00 NAIUTWANCZi 8,50 1.79 6.7n

6 WUAlocaID 3;43 0.20* 3.22... ... ...

TomAL 42.15 29.27 12.86… .......... .. c. .. c c.

amut in special revolving dollar a_omt)

Of whish:

IDA los 29.50 20.49 9.01WIAD loan, 12.50 9.79 2.71

ccc........c.....cc...... ccc ... e..c... eccae...c.... cc...

As of the end of 1987 therefore, only about 65S of allocated loa f und hadbeen dram down. With the eztesion of the project and the iclusion of nwactivities, however, the rate of expndte Is increasing 3apidly; InJanuary, 1988, for example, the project spent US$ 1.81 mlluon. Of loanfuns usd, capital tus (der ID categories 1 and 2) accountedfor some US$18.22 million or 62% of the total. The balnce of the loanfunds were aitoly usod for recurrent exp nditures rliubursable undercateSy 5, and for purchase of farm inputs for FASCOK.

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9. An aalysis of proJ3ect e iture by compon_nt (or project output) isextrmly desirable for the purpose of "esetlzt return to indiLVdulcimponents. As Ls the cse for nearly all such projects, howeer, actuaaccouttig practcess facilitat. only an ppro pieture. The data belowreprJest an attempt to spUt total project expenditures by the majoridentifiable project output to which they relate.

Approximate Project Eeture by Compo_ent, 1982 - 1987

Component/Output oporn of total (C)............ * t~ ........ ec ..... n.e..........e...c...

dinistration (saccmts, COiiatios,

management. II & K) 19

R"erch 4

Extension (crops, home, animalhusbandry) 14

Vetinary S

Fisheries 2

rrigton/ral ter supply 7

Civil e erg (rao, buildin) 21

Lad use plannng

Eecanialservices

Plant qu~arantine1

FASOI= 21

..... ..........

TOM~~~~~~~~~ 100

Thi breakdown shos a fdaily typical stuaton wLth the direct ovevheadcosts of admiunstalo and mechanuic servies togeter absoxbing arondon quarte of all e nr. Also typical is the relatively highexpenditue on civil works, wit its captal-intesiv. imt requiremts.I*5A0K for tiput purchases and distriution are also of the sane ordr ofmagnitude. Etension costs are net In importane (split betwen staff costsand transport costs), folloved by the other, smeller components.

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10. Expendtur by District is available for the period after1983, and breaks down into the following proportions:

District Proportion of totalexpenditures (t)

.... _....... .......................................

so 26Hohoe 6Xpaudo 7Jasikan 8krachi 3Ekvanta 4Sogakupe 7Denu 5Anloga 2Regional IQ (Ho) 31

Volta Region 100

This pattern reflects the Lnevitable concentration of resources at theRegional centre for administration and organization, as well as thoperation of some project compneants In spoecfic areas only (for examplefisberLes and rod rhabiliation.) Given the population distribution of theRegion and the considerations just described, no major equity Lssues areapparent fromthe geographical patt of expenditure.

Operation of loan es

U. As regards the actual operation of the loan funds for developmentpurposes it can be said that there have been no problems with the flow offunds provided under the loans which have $mpeded project activity. InLtialdifficulties connected with inexperience in managing such agremntx and theprovision of adequat documentation to enable reimbursement of expendStureswere soon overcome The original credit agreemnt was amended twice; onceto change the level of rvimbursaoble expeaditure under category 5 from 85%to 95% of the total cost, and once to allow the rallocation of fundsfollowing the redefinition of project targets. IUD also approved the"tting up and operation of a special revolving dollar account with aChanalan commercial bank In London to faclltate small-scale lovorsspurchases uhichwvas not In the original credit agreement. The role ofprocuement agents in the prepar tLon of doc4met tion for internationalcompetitive bidddiag has been found extremely useful by technical staff ofthe project, although this has been criticised by IUD supervisLon missions.

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Local fund sources

12. Funs from the Government of Ghana hav basically been forthcoming.Problem La this respect in the very early days of the project were moreconnted with the genral economic situation than ay specific problswith VOREAD. The centralisation of the capital vote at Acera did causeproblosn of access to *and release of, funds, however. This led tocontractors being uwilling to undortake VORAOEP work. and the projeetfunding some capital activities from current e2lpe1dtur through theoperation of a local account in Ho.

Local administration of funds

13. In general th. picture has been one of tfficient adinistration of loanand local fund at Ho. Budgetlg, planning atu reporting functions haveboon maintained satisfactorily, althougb delays have occurred with theauditing of accounts by the locally-appointed auditors due to presjure ofwork. The project bhs represented a considerable degree of decentralizationof financial autonomy and demonstrated that such systems ar workable.

fture Considerations

14. In the liht of this eaperLence It is to be hoped that some degr ofself-accountability can be maintalned for VORADRP following its "bsorptIoPInto moe traditiona gverent structurea in the futpure. It ast oeeupbaaseed that there ifl be a definite nee" for planning the finances offturo activities currenitly undertaken by WinDUP on an Sitegrated basis ifthe momaznum of development In the Region is to be, mintaied.A oaposite apprch to budgetilg for the Region wll be essntil a the.returns from crop development depend upon. investeents continuing to be madein the iarloui area (roads, eztension, water-supply *tc) whbih contributeto the returns. This ned hs iMplications for .future fin=anciladministration of the RdgLoh.

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V. cL IMACT

Znoeo nalOutpu

1. Project invesneent 1a impved output in the region ard details ofpysical ic a outp ae discuss" below. (An eclonic aalysis ofthe project impt is dscused In the et chapter.) PQojOeCtimlementation differed substantially fm the design at appraisal adthus incementalbeeits achiev"e ffer from those orgivally enwisagd.Betimats of project benfits given below aSe subject tk lmitations In thequlity of the data onwhich tbhy are based.

Nature Of Benefits

2. Incremnat l crop production accounts for sme 60-75% of "timatedbenofits in the early years of the project; this proportion declins inliter years as benofits from other components (eg livetock, fisheries,roads *te) begin to come on stream.

3.- The most important coaponent of incremetal crop production, and theerop on which most extension activity has focussd, has bee seaze. Araundhalf of the ferns In the Region cultivate aize, as eitbhr sole or mixedcrop, typically on area of 0.75 - 1.25 hectare, out of a total fare sizeof aroud 3 bectares (Soure : onoitoring and evaluatiol dapartts.basllne and 'contact famers surveys.) Project Impact on aggregat maize

production is estimated to be In excess of 8000 towoes per nUm after 1988(PY7.)

4. *-h crop extension service bas morked through a rlsin 'sg and visit'(T&?) system of fortuightly meetings with 'contact' farmers to promulgate* recomndation for the cultivgtlon of Improved varieties of maize, usingImprovd se sad timly *plicahon o ffetilisers. Zecodations for-plant densitie (spacg, plants per stad ate) and weedIng practic bavealso been developd. Potential benefits from full adoption of extensionre omencations are coniderable; project research results sug t thatyilds cm be more tha doubled.

5. Th overoblaing picture on maize lttn the Region, however, Isof prtial adoption of extension re e i. Crop yield surveys

* conducted by the & 6 dep rtent sugget that few farmes ars completeadopters. By 1987, for example, 55% of farmers weeO adopting the reoeddpractis for f lisr plication osme of thelr maze, whil 67% werereported as adopting the lmproved seed varieties. The majority of famersony partlly adopt re tio : for exmple, usian fertilisrs to alesser extent than r c d, or by usng fertUlzer on unimprove seed,or by plating In lines but using only traditional material. For thisreason, potential beofits from new technology extended to the targetpopulation are greatly eonstrained. As a reult, averag estimated benofitsper farm are couseratively estimated at something under one tonne of maize.for 'adoptersJ. This is based on data from the Monitoring and EvaluationDeparment daize Yield Survey undertaken in 1986, when It was found that the

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range of shelled maize yields was from around 1.5 to 2.8 tons por heceare,with yields being a function of both type of s"ad used as well as app-icationof fertiliser and recommended planting practices.

6. Very little information exists about trends in the uptake of mprovedpractices In the Region, apart fros the partial data contained in theContact Farmer and Extension impact surveys in 1982 and 1987 respectively.The project has not been going for a sufficiently long enough tim forsurvey data to measure the rate of the knowledge-diffusion proess. Studiesfrom elsewhere in Ghana on maize growers (conducted for the Ghana GrainsBoard by CIK!TM) confirm the picture of partial adoption and also suggesteventual rates of adoption of Improved practices Results indicate that mostfamers wifl move towards their production possibility frontiers, but atdifferent speeds and In different respects with a smell proportion becomlngcomplete adopters.

7* Recommendations on other major staple crops in the Region (cassava,yam, sweet potato, sorghum *te), have had much less of an Impact. The'mini-sett' propogation techniques for yam, to overcome the shortage ofplanting material, have been developed and there is reson to think theireffect (combined with a greater supply of planting material) in future canbe considerablo. Similarly for cassava (which is a staple to some degree forthe majority of the Region's population), an TTA-developed variety has beenmultiplled by the psoject and associated recommndations issued. Althoughthe potential bonefits from the cowpee componaet of extension work arelage, they must be discounted due to thixr Ugh dependence on relativelysophisticated inputs; no estlmate of bonefits bas tbhrefor been attempted.

. Beonfits from other crops are mors m surable. In the case of rice(grow by some 15% of farmers In the project area), the project has not onlydeveloped appropriate-recommendations but has actually. sustained productionthrough the supply of inputs to the Afife i¢Le Project. AnnSal incrementalrice production (both rainfed and Irrigated) Ls stimated to be some 2000tonnes In 1988 (PY7.) gstimates of nI irrigated rice production.com from the Aft.2 Rieo Project. Benefits from Input supply under VORADEPalso apply to shallots. whre the availability of essential inputs hasawvrted a production collpse In the pat (estimated in crenmt of 600 tonnesper run by 1988.) The iact of the project on tomato growing appearswidespread, with the establisnent of institutional and 'backyard' gardensacross the Region, with ncremental production estimated to be of the orderof 1200 conoes per anum. Financial and *conoLi bonefits from all theseactivities are considerable due to the crops bhigh values even thoughabsolute production volums my be relatively low.

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9. Input supply, through FASCOI and the VORADEP-constructed Farm ServiceCentrir(FSCA) I ha been a major feature of VORADS? activity and has greatlyaffected the rate of agricultural change in the Region. At the start of theproject in 1982 - 83 FASCON wa supplying less thaui 2000 tomes offertilisers annually; by 1987 this had risen to around 5500 tones, plusseed, chemicals and smll items of agricultural equipmnt (such ascutlasses.) The supply of the inputs theoelves has obviously beenfundamental to the bringing about of technological change; their deliveryand availability tbrough a network of FSCs bas had benefits in the nazture ofboth efficiency and equity (in the latter case more so after the projectinput supply pollcy change In 1984.) It is Impossible to assoss thb impacton the agriculture of the Region of the simple availability of these inputs4ithout referenee t the overall econoic environment within which'-they havebeen supplied. In this respect, the relative real cost of fertiliser tofarmrs has risen drastically over the period of project life, and continuesto do so; and the availability of agricultural credit in the Region isextremely limited. Even so, FASCON is currently lisposing of its entireannual supply (apart from a small transactional wastage) of fortilisers. Ittherefore appars to be the case that supply, rather than demand, is theconstraint to usage. (FASCON estimate that some 10000 tonnes of the rightproportions of fertiliser, available at the right time, could be soldannually at current prices, but supply to FASCON through VORADEP is limitedby foreign exchange limitations.) The impact of input supply on agriculturewould therefore appear to be great, but constrained by factors external tothe project.

10. VORADEP has also had other, non-.crop agricultural impacts. Theveterinary progr _ of 'acc"iions urn helped to keep tha cattlepopulation stable (if not Ulightly increasing) in the face -of outbreaks ofrindepest and CMP In the legion. The roads and water supply programmeshave had major lipacts upon the infrastructure of the legion. In the case ofroads, some 1150 kilometres of trunk and accesa roads will have be n builtor rehabilitated (eitbhr by contract or fore account) by the end of 1988,and over 240 boreboles have been sited as part of the water supplyprogramme. The Impact of the roads Improvements are more direct uponagricultural production, and traffic surveys conducted by the monltoring andevaluation unit of VORADEP together with estimates of teo quantity and valueof marketed production, allow an estUate of the extent of this impact. Thepoor state of roads in theb egion (especially In the north) plus the highvaluo of the increental arzketed produce has eant that the roads programme

appears economically worthwhile as a component on its own. The cae ofboreholes Is harder to quantify, though the welfare effect throughout thelegion appears to be measurable by the declining Incidence of water-borneand associated diseases (particularly gulnea-worm) as recorded by theMinistry of Hbalth.

11. The impact of the fisbhriSs aqyculturo extension component has notbeen estimted, although the component has offered extension assistance inthe form of design, stocking and harvesting Snputsato small farmer wishingto establish ponds over a period of several years. Of much greater Impact islikely to be the substantial invstment In marine capture equipment forcoastal fishermen in 1988. The Impact of this investment should be large,with savings In foreign exchange and a potential doubling of annual catch.

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Other Project impacts

12. The project h&. had other, non.messurable impacts on the Regton.Foremot amonp t these hs beou the decoutralisation of decision-makingrogarding the devlopment of the Region. VORADEP ha bee responsible forplannAng end Lm1lementing an integrated agricultural developmnt strategyfor the Region, with the undertaking of associated administrative functionsfor finuacial administration, budgeting etc.

Foreign exchange and revenue Implications

13. The incremental production of some of the crops from the legion as aresult of VORADEP should result In a savinLg of foreign exchange over theperiod of project life. GbAna currently import a rang of cereals to meetits food defi¢lt, and Increments of maize production should be directlysubstitutable for some of this. the case of rice is even more apparent, asGhana imports (or receives as aid) most of this pref&_,red food at presont.Long-ru trends towards the production of rice at near-compotitive worldprices will result in substantial foreign exchange savings. Foreign sxchqngeexponses will continue to be incurred, however, on both the diroct inputs(fertilisers, chemicals *tc) necessary to generate agricultural increments,and on the indirect inputs which are also necessary (especiallyInfrastructure investment.) Vithl the terms of the economic impact analysisthe nett position is one of foreign exchange saving.14. -Shaoets and tomatoes are potential. foreign exchange earners, bothbeing currently xported to nighbourting countries. The development ofshallot eports to Togo and Suria Faso appears pcularly attractive.The impact of the livestock component is assumed to be limted to within theOhanela economy. The fisheries lnvestmnt which is about to be made shouldhve an impact on foreign esibanpe i two ways; firstly it should result Inthe saving of foreign exchange as fishuerme no longer travel to Togo topurbhase equipmnat, Sad, secondly, can result in the earning of foreignexcange with the incresed sales of fish to other neighbouring (especiallylandlocked) countries.

15. The revnue effects of the proj ct are negative. The project activitiesand their t on beyond 1988 demand large a zmt of Goveznmntresources (perhaps as much as Cedis 900m pe amam as astimated.by GNA),and thse wil not be recouped In the fom of higher taxtlon or cesrevenues from small farmers; hovevr the economic aysis of the projectwhich follows sugets that this levl of financial comitment in therelatively short-mm wold result In long-ru economi benfits.

Incms, Employmet and Equity

16. Agricultural money and rel incoms are etimted to have risen as aresult of VORADEF. For individual farm familes ths ins a function of theirlevels of adoption of new technology (and In particular thelr use ofpurchased inputs) and the resultant extent of crop Inerement. These moneyreturns re typically modest at present In absolute teros, (perhaps Cedis20000 per farm from Tha of maize), but represent a substantiaL relativeincree In disposable incoea.

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17. There are no definite emplomet impacts as a reult of VOADEPobsevable at preost t.a crmts of real incomes should in the meium tolong-run call fo@ft changes in the pattern of demand for goods anA xevvicesiu the Region (through 'Fowth linkage' mechanis). and thus cause anincreae in specific ars of employment opportunity, but these are not

sale at praeset and ae c9aventionally excluded from the anlysis ofsuch develpment projects. The project has of course itself beie a majordirect employer ia the Region (currently with over 2000 staff, man of whomA"I entl to the previous levl of public sector activity.)

18. There aro no mjor equity issues arisng, from the pattern of resource4location under V Dtl. The pattern of project expenditure by Districtpresented in the capter on financial performance shows no geographicl biasbeyond that unavodable in a project of VODZP a nature. The ealy emphasison maize cultivation by the project is possibly to some extent questionableon grounds of eqity whe only balf the farmers In the Region are growingthe crop. Rover, thiss probably both unavoidable and (in impact terms)uniportant when benfits from tecbnological change are apparent from maizecultivation to a muc greter extent than other crops (especially cassava,which is more widely grown). Moreover, the benfits to maize growers havebeen incrasingly coaplemted by the returns to other crops and otheractivities (such as livestock, fisheries etC) which embrace an incresinglygreter proportion of the Region's population.

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VI: ECMICC RAZ OF RUM

BaSIS of calultio

1. The bao assumptions for the lnteral economic rate of return estimateare described in Annex* 1. The cot and benefit struture for the project asa whole is shown Im Table 58 on page 62. Tables 1 to 9 of the sam sectiondescribe costs arA (where possible) easurabl* benfits for individualproject components, or sets of components, grouped functionally. For thepurp6aes of construetion of the Table", all tbo bonefits from the cropdvelopment programme are shown to acreo to the extenolon component; it lsof course the case that these benefits depend directly upon input supplythrough FASCOM, and lidirectly upon a range of adminstrative andagricultural sor'ices. In other cses, returns to individual components arsmore easily identified due to the discreet nature of the activity (eglivestock and fisheries).

2. No benflts hav been included for those components whose output isinhetently uimaurable. These include adlinistration (managaunt, accounts,communications and monitoring A evaluation), lapA use- planning endagricultural research (Tables 1, 2 and 3.) Costs beyond 1987 are assumed tobe Incurred only for thosa components whose benflts a measrable afterthat date. In the case of road and borehoes a percentag of the capitalcost of istall.e resource ban been assumd to be ne"d anually formaintenanc; for extesion ad lvestock activities a movig averapg oftotl costs over te 1982-87 period bas been assumed necessar to keep theprogram going. No new devlopment work is assumed to occur beyond 1988.

3. All costs an benfits ae expressed iu 1982 constant terms. The ifof the project s assumed to be 25 yeas.

The natur of Deefits

4. Th project La etimated to have an nternal economic rats of return of16 percent: this co=cL&s. with the rate of r*tuqa calculated at app;aisulIn 1980. The nature of benfits realisod is different from those projectedat appraisal, both regarding. the extent of benfits from the cropdevlopment programe d the range of retuns fom other components.

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5. The largest single source of benefits coms fro etl sizeproduction under therop developmet program (a. Table 4.) Under theassumption that Ghana continues to be. not recipient of cerals from aidand/or coinrcial sources, this increment to production ba a tolativelyhlgh real value. Other itncrementl production (especially rice) also hasi high real valu. oven thoush the quatitios produced as a result ofVORADI? activities may appea relatively modst. The prodction of shllots(valued at oca" prices plus a mall premum due to some quantitis beingeported to neighbouring eountries) in the Region is also estmated to haverisen as a direct teult of FASCOM input supply; in on yea but forVORADE-supplied inputs prodution would havecollapsed. The project haalso ecouragd the production of tomtoe, with a relatively high localvalue. Other crop production incrmats (cassava, yam, compoa) be notbeen Included for the period o 197 as croppg recommdations bave onlyrecently been extended to fares; benfits thouSh are estimated for futweyears. All benefits estimted for years beyond 1987 are sensitive to inpuavailability (see 6 below.)

6. Additionl benefts are also estimted separately for sevralcomponents: roads, boreholes, FASCON, livetock and fisheries developmnt.In the case of feeder rods. (Table 4) bnefits are estimted for theimplicit savtgs labour tim In a change from head-loading to the us* ofmotorised trauport, for the value of a small moun of produce whLch ould.vot oterwise bhe rketed, anA (in the long run) a smll Increment due toprodution beixg stimulated by the proSity to a road. In th case ofrehabilltated trunk roas no incrmental traffie Is geerated, althoughthere are some cost savgs to existing traffic. On the basis of thesecalculation ta roads preogra shos a positive retu to its directlyidetifiable costs. Costs a" asuaed to bo incurred- foz c ofthose roads contructed or rehabilitated before the and of 1988 throughoutthe reomaing assumed project life.

7. In th case of boreholes, benefits arxp harde to estimte. They dependupon better quality water ad bettr acess to water aUlting in betterhealth which has an effect upon agrilatural productivity ador production.Data from the Ministy of flalth sugget that the measured inidenc of_unea-worm is going down In Volta Region, and this has been taken as aproxy for bettr heath and prodction. Tabl* S tborefore attribute anIncrement of production eqal to 5S of that of tbh csop d mnt.;cggra to the insutllation of boreholes and consequent better. levls ofrural health; at this level ths componet shows a postive return, am4gthat futur ms costed at 5% per aniu= of total capital costimurred before ths end of 1987.

8. FASCCM operating costs and stimated benefits are shown In Table 7. Tbeonly benefits Included ar th*o teultiug from better storap facilitiefor fertilisers. chemicals d. sed. These have been "timated at a small(4%) proportion of the value of anual tbroughput, although te actualsupply of the Inputs temselves is critical to the sucess of the whole cropdevelopmnt program. As a result, the component shwo 4 substantialnotional negative return.

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9. Veterinary services and animl husbandry extension costs and benefitsare shown in Tablo 8. Based on animal Census ata ad the namber ofvccinatLons undertaken, an estimate hs been made of the change In themortality rate of cattle in the Region and the economic value of the herdsaved. So stimte of the value of veterinary servwces on chic-kens shep,go*ats d rabbits has been Included. Animl husbandry axtenion is assumedto hae a valuo equal to 10% of the cattle saved; this is likely to berather a conservative figure. The component as a whole shows a positivereturn on this basis.

10. Fisherie devlopment costs and benefits. are shown in Table 9. Nobeeflts are assumed for the extension aquaulture co_mpont of the projoct.All benefits cacrue from the purcbase (for oard sale to fisborn) ofnets, outboard motors and ancillary fishing equipmet ln 1987. Thi isassumed to be a 'one off' event, and increnv tal production (ovor a fouryear period) is valued along the lins of that used to justify the purchasein the first place (little else can be done, ex ante.) This lwestmentappears extremely attractive to the Region.

11. Overall, the returns to the nvestments under VORADEP as estimatedabove appar more than satisfactory, and well exceed the real opportunitycost of capital.

Sensitivity of Betorsa

12. The calcltion of the project's rate of returzn is based on suchavnaible ds-a as tbere is, plus a realistic set of assumptions. It is thecase, bowever, that retusrs in future periods are sdsitive to a number offactors. The main ones arc,

* wether CGhma remains a nDtt Importer of cereals,. and consequentlywhat the value of incremenal matze and rice production is;

^the effect of the rsearch and extension progrp s on other majorcrops In the Volta Region (esp eilly yam and cassava);

* the rate of diffusion of Lmproved practies amogst contact andfollower firers over the long term;

the ability of the public sectOa (tboxugh FASCON) to contiue to makeavailable thoso inputs to farmers upon which nucrements of productiondepend, and the abLilty of farmrs to purchase nessary inputs at priceswhich make thir use worthwhile;

* the ability of the extension s.rvice to maintain the intensity ofcoverage lt presently offers to farmers, and the level of resources it willrequire so to do;

the actual levls of lxv stment requyred to maintain the capitallnfrastruture (roads, boreholes etc) over the long term;

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- the Inclusion or omission of benfits frm components wios outputsar currently very difficult to d

- the rea value of foreign exchang to the Gbhanaan ecoomy.

