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Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 15031 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF BENIN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT FOR PLANNING AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (CREDIT 1530-BEN) NOVEMBER 13, 1995 Country OperationsDivision West Central Africa Department Africa Region This document hasa restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contentsmay not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized

Transcript of World Bank Document...1995/11/13  · part due to the indirect impact on Benin's economy of an oil...

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Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No. 15031

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

REPUBLIC OF BENIN

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT FOR PLANNING AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT(CREDIT 1530-BEN)

NOVEMBER 13, 1995

Country Operations DivisionWest Central Africa DepartmentAfrica Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Currency Unit = CFA franc (CFAF)

The CFAF is tied to the French franc (FF) in the ratio of FF I to CFAF 100 following the January12, 1994 devaluation of the CFAF from a ratio of FF I to CFAF 50. The French franc iscurrently floating.

FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER

January 1 - December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BCP Department of Projects (Bureau Central des Projets)CAA Debt Management Department (Caisse Autonome d 'Amortissement)COTECNA Pre-Inspection Shipping CompanyDCA Development Credit AgreementDEP Direction des Etudes et de la ProgrammationECU European Currency UnitEDF European Development FundEDI Economic Development InstituteFAC French Fonds d'Aide et de CooperationICR Implementation Completion ReportIMF International Monetary FundINSAE National Institute of Economics and Statistical Analysis (Institut

National de la Statistique et de I 'Analyse Economique)MCT Ministry of Commerce and TourismMEMH Ministry of Energy, Mining and HydraulicsMIPME Ministry of Industry and Small and Medium BusinessesMPS Ministry of Plan and Statistics (Ministere du Plan et de la Statistique)MTEAS Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social AffairsMTPT Ministry of Public Works and TransportPAGE Economic Management Project (Projet d'Appui ci la Gestion

Economique)PE Public EnterpriseSAL Structural Adjustment LoanTA Technical AssistanceUNDP United Nations Development ProgramUNDTCD United Nations Department of Technical Cooperation and

DevelopmentUNFPA United Nations Fund for Population Activities

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface ...............................................................................Evaluation Summary .......................

PART I: Program Implementation Assessment ........

A. Evaluation of Objectives .... 1IB. Achievement of Objectives .3C. Major Factors affecting the Project .4D. Project Sustainability 6E. Bank Performance .7F. Borrower Performance .8G. Assessment of Outcome .9H. Future Operations .9I. Key Lessons Learned .10

PART II: Statistical Annexes .................... 12

Table 1: Summary of Assessments . . .13Table 2: Related Bank Credits . . .14Table 3: Project Timetable .. .. 14Table 4: Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual . 15Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation 15Table 6A: Key Indicators for Project Operation . . .16Table 6B: Fellowships for Training Abroad .. 19Table 6C: Summary of Estimate and Actual Technical Assistance Provided 20Table 7: Studies Included in Project 21Table 8A: Project Costs .22Table 8B: Project Financing .23Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits .23Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants .24Table 11: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements 29Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs 29Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions .30

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Completion Mission's Aide-M&moire (with English Summary)Appendix B: Borrower's Contribution to the ICRAppendix C: Description of Technical Assistance ExpertsAppendix D: Auditors Report (Summary)

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their officialduties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORTREPUBLIC OF BENIN

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT FOR PLANNING AND ECONOMICMANAGEMENT

CREDIT 1530-BEN

PREFACE

This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Technical Assistance Projectfor Planning and Economic Management for which an IDA Credit 1530-BEN in the amount ofUS$5.0 million was approved on December 13, 1984. The credit was declared effective onSeptember 13, 1985. It was the first broad based Technical Assistance Credit made by IDA toBenin. It has since been followed by another Economic Management Project (PAGE) whichbecame effective on January 31, 1995.

The credit was closed on March 31, 1994 three years after the originally scheduled closingdate of March 31, 1991. Final disbursement took place on November 4, 1994, as of which date abalance of US$836,728 was canceled. Cofinancing for the project was provided by the UnitedNations Development Program (UNDP), the French Ministry of Cooperation, the EuropeanDevelopment Fund (EDF), and the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UJNFPA) all ofwhom received and cleared the report.

The ICR was prepared by Jean-Paul Dailly (Country Officer) and Rosemary Cubagee(Consultant) of the Country Operations Division, West Central Africa Department. It wasreviewed by Mrs. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, COD Division Chief and Mr. Franz Kaps, OperationsAdviser and approved by Mr. Olivier Lafourcade, Director. The Borrower provided commentsthat are included as appendices to the ICR.

Preparation of the ICR is based on materials in the project files, interviews with theGovernment Officials and the Technical Assistance Experts. The Borrower contributed to thepreparation of the ICR by providing views reflected in the supervision mission's aide-memoire,and preparing its own evaluation of the project's execution.

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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORTREPUBLIC OF BENIN

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT FOR PLANNING AND ECONOMICMANAGEMENT

CREDIT 1530-BEN

EVALUATION SUMMARY

1. Background. As fiscal and balance of payment deficits became unmanageable in the early1980's, the government sought economic advice and financial support from the donor communityand requested Bank technical assistance in June 1982. The Bank responded positively to thegovermnent's request and the Technical Assistance Project for Planning and Economic Management(TA) was approved in December 1984 and became effective in September 1985.

2. Objectives and Implementation. The main goal of the project was to strengthen theoverall economic management capacity of the government. Specifically, it aimed at reinforcinginstitutions responsible for macroeconomic policy analysis, public finance management, publicinvestment programming, project preparation and statistics through training and long-term and short-term technical assistance.

3. The project's objectives proved to be overambitious considering the country's circumstanceswhen the project was approved. Implementation was severely hampered by inadequate management andweak, poorly-structured institutions. Furthermore, the lack of motivation in the civil service and theunhealthy political climate of the time were also major obstacles for running an effective staff developmentprogram.

4. The project did not achieve most of its training, capacity-building and institutionaldevelopment objectives. Little progress was made in terms of improving the public investmentprogramming and monitoring public debt. The performance of the Customs Department did improveand a revised "budget nomenclature" was prepared.

5. The achievements of the TA project are limited and are not considered sustainable. The mostuseful components were the studies, strategy papers and public sector audits carried out by short-term consultants for the preparation of adjustment programs. The modest contribution of the projectto the design and implementation of the structural adjustment program will have a lasting impact ifthese programs mark the beginning of long-term improvements in the country's economicperformance.

6. The Bank's performance at the project identification, preparation and appraisal stagewas unsatisfactory. In view of the weak management capacity available in Benin at the time ofproject preparation and appraisal, the Bank should have pursued more limited institutionaldevelopment objectives. Extensive discussions with the government and future project beneficiariesabout the role, performance and priorities of existing economic management institutions would haveshown that the government and the Bank did not have a common institutional development agenda.

7. The Bank's supervision performance was also unsatisfactory. Despite non-compliance withkey convenants in the DCA, disbursements were never suspended. The overall supervision input fell

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short of the Bank's commitment, formally expressed in the President's Report, to provide intensivesupervision. Supervision missions did not include training/institutional development specialists. Theproject also suffered from the lack of continuity in Bank supervision due to the frequent turnover ofBank staff. Although the project was to be jointly supervised by its cofinanciers, joint supervisionmissions were never organized.

8. The borrower's project preparation performance was generally unsatisfactory. Thegovernment produced a few reports and documents which alluded to major institutional problems butdid not propose adequate solutions. These reports did not reflect the need to coordinate the project'sdesign with the country's economic management and institutional development objectives. Thereview of preparation reports seems to indicate that the government preferred a piece-meal approachto technical assistance and training rather than the more comprehensive design recommended by theBank. With hindsight it appears that the government's approach may have been more suitable to thepolitical and institutional climate prevailing at that time.

9. The borrower's performance during project implementation was clearly deficient. Keycovenants in the Development Credit Agreement (DCA) were not complied with. The covenantswere essential to implementation and included restructuring of the Ministry of Planning, availabilityof counterpart staff to the TA personnel and systematic evaluation of the technical assistance.Training programs and their impact on the performance of the trainees were not monitored. Despiterecommendations in the report of auditors, project-financed vehicles and computers were notidentified. Overall, the government's commitment to the project was weak at all stages of theproject's cycle.

10. The outcome of the TA project is unsatisfactory. Although the project produced somevaluable outputs in terms of statistical and financial data, macroeconomic analyses and policyrecommendations, the project's institutional development objectives were not met. As indicated inparagraphs 13 and 28 of Part I of this report, a much smaller operation could have produced most ofthe limited benefits actually derived from the project.

11. Key Lessons Learned: The review of the project confirms lessons derived from similarstand alone TA projects: (i) a strong political commitment of the government is essential to projectsuccess and managers and staff assisted by the project should participate actively in the design of theoperation; (ii) the project's objectives and design should be based on a careful analysis of structures,operational processes and skills requirements of the institutions concerned. Where institutionalcapacity is weak, project objectives should be modest; (iii) monitoring of project implementation andevaluation of the performance of long term TA advisers should be based on detailed implementationplans and performance criteria; and (iv) the Bank should allocate adequate resources to projectsupervision; supervision missions should include an appropriate skills mix of economists/countryofficers and institutional development specialists capable of adjusting project design to changingcountry circumstances. Furthermore, a minimum of continuity in supervision staff is essential.

