Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No: 20590

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT(CPL-36470; SCL-3647A; SCPM-3647S)

ON A

LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$6.0 MILLION

TO THE

KINGDOM OF MOROCCO

FOR AN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PROJECT

JUNE 22, 2000

Rural Development, Water and Environment DepartmentMiddle East and North Africa Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of theirofficial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective March 2000)

Currency Unit = Moroccan Dirham (MAD)0.098 MAD = US$ I

US$ 1 = 10.21 MAD

FISCAL YEARSince 1996: July 1 - June 30

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CAS Country Assistance StrategyCDF Country Development FrameworkCED Comptroller of Expenditure CommitmnentsEA Environmental AssessmentEMP Environmental Management ProjectEMS Environmental Management SystemsEU European UnionFY Fiscal YearGOM Government of MoroccolCB International Competitive BiddingICR Implementation Completion ReportMATEH Ministry of Land Development, Environment, Urbanism and HabitatMNA Middle East and North AfricaMOA Ministry of AgricultureMOI Ministry of the InteriorCNE National Environment Council (Conseil National de l'Environnement)NEAP National Environmental Action PlanNGO Non-Governmental OrganizationOED Operations Evaluation DepartmentPDES Economic and Social Development Plan (Plan de Developpement E~conomique et

Social)PR President ReportSGG Government General Secretariat (Secretariat General du Gouvernement)SEE State Secretariat for the Environment (Secretariat d'Etat de I 'Environnement)SSE Under-Secretariat for the Environmnent (Sous-Secretariat d'Etat de I'Environnement)

(SEE's predecessor)

Vice President: Jean-Louis SarbibCountry Manager/Director: Christian Delvoie

Sector Manager/Director: Salah DarghouthTask Team Leader/Task Manager: Nicole Glineur

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONTENTS

Page No.1. Project Data 1

2. Principal Performance Ratings 1

3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 1

4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 6

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 10

6. Sustainability 12

7. Bank and Borrower Performance 13

8. Lessons Learned 16

9. Partner Comments 17

10. Additional Information 26

Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 27

Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 28

Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 30

Annex 4. Bank Inputs 31

Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 33

Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 34

Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 35

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in theperformance of their official duties. Its contents may not be otherwise disclosed withoutWorld Bank authorization.

Project ID: P005504 Project Name: ENVIRONMENTALMANAGEMENT

Team Leader: Nicole Glineur TL Unit: MNSRE

ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: June 22, 2000

1. Project Data

Name: ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT L/C/TF Number: CPL-36470;SCL-3647A;SCPM-3647S

Country/Department: MOROCCO Region: Middle East and NorthAfrica Region

Sector/subsector: VI - Enviromnental Institutions

KEY DATESOriginal Revised/Actual

PCD: 12/05/91 Effective: 10/06/94Appraisal: 04/20/93 MTR: 06/06/97

Approval: 09/14/93 Closing: 12/31/98 12/31/99

Borrower/lImplementing Agency: KINGDOM OF MOROCCO/UNKNOWNOther Partners:

STAFF Current At AppraisalVice President: Jean-Louis Sarbib Caio Koch-Weser

Country Manager: Christian Delvoie Harinder KohliSector Manager: Salah Darghouth Anand Seth

Team Leader at ICR: Nicole Glineur Sherif Arif

ICR Primary Author: Harald Stier

2. Principal Performance Ratings

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactoxy, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=HighlyUnlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)

Outcome: U

Sustainability: L

Institutional Development Impact: M

Bank Performance: U

Borrower Performance: U

QAG (if available) ICRQuality at Entry: U

Project at Risk at Any Time: Yes

3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry

3.1 Original Objective:

An outline of a new Government policy on the enviromnent was presented in the National Report submitted

to the 1992 UNCED Conference and reflected a strong, yet new, commitment to protecting the enviromnent

with appropriate natural resource management and a minimization of pollution. At that time, in Morocco,there was a real vacuum in the legal and institutional framework in the environmental field andenvironmental questions had been handled by the Directorate of Environment and Urban Planning in theMinistry of Interior (MOI). With this new emphasis, a separate Under-Secretariat for the Environment(SSE) reporting directly to the MOI minister was created. To implement the Government policy, SSErequired to build up its technical capacity and operational procedures needed to be developed while at thesame time the overall institutional (both at central and local level) and legal framework for environmentalprotection had to be strengthened. At the Government's request, the Bank had the opportunity to assistMorocco in developing the regulatory and institutional framnework, formulating an environmental policyand developing appropriate economic and financial instruments to ensure the integration of effectiveenvironmental management into Morocco's micro and macro economic policies.

Hence, a technical assistance project was prepared with the following objective:

"to assist the Government in strengthening its institutional and regulatory framework for managingenvironmental protection. It is expected that the establishment of the needed environmental institutions andfull development of the necessary environmental laws would require a concerted and long term effortspanning many years. The project, representing the first step of such efforts, will define the elements forand initiate the process of strengthening the Government's environmental capacities."

The objective was in line with the 1993 Morocco Country Assistance Strategy. The project alsocomplemented other Bank-financed projects which relied on the enhanced capability of environmentalmanagement. The project was viewed as providing an impetus to shift the region's conceptual frameworktowards designing sustainable investment projects.

3.2 Revised Objective:N/A

3.3 Original Components:

The main project components as stated in the President's Report (PR) were:

(i) Strengthen the technical and administrative capacity of the Under-Secretariat of State forEnvironment (SSE) as the central environmental authority, the Ministries of Agriculture and Public Works,representing the sector ministries and the Wilaya (Province) of Fez representing the local government inorder to apply on a pilot basis the decentralized environmental management process.

(ii) Reactivate the National Council of the Environment (CNE) to oversee the environmental activitiesof the ministries.

(iii) Reinforce the legal and regulatory framework by reviewing and updating existing regulations,introducing the environmental impact assessment (EIA) as mandatory for new investment projects whichmay have potential adverse environmental impact and assisting in the preparation of two new laws: thepermit law for integrated pollution control and the chemicals and toxic wastes control law.

(iv) Design an enforcement and compliance mechanism for environmental protection through adoptionof the "command and control" approach based on norms and standards which were being developed withthe assistance of the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), for chemical uses and the "rollback" approach for point sources pollution. This component which was listed in the PR was financed with

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concessional aid and was not included in the legal agreement for the project.

(v) Finance a series of studies on economic and financial incentives and measures for environmentalprotection and for enabling Morocco to adopt European Standards in preparation for a free trade agreementwith EEC.

(vi) Promote an environmental education and awareness programn outside the fornal education systemon the basis of a strategy which was developed with the assistance of the GTZ.

(vii) Establish a National Environment Information Network (NEIN) on a pilot scale in the form of acentral information node at the SSE and two service nodes at the ministries of Public Works andAgriculture and the Wilaya of Fez.

The project would provide (a) provide technical assistance for six policy, economic, financial and legalstudies (272 months of international and local consultants); (b) organize 33 technical and specializedworkshops for 600-800 professionals from the sector ministries, local government, NGOs and private andpublic sector consulting and industrial firms; (c) provide training abroad for 26 professionals; and (d)furnish computers, vehicles, office equipment and audio-visual aids.