13. As ld; of the abov factors ar potentil soures of varUbLity overthe raining perio of project life, it is bet to thik of the lkelyeventual economic rat of return as lying in a rag around the actualfigure suggted In part. 4 (above); them. orunfavourable outcoms inrelation to the above factors will tend to depres the rate of retun. andthe more favouable outomes wil tend to increase it.

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VII: InnITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVEOPMET

IntitutiSal D"sgn and Cowth

1. Details of the growth of institutions concrned with the delivery ofProject srvices are given In Arnexes 2-6. Below are higlighted the main.features of Institutlonal development and the likages vhich have had asigniLIicant effect on the overall progres of Project perfonmac.

2. There is concern relating to the perfomatnce of those orgaistions ninstitUttions carged wlth an integration and co-ordination role. VORADE? wasa specially constituted entity, f,,orged from the exiting OA, structure andstreamlined to met the needs of the'VpAcific objectives and goals ofagricultural development. The key question is whether the emergent structureof VORADEP ws appropriate to the pursuLt of the strategy expounded in 1930(SAR) and whether it had the capacity and power to carry out its objectivesof agricultural and rural devloapmt.

3. A number of issues are central to this question:

- the adequacy of top-level organisation and magemet. By and largemanagemt reoures have been adequate and effective. At th outset, itmust be adumtted that thee were conficts and tensions betwee theinternational tems of spec ts an the Project Nanagement. But,thereafter, with the arrlval of a replacemet expatriate team, the situationimpraovd and progress of Projeatntaion gatbhred momntum. It miatalso be stressed that In the oarly years agement problm wereexaersbated by the strains imposed on the Project by the economic andfinancial problem facing the CO at the tim.

- teb increase In staff is an indication of Institutional development.lb 1981 the total staff establishmnt vas 1706; by 1988 it was 2009. UhileBOA staff durLig the period was fairly stsb1l at around 1500-1600, the buLld'p of other staff, i.e. directly contracted by the Project, grewinreswingly, from 21 In 1981 to over 500 In 1988.

- given the primacy of the pollcy of decentraliSacion of OGm (andIDA/IFAD) it is Interesting to observe how VORADEP, within its geographicalcontext, responded through its regional dscentralisaton of organisation andactivity. The organisation ¢birt had a decentralLsod structure bywhich the Project planned tho region-wide impl enttion of its activities.The Zonal and District arm of the Project's support and technical servlceshas ldd an effective network through which both administrative andoperational services can be extended. ThLi Lustitutional outreach has alsoproavded a fr_amork for devlopmet which bodes well for futureagricultura strateg and actLvities In Volta Region.

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Support Services

4. The componAnt activitios of VORADEP, designed to deliver key servicesto the fazuers and to the commnity as a whole, hoe also been mediatedthrough a number of appropriate and potentially sustainible institutions.

S. The most important of these support sorvices is Extension. The mostImportant institutional characteristic of extension In the Region bas beethe establishment of a unified T&V system, with an operational capabilitywhich ha brought (and W incringly bring in future) extension serviceiwithin the reach of the farming population of. the Region. The iact ofExtension programes is examined in Annex 2. Possibly its most iportantevolutiory feature during the duration of the Project has bee itsresponse to the lack of skilled staff to meet the needs of diverse set ofrequiremets for crop, livestock, hom extension and plat protection needs.The programme to train extension staff to impart all (or most) of thekunoledge requLred by faromrs with several interets shows a flexibility ofapproach and a drive towards optimum utilisation of field staff which iscommndable and forward looking.

6. The evolution of research during the Project shows a similarrs ponsivenes and flexibility. From tha start, research had been directedtowards adaptive work with a strong on-field trials orientation. Hrower,there bas bee a s*hift in mphbasis, dictated by farmers' needs and theImportance of effective extension work, which has made the Research

earmen lat more relevant to project goals. In particular, the stablishmentof greater formal co-operation betwon trch/Extnsion/Fasom inmorerecent years marks a watershed in the integration and Impact of thesessentially Later-related and complementary compoaents of the CropDevelopment Programsm. Th Research Department bh also shown a sipificantpropensity to collaborate with othor research institutions, national andinternational, In its own work progrme at the experimntal nd field trialstages.

7. *he thLrd Important component of the COW development thrust is FASCOM.ThsJ institution,, charged with the paocurement nd distribution. if farmInputs and other farm requirements, bas ben faced with a nimber of seriousproblems inclll to its development (see Annex 3). From the Istitutionalpoint of view It has been oenumbered with an exeautive ad organisatlonalstructure not alwos supportive of its trading operations. The centralorganisation of Its activities, at HQ in Ho, which hs been, depite certainshortcomings, adequate to its tasks, has not been matched by the developmentof its field network of supply outlets - the FSCs. It is only In the lsttwo years of the project, 1987 and 1988, that tho construetiop targets forFSCs have been satisfied.

8. Continued development of an effective crop development programme In thefuture will depend heavily on a sustained and co-ordLnated.development ofthe above thre institutions - Research, Extension and FASCOK. When theVORADEP ends, every effort must be made to ensure that of these service,coatinue to exploit the development opportunitites. The AgriculturalServites Rehabilitation Projcet (ASUP) will be particularly important inproviding resources for further institutional development.

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9. The Monitoring and Evaluation Department (called th Economic Planning,Monitoring and Evaluation Unit in the SAR), was created in 1982, as part ofcentral Support Services, responsible directly to the Project Manager. Itsterms of refernce focus on Project-related activities, and its efforts haveconcentrated on surveys and studies of project components and regularreporting of project progress. More general data on agriculturedevelopments in Volta Region were the responsibility of the EconomicReearch and Plarning Services (EBPS) of MOA, which was never integratedinto VORADEP. Furtherzore, lack of staff, resources and direction proventedtIlfrom carrying out these tasks. Cosequently there was a great gap indata of certain key aspects of agricultural activity in Volta Region vhichwas never covered either by the project Monitoring and Evaluation Department.or EUPS-i k.

10. The further development of the project M & E department will depend on anumber of factors. The first is the re-organisation and itr ng oftho Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Department (PPMED) of Kokwithin the frmework of ASEP. This re-organisation is underway ad thetr ngenin of PIKED is part of the broader reform. The effectiveness of

the Regional PPXED will require a number of changes in its role. DuringVORADEP the X & E department has undertaken no plarning as such. Hence, apriority would be to introduce a planning function into the newly expandedPIKED. Secondly, the scope of future responsibilities would be wider as theregional arm of PPNED. This would require additional staff, resources andtraining. Som of these needs could be met from tha funding expected underthe ASRP for N & E and from the Research and Extesion budgets ($1.2a intotal over 3 years).

Staff and ?rainin

_li Theo streamlinng of thoe HA orgaasation and structur at the beginningof VORADEP necesitated International recruitment of some key positions notfilled by local personel. It should be- stressed that evezy effort was madeto identify qualified and.experienced Gh*nie staff.

2. At the higher levls, several senior posts were filled from outside theEQA, icluding the Project Manager and Chief -Acountant (who later becameFlinacial Controller). Moreover, it was felt that several of the Heads ofTecbhneal Support Services vwuld have to be filled by interaztional staff-notably CFO, Extension, Enaioering *tc. As noted earlier, the experience ofthe first few years with the international/local maagmt relationship wasunsatisfactory. Thee vere recruited directly by the World Bank butproblems vee ecountred nsurlng solection of staff with the rightabilities for forging the necessary relationships with local staff.

13. As regards training, a considerable number of project staff bonefittedfrom local and external training courses, both short and longer term.Suinarsed below is the training undertaken, by type nd by department.

p*

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VORADE? TR U ,NBY DEPARIDT. LEVEL OF STAFF AND IDOCTIOt

Department Senior Staff (NO) Junior Staff (No)Local Training Local

Admiui 9 1 8Finance - 1 4

l&E - 4Land a".P1. - 5Resrch 2 19 2* ydro/Vater S * 2Extension - 14 [5CLv.EngKch.-Zu 32 3 -Fiseres - 3 1Vet.Servtces - - 3Ain4. ua-b. * 11

Total 43 52 44

14. Given the highly specialLsed rts of R"earch and itsinaequte statmus n Volta Region pre-Projact, it is not surprisiag that theResearch ehas cared out an Impressive training programs. rmsm is true for Extension, although in ths case reasonable opportuitisfor training were avaiable locally, arlarlytUS Kue andUniversity of Gbaia. A surpising number of local cours" wer of longduration (2-3 years) while the majority of external cores we. short term,igbly speciallsed units of betwen 3 and 12 -moths. Forty of the total of

52 external programmes war sponsored and flianced by the World leck; othersponsors Lucluded USA Goevrnmt, oE rl and, oV , OD UK, ItalianSGovernent, Japoase Government and FAD.

15. .The hgh incidence of trainin suggets that tbh Project diagnosed thatlocal staff, at all levls, especally senior, required further itensivetraining to be able to carry out thser jobs more effectively. An aalysisof the timing of the senior training shows that a high proportion ofprograme took place late in the Project's life, with 34 of the programesoccrring 1985-1987/88. ThLi night bo explained by a lack of a plaunedtraining programme in the erly years of the Projet becaus of failure to"igose training neds. It aight also reval an urgency to take advantageof trad progr before the Project ended.

16. An evaluation of the succs and of the training isdificldt to make, since benefits of training have a long gestation period.It would appear, from dicussions with senior _maagent, that the retentionrate of staff after traing was favourablo and sugests that thebenSficiaries found that the training experience had to anincresed interest and effectivenes La their'jobs.

- 39 -

Special Coultacy Inputs

17. An important componet was consultany services to assist VORAEP inspecific area. During the Project consultancy inputs were provided for:

- KSonitoring and Evaluation (two visits per year)

* Extension

* LLvestock

- Fbishries

- Rlutrition (Mome Extension)

- FASCOK

The purposes of these consultancles were varied and were designed to respondto specific component problems.

18. For K & S. a relatively new discipline, the aims of the regularconsultancy inputs were to monitor the progress of the work prograe ofeach Department and to suggest an mpleme mtion methodology for field andother surveys. An input was also envisaged to assist In the analysis of

sults. Ths would appear to have bee an effective coasultancy andcontributed to the role of the Dp.rtDmt as an important management supportservice. owever, the scope of K & I In the future wil require elaborationin order to satisfy regional data needs and further consultmncy may berequired. It should also be noted that advice alone may not be sufficient,and that external inputs In future might profitably assist with programm

execution, especially during the erly stages of progrm developmnt

19. Consultnces to Livestock nd Fisheries were a response to theshortfalls in tho performane of those Dep rtments In the first two years ofthe Project and studies were commissioned following recom- endatons of theTn-Depth Review iu 1984. Deteiled studies Identified priorities and futureprogr es The recoiendations for fisheries were adopted as an importantpart of the current and future progrmme, especially with regard to*gua¢ulturo development and the esploitation of brackish-waters. Furhefunding will be necessasy, however, to fully exploit the aooultancy dviceg1ivn during Phaso I of VORADP.

20. A comprehesive review of Extension (T & V system) was undertaken by aconsultant In 1985. An Important outcom has been the continuation of T & Vtralning by the consultants, who undertook the Initial trainins program,in order to ensure that new staff are exposed to appropriate in-servicetrainLng on T & .

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21. Hom Extension (mw a part of Extension) has biefitted from oneconsltancy study, of Nutrition and Food Consumption in the Northern Zone(Rabanek 1985). Thore should have been a follow-up study, possibly in early1988. but the recommendation (made in a consultancy to th1 N & S Departmentas part of a data review prior to the PCR) for such a follow up was notcarried out.

22. A FASCOI consultancy in 1987 undertook a comprehensive review andcritique of FASCOH's entire operations. Uhile the body of tho report Isstill under consideration, FASCOK managemat has already followed up on someof the recommendations, especially concerning- transport.

23. On balace, it appears that the consultancy inputs have ben more thanmere cosmetic exercises and many of the recommendations have been taken upby the Ptoject. The problem, as elsewhere in similar situations, is thatthe mechanism for review of consultancy reports is extremely cumbersom andiavolves many interested parties. Feedback is thus delayed and ln somecases fails to emerge. There are still recommendations from past studieswhich could contribute with initiatives for the future development ofagriculture ln Volta Region.

Intitution IUilding

24. This chapter has outlined the main institutions developed by theProject to provide the mangement, support and technical servics requiredto deliver the planued outputs of VORADEP. Originally, It was boped thatthere would be a phase UZ of VORADEP under which tbeseo Istiutions could befurther dbveloped and refined. However, VBADEP will now almost certainlyterminate at end 1988 unless furthor external funding cAn be attacted.

25. Some discussion is needed of the futur drectioan momentum ofchanes initiated by VORADEP. The mode of future developmet is vital, notonly for the integrity of future Institutional growth but also for therealisation of the future beneftts Crates of return) projected over theProject Lffetis from the iuvEtment alredy made.

26. Given the assumption that VORADIP as a smia-utonomous entitytermintes at end 1988, the result will be the tation of VORSDEP'sagricultural activities and insttutions Into the main IA organisation and

*structure. This means that responsibllity for VORADEP's nona-griculturalcomponents (water supply, roads, ete) will revert to the approprat lineMinistriss. What is essentially left under MA is therefore the directlyproductive areas of Crop Development, Livestock, and Fisheries, togetherwith essential central support services.

27. A dcisive factor In tha future prospects for these activities will bethe extent to which the Government Implements the proposals for developmentof agricultural services under ASRP and the ways in which suchimplementation influences the future direcion of existing Volta Regionagric''tural Institutions.

- 41 -

28. The followi" issues are vital In this reect:

Extemion - under AU? this activity is to bo ro-organizsed andstrnd two phases. The fixst phase will focus on a field-basedpilot programe, concetrating on food crop etesiont services under W&,and the second phse will compriso a national leel re-orpnisation ofagicultural extension servic" supported by a proposed national agricultureextenion project. lhe Phase I pilot prograom would draw hevily anVOREh's epriece with-h the T&V approa. 'he future of the developmntof Regional Extenion services sems assured for 3 yers by a comittment byCovernmnt to continue suort for those services under AS3P, although the

finae available is modest (about $ 400,000 for 3 yews). The most1mportant question is whether at the end of Phase I the Goermnnt (H)will opt for the T&V approach as a basis for the national extension serviceor move to some other approach. This bas erious implications for theextension program. In Volta Region. After three years, when the ASRPfunding cease, the responsibility for Volta Region extension will beGovernment's and the development of *xtension In the Region will beintegrated into the national framework.

Research - proposals for re-organisation of research (under ASRP)empbasise the seod to avoid the fragmentary and independ nt ature ofresearch, with a variety of special-interest institutions Carrying outresearch without wuch formal co-ordination. Mhe ASRP states that sptimsresponsibility for implemnting the research programs wil be with CMi.Tbe MA will enter into conWractural arrangemets with CSIR and ,a=, hbichwill collaborate with nd obtain specalised sistance fio local associateinstitutions i the conduct of the wovk* (AM. Annexe 3-3. pe 8). ThLsasns presumably that contnuation of a VORADtP-type Adaptive ResearchDepartment in Volta RaiUon will not take place and grcultural researchneeds will be met througb the national roseach o:gnisation and/or whateverregionally decentral-d structure eventually emerges. The regionald-imesions of the proposed syste e av not yet boe vorked out. Th. crop.based focus of the ASRP proposals for research prioritiS, at a nationallevel, could well undermine the regional-based activities of the AdaptiveResearch De4rtent in the past few yers. Anotebr Important characteristicwhich requires continuity and development is the researh-extension linkwhich has been caefully fostered in VORAW. oiw such a link LS to beforged in the national research plan i as yet unclear.

- 42-

Honitorimt - the Monitoring nd Evaluation Departent of VORADEP hasbeen concerned with Project requiremts for th monitoring of cop tactivities, specific evaluation exercises of project departmet programmes,and reporting of progres and perfouswuc. No plarnin work htas beeudertaken. The propoal under ASRP for coitinuing support of HUActivities in Volta Region presumably relates to the continued mouitorng ofon-going programmes in Research and Extension, a a first priority. Thefunds available (around $ 400,000 for 3 years) hav been cosidered to thislight and preliminary proposals for use of these fund have been directed tostr ngthening the capacity of the Department to carry out theseresponsibilitis. The long8r tern prospects for the Policy, Planning,Monitoring and Evaluation activities to Volta Region mest wait theimple entation of the proposals for the central PPlMD and the nature of theregional decentralisation of their activities.

conlusions

29. It is clear that the viability and capaeLty of VORADIP institutions tosurvive project phase-out will depend largely on the plans for the re-organisation, and the regional modalities to be developed under ASRP. For.the period 1989-1991 commitments have been made under ASRP to continuesupport for Research, Extension and Monitoring and Evaluation. Hence,providing that effective use ca be made of the resources thus provided,there is expectation that the momentua generated by VORADES in tbhs keyareas of agricultural development will be sustained.

- 43 -

VIIY: SPECIAL ISSUES

Subatitut.o and DiveISIou

1. There is no evidence that Project funds were substituted for funsavilable, from other soures for on-lending.

2. There were seeral Lostanes whero physical invstments indepth werenot made. Thi was due principally to recmendations mad by the ReviewMlssion In 1984 s a response to the poor performace and problems ofimplementation in the first two years. A major cutback In the buildingprogra wm v proposed and revised targoet for staff housang and FSCs wereestablished. The compat sion betveen the new targets, the SAl and actualachieveents roe analysed In the appropriate Annex. Another Important cut-back cone rned the AniLml Nusbandry component where, after 1984, no furtherinvestment was to be made on the four animl husbandry stations. In no casewere the funds diverted to other purposes.

Wather and Othor Risks

3. Apart from one season, the weather pattern during the Projoect periodwas not unduly alwvrse. However, In 1983/84 failure of the rains causedbavoc wIth the crop prograems and, in co ajunction with the unfavourableeconomic conditions nationay, the porfc of the Project was.wellbelow expectations durIng tblS period.

Researh and Techinical Capablity

4. Adaptive Research was an Integral part of VORADIP. In the first 3years or so of the Project perlod, progreas In developing, testing andextending new techniques was slow, vith the excption of thoe saieprograme. However, this ws only partly due. to the eseorch Department.Other factors icluded a failure to eatabUlsh close links with extesion tofurther tho dissemination of new metbods to the farms and to testresponse. This detect howevor was rectified later In the Project period.

S. Perbaps an important cause of the relatively slow speed of the planredRsearch program was the rathor optimistle assessuent of the time nsededto deovlop and test nw techniques. Before the Project, links with otherresearch Institutions wers almost non-4st.nt. Such links take time toforge and outputs from such collaboration may take considerable time toeImrge. During the Project period the Research Departmnt set up links witha numbor of leadlng rsearch bodies, national and international, to goodeffect.

A

- 44 -

6. Aadaptive research requires highly qualified and experiencedofficers and the Departmnt began with insufflelent staff of the rightcalibre. Nowveor, during the Project a successful trakning program vasimplemnted and a substantial number of officers benefitted. This shouldprove to be a vital Invosmeont for future research efforts both in the"Region and nationally. provided the uomentum and motisation of reont yearscan be maintained.

Sector and Political Influences

7. Sector influaene on tbh Project Manif sted themselves In several waysand at various levels. OADEP as supposed to be a semi-autonomous body.with close links with CA. Its m*eutive comittee, VOBUDEC, was chargedwith supervising and co-ordinating VORADtP activities In line with MOApolicies and strategies. Howevr, this proved difficult, ln many Instances,since ROA policies were not clearly defined and, in other instances, hadlimLting effects on Project progress. The effects of procurement policLesand pricing of inputs (especially fertilLsers), both of which lay outsideVORADEP (FASCON) control have been detailed elsewher.

S. As an Integral part of the Regional Administration, and responsible toHOA for all substantial matters. VORADEP had little real say in policyformulation, and Project manageent vas dependent upon the good offices ofVORADZC to achleve any positive impact on Gover:ient thiakdng and policy.The Project Manager certainly had leverage on all costituent bodies of theProject, such as VOBUDC, FASCOM, *tc buC little real nfluence in thecorridors of power In Acmr.

9. The Bank's role In this project could bave been more constructive, insome areas since it had leverage potential by virtu of its position asdonor. Rowever, Bank missions were concerned more with adminstrative andtechnical Issues relating to Project Implementation and perfozsancp and lesswith the larger issues of overall Project rel tionship with, and responsefrom, central bodies, *hich were having a profound negative effect onperfomne. As noted elsewhere, Bank missions delt with Project

aageet (at VORADKP levl) and not at all with VORADC, the rel sourceof nuence in c t problem ad constraints.

Integrated Devlopment

10. The structural and orgmnisational designs for Integrated development ofVORADEIP activities ere adequate to the task. The managerial andoperaional links appeared appropriat to the need of decentralisation ofproject administrratio and lplementation into the zones and districts andto the diffusion of Project services within the Region.

11. Two mjor problems hinderd the creation of an integrated struture andprevented the emrgence of an-effective co-ordiated approach to regionalissues and problem until late in the Priject period.

- 45 -

12. The first problem stemed from serious delays in implemntation andphysical shortfalls in thb-first years of VORADRP. These have beendocumented in the Project component reviews. The attainment of Projoctobjectives and goals dependd upon the delopmnt of the Project's deliverysystem and support services, as was envisaged in the originalimplmentation schedule. Delays in, and lack of, implementation especiallyin the lnfrastucture programe, until Well into the second half of theperiod inhibited progress in the key components related to the cropdevflopment progres. Notable examples are the lack of progress in roadsand buildings (especially FSCs - crucial to the input supply effort) whichhad a direct relevance for the delivery of Project services in extension andinput supply. he TMproveme achieved In the second hulf of the Projectmoved towards a more integrated approach and it can be argued that by en1988 a fairly sound foundation will have been laid for the future ofagricultural development in Volta Region. The extent to which the benefitsof this success will contribute to future development will depend on the wayin which Volta Region agricultural programes will be integrated into theI(0 plans.

13. The other typo of integration is that between Project activities andoutside agencies, the extent to which co-ordination occurred between them isan important factor in future prospects. Regretably, little real co-ordination and effectiv links were achieved. As noted, some useful linkswere established between Adaptive RJea rch and other Research bodies inGhana and elsewhere. Howver, problms were encountered In a number ofother important cases e.g. betwoe the Rural Water Supply component andGhana Water and Sewerage Company; between FASCOO and GSC; betwee theIrrigatiov componet and IDA (Ghana); *e. The difficulties faced In thoseas s are recorded In the componenot revies. At the general lvoel, it means

that continuation of these components after Project phase-out will not have-benfitted by the experince that could hbwv been gained duri4g the Project.period tbrough a close working 1.aison between Project and relevant lineMinistry agencies.

14. The problems and tensions Inherent in the implementation of a largescale multi-component project lik VORADMP plae heavy responsibilities onmanagement and tehnical rsources. There is no doubt that the early yearsof impl eentato witnessed somie sigficat problems for management andseaSor technical staff, partly due to Internal constraints and pattly toeconomical conditions. With. the reforms -f the Review mission, theimprroveent. in th genoral oconomic nvironment of the Project, and theemrgent benefits from the traivnig programe, tbhre is equally no doubtthat mnagerial and technical capabilities and performance Improved markedlyIn the later stages with positive effects on progross and performance.