12. Experience with the TA project also shows that some of the most important projectachievements did not really need long-term technical assistance and could have been obtained withthe help of a smaller, flexible operation financing a variety of short-term activities, including strategypapers, audits, special studies, workshops and training.

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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORTREPUBLIC OF BENIN

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT FOR PLANNING AND ECONOMICMANAGEMENT

CREDIT 1530-BEN

PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT

A. EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES

1. In the mid-1970s, Benin opted for a marxist-leninist political, social and economic system.One of the principal objectives of the new government was to accelerate economic growththrough a major expansion of the economic role of the State. The powerful politburo of the singlepolitical party assumed responsibility for macroeconomic policies and monitored the activities ofall economic ministries. Economic growth accelerated significantly between 1976 and 1981, inpart due to the indirect impact on Benin's economy of an oil and uranium boom in Nigeria andNiger respectively. When Nigeria and Niger began to experience serious economic difficulties,Benin also went through a period of economic recession. Furthermore, economic institutions,weakened by fear and rent seeking, were unable to provide appropriate solutions to worseningeconomic problems. As fiscal and balance of payments deficits became unmanageable, due partlyto public enterprise (PE) losses, the government sought economic advice and financial supportfrom the donor community. It requested Bank technical assistance in June 1982 to strengthen itseconomic management, particularly its debt management agency which had been dysfunctional forseveral years.

2. The Bank responded positively to the government's request and proposed to help in threedifferent ways: first, technical assistance to improve economic management and develop nationalcapacities, second, a Public Enterprise Rehabilitation project, and third, the opening of a residentmission which would provide policy and operational advice to the government. The residentmission was opened in 1983. The Public Enterprise project became effective in 1987. TheTechnical Assistance Project for Planning and Economic Management (TA) was approved inDecember 1984 and became effective in September 1985.

3. The Bank's objective in making these three proposals was to develop a more confidentoperational relationship with Benin and to lay the groundwork for future macroeconomic andsectoral reforms when political and economic conditions would be more favorable to an extensivepolicy dialogue between the government and the Bank. The TA project was just one of theoperational instruments of the proposed strategy.

4. The main goal of the project was to strengthen the overall economic management capacityof the government by reinforcing institutions responsible for macroeconomic policy analysis,public finance management, project preparation and statistics. As described in the President'sreport, the project had six specific objectives: (i) improving the government's performance in theformulation of its development and economic management strategy; (ii) strengthening publicinvestment programming, budgeting and monitoring processes; (iii) improving project preparation

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and project evaluation; (iv) developing a coherent framework for public finance management; (v)strengthening agencies responsible for collecting and analyzing economic statistics; and (vi)providing training in economic analysis, statistics, project preparation, business accounting andbusiness management.

5. The project was expected to provide the government with a number of new economic andpublic finance management instruments. Its components included:

(a) Public Investment Programming mechanism that would help the Ministry ofPlanning: (i) design public investment programs based on realistic macroeconomicprojections and coherent sectoral priorities; and (ii) select, prepare and supportwell-conceived, high-priority development projects;

(b) a Budget Framework that would facilitate appropriate monitoring of public investmentprograms and expenditures;

(c) a Debt Management system, based on improved debt accounting practices, that wouldprovide the data and analysis necessary for effective debt portfolio management; and

(d) updated naional accounts and economic statisties.

6. Project inputs and outputs would include:

(a) data collection, economic analysis and policy advice by technical assistance personneLincluding 18 long-term advisers and a variety of short-term TA assignments;

(b) staff training in the form of (i) counterpart training by technical assistance personnel;(ii) local training programs; and (iii) fellowships for advanced studies abroad ineconomics, finance and statistics; and

(c) equipment and logistical support for a number of economic management agencies.

7. Although IDA was cognizant of existing political constraints and institutional weaknesses,it appeared that these could be overcome leaving Benin with an improved economic managementprocess. In retrospect, the project's objectives were overambitious considering the number ofobstacles to be overcome as a result of the country's circumstances when the project wasapproved.

* First, political conditions were not favorable to an open economic policy dialogue betweengovernment officials and technical assistance experts. This was a major constraint for implementinga TA project in the field of economic management. Intemational experts could help develop a more

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adequate data base for economic, public finance and debt management; they could also initiatedetailed economic/sectoral analyses and project preparation studies; but it was virtually impossibleto influence decisions made by the govemment on the basis of data and analyses provided by theproject.

* Second, the institutional framework was not consistent with the economic management processespromoted by the project. The mandates of the agencies concerned were ill-defined, and constantpolitical interference weakened official decision-making mechanisms.

* Third, the lack of motivation in the civil service and the fear inspired by the political leadershipwere also a major obstacle for running an effective staff development program. The quality ofBenin's civil service had been affected by the departure of some of its most competent officials whodid not support the govermment's political and economic policies. In addition, most of the juniorstaff who had joined the civil service at a later stage had not received the type of basic economictraining necessary to derive adequate benefits from more specialized economic and public financemanagement training. The local University was particularly weak in this field. Rather than on-the-job training and specialized training programs organized with the help of TA personnel, a "highereducation project" aimed at improving the curriculum of economic studies, strengthening theperformance of the economic faculty and organizing ad hoc training programs for governmentofficials, could have been a more effective method to achieve some of the training/staffdevelopment goals of the project.

8. The project objectives were never formally revised. However, in the late 1980s and theearly 1990s, the project was de facto restructured to better serve the objectives of threesuccessive structural adjustment programs. The new orientation of the TA project de-emphasizedthe use of long-term technical assistance personnel and emphasized the performance of morespecific tasks directly related to preparation and implementation of ongoing and future adjustmentprograms. In addition to specific macroeconomic and sectoral studies, the project was expected tocarry out a number of "audits" aimed at providing in-depth analysis of the objectives, performanceand institutional weaknesses of existing government agencies.

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES

9. The project did not achieve most of its training, capacity-building and institutionaldevelopment objectives. Little progress was made in terms of improving the public investmentprogramming and monitoring process. Better data was obtained on public debt, new borrowingsand actual disbursements; the performance of the Customs Department improved' and a revised"budget nomenclature" was prepared. The project, however, was unable to computerize debt andpublic finance information, due to poor project coordination. A training center was built and theproject eventually organized a number of specific training programs. In the absence of follow-up

I See paragraphs 20 and 39 below.

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by the civil service department, it is not possible to evaluate the quality and the impact of theseprograms. Most of the civil servants who were trained overseas never returned to their countrydespite stipulations that they return to serve.

10. Although eighteen long-term advisers were to be provided by the project, only eight wereactually recruited, due to weak project management and cumbersome administrative procedures.Overall, their performance was not satisfactory. Some of them produced useful data and analyses,but much of their output has been lost because of the poor quality of Benin's filing systems. TheICR completion mission was unable to identify any evidence of impact of TA personnel in termsof skills development of their Beninese counterparts.

11. The most useful components of the TA project were the studies, strategy papers and publicsector audits carried out by short term consultants in the context of the first, second and thirdadjustment programs. A study identified structural reforms and other measures necessary toimprove the competitiveness of Benin's economy as a result of the devaluation of the CFA franc.Organizational audits of five key Ministries2 provided the basis for institutional reformns to beimplemented in the context of the FY94 Economic Management project.

12. In other words, while technical assistance and training achieved very little, most of theother less ambitious project components were much more useful to the government and the Bank.Eventually, the TA project proved to be a flexible operational instrument which helped the Bankand the government improve their knowledge and understanding of key macroeconomic andsectoral issues. When the government, in 1986, established a committee responsible for preparingthe first structural adjustment program, the TA project financed several activities viewed asnecessary to identify policy and institutional reforms to be included in the program. Although thePerformance Report of the first structural adjustment program concludes that its results weremrixed, the program marks the beginning of a series of macroeconomic and sectoral reforms thathad a positive impact on the country's public sector management and economic performance.

13. Overall, less than half of the project components (in terms of share of total project costs)produced useful outputs. Long term technical assistance for institutional development hadvirtually no impact. In other words, a much smaller operation financing a wide variety of specificactivities (audits, special studies, macroeconomic and sectoral strategy papers, strategydiscussions, workshops, special training programs), for which there was a demand in the country,could have achieved most of the benefits actually derived from the TA project.

C. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT

14. The general insecurity that prevailed during the political transition from 1988 to 1991slowed down project implementation and weakened the proposed institutional development effort.

2 Ministry of Commerce and Tourism, Ministry of Energy, Mining and Hydraulics, Ministry of Industry and Small and Medium businesses,Ministry of Public Works and Transport and Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Affairs.

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15. Frequent changes in government personnel, including project coordinators, also affectedproject execution. Newly appointed project coordinators often did not have the skills necessary tohandle many different project activities, government departments, TA advisers and donoragencies. Overwhelmed by routine administrative tasks and procurement procedures on behalf ofweak implementing agencies, project coordinators could not perform their principal role ofcoordinating and monitoring training and technical assistance.

16. Delays in recruiting TA personnel defeated the coherence of the overall technicalassistance program.3 Eventually the macroeconomist recruited under the project assumed the roleof project coordinator and, therefore, was unable to deliver expected outputs in the field ofmacroeconomic analysis.