3.4 Revised Components:

During project implementation it was found necessary to regroup the project components into four "lots",in order to obtain suitable packages for consultant contracts, putting together activities with matching skillrequirements for technical assistance needs. This was also necessary to better reflect the GOM budgetstructure (budget lines) and thereby avoiding drawing from different budget lines to pay one consultant orpay several consultants from the same line; which would have rendered execution more difficult. Thecomponents were therefore regrouped into four lots without making any substantive change to the overallproject concept. This modification appears to have been made, defacto, early on by the GOM, before theprocurement process was launched, but it only appeared in Bank form 590s in June 1997, after themid-term review. The revised components were:

Lot 1: Legal and Institutional Component [containing components (i)-(iii) above]Lot 2: Economic and Financial Instruments Component [component (v) above]Lot 3: Environmental Information System (SIDE)[component (vii) above]Lot 4: Environmental Education and Dissemination [component (vi)]

Because of the initial delay in project startup, compounded by additional delays due to the complexity ofthe procurement/financial setup involving three agencies and the Wilaya of Fes, and the inexperience of theimplementing agency, the project could not be completed according to the original timetable. TheGovernment requested in February 1998 to: extend the closing date by 18 months, eliminate the Wilaya ofFes pilot component, and hence reduce the loan amount by US$1 million (see below). Five reasons weregiven for such changes:

* Belief that the legal and institutional analysis carried out under the project would only prove usefulif Morocco could achieve concrete results in the areas of environmental legislation, institutionalcoordination mechanisms, environmental planning and financial and economic instruments.* The catalytic role of the EMP in training, intemships, dialogue and inter-ministerial coordinationand with field staff needed to be maintained and strengthened.

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* The expected impact of the project with regard to sensitizing decision makers and the generalpopulation to environmental issues.* The catalytic role of EMP in mobilizing financial resources and the support of donors could becompromised if the project were to be closed without having obtained its objectives.* The project only became effective more than a year following Board approval and implementationeffectively only started in 1996.

Following a formal request from the Government of May 15, 1998, activities in the Wilaya of Fez werecancelled, in conjunction with US$1 M of the loan amount, in October 1998 (reducing the loan to US$5M). Activities in Fez had made no progress due to lack of counterpart funding, the Wilaya being unable tobudget the necessary resources. The local communities are administered under the Ministry of Interior. Atproject preparation, with the SSE being part of the this ministry, there was a budgetary link and thepreparation team trusted that the Fez component would be budgeted. With this link broken as the SSE wasseparated from the MOI (see section 4.1) other investment priorities were given preference. The eliminationof the "Wilaya of Fes" component was justified because of two key reasons: (i) important institutionalchanges which occurred since the project was designed, had led to the creation of a Department ofEnvironment independent of the Ministry of Interior in charge of local governments; and (ii) the budgetprocess, as confirmed by the Ministry of Finance, did not allow government transfers from Environment tolocal governments.

The GOM request for an 18 months extension of the loan closing date, from December 31, 1998 to June 302000 was considered by the November 1998 supervision mission during which it was decided to restructurethe project. The criteria which guided the restructuring of the project included: (a) direct contribution ofremaining activities to the development objectives of the project, (b) the elimination of the sub-componentsand components which became obsolete either due to the evolving SEE organizational and administrativeframework or to the intervention of other donors, (c) the integration of the project within the Government'snew Social and Economic Development Plan (PDES); and (d) the establishment of a scheduled action planto enable project's completion within the extension period. As a result, the following changes wereundertaken:

(i) cancellation of the training component of lot I (funded outside the project);

(ii) cancellation of the lot 2 phase 2 study on Economic Instruments (the introduction of theseinstruments was judged as prertature, by GOM, within the country's socio-economic context);

(iii) cancellation of the Education and Awareness component (funded outside the project); and

(iv) The SIDE component was refocused to be fully in line with the PDES and to operationalize theproducts in order to enable decision makers to determine their priority activities on the basis ofreliable information as well as to disseminate information to all concerned parties.

On the basis of this restructuring, which led to the cancellation of another US$1.5 M (reducing the loan toUS$3.5 M) the Bank approved a one year extension of the project to December 31 1999. At the request ofthe Government, an additional FF5.0 million was cancelled during the April 2000 supervision mission. Theamount corresponded to the equipment to run the SIDE which was to be procured with other funding. Thefirst bid for the procurement of the equipment was launched in early 1999, a second bid was launched inthe summer of 1999. To date the bidding has not materialized and a new bid is expected to be launched.

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3.5 Quality at Entry:

ICR rating unsatisfactory.

The project's objectives were largely in line with the CAS and consistent with government priorities at the

time. At the design phase several major risks to project implementation were identified, which did indeedmaterialize, seriously impacting the quality of project implementation:

* Environmental protection was new to the Government's political agenda, and its politicalcommitment uncertain;* The State Secretariat of the Environment, then Under Secretariat, (SSE) might experienceresistance from the sector ministries in cooperation;* The project was institutionally complex; and* Enactment of the two laws to be prepared under the project could occur after the end of projectimplementation.

With hindsight, the scope of project activities exceeded the capacity of a new and inexperiencedgovernment agency (SSE). The SSE carried insufficient weight in its efforts to coordinate between wellestablished ministries such as Agriculture, Public Works (now Equipment), Finance, as well as later onwith the Ministry of Interior. A less complex institutional involvement with a less ambitious set of projectactivities might have had a greater chance of being fully implemented.

Although detailed project preparation was made with the help of consultants, it does not seem to have fullytaken into account the budgetary procedures, which proved fatal for project implementation. Need for thefinalization of TORs and preparation of bid documents were given as reasons by the Ministry of Financefor delaying signing of the Loan Agreement until May 1994, eight months after Board approval. Thepreparation team had correctly foreseen this problem and made the submission of bidding documents forthe first year of project implementation a conditionality but this was dropped by the FEPS review meeting.Failure to clearly understand GOM budget procedures and to analyze the flow of funds for the project werethe major factors in causing an additional delay in the signing of the first two consultants contracts (Lots

1&2) until early 1996. An inter-ministerial steering committee had been set up (condition of effectiveness)to provide overall policy guidance, review work programs and resolve any inter-ministerial implementationissues. However failure to ensure that its members were the decision makers rendered it dysfunctional andinter-ministerial disagreements seriously hampered project implementation. Also lack of sufficient attentionto the division of responsibilities for project implementation within the SSE, among its services, had led totensions, lack of commitment and lackluster performance. Yet a power struggle as a result of thereorganization of the Directorate of Environment and Urban Planning and the creation of a separateUnder-Secretariat for the Environment with four Directorates was clearly seen and reported on by thepreparation team. No regular project progress reports have been prepared by the project executing agencyand since this was not a requirement in the loan agreement with GOM, it could not be enforced. The lack ofrecords has made it hard for Bank task teams to supervise the project and for the ICR mission to evaluatethe irnplementation performance.

Overall, the preparation team had correctly identified major project risks, but had not effectively been ableto mitigate these risks since they all seriously hampered project implementation.

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4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs

4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective:

The project outcome is unsatisfactory.