15. From a m et and technical point of view a less complex Projectdesign would hao beei easier to implemnt. owever, on balance, it isconcluded that the integrated approach to the array of needs of, andconstraints to, agriultural development (and indeed rural developmnt as awhole) in Volta Region bas generated real and manifold benefits which, withjudicious and caeful planning, can be sustained In the future.

- 46 -

plication and fiture issues

16. Th. question of replication of VOWEADI-typo projects L a complex one.This depends not only on the lessons to be learned from the VORADEPexperience but also on the current thinking of agencies financing andexecuting agricultural development schems.

17. In the VWJRDEP experience, the principal lesson to be drawn is that thetype of organization required to implement a complex, multi-componentproject place enormou strain on local administrative and technicalresources. The benefits which accrue from this type of Integrateddevelopment project are substantially roduced when impllemntation of any oneor more of the major components is delayed. The interdependence andcomplementarity of the components is such that a rolatively high level ofmanagerial skills iS required for effective implementation. It maustthere-ore be questioned whether such project design is appropriate in thecurrent circumstances prevelant in the Volta Region. It my be the casetherefore that future projects should concentrate on those fever, morespecific areas which are identified as constraints to agriculturaldevelopment; at present in Ghana these are likely to be research, thedelivery of effective extension services and the collection and managementof information so as tz facilitate the planning and policy-miking process.These considerations are currently incorporated n donor proposals forassistance to the Ghana Government; it is to be hoped that actual projectImplemntion (for example under the Agriculturs4 Services RebabilitationProject) follow* this course;,

18. A second difficulty of this type of project is the lack of influencewvhih management usually exerts at the national level. oiicy makingproeoeds at ths leel ofte In apparent disregard of regionalcircumstances, and with little regional involvent In formulation. Thuwregional development projects are often excuted in a policy environetwhich is unhelpful or, even trtl to project objectives. InVOWADEP's case the policy eiro t, over which It had little or nocontro1, created problems with the purchase and distribution of griculturalinuts - inluding seed from the Ghaza Seed Company - wbich resulted Infslower tha anticipated progress.

19. Thirdly, collaboration between the various government agencies involvedIn project eeuustion ZS often not sufficiently strong. Whllst relationsbetweon VORADEP and the Avrious executing agencies have not beenantagonistic, collaboration has often been weak. Thus the difficulties ofpersu"ading GhCbu Water and Sewag to take over -antenaq responsibilitiesfor the boreholes constructed by the Project, and of recelving a sufficientvolume of seed from the GhaCn Seed Campapy. Both issues must be resolved ifProject benefits are to b sustained. In conclusion, it is felt thatIntensive geogr phically based developmet projects have a role to play indevelopment strategy, but they wust be planned and excuted within a kinimand consistent.e pocr environment, and be linked to the central policyplazming apparatus. Further, institutional aspects of ee cution must bespolTed out clearly at appraisal (this is an equally important aspect ofappraisal as economic analysis) and systes introduced at project ineptionto ensure institutlonal responsibility, For example, protocols may be

- 47 -

established between the project *nd its oxeuting or supplying agencies *ndinstitution representatives on projects boards of directors may be heldresponsible for the actions f that institution. Regional projects are notto be replaced by national level developoent programes, but should beexecuted within a national policy framework.

Bank performce

20. The diagnosis of the priorities for agricultural development In VoltaRegion at Appraisal was realistic. Analysis of constraints wa generallyappropriate and the emphasis on the nmed for institutional' developmentaccurate. However the rate at which cbange in the attitudes and practicesof farmers wvs expected to occur ws over-optimistic, especially given thelow level of awarenss of liproved methods at the time.

21. At the time,of Appraisal, and subsequently, economic conditions inGhana deteriorated to the point where government finances were In a parlousstate. Government subventions to VORADEP did not materialise to the fullextent expected and progress in Implementation in the early years wasminimal. However it was not until 1984, some two and a balf years afterproject start-up, that the project and IBRD recognised the neod for aserious reappraisal of the situation. The Review of 1984 made somesubstantial changes.in.di"etion and targts at a time when the project haddifficulty In trying to attaie the previous targets.

22. There is no doubt that the size and complexity of project design,together with the need to achieve parallel and integrated devolopment of theproject co ts, contribUted to implementation difficulties in thoseyears. The original design of te projet was over-ambitious; tbi Is borneout by the sealing -down of a n=ber. of activities at Review:

23. As regards iuplementation performance it must be stressed that the* appraisal report was not clear and specific enough in a numbpr of key areas.-hile specifications for the crop component were detailed they were provedsubsequently to have been unrealistic, given the existing agricultural*envicnment within which they were supposed to be Implemented. In otbercas , particularly livestock and fisherle, the specifications laid down Inthe SAR were either vague or,.non-existent.

24. The all-important civil works programs wero planned to be implementetin time scals which ver clearly too ambitious, given the anagerial amtechnical capacity in these areas at the start of the project.

25. In addltion, there were a number of serious shortcomings in the earlystages in the 1'roject's manpower capacity. The oxiginal assessmnt thatexisting MQA staff could meet the project's.manpower needs was unfoundedboth -as.regaras quantity and quality. Furthermore, the technica assistanceinput at the early part of the project was unsatisfactory and this causedsome tension and conflict within the managment of the project.

- 48 -

26. The project was supposod to strengthen and streamlne the existing IAorganiation; this m0eat that existing MA agenies iL the Region shouldhav either been absorbed into the project strcture or hae been broughtinto closer cooperation with the project. This did Lot happen: for examplethe Emonoi Rssex and Planning Services DepartNmt of HU remainedoutside the project's operations throughout its lifetim. Furthersor. linDirAstry agenies with obvious liLnks to VORADEP (eg GWSC, Feeder RoaDepartment, and Irrigation Devlopment Authority) were nevr fully involvedin the relevant activitie of the project. There is little evidoe thatmuch effort was made to forgo a closer liaison with these agencies.

27. Bank supervision of VORAP was attentive and effective. Howeer;certain problis faced by tho project we"r nevr alequtly resolved andpoeristed throughout the project life. To be fair, such supervisio missionsshould (and can only) focus their attention on internal issues and problemsconfronting VORDEP's operations. It ix£ not lkely that Back missions canhave much levrage on problems originating outside the project andparticularly upon those relating to government policies, *g pricing andinput procurement. Working relations between the Blank and'VORADEP managementwere normlly good; most reports and aides memoire rtflect the extent towhich VORADEP rsponded positivoly to Bank recomndations.

28. As regards project reporting requireomts the appraisal docunent wasvagu. much more gixidane could have been give to the format of requiredreporting and especially to the ned for regular information collection. Themost glaring omision conDCernd th. need for regular progress reportingusign the key-indiator format whbch would havw provided a useful frameorkfor systmatic collection and analysis of information on projectimplementation. This would bav facilitated both regular project evaluations(quarterly and anrual reports) and net the more densding needs of' mid-tersanti post-project evaluatiorn. Despite these conttalats th Monitoring ndEvaluation Deprtment developed and imples 'inted a comprehensive and relevatnsystem for periodic reporting.

IMP : EC_UIIC EY*lQIII

tabet Is Prsj,nt Cuau U lNUs l u, ucmtsl CMiuicat, mite a0 evaluation)

"* P12 P13 14 5 P16 P Pn Pn PYIO fYlt P12 "13-25

(Fiprmn is iWel ' .k .n93 1934 £8 196 198 9 i8 l9 19"1 19 193 194-201

Camo_ut tCtmlCurt Cl is SW 12 00 k 9*90 Om 1110*192 C tst tCiis 5290 3240 2043 1141 IM 18w0

Currnt I"S Dolar 1350 344 409 1 41962 bCmtat NS kilwn 1350 121 368 05 69 1192

total 19M mttlt iedi C.t. 43400 138" 13810 2440 it4s9 50104

Compat ksti .ts(1912 Cestua tedJii

1t.t1 Coetst Cdi kS l its a IitUIfLE EFItS lEl mEIInimS.. neeefbfl .e e 0 fl.. .

IAEP, ECliHIllC EllAuMIS

Table 2, ProJect Ceepmmt:L*I 9S£ FUIUII

"I n 12 PS P P1 n P1 P l P9 91 11 Pll 2 P 2

(Figqn to '400) l6 55 5934 1111 1936 503 1999 59 5991 1ff2 15S3 1194-21

Cqaisat cuts;Cfru twit 20 42.) lo0 1M WaIl2Cbtmat Ctudis 209 19 162 301 413 2

CUrrHlt usIoHar 101 0 0 0 20 1501562 Cateat US toilors 100 11 0 11 120i

Total 192 Cttnt iei Costs 200 I5 162 301 104 4112e-eee-n.enee.eee..e..efape ~ ~ ~ .. ........ .....

Coa t Ssfitst119W tmtnt t ldisl

Total Casuist ei lsfitti A 1 F U" IlEl lF51S lEl 151503 11

* * *

a *HIfAS 131X1 3 S1I3ll 31I~IdIJ, U1 Om 5j41103 tl3 IWIIJ°! 1311

1 {X tiO~~~-1 19g1 {Ul t l og3 111103 mllt X1e*ti 1OL wit ItII £61 OK SIMtJ 1 11" 113QO &2 IQI i Zt *nIo IAIsO31JP

6US 60tn Z** G4 19 OWl 11962 ls 1J U

ftsuj) itlw_w

flit r.4.11 1641 UI wt1 8661 161. 99* ml 5*961 £641 tZl twCO. 3t B JUti

;'-il. :I$e t-f " AtlI 4Ad 1W LAd qd Sd i tlAd fAd V4 ld

tMESN 1,u1j1W IP114aww1 130164 1£ O;t;

jPljj911 3 )UI:O33 d3i a

I(1S U10 AU.1101 tUlf £

46s9 * 419 91 OrM to 6 061 L9111 IlUt- 1010 Itoi- 6M- Ul- 1- U If Ad9158 , 6£" *Li 6 ki ss OM *15ll 6t61 44161- 16101- Stil- int- Ow' M1- "I1 it Md

61' ;t0 W 9t- W* to W n " uo * uI co ut If lmanioil noK ;it et,r W It. 1 Ito P WI W 10 *1 loS it J 51l

P.. .... . 4. It'...... . .1.0 _'0_ ........... 0' 96 0' 1011_."ilM Let" 1*UO Me IKU 1U1 ISO 11114 I9 11 I 4U15I Yt0 I 11* 11001 9 31103 1111 33194113

91951 50*1 9091 SAi9 94'" "0il Kol "Ott 0n Vit 0 0 1 ni0J Pial.

461111 81941 91141 91945 614 94 KM 0 StI 95 Mt 0K4 351023 1103 5 O4WIj 5Uw50

1"it tat tfic S1:6 U u tZ aLl itsO Oct ut 41 t Mll" on 101 i

1:94 1ot lot IN1 1ot II In OKC *9 09 @61 0f 06"M 1 uiIq u 1 i3r

6614149 49 49 49 AU A 91 6011 a1 M6 M5 OK S11 lUio l 16431

1 6091561 144 1 14 0445 464 61 £61 m1 6u1 ml45 1En1 1841 o1 f va "lZ I

il-ISAd ISi IllS 01d U M gAd lAd H A lAd ltd t I t 1 d lAw

35 U1UW43 230J4 tQ ft

Ie!VrW3 311u'n 'diYIF6

UbM t ECIMIC ItMlI

Idle 5: Proiect foaptoatiEULSiU WRY

"I1 112 P13 P14 M1 P14 116 P19I " 1110 Pvit P112 91`1-25lFilor" i h m lm lul nm m iw .m lm It" eIQ Ml 1" H)

(fiqan ir 0000,) 192 1163 £19N 193 191 196 1933 b 1939 £90 19t 399 1993 1994-2001, .......... _ .............. ___ ................. . . __ .................... . ....... ._........ __.

C.eput Csts;Currut Cdis 3521 537 m U12 95 2345Im tCstit Cidis m1 242 241 2 4511 3;

Cirrnt US hilars 100 40 0 N10 600 019S C itastt iSh 1 rls to 51 P m u a

ola12 Causlat Lodi bits 421 20 24 2 3 219 3 2104 2610 24)1 2754 1644 IiU 8338._._ _. ..................................................................... _.............. . . .. . ..... . ...........

otearsist Saaalit(196 Coastalt "Its)

hreblft abrstallitlml 0 0 425 22ml 3744 4549 59 1*3 7245 112? om 981S 52U 241isprowi sitar %W1pl

wtits Ias costs -4121 -N1 31 -22252 -115M3 41. 24 31 4.12 5310 7345 9223 1199'

*iacm t tol I1 1 I I I ' I I I 0 0 Iite,,,l At 12I I I I I I I I 0 0 0 0 0

PP at 10, 472 -I£11 311 -1109 A-2212 259£1 141 I97 2159 2276 2031 3233 21570PP at 123 412 -3344 300 -£1195 -1140 2m3 1319 I714 109 .1931 23a5 2152 £459I" 0103 434WV 0121 -416

_.__ _ ...... __ ........................ . .. _ ........ ............. _ ........................ .. .... . . ... ...... _. _ ...

fit P12 M~ M4i 805 PV& 81 pie Mt Pit-) Fill h1 t -11-25

lfiqvn~ 0,t 'Of$ 1962 liSI IM4 1905 1956s 1907 1ti8 19119 1030 113t jq- 131394-!

Cwtaret Cedis 4200) 1411 84900 44560 6800 91b00 91600 916* taw0 %6+4) 91I&-0 HOO v'w192 Caoisat C*is 4200 MS5 4716 1292 15640 14656 14656 14656 14654 1465 14hi 14*5*t 110521WCureak us boIla'g 1100 254 0 2* 826 £66 0 0 .33 0 0 333 13321962 CoastmotUOdui uls 1100 201 4 i72 6*6 533 0 0 266 1 I.." -ieSlatal 1982 ECoisat eiii Costs 3SSW 6351 4136 18426 31719 31100 14656 10656 23181 HZ%3 1465* 23111 3o135ilocreaaual ikput colst:Fec tli)kw 0 0 12800 19204 2560 320* 3200 352* 384O 410: 44900 46W0 603100Seed 0 0 1200 1300 2613 1315 3658 I1I1 5226 6410 155 7819 101107 CbmaicalkS 6 9 0 394 5129 6400 640 10408 it 16 0 320 89*0 MO0 12h.4Lebour 0 0 Po0 01400 26100 348* 43300 5220* 696 8040~ 9135 951M 12441*0blota Ikputs * 0 22700 4224 59433 76336 80558 9362 120906 142930 1521*5 159219 206P47

total cr08 otveolpwsl costs 39400 3351 27416 60*6 91012 10*41 100214 113271 144007 15159 1WEI2 I2404 2371197l

Laaostmrst leaeittet (1982 coastaat Cedist

Palle 6 ~ ~~~~~~ 0 56'3 2115 59500 14305 6122 104139 t10816 133533 AWO~ It5:47 9254)Race 0 0 2318 157941 .554 5194 5194 519 5194 574 4??z4 57*4 IM1ca*peas 0 * 0 0 0 14108 1364 1612 14 287* 2;12 353*0Cassava 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 40 10 26 541A. 40

tan 0 * 0 0 ~ ~~ ~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 0 0 0 I92 2400 4281 33a-t 3340 49920hale . ~~ ~~ ~~~~~~~0 0 222 4 2 2790 2180M 213 20 2780 2 1827) 2710 2?80 36USIaaUels ~~ ~~ ~~~~~~0 0 152 3705 552 1562 1562 1562 ISO2 162 1562 1W6 26306

Total Crops: 0 0 11741, 4203 6964 9M52 108436 116995 1349314 150913 06696 183223. 1192499trap sterN). practlces Iswarioqb nai2a 0 0 869 893 17105 -2232 2609 3124 3516 4011 4463 490 13922Kmos edeaimai 0 0 5W 2102 342 4226 !024 15950 674 75.49 814 90.1 119W15

total Eonsleat Ciii lenf its 0 0 12091. 45021 149111 90919 10*138 128069 145504 i625.138 17913 197293 25*46)!

lenefats less Cost -39(40 -8357 -14939 -15639 -22100 -1106 VI97 1419? 12*7 495? 029522 14*94 22634*5.e....a.... ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ---- - ..................... -----

aico it* 103 I AM26 .7513 .603 1 .5645 r.53 .4665 .424) .3855 .3501,5 .1)93oascotualt 13 1 .191 .7)18 .6355 1 .*06 .4523 .4039 .3060 .321 .28175 .145FV at 1OX -3940 -7591 -12345 --1)7501 -05094 -*0594 #5011 1591 5*8 21 V4 4W' 52:0 WM71Mr it 1.3 -39400 -7462 -1)909 -11132 -14045 -9688 4040 6*90 491 11* 4171 42.52 32955a.

lIPI *IIA 35Th ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .........

VDIAs EtltE EMiPAh10N

tail 7: Project Co. ,otfISOI

"I Pt2 P11 Pn4 Fis n6 P17 pie pig kilo Pill P112 fll-34

IFiapor n io b 1k9 9 £4 £0s 1996 199 t 16 £9 It" MI 5992 1993 M99i-2001

*Cuspomt Cots;Curret tCdis 27 52b 940 24347 49025 105153 £05153 0 5153 05153 1*5153 105153 10153 £38HA819M2 ontat Codis 237 2383 3021 Ml0 11211 16U 124 U121 16824 16824 16824 1624 218?18

Cureu uSh)i)ars 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0amS Cbst usDUSollars 0 1 0 0 & 1

tJtSl 190 olsant tdo cots 2337 2383 3021 701 11276 £124 1024 104 16824 U1*24 11324 1824 2U1718

_oIemn kootitst11952 CAMsta Ctdis)

1 storage uavims.

Sreed 0 0 40 90 1260 1600 1£70 I90 26 224O 2320 316)0Funtltsr 0 0 0 £31 57 1o 2 21 30 353 392 595C.eIgaIs 0 0 0 192 251 20 320 352 384 418 448 464 *32

.titl tonstat Cadi 8mnlits 0 0 7? 1242 1617 20n 2103 232£ 2565 2716 301 317 4123

hefel INS Cost 1 2337) 2363) 1 2321) 1 519 1 W I 1 14741) (14 ) 1t.14501 1 14259£ I 14t29) 1 I 136491 11774311._.__ ...............................------. -- - - -- __. .. ...........-.....-- ----------------- --.................................... .....

htea FtCUMA costs ari local oprting uosts oly, not total Ebliar murts mint to FAOUIS Itro _

Disceua.i at Ift I ."II .02& .7513 .A .6 .545 .5132 .4165 .4241 .36S5 .35*5 .1?§IiOfcout at £23 I .0i29 .7972 .7118 .6355 .5174 .W5 U .4523 .4*39 .360i .32' .2875 .14iPV at In -2337 -2167 -1916 -4372 -513 -9157 -4310 -7443 -6652 -SM49 -5314 -4784 -3I9U,PV at 122 -2337 -2128 -180s -4142 4101 -l83 -7456 4510 -S75 -5*s -4416 -5924 -2.0;3ani 01! -96ll5WV 122 456

… . .. .. .. _ .. . .….... . ....... ,_ ... _.._. ._. . . . .............. …..................................

|YWSPSE;;Eol

1labI Si Peeled C.paenti:UW1J9: UIIVIIIES Iiacldn veteglsrv cerice auu airls. hse*ry autais. . ... ._........

Ptl P12 *! Pn4 P15 FP1 "I h.$ P19 ly Pill P12 PMl3-25

ItF4ee i, s % 1U 11$ 1962 1993 1 1 98 19"7 1t98 1 1990 til 19M2 9IS9 I?4M-2007

Carrest Ceits 380 413t8 65s3 14032 392N 0 30 21053 24504 26451 3?441 3t423 3A4 43924

1912 Ctoat Cedis 30 2132 2732 290 Sl3* 4224 339 921 455 5191 59i' 58n 7528

jttait uS bulits tOI 217 9 110 510 39" 95 314 334 4 459 439 '$97

19 Cetutat uS bilitE 20 20 0 9S5 415 III 2l 5 1? 17 351 455?

totI 1912 l i tet Cot Costs 102% an2t 2il2 5S9 2ziO3 111i2 102 1t1s 130 541 1n ms1 221165_ ....... _._ ... _._._ _____~~. . ..................... .... ..... ~_.

Coegecat kasef its:O11 Coesalt Cadil.

IateriovservceUatUe vAcutiftl oas 0 0 44 12480 1440 15MO 1433* 14321 1 6336 1.320 212116

im, Pats, paltry utwiscs 1U aUIFIISl N fITS 5515I.*

blaul ttar testim 0 0 14O 252 3144 4 44 439 46 41 419 43f9 a4

teU Coitaat Ciii biftits 0 620 11M2 1U24 18M i194 21214 21214 21216 2121t 21214 21n

hafit It s Cost IO2 II I1 35W 529 I 4t9 253 K42 M2l U120 51 37 41) "1414_* ___-___...S* fl e . . l f . e l . e a n l n l b e . ffl* et at it I .M9 .2 .7513 .An .UM 1 .5132 .41 .4241 .3M55 .35 .m

Sismi t 122 1 .39 n .192 .1135 .u .5474 1 .402 .039 .360 .322 .21I5 .145

n at 103 -1o02 -1935 289 S91 -55 l57 10 44 37U 2449 1314 1440 97

t t 1-192 -1794 219 3719 -4O 14 451 413 3280 2082 1150 139l 731n

IIW 810" 1373

an323t .99 .

6611 UItt Sirt Ulf AM

eo 9 9 0U re" 9 NW all- mt Ll- 9 1- £1 C- 69- gm- 1l1t Ado0 O 9 106 O0Ot "1Oi1 9L6- .6961- U1- 16H- la- ULl- .Omt- tot it P

91 UK* S Ut' ;9r 6t* two 9' 966 Mt* 11t flu* U1W gall I U11t 1U3P310COW ICUI 1811' CIII. 1WK gm* an* tw 1111' 1"W 16W WI 1 to' ; ws

9 4 11951 118t1 IUU11 149t1- 991- Ltol - 91t. 6- 01- O - S 13ul 1;;gUq

11811 lUltlion BtK 0 * 9 0 * 11 1"4 104113 PIo

, £1111 11811 IWZ 0 9ait ltlt mu mu * 0 * * * * 23 3aNi' Inlu 363 1 $1 i1n 3UIAJ WI SW;3 1331e 562

*801 919911 LOLl ml6 91 of1 Om9 31036 loss") test Iop

00911 091 a3 1* 0 0 Om1 'J'19a3twin" cutowl5 06t of1 0 0 0 o9f uPIgg * JVVJA63

6911 o 016 601 680 HI8 09810 1196103 ml6399U fat mu WI 610 m SIM I"JA~11103910636

l~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~l"

. .. ,.,, ... ~.......... _...__

L*C-1661 £161 661 461 96I 66to 6610 t "it 61 96ml t 8661 14 t86 gq I, 1 Ali

Cl-0lAd 104 111 BAd 3 auW I"d l 9U lAd dU O OA ISd

* IIUIdSMAN IN*gfhb " 1341JI % o IVI

I11'0V036 31163 Id it1

Awmr4tt Lxtu.11L ; Lkv1u81Av4.