17. Existing institutional set ups were a major obstacle to improving economic managementprocesses particularly when they involved several government agencies. The specific functions ofindividual agencies and procedures for inter-agency coordination were not clearly defined. Themandate and the structure of the Ministry of Planning, a vital agency for the TA project, wasinadequate. The Ministry was unable to coordinate preparation of sound development strategiesand coherent public investment programs. It was not equipped to monitor ongoing projects.Finally, the government had to create a new institution - a Special Inter-ministerial Committee - tohandle preparation of the first structural adjustment program in 1986.

18. Information systems were also inadequate. Lack of established procedures for thecirculation of information, and poor filing systems, prevented potential users to have access tostudies, reports and other project outputs produced by TA personnel. During the ICR mission, thegovernment was unable to find copies of key reports produced under the project.

19. Weak civil service management systems also influenced the project's performance.Appointments of agency managers were not coordinated with ongoing programs aimed atstrengthening the agencies. No significant effort was made to identify training needs and tointegrate training assignments into career development plans. Often staff trained under the projectwere appointed to positions unrelated to the training they had received.

20. Managers of implementing agencies were not properly briefed about the project'sobjectives and procedures. TA personnel was often used for activities which were not inaccordance with their terms of reference. Lack of secretarial support, computers and equipmentwas also a major problem for many long-term advisers, with the notable exception of FAC-financed experts (French Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation) assigned to the Customs Department.

3 A major feature of the project was the coherence and the coordination of various activities to be performned by project-financed long-termradvisers.

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Directly supervised by the French resident mission in Cotonou, FAC-financed advisers werealways provided with the logistical support needed to perform their functions.

21. A combination of the lack of a well prepared training program before the beginning ofproject implementation and the poor performance of TA personnel responsible for trainingresulted in a delay in project implementation and affected the overall quality of the project'straining component. This training component was restructured in 1992. Emphasis was placed onshort-term training in statistics and accounting for the Statistics Department. About 40 staffmembers of Statistics were trained under the project.

22. The project also suffered from the lack of continuity in Bank supervision. New staff wasunaware of views expressed and recommendations made by previous "supervisors". In additionthe response of headquarters staff to government requests for comments/non-objection was notalways as prompt and diligent as desirable.

23. A particular feature of the TA project was that it was cofinanced by the Bank and fourother bilateral and multilateral donors. Coordination between donors proved to be a difficult task.Differences in procedures and policies complicated project management and implementation. Adisagreement between the Bank and the United Nations Department of Technical Cooperationand Development (UNTCD) weakened project supervision. Because UNTCD was responsible forassisting the project coordinator, it challenged the right of the Bank to supervise the project andreceive detailed accounts on project expenditures. The problem was eventually resolved when theUNDP replaced UNTCD as cofinancier of the project.

24. The resident mission made a useful contribution to the project. The review suggests thatthe mission made effective use of some of the project's output to influence government officialsand stimulate their interest in policy analysis and eventually policy reforms. In 1991, the residentmission assumed full responsibility for the supervision of the project and played a leading role inre-orienting project activities in support of ongoing structural adjustment programs.

D. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY

25. The achievements of the TA project are limited and are not sustainable. The modestcontribution of the project to the design and implementation of three structural adjustmentprograms will have a lasting impact if these programs mark the beginning of long-termimprovements in the country's economic performance. Similarly the audits of governmentagencies were used in the preparation of an Economic Management project which was approvedby the Executive Directors in FY94. The design of the Economic Management project took intoaccount lessons of the TA project's experience. There is no evidence of long-term benefits thatmay have been derived from the other project components.

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E. BANK PERFORMANCE

26. The Bank performance at the project identification, preparation and appraisal stagewas unsatisfactory. A Bank economic mission in 1982 identified a number of critical economicmanagement and long-term priority development issues which needed to be addressed by thegovernment and the Bank. The mistake was to conclude that long-term technical assistance couldachieve significant capacity-building and institutional development objectives considering thecountry's political and institutional environment in the early 1 980s. The character of the regime inplace did not permit consideration of significant reforms of existing institutional structures andeconomic management processes. A political revolution, not a group of long-term advisers,eventually changed the country's attitudes and economic policies. Training was perhaps a morefeasible short-term objective, but not on-the-job in a highly inadequate institutional environment.In addition, the project's preparation work did not include preparation of a training program. Awell-prepared training program, based on a competent assessment of training demand and trainingneeds, would have helped identify institutional and other conditions necessary to make the trainingprogram relevant and effective. In this context, withdrawing EDI experts from the Bankpreparation team because of budget constraints was an unfortunate decision. EDI's experience intraining would have been a major asset for project preparation.

27. In view of Benin's situation at the time of project preparation and appraisal, the Bankshould have pursued more limited institutional development objectives. Extensive discussions withthe government and future project beneficiaries about the role, performance and priorities ofexisting economic management institutions would have shown that the government and the Bankdid not have a common institutional development agenda. A comprehensive technical assistanceand institutional reform program was therefore unrealistic.

28. The rationale for the Bank decision to go ahead with the project in FY85 was theassumption that economic and political conditions can evolve rapidly. Sudden transformations inthe country's environment could offer opportunities for policy and institutional dialogue which theBank should not miss. Indeed, Benin's example shows that sudden political changes during projectimplementation are possible and require a rapid response by the Bank. In such circumstances theavailability of a flexible operational instrument, like an ongoing TA project, can be particularlyuseful. In this regard, the Benin TA project proved to be an extremely valuable instrument duringthe political transition, when the country was beginning to understand the need for change andsought Bank assistance for defining the most urgent economic management and institutionalreforms that should be initiated in the context of structural adjustment programs. However, asindicated in paragraph 13, there was no need for a large technical assistance project to takeadvantage of these opportunities. A much smaller operation could have financed all the audits,studies, workshops and training programs necessary to analyze and begin to addressmacroeconomic, sectoral and institutional issues identified by the government and the Bank.

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29. The project design did not take into account important factors which were already knownwhen the project was appraised and had a strong negative impact on project implementation.Parts I and III of the appraisal report accurately described most of the constraints that affectedinstitutional capacities. Nevertheless, Part IV described project objectives that largely ignoredthese constraints. In addition, the complexity of the project was not adequately recognized.Managing a multi-component, multi-agency and multi-donor project was obviously beyond thecapacity of the Ministry of Planning.

30. The Bank's supervision performance was also unsatisfactory. The overall supervisioninput fell short of the Bank's commitment, formally expressed in the President's Report, to provideintensive supervision.4 Economists and Country Officers were responsible for supervising the TAproject. Supervision missions never included training/institutional development specialists. ThePresident's report also promised that the project would be jointly supervised by its cofinanciers.There is no evidence in the Files that joint supervision missions were ever organized.

31. Ten of the fourteen supervision missions were staffed by staff who had never beenassociated with previous missions concerning the Benin TA project. A review of supervisionreports shows that new reports seldom reflected the findings and the concerns of previousmissions. There was an obvious lack of consistency and continuity in the analyses andrecommendations of successive supervision missions. The Bank does not appear to have takenactions to remedy non-compliance to project covenants by the borrower.5

32. In 1991, the resident mission assumed full responsibility for project supervision (andbecame the task manager for the project). The mission, however, was never provided withadditional resources to carry out its new functions.

F. BORROWER PERFORMANCE

33. The borrower's project preparation performance was generally unsatisfactory. Thegovernment produced a few reports and documents which alluded to major institutional problemsbut did not propose adequate solutions. These reports did not reflect the need to coordinate theproject's design with the country's economic management and institutional developmentobjectives. The review of preparation reports seems to indicate that the government preferred apiece-meal approach to technical assistance and training rather than the more comprehensivedesign recommended by the Bank. With hindsight it appears that the government was probablyright considering political and institutional constraints prevailing at that time.

Out ef'80 rffweeks alocaled to ipervisu n zmring poject imnplementation, only 12 stdaffweeks wee in the field, excluding time spent by theresident nission in support of headquarters' supervision missions.

Only one supervision report contained mandatory infonnation on legal covenants. Until 1991, performance ratings in the supervisionreports did not adequately reflect that the project major objectives were comproniised and that implementation was unsatisfactory.

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34. The borrower's performance during project implementation was clearly deficient. Keycovenants in the Development Credit Agreement (DCA) were not complied with. The Ministry ofPlanning did not reorganize the Directorate responsible for public investment programming, aspromised during negotiations. The government did not make the agreed contribution to theproject financing in the form of additional staff in support of technical assistance personnel. Thereis no record of systematic evaluations of TA experts by their superiors. No effort was made toensure continuity in the management of the project. Both the officers in charge of projectcoordination and the counterparts to TA personnel changed frequently. The Ministry of Planning,which was responsible for project management, did not take corrective actions to improve theperformance of TA personnel. Training programs and their impact on the performance of thetrainees were not monitored.6 Despite recommendations in the report of auditors, project-financedvehicles and computers were not identified. In other words the government's commitment to theproject was weak at all stages of the project's cycle.

G. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME

35. The outcome of the TA project is unsatisfactory. While the project produced valuableoutputs in terms of statistical and financial data, macroeconomic analyses and policyrecommendations, the project's institutional development objectives were not met. As indicated inparagraphs 13 and 28, a much smaller operation could have produced most of the limited benefitsactually derived from the project.