The projects objective to strengthen Morocco's institutional and regulatory framework for managingenvironmental protection is not a precise measurable goal and the preparation team underlined in the PR,that the project represented a first step in such efforts and would define elements for, and initiate theprocess of, strengthening GOM's environmental capacities. Hence, the outcome of the project objective areevaluated according to what the components were set out to achieve:

* Institutional Strengthening. The institutional analysis of three main ministries and of research andoperational agencies under these ministries' jurisdiction was completed. Based on this analysis, twoscenarios for restructuring the Ministry of Environment were proposed. Operational directives andprocedures for the cooperation between the Ministry of Environment and other governmental departmentsand NGOs are being formulated after an analysis of relationship between the National Council for theEnvironment (CNE) and the National Supreme Council for Water and Climate. According to the January1995 Decree (2-93-1011), CNE was restructured to broaden governmental and non-governmentalparticipation in the enviromnental policy formulation process. Its large constitution of more than 400members renders it inoperational. During project implementation, the SSE was exposed to severalinstitutional changes unreiated to the project, which contributed to implementation difficulties. From havingbeen an under-secretariat in the Ministry of Interior, it became a separate ministry, then it became part ofthe Ministry of Agriculture and is now State Secretariat for the Environment (SSE) within the Ministry ofLand Development, Environment, Urbanism and Habitat. The project contributed to elevate theenvironmental agenda of the government and initiated communication between environmental units of manyministries. At the time of the ICR mission, the SSE was working on a submission for Morocco to host theseventh world Conference of Parties on Climate Change (COP 7). SSE also was able to place arepresentative to mainstream the environment in each of the 31 commissions for the PDES. The NationalCouncil of the Environment has been reactivated under the project but has failed in steering concertedgovernment action for reasons explained above. Because of lack of local budget, the creation ofenvironmental monitoring unit in the Wilaya of Fes has been canceled. The specific issue concerningdecentralization of environmental management is being dealt within the broader context of theadministrative reform in PDES.* Enhancement of the Legal Framework. The following legal instruments were prepared: draftenvironmental framework law; legislation on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), hazardous wastes,toxic chemicals and integrated pollution control. These legal instruments are still at an early stage of theapproval process. This is not inconsistent with the situation in other MNA countries where often it takes adecade to enact laws. This would appear to be an indication of lack of sufficiently strong governmentcommitment and leadership to arrive at a consensus among concerned ministries. Despite the fact that EIAsare yet to be legally required, the project has succeeded in making the EIAs a practice for major projectswithin key ministries and the private sector.* Financial and Economic Incentives. Based on the industrial audits carried out in the Sebou RiverBasin, financial and fiscal instruments are proposed for pollution reductions, e.g., ecotax for sugar,pollution charges and environmental covenants "Contrat de branche" for tanneries and olive-oil producers.* Environmental Information System. While the system is completed, the National EnvironmentInformation System (SIDE) is not yet operational due to lack of equipment.

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* Environmental Education and Dissemination. A broader strategic dissemination plan for publiceducation is established annually by the SEE (Department for Public Dissemination and Education) and theoriginal proposed component became obsolete and was cancelled.

4.2 Outputs by components.

The lack of project progress reports and systematic monitoring data on project implementation, rendersdifficult any effort of a systematic account for project outputs in relation to PR projections. Availableinfornation shows the following results:

Institutional Strengthening and Legal framework (Lot 1).

Institutional Strengthening. Under this heading the following main outputs were produced:

(i) A report on the institutional analysis, first submitted by the consultants in April 1997;

(ii) A proposed institutional framework for the strengthening of the SEE was made in February 1998;

(iii) A study to redefine the role of the National Council on the Environment, March 1999.

(iv) A training program was first prepared by the consultants in 1996 and approved by theparticipating ministries in 1997.

Although delayed, all the TA work to enhance the institutional capacity in the field of environment underthe project was carried out as planned. Based on the institutional analysis of the three main ministries andthe research and operational agencies under these ministries' jurisdiction, two scenarios for restructuring theSSE were proposed and provided a basis for its reorganization. Little evidence has been found of theimpact of the EMP in strengthening environmental functions in the participating ministries and theenvironmental unit established in Fez remained inactive. The separation of SSE from the MOI and creationof a separate ministry of environment, in March 1995, broke the institutional ties with the Wilaya andcaused a void in terms of budget funding. This finally led to the cancellation of the Fez sub-component inOctober 1998, as referred to earlier. Training under the project would have been beneficial at the outsetbut later is was considered that sufficient training was provided under other programs and thesub-component was finally cancelled in November 1998. Operational directives and procedures for thecooperation between the SEE and other governmental departments and NGOs were being formulated.CNE was restructured to broaden governmental and non-govemmental participation in the environmentalpolicy formulation process but failed to function (section 4.1). While the outcome of this component isunsatisfactory, the outputs, as defined in the PR, were satisfactory.

Legal Framework. The following main outputs were obtained:

(i) A review of legislation regarding the environment was carried out in 1996 and provided a basis forthe consultants work on the legal texts;

(ii) a draft law and decrees on environmental impact assessment, April 1997;

(iii) a draft law and decree on integrated pollution control in April 1997:

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(iv) a draft law on toxic chemicals and hazardous wastes in March 1998,

(v) a draft law and decrees on atmospheric pollution, March 1998.

(vi) A draft environment code was submitted in June 1998.

(vii) an inter-ministerial legal audit was carried under the project and finalized February 1998;

(viii) a study on "branch contracts", December 1998;

The TA work for this component resulted in the expected output and essentially all the work envisaged atappraisal was carried out. However except for the fact that EIAs are being carried out for majorgovernmental and private sector projects (see section 4.1) the impact of this component, at the time ofproject closure, is limited since the legal texts have yet to be endorsed. The laws on toxic and hazardouswastes, atmospheric pollution, environmental impact assessment and the environment framework are still inthe preliminary govemment legal review committee (SGG) and have not yet been submitted to theGovernment Council for decision, this represents a 3 to 5 year gap (depending on the law) from the projecttarget. The inter-ministerial review committee never reached agreement on the integrated pollution controllaw, which was never even submitted to SGG. The study on branch contracts never led to any suchcontracts. Although this sub-component has had no impact yet, since all the legal text work was carriedout and the results may still be forthcoming, output under this component is rated satisfactory.

Economic and Financial Instruments (Lot 2)

The outputs under this component were:

Phase 1:

(i) Five sector studies (leather, vegetable oil, textiles, sugar, and chemicals) with an evaluation ofpolluting discharges were carried out and a report a was submitted in October 1996;

(ii) Environmental audits were carried out on 11 companies;

(iii) A study (phase 1) was made on economic incentives and instruments for pollution control wereprepared and a report was issued in January 1997;

(iv) A report was prepared on socio-economic and sanitary impact, March 1997

Phase 2 (no output. cancelled November 1998):

(i) Application of economic incentives and instruments for pollution control (cancelled);

(ii) Application of "branch contracts" (cancelled)

As GOM did not indicate readiness to application of these ambitious tools in the socio-economic context ofthe country, phase 2 of this component was cancelled.

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Environmental Information System (Lot 3)

The outputs under this component were:

(i) Inventory of environmental inforrmation in Morocco, May 1999

(ii) Concept study on the Information System (SIDE), November 1999

(iii) SIDE operational manual, October 1999

(iv) Training plan, November 1999

(v) Training of operators, except for the overseas training, has been done.

(vi) A concept study for Network of Partner Actors in Environment (RAPIDE) has been prepared.

(v) A Report on the State of Environment in Morocco (REEM) has been prepared.

After the late recruitment of the consultants, the SIDE was revised within the framework of the PDES. Theconceptual framework, the Partnership Network (RAPIDE), the Report on the State of the Environment inMorocco (REEM) are completed. However, the equipment, which is procured outside of project funds, isnot yet in place. Hence the consultants have been unable to set up the network.

Environmental Education and Dissemination (Lot 4)

This project component was cancelled in the November 1998 since it was funded outside the project.

4.3 Net Present ValueiEconomic rate of return:N/A

4.4 Financial rate of return:N/A

4.5 Institutional development impact:

While the project strengthened the technical capacity of the SSE, it did not strengthen its administrativecapacity. Project studies and the implementation difficulties encountered through the project clarified therole of SSE and the project has contributed to the reorganization of SSE with a view of mainstreamingenvironment in the sector ministries as well as with the private sector and civil society. SSE is movingaway from attempting to manage all environmental issues to being a catalyst in ensuring that environmentalissues are managed by relevant institutions and the private sector, in compliance with prepared legislation.SSE now stands ready to host the seventh Conference of Parties on Climate Change (COP 7).Never-the-less, the legislation and incentives for an effective monitoring of the effects of economic activitieson environment still needs to be legally endorsed.