51.61. I3:rI3 ( eomis - v4dif

FYI fM2 fYI P94 95 9f P91 Pi PtS ; itv, itt ft12 Fil3-25

INgures in '0001 19E! 13 Ila 14 iS 199 191 t is 199 1990 1$ I92 IS3 l420>>

1W01bE0 Colts 41902 Croatett Ct.s,Aiuirlstraltin 040 1360 I927 2440 41997 5U744t5m oso Plaaai 5200 1" 162 341 I04 4172

is9raceliir. rneirco 20 1977 1101 6002 7023 140*bails pnyas.w 19 404 4576 10541 20101 91200 19"0 1,133 1930 19$5 IYS1i 19310 270999eprp4)igst,at,r nupv 6721 26 240 25003 2169 375 20 2610 267 27tS 1i4 04b 9339irtmu, 3940 035 4731 11426 3159 31706 1456 4656 23131 1465 14656 23131 R1M

FAlO 2337 2363 3921 1061 11276 TAM4 1924 12N 1624 16824 1824 16024 216?131av~tiaor1 102 0 3'29 2732 936 M393 16102 .1926 11U 13096 15441 I'4S 11051 221165Fiwulin 3600 139 316 19131 307 IBM 3340

KfiT. 0l UP ECtlmiiC COSTS I 12295 301 3079 109 160191 24331 10450 6 4 75576 c95S7 10*i 7753M U0071.. _ .............. .. * _ ..... _ .. _* ............... __ __.._ ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............... ... . .....

Eoapoamt hktits,1195 t.usttat tedi,)buisisltraeF 110 _IFIZIE Not"Z

4Aical atsol Ut*tu IUITIFIAW S 1111111Roads Irq 0 0 0 33I $310 42079 4079 42 4079 42419 42011 42079 3031794nalvt 0V 0 0 5 ml 3746 45" 59 64 7265 SW27 398 996S 1232I41

Ezieuta 0 0 12491 45021 74911 90979 100191 12 9 145304 162530 179177 191293, 264815FuAIR 0 0 700 1242 1"? 2077 2103 2321 2565 196 3041 317t 41237tlVtStKk 0 0 640 11m lf52 50720 19MA 2121f 21216 21213 21216 21216. 1500Fidlin 0 4 0 0 0 0 21437 21437 25437 21437

luAL VYll ELSOiIC 050l510 0 2002 6369 101 153 I1N 221525 23 250394 25507 27329 7906

&"elit% Is l osts -1258 -37 -1067 -44627 -66334 -05121 953 1 556 131 16429 f67? 134" 96093 7E251

lumtl A 103 I .1909 .8264 .7513 .6 .620 .5645 .5152 .4165 .4241 .36515 .3505 .1Amkscut At 121 1 .6929 .7m .7113 .5 .564 .50I .453 .4039 .3a6 .322 .'s75 .145eIV at 1lo -122953 -3409 -323 -332.9 -4530 -532 5402 m7 7W64 01 71120 s0n3 I4e** Y at In -122n -393 -8553 -3176* -42155 -412 43499 70392 66357 0037 594(05 5317 1139

U*V 0121 193204 EtNIC IAE 6f 3t11F51 ISEINME * Il~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. . ........ . . ................ ..... . ............. .... . . . .......... .

3 TfitL ECOMAIC OS9S IS INE PiA lf thOSE i[EItIFIA3LE TO 1dE V611 CtItEitS.tilE 10 HiMULtIKS itv.I.VEL 111 AHttIRUIIU tf ALTIUAI SIS 1A* ASE tS1 II 05EIMAiIM ES 1f It WM11 AiND ElCiiA , tlIS SE hILL NOT IECESSiRILY ArEE IITIClM. . .EAC1 slid Mi OLAF

- 59 -

A m 1 -RJUE OF REZUN, DATA AD ASSTVMP S

1. This Annaxe details the assumption contained In Chapter 6, and InTabls" 1 to 9, ad which axe fundametal to understanding tho eAls for theestimation of VORADIs internal economic rate of return. The basis of themethodology for dealg with Ghanaian domestic inlation, exchange ratemovemets, shadow wage rates and the valuing of nemetall crop output have'son discussed with staff of the funding institutlons, as well " theMInistry of Finace and Economic Planning, the Statistical Servlce andVORADEP staff.

2. All component and project costs and beefits hae been converted to1982 (ie PY) constant terms. C it after 1982 hav beenconevted to 1982 constant torms by app9lyig a fac tor calculatd from theGha All Items Combied Consmer Price Index for the 1982 . 87 period. Thisdata was obtaind from the Ghaa Statistical Service (publicatioa no.All/87.) The relevant coeffieients for applying to actual money expendituresand benefits for each year are therefore as follows:

YER InVuna O31T

1982 1

1983 .4U

1984 .32

1985

1986 .23

1987 .16

3. All ollar ebaeditures ave been deflated by approximately 5 persasm over the 1982 . 87 perod. This is to allow for the effect of USdomestic inflation and for the dollar's relative deprection over theperiod. This is relevant as projoct expenditures have been denonated inPounds, Marks, Yen *t. as well as dollrs themselves.

4. All dollar expenditure have been conwerted into constant CedL tarus.The massive cha In the relative itetonel values of the twocurrencie over the period hs necessitated the us of some type of shadowechange rate. Because of the political sensitivLty In the estimtion ofsuch pamter during the ealy years of project life, little work was doneIn Ghana on the sttimtIon of the rel econmic vale of foreign exduhng tothe Ghmnaian ecoomy, either by domestLc or rtionl istitution. Tbemethodology adopted In ths report bha beoe to take an appxiation of acurrent rel exchang rate, bsed -upo prmveiling foreign exchangs auctLonrate w ad dicuLnst it back over tim i line with domestic inflAtLon. Thismethod gives tho following C*dW/dollar exchange rates:

1jI tllllZSt [§9

| g fN' fUEl Xr e'4t; 0" | 4staigt t2W§ef~a

ptn|| [|!Vel2!E;j t IC9~Ii

-61-

8. rojeted future economi costs whiob have bein included in the ?&blesrepresemt those dizrct inestmets which ar necessary to sustain benefitsover the remainder of project 1Lsf. Essentially these relate to the

,maiutenauceosts of roads, te of boreholes. maintenace of farmservice centres, d t of etensio, livetock and fisbhriesservicos. In the case of roads It has bee assumed that 1S of the totalcost Incurred on the programee to 1987 is needed ainually to maintain thenew and rhabilitated trunk ad aeess roads; In the c"a of boreholes it isassme that 5% of their capital cost Is needed annually for aitenance,and in the coa of extension servlcs It s assumed that inrtal costsrelate to the grt t it of staff required under the ?&V systm.Vehcles (4 VD and ntoried by tie extension service are writtenoff and replace evry 3 yars. No extra costs over the period PY6.1Y25 areassumed for admListration, NM etC, and no benefits are included foractivities such as resoarch, aquatulture etension and land use planAnig.

9. here some approxmate estimata of benefits is possible for individualco_ponents thLi has been attempted. This applies to roads, boreholes,buildings, livestock and fisheries. Given the integrated nature rf thepattern of investment which VCE*EP represnts, however, it is moremeaningful to consider the package as a whole.

10. In the case of the roads prograi. benefits have boen timated alongthe lines used in 1985 to appraise the lnvestmaet in the rehabilitation ofroads in the Northbrn Zon of the Egion. For access roads, savings areestimated on dho Implicit swivnI So Ubou tlim frm motor transport ascompared to head-load tranuport. Estimates have therefore been made ofaverage head-load weights, tim spent travolln to markets, distanescovee, populto/tffi rates, annal toags of crops pr kilometre ofroad *tc. A ma mount (10%) of basprod onh bee added tothis estimste in lAt years as a result ofmproved access roads.encourHagin. agricultu production, a as r tg In savings of croplosss which would otbervIse not be marketable in perlods of bad weathercondltions. In the eas of trunk roads, no incrmntael traffic or productLonis envisaged, although savings in some tranport costs ae included.

11. Borehole and water suppyI i are assumad to call forth anincement of production valved at 5% of that attrutable to the cropdevelopment progrMe. In the absence of a:y quantifiable measure of thoresult of ebath improveMent_ du to a lowr estimate of the incidene ofguinea wom and other diseases among tho target population, this sems areasonable approach. The am logie apples to the home extension prograe.whre production benfits are assumd to aecrue from better nutrition andhealth circumstances.

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12. In Table 6, describ ng the extension component, it will be noticed thatall benefits from crop development are attributed to this component. It isof courso the case that the benefits frou crop developmnt are dependent notonly upon extension but also up"n thoso other components which provideservices without which incremental production would not be possible (mostobviously input supply.) Benefits are assigned here, however, on the basisthat extension is the last and most direct link in te chain of servicesreaching the target farmers. It is of course more realistic to cosidar thesebenefits as resulting from all the activities of VORADEP components, andtbhrefore to consider the overall picture of project costs and benefits aspresented in Table 9. Benfits from crop development activities are basedupon the supply of inputs (seed, fertiliser etc) actually available, theestimated extent of adoption of a variety of practices by target farmers,the likely results of partial and complete adoption (from N&E Departmentsurveys), and projected possible rates of diffusion of technology amongstall farmers over the full period of project life (partially based on surveysconducted by C2hlfIT for the Ghana Grains Board in a similar region of maizegrowers in Ghana.) ME Department survey data have also been used in theestimation of the proportion of firmers growing various crops, thedistribution of erops' areas and relative importanes of sole and aixedcropping.

13. Estimtes of the benefits accruing to lnvestments in livestockactivitis are based upon changes In stock mortality rates as a result ofveterinary ad animal husbandry extesion activiti". Anlmal Census data andvaccination rates (for CMP, rinderpest etc) bave been used in this repect.

14. Retunsm to flbserle unvestments bave beon confined to marine capturefishing only, and are based upon estimtes of returns from tte purchase ofnew equipment (motors, nets, twine etc) using a simiLir methodology as thatemployed by th. fisheries consultant engagd by the project In 1985. Amplescop for lmpboveenits, In tonage of wet fish landed seem probable and thesame rates of economic value added (of about 3 tims the vulue of the landedcatch) In preparation and processing usod. No quantifiabl estimats ofbenefits are made for the aquaculture extenion component relating tofishpond services and dovelopmnt.

15. Icementl output has been valued at nrnational prices whore goodsare traded, and at local wholesal prices were goods are. not traded. In thecase of malze and rico, relevant international prices have been used. Thereis cortainly a deficit of rice production In the country, and maize must beassumed to be substituable for the range of cereals currently brought intoGhana on either commrcial or concessionary/aLd terms. Yams and cassava aronot generally traded. Tomtoes nd (to a greater extent) shallots can be;they have therfore been valued at their local price plus a premium of lO No benefits have been attributed as a result of developments la any othercrops as research under VOADEP In thes areas is presently unpredictable asto Lts outcome.

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16. The difference betwee ths st of assumptions wsd In the estisitionof an internal econmic rate of return for VOWRADEP and that used by theGhaa Institute if Managemt and lhubc Administration (GIlA) in 1987needs to be somianted on. The CIA study used a shadow exchange rate basedupon the subsequent years actual rate as a wa of determining what theexcha_p rate should have bee in any one year; a shadow wage rate equal tothe minimum wage rate for 1987 was used; costs and benefits appear to bepreseted in current tem, and foecast costs mer based on the su ofcomponent costs for the last oprat y of project life for whichGlA had dta. The valuing of outputs due to project inwesteent was voy

simlar, although no rotur wore estimated to livtock and fsheries. Thecalculaion of benfits frm crop devalopuet In the ¢lA study was al*otentirely based on t_yWretical return to the actul volum of inp1uditributed; usequent te available from proj ct ad non-project someshas faciitated refinement of this approach.

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AMMZ 2 - RESRARM AND UESICOt

Objectives and Gals

1. The Staff Appraisal Report 1980 did not st targets for reseach.Rover, the objectives which th. report secified under Research and FarmTrills Vero as follows:

- liaison with natLonel ad International agricultura reserchinstitut".

- collection and dissemination of crop research o ti of regionalinterest.

* on-farm trials to test research recomndations for ne technologyundr locl conditio and otbr int evel technology (Lncludingus of rl achry).

2. Mh Tn-Depth Review Misson Of JaqAry 1984 re_inded thatUVpl.ttion of the research progrim shuld he _peeded up ad to thisend the o act shldseek cona assistance from the r tii3sltate for Tropil cultua (IA). Subjet to thi advic, thestatio at Ip1v would be improved for wock in the south and Zonpo Macsrfor the north.-

StaKffg and mactious

3. Th Applied Research Departmet iS headed by a Chief Agronmt ndassited by 5 Agrnmists,.13 Seior TeShicis of various grades 18Technicl Officers in carying out location-specific on-fam trials ad somesee maltipliain

4. The fivo agronomists specialLse La the folloin are : cereals and1Lsms roots and tubers; faming systems, including plantain and bananasas well agro-forestzy; cocon_ts; and veptable.

5. Relant techologies dvloped eltbhr by po and appled rchbodies ae tested on Nor I*lientat stations. In Volta ReSgo IpvAgricultural Station is usd for ths purposo. Sub stations bhv beenestablished at Zope and Banda. Promising techniques or prctice are thenteted in f&_Ws field".

-65-

Activities and Achievets

6. Activities in research and fild trials have boon mainly AA the areasof coreals and root crops.

7. in the case of cerals, lialson with the CIDA/Ohua Grains DevelopmentProject has been in the joiLt organisation of on-farm variety trials ofmaize. The results of these trials have boen used to make recome_ndationson the varieties best sulted to the ecologLcal zones of the Project area.In addLtLon, the research department started producing the recoimendedvarieties of soed maize in 1983 for sale to farmers, starting with 15.6bectares. In 1984, som 1.15 tonnes were produced. The departmont hassubsequently produced and supplied seed maLze to farmers in the project areevery year.

8. Co-operation with the Vst African tic Develop mt Association (WARDA)started in 1984. Rice variety trials have subsequently been carried outjointly with reoaendations of varieties suited to the project are.

9. As regards root crops, the most significant achievemets in root cropre sarch and development bave been with cassava, yam, and sWeet potato.

10. Co-operation with rTT in cassava disease control and variety selectionresulted in the lowering of the incidence of the cassava mealy bug andspider mite infetations wbhch WAd hitto drasticaly depressed yields.Varietal tests also led to the selection of 2 varietLes which gave anavrag yield of 20 tons per bectare. These ae being multiplied, andplanting materials to cover an area of 50 Ha to date have bee produced andsupplied to farmes malay thrgh the extension system. Thi is expctedto increase signficantly the tonnage of casava produced in the Projectar3.

11. The yam mini-sett technique wa Introduced In 1984 in co-operation with1ITA on the Projet. Results of r taoved that mini-setts of localy1 Sve sproutn pentag varyLg from 70 to 90g. The. adoption rateof the technique aong fa=ore to hom it was Introduced ws around 40%.The tchnique is ely being incorporated into the TAV exteniontraining progrisme. Further research work is also boeng cirried out tosimplify the systm for farmers. The adoption of this technIque willLUprove the supply of seed yam In the Project area.

12. Research on meet potato obtained from ZITA via the University of Ghanahas resulted In tho selection of varieties, yiolding 20 tons/ha or more,almost twiCe as much as local varieties. Planting material to cover 100hectares of these Improved varietieS hav subsequently been supplied tofarmers in the Project are through the extesion service.

13. A groundnt valrty trial at one location was one of the fiveexperiments located at 29 sites throughout the various ecological zones ofthe Project are in 1983. Severe drought howvevr adversely affectedgermination in the field. Test contlnued in 1984 and processing of the dtafor publication was also -tarted.

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14. Contcts to obtain cowpeas for testing,in the Project Area wereinitiated in 1982 by tho Senior Reserch Agronomist at an internationalworkshop at ITa. Subsequently, in 1983, one cowpoe variety trial was laidat one location in the project are. Also, ahother trial involving amaize/cowpea lntercrop was carried out JoLntly with CIDA/Obana GrainsDevelopment Project. Lialson with the Semi-Arid Food Grains Research andDevelopment (SAFGRAD) project ln Burkina Faso for cowpea varletal testingwas inLtiated in 1984. Co-operation was also sustained with the CIDA/GhanaGrains Development Project on thelr trials in the Project area. Coupea seedwhLch wa produced in i984 for further multipllcatlon ln 1985 amounted to 1ton. This consisted of two varieties, Vlta 7.and TVY 2394 - 02F. The arsunder whlch selected varieties of cowpeas (1843, 1239) for seedmultiplication in 1985 was 2.25 hectares. Following the trials and selectLons ofproduced and supplied to farmers through the extension xervice in1986 and 1987.

15. Work on oll palm has concentrated on making available to farmrs in theProject area the lmproved varieties developed at the oil pals researchstations of the University of Ghana. In 1983 the Research Departmentmaintained 5,200 soedllngp at Kpetoe out of whLeh 3,400 were sold tofarmers. In 1984 the Project procured 20,000 germinated nuts from the OilPalm Research Centre at Kusi which were nursed at Kpetoe, Vakpo, Hohoe andJaslkan for distribution to farmrs in 1985.

16. Followig discussions in October and Decebor 1982, a coconut plan ofactoan was prepared by the I=O for 1983 to 1985. Thls was followd by atwo-week training in coconut agroonmy for three research officers at 1310'sMarc Delors Station, Port Boust, Cote 4'1volre in March 1983. * In 1984, acoconut variety trial consisting of 720 seedllngs of five hybrld varietieswas laid at Anloga. The experimaent w designed to compr. the local VestAfrLean Tall variety with the hybrids In a randomised complet block designof 6 replications. The seeds of the local variety were procured from theWestern Region where uaulterated local plats now exlst. Sites woreselected at Mafi-tmasi And at tbefl for other trials to be stablished in1985. Subsequently, a plantatLon and a seedling nursery were established atAnlogs In 1985. Shallow wells were construcetd to Lmprove on the wateringfu.ilities at the sLte.

Other Research Ixperlnts

17. Other research expermentslinvolved co-operation with the CIDA/Gh anGralns Development Projet In 1982 there wr Mieronrtr ent nd Nutrientexperimnts at 2 locations, Starter Fertllizer trilas at 2 locations, a ZeroTllage tril at 1 location and Vertification Demonstrations at 25locations. To provide poultry for usw on research plots, the rosearchstation at Kpve wa supplied wLth 1,500 day-old chicks by the Project In1983. In 1986 the poultry and llvestock unlt maintained 7,609 bLrds.

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EXZSION ANUD TAICG

18. efor the ieption of VORADEP. extenion was chaacterised bysevral systems and irregular visits usually coupled with non-extensionactivities (e.g. sale of inputs, proc"sing of loans to farmers, etc) byexthusion officers.

19. with the start-up of VORADEP the T&V stm was adopted andintrodced In 1982, following the recomendations of the Staff AppraisalReport ($ARI) of IDA/U'AD.

20. The hiR sa the extein coomponent as the key instramnt In theVORADEP Crop Devlopmnt programme and envisaged that the T&V sytem wouldintensify gOA genral extension services in the reion. Th& scope, methodsand qualLty of the sorvices would be improved ln a number of ways, viz :-

- systematic extension via T&V

- Increase In field staff to reduce the extension officer/farmer ratiofrom 1: 900 to 1:5 00

- provision of adequate logistical support for extension, improvedsorvice conditions and adtquate training.

* provision of strong tehrnical support and supervision from seniortechnical and management staff.

Targets. aoals and Zarly l.erformsnce

21. The original target of the extension systea was amamum nuMber of60,000 fam families. An extenion offlicr to farmer ratio of 1:500 withlnan area of lOke ceatred on the offie r's station wmm specified.

22. Criteria for the selection of a contact farmir (CF) for each group of10 farmers were as follos :

- the Cy should be good farzmr who is well respected by the othergroup maebers.

- the CF should be receptive to new idea and willing to allow hls farzto be usod for de_mstration purposes.

- he most be able to co-unicate with his group members and other CIs.

- the CY's farm should be the average for the group and the famer shouldbe a full time farmer, with no alternative source of Income.

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23. A target of 120 Technical Officer circles eovering a famingt familypopulatton of 6SQ000 was sot Ln 1982. One of the Iuitial problem whLeh wasrevealed In tho registration of farmers to be visited by the TecnicalOfficers was that this vas done without tho officers visiting the ContactFaruers' farm as per sch*eul during the cropping season to advise thefamers on Improved techniques.

24. Monitoring exercises subsequently shoved that 35%, 7b and 76% ofContact Frmers in the Northern, Central and Southern Zones respectively didrecive at least one visit from the Tecbnical Officors during the mjorseason of 1982. (Contact Farmer Survey 1982 carried out by the Monitoringand Evaluation Deparment.)

25. lefore the end of 1982, three Mobile Training Unit Land Rover vehIclesand 108 motor cycles wer supplied for extnsion activities. in 1983,mobility problems were created by inadequate avail.bility of fuel andlubricants for both motor cycles and training veieles. in the NorthernZone, the frequent breakdowns of the Dambai and Damenko ferries coupled withbreaukdons of the training vehicles hindered the regularity of fortnightlytraining sessions.

26. The constraints which prevailed in 1983 carried over Into 1984 and woreaggravated when budgetary allocations by GOO were restricted to staffsalaries only. Howeer, a total of 66,634 farms were notionally coveredby the T&V systm and technical officer strength by the- and of the yer was172. The unification of crops, hom and anisml husbandry extension wasinitiated by the organisation of comon training for the officers of these

units. However, farm visits under the T&V system vere carried out mainly bythe crops offle rs.

27. IZn 1985, one of tIa main objectivs of extension was to determie themost effective wumber of farm visits which could be made -in a fortnight byen extension officer. A feedback monitoring report system was therefore

desiSgnd to facilitate this. Close collaboration with the ResearchDepar-ent and the Ghana Grains Development Project also led to the

cmpilation of recme io and design of demostrations to be carriedout oan Contact Farc rs farm.

28. By May 1986, foflowlng recomendations by the 1984 in-depth reviewmission, extension officers from the lilestock and plant protection unSitwere Integrated Lnto the T&V extensLon system. The nuiber of FieldExtension Officers was therefore Increased to 242 of which 70 wore of theTA/STA grad. There also were 33 Agriaultural Extension Officers orSupervisors, 9 District Extension Officers and 3 Zo0 Extension Officers.Subject Matter Specialists also were assigned for each disiplin.Furthermore, the nber of 50 farmr groupa per FED hich was consideredaeessive wa reduced to 8 per FO.

29. To rationalie further the extenson servie, the Hom Extuion ULitwas Integrated Into te TV extenion system during 1987. By the end of1987 therefore, the number of FLeld Extenion Officers vas increasd to 257throuph the integration process and also with the intake of college leversand officers on re-settlement schems.

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30. AC tha stsg, lt Is useful to oxaUe In mors detail the nowrganisactioual scre of the T&V system an hiliegt lts maLa links ud

funtions. Toh . aisotion structure whlch .me:g after therecoendatt.ns of IDAD In-depth RevUe of early 1984 Ls attached.