H. FUTURE OPERATIONS

36. A US$5.2 million Economic Management (Projet d'Appui a la Gestion Economique,PAGE) project was appraised in 1993 and approved by the Executive Directors in 1994. The newproject aims at improving the structure and operations of the same agencies that were expected tobenefit from the TA project. The design of the Economic Management project avoids some of themost obvious shortcomings of the TA project. It uses only short-term technical assistance,drawing mostly from local or regional resources.7 A national training center competes with othertraining institutions to meet training needs which were evaluated before project became effective.A recently created national capacity-building committee matches identified training requirementsin the civil service with existing training programs in the country. There is a clear agreementbetween the government and the Bank on the type of institutional reforms' to be carried out in thecontext of the project. A detailed training program was prepared and discussed with beneficiaries

6 During the ICR mnission, the goverunent was unable to indicate who had received training and which positions were occupied by thetrainees before and after the training prograns.

7 TThe project was recently restructured and the long-tern TA component was eliminated.

Based on audits carried out during the TA project.

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before project appraisal. The Civil Service Department will update personnel files, now linked tothe payroll file, and will take into consideration training received in future decisions concerningappointments and promotions.

37. The project was restructured in early 1995 to improve beneficiary participation at allstages of project implementation. The main focus of project activities will be on realistic economicmanagement objectives. To correct the shortcomings as regards the training component of the TAproject, the restructured PAGE provides for a detailed training needs assessment of all staff to betrained under the project as well as a monitoring system of the training obtained. A detailedproject implementation manual specifies performance indicators to be monitored during projectsupervision. Continuity is being maintained in supervision which is carried out by the ResidentMission.

L KEY LESSONS LEARNED

38. The review of the TA project in Benin confirms lessons derived from similar stand-alonetechnical assistance projects:

(a) a strong political commitment of the government is essential to the success of theproject;

(b) managers and staff of the agencies assisted by the project should participate actively inthe design of the operation;

(c) the project's objectives and design should be based on careful analysis of structures,operational processes and skills requirements of the institutions concemed. Whereinstitutional capacity is weak, project objectives should be modest;

(d) flexibility in adapting the project to changing circumstances is required;

(e) adequate attention should be accorded to project management and coordination issues,particularly for projects involving several agencies;

(f) monitoring of project implementation and evaluation of the perfomiance of long termTA advisers should be based on detailed implementation plans and performancecriteria. In fact, in line with the Afiica Region's guidelines for long term TA, suchassistance should no longer be provided, except under special circumstances with verytight pre-conditions;

(g) the Bank should allocate adequate resources to project supervision; supervisionmissions should include an appropriate skills mix of economists/country officers and

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institutional development specialists. Furthermore, a minimum of continuity in projectsupervision staff is essential; and

(h) training should only be provided on the basis of detailed training needs assessments andcontinuous monitoring of the trainees, including the provision of follow-up training.

39. The Bank does not seem to have a comparative advantage when it comes to planning andmonitoring the employment of long term technical assistance. Bilateral agencies appear to bebetter equipped to handle resident advisers, as evidenced by the better performance of the FAC-financed component in the context of the Benin TA project.

40. Experience of the TA project also shows that some of the most important projectachievements did not really need long-term technical assistance and could have been obtained withthe help of a smaller, flexible operation financing a variety of short-term activities, includingstrategy papers, audits, special studies, workshops and also training. This is the way many otherTA projects were effectively restructured at the end of project implementation when all the longterm advisers had already left the country. Eager to improve their knowledge and understandingof specific macroeconomic, sectoral and institutional issues, the Bank and the government usedthe undisbursed balance to promote a number of specific activities which proved to be much morevaluable than the original project components.

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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORTREPUBLIC OF BENIN

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT FOR PLANNING AND ECONOMICMANAGEMENT

CREDIT 1530-BEN

PART 1I: STATISTICAL ANNEXES

Table 1: Summary of AssessmentTable 2: Related Bank CreditsTable 3: Project TimetableTable 4: Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and ActualTable 5: Key Indicators for Project ImplementationTable 6: Key Indicators for Project OperationTable 7: Studies Included in ProjectTable 8A: Project CostsTable 8B: Project FinancingTable 9: Economic Costs and BenefitsTable 10: Status of Legal CovenantsTable 11: Compliance with Operational Manual StatementsTable 12: Bank Resources: Staff InputsTable 13: Bank Resources: Missions

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Table 1: Summary of Assessments

A. Achievement of Objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not applicableMacro Policies

Sector Policies IFinancial Objectives

Institutional Development IPhysical Objectives

Poverty Reduction

Gender Issues .1Other Social Objectives IEnvironmental Objectives IPublic Sector Management .1Private Sector Development VI

B. Project Sustainability Likely UnUkely Uncertain

C. Bank Performance Highlysatisfactory Satisfactory Deficient

Identification V

Preparation Assistance

Appraisal 'ISupervision /

D. Borrower Performance Highlysatisfactory Satisfactory Ddicient

Preparation /Implementation

Covenant Compliance I

E. Assessment of Outcome Highly Elighlysatisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory nusatisfactory

.

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Table 2: Related Bank Credits

Cradit Titi. ~~Purps Year Of Stts

_________________________ ~~~Approval _ _ _ _

Public Enterprise Sector To assist the Govenment in the 1987 ClosedRehabilitation (Credit 1748- rehabilitation of its public and parapublicBEN) enterprise.

SAL I (Credit 2023-BEN) To support a fundamnental reorientation of 1989 Closedthe economy away from state interventiontowards greater reliance on market forces.

SAL II (Credit 2283-BEN) To support the second phase of the 1991 ClosedGovernment's Structural AdjustmentProgram.

Projet d'Appui a la Gestion Economic Management Support Project 1994 On-goingEconomique (Credit 2552-BEN)

SAL HI (Credit 2727-BEN) To support the implementation of key 1995 On-goingmeasures designed to strengthen the supplyresponse to the devaluation of the CFA francand to consolidate reforms initiated since1990. ,,, .. -

Table 3: Project Timetable

Steosi i Proiect Cycle Date Planned Date Actual/Latest EstimateIdentification June 1982 June 1982

Preparation June 1982

Appraisal December 1983 December 1983

Negotiations October 1984 October 1984

Board Presentation December 13, 1984

Signig February 28, 1985

Effectiveness June 1985 September 13, 1985

ProjectCompletion March 31, 1991 March31, 1994

Credit Closing ___________November 4, 1994

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Table 4: Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual(UJSS million)

FY8S FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91 I FY92 FY93 FY94

AppraisalEstimate 0.5 1.6 2.7 3.6 4.2 4.6 5.0 - - -

Actual 0 0.4 0.9 1.4 2.4 3.0 3.8 4.4 5.1 5.4Actual as % ofEstimate 0% 25% 33% 39% 57% 65% 76% - - -

Date of finalDisbursement November 4, 1994

Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation

Key IZplementation Indicators in President's Report Estimated Actual

Planning and Project Preparation1. Strengthen mnacroeconomic analysis May 1988 June 198812. Improve project analysis and selection capability May 1987 May 199023. Strengthen link between investment programs and budget May 1987 May 199034. Improve industrial project preparation and supervision May 1987 May 198745. Develop livestock sector program June 1987 Not implemented

Public Finance Management6. Improve the operations of the CAA March 1986 January 1990'7. Improve budget structure June 1986 Not implemented8. Improve the operations of the Treasury March 1986 Not implemented9. Strengthen generation of public finance statistics and related January 1987 Not implementedindicators10. Evaluate customs operations January 1987 Not implemented

Statistics11. Improve basic statistics produced December 1988 February 19906

Training12. Assessment of training needs in key ministries and agencies August 1988 January 19877and design of training program for counterpart staff13. Improve skills in project preparation and supervision June 1987 N/A s14. Improve skills for business accounting December 1987 N/A15. Improve skills in tax auditing December 1986 N/A

I TA was laid off due to incompetence; as a result objective was not met.

2 TA resigned after 1 year due to bad working conditions; as a result objective was not met.

3 Objective was partially achieved.

4 Objective was not met.

s Objective was partially achieved.

6 Objective partially achieved.

7 Objective was partially achieved.

8 Not available

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Table 6A: Key Indicators for Project Operation

KVey Opeh Ini catorsit Esdnmed TA Experts Estaftd Re__ts Actu TA Experts Atual Rendla Cornf t

PriM * Repet (Mf) I::::::__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Inpu b :: ,_ _ ;_::__ _ (ha) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ :_:

Part :A Planning and ProjectPreparation1. Stegthen m _acroeconomcs Macreconomist 1. Improved analysis and Macroconomist Target not met Expert was laid off due toanalysis (36 mr/mr) projections to produce 'Notes (36 m/m) inc _ee Expert

de Conjuncture" quarterly assued the role of-i o conwhaainded of Task sagned

2. Improve project analysis Project Analyst 2. Introduction of formal Projec Analyst Expert (12 Actual target wa not iet Expert rigned after I yearand selection caability (24 m/m) project analysis and selection m/rm) Howvvre following were bad

imiplaenuted: cnkos

* Analysis of thesituation.

* P-Hnazy preparationfor orgnizing projectsanaly*is and

* Organization of project_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ cyclc.