The project has contributed to elevate the environmental agenda of the government and initiatedcommunication between environmental units of many ministries.

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5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome

5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency:

* Frequent changes of Bank task team leaders lead to substantial discontinuity of dialogue anduncertainty of purpose; and* Lack of timely training on procurement and disbursement procedures to executing agencypersonnel contributed to delays.

5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:

Government commitment to the project is questioned by (a) the CNE lack of effectiveness; (b) insufficientcoordination between participating government agencies; (c) the lack of strong support for the endorsementof environmental legislation and; (c) the reluctance of Government to use Bank loans for TA.

Governmental budget allocations were insufficient at various stages of project implementation

Governments rigid budget system did not easily accommodate the use of counterpart funds for the project.Procedural bottlenecks impeded the timely availability of budget allocations to the ministries and limitedtheir capacity to execute projects efficiently and pay services within reasonable delays. These bottlenecksled to a delay of some 18 months in project execution. In addition the Government's a priori system ofapproving expenditures required excessive time.

The structure of the department responsible for coordination of environment questions within theGovernment changed constantly over the course or the project. The Under-secretariat of State within theMinistry of Interior, at the onset of project implementation, became a full fledged Ministry of Environmentin 1995, a Secretariat of State for Environment within the Ministry of Agriculture Equipment andEnvironment in 1997 and finally a Secretariat of State for Environment within the Ministry for LandDevelopment, Environment, Urbanism and Habitat in 1998 until the present. At each change the newmanagement reevaluated project activities which took time and caused changes and disruptions in projectimplementation.

5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:

Contrary to agreements during negotiations, staff in the project implementation unit were not allowed todevote their full time and attention to the project. In addition staff recruited for project implementation(about 30) were reported to be new to the task and ill prepared, were not supervised by more experiencedstaff and received insufficient training (including in governmental and Bank procedures). These factorscontributed to the delay in the recruitment of the consultants, in the preparation of TORs and biddingdocuments, and in the evaluation of the first proposals, which were reported to be ready in January 1995whereas contracts were signed only in early 1996 (the rigid budget system also contributed). Theincapability of project staff to cope is also evidenced by the Bank suggesting the recruitment of a consultantto assist with the procurement of Lots 3&4.

Failure of the project implementation unit to involve other concerned departments of SSE in the planningand execution of project activities resulted in a lukewarm interest at best and an uninspired contributionwhen called upon. This no doubt affects the ownership of project output resulting in poor support for itsdissemination and application.

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No systematic records were kept on the project. Bank missions repeatedly reported that financial andphysical reporting was inadequate and no progress reports were prepared. As a result it was hard for theBank to monitor project progress and take remedial action, and for the ICR mission to collect coherent datafor the evaluation.

5.4 Costs andfinancing:

Total project costs were estimated at US$10.8 M (DH94.2M), financed through a Bank loan of US$6 M.Following a confirmation of the cancellation request, sent by the Government on October 1, 1998, the Fezcomponent was cancelled and the loan amount reduced to $5 million. In addition, as a result of theNovember 1998 restructuring mission, the training component of lot 1, the lot 2 phase 2 study on EconomicInstruments, and the Education and Awareness component were cancelled, reducing thereby the loanamount to $3.5 million. Finally, at the request of the Government, an additional FF5.0 million (US$0.7M)was cancelled over the course of the April 2000 supervision mission. A total of US$2.02 M had beendisbursed at loan closing whereas compared to project expenditures as recorded by SSE of DH3 1 M shouldhave resulted in disbursements of somewhat over US$2.5 M (depending on the exchange rate). Howeverthe last scheduled disbursement of project funds did not occur. Late withdrawal requests for expendituresof about US$ 0.5 M for SIDE consultants services did not reach the Bank before the closing of theaccounts on April 30, 2000.

DISBURSEMENTS (cumulative)

(US$ million equivalent) FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00

Appraisal Estimate 0.18 1.74 3.80 5.04 6.00Estimate after Restructuring 0 0.60 1.14 1.90 3.46 3.46Actual 0 0.60 1.14 1.90 1.96 2.02Actual as % of Estimate 0 34% 30% 38% 57% 58%

Date offinal disbursement April 30, 2000

6. Sustainability

6.1 Rationale for sustainability r ating:

The limited results achieved are rated as likely sustainable.

The project is rated as unsatisfactory because the delivered outputs did not meet expectations.Never-the-less some achievements are likely to be sustainable. At project completion, there are goodprospects that the achievements of the development objectives will be maintained. Dialogue continuesbetween the World Bank and the Government to further strengthen institutional capacity of governmentagencies for environmental management. The achievements of the project are not only likely to besustained, but form the cornerstones for mainstreaming environment in the sectoral ministries, privatesector and civil society.

Institution Building. The achievements under this component include a strengthening of the SSE and ofelevating the environmental agenda of the Government and this is highly likely to be sustainable,particularly in the view of what is expected from Morocco's partners e.g. for an association with the EU.The reorganization of the CNE did not seem to have the full Government support and the reform has notbeen sustainable.

Legal Strengthening. The achievements in this area include draft laws prepared under the project, none ofwhich has yet passed the SGG. The various stakeholders who constitute the Government have differentinterests to defend and have not (yet) been able to agree on suitable texts. On the one hand, one mightargue that this legislation is premature and will not be passed in a foreseeable future. A more optimisticview stems from the experience from other countries in the region which indicates that, on average, it takes10 years to endorse environmental legislation. The ICR mission adopts this more optimistic conclusion andrates the achievements under this heading as likely to be sustainable.

Information System. This component was not completed at project closing due to lack of equipment, butthe SEE is continuing work for the equipment set up of the SIDE and funds have been budgeted to thateffect. These expected achievements are likely to be sustainable for reasons similar to the ones identifiedunder the Institution Building component.

Overall the project has helped Morocco to launch an environmental agenda and start mainstreamingenvironmental issues, which momentum can no more stop given its importance and the expectations ofMorocco's economic partners in this respect. Sustainability is therefore likely.

6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:

The project once completed is not a separate entity but an integral part of Morocco's overall institutionalstructure and operated accordingly. Staff recruited under the project are funded from the regularGovernment recurrent budget and under the same conditions as other civil servants. Activities, such as theSIDE, has government funding for its completion.

Performance indicators for the final achievement of project objectives would include:

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(a) Passing of legislation:

(i) on environmental impact assessment;

(b) Progress towards the endorsement of the following legislation:

(i) on solid waste and toxic chemicals and hazardous wastes;

(ii) on atmospheric pollution;

(c) Environment Information System (SIDE) operational

(d) Application of economic and financial incentives for pollution control

The passing of the legislation (a), progress towards legislation endorsement (b) and rendering SIDEoperational (c) are indications of a clear SEE's direction and efforts toward improving the environment inMorocco.

The Bank should continue to support the main objectives of the project and the achievements of projectoutputs. It was voiced among the ICR mission's bilateral interlocutors that the Bank was best placed topush legislative reforms and proponents for environmental reforms in Morocco look to the Bank forsupport and leadership in breaking the resistance of special interests. This could be done in the context ofthe overall Bank program discussions (Comprehensive Development Framework [CDF]) as well as in thecontext of specific projects. The Bank has environmental requirements in all its relations with Borrowersand follow-up on the EMP should be part of its dialogue with Morocco. Failure to do so would show lackof the clear direction and purpose expected in Bank assistance. If an impact evaluation of the project isplanned by OED, 2005 would appear to give sufficient time to pass the legislative EIA and solid wastepackage and start to see its impact on economic activities in Morocco.