EVOLVED T&V Oa SATION

The roj act rReg. DL. of Agric

!f ° t Sovcz |

Regional SMSs (Beads of Units)Crops, Animal Husbadry, Platftotection & Hoe Eteuson

ZonalC N1 Ms

D. mm.

rsis}- i'

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A2btsvi.tton:

sO DBSIGV o-

1 HAD EMSION SRvICZS

4 11TS41o-3 SKS-. Ol HZAD OF mT

12 235 bilL SUIJCT MATT SnCIALIST'

3 210 ZoL . Mr Ioi omcuR

9 D1D DISTRICT ImSION omCR

9 DM0 DISTRICT ANIMAL HUSBAZD O7CER

9 DUIO DISTRICT om =0810 O7CR

34 AEt AGRIULTURAL ZXTZOS 077XCEI0O RANME omcza

257 710 Ft=, mlsiomR 72CR

82 HBO am ESIOi omc0 t

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Th Orgaiational Stuctre

31. The Extension department is headed by the Head of Extenion Services.Wording under and closely with the Head, ar the legioal Subject MetterSpecialists who are the hbead of units of Crop Extenion. Home Extenion,Animl Husbandry ald Plant Protection. Mhe spatial stretur of tet systemreflects the zonal and district units of the legion. At the zonal level,there is a Zooal Extension Officer (ZIO) co-ordInating th activities of thedepartment. likewise the District Extension Officer (D00) at the districtlevel. Each District Exteosion Officer is responsible for a number ofgricultural Extension Officers or Rang, Offlicrs, who in turn is

responsible for 8 Field Extenion Officers (FCOs). In each zone tbhee are 4Subject Hetter Specialists who are responsibl for tce±ing in the 3districts In the zone.

Distribution of Technica Offlcer Cxrcles ad Inactions

32. FleU Extension Officerx(FEOs) are fairly distributed in the projectarea, basoe on the distribution of a total of 145,000 farm famllies,achieving a ratio of 527 farmers to 1 Field Extesion Officer. This meansthat there are more cirles in the densely populated aras of the south,than In the sparsely populated ares of the north. Each FE0, at thebegining of the year, is expeted to register a mluinum of 8 farmer groups,each of 10 "contact farzmrsl. Each group has a leader former. rslected bythe other group members. Mhe FEO, therefore, is directly in contact vith amInimum of 80 farmers. A circle is nned by motly Technical Officers(TOs), few Senior Technical Assistants (STAs) ao eperieoced TechnicalAsslstants (TAs).

lmuctions of Field Staff

33. The Field Extension Officer (710) visits a group each worktng daywithin a fortnight, with two days allocated for training sessions and extravis' ts to any of the groups. He holds regula meetings on days proviouslyarranged and also visits farms to give on-tho-spot advice, also obsorvingand noticing any problems enountred. by farzmrs on the ftiold. This fixedregular tine schedule is kept by F1O1 to enable farmers ad supervisors tobuom the progrme in advance. The Agicultural Extension Officers (AEOs)are responsible for the supervision of the FE0s. Each AEO L In charge of 8circles, thus being responsible for 8 MEGs. They pay regular visits to theMEOs and any of their farmer groups to give them timely advlce ad also help

with some of the problems. The Subjoct Hatter Specialists (SNSs) are personswho spend about a third of their ttim training FDO *and Ws5 at the districtlevel, a third of their tim solvlng problems In the field and collectingfeedback, and a thrd of tbhir tim In contacting their technical resourcesl.e. r"earch stations, etc and planning for the comig fortnight cossions.

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The table below show the distribution of field workers byzoe and by dstrict.

DISTUITO OF FIEUD EXSSon omcS

zOm District e mFl90IIW

Xra . 20 9 3Ulorant. 19 10 3Jikn 31 11 4

ZOMAL TOTAL 70 30 10

Rob" 34 7 4central Xpdo 26 8 4

tlo 38 10 5

ZOML TOTAL 98 25 13

Auto 15 6 2South o 31 8 4

Dean 43 13 5

Z,. L TOTAL 89 7 11

1EGOaL TOTAL 257 82 34

34. ThisTrainIg and Visit syst of Etesiont i ntelve. The lee ofuce"s is partly the result of pravision of ad"e te eass of

traU por for eztesion workrs. The FnO hae been provided with motor-blkes or bicyces, A*s with motor-bikes, ilst th Ms and District andZontl Extesion Offices sbare 4WD station wagons or pick ups.

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Tra4i4g

35. Training Is considered a vital support to extension. Each season Isdivided Into fornightly cycles and training sessions ar held fortnlghtly ona flied day In each distxict. This wellstructured timetable of trainingdays is to enable other functionaries, for example Regional SMSs to attendthe training sessions. The training session is convened by the DEO and isattended by the Zonal SIS for Crops, Animal Husbwady, Hom Extension endPlat Protection.

36. At the training sessions, mssages based on the expcted activities ofthe far for the coming fortnight are presented, with empbhis on the*iupect points", that is, the specific asit of the activity that needs tobe Iproved. It is important to note thathcftese messages have been formlated in vays that they can be readlly and clearly transmitted to farmers,and are appropriate to the specific physical and ecological enviroruent.

37. An extension worker can only confidently explain a new practice to afarmer if he can dmonstrate it clearly. Without this ability, he carmotmaintaln his credibility with farmers. Practical training therefore is animportant component of the fortnightly training sessions. This is carriedout by the SKS on the training plot near the training centres or on a farmerfield.

38. At the trainlng sessions, SKIS receive feedback from the FEOs on theneeds and problems of the farmers, and give tem solutions where they can.These problems coveo managemet, pest and diseos control, wather reports,etC.

Ixtens in ActivitLes =mdet the T&V Systm

39. Snce the re-orgaLsation of the extenion activities of VrAADEP asdescribed above*, the mathods used by the T&V staff to Impart mA'ssagesregarding Improved farming practices have been modified and SatensifSed. Themain activities adopted are sumazisod bboew.

40. Each FEO works with a ainllum of 8 groups, each of 10 *contactfarmers. He holds rgular meetlg with each group for cne day. Thfs day ispreviously arranged and agred with the farmers. FEOs together thereforeare directly in regular contact with a minimum of 21;920 contact farmersfortnighly throughout the yer to advise on use of IMpromed varieties andcultural practleso. The HEs, on the other bad, visit 7, CO contact womenfortnightly. This means that 20% of farm families ar coLtacted directlyand regularly by extenion workers. The remaining 80 who are 3 followUrfarmars" are expected to benefit from periodic advice from to. extensionworker or tho contact farmer. Information boards have bea set up in 1,000villages throughout the region showing the Aate of the FEPO naet vislts,extension posters, impact points, information on fl ld days, *ec.

41. MROs pay regular visits to farmers fields to &asess adoption ofrecommendaions, give on-the-spot advice =an also take notes on problem _ fthe farmers.

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42. In an effort to bring research into farmers' fields, and to teachfarmers the increaed yield that results from use of improved farmingtechnologies, contact faraers assist FEOs to lay demonstration plots. Theseplots ranging between '/100 and 1/50 ha ia size are established on farmers'fields. Farmers are exposed to new recommendations on these plots.Recommendations include plantlag in lines to obtain optimum plantpopulatians, use of improved varietio of crops, general use of fertilizer,other correct cultural practices, herbicide and pesticide applications,harvesting, storage, preservation and processing.

43. The crops currently being promoted are incie, rice, cassava, cowpeas,sweet potato, groundnuts, sorghum and vegetables. Each FEO is expected tolay'a minimum of 8 demonstrations on these crops depending on the agro-climatie and *cological 2one. A total-of 2,192 demonstrations wereestablished on these crops in major and minor seasons in 1987. The otherdemonstrations involve rapid yam multiplication technique and thecultivation of plantains and bananas. Agroforesery has been recentlyintroduced to the field officers and farmers and alley cropping plots havebeen established in each district.

44. Each FEO is expected to organise 3 field days per crop demonstration.These are at planting time, at fertiliser application, at tasselling. andbarvesting and storage, atc, depending on the crop. Field days are held by

MOs to provide a comparison of improved versus traditional practices on thefarmers fields bhere the demnsotrations are laid and also to have theopportunity of asquiring new skills.

45. Film shows are organisod to supplement training of FOE4 and in villagesto expose farmrs to reo _edaons given by the FE0s. In 1987, a total of246 film shows i.e. an average 27 film shows per district per year werorganised throughout the egSion.

46. Rallies are hold in each ceircle by FEOs at the beginning of the sasonto inform farmers about fortcoming farm operations and the general farmingprogre for the year. Farmers are also made aware of the inpst situationat these rallis. At the end of the year, simLlar rallies are held toevaluate suce ss during the year and also plan strategies to solve problems*enountered.

47. one stratey used by the Extesiosn departeent in VORADEP to achieve.these goals is targetting. Targets are drawn up for all major activitiesundertaken within the department.

Achievements and Xmpact

48. The assessment of achivments and Impacts of a complex syste such asthe T&V extension system is inhorently problematic. In the case of VCRADEP,the task is made more difficult by lack of firm data on key aspects, notablyaras cultivated under the various regimes (improved, semi-improved andtradtional). Furthermore, yield estimtes for different crops and for thedifferent extension packages is scanty and what is avilable is oftenunrepiesantative

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49. Consequently, other dta havo had to be used and adapted to give someindication of the outputs of extension. The main indicators used in thisassessmnt are awarenss by farmrs of iproved cultural practice ed theadoption rate of the main practices *xt.endd by the Projeet.

50. Fortunately, the roject, throug its Monitoring .d EvaluationDepartment carried out two survys in which certain key aspects of extejisncontact were analyse - thes survys were the Contact Farmers Suve (CPS)1982 and the Extension Impact Survy (EIS) 1987. Therefore it is possibleto compare progress and devolopmnts In extension contact over the majorpart of the ProeCt's Implementation. The SAR, ln its spcifications forcrop devlopment states accelerated acceptance by farmers is expected byfull devlopmet at yer 7, at which tim some 51,000 he would be underimproved crop productioe (Section C, para 3 .05).* Some light an be thrownon accoptace but estimates of area cultivated must be nade on other base.Moreover, there is also some basis, from survey data, to compare registeredand non-registered farmers avd hence to as"ss the diffusion effects tofarmers not in direct contact In all respects with the exten3un service.

Comparisons of Extension Contact 1982 and 1987

S1. Tables prosenting the main dta from the two surveys are analysod inthis section. Th clidece of extedsion officers' contact with farmers wasanalysd by te frequecy of visits to farmer and frequeny of famersattending organised meting. Between 1982 and 1987 both indlcators shwdfavourable progrss in contact. In 1982, 4"% of tfmexs were visited byextesion officers at lest once In two weeks; in 1987 the percentag hadrisn to over 533* Rore sig atly, 29% clalmed no visits from extccsionofficers during the 1982 saon, while in 1987 less than 7% wvere i thatcateory. The range of the extension contact advice as reflected in theproportion of farmers receiving such advie" for the various stages shows aksignifcat improvewnt over the period. The survvey dta by suin crop ares~arisd Xbelow:

PURCZsTAGE OF FArhBHf RECEIVING ADVICE 0 SPECIFIC CECIl

-MHaize 37 84Riee 3 26CassaVa 20 71Yam 3 44CoWpa - 47Vegetables 31

Source CIS (1982) and EUS (1987) K 4 S Dept. VQADZP

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52. Famrs ' awareness of specific cultural practices is * reasonablemeasure of the extent of the extension officors' Ogetting over the message"to the faerz,. The Oprovement in this aspct of extension contact hasbeen impressive, as the following coupaisrons show.

PERCZMNIGE OF " RUS ARMBE OFAOR RECOMMED PR&CES FOR A=ZE

Recommended Practice 1982 1987

Use of improvedmaize seed 28 73Use of fertilizer 40 68Plnting date 33 66Hand weeding 28 SO

Source CPS (1982) and £1S (1987) N & Dept, VORADEP

53. Perhaps the most meaningful measure of impcts available in thisanalysis is th. adoption rate by famers of specific cultural practicesextended by the extension officers. This mset be viewed with caution,however, because both survey covered activities in one sason only and thesamples were different btve 1982 and 1987. Nevertheless, the adoptionrate ay be regazded as a useful Indicator of farmers' responsiveness to theextension office"r' advice. Th folloing table shows the results:

PDCEUW OF FADUS ADOPTINGtRNDKEBDW PRA=CZS FOR MAIZE

Recommended Practice 1952 l987

Use of laproved. sd 22 67Application offertlizer 17 55Plantig date 30 61Haod weeding 31 SO

Source CPS (1982) and t1S (1987) H & t Dept, VORADEP

54. In addition to the above picture of Improaement In the laledgp anduse of major cultural practices the 1987 survey shown careasing awarenessand adoption by famemrs of otber itportant practices;, for malze - sed rate(awarenes 63%, *adoptlon 63%), thinning (awarevnss 30%, adoption 24).

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55. Om of the mjor asSumptions underlyn the extesionphilosophy of the system is the operation Of A diffusion effect,spreadng know4W fro contact/followr fainrs to on.trgistercd famers.Frm contact with dfferent activftie progrmamd by VMOAD extensionserviGes, it is possible for non-registered farers to be aware of. and toadopt, improved inputs and cultural practices. Th 1987 survey identifiedsome of the main li*ks la the diffusion process.

56. About 39% of non-registered farmers were aware of the presece ofVORADEP exteision officers In their villgs; only 25% and 14% respectivelyhovwver, were awar that their follow farmers, wet registered as contact andfollowr fazers.

57. Xowledge of cultural practcte for crops, passed on through extenofficers, was fairly madoest. with the exdoption of a1ize (73% of non-regstered farmers), cassv 46%* rice 26%, am 21%, cowpea 31%, advegetables 17%.

58. Awareness of specific reCOMmnded praGtices and their evetual adoptionby no-registered farmers is summarised below:

PZCSC4TGE OF NON-REGISTERED FARMERSAMAU OF AND ADOPTING RZCOI -EIDED PRACTICES FOR MAIZZ -1987

RecmenIded Practice * Awareness % Adotion

mrovd as"e sed 58 52Applieation of NPW 49 47

lanting date 49 46Seed rate 46 46

aend Wading 34 28Thinning' 15 ' 14

Soure. ElS (1987) - K & K Dept, VORADEP

Conclons

59. Th foregoing assessmets indicate that the extension system hascommendably Inareassd its contact with the farmers of the Region, bothregistered and non-registered. It is useful and instructive to ntOt thatthe uajprity of noa-registered kfrmers gained their kn.wledge of recmmeneddpractices from their fellow farmers by visiting the desonstration plots laidon contact f rsme,' fields.

60. The most iSpres"sive results ere achieve With regard to improvdmaize, as was expected. ThS wa not solely du to higher yilds but alsoto selection of varieties which were acceptable on grouds of cooking andtaste charaeteristies - an aportant point.

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61. A close similawity was observed for fertiliser use betwoen the twogroups (56% and 52%) but contact farers were significantly ahead In theirawareness of the all important recoiended application of fertliser (NPX -68% compared with 48%) - a reflection of the corstant contact with extensionworkers. The significant Increase in wareness over the period 1982-1987 isclearly associated with the marked increase In extension contact over thatperiod.

62. However, traslation fros awareness to adoption reveals substantialgps, spoeially for the major recommedations - Improved sood andfertilisers. These significantly lowor levels of adoption are more likelyto be the result of high input prices ndor inadequate supplies then fromlack of knowledge or technical know-how.

Some & tension

63. Though Rome Extension is now an Integral part of the ExtensionDepartment, it started life as a separate department and developed anapproach which has largely been continued within the broader framework ofExtension.

64. At appraisel it was estimated that in 1979 about 4,500 women and youthsvero participating In the programme in 117 villages and 130 schools. ByProject Year 5 it was expectad that 4,755 families would benefit from HomeExtension prograos. It was also proposed that a bousehold nutritionalstudy would be carriod out.

65. Prfo trg the Projoet has been substantial despite someifficulties, especially with regard to transport. By end 1986 there were

120 field staff (+53 lUbourerJ) and the number of participants egisteredalmost 20,000. The build up of the programme is shown in the table belowwhich charts the progress in the food production component of home extensionactivities.

66. The growth In urban gardens has boen notable because duzrlg the first2-3 years of the programme the emphasis tended to focus on urbanparticipants. Following the roiendations of the Review and because ofimproved tra"port the programme gradually moved to extend its activities Inthe rural area. This is reflected In the icrease In the nmber ofvegetable growers on farms.

67. The number of schools inolved in food production, preparation andnutrititon programes has continued to rise and demntration plots bavebeen astablished. So far, however, only one demonstration bhons has beenestablished (1984); and because of the difficulties Involved In planning andmaterials for further homs, later mphasis for demonstrations bas been on

wations introduced Into registered mmbers' houeholds.

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68. As regards impact of the various prograes of the Hom ExtensioncoMPOnent. insufficient data exist to a4sses the vital aet ct of thDepartment's activiti". Th mot appropriate indicator is likely to be theImprovement in nutritional status of the target populatio. A priori, theoxtent to which wome have been inreasingly itnolved in the variouactivities of the hom extension programs wuld suget that success inparticipation and adoption of new, Improved practices wuld lea to improvenutritional boeAviour over a wide range of dtostic and community activites

nhd, in the longer run, upgrading in nutritional statu.

69. In 1985 a study of nutrition ad food consumption was carried out inthe Northern Zon by a consutant (Rabank 1985). A nueber of indicatorsreflecting the impact of horn extnsion programmes were Identified, foreffects on food comimption and food security, hygiene and saitation, ete.Howvr, the homs extension prograe had only bee going for a short whileand no hard data could be expected to trace obJectively the impacts on theabove aspects of nutritional status. A later consultancy assigment(Land*11 Mills 1987) suggested a follow up study in early 1988 (3 yersafter the erlier study and 5 years after Project inception) to assess,where possible, indications of nutritional impacts of the HE programmes,especially the food production activities. No such study was undertaken.

HMK EUTUSIOM ACTZVTES

1 m2 NYS PY4 15 1161982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1967

No of particip nts 5,178 8,800 17,147 14,511 19,959 22,100No of school gardens 120 160 247 n/a 250 279No of urban hoe-gwrdens 450 1.520 1,516 n/a 1,853 2,250No of vegetabl emgroer

on fez. 1,415 4,147 n/A 4,099 5,600 6,000Po of demonstration plots O 28 a n/a n/a

RZSEARC - D1SI0N UWACES

70. While both the Rsearch and Extension Deprtnts made reasonableprogress during most years of the Project, and especially In the past 2-3years, it was felt, both within and without the Project, that thore was notsufficient liaison and close co-operation between the two dpartmts.

n. For the pat two yoers closer liaison betwee Reseach and Extensionhas been achieved vis the establishmet of monthly meetin betweenResearch, Zxtension and FASCOK staff. For two days each month a workshopand joint field trtps have bee hold, attended by SESs, ZEOs, FASCOK and theResearch staff. The workshop ia co-chaired by the bead of EstensionDepartment and the Chief Reseasch Agronaouit at the main experien*t stationat Kpeve.

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72. t eeting. workshop paticipant review tbe findinp adprop... 9f fiedt trIAls ad sueset topics for Me tral.; eVOlUate thesucces of fortnightly training and of production: eons, bydeteniu b1o well previos reco ha been uderstood andAccepted by 130, AgIs, f ; d select t sand impactpoints for the c"ong fortn4hts. lbe rec---etio s adoted at the

orkshop to fit local envroamftt and fa s resomces. Selectingapproprate prdtion uecoeatio-s and theoi Impct points is thereforethe *ets funtion of the mothly workshops. Ufort are underay to holdthes workshop at Zoel and District lvel Also.

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ANU 3 INT SUPPLY

Objectives

1. The pximazy objective of the inut supply component, according to theSeR, vas that 'tha project would ensure timly and adequte supplies of farmnputs to the faomeW. Inputs would cmprise fertilzers, Improved see

ad a variety of cheuicals. Further, imrove fam tools and mplements,and some tractors with related equipment woud be provided.

2. The project would soll seasoal farm Inputs on a cash b1a, but whennecessary, deferred paymet ould be employed. It was assumd that meUv-term credit would be provided by AD and/or coinmrcial banks.

3. .?roject re nt of Improved seods wold be obtained through GhanaSeed Company (CSC). It was assumd that GSC's fams with an epanded groorschbm would be adequate for seed suppli" for the project.

Organsatin of Iuput Supply - FASCOM

4S To spply and deliver inputs and other fam implmets to farmrs, aspecially-constituted company, Famers 9 Services Company, (FASCQK) wold becreated. FASCOM would.be ned by the 00 (ares held by Ministzy ofFlnance), farms ad a consortiun of b1ankin Instftutions. IASOCK would bemanaged by a board of Directors, vith th Rgionl Aritural Co-ordiator(RAC), (now the Regional Dictor of clt), as Cbdsximn, FASCOMNMnag Director, 2 pstv of Ministry of Finane, 3reprsetatives 8of banking Institutionu and 3 far . Inus would beditribuled troug 65 outlets. (17 FSC atid 8 VLstict store) thoughoutthe project area. Farmers Ideally would be group toetbe with -associations and co-operatives for channelling Inputs as well as advisoryand other servics. FSCs would be ouied and maintaind by the MA since Ltw" envisagd that they would also be used ford supertisionand training purposos.

Oprtia Criter

5. FASOCI would operate slAmg comercia line, with prices of nputs, Ingeneral, being set with a 20% mark-up on ex-SC costs to cover overeds andprovide a profit. For all input involving a GON subsidy (fertilLsers) MLAwould fully reimburse FASCOK for the subsidy, calculated on the basis of *x-FSC selling price and to be paid in advace at the begLrinng of each yar.

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lutituticnal Devlopmt and Pe

6. Gaven FSM' s objectlves ad operationl n eads, the o tionalsoe-up shows a appropriat divslon of function to Cay out necessaryfinancial, Commercial and transport responslbilitie.

7. The ability of FASCON to carry out its tmdate out depend, to a greatextent, on the degree to which it anaged to marry Its ememrcial aIa andits Regional detlopmt role. The first quetion to ask is whether themanagement of FASCoK, vested in its Board of Dirctors, has been appropriateto th tasks mentioned above. Th composition of ?ASCOK's Boad ofDirectors clearly reflects the Company's role asn Implmenting agent ofVotADEP (the current Board is larger tha that proposed in SA). Howevr,such a Board ma not be appropriate to a coercially-orientated company.

8. The most Important "spect in this issue is that the Dlrectors re thereto represent the intests of the Institutions and organiWtione whonominated thm. Such Interests could, and In some cases did, differ fromthose of a comercil company, whose directors e*nur sound proflt-orientated policies and management.

9. The development objectives of FASCOK, which are designed to besupportivo of overall VORAD?P polLcies and strategies, may not be fullyserved by a Board with such diverse interests. Crucial In this respect isthe role of the r pr sentatives of .DA and MMll, for two reasons. The firstrelates to the question of whether or not OA polLes , as reprosented bytheir Board "3rese haatve, ave ben suppportive of FASCOXs (andVORADWP's) goals. There is evidence to suggest that there ban bee no clerforualation of IWA poliel"s to widch FASCOK (and VORADP) could relate theiroam policies. There is no doubt that certain central Government poliies,esp"ecally on ptricig of Lnpus and procurement, have worked ageinst *ASO0's.Omw objectives and coercia alaIs and have had adverse etfcts on VOADUPsprormac.

* 10. The prfo eeof FASCOK as an Institution con tStut to provide* agricultural input can be judged from a number of viewpoints. Here the

evaluation as broken dow Into the followlng parts

- financal prformance

- *ffectiveness of its constituout operations esppcially- transport

- performance as regards input supply and delivery of inputs to farmers.