3. Strne link bdween Investment Prgrmmer 3. Established procedure Pro Expsat Target w partiml etLinveshment prograns and (24 m/n beginning 6/85) linking invesment program (24 m/ni, Mardc 19S6-June The following werebudget with anTent budget 1990) itnpl in v

* Set-up investmentp rmgan over seveal

* Elaborated a metbod for

m St-ups technique for

program baalweexaaatim aNW

* Prepard a computermanual for use in

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~training prograns.4. Inmprve industrial project Industrial Advisor (24 rn/mn 4. Formal industrial project (24 rn/rn) Targe not suetprepaation and supervision ________ preparation procedures _______

5. Develop livestock sector Livestock Advisory Services 5. Livestock sector strategy August 86 - November 87 Target not meL Expert's work and finlu reportprogram (36 m/m) (15 m/m) did not meet component

objective

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operating Judietors In Estimat TA Experts Estuaa Resus Actual TA _pert Act1 Rels C _Predsdut's Rqert (11mW) Inpub

_b _) .

Part: B Public FinanceManagmrent

6. hnprove the operations of (i) Acontng Advisor (6 6. Adaptation of CAA's 2 experts were rcruited for I Tsget w not achieved. The computa zaion of thethe CAA mr/n) counting to suit National year. Computer expert and National public debt

Acudting plan Accuning expert The following were mn_nemet was n(ii) Computer Syse Cmputerization of national (12 rn/m) implemented: achieved.Analyst (9 n/rn) public debt management * A diagosis study ofthe

operations CAA.* A dafting of a manual

for accoutingprocedures; and

* In fomation system forCAA

7. Improve budget structure Public Finance System 7. Introduction of uniform Expert recruited from the Target wa achievedSpecialist (12 m/n) budget nomenclature nternational Monetary Fund Introduced budget

(IMF) for 2 years nomenclature(24 rn/m)r

S. Improve the operations of (i) Accountant 8 Revision of accounting Two experts were recruited Targt not achieved The expats left the countrythe Treasury (ii) Computer Specialist procedures and regulations, under FAC flnancing No activity and did not accomplished the

(9 mrlm) updating and computerization task.of Treasury accounts

9. Strenghen generation of Economic Statistician 9. Procedures for regular Target not achieved The experts left the countrypublic finance statistics and specialized in public finance production of public finance No activity and did not accomplished therelated indicators (18 m/mn) data and economic indicators task.

10. Evaluate customs Short-tem consultants 10. Genral diagnosis ofthe Implemented Under FAC T t partaByoperations (6 m/m) 'Direction des Douanes"and financing arget ba iall

inter alia evaluation ofthe a foploenng:custofms collectionsthfooig

* Evaluation of customsduties;

* A study oftaniffprotection systen; andthe taxation system;

* A stdy of pricing andprice fixing; and

• Audit of the customs

depaitment- and areform of the customsYtimf

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Key Opeting _adicotorm in I aUmatd TA EzPes R0 Reot Acta TA Ezpet* ACta DaRftu

Part: C: Statiatica

11. Improve basic statistics National Accots and odher 11 Improved procedur for 2 Expeat Target parpaly achevedproduced by the National mu ro-datistics specialists (36 production of national (24 m/m) The prodution of nationlInstitute of Economics and o r) aer mum dat was pa-. iySaiical Analysis (INSAE) irroved_

Expeditu Survey Advisors 12 Household eenitr No record of what was(60 m/m) survey ad results actually achievedDemographer (IS n/rm) 13 Analysis and publication N/A T u a eved

of 1979 census and 1983 The analyis and publication

survey results ~~~~~~of the 1979 cimia wasachieved; hower, 1983suvey rults was partiallyachieved

Part: D - Training

14. Asment of tining Training advisor (I n/rm) 14. Assemet of taining N/A Targd wa pardaiy mat by The expert's recommendedneeds in key ministries and needs of Goverment hmplenenting the folowing: seminar and short-termdesign of training program for agencies. Implementation of Evalusfion of tra Oining were notcounrput staff specific training progms for inip anat med

Benin's profesionals workingas cuterpw with the * Seminar on stafftechnical assistants development in the

)Dpatmn desEtuks et de laProgrammation (DEP)"'

* Organization of fieldtrip to Lom6, Togo bysenior staff of BCP.

15. Improving skills in In-service training program in 15. Increased projed analysis Target not metprojeet preWration and project preparation, analysis capability No Activitysupervision and supervision

16. Improving skills in Training program in business 16. Improved accounting Target not met Staff did not return to Beninbusiness aouting accouning skills and improved No Activity

accunting procedures inpublic and private entrpriss

17. Improved skills in tax Experinced tax auditor with 17. Two tax auditing brigades Target t metaudhing training capabilities (6 m/m) of about five members each. No Activity

Incased Govenmnentcapability to collect taxe

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Table 6BFellowships for Training Abroad

Estbudtd Result Actl Couwes D ple Length of Counr/ nd Commentseased Places

Grduate studies in Business Administaion 2 years - Montrealecononics, financalanalysis, and statistics

Agricultural Economics 2 years - FranceMacroeconomics Modeling NA

Planning and Evaluation of Projects 2 years - FrancePlanning 9 months - SenegalEnterprise Management I year Candidate failed the final examinationAccounting 2 years - FranceTaxes 2 years - FranceSpecialty in Public Administration 10 monthsSpeciaty in charge of Personnel 28 daysManagemenKSpecialty in Administration 10 daysManagementSpecialty in Accounting 17 daysSpecialty in Managemern and 10 daysAdministrationSpecialty in Banking 6 monthsSpecialty in Banking and I yearCollectionSpecialty in National Commission 3 daysof verification of goods' a

ESTIMATED STUDENT YEAR 12

No records of trainees sent abroad have return to theACTUAL STUDENT YEARS 14.90 country, employed or re-employed as originally

aIreedi

hitodued during project irnplementation

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Table 6CSummary of Estimate and Actual Technical Assistance Provided

(in staff months by component)

Component Estimated Actual

Planning and Project preparation 138 111Public Finance Management 63 60Statistics 114 0Total 315 171Actual % of staff months used _ 54%

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Table 7: Studies Included in Project

Study Purpose as Defined Status Impact of Studyat appraisal/Redefined l

1. Audit sur organisation de cinq (5) Audit of the MEMH. Completed Lead to action planministeres MCT, MIPME, MTPT and implemented under the FY94

MTEAS' Economic ManagementPrograms

2. Conseillers Chargds de l'amdlioration de la N/A2 N/A N/Agestion du personnel de l'Etat

3. Convention etude et prestation du personnel N/A N/A N/A

4. Etude du sous-secteur de l'e1evage et Liquidation of selected Completed Consultants recommendationI'etablissement d'une strategie et d'un Banks. was not implementedProgramme pour son Ddveloppement

5. Etude de Prd-inspection COTECNA (Pre- A pre-shipment inspectionInspection Company) company in Benin has been

maintained and customs hasimproved

6. Etude sur la Competitivitd de L'Economie The impact of CFA franc Completed Lead to action plan of reformsdu Benin devaluation under SAL III

I MEMH = Ministry of Energy, Mining and Hydraulics; MCT = Ministry of Commerce and Tourism; MIPME = Ministiyof Industry and Small and Medium Businesses; MTPT = Ministry of Public Works and Transport and MTEAS = Ministryof Labor, Employment and Social Affairs.

2 N/A = Not available

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Table 8A: Project Costs

ApprAisa ActualEstimate ~~~~(USSM)

Loa Foreign TOWal Local Foreign TotalItcm:000 C01::::: :: osts : Co : : :co:C,::sts coot Cost

1. Planning and Project Preparation 0.3 1.4 1.7 0.4 1.5 1.9

2. Public Finance Management 0.2 0.7 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0

3. Statistics 0.2 0.6 0.8 0.1 0.6 0.7

4. Training 0.4 0.7 1.1 0.4 0.3 0.7

5. Fellowships 0.4 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.7

6. Activities to be identified 0.2 1.0 1.2 0.1 0.7 0.8

7. Equipment and Vehicles 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.3

TOTAL 1.3 5.4 6.7 2.0 4.1 6.1

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Table 8B: Project Financing

Appraisal Estimate (US$M) Actual/Latest Estimate(US$M)

Local Foreign Total Local Foreign TotalSource Costs Costs Costs Costs

IDA 0.9 4.1 5.0 1.0 2.4 3.4

IJNDP 0.3 1.4 1.7 0.3 1.4 1.7

FAC 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.7

EDF 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.1 '0.1

UNFPA - 0.2 0.2 - 0.2 0.2

Government 0.3 - 0.3 0.1 - 0.1

TOTAL 1.9 6.6 8.7 1.6 4.6 6.2

Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits

NOT APPLICABLE

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Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants

Credit C:wfant Premet Originl RevisedA0gww t : type 0 s ts i: hulfilh t i:h|:::t :Deserlinlon .1 :tet Comnenb

Sction _ _ _ _ _ ~~~date date _ _ _ _ _ _

3.01 (a) 5 CP The Borrower declares its commitment to the objectives of the Project as set No commentsforth in schedule 2 to this Agreement, and, to this end, shall carry out theProject through its ministries and agencies referred to in Schedule 2 in thisAgreement under the overall responsibility of the Ministry of Plan andStatistics (MPS) with due diligence and efficiency and in conformity withappropriate planning, training, administrative and financial practices, and shallprovide, promptly as needed, the funds, facilities, services and other resourcesrequired for the purpose.