7. Bank and Borrower Performance

Bank7. 1 Lending.

Bank performance at project identification was satisfactory and took into account the Govemment's newemphasis on protecting the environment although the necessary institutions, legislation and know-how tolaunch a program were lacking. Also environmental and water resource management was one of the keypillars in the Bank's assistance strategy for Morocco (CAS). Bank performance in project preparationand appraisal was unsatisfactory contributing to making the project unsatisfactory at entry (section 3.5)and leading to delays and other difficulties during execution, explained above. While the staff mix andcontinuity at preparation and appraisal were adequate, design issues and the materialization of riskshampered project implementation. The content of the project was too ambitious and complex, a problemwhich had already been raised at the IEPS Meeting and at the Yellow Cover Review Meeting where theteam was asked to be realistic in setting project indicators and targets. At the same time, safeguardsproposed by the preparation teamn (such as early preparation of bidding documents) were removed byformal review meetings. Components had to be redefined during implementation in order to obtain suitableand sequential consultant packages, and finally large parts were cancelled. Not enough account was takenof the executing agency's capacity to implement the project, including its unfamiliarity with governmentaland Bank procedures and inexperience in the financial management of projects. Moroccan partners

- 13 -

commented that not sufficient attention had been given to take the socio-economic Moroccan situation intoaccount, demonstrated by stalled legislation. Similarly, a Bank staff expressed that the design of theproject did not account for the institutional situation of Morocco, and proposed too many studies withseveral ministries without specifying the operational outputs and coordination mechanism.

7.2 Supervision:

Overall supervision was unsatisfactory although there was improvement in 1998 when the project wasfinally restructured. Frequent changes of task managers (there were five) led to lack of continuity inapproach and in the dialogue with the Moroccan partners, reducing the effectiveness of Bank interventions.Issues raised as requiring the attention of the following supervision were often not mentioned in the nextreport. Project reporting would have benefited from a more consistent structure and continuity. AMoroccan project staff expressed that Bank supervisions were more of the "inspector" type, often hasty, ofan administrative nature and did not contribute technically to good implementation of the project. Forexample, assistance by supervision missions in finalizing bid documents would have helped. Training inBank procurement procedures was discussed, but there is no record of its implementation. Only at the endwas there an improvement and the project was restructured as a consequence. Yet it is the technicalassistance part of Bank cooperation that is mostly appreciated by the implementing agencies, rather thanthe Bank's financial contribution.

7.3 Overall Bank performance:

Overall performance by the Bank was unsatisfactory, during both preparation and implementation.

Borrower7.4 Preparation:

Borrower performance at identification, preparation, and appraisal of the project was unsatisfactory.While the Borrower took on an active role in the identification, preparation and appraisal of the project,although new to such project the borrower shares the responsibility for the unsatisfactory project at entry.

7.5 Government implementationperformance:

Borrower implementation perfornance was unsatisfactory. The Borrower shares responsibility for theprojects poor implementation performance. Failure to resolve the problem of project funding with multipleproject agencies caused serious delays in implementation and contributed to the failure to complete theproject. Although the Government reformed the CNE it resulted in its ineffective functioning. Theinter-agency steering committee's failure to resolve project problems in a timely manner added to projectdelays. Legislation prepared under the project has not yet been passed, this postpones the impact of theproject on environment. Lack of ministerial consensus in implementing EMP project, and reluctance toborrow for technical assistance are some of the reasons for the limited success of EMP.

7.6 Implementing Agency:

The performance of the implementing agency is unsatisfactory. Staff in the project implementation unitwere, contrary to agreements, given other tasks thereby contributing to delays in project implementation.Financial and quality monitoring of the project was poor. No progress reports were sent to the Bank overthe course of the project. Because all concerned departments in SSE were not sufficiently involved in theplanning of project activities, the project suffered from their lack of interest. Although there was substantialprogress in the implementation of project tasks in the last year of the project, administrative problems

- 14 -

identified earlier continued to persist until project completion. This negatively affected project completionand disbursements.

7.7 Overall Borrower performance:

Overall performance the borrower was unsatisfactory for reasons explained above.

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8. Lessons Learned

(i) The Bank does not have a high comparative advantage in funding technical assistance projectswhich are not seen as competitive or bankable. In addition, environmental capacity building inparticular, and institutional projects in general, are better carried out by aid agencies with staff inthe field and grants available for environmental pilot activities. Where institutional developmentprojects for new agencies are undertaken by the Bank, close supervision is necessary, preferably byresident staff where possible. The Bank advisory role in institutional type projects is seen as moreimportant than the loan itself. Political will is essential for project success, as is coordination ofdonors and government agencies for instance through the CDF.

(ii) A project monitoring system and reports (financial and technical) should be agreed during projectpreparation and reflected in the legal documents permitting their enforcement.

(iii) The planning and verification of the flow of funds from the budget to final payments is critical atproject preparation.

(iv) Design for environmental management projects should take more into account the socio-economiccontext of the country and should focus on attainable activities. Alternatively top managementshould ensure that set environmental goals are met at the highest level.

(v) At the project implementation stage, opportunity should be taken at the onset during supervisionsto redirect course of action in order to reflect evolution of events and other donor interventions.

(vi) The legislation prepared under projects is seldom enacted during the typical five yearimplementation period. Following the project closure, the Bank should continue manifesting theimportance it attaches to reaching the final targets on which the impact of the project depends. TheBank should find means to continue support for the adoption of such legislation.

(vii) As it has proved particularly difficult when the counterpart is a new inexperienced agency, withlimited capacity and technical know-how, to fully implicate the borrower, means must be found toensure better ownership of the project in such cases.

(viii) Although participation of cross-sectoral institutions in the project is essential for its success, it isnot sufficient. Ownership must be ensured from all participating institutions. The borrowershould propose cross-sectoral coordination mechanisms during project preparation, which couldbe tested at the onset of implementation.

(ix) Within the Bank side, the project was managed by five task team leaders. The implementingagency was headed by four different ministries during the course of the project. Such frequentchanges within the Bank and the implementing agency lead to lack of continuity and purpose in thedialogue and cause disruption and delays in project execution. The Bank should encourage morecontinuity in its project teams.

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9. Partner Comments

(a) Borrower/implementing agency:

Le present rapport elabore par le Secretariat d'Etat charge de 1'environnement est un rapport

de fin de projet. II fait suite a une serie de 9 missions de concertation et de suivi de la Banque mondiale,

et d'un rapport d'evaluation a mi-parcours. Le contenu du rapport sera axe sur une analyse qualitative,

plut6t que quantitative suivant le modele propose par la Banque mondiale. Ce rapport sera egalement

annexe au rapport d'evaluation de la Banque mondiale en son examen par le Conseil d'Administration

de cette demiere.

- Objectif du projet

Le projet de Gestion de l'Environnement (PGE) est un projet financ6 par un pr8t initial de la

Banque mondiale de 6 millions de dollars, ayant pour objectif d'assister l'autorite nationale chargee de

la protection de l'environnement en matiere de renforcement de ses capacites institutionnelles,juridiques, techniques et communicationnels.

- Duree du projetApprouv6 par le Conseil de la Banque mondiale en septembre 1994, I'accord de pret du projet a

e signe en mai 1994 et le demarrage effectif des ses activites en f6vrier 1996. La date de cl6ture

initialement prevue pour le 31 decembre 1998 a et reportee au 31 decembre 2000.