Finncia Performe

11. The finncial perfomance of FASCMK was subjected to a soarchIngeainaction by a consultancy study (Coopers and Lybrand 1967.) Theirovaluation prseated a critique of fianeLal performane for teh period1981-1986. The findings regarding part performanc may be sumarised asfollow.

. - 83-

* a trend of substantial and increasing t,loas

* Sinadequate and dec""rig margins due to unornemrcial pricing polLies,leading to 1986 operating costs at a levl of 10 time those In 1983,compaed with turnover, which increased by just over 7 tims in the sameperiod.

- intial mphasis on VOWADEP project farmers rather tha regionalfarmers as a wholo has led to proj et-led rather than ecomrcially-ledprocuremet polici.

- the consequeces of this hav meant stocking, late dliveryand lost sales, and high trsport costs, all of which could he bean-asided.

- inappropriate capital -Structure, resulting from the financing of short-term trading stocks with long torm dabt. Finaneing of imported inputs bylong term loans ment that the Company bas in most yers enjoyed a helthycash flow position. Consequently, this situation ha tended to re) Mpressure to get more realistic selling prices and to control costs. Thequestion of selling prices for inputs is looked at in the section evaluatingthe peformance of FASCOn's inpt delivery program_.

Wfctivee_i of F'FACSO operations

12. Sho Coopers aid Lybrand's report drws atteonton to a nmiber ofdeficiencies in the organisdtio nd operations of the varLous departnatsof FASCOK. Thse motly concern Internal division of responsbiUties andfailure to institute stringent eontros.-over the operation of thesodivisions.

133. For an isbtitution charged with procuring, delivering ad slling farmInuts tO s. idely disperset farming population, often with accscsdifficulties, the key Operation must reside with tdo transport activities ofthe compan.

14. Tr asport performnc has been influence by the followaig factors :

- orgasisation of the transport operations

- prcuremenn t policy and its Implications for transport operations

* ownership and size of transport flet

15. Within the FASCON org slistional set-up, transport operations wVeroversenm by a Transport Officer who reports to th Administrative Manapgr.TMe rank and authority of this officer were not sUk as to ensure firmcontrol over transport policy and vehicle usage. Influences other thanthose of a purely operational nature therefore tended e@ interfere with theproper functiOonng of the transport arm of FASCON's operations.

-84-

16. The transport operations and their financial viability have been mostaffected by the procuremt policy undr which FASCON has had to pursu itslut activities. Oavernrent, rather than FAsCON, has been respous'ble fordetermining the allocation and date of arrival of fortilizers which clearlyhba not been pered to FASCON's delivory needs. Often, fertilizers havearrived late for the planting season and, in such a sita;tion. FASCON hashad to gear its transport capacity to the need to evacuate the fertilizerfrom port In as short a period as possible, normally within a period of 2months. This peak demand for halagg capacity bhs ld to little or nodemand for the rest of the Yer. It also meant that with such a shortperiod for evacuation FASCON has required more veblcles than would have beennecessaxy if the Company had beon able to plan a more appropriate policywith regard to procur ment and arrival of fertilizers.

17. The policy of apparent self-sufficiency in transport capacity has beena costly ono. According to the Coopers and Lybrmad study, in 1988 thecomany will hae around eight ties the haulage capacity it can itself use,with the associatod high depreciation and Interest charges this involves.

18. in ths situation, it is clear that tho transport operations of thecompany must be dependent on substantial hire income for viability.Hawever, the evidene shovs that hire ousiness was Insufficient to augmentown-use operations to any significant extent. Between 1984 and 1986 hireIncome for each year was 2.4m, 1.9m and 1.6m Cedis for hlred days totalling121. 96, and 62 respectively. On an individual veilel basti (for a fleetof 20 serviceoble vehicles) this represents an average of 6 days in 1984 and3 day in 1986 for the available six moth hire priod.

19- As a result of the foregoing the overall picture of vehiele utilisationhas been one of low and uneconomic exploitation of available capacity. ForNErh-A fy 1987, for example, only 28% of the capaecty of 21 operationalvehiles was being employed on FASCOK related busines, I.e. own-use andbiring. A further 10% was employed on Governmat business and 28% unused.34% of the vehicles wore not operatioal during tuhis period.

nput SUPPlY - Review of lASCOs Trading f

20. This review has bee confronted wLth data probleme. Differeut sourcesof ainormationabout input supplies, distribution and actual sales yielddifferent estilates. iWhile FASCOK has been the principal source of inputsfor the Region's famers, there have been other sources, though these havbeen of minor Importance.

21. AS a basis for assessg pforne, actal sales to farmers arecompared with the targets Set at SAR and subequencly revisd at Review.The first table, below, presents these target data for the period 1982-1986(1986 was the original planned termnation dat of VORADEP). Both sets oftargets are based on technical crop recoendations and the crop areatagets and therefore reflect the assumptions made at Appraisal and Reviewabout adoption of Improved packages and likely crop aresa.

- 8S -

22. Actual distribution and sales of Inputs are aalyse In the nem twotable for tb Rau input catepft", fertilixer an Ilproved seed. Thedlvergensebeteee tenets an actwas, use quite muked, as an be seon by.comparing the relevant data. I as been arued elsewhere t.at $A crosecomniaios r.dig fertilLer usag ad expected crop avea wer oroptimistic. With saw eceptIos (1983, for example) sa" atualy takenup by fuers tnd to support ths coeluslio.

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InPU SUPPLY (touR..)

(SA & leVi.)

INPUT PY1(1982) PT2(1983) fl3(1986) 1T4CV985) PTS(1986)

- 20 20 20 355 885 1657( - ) 2680( - )380( - ).- 1S 15 15 60 130 240(8000) 360(10000) 520(12000)- S/A. 100 300 .500(1000) S00( 1500)1U00( 2000)- C A N 20 40 80( - ) 100( - )140( - )- T S P 5 10 20( - ) 35( ) 55( - )- S - - -(2000) - -( 2500) -( 8000)

TOTAL 540 1365 2497 3975 5620

SEEDNMA=zE 25 75 125( 125) 200( 200) 275( 275)

- RICE 9 18 36( 42) 72( 56) 99( 66)- c Sm 6 15 26( -) 45( - ) n 1o)* sammiw 1 2 2( *) 3( - ) Sc - )-CWA . ( * ) -( ) -( - )

TOTAL 41 110 189( 167). 320( 256) 450( 351)

Figues Ia brackets are mid-tos r*view werpts

SupP OF PuILM AID ACA 1982-1967

.93s (tome) S 1Ae (ton..")

1982 531 1151983 4140 34501984 1229 12111985 1811 18111986 4936 49361987 6076

Source & Note. Supply estimates - FASOOK (thes differ slgbtly fre.Review Estimates for 1983 which was 4308 torms). Sles eatimatesare based on FASCOm data

. -87-

23. As regards fertilizers the supply ts been erratic over the period.Ths hs been acconted for by supply conditions rather than demad. As basalxeady beu noted above a major prblem Lacing the aompany is that sales offertiliz#rs haw hin determined by quantitie allocated, and t8img ofavalabilIty. by OA. The Ministry ha rarely been able to finnceC thecoutry's demd for fertilizer due to foreign exchng sb#wtages withinGana. (Tor example in 1984 ad 1985 estiated total fertilizerreqUrents were 50,000 and 55,000 tomes wherea imports were 38,350 and30,000 tome repectively, acording to MM).

24. Fertilxe2r sal" were plannd to be made, through FICs, strategicallylocated at the vitg leel and swpplied by District stores, which In turnwere to be stocked by FASC*0 dstribution. Unfortunately, tho progrs ofthe ISCa programme oas not been fully developed as enwisaged. Howevr.since VODZP. had te use of rented buildins for its input distributionactiviti", lack of outlets canot be the sole reason for the poor salesporfosmance. Thr Ls some ovidenc to suggest that lack of efficLentmanagemnt of those buildinp may hav contributed as much to the problem asrestricted effective demand for fertilizers.

25. Too Intensive crop eaqcomqandations have bo anmentioned abovo. Giventhe distribution problems. it is not, 'therefore, surprising that farmerswere unlikely to use 300 kg fertilizer/a, (250kg/Ha iA the Review) on maizewhen this has to be carried manually to frms . Furthermore, fertilizerprie s rose (1983/84) at a time when markot prices for crops were falling,thus addg to the difficultie of the farmer in purcuhasg fertilizer.

26. Th situation with regard to distribution of improved see d s evenmore difficult to asess due to serious inconsistancies betwen differentsources of informaion. The next table assembls estimate of need suppliesand actual salex to farmrs. It shoulLd b amphasised theat sals by. FASCOMade only one source of supply; others of Importance taclude direct sale byGSC, supply from TOs, and from fellow farmrs.

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IMWOD SUD SumIr, by CRO 1982-1987

1982 1983 1984 1985 - 1986 1987

S1SED(tos)

KAU* 32.3 66.0 36.7 16.0 12.7RIO 19.8 - 3.5Grouwmdt 4.0 -Sorghum 0.4C.nsp. - - . - 0.3 0.2Veptables 0.3 0.1 0.2 -

56.8 66.1 36.7 20.0 12.9

of whichASCOtl 45.0 15.0 * 10.0 2.0

27. FASOCCI sale of imprv sed bav. beeneratic ad dipo"inting.See sales have been infuened be A nuar of facters, amg thm being thefaiure of ¢SC to met supply r ie . See quality has not alwasbn adequate ed this - Ied farmers to lose confidne In 00 and inASsce. foalsyrs uptake of impewd sed ha bee less thin

ezpct*d.

28. . Other sales by 7ASCOK hav. been mainly of rm tqola. Th epupany hassold a range of such tools and Squipmet covering about 20 ite.; thi majorone being satlase. bag. sprayes amd boots, accootig for over 90g ofthe volum of this group of produts. . In 1987, about 100 of AS0M0a'sturnover was accounted for by sales of cutlass".

29. Animal feeds hav also bees a iwortant sales tem, the main productsbeing wbetbren, yellow maize ad pultry feeds, of which 268 ton (94%) wawheatbran.

30. A8CMI0 sold 12 ad 59 tons of cemt In 1982 ad 1983 respectively, buthas not stocked any sinc. Ther .ears. to be a growing deulmd for cemntin Volts Region end, given FA*8=ts transport capacity, it would seemworthwhile to re-Introduce cement into the company's product busines.

31. Sales of cheicals haw been most. It was sessumed that such saleswould be note favourable since wees are a sajor problem and elso it wasexpected that the extenson srvice would stres weed control as animportant ip practice. However, the Exteni oIpt Survey 1987shows that only about on-thrd of c"ntt maize famers hae bemaware of wee contol and only about 10% have atually adopted ther eueedtion.

a , . -89-

Future Prospects for Snpt Demand and Supply. Soplications for FASC=

32. This section discuss.7 the factors likely to detari demnd forimproved inputs in the futre ad the ature of the linuts delivery system.Demnd for inputs In the pet, especially during the Ptoject period 1982-1988, was expected to be determined by certain assumptions regarding croprecome ton, crop area to be cultivated, and adoption levels ofimprove cutural practices. Not all tbee assumption were realised andinput detmd did not materals pradictd.

33. Estimtion of future demd for inputs can be made on more realistic"amptiom tha prvioualy about the fotagoing variables, given theexperi¢en of VORSP ad a better undorstanig of the emerging trens infarmers' attitudes, constraints etc which shap their uptake of mn metods.

34. The dmand for inpts s to a geat extent dependent on delopaents inthe future agricultural programe in Volta Region and epecially on twoapects. These are total ae cropped ad pattern of mangemnt practices(tradionl, somi.improved, liproved.)

35. At pr"ent, data on the first viale is uncerin sile VORADEP hadnot collected systemtic Information on crop area At a roughapproximation estimted sr" undr crops (food) and with Input usgepotntial currently i about 200,000 Ha, of which maUs, cassava and yamaccount for 160,000 Ha.

36. At preset the ounder each management lel ae estimtedt Ius:

i Trdtioa 125,500 Na 64%i Smi-iprovd .49,700 H 25%

iii Improvd 20,000 k 1I%

36% of total area cultivatedi thus estimad to be usin someImproved Inputs.

37. A breakdod! of the abo areas by c gives a bntter basis forassessng likely future demand for inputs sInc extet of awarns andadoption varies. SI by crop. Estmtes by cr of the szreaundthe tbre levls ae shown below:

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* DISTIITION OF CROPPED AREAS BY-AAGM LEVU

Croo Traditional SemL-Lawroved d

maize 47 39 14Casava 72 26 2Yam 87 * 13Coupeas 73 - 27Croundunts 61 36 3RLe 88 12Sorgum 63 33 4Vegetables 48 30 22

Source : VOhADEP

38. Xaixe ts the most imortant user of inputs, 53% (improvd and semi.improved) coverng around 37,000 Ha area. Cassa is next, with 27% andaround 20,000 Ha under sem- and improved practices. Though -area currentlycropped with use of aodern Inputs are as yet small, the following cropswould apper to have favouable input usag potential, accordlng to evidencof VORDE souces - rice. cowpe, yams And vptables. In te case ofrice and covpe, the proportin of farmers using inputs is faitlysipificant. Vegetable have a high percetag usg of input, butcuret'ly oly a smell areas actualy cultivated, mainly in the Southernsone of te ogi (especialy shallots). Nevertheless, the ezpansionpossibilities are promising ad vegetable growig is a highy intensive userof Improved inputs.

3i. The most li1ly futur input demand sceario wirll bc by agradual ale n of current constrauts to usa of modern mateil 4ndcultural .2he most benficial Impact La ezpected to come fromgreater p tt of farmers' attitudes and practies by the extensionservice. Othr critical factors are avalability of fnd seds,especially for saize ad ric farmes; releas of imve timaterials to farmers ultivating cassava, yam ad ca"ssa; stocking ofrecommendedfertilizers for coupea and groundnut ultivatio.

40. Apart frm agronomic factors, aother impovtant issue is that ofavailablit of credt to famers. In the past credt finacing has beelimited by lack of finncil servieas to lolr famrs due to lack ofsecurity and inadequacy of farmerso Future expansion. Funcredit availablity will, to a age ete t, t e tho trasition tomore input. Inteneive levels of l to and the demad forImproved Inputs epecially fert1il"rs.

h . - 91 -

41. Given dh foregoing assumptions, it has been etimated that sales offortilizors and seeds could inreas in the following vay. over the nextfive years:

Tonne

Fertilizer Seeds

1987 6076 1421988 7711 1741989 9346. 2071990 10981 2391991 12617 272

Source Coopand FASCO Rport 1987Sectin 43P* Appendix A

future supply Prospcts

42. In order to asss the future prospects for FASCOI as a distributor offam inputs, a nuber of assumption ust be made. The first is that theGoverament intends to ary out Its comitted policy of privatisation ofinut sale, especially fertAlizrs, and that subsidy wil be reove asplamnd by 1990/91. he second assumption is that FASCo or stio,ownershp nd operatios wll be re-,orgenied, as a matter of urgny torelect Its future role as a competitive, comercil organisation capable ofatisfyin fa=Wes-' input re- irents. As the previous analysis of growth

suggests ther would- appea to be sal o rmities for viableopration of a reformed IPAS0.

43. Although 1ASC0 do" nt have en overall nopoly of the "l of inptsJmd tools (a rnge of other bodie ae also actively inolved), it holds anear monopoly th sho le of fertilers and chbeical, together with thenecessary stribution eto continue to do so. FASCO' snetwork of ditrit and vllae stores (liCs) gives it a competitiveadvantg over cdpttors; especaly given the r"sive t ofthe VO ZI IS costrution programee In the past two yea.

44. FASCI's mful ro the efficient and timly provisio of faminUrts dqm_& on the resolution of a nber of Important issues andproblem, som of which hae alredy been touceId upon in thi chbater. TheCooprs ad Lybrand's study dealt comprehensively with the compay'sproblem and with the possibl options for future viability. Here it isappropriate to identify the key issues and their Implications In suaryform.

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Commercial verw a Dvelopaent Interets

45. Th crucial uned ls to clarify this conflict. Is FASCWK to be a trulycoe rcLal enterprise or is Its primary role to nsure the equltabledistribution of farm inputs in Volta Region? Are these roles copzatible?Failure to resolvo this Issue w11l create a situation Where the deficewnciesof tha past five or six yers will tend to continue and FASCOM's viabilityas a supplier of inputs w1l be undermined by confusion of purpose nddirection.

Owneship of WIG

44. An iLportant part of FASCO' a *-t up is the PSC notwork. It has beensuggested that the FCs should be sold or handed over to farmers' co-operatives td associations. Thls has been a long-ttra objective and has,prim facie, advantages, hot least that of giving the farmers a firminvolvement ln the input supply activity. Other consequenes howevor havoto be weighed up.

47. To date there is not much evidence of widespred popularity forfarmers' co-operatives in Volta RegLon; the difficulty in setting up FSCManagement Committees tastifies to this lack of interest. It might not bepossible to soll even a majority of PSCa. This would create competitLonbetween FASOOK and Earnr -owned FSCs, whlch may or may not be an advantae.Individually onud and sonaged PSCa may face transport problems regardLngtransfer of stocks betwee FSC.

* Government, 1artiCIP"Iin

48. The te ee of Governmet participation in FASCOK will undoubtedly be akey influOCe on potential Investors' attitudes. Major participation, as Inthe past, could deter such investors; but minority Government interest mabe of some benefit, not lest in demonstrating Governmnt's support and Inkeeping Government informd of the progres of the co my.

ove0 -p Op-G=

49. SAR endsagd the. particLipation of all farmers in the regLon in FASCGOvia the Farxers Equity Scebom, which was, hover, never Implemented.Perhaps the original idal failed to Identify farmers preferences mod latersurveys confir that farmers would prefer reduction In sals prices topaying for shares In FASCOC. Moreoevr, it is unlikly that ordinaryfarmers would have ben selected as directors; most probably elected,influential farmers with strong local, *ethnlc interets rather than purelycomercial aspirations in the company's nterests would have dominated thescene. Sales of shares to coorc1s1 farmers may be feasible, provided it islimited to minimum subscription (individual farmers and legally registeredco-operatives) and after tbey hav clarly understood the problem faciLgFASCOW.

.

- 93 -

50. Ownership by othr intets coul be considered: for example,. eeraltraders, a ready scum of capital with appoprtes management experiecePASCI employees to provide *cm equity participation; locl financaInstitutions; and possibly other acceptable Interests.

51. Uhicheer option rgrding owership La prefre. no desirable chngim the ownesipL structure of FASCOI am take place nless the compaW is seenas capable of operating as an de encommercial entIty. 1ore Important,if Satisfactory chang"s In ownershp a to be achieved by 1991 th problemelating to exsting practie ad ope olconstrants t be speely

resolved ad the preferred solutIons set ia train.

. . . . .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

-94-

ANNJM 4 LIVESTOCK AND FISHERIES

UVESTOCX

!arsets and Goals

1. Mm LVestock compoent, comprisng nmal Hsbandry and VeterinaryServices, was Inadequately specified In the SAL. go tarpts were set andproposed activities vere drawn In very geeral terms, wieRout clearobj.ctives or programes.

2. On the alal husbandry side, the propoals embrace tbi followingprovlsion of equipmet, vehicles and stff training for the existlig stockbreeding fams; provision of a pig fee sil,.

3. For veterinary service", the foUowng were proposed : provision ofvehicles, equipment, vaccines and drugs; laboratory facilities would beupgradd, both ia Hio and in the districts; 5 dipping tanks were to beconstructed.

4. Not surprisinly, little progress was mad in the initial period of twoyers of project pltaon. As a rest the IDA/IAD In-depth Reviewade* a dnmr of re dton to retriee the situation.

Ravisas to frogame - ln-Depth Reviw 1984

5 S As regad anml Vus as follows;

- support to the station to be withdrawn

- all drug subsidies to be withbdraw and revenues paid Into a reolving'fm.

aimal husbandry extension staff to be absorbed ito the gnralexeenson staff.

6 * As regards veterina services, recstom a follows;

continued support of veteinary service at the level of previousyea*, provlded that all drugs are sold at a mark-up and proceed depositedin a revolving fund for drug.

- phasing out of Govoenments subsidy on vacins agaitet rinderpestand B21.

- leasing of project vehicles to the veterlnary service for thevacintionca upp.

- 95 -

lAYiev of Vestotck ACtivities 1982-86

7. In 1982 the main constraint to livetock prodction wm unvailabilltyad htig cost of feed inputs. In 1983, littlo significant devtlopentocurred ad there were no no changes Ln population. During 1984, tbere wa

roent in food ad drup supply, though Perfomence on Projeetstations aos poor de to dieas icidence and feeding problems in the d0yseason. The situation wa aggravated by ineffective co-ordination withnthe Veterinacy Deparnent a personel were not attached to the livestockstations. 1985 saw the effort of the previous ye startin to bea frutwith positive results from the anti-rinderpest caupai, and hoen a'signifcant increase In cattle. All catgori ez growth innumbers.

BY NAIE TYPE, 1982-1987

TIRS 1982 1983 t984 1965 1987

Cattle 86.000 87,000 87,000 96.000 100,000Shep 144,000 144,000 187,000 220,000 426,000Goats 230,000 230,000 178,000 209,000 310,000.Pis 27.000 27,000 34,000 38,000 62,000PouLtry 31.000 27,000 41,000 55,000 65,000Rabbits 2,000 1,000 1.000 2.000 2.000

- 96 -

V92ga SERVICES

(It CoVersge)

Mctitty mI nY2 PY3 PY4 PY61982 1983 1984 1985 1987No % so % No % No I No I

VaccinetiocaIdedrpest 11,982 14.0 u.& n.e 60,200 69.0 85,997 89.1 90,000 90311 4,573 5.3 n.& n.s. 1,380 1.6 8,044 8.3 25,000 25Anthrax 2,166 2.5 10,266 a.& 5,097 6.5 - -

Clotruidal 11,619 n.- 4,48S 2.5 - - -

8.C.D. 274,300 78.0 194,284 a.& 311,671 n.e 191,500 34.3 -

Fowl poMi 19,500 n.. 16,499 n.a 29,716 5.3usmbor@, 49,000 13.9 2,700 n.e 11.900 n.a 33.308 6.0

Divyinj/SoravinzCattle 27,745 32.4 40,288 n.e 46,839 53.7 24,905 25.8 20,000 22Shep 11,292 9.0 30,177 n.e 26,869 14.4 27,984 12.7 30,000 12Goats 12,439 10.0 25,647 n.a 28,012 15.7 31,451 15.0 30.000 10Pip 996 5.0 2,183 n.e 2,528 7.5 4.365 11.6 5,000 8P-ultry 11,581 35.0 5,179 n.e 9,481 n.4 9,151 16.5 lL,000 17

Cattle 18,919 22.0 40,288 n.. 47,516 54.4 53,652 55.6 60,000 66Sheep 25,510 20.8 30,177 n. 43,382 23.2 51,139 23.1 50,000 11coats 19,974 16.6 25,647 n.e 39,521 22.2 48,757 23.3 50,000 24pigs 1,427 6.8 2,183 n.e 4,925 14.6 5,044 13.4 7,000 11Poultry 22,480 *6.4 5,179 n.e 2,149 n.e 32,570 59.2 33,000 50

Astivtit in 1987 and 1988

8. Vith the eteninon of VORADIP for one yer to end 1987, with a wirAlang-donm perio to JiU 1988, a mnumbr of nsportant activities were plannad. inorder to faclitate the hndliAng of *aonals it was propose, In theLivestock ConsULtanoy report, to construct a total of 17 cattle crushesusing local labour and materials. Nost of thiswork was completed during1987 nd the progr w expected to be finlised by uid-1988.