3.01(b) 5 CP To assist MWS in discharging its responsibility under paragraph (a) above, the No commentsBorrower shall: (i) maintain within MPS a project unit, headed by theDireceur de la Coopkration Tecknique as Project Coordinator, including anaccountant, administrative officer and a secretary, and assisted by a trainingadviser, and (ii) maintain in position four Chiefs of Operations, who under thedirection of the Project Coordinator, shall be responsible for theimplementation of Parts A, B.l, B.2, and C of the Project, respectively. _

3.02(a) 5 CP In order to assist the Borrower in canrying out the Project, the Borrower shall Due to weak managementemploy consultants and experts, including, nter a&, those consultants and and administrativeexperts listed in Schedule 5 to this Agreement, whose qualifications, difficulties linked to aexperience and terms and conditions of employment shall be satisfactory to the multi-donor environment,Association and such consultants and experts to be financed out of the proceeds only eight advisers wereof the Credit shall be selected in accordance with principles and procedures recruited instead ofsatisfactory to the Association on the basis of the Guidelines for the Use of eighteen envisaged in theConsultants by World Bank Borrowers and by the World Bank as Executing projectAgency published by the Bank in August 1981.

3.02.(b) 5 CP Without limitation to its obligations under paragraph (a) of this Section and No commentssubject to the provisions of said paragraph, the Borrower shall employspecialized consulting firms or agencies, satisfactory to the Association, toassist it in the hiring and monitoring of consultants and experts for, inter alia,Parts A.l and 2, B and C of the Project.

3.02.(c) 5 CP The Borrower shall take all reasonable measures to facilitate the work of the Most of the experts did notconsultants, experts, consulting finms or agencies employed for the Project in serve their full term due tothe performance of their services thereof and make available to them all poor working conditions,informnation required for such work. and disagreements with the

Government

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Credit Covenant Present Original RevisedAgreement type status fulfillment fulfillment Description of covenant Comments

Section date date3.02(d) 5 CP Except as the Borrower and the Association shall otherwise agree, as well as No evidence that it had

the EDF, the Republic of France acting through FAC, the UNDP and the been complied with or notUNFPA, to the extent that they shall be concerned, the Borrower shall notamend or waive any of the terms and conditions of employment of theconsultants, experts, consulting finns or agencies referred to in paragraphs (a)and (b) of this Section, or grant any material extension of time or any approvalof sub-contracts or modifications thereof, or agree to any substitution ofpersonnel of such consultants, experts, consulting firns or agencies, orsuspend payments under, or terminate, any contract with such consultants,experts, consulting firns or agencies.

3.02.(e) 9 NC At the end of the first year of employment of each resident consultant and No records on theexpert and upon completion of tasks performed by short-term consultants and evaluation of consultants'experts, the Borrower, acting through the Project Coordinator, shall make an performanceevaluation of the performance of each such consultant and expert and exchangeview thereon with the Association.

3.03.(a) 5 CP The Borrower shall assign to each resident consultant or expert before arrival at Was not fully compliedhis duty station local counterpart staff with qualifications satisfactory to the with due to high staffAssociation and an adequate number of support staff. turnover

3.03.(b) 5 NC The Borrower shall appoint two public finance statisticians to work full time as Same as abovecounterparts to the resident economic statistician specialized in public financeunder Part B. I (iii) of the Project.

3.04. 5 CP The Borrower undertakes to reorganize and thereafter maintain the Bureau Same as aboveCentral des Projets of the MPS referred to in Part A, I (iii) of the Project withfunctions and responsibilities satisfactory to the Association and with qualifiedstaff in adequate numbers.

3.05 9 C Before undertaking any training program under Part D of the Project, the Project was reshaped toBorrower, acting through the Project Coordinator, shall furnish to the focus on short-termAssociation, for its approval, a detailed proposal for each program, including a trainingreasoned justification, plan of execution, and list of supporting services to beprovided thereof

3.06(a) 9 C Before awarding any fellowship under Part E of the Project, the Borrower, No commentsacting through the Project Coordinator, shall furnish to the Association for itsapproval the qualifications of the candidates for such fellowship.

3.06.(b) 5 CP Upon successful completion of their studies, the Borrower shall employ No evidence thatfellowship recipients in the positions for which they shall have been trained and fellowship recipients haverequire them to serve at least three years in said positions. been employed

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Credit covenvan Preset Original ReviedAgre lmt type status fulffllmnt fuffiflihent Description of covenant Comments

;Section : :::: date date i: ______:_:_; _;_:: ________________:__i_:_;_: _ :3.07. 9 C Before undertaking any technical assistance, study or training activity under No comments

Part F of the Project, the Borrower, acting through the Project Coordinator,shall prepare and furish to the Association for its approval a detailed proposalfor each such assistance, study or activity, including a reasoned justification,plan of execution and list of supporting services to be provided therefor.

3.08.(a) 4 C The Borrower undertakes to insure, or make adequate provision for the No commentsinsurance of, the imported goods to be financed out of the proceeds of theCredit against hazards, incident to the acquisition, transportation and deliverythereof to the place of use or installation, and for such insurance any indennityshall be payable in a currency freely usable by the Borrower to replace or repairsuch goods.

3.08(b) 5 CP The Borrower shall cause all goods and services financed out of the proceeds of No evidence. Vehicles andthe Credit to be used exclusively for the purpose of the project. personal computers not

identified as Governmentproperty

3.09(a) 9 CD The Borrower shall furnish to the Association, promptly upon their preparation, No comments ospecifications, reports, contract documents and procurement schedules for theProject, and any material modifications thereof or additions thereto, in suchdetail as the Association shall reasonably request.

3.09.(b) I CP The Borrower: (i) shall rnaintain records and procedures adequate to record Computer and trainingand monitor the progress of the Project (including its cost and the benefits to be center are poorly designedderived from it), to identify the goods and services financed out of the proceeds and ill-equippedof the Credit, and to disclose their use in the Project; (ii) shall enable theAssociation's representatives to visit the facilities included in the Project andto examine the goods financed out of the proceeds of the Credit and anyrelevant records and documents; and (iii) shall furnish to the Association atregular intervals all such information as the Association shall reasonablyrequest concening the Project, its cost and, where appropriate, the benefits tobe derived from it, the expenditure of the proceeds of the Credit and the goodsand services financed out of such proceeds.

3.09.(c) 9 CP Without limitation or restriction to the generality of the provision of paragraphs No comments(a) and (b) above, the Borrower shall cause the Project Coordinator: (i) toprepare and, commencing July 1, 1985 and thereafter, not later than DecemberI of each year, furnish to the Association for its review and approval proposedannual work plans and budgets for the execution of the Project; (ii) not laterthan July 31 and December 31 of each year, to prepare or have prepared a

_ semiannual progress report, of such scope and in such detail as the Association

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Credit Covenant Present Original RevisedAgreement type status fulfillment fulfillment Description of covenant Comments

Section date date _ l

shall reasonably request, on each part of the Project showing, inter alia,training results, policies developed and institutional changes produced andexpenditures made to date, and review each such report with the Chiefs ofOperations; and (iii) promptly thereafter, to furnish each such report to theAssociation.

3.09.(d) 5 C Upon the award by the Borrower of the contract for goods or services to be No commentsfinanced out of the proceeds of the Credit, the Association may publish adescription thereof, the name and nationality of the party to whom the contractwas awarded and the contract price

3.09(e) 9 CP Promptly after completion of the Project, but in any event not later than six Pending audit reportmonths after the Closing Date or such later date as may be agreed for thispurpose between the Borrower and the Association, the Borrower shall prepareand furnish to the Association a report, of such scope and in such detail as theAssociation shall reasonably request, on the execution and initial operation ofthe Project, its cost and the benefits derived and to be derived from it, theperfornance by the Borrower and the Association of their respective obligationsunder the Development Credit Agreement and the accomplishment of the

._______ _______ ________ purposes of the Credit.

4.01 (a) I CP The Borrower shall maintain or cause to be maintained separate accounts and No comments

records adequate to reflect in accordance with consistently maintainedappropriate accounting practices the operations, resources and expenditures, inrespect of the Project, of the departments or agencies of the Borrowerresponsible for carrying out the Project or any part thereof

4.01 (b) I CP Without limitation to the foregoing, the Borrower shall: (i) maintain or cause to Pending audit reportbe maintained separate accounts reflecting all expenditures on account of whichwithdrawals are requested from the Credit Account on the basis of statementsof expenditure; (ii) retain until one year after the Closing Date, all records(contracts, orders, invoices, bills, receipts and other documents) evidencing theexpenditures on account of which withdrawals are requested from the CreditAccount on the basis of statements of expenditure; and (iii) enable theAssociation's representatives to examine such records.

4.01. (c) I CP The Borrower shall: (i) have the accounts referred to in paragraphs (a) and No comments(b) of this Section for each fiscal year audited, in accordance with appropriateauditing principles consistently applied, by independent auditors acceptable tothe Association; (ii) furnish to the Association, as soon as available, but in anycase not later than six months after the end of each such year, a certified copyof the report of such audit by such auditors, of such scope and in such detail as.