- Conception du projet (formulation et preparation)

En tant que projet integre, le PGE etait concu selon:

Une structuration sectorielle impliquant dans la gestion et le suivi des activites un noyau dur, form6 en

plus du departement charge de l'environnement, de deux autres departements ministeriels a savoir, le

departement charge de l'equipement et celui charge de l'Agriculture, du Developpement Rural et des

Peches Maritimes.

Une structuration thematique traitant respectivement des aspects institutionnels et juridiques (lot I d'

une duree de 24 mois), des aspects technico-financiers, en relation avec les instruments economiques et

financiers (lot 2 d'une duree de 18 mois), des aspects communicationnels en relation avec le

developpement d'un reseau d'echange d'information et de donnees environnementales (lot 3 d'une dur6e

de 15) et egalement des aspects lies i la promotion et i la diffusion de l'information, en rapport avec la

sensibilisation (lot 4 d'une dur6e estimee de 6 i 8 mois).

Cette structuration thematique suivait une logique de realisation qui faisait que le lot I et le lot 2

devaient permettre des echanges mutuelles de produits et necessitaient une parfaite synchronisation et

coordination des activites (plan d'action des audits industrielles a finaliser sous forme de contrat de

branche a titre d'exemple). Une fois l'assise institutionnelle, juridique et technico-financiere elaboree, la

circulation et le partage de l'information devaient etre facilites via la constitution d'un Reseau d'Acteur

Partenaires en Information et Donnees sur l'Environnement (lot 3). Par la suite viendrait la phase de

dissemination de l'information et de sensibilisation en vue de capitaliser les resultats auquel le projet

- 17 -

aurait abouti, objet du demier lot, le lot 4 du PGE.

Egalement, afin d'orienter le projet vers la realisation d'actions concretes sur le terrain, le bassin duSebou, bassin le plus pollue au niveau national a ete choisi comme zone pilote. Par ailleurs, la wilaya deFes a e identifiee en tant que cible de decentralisation des activites du projet, sachant que ledepartement de l'environnement, lors du demarrage du projet etait Sous-Secretariat d'Etat charge de I'Environnement aupres du Ministere de l'Interieur.

Resultats attendus

Les principaux resultats attendus du projet peuvent etre r6sumes comme suit:

Renforcement des capacites techniques, administratives et de coordination en matiere de gestion de F'environnement du Departement de l'environnement et des ministeres de l'Agriculture, de l'Equipementet de la Wilaya de Fes;

Renforcement du cadre legislatif et reglementaire du departement de l'environnement dans le domainede l'Etude d'Impact sur l'Environnement (EIE), la gestion des dechets dangereux, le projet de loi sur lagestion integr6e de la pollution, l'elaboration et le test de deux contrats de branche A titre demonstratif;

Mise en place d'un Systeme d'Information et de Donnees sur l'Environnement (SIDE) au niveau centralet sa decentralisation au niveau de la Wilaya de Fes; et

Elaboration d'un programme de sensibilisation.

Execution du projet

L'execution du projet a ete assuree par le departement de l'environnement en tant qu'agence d'execution, associ6e aux departements de l'Agriculture et de l'Equipement. Un comit6 interninisteriel desuivi et egalement charge du suivi des activites du projet.

L'accord de pret a et signe le 20 mai 1994. Les activites du projet ont effectivement demarre en fevrier1996. Le projet a ete cloture le 31 decembre 2000.

Le lotl relatif aux etudes et A l'assistance technique pour le renforcement du cadre juridique etinstitutionnel en matiere de protection de l'environnement a demarre, en f6vrier 1996 et s'est acheve enmai 1999. La sous composante formation, avenant du lot 1, d'une duree de 10 mois n'a pu 8trerealisee. Ce lot a ete realise par le Bureau d'etudes suisse Urbaplan.

Le lot 2 relatif aux etudes et A l'assistance technique pour la mise en place des instruments economiqueset financiers pour le contr6le et la reduction de la pollution a demarre en fevrier 1996 et s'est acheve enavril 1997. La sous composante 2eme phase du lot 2, avenant d'une duree de 8 mois n'a pu etrerealisee. Ce lot a ete execute par le Bureau d'etudes fran,ais BCEOM en tant que bureau chef de file,en collaboration avec les bureaux d'etudes, hollandais DNV et marocains CID et EAU Globe.

Le lot 3 du PGE relatif a la mise en place d'un Systeme d'Information et Donnees sur l'Environnement(SIDE) a d6marre en mai 1998 et achev6 en Decembre 1999. Le Bureau d'etudes americain Ecologyand Environment a ete charg6 de la realisation du projet.

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Le lot 4 relatif A la sensibilisation et A l'education en matiere d'environnement, d'une duree estimee A 8mois, a ete annulee.

- Restructuration du projet:

En rapport avec les objectifs initiaux du projet, nous rappelons que le projet a connu deuxrestructurations.

La premiere restructuration a fait suite A la 7eme mission de la Banque mondiale (I au 7 fevrier1998 ). En effet, considerant d'une part la surevaluation des previsions initiales des aleas financiers etphysiques ($US 831 300) et les prix des dquipements infornatiques en perpetuel decroissance et d'autrepart les delais restants pour 1'execution du projet (date de cl6ture officielle du projet en decembre 1998),la partie marocaine, en accord avec la mission de la Banque mondiale, a demande la restructuration duprojet par:

- I'annulation de I million de dollars US;- I'elimination de la composante wilaya de Fs ; et- le report de la date de cloture du pret au 31 decembre 1999 soit une prorogation de 12 mois.

La seconde restructuration du projet a fait suite A la 8eme mission de la Banque mondiale (8 au 20novembre 1998) en prenant en consideration l'evolution de la situation connu par le projet et enparticulier le re-ciblage de ses objectifs dans le cadre du Plan de Developpement Economique et Socialdu Pays (PDES). Cette restructuration a permis l'annulation de 1,5 millions de dollars US soit P'annulation des composantes non encore engagees a savoir les avenants cites plus haut du lot I et lot2ainsi que la composante lot 4 du projet. Le montant du pret est alors de 3,5 millions de dollars US.

- Evaluation de la perfornance de l'emprunteur durant l'evolution et l'execution du projet

Contexte:Avant d'evaluer la performance de l'agence d'execution durant 1'6volution du projet, il est important desituer le contexte dans lequel le projet a evolue.

Genese du projet: I'idee de projet a debute, selon notre information en 1992, dans un contexteou les projets en rapport avec la protection de l'environnement etaient rares.

Nature du projet: le projet de gestion de l'environnement etait concu, comme signale plus haut,en tant que projet integre impliquant au moins trois secteurs d'activites (trois departements) etintervenant sur plusieurs themes (du lot I au lot 4).

Contexte institutionnel : Ce demier a connu une evolution institutionnelle qui a fait que lagestion du projet a et assuree respectivement par le Sous-Secretariat d'Etat charge de rEnvironnementaupres du Ministere de l'Interieur (de 199 3 a 1995), par le Ministere de l'Environnement (de 1995 a1997), par le Secretariat d'Etat charge de l'Environnement aupres du Ministere de rAgricuture, del'Equipement et de I'Environnement (de 1997 a 1998) et finalement par le Secretariat d'Etat charge deI'Environnement aupres du Ministere de l'Amenagement du Territoire de l'Environnement, de l'Habitat etde l'Urbanisme de 1998 a cejour).

Le suivi du projet a ete assure au sein du departement par un Directeur de projet assiste par unecellule d'execution. Au niveau exteme un comite interministeriel assurait le suivi du projet.