9. The rfo of the dippFtg progrim was disppting during theperiod 1982-86, with cattle diping only attdain,n about 25% of the plandnumbers. ThLs was a result of the shortage of dips. The plannedconstruction of 12 dips durlng 1987 was almost attained (10) and It isexpectod that the target ill be reached during the first half of 1988.

10. During 1987 a som1l msomt of refrigeration equiprnnt ws purebased toensure the continuity of the cold bhain for vaccins, espeially In theNorthern Zon. For this purpose a 4 wheel drive pick up has bee purchased.

.~~B* §0§ z46 g F t§' i ' '

ll i! ,g' ,, 44 j § , , ' .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~4

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16. Folloving upon the Review zecomsendations im 19V84, two studies werecodinisioud an carried out In 1985 and preseu_d to 31A. The firse studyassessedthe, ecological conditions of the coastal lagoos, estuaries andsavmps to dete at their sutabiUty for acquacltre development aud toidentify the possibl species for culling. A further cousultancy wsreomended iL view of the findlg that so*ls In the are were acidic.

PSHnD COPTODO

na* n m ns 5Activity 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986

Pond Costuction

a) C riaNo. 8) 26 43 3 *3Area (Ha) 3.44) 10.40 12.04 2.13 0.90

b) HouseholdNo. - ) 31 8 10Area () -) 0.06 0.24 0.35

a) Co_srcl (no) 5 4 24 10 8b) NOUSOhold (no) 2 1 17 20 15

u7. The second study exa.led the soils ad determined thAir acidityPotential In selected Sits in the -coastal zon of Volta selon. .It "areceisnded that a pilot project be established to 4etemin the feasbiityof braci water a tand advise prosptive fish fammers.

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AM S - RURAL ZSFU

1. The objective of Includg 1ma rural infrstuxal dopmo et in VORADS?vas to faclitate the achievement of the basic proj ct &al of mproving thewelfare and standards of living of the faming population.

2. The itrastructural components identied a necessary for attalningPtoject objectives ere:

rehabLIttation and racontructon of Fam Access Ad Feeder loads.

-mpovemen: of domestic water supply through borehole/wal tdrilUg.

lprovision of housing and office buildixg facilities for Project Stafftbrough new construction and rehabilitation of existing Ministry ofAgriculture buildlngs

- Jassessmet of smell scale irrigation potential and plaing for settingup pilot irrigation schems.

The CivUi & echanIcal Engineering Serices Depaxtment

3. In order to carry out the functions lited abav4, a Civil t-lnierlnDivision Was to be created. Together vith th bonicalngServices Depar_ent (which wa to be improved and upgraded), the CEngineeringDIvison mm to be responsiblo for the plannin and eecution- ofactivites amed at achieving goal st out In the 1980 SAR.

4. The tim required to establsh -such A deparnnt (hitherto non-existentIn the In-.stry) -w probably unde estimted. The Expatriate Engier whowas to set the division up did not arrive untl March 1982. e tt ofstaff then statd and the staff position as at the enA of 1983 (just beforethe mid-ter view) was 39 vith 61 vacancies.

S. Uhen the Review Mision arrived in Januay 198U therefore, no actualconstructio worzk had started in the dLvision, aldtough some pr oVwoaf had bee carrid out. The Mision revised the origil targts st and

epared scedules to be folloed In the construction. A review ofactivites (compnent by component) togther wlth ton of planningprocedures and evaluation of and Impact ow follows.

ROA8

Rewiew of ActivLtie

6. Mme 1980 S*3 specified roadworlu to be cari1ed out in two pas.

Voz to be carried out by Force Accout.

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* works to be carried out by Contract usin M as exeentig Agency.

7. The Civil Engineerig Depatment was to Identify roads to berebablitated, arrange for contracts to be avarded for works as above,arrange for the prour t of construction equipmet for we on roads asabove and carry out the works.

8. By Januazy 1984 no constrction bad started, but the followngactivties had been carried out:

- Ldentification of links to be rehabilitated.

revi.s.ou of rod standrds expcted.

prepartion of tender documents for the purase of rod constructionequipment through ICB.

9. The construction equipment ordered La 1984 arrived In May 1985 and workstarted a mouth later. Roadwork- in the Cntral and Southern Zone wereaore convenient for the department to cary out as this simplifiedsupervsion and Central Workshop support. One hundred and forty *eght km offedor roads hav so far been rehabilltated and another 291 km maintained byforce account.

10. Roads In the Northern zone were identified as beizg In wmu worseconditio than thos In the Central and Southern Zo. In December 1986,a Consultancy Agement wa signd vith Zocks Cault MI to aes theeconomic feasibility of the rehabilitaton and of some 150 In oftrunk roads and 300 kI feder roads in the lorthernZoe. bi ibeaslbilityreort was to be completed by the ed of January Z987 so tat contractdocuments could be prepard for contracts to be mawd by 30th April 1987.Execution of contract works*wa scheduled frm 1.6.87. to complete not laterthan 31.3.88. Thes tig*t schedule ver aimd at esring coopletIonbefore VORADV closed at the end of 1987.

-x!rM PLAQX PRNOCZDS

oad CosJtction by Iorce Accout

11. ConSidering that the Ministry " it oeited before the Projet did nothave road construction as a function (and therfore dd not have a rodconstruction unit), the Project undoubtedly set its a diffLiclttask. The dela in establisbing t'. unit, lead1 ng to delays in comncementof construction activitie, is a pointer to this fat.

12. Cnntionplannin proceduras for wvrdk of this nature (viz trafficsurveys to determine priorities , enginering urveysd estimas ofquantities of work, ete.) wre not strictly adher"d to owing to thelimitation in tim available. Instead, a visual xemintion and an inventoryof roads In the entral and southern zones werecrrd out to fors idea

sbouescope of work. One major construction gang was fotod to tart

* - 101-

coSuction. OVA Site formen was contantIly kept at lto whilst a moblleworkshop van with 3 inchaics took cars of mnor repairs and .aintence.

13. It was not posible to spUt the gag (or form a sead gag) at thestart because of problems with suerision ad co.oudlation. Hovewr. asecond (minor) gang was later formed wfhen 2 new graders axrived to cary outre-grading anA other maintenane activities on road that did not ned major

__ro et.

14. On-site planing for coanstction wold sptato (unr thecirmtacs) as lon as records were kept on labou, plant (icluding FOG)nd mterial oswt that wat Into work carrid out, as long as

supervision by a cometent enginer wa regua. Whilst It my appearhee to carr out work by force accot, the absen of clely defind

limits ad tagts for carrying out the works may leA to exceses in samsareas and iaeUaiS In otbers.

load Construction on Contract

15. Sh roadworks n i the feasibility sty by o Conut,M vetre award to prequalified contractors throug locl comptitive

bidding (LCI) in five lots. A total of 218 km of feeder roads and 541 km oftruk roads ware given out on contract for a contract am of Ce" 567.94millio plus a foreign component of US $ 4.19 million. Four of theoa swre due to co ce on 12.10.87 nd be completed in April, 1988

wilst the fifth contract was to stxt on 15.12.87 and be completed in Ray1988. In all ases, the Engineer;. relprsenative was locks Consult GM,Cbusultig hn s. Apart fm the ratra sboxt tim allwe forPraton of the feaibility report, all other activities andspas veto standad'and clear. and suld not be a problm for ayof te contractors to follow.

16. It is e3peted that the t of Feeder ldso (l) i the Voltaleg*o wLl tak over the of th roads st y ORA.Mm sucess of the road project wl depend on the ofth roads. *very effort mut be made to ensure that MR carries out thfunction effectively.

c e and mpact of loaduorks

17. The achevements made in rad constrtion, In relatioa to targets set,are shon in Table 2. When all contracts are evetally comleted, theproject would have rehablitated a total of 657 1a of feeder roads ad 541kh of trunk roads.

18. The roads on cotract In the Northern Znw ae at variou stages ofcompleti. novever, ilst two of the coe rtors re likly to completethdir coutracts oan scedule (i.e Api 1988), th remal_ing thre may nedup to the end of the year to comWlet thoir assigment.

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19. The effectiveness and impact of the road programm can be dterminedbetter through a comparison between pre-constructton traffic survey resultsand post-cOUStruction survey results. As mntioned *1rate however. no suchpre-construction traffic survys wore carrid out on the roads constructedby force account. One post-constructLon survey has ben carried out on theHo-Vodz -Sokode feoder road, although no qualification of impact can bemade on the ono survey alone. Although quantified impacts cannot be quotedfor the 'Force Account' roads. the response from villagers livLng long theroads Is a definite commndation of the program.

20. In the case of roads constructed by contract, pre-constructlon trafficsurys were carried out In the assessment of the roads. It will besubsequently possible therefore to determine mor precisely traffic'generated by improvemnt and hnome a measure of the bonfits of theprogramm. The .mpact of increased use of the road ls, no doubt, bettercommunications and In particular easy access to farms and markets.

CONS$RUCTION OF BUILDINGS AND HRUSING

ReGVew of ActIvitis

21. The provision of bousimng and offlce buildlngs for Projectstaff was identified * an *mportant requirement for achieving Projectobjectives. This was In recognition of the acute shortage of residentialaccomodation In the region (par tcularly in the outlying are). Originaltargets set for Buildings and Housing are included in Tables 3, 4, 5 & 6.

22. The building and housing programm. goi off to a slow start for a nu6arof reaons, the principal ones beng:

tim taken to establish the Clvil Engineeri8 d parment.

- ^reviws in the dsign and costing of structures

scarcity of building materias.

From project yea 1 (1981/82) up to the mid-term review (1984), progrss inthe building component was unsatisfactory, the only achiev nt being

- c commement of work on central vorkshop.

b commencemet of work on a 9-office exteunon zo the exsting RDAoffices in Ho

- contacti ng of housing/bulding designs (includig FSCs) to consultingArchitects r in Acca.

23. Mm Hid-ter Review Mission, considering the lmitations In tim andmaney revised the targts. Details of the revised targets are icluded inTables 3, 4, 5 & 6. The revision cut the original housing progr_ame by 50%and spcified 200t capcity FSCs for village use and 800t capacity for

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Distriet centres & program. was prepared to be followed La thconstruction work.

24. Threo alterative modes of construction were specified for the works:

- constrution by forc account (for Regional office buildi)

¢construction by local cotractors (for central workshop, zonal offices,FASCON HQ and Ditrictl Centre ISCS).

- construction by "Labour Only* contracts (for village FSCs, KpvoeResearch Centre, building renoations, stff bousing).

25. Wo-k on the Regional Office buildint progressed fairly satisfactorily.After re-costing In 1984, the first block was finished and occupied at theend of 1983. The second 9-office blck requested at the review was how rnot constructed.

26. Part of the central workshop was continued by a local contractor whilstsome part (mainly the part occupied by the Civil Engineers) was contined byforce account. The precise cost of work carried out by force account basnot been estimated by the Project. All work on the central workshop wascompleted in 1986. No attempt was made to cae out any work on the FASCO0HQ. Thls iem is still outstadin but no progra_e ha been planed forits constuction.

27. The seven-800t Distxrct cente nce have also not been constrcte.However, following the rejotoln of the Architect's designs for FSCs

arlier, the project's e ut prere depsin for the villagliC. in 1985. Te e opend in 1986 ad contracts for theconstruction of 30 villag FSCs were awarded to -nine diffrentcontractors * otl labour only' contracts.

:28. Work oan al 30 village 13Cc as. started in May 1986 ad finished by theend of 1986. A seond phaxe aimd at constructing 4 more village iCstarted in July 1987 ed ar all no virtually completed. In additio twostore with a shed were built at two research stations by force accout.Three worksops wee bullt at Jasikn, Kete-rachi ad Vasbai by forceaccount. All thre were built betwe Jun ad August, 1987. Three xonloffices sebdwuled to.be buit were not constructed.

29. After sevral reviws In deigp for the VOWRDEP ousing project, theCivil Enginering Deparet adapted the VIA Akus township drwing andrequested th lank to proceed with ICB for the construction contract. Asaoand Boekys and Partnes, consulting Engineers & Architects more appointed toprepare contract documets for the buildingp. T State ConstuctianCorporation (SCC) vwn te cotract and started wrk on 2.3.87. Work On themain structue was completed on 16.2.88. Water supply and electricitysupply to the VOIWA townsiLp is currently being contrcted. Althugh laxw1bas bee acquired for buidtg in tho districts, no new housing has beebuit.

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zomntary an Ilameis Procedres for Buildings

30. Unlike components lie Toads, etenion etc. which were amd atbonefUtting te smllholder farnrs, the buildong and hosing projects wereto facilitate iaplementation by catering for project staff. It wastherefore necssay to intesify efforts to get housing projoets complte atthe earliest possible tim. Unfortunately, sevral hanicaps (mentioned inthe introd on to this annex) were allowed to delay construction to theextent that the houing project ha oly just been finished.

Construction by Forwe Accoet

31. iuilding rehabilitated by force accoumt included offlces ad senior andjunior staff houes located in five of the regio's nine diricts. Inaddit&.on, som major buildin contrution such as the nine-office block atHo was carried out by force account. The Identification of structuresneeding the attention of the Unit ha" been through project maagemnt.Satimtes for materials required were made nd the materal purchased from

project funds. It was not always poss1ble to put a pric on som jobscarried out in this matter. An effective accounting system Is required ifsuch work Is to beocarried out by force account.

Constrctio by Contract

32. Contracts for buildings were flabour only contracts. The projectpurchased al materil. required and supplied to the contractor as nd whenrequired. Ts completIon of villag FSCs and staff houin withIn arelatively short period of tlim is an indlcation of the effectiveness of tboprocedure.

Achieemt and zmpt

33. The achive made In building, In relation to the origial and-revised targets, are tabulated In tables 3, 4, 5 & 6. With the exception ofthe senor staff and ntrm te4 staff housing, in which the Projectacheoved 100 and 83% success respectively, a larg proportion of thetargets set wer not achieved. tOnly 15% of the targted 100 junior staffbouses have been built, and neither the FASCON Regional Headquarters nor theDistrict centre PICs (800t capcilty) were built. The 3 Zonal offices hvealso not been built.

34. Although the Project made mlpressive achim nts in building 9 seniorstaff and 20 iermediate lev houses, thes have com right. at the -end ofthe Project. Staff cannot be "id to have beeflted from the housingscheme to date, although it Is a useful Investment for the future. On theother hand, the 50 achievement in bullding a reg0nal offic block basreduced pressure on oifice space since its completiou in 1984.

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35. The failure to build a headquarters for FASO and District ceontre FSCsdoes not apper to have seriously affected the operation of FASCOM. Thirtyvillag FSCs completed in 1987 are already in use and have improved thedistribution of farm inputs in their area. Four more have been completedIn MSarh 1986 and re expected to be put to use shortly. Moreover, thecompletion of the Central workshop at No and the three zonal workshops inJasikan, Sogakope ad Kate-Krachi, bve afforded the Project's *echanical

Services Department better facilities for carrying out its functions.

UAT SUPPLY

Review of Activities

36. The original SAR suggested the Installation of 10 boreholes ofapproxmately 20cm (81) diLamter and 75 metres (250') depth, each yieldLng

about 40 cubic metres/day and supplying 800-1000 persons. Each wellwas to be equipped with a submersible pump, an elevated storage tank of 15cubic metres capacity and a modest distributLon system. Installation andmaintenanc was to be the responsibility of CWSC. No suggestions were madeabout the distribution of the boreholes but residential are" for Projectstaff. breeding fatms and the Adidome Training Centre were to benfit fromthe exercise.

37. By Janury 1984, no construction bad started though the project staff(uSnlg existing data and satellit photography) had located suitable ares,

inly. in the north. TU Review mission took advantag of a well drillingprograme that hd just ended in the region (financed by German aid) toevtIse the originally set for the water supply programs. Ittreuested Project staf to contact the German coactot, fffoug SC,.to costrut about 5040 borveole in the northern area, fitted with Indianhandpumps of robust end simple costructLon..

38. Tovwrds the end of 1984 the contract for 100 band pump wells in 87specified vilages ws signed. Sy the end of 1985, 155 boreholes had beendrilled out of ubich 107 re successful wls. There were 66 wells in thenrth. 25 La the cetre ad 16 in the south of the region. Funds becameavailable for furtbor drlling and another coatract for 120 wells (later*itt_ to 128) was signed as before. This second phas* was constructedbetwee 12th Septuer 1986 and 4th March 1987. A total of 207 borebolesresultiag In 139 sucessful wels were drilled.

39. Th supervision NIssiou Aide- oeire of 1986 requested that everyeffort be made to get tUIC to agr to take over the minteac of all 246wells. Several comnsltativemeetings and discussions have taken plaebetmeen VORADEP and GISC on the handing over. A formal letter requesting.GMac to take ver ha bean written and a reply is yet to be received.

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Com etay on PlSAng Procedues for Water Suly

40. The tl.=*Iy revisiou of specifiatione to take advatageof the presenceof the well drilling contractors In the regio at h time is commendable.The use of robust hand pups should prove mar suitable (and cot offective)than the origin&l Idea of using diesel engine pumps.

41. Wheres the direct of VOAD in the Implo of the&al water supply programme my have yielded quick results, this could be

at the expens of a regur t programme to keep the wells proporlysoezice. The org l rque was for &.guarantee from GWSC to acceptresponsibility for maintaining wells drilled by VORDP. Depite originllygiving tis guarante, it appar GVSC my treat the VOAEP eLls With lesurgeny -than their own drlled vells.

42. Selection of well location was to be based on geophysical studies andoan population dsNity. However, the drilling progamme was implametedwithout geophysical studies being carried out. Insted, villag and townswere selectd on the following basis:

- popultion

- availability of alteative sources (eg rivers & strems)

GWSCs programe for extending supplies In tb futur.

Thoe actual location of th drilLin operation vithin a "lcted vilg wabasd on the experite of the drillng crew In site eletion.

43. The proedre prove quit su ful ecpt that It resuted In a hi gpercentage of unsuccesful wells drilld In the south (the undeinggeologcal o tios in the south hav liaited potetil for ground waterdeveopment). In the north, howr, where tbs underlying geologicaformations have present a greater potental for groundwater devlopmnt, thesucce"s rate wa muvh bhihr.

Achievmen ad Z.pact

44. In all, the project drilled 246 successful well in the rogion. Thisfiguni is more than 50t of the wells drilled In th same regon by GVSCunder German aid during the same period of tim. Out of the total 246successful wells, 205 were In the North, 29 In the Central and 12 In theSouth. Table I shows a brekdown of wells iLn the regio by ditrict and byagency responsible for theit impletatio. The table sows that In allthe VOSADP rural water supply prograe is re_Spoble for 34% of allexistin hand pup wells In the region (GUSC is responsible for 44). Inthe Northern section of the region, VODEP wells accout for 78% of thosecurrtly eisting there. It is vorth noting that the byVODEP still leaves a deficit of about 1,641 wells needd In Ste region.

-107-

45. The lapct that a rural water supply progras way haveon thopopulation is varied. Som Lidicators are

- impronemct ain health.

- redction La populatlon drift to the urban araw.

- btter Incentives for qualified personnel to worl La the rwal area(e.g. techers, extension staff, health persouml. *to)

- increase in agricultural productivity.

- encouragemt of rural Industrie.

ased oan the contribution made to rural water supply in the region, (Table 1),VORDEP ca claim 32% of whatevr postive impact the wells In th regionmay have an the local population.

CENTRAL tO35P AND VUICLE OPRATIONS

Revie of Activities

46. Th Central Workshop provides an essential support service not ooly tothe Civil Engineering Divisio but also to all Divisios of the Project,IenludIng FASCOE. Mm faixty larg fle of roject vehicle and th hevycostrxution equipment envisaed for road cottio cal for anefficient workshop with ad"uate and well potected premses for itsoperation. m Cenral Workshop at Nb was quits well devloped La terms ofequpment at the Ae of the reviw. The main tasks require were:

* transfer to nev Central Workshop bulding

tesat of xons1 workshps

- tools and eqipmet to be purchase for onal workshp

* Institution of managemt controls of vehcle usgep

* institution of Methods of moitoring operating oSts -of ehicles and

Further, the canks Aidebleoire of October 1986 require that 31 vehielepurchasd In 1981 should be disoed of by Slat Deceer, 1986 folowinggovernment -V.

- 108 -

Achievm and lmpact

47. The whole of the N chanloal Services Division with mostechanical spre pas moved to the completed workshop in 1986. There

ave howver. soa apart parts stores still in the premises of the Begioaloffice. A new workshop was, established In Jasikan, a smller on in Krachtad the Sogpe workshop rehailLtated for uxe as zonal workshops. All3 shops are nov operatioml. Tools and tool boxes ordzerd Ln 1985 arrivedin 1986. These hve been issued to the various workshops and mechaics.

48. Steps have been taken to control misuse of vehicles an also to mntorvehicl"e operating costs for each project vehicle. Elghteen projoet vehiclswere auctioned Ln December 1986. Since then, twenty other vehicles bave beenboarded and arrangeents are being made to auction them. In addition, aboutthlity-one MA vehiles and tractors have been boarded for auctionig.

49. The Central Workshop and Mechanical Services Division hav not had toomay problems in achieving objectives. Co-ordination betwoen thedivision and the Civil Engineering Division has boon enhanced by theircoinn location. The Division has assisted farmers in clearing fauland(about 160 Ha between 1984 & 1988) and constructitng dugouts (a total of 9).Revenue from these services has been paid into Project accounts. With astrong management, the Division could increao its oquipmet to be able tooffer machanical services to farmers and the geeral public on a comercialbasis, although in the past attempts by Coverneant institutions to providecomerc al services have proved unsuccesful.

Reviv of Activitie

50. The 1980 LSR said thet although th poteqtla for sma11 scal Irrigatedagriculture existed In many ares of the region, thero wsJ lack ofinformaion on data relating to dams, dugouts, streams and lake shores.

Facilitles were to be provided for data colection in hydrology,agrmateorolooag ad agronomy for preparing a along ter irrigationdevlopment plan for the region. Ten small pilot irrigation schemes (20-30 Ha each) were to be etabliLse, based on the results of theInvestigations. The Project was to concetrat on pilot schmes, levingexisting schemes to th Irrigation Dvelopment Authority. DurIng the firstthree years of the project, the Itrigtion Division carited out most of theessential responsibilLtiS assignd to It. HMteorologieal and surfccrater hydrology data had been collected for Todsie and Alakpa rivor basns.Seve pilot irrigation project site had. been idetified and deslgn m Inprogress.

51. At Leview (1984) the reo adndation md for the divisol vere :

00to coimplete surveys and 8ngineering desi for the sen siteidentified.

- 109 -

- to construct ad suprvise the operation of Keylm, Dausnki or y4etoe,ad Vskpo sites aver a 3-yer period.

52. Only one site wa to be under construction at ay one tim and onlyminimal eartmoving was to be carried out using one graer from the roadsgag. Proision hd beelm made for purchsing a mll excavatr and a fAttruck. In general the section vas to awoid ploying contractors to cayout work but finance bad been includd for possible lettin of a smalllabour onlye contract, for buying materials, and for possible ring of

* m~achines.

53. Sins th review, the division hs coIpleted surveys and design for theseve idetified sites. ebabilitation of the feyim. dm is still

outstandig. Contract documnts for conetruction of the Vakpo pilot schemhave be preaed but the cost of delopmt w rather hg andconstruction has not taken place.

Coentazy on Plannsng Procedures for Irrigation

S4. The task of planning, designing, constructLng and operating anIrrigation schum is a long and oxpensive one. To xpect the irrigationdivision to establish 10-20 Ha pilot schemes within the project's six yearprogrse wa rather optimistic. *he Review mssion's target ofconstucting and operating thre (20 Ha) projects La thre years was equallyoptiaistic. Alhuwgh thed divisio did well la Its a m nt in plonningad suzveys. a lot sre pogFess could bav ben made it the relationspbetwen the VRUDIP and L ws mre carefuy plan at ithe ineption ofthe project to take full advutage of the experienc of the IrrigtionDevelopment Authority.

Achievement *an Impact

55. Th Irrigation divisinf ha collected relevnt data ed prepareddesigns for ase pilot sceumes in the region. Nowever, no rcl lpaet bhresulted s only preparatory work bhs been done. he deigns Prepared,shold be revieed with assistane from the ID to enable plans to be madefdM their implementation whnn funds become available.

*I51t1ll8ltl OF USJ II MtA 3iOU - gmtlose.

................... .......... ..... *....... ............ ............. .............. ............ ,,,.,,..................... ............... .......... .....sla1 *tUC I aUIiOmS UaiS (now 19") 0 TOTAL 4 0I IOTIL

am btUl_c IIlt .c. c W6ae L a EOIU* †† in:Iin:~~~~~~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~ ;1*Ut :' ' 19G so " 1105 .los 096J0....... ... .......... .... .............. .... .................. ............. ........ ... ........ .............. ...... . ... ........ .. ........... ....... ..............FACII 1401,00200 to ' 14 .I.t Is 23 3611 lMUrA 79,647 IGO .I 6s " IsJASIK 1A ,4U0 21 )9 .1 .0 69 124 50

......... ........... . ............... ................... ...... ... 0...... ......... ........... .......... ........ ............. . ........llollMB 127,249 255 131 2 11 5 13 Us I s.onm NfMAI C6.06,3 214 10t i 6 sO 1" tO I1"9.04 114 16 la. " 2. .............. .......... . ................ . ............. . -........ .......... ........... .. ........ ......... ..... ........ ......--AMi 110,510 221 is . .IS 3 1soGAmO 115.16 2S . 11 . 4 4 1i 21 22597 *54 . 12 . . 1I~~~~~~~................ .............. .......... ...... ........ ......... ........... ........ .. ........ . 0 ..............tlau lYTo 1.201,095 2,4" U3 1O .31 so 246 n7 20............... ............ 0.......... ..... ........ ... ........... ......... . ............. ..... ........ :OM satiouns to Wm" on a Cott* of M venom pw U.Iaa oclm* t_o* 1 oedo a t tlo of 5OO psiss ps i1 .ell

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........ .. ......... ...... ......... ............. ......... ........ ... ........ ..... ......... ... ........ ...... ...... ......... ..... ... .. ...... I... ....... ...... ... ...... .............. ......

.4nS go; . it OCt .S .o . .S . St(St) U

1......... ..... :....... ....... ........ ........ ......... . ....... ....... ........ ......... ........ ...... ........ ......... .... ............

1;........ .... .... ..... ..... ..... ;......... .... , . ..... ........ ... ...... ... ...... ..... ... .... ........ .. ...... ...... ....... ... ..... ... ..... ........ .... .... .4 St 009 9c Oct cW . * ( o.st)

...... ........ ... ...... ... ............. ........ .... *..... ......... .... ..... ..... ..... .. I ...... .... ........ ... ........ .. ..... ...... .... ....... .... ........ ............

. . . *_ in s a. . . (tet).. ......... ......... ....... ............ ........... _ ......... ............ ....... ..... ...... .... .... ........ ........ ... ...... ...... .......... ... ... . ......... .... ........ ......

* 1u)W tlAo3 1UUISI3O I t3OW pS6~t t 'i X"| 1 tumaw ,Mtu" tW"qlti@ I Um 9 tulip~~~~~~~~~~~~.... .. ................. ................... ........ ....... ... . ,....... 't' ...... ....... ......... ......... .. ..... J6.. ...... ............ .... ........ ............

sauiet n mY U53Y2.UNIAI:WY UWUN aMOMMoW anm-a auMuMA * Smwa.................. ............... ....... ............... .. ...... ... ,........... .-................ .............. ........ .............. ..... .............. * .......... -

woo -I as -OM O am llt Irn gm -pV OloOlit Wm ui1u.3Samon"am sUls" WmJ UUSiRU a UUIUIM $Maq no IN aS UDIIU .11310 . iS iMirUu..................................... ............... ............................................... ............................................ ................................. .......... I

(saamtl* )__G.~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ * ._haa uW

9..

VOLTA RBOWN ACRICULEJL DEVELOPMENT MOJEC.DOUSING 1M . TAGETS AND ACHIEVIENTS

35101 STA8IN NUIM I.NTWIIDAIT LIEVEL tlANDE LESEL........... .... .............. .. ........... .... ............. .. _...... . .. ..... .... .......

uTAENT ACUhRVrt TAROE ACEVMe TAlRET AMMNT......... ... ; ......... ... .. : ..... . ........ ............ ........ .. .... * .......... ... ..... ..... .... ...........

original Svisd ctual I Otlgil Revisod Actual * Original evised Actual I..... ............ ....... ...... ...... ** -r*----*----- *9v '**}-. ............ ... ........ ...... ....... ... ........ ...... ..... ...........

(1902) 15 . 22 ...... ........ o...* ........ .... ....... . .... ... ........ ........... ... ........ ....... . F._........ ... ......... ... ..........

(1963) . . 26 . 20 .

..... ..... .......... ......... ...... .... ... .. ....... .. ;.. ......... ....... W............ . ..... _.4.

4(1965) . 5 . .I 4 . 70 .7.......... ..... o...........d ......... ... ...... ..... .............. ..

!4 (1935) . 6 . .. . . .0 13 ..... .. .......... ... ...... .......... oo. .... ........ ... )...... . . F........ .... .......... - . ...........

!f (9") . . . 6 is1 ..... ~~~~~..... ................. . ...... . .... ...... ....... ............ . 0 ........ .......... ...........

m (1987) . . . 14 . 44........ ....... ....... ...... ......... ..... ........ .. ..... ....... ....... ......... ..... ............. .... W.-. ....... .... 11 (1988) . . 9 100% t.. . 20 83 . 15 15%

..... ....... ..

TOAL t 9 9 100% 4 24 20 63% 200 100 15 15%

TUU 3, ~~~~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~ m inin inin~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

VOLTA 3300WAIOSI UlI1L MVO9U FIIOJRCT. ALAM Wit 5I111 13 1 - mUe mm AaltC unE

...............,.............. ....... ................................. ............................................. ...................................... I0AL HEAUMRS DImiCT pasI SERVICII CUTRB VItlAGS tARM Sawi Cz MM........... . . .. ...... ............ ..........

TARNT AOItRVIII TAROt? AClIlVlUMl TARO"t ACRIEVENTt.......... ... ......... ... ......... ........ ..... ... ........ .... ....... ........ ... .. . ......... ........ ... ..... ....... Originl RevIsed Actual S igial. Revised Actual S Originl Revised Actual *.......... .t..*..*. .......... ....... ..... .... . ....... * ...... .... .......... .. O.. .. ...... .. ... . .(1982) start . . 5 Is.............. .. I......o ...... .. . . ..... ..... .. 0. .. ... ........ a ... ... ........ .......!t2 (193) . . . . * 42...... .... .. ,......... ....... .. 0 .... ...... ,.... ..... .. ..... ...... . .... .... ,,. ......... . ........ . .... .. ... .(19") coplet . . . . .. .. ...... ... .. .. .. .... .. .. .. . .. .. . .. ... .. ... . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. . .. .. .. .. ..... . .. .. .... . . .. .. ... . ....... .. .. .. .4(1985) strt . .. 4 . 9

...........~~~~~~~~- .... o ........ ... ...... ..... o... . ..... ..... . .. ........ . ... o...... ... *,... ..........5(1986) . 3 s. 1. .......... ... ....... .... .... o........ ..... ......... ......... ........ .... ..... I... ......... ....... o. .......6 (197) Coiet . . . 25 30.._......... ...... ........ .. ... ......::: . ........ ...... . .... .......... .... -...... ... ....... 00. .......T7 (1988) . . , 4..

TOTAL I 1. . O% 5 7 0% S7 52 34 455... ................ **...... . ..... .. ... . a... ....... .b....... S ............. ......... ...a .... ......... ....... ... ........a.... ........................... .......

* Two ses with stotr were also built at2 reswa station.

.TAS 4

a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~san

-~ -to - -t - - - -

1n33U j I .:gyw to tI r ,,vz.oz........ ............ .. .......... ... ........ ... ... ......... .. ........ .. ......... .. .. ,...... . ...... .......... .. .......... ... ..........

....... ......... ..... ...... . .. ......... .. ........ . ........ . ...... . ; ..... 0....... ....... . ........ ... ........ . ............

. . . * . . .. .O 9........... ........ ........ ........... ....... ...... . .... ... ......... ... ...................

t133U . a . a . (olol) ..... ....... ...... ....... ............. .......... ............ ........ ... ..........

I t ~~ a(sest)

........ .......... l........ ......... ................. . . .. .. 1 ..

<^;*......... ........... ...... ......... .. ........ .......... ......... ....... ....... ......... ........ ... .... ............

l~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~ ~~~~~~ . a .,(s1 oci6) t....... .. ......... ... ...... .. ........... ................ ...... .. ... ..... * ........ ....... .. ..... .. .......... ............

, . . . . . (C j) W.. ........... .......... .......... ....... ... ....... ........ ... . ..%k 1w03v p.wl&" twolh1 I 1mvw pooP". 131 I 13O3 u51TAU 'IP....... . ........... .. .......... .... ......... .......... .. ...... ......... ... ...... . ..... . .. ... . -- ......----....---.......

* 1t _ t"Pta * tt t^ * lw^t _ t"Ptaao

........-............. .......... .......... .... ............. .................. ............... ......O........................... ,,,,,,,,,.... - --.................... ............................ ................ ................... ...........

Imtw jmwm m

VOLTA REGION ACRICULTtJRAL DEVKWLPENT PROJECT.

BUILDING KAINTEUMCE IPROGRMO - TARGETS AND ACHIEVEKENTS.

0o1M am auiWING ADIDOKE FIAR INSTITUTE KEVE RESLARCH cuErn.. ......... ..... r-.....%................... ...... ......... ... _.......... ............. .... .............. .............

TARSGT ACHt!YhIENT TA¢RT CNIiVBNENT TARGET CIEVEKENtl...... ................ ......... ...... ....... ..... .... I............ ..... ............. ........... ........ .... .. ....... ............. .......... ..... .

Original vwised Actual % OrLginal Revisd Actual 4 rlginal Revised Actual *............ ...... ........... ....... .. _. ..... ... .. * ........ ..... ........... .. ..... ... ....... .... ........ . ...... ... ..

Pm. (1982) start complete not otstarted ncluded

............ ..... ........... ..... ......... ... .. ..... .. ... .. ......... ... ,.4... ... ; .... ........ ........ ... ....... ... ..

Y2 (1983)

............ ........ ........... ........ ......... ...... ...... .... .... ........... ...... ........ ..... .......... .......... .............. .........

py3 (1984) complete

............ ... 7... ........... ...... ........ .... ....... ... .... .......... .......... ......... ..... .... ........ ... ........ ....... ...

PY4 (1985) Start .band. start

. .. .. .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. .. ... . . .: . .. .. .. . .. . . .. .:.. .. ... . . . . .. .. .. . .. . . .. . . .. . ..... .. ..... .. .... .. ..

PYS (1986) 6 U a

..***....... .*.... ** *.*. *** t-*e-*-..................... .......... .. .... ..... .... ................... ........ .. . **.*...... .*.. . . .*. .w.v. .*

PY6 (1987) ouplete . coploet

............ ............ .......... ......... ...... ............ ...... .... .. ......... ..... ........ ....... .......... ....... .... ................ .........

pY7 (1988)

............ .... ....... ....... .... ... ......... ........ .... ...... .... ........ .......... ....... ....

TAL complete substant ally to c . . cooplot not

unspecifi complete complote couplet.no.

-~~~~~~~~TWd 6

Table 7

INFAMtUCUR CLASS ACUIEVENRT TOTAL COST COST/(11T c million a million

Staff houing 9 senior )20 lnternodito. ) 415.6415 lovoe level. )

................... ....................... ......... ................ .......Village 8C5 34 58.51 1.72

2 Shods 1.20 0.60................ 7..... ........ ............... ........................................

Regional Office I 2.93 2.93WILDIMGS block

................... ............. - ...................... ................ ...Control Workshop 1 16.70 16.70........... .................... . ............. ,................ .......Zosl Workshop 3 9.13 3.04.................... .......... ..... ............... ....................... .... .^BuLlding Of f . senior . )mairt_nance staff bmgaowsl )

0 julor staff )16.u.bonse In North a )Control Zones )

v*- r_- _ * _ ^^ * ................................................. . ..............................

aods o Contract 218 km feeder )567.94 pl.s541 trunk )US # 4.19 mtion

................................. I ..................... .......................... . ._............... .Roaod by forco 103 km 31.42 0.31account

....... ;.;.......e.... .......... .-...... .....- ................ ........RO*0 Me roads forc 45 43.52 0.97

................... ......................-.-. ............. ................. ....Road strtuets 38.65by force account. . .. .. .. ... . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. . .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ........

Road mintenaneo 291 km 9.40 0.03........... ............. ................... ................. ,,,,,,......... ....................... ................... .......

Nanad pump w11s 246 OH S.5 millin ON 22.646........ ......... ;; ............... ................. * ... ................... ...............

WATSR SWL Sater supply to 0.31SYSTEM AdLdoes PigU I

................ ,....................... .................. ..................... ..................... dWater tank at I 0.96Valkpo

......... .......................... .......................-- ----. 0 0 ------------------BRRlCTIOtl Agro.aeteorological 5 0 .70stations

................ .................. ................... ....................... ....................... ......................................... ......

- 117 -

ANNEXE 6 - MONIZTORING AND EVALUAT'ON

1. The Monitoring and Evaluation Department Is vell establishedunder VORADEP and has been functionLng since dbe inception of theproject in 1982. Tho Department has mad a major conttibution toproject administration.

2. Unusually for such a unit, the ewphasis of its work has been an themonitoring function; consequently a relatively woll developed reporting(quarterly, annual etc) system exists within the project, but-data (fromsurveys and studies) on the Impact of the project an the tarzet populationis relatively scarce. This is particularly apparent when attempting anevaluation of the project. Field surveys and studios undertaken (and whichthorefore constitute the data base available to project staff) comprise thefollowing; Pre-test survey 1982, Contact Farmer survey 1982 and 1984,Baseline survey 1984, Msaiz Yield survey 1985, Farm Service Centre survey19SS, Extension Impact survey 1987, Road and Traffic surveys 1985, TractorDemand Assessment study 1985, Market Price Surveys 1982 - 1987.

3. Ideally, the unit should have collected a consistent data set from FY.of the project through to PY5/7, so that changes in major variablesaffecting the welfare of target farm families could be identified andma&suread. As can be seen from the foregoing, this is not the case. What hasbeen oompleted LA a set of sutveys on different topics (baseline, contactfarmar, traffic volume, maize yield surveys etc) undertaken at differenttimes and for different purposes than project evaluation. The overall dataset availab1; at the project suffers as a result; the gaps in the data sethave been idencified in the past.

4. The noed for a framovork of surveys to be developed in the future withwhich to collect data to evaluate the suecess or otherwise of VORADEP is asimportant as ever. Although the major part of the incremental Lnvestment hasnow been undertaken, benefits are assumed and expected to flow until PY25.Consequently, there is a need for continueud montoring to measure whetherthose benefits are accruing, and in what form. In particular it will be'important to measure the following key variables:

- yields of major crops grown by farmers who are identified as adapters,and cowa-rison with thoe of non-adopters;

- the characteristics of farmers who becoae adopters, su as to helpexplain the nature of the adoption process;

- the rate of adoption over time amongst all farmers (ie measuring thespeed of the diffusion process);

w - the ftnancUal consequances of adtption of new technology, and welfare,nutritional and social consequences of this;

- the extent of benefits from improved inftastructural facilities (roads,FSCs, borsholes) and changes in these over time; and

- 118 -

- the nature of benefits from the fisheries and livestock wnvescments.

5. As VORADEP is phased out and its functions probably dispersed amongptline ministries it will become more, rather than less, important for a unitto ¢ollect data about the continunag impact of the Project. The unit shouldbe in a position to ensure, by the provision of relevant information todecision-makers, that necessary investments are made to ensure contirningbenefits from VOaADEP. This is the case not only with respect to the obviousVORADEP components such as crop extension and input supply, but also theless obvious ones such as Snfrastructural investment and hoam extension. Inthis sense the unit should become a very useful tool in the process ofcomposite budgeting for the Region. As funds are available under thenational ASBP, a strong case exists for some of these resources to be usedto support E& on specific VORADEP-related activities.

6. Under the ASRP it is envisaged that M&E in the Region should prepareinformation on Regional agricultural production and consumption patterns,should collect market and other prices and provide an information base onwhich to formulate agricultural policy.

- 119 - ATTACHMENT IComments from the Mistry of Agriculture

M.A. Form 7In muSe . reply h MINISIRY OF AGRICULTURE

,*heq d VR 1'.0. BOX M. 374ty.. / . /'& i.I ACCRA

Your Ref. No REPUSUCOFGHANA ...........

Dear Sir.

RE: fhANA - VOLTA REGION AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENTPROJECT (CREDIT 1639 -- GHl) DRAFT PROJECT

COWPLETION REPORT

I acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 23rdFebruary. 1990 together with its enclosure on the above-mentioned subject which you forwarded to me among others.

2. 1 have studied the report and generally agree withit as contained in the evaluation summary. I however have Thiscomment to make at item 1I page VII of the report which point isconcerns the sustainability of the Project. The Ministry of includedAgriculture does not support the view that in order to ensure andcontinued focus on overall developments in the region amplified"VORADEC' or the Board ot Directors of VORADEP should be on inmaintained. Rather, In line with the decentralization para. 15programme of the Government. all agricultural activities in of thethe Volta Region should be implemented under the Jurisdiction Overview.of the PNDC Deputy Secretary for Agriculture as is thepractice in the other regions of the country. The overalldevelopment of the region including road construction.boreholes and water supply and maintenance as well as theprovision of other forms of infrastructure is theresponsibility of the Volta Regional Administration and theRegional Consultative Council.

Yours sincerely.

PNOC SECRETARY FOR AGRICULTURE(COMMODORE S.G. OBIMPEM) (RTD)

MR. GRAHAM DONALDSON,CHIEF AGRICULTURE, INFRASTRUCTURE &HUMAN RESOURCES DIVISION.

OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT,WORLD BANK,1818H STREET, N.W.WASHINGTON D.C. 26433,U.S.A.

cc: PMDC Secretary.Min. of Fin. & Econ. Plan..

Controller for Africa,I.F.A.D. (1 FAO).107 via del Serafico.00142 Rome,Italy.

PNDC Oep. Sec. for Agric..Ministry of Agriculture.Ho.

f ~~R E G I O N

n - /re < i~~~~~~~~~~ Eeth D-lPo aldto

B R O N G -A H A F O A-0 f- S" b( -' i-0sm x -11 < },-, s- - X S ; zu - BiA 0 F. &.o 5.

_ -_ -\ X \ Si J, ' ,L,',.,. 'v"(Dt, ia- s

R E G I O N N.- wio FE rp-K

.r . ~~~~~E A S T E R N -; AII-,A-KSh-A_ _

y (9) ~~~~~~~~~~~Pwp-dutC.-ILi. ewIrrig.N bHo-D-Pbi.,

O 10 20 30 K0F F:) ^>2.|o [oXo2oomcdo>v2eth Kr ct4 Off Mhor Scher

O 0 S O 5 20 25 )ZocrCtnrt

VOLTA URtETGION

DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (!!t >e,>,,o t:;, ''

LAND USE IN PROJECT AREA 0 , T OG O

N.Sx b->- ,,

v R *TO1=oGO is_so

COT N f LIP rAl,, s s - - -- ''--'- v_ Mm it (Rg0 ~ M s S x,,,

g ; 5 * o fl 0 < iq ' .2 6 : C f fii e r .n -E~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~6

N R T H E R N R E G I O N

GREAT SOItS GROUP) < fie C / FOREST ZONE

*; , y7 A >w:>2 / Ochrosol-Oxysol Inteegrades)/ ccj. 4 \ 2 - 1 - Lirhosols t

V 1 { ; D \ et C f t_ 1\ INTERIOR SAVANNAH ZONE

>1\ e . \ Z) Jn // I- i, ............ j, ,SSannch Ochtcsols- - ~~~~~Grondwate, Lote,ites and

B R O N G A Gr1undwte, Laterite -nOchdso

R E G I O N )- / ScannahBrenosols

COASTAL S ZONE- Sawannol, Ochio'sls

*...~ ~ "'~ Rgsowlic Genoundnarr LateritasTropical Black Earths

-:-, *. \ ._< . C4jj j Tropical Grey Earths

im ~~~~Acid GleisolsiL 5 < X r Sodium Vleisols

X \ > ? tJ < 7 \ 11 ~~~~~~~~~~~Savo.nah Lithaosob

A S H A N T I Jasikan LsNi j - - fl~~~~~~~~~~~~iorict Bec-d.ries

R E G I O N - Reglon Boundaries

> 9 / -*- 'nte,naionail Boundaries

~~~~E A S T E R/N . t X$

| _ X 0 , * * T O G 0

<fD, lp 27.. ,, . r _

KILOMETERS 0

MRtES

GHANAVOLTA REGIONAGRICULTURAL

DEVELOPMENT PROJECTSOILS IN PROJECT AREA

N. h... "

(Alh.-,

kw I

9.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ z

B U R K I NA F A S O

.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~' -pOR2 / mt t u p.8 p T R REG N.r~ : T p E A, S T.

U W E R T 2 .E G I ' ___________________

O1-HANA

* VOLTA REGIONAGRICULTURAL

'\z :>.>_ < zy / DEVELOPMEN PROJECT>. \\ IBRD AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS

N FoiewI HerdA,nm

.g. N O R T H Er Reho2i,tir n P

/oRtg b. _ Coco Petg

Rr ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~A.*/\. ..... -C. A;OS.51 hIR E G I 0 N MM _pe ieb Fi,snfo

U.',X .S ) v_ Proiect

Moegc. Road,uvtv

40~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

0~~~~~~~~~~~~

It A~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I

COCOAfO1- <

ESTATE ~~~~~~r I'

Kib K~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

w t: b E N~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..2.,2O~4

World Bank Document · C149.2S (1987); Completion Year Average (1988) - C1?8.57-iv - PROJECT...

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Transcript of World Bank Document · C149.2S (1987); Completion Year Average (1988) - C1?8.57-iv - PROJECT...