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Credit Covennt Pmet Original Resd. Agement type status fulfllment flfillment Description of covenant Comments

Section date date __::_:_:: _ _ _:__ _

the Association shall have reasonably requested, including without limitation tothe foregoing, a separate opinion by said auditors in respect of the expendituresand records referred to in paragraph (b) of this Section as to whether theproceeds of the Credit withdrawn from the Credit Account on the basis ofstatements of expenditure have been used for the purpose for which they wereprovided; and (iii) furnish to the Association such other information concemingsaid accounts, records and expenditures and the audit thereof as theAssociation shall from time to time reasonably request.

Covenant types:

1. = Accounts/audits 8 = Indigenous people2. = Financial performance/revenue generation from 9. = Monitoring, review, and reporting

beneficiaries 10. = Project implementation not covered by categories 1-93. = Flow and utilization of project funds 11. = Sectoral or cross-scw al budgetary or other resource4. = Counterpart funding allocation5. Management aspects ofthe project or execuling 12. = Sectoral or roas-secoral policy/ regulatory/institutional

agency action6. = Enviromental covenarts 13. = Other7. = Involuntary resettlement

S. Present Status:

C = covenant complied withCD = complied with aflter delayCP - complied with partiallyNC = not complied with

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- 29 -

Table 11: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements

NOT APPLICABLE

Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs

State of Project Cycle Actual Staff Weeb

Through Appraisal N/A

Appraisal-Board N/ABoard-Effectiveness N/ASupervision 81.4Completion 15.2TOTAL 96.6

N/A = Not available due to the re-organization of the region.

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- 30 -

Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions

Sac f PoetCY*1 MoNf6fNiYe Numiber of asnSpcaidPersons Field Staff ;Skils

,j,0X,~~_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __f-j4 0f : 00 ff' t f R epr sented l

Through Appraisal N/A LO; ECO

Appraisal through Board Approval 83-84 N/A N/A LO; ECO

Board Approval through 84-85 N/A N/A N/AEffectiveness

Supervision (13 missions) 9/1985 - 8/94 14 58* LO/ECO;CO

Completion 5/95 1 19 ECO

N/A = Not available due to the re-organization of the department.s From 8/6/91-9/30/93 project supervision was conducted by the Resident Mission (RM). RM did not specify~ number daysspent on the project.Staff skills: CO = Country Officer, ECO = Economist; LO = Loan Officer

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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORTREPUBLIC OF BENIN

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT FOR PLANNING AND ECONOMICMANAGEMENT

APPENDIX A:

COMPLETION MISSION'S AIDE-MEMOIRE

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Appendix APage I of 3

AIDE-MEMOIRE(English Summary)

I. The purpose of this Aide-Memoire and a meeting with the Government officials is to allowthe Government to review and comment on the ICR before the mission departs to headquarters.A meeting is schedule with the Institut National de la Statistique et de l'Analyse, Ministere desFinances et de l'Economie and Ministere du Plan et de la Restructuration Economique. Themeeting is on May II, 1995 at the Ministry of Plan at 4 p.m.

A. Project Implementation

2. Project effectiveness was delayed by the Ministry of Plan's (MOP) reluctance to proceedwith the reform of the Bureau Central des Projects (BCP) as agreed during negotiations.Disagreement between the co-financiers/executing agencies, United Nations agency - theDepartment of Technical Cooperation and Development and IDA over IDA's right to supervisethe project and receive detailed accounts on expenditure also delayed the project in becomingeffective.

3. After the project became effective, political turmoil in the country jeopardized the projectprogress. In mid 1988 three years into implementation, there were Military coup attempts and aseries of strikes led by teachers which spread to the public sector and paralyzed the economy.During this period, Benin's labor force was severely affected, hence it crippled the enthusiasm thatwas generated among the various ministries when the project became effective. The firstStructural Adjustment Program (SALI) was implemented during 1990 - 1991 to help theGovernment restructure and streamline key government ministries. The major reforms at thattime affected the project in several ways as five project coordinators replaced one another inquick succession. The first of the five project coordinators was then re-assigned to a different partof the Ministry. Once again the project lost its momentum as the new coordinator had littleknowledge of the project.

B. Project Achievements

4. The objectives of the project were only partially achieved and limited success wasrecorded in several areas. Although project objectives responded to Benin's immediate need atthat time to set up the ground work for the implementation of the SAL, results were less thananticipated in project design (see appendix C).

5. Overall the technical assistance support provided under the project suffered from:

(a) persistent absence of coordination between the TA experts and Governmentofficials, whom the former were expected to coach;

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Appendix APage 2 of 3

(b) lack of mechanism and agreed action plan for interaction between TA experts andGovernment technicians on the one hand and policy makers on the other;

(c) inadequate definition of tasks and roles of Government technicians and TAexperts;

(d) the transfer of technical know-how, this major role, assigned to TA experts, wasill-defined and no performance indicators were set to measure the extent to whichthis transfer had been done. No mention is made of the TA's job performanceexecution in progress reports or in supervision reports;

(e) while most ministries now have computers, it is not possible to attribute computercapability in these ministries to the project as no mention is made in supervisionand progress reports of such training.

D. Lessons Learned

6. Several lessons may be drawn from the experience of this project. First the project wastoo large and complicated to be managed by one project coordinator. It had too manycomponents to be managed by one task manager. Secondly, a closer and more coherentmonitoring by the Bank of the indicators of success during implementation would be desirable.Also needed is more Bank active participation in preparation of project decisions such as theformulation of training programs and assessment of training impact.

7. It is important to ensure that the conditions of services and administrative procedures onthe Borrower's side do not constrain the fulfillment of TA project objectives. In particular,reasonable staff stability, clear indicators of how TA would be integrated into counterparts' workprograms and impact their job performance, and a minimal incentive framework that should favorlearning on the part of counterparts and facilitate skills transfer on expertise's side should beaddressed by both the Bank and the Borrower during TA project design.

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Appendix APage 3 of 3

AEDE-MEMOIRE

Minutes of Wrap up Meeting with Benin Authorities

The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) meeting for the Technical AssistanceProject for Planning and Economic Management was held at the Ministry of Economic Planningon May 11, 1995. The meeting was attended by representatives from the following agencies:Ministry of Justice and Legislation, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Rural Development, Ministryof Plan, Department of Investment Promotion, Department of Regional Planning the TreasuryDepartment, Department of Industry, and the Department of Debt Management.

The mission briefed the Government officials on the objective of the ICR and the mission'sfindings. The Government representatives agreed with the mission's findings and made thefollowing remarks:

(a) The high staff turnover of the project's personnel on the part of both theGovernment and the Bank Group created many of the implementation problems;

(b) Delays by the Bank Group in approving procurement applications also causedmany implementation problems;

(c) Given the current economic and political situation of the country at the time, theproject could only address part of the problems in the Government agencies; and

(d) Although the training component of the project had some positive impact in theMinistries, it is inadequate for current and perceived future needs.

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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORTREPUBLIC OF BENIN

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT FOR PLANNING AND ECONOMICMANAGEMENT

APPENDIX B:

BORROWER CONTRIBUTION TO THE ICR

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Appendix BPage I of 5

RAPPORT D'ACHEVEMENT DU PROJET D' ASSISTANCETECHNIQUE A LA PLANIFICATION ET A LA GESTION

DE L'ECONOMIE (PATPGE)CREDIT 1530-BEN

RESUME

I. INTRODUCTION

Le Projet Assistance Technique a la Planification et a la Gestion de lEconomie (PATPGE)dont l'Accord de Credit a ete signe le 28 fevrier 1985 est entre en vigueur le 30 juin de la memeannee avant de connaltre un demarrage effectif au cours de l'annee 1986. Initialement prevu pourprendre fin le 31 mars 1991, le Gouvemement du Benin a dui demander plus d'une fois laprorogation de cette date, la derniere etant intervenue le 31 mars 1994.

II est donc evident que le present rapport mettra, hormis la description des objectifsinitiaux du projet et son plan de financement, un accent particulier sur les differentes activitesretenues eu regard aux objectifs du projet et par rapport au recentrage du projet qui s'est averenecessaire suite a 1'ex6cution du Programme d'Ajustement Structurel.

H. OBJECTIFS DU PROJET

Selon l'Accord de Credit signe le 28 fevrier 1985 entre le Gouvernement du Benin et laBanque Mondiale, ce premier projet d'assistance technique vise a ameliorer la capacite deplanification et de gestion de 1'econornie du Benin

Ses objectifs sont:

- ameliorer les methodes d'laboration de strategie de developpement etde formulation de politiques 6conomiques;

- ameliorer les methodes de programmation, de budgetisation et de suivides investissements du secteur public;

- d'ameliorer la preparation et I'analyse des projets d'investissements;- d'organiser les finances publiques selon une structure plus coherente;- de renforcer les institutions participant a la collecte et a l'analyse des

statistiques;- d'assurer une formation pour la preparation et l'analyse de projets et pour la

comptabilite d'entreprise et d'offiir des bourses d'etudes superieures al'etranger dans les domaines de la statistique, de l'economie et des finances.

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Append BPage 2 of 5

IE RESULTATS ET IMPACTS DU PROJET

1. Planification macro-6conomique et Elaboration des projets

A la Direction du Plan; Expert macro-conomie

Les objectifs ne sont pas atteints. L'expert s'est plutot contente de jouer le role desuperviseur des activit6s des autres experts, laissant de c6te la formation des homologuesnationaux.

Plusieurs etudes n'ont pas 6te realisees (analyse conjoncturelle, suivi de l'evolution del'economie).

Expert en Programmation

Les objectifs fixes dans ce domaine sont atteints.

Lexpert a contribue a renforcer la capacite des cadres nationaux a la programmation et ausuivi de 1'execution des investissements.

Au Bureau Central des Projets (MPRE)

Aucun objectif n'est atteint. La reorganisation du BCP n'a pas et6 realisee et 1'expert n'apu ex6cut6 sa mission. Les raisons sont plutot d'ordre institutionnel et ne releve pas du fait derexpert.

A Is Direction de l'Industrie (MIPME)

Les objectifs fix6s ne sont pas atteints. Deux etudes seulement sur onze ont ete realis6es.Lexcprt a demissionn6 un an apres son recrutement a cause de conflits au sein de l'equipe desexperts (team-leader et autres experts).

II n'a pas et6 possible de trouver dans l'immediat un autre expert pour assurer la suite desopdrations. A cela il faut ajouter des problemes d'ordre institutionnel qui n'ont pas permis un suivipar l'administration de ce volet.

A Ia Direction de l'Elevage (MDR)

L'objectif n'est pas atteint. Le rapport definitif de l'etude n'a pas pu elaborer une strategieet un programme de d6veloppement de l'6levage. D'autre part, Nevaluation du rapport du groupeLouis Berger a r6vele que d'importants financements sont entrain d'&re investis dans ce secteur.Par cons&quent, l'intervention du projet n'a plus ete jugee utile.

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Appen&c BPage 3 of 5

2. Gestion des Finances Publiques

A la Direction du Budget

Les resultats ont ete atteints. L'expert, de par son experience et son ouverture a apporteune contribution appreciable a la Direction du Budget par la formation des cadres et les travaux,qu'il a realises.

A la Direction du Tresor

Les resultats prevus dans le cadre du projet n'ont pas ete atteints.

A la Direction des Douanes

Les objectifs ont ete atteirts.

A la Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement (CAA)

Les objectifs sont partiellement atteints. La CAA, grace aux travaux du Conseiller enComptabilite a adapte un Nouveau Plan Comptable. Mais en ce qui concerne l'information, lespropositions faites par le Consultant ont et jugees sur-dimensionnees par la Banque mondiale.L'architecture informatique proposee a et6 reduite a l'acquisition de trois (3) micro-ordinateursjuges necessaires par la Banque pour les besoins de la CAA.

3. Formation

Un expert en formation recrute par le PNUD a identifie les besoins de formation au niveaud'un certain nombre de ministeres et a procede a l'organisation de plusieurs voyages d'etudes. Desseance. de formation ont et realisees au CENAFOC mais des goulots d'etranglement ont viteapparu en ce qui concerne la formation des homologues locaux travaillant avec les experts. Autotal, il faut retenir que le plan ambitieux de formation retenu au depart n'a pas ete execute.

4. Bourses

L'economie, la demographie, la fiscalite et la comptabilite ont et les domaines retenusdans lesquels des Bourses devraient etre octroyees aux cadres pour des formations de longueduree a l'etranger. Effectivement plusieurs cadres des ministeres des Finances et du Plan ontbeneficie de ces formations. Mais pour permettre a un nombre plus important de cadres de mettrea jour leurs connaissances les longues durees ont et converties en des formations de courtesdurees et des criteres plus objectifs de selection des candidats ont ete mis a jour.

Cette formule a permis le recyclage d'un nombre plus important de cadres dans desuniversites et des centres prestigieux de formation. Par ailleurs, plusieurs dizaines de cadres deconception et d'execution dont les directions ont et dotees de micro-ordinateurs ont beneficied'une formation en informatique dans des instituts specialises de la place.

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Appendix BPage 4 of 5

5. Les autres activites

Un peu plus de trois ans apres le demarrage effectif du Projet, le Gouvemement du Benina signe un accord avec les Institutions de Bretton Woods pour la mise en application de sonpremier PAS; ceci a amene le recentrage du PATPGE et desormais le Credit 1530-BEN a ete misa contribution pour les reformes prevues par le Programme d'Ajustement Structurel.

IV. DIFFICULTES ET INSUFFISANCES DU PROJET

Le projet a connu d'enormes difficultes des le debut de son execution a cause de lamultiplicite des bailleurs de fonds. Nous noterons quelques difficultes liees a la collaborationspecifique avec la Banque.

Les principaux problemes rencontres par le projet peuvent etre reperes au niveau de:

* Ia conception technique d'un projet lourd oui la coherence des volets inipliqua.t un respect desdelais, des echeanciers et l'impossibilite de rectifier rapidement certains terines de reference,

- la conception des structures de gestion du projet ou les regles d'orientation et de proceduresn'ont pas ete clairement definies, ou du moins interpretees a l'identique par les organismescofinanciers.

Un certain nombre de dysfonctionnement peuvent &re notes au niveau de la structureinstitutionnelle, de la multiplicite des procedures et de la lourdeur de gestion.

Au niveau des bailleurs de fonds

La Banque mondiale et le PNIJD ont eu des procedures et des orientations differentes.Ces divergences ont notamment concerne le role du Coordonnateur National, les choixconcernant la formation, plus specialement l'allocation des bourses et des financements. Dans lapratique et du fait des divergences d'interpretation, il y a un non respect des principes du partagedes couts et parallelisme des financements.

Au niveau des relations entre l'administration et Bailleurs de fonds

L'administration Beninoise etait inclue dans un projet ou chaque bailleur de fonds avaitses orientations, ses attentes et ses procedures.

Au niveau de l'equipe en charge du projet (Experts, Homologues, CoordonnateurNational, Team-leader)

Des conflits de personnes ont interfere pour compliquer les liens entre experts, team-leader, et le PNUD. Tout ceci a cree un climat peu propice a un esprit d'equipe indispensable aubon deroulement du projet.

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Appendix BPage 5 of 5

Ces difficultes n'ont donc pas permis de gerer le projet dans sa conception initiale. Chaquebailleur de fonds s'est resolu a executer le projet dans l'entendement de ses orientations etconceptions.

Difficultes liees a la collaboration avec la Banque mondiale

Les contacts permanents de la Coordination du Projet avec la Mission R6sidente de laBanque ont permis des echanges tres positifs en ce qui concerne la resolution des problemespouvant decouler des interpretations de conception, d'orientation, de procedures de mise enoeuvre du projet.

Cependant, la principale difficulte connue est relative aux avis de non-objection quimettent six (6) mois voire un (1) an pour nous parvenir avec toutes les consequences que celaoccasionne sur la realisation des objectifs et activites.

Cette situation merite muire reflexion tant du c6te de la Banque que de l'administration afind'assurer une meilleure consommation des fonds.

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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORTREPUBLIC OF BENIN

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT FOR PLANNING AND ECONOMICMANAGEMENT

APPENDIX C:

DESCRIPTION OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO BE PROVIDED

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Appendix CPage 1 of 4

DescriDtion of Technical Assistance to be Provided

A. Macroeconomic Planning and Project Preparation

1 Macroeconomic Analysis and Investment Proeramming. In the MPS, aMacroeconomic Advisor would work with a team of nationals headed by the Director ofDES. He would lead work on policy-oriented Macroeconomic studies, advise ontechnical matters relating to the formulation of national development strategies and thepreparation of national development plans; and assist in the monitoring of economicdevelopments. The latter was expected to lead to the regular quarterly production ofstudies of the current economic situation (Note de conjuncture).

2 An Investment Programmer would work in the DPAT, advising the Director ofDPAT and the four programming section chiefs. The work of the investment programmerwould be to reinforce the concept of keeping public sector investment plans in line withnational priorities and existing budget constraints. At budgeting time he would ensure thatthe investment budget is a part of a financial program that is feasible and that also providesfor recurrent and counterpart funds. Between budgets, he would concentrate on follow-up of project execution. His programming work would go part-way towards addressingthe issue of the operation and maintenance of existing investments by integrating into thebudgeting exercise the practice of explicitly allocating the needed resources. The advisorwould follow up and expand on the work of the UNDP-financed expert.

3 An Epatriate Project Analyst would be recruited for two years. He would workclosely with the Director of the BCP and would take advantage of teaching materialsdeveloped by the Economic Development Institute (EDI) on project analyst to help theBCP build up a reference library during the project period.

4 An Expert on Proiect Preparation. Project formulation and preparation would takeplace in the DEPs of the technical ministries. In order to strengthen their capabilities,staff released through the restructuring of the BCP would be reassigned in the DEPs ofthose ministries. The DEPs would have continuous access to the advice of the expert onproject preparation and analysis recruited for the BCP.

5 An Advisor on Industrial Projects Given the present and future importance ofindustrial and agro-industrial projects in the economy, the services of an Advisor onIndustrial Projects would be provided to the Industry Directorate (DI) of the MFE. Theadviser would help the DI to increase its capacity to (i) prepare and promote sound

Other Past and On-eoine Technical Assistanc . Five agencies had provided technical assistance to Benin in theareas of