- 19 -

- Evaluation de la performance:

Tableau N° 1: Indicateurs de suivi du projet

Action acheveeAction prioritaire Date butoir Responsabilite avec date /ou etat

d'avancement etremarque

Directives Iprocedures Proposition d'organisationoperationnelles de institutionnelle finalisee etcooperation entre Avril 1998 SEE proposee par le consultantME/Agences et en Octobre 1998Departements/ONGs

Projet de loi relatif a 1' Soumise au SGG le 18etude d'impact sur 1' SEE fevrier 1997environnement au SGG

Projet de loi sur la gestion Rapport sur les produitsdes dechets dangereux au Decembre 1997 SEE chimiques et dechetsSGG dangereux finalise par le

consultant en mars 1998

Projet de loi sur le projet finalise par lecontrdle des dechets Decembre 1997 SEE consultant en avril 1997dangereux au SGG

Rapport sur les contrats deDeux contrats de branches Decembre 1997 SEE branche finalise par letestes a titre demonstratif consultant en decembre

1998

Contrat du consultant arriveSysteme d'information sur Juin 1998 SEE t Equipement / A terme en decembre 1999.I'environnement Agriculture Les bases d'un systeme ont

ete identifies

Programme de composante annuliesensibilisation Juin 1998 SEE suite A la seconde

restructuration du projet

L'evaluation de la performance du projet sera declinee en points forts et points faibles.

Points forts:

- projet precurseur qui a et parmi les premiers A traiter la problematique environnementaleau Maroc

- 20 -

- projet integre, impliquant trois departements et quatre thematiques environnementales- projet A caractere strategique qui a identifie les perspectives de developpement du secteur, maisegalement ses limites.

Points faibles:- projet dont la conception n'aurait pas ete elaboree localement, n'exprimant donc pas un besoin urgent

A combler.- projet qui a ete supplante par d'autres projets moins ambitieux et aux objectifs specifiques similaires.

- projet d'une duree importante (6 ans).- projet difficilement maitrisable en raison de l'inter-activite entre ses differentes composantes.

-projet devant repondre A deux procedures differentes de passation et de suivi des marches (nationale et

celle de la Banque).

Conclusion

C'est un projet qui presente des apports en termes de strategie de planification environnementale mais

qui presente egalement plusieurs limites qui ont fait que la plupart des indicateurs de performnance ne

pouvaient etre atteints.

- Evaluation de la performance de la Banque mondiale durant l'evolution et l'execution

du projet

Points forts:-conception d'un projet doublement integre (sectoriel et thematique)- missions de suivi et concertation regulieres (9 au total)

Points faibles:- conception du projet inadaptee au contexte national- changement frequent des charges de projet. Ce dernier a connu 5 charges de projet- manque de compilmentarite de ce projet avec d'autres projets de la banque pour la

capitalisation de l'inforrnation et del'expertise (exemple deja signale A la Banque concemant le PGE et le Projet de

Protection de Sebou)- manque de coordination au benefice du departement de l'environnement des autres projets A caractere

environnementalengages par la Banque au niveau national (voir chapitre correspondant du rapport A mi-parcours)

- Sous utilisation des potentialites de la delegation de la Banque A Rabat au profit du secteur de 1'

Environnement.

Conclusion

La conception du projet a ete faite par la Banque mondiale d'une maniere surdimensionnee par rapport

A un nouveau departement ministeriel charge de l'environnement. Afin de renforcer les capacites du

departement en matiere de gestion, la composante formation aurait par exemple pu etre initiee depuis le

debut du projet.

Par ailleurs, les outils de suivi et de soutien que ce soit au niveau de la banque (changement frequent des

charges de projet) ou au Maroc (delegation deconcentree de la banque A Rabat, tout au moins depuis

- 21 -

son av�nement) n'a pas permis un soutien r�gulier et constant de cet ambitieux projet.

Conclusion g�n�rale

En conclusion, ii ressort que le projet de gestion de 1'environnement tel que con�u par Ia Banquemondiale �tait un projet int�gr� ambitieux (th�matique et interminist�riei). Les moyens de soutien et d'accompagnement du projet n'ont �galement pas � tons mis � disposition pour assurer 1'optimum requisde chance de r�ussite du projet.

- 22 -

LISTE ET RESULTATS DES ETUDES DU PGE

Projet de Gestion de Produits Date de ObservationI'Environnement remise

Synthese Mars 99

Organisation institutionnelle: Mars 99Diagnostic

Organisation institutionnelle: Mars 99proposition

Renforcement du Conseil National de Mars 99I'Environnement (CNE)

Composante liee A laproposition desinstruments financiers,A I'elaboration du FNE

Instruments financiers Mars 99 et A la participation dusecteur prive du lot 2 duPGE qui n'a pas eterealis6e

Lot 1: Composante Composante liee a 1'renforcement juridique et elaboration des contratsinstitutionnelle Contrats de branche Dec. 98 de branches du lot 2 duAttribue au Bureau d'Etudes PGE qui n'a pas eURBAPLAN realisde

Permet l'elaboration d'une legislation visantune gestion integree dela pollution

Projet de loi sur la prbvention et la difficilement realisablereduction int6gr6e de la pollution Mars 99 dans le contexte actuel

Projet de decrets relatifs a la lutte Base sur lecontre la pollution atmospherique Mars 99 commentaire du projet

de loi et de decretexistants elabores par ledepartement

- 23 -

Produits chimiques toxiques etdechets dangereux Mars 99

Code de I'Environnement:

- Livre 1: Principes generaux et Dec 98competences institutionnelles- Livre 2: Titre 1: les milieuxphysiques Dec 98Eau et milieux aquatiques

Dec 98 Produit important du- Livre 2: Titre 2: les milieux Lot 1 du PGE

Lot 1: Composante physiques Dec 98renforcement juridique et Eaux maritimes et littoralinstitutionnelle - Livre 2: Titres 3+4: les milieux

physiques Dec 98Air et Atmosphere, sol et sous-sol,mines et carrinres

- Livre 3: Pollutions et nuisances

- Livre 4: Protection de la Nature etPatrimoine

- Livre 5 et 6: Etablissementshumains, instruments d'6valuation,de protection et de gestion de 1'environnement

Permet une analyserapide de l'arsenal

Version CD ROM du code de 1' juridique national enenvironnement matiere d'

environnement

Lot 2 Composante mise enplace des instrumentseconomiques et financiers Rapport sur les audits industriels et 5 secteurs dtactivit6 ont

evaluation des charges polluantes Octobre ete etudies (tannerie,attribue A un Groupement de 1996 huilerie, textile, sucrerieBureaux d'Etudes, dont et chimie)BCEOM est chef de file

-24-

Rapport sur les instruments Janvier Premier diagnosticeconomiques et financiers 1997

Lot 2: Composante mise en Rapport sur I'ivaluation de I'impactplace des instruments socio-economique et sanitaire Fevriereconomiques et financiers 1997

Rapports de synthese Mars 1997

Rapport d'execution(Mission A)

Rapport de I'Etat des lieux desDonnees environnementales(mission B)

Rapport sur la Conception du SIDE(mission B)

Pr6paration du cahier des charges(mission C)

Pr6sentation d'uncanevas du rapport

Rapport sur 1'Etat des lieux des Juillet 1999 REEM incluant ledonnees sur 1'environnement resultat de l'inventaire

des donnees

Lot 3: Composante Systeme Pr6sentation du modeled'Information et Donnees sur conceptuel de donnees,I'Environnement (SIDE) d'un plan decomposante attribuee au communication et d'unbureau d'etude E&E SIDE, etude et conception Aouit 1999 plan d'organisation

(version preliminaire) pour la mise en auvredu SIDE

Etude et conception du SIDE Novembre Conception revue du(version finale) 1999 SIDE avec definition

des produits a 6laborer

Presentation duprogramme de

Rapport de formation Novembre formation avec1999 evaluation de l'6quipe

-25 -

Rapport sur l'Etat de i'Environnemnt rapport adoptant leau Maroc (REEM) Decembre principe

1999 Pression-Etat-Reponse

Lot 3: Composante Systime Presentation de lad'Information et Donnees sur conception du RAPIDE,I'Environnement (SIDE) des procedurescomposante attribuee au potentielle debureau d'etude E&E fonctionnement avec

Conception et mise en place du Decemnbre identification desRAPIDE 1999 donnees essentielles a

echanger. Presentationegalement d'un plan desurveillance

(b) Cofinanciers:N/A

(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):N/A

10. Additional Information

N/A

-26 -

Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix

Outcome I Impact Indicators: ..

IndicatorlMatrix inProjctd h last PSR . ActuaULatdst Edimab-(a) industrial audits carried out December 1996 December 1996

(b) formulation of operational directives and June 1998 June 1998procedures for the cooperation between theMinistry of Environment and othergovernmental departments and NGOs.(c) submission of a draft decree on the February 1997 February 1997, submitted to SGGprocedures of environmental impactassessment to the Government Council.

(d) submission of a draft law on hazardous February 1998 February 1998, submitted to SGGwastes and toxic chemicals to theGovemrnment Council.

(e) submission of a draft law on integrated December 1997 December 1997, submitted to SGGpollution control and polluting acivities to theGovemment Council.

Output Indicators:

-lndlca i x - - . : dn lstPSR at. a X. -A nmat .N/A

End of project

-27-

Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent)Appraisat ActuallLatest Percentage ofEsitimate EsiaeApprsa

ProlecttCCOsft yCompr nent US$ miion US$ millionLot 1: Institutional Strengthening 1.91 1.09 51

Legal Strengthening 0.88 0.60 61

Lot 2: Compliance system 0.86 0.75 77Lot 3: Environmental Information System 1.86 0.85 39Lot 4: Education and Awareness 0.78 0.00 0Recurrent Costs 3.43

Total Baseline Cost 9.72 3.29Physical Contingencies 0.32Price Contingencies 0.79

Total Project Costs 10.83 3.29Total Financing Required 10.83 3.29

Pro3ect Costs by Procuremnt Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)

r ................ ~N~B N .B.... Tt0 i;;:NB. 0X jal Cos1. Works h0.00

(0.00)2. Goods 0.26 1.08 1.34

._____________________ (0.21) ( (0.88) 0 (1.09)3. Services 5.54 5.54

___________________ () . ()(4.91) 0 (4.91)4. Miscellaneous 3.95 3.95

(1_____________________ 0 () 0(0.00) (0.00)

5. Miscellaneous 0.00() () () () ~~~~~~~~~~~(0.00)

6. Miscellaneous 0.00() () () () (0.00)

Total 0.26 0.00 6.62 3.95 10.83(0.21) (0.00) (5.79) (0.00) (6.00)

- 28 -

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)

. .- . -. ~~Procurbm n-Motliosl . :- - -Expenditure Category ICB P Cm Metho 2 N.B.F. Total CostNB Other1. Works 0.00

() O..j........ ().. () (0.00)2. Goods 0.14 0.14

() ~~~(0.1I 1) O ( (0.1I1)3. Services 3.15 3.15

o _ () _ () _ (1.91) ( (1.91)4. Miscellaneous 0.00

o) o . 0 ,,,,. O (0.00)5. Miscellaneous 0.00

o) O.. () (). (0.00)6. Miscellaneous 0.00

0 _ ()__ _ ()_ _ O (0.00)Total 0.00 0.14 3.15 0.00 3.29

(0.00) (0.1 1) (1.91) (0.00) (2.02)

" Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies.

2I Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contractedstaff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to(i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local govemment units.

Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent)

Apprasal stiteC - : alI1 t.s' 6-Bank: | Govt. CoF. fl- k - v | G : f Fk Nlt . CdE

Lot 1: Institutional and 2.69 0.40 1.66 0.53 61.7 132.5 0.0legal strengthening

0.0 0.0 0.0Lot 2: Compliance system 0.82 0.15 0.63 0.12 76.8 80.0 0.0Lot 3: Environmental 1.69 0.48 0.23 0.62 13.6 129.2 0.0Information SystemLot 4: Education and 0.80 0.09 0.0 0.0 0.0AwarenessRecurrent costs 3.71 0.0 0.0 0.0

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Annex 3: Economic Costs and Benefits

N/A

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Annex 4. Bank Inputs

(a) Missions:Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating

(e.g. 2 Economists, I FMS, etc.) Implementation Development

Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective

Identification/Preparation11/91 4 3 Env. Spec., I Econ.10/92 1 1 Env. Spec.

9/93 1 1 Env. Spec.2/93 5 2 Env. Spec., I Econ.

I Env. Law Spec., 1 Cons.

Appraisal/Negotiation

4/93 4 2 Env. Spec., I Econ., ICons.

2/94 1 1 Env. Spec.

Supervision(1) 4/94 3 2 Env. Spec., I Econ., I S HS

Env. Spec., I Econ.(2) 11/94 3 1 Env. Spec., I Econ., I S HS

Resource Mob. Spec.(3) 7/95 3 1 Env. Spec., I Econ., 1 U S

Resource Mob. Spec.(4) 11/95 1 1 Env. Spec. U S

(5) 4/96 3 1 Env. Spec., I Resource Mob. U USpec., I Env. Law Spec.

(6) 11/96 2 1 Env. Spec., I Resource Mob. S SSpec.

MTR 6/97 3 1 Env. Spec., I Resource Mob. S SSpec., I Env. Law Spec.

(7) 10/97 1 Nat. Resource Economist U S

(8) 2/98 2 1 Nat. Res. Economist, U SI Env. Law Spec.

(9) 11/98 1 1 Env. Spec. U S

(10) 5/99 2 1 Env. Spec., I Fin. Analyst U S

(11) 12/99 2 1 Env. Spec., I Consultant U S

ICR6/2000 2 1 Env. Spec., I Consultant

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(b) Staff:

I Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest EstimateNo. Staff weeks US$ (X000)

Identification/Preparation 54.8 64.4Appraisal/Negotiation 16.9 176Supervision 95.3 357ICR 8.0 27.0Total 175 624.4

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Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components

(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)Rating

Macro policies O H OSUOM O N * NAJSector Policies O H OSUOM O N O NA

| Physical OH OSUOM O N * NA? Financial O H OSUOM O N * NA

2 Institutional Development 0 H O SUO M 0 N 0 NAEnvironmental O H OSUOM O N O NA

SocialFPoverty Reduction O H OSUOM O N * NA8Gender OH OSUOM O N * NAiZOther (Please specify) O H OSUOM ON * NA

Z Private sector development 0 H 0 SU O M 0 N * NAE Public sector management 0 H O SU *M 0 N 0 NA

E Other (Please specify)

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Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)

6.1 Bankperformance Rating

? Lending OHS OS *U OHUf Supervision OHS OS *U OHUN Overall OHS OS *U O HU

6.2 Borrower performance Rating

f Preparation OHS OS * U O HU• Government implementation performance O HS O S 0 U 0 HUF Implementation agency performance OHS OS * U O HUF Overall OHS OS * U O HU

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Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

The ICR is based on the documents in the project file and the relevant sector work.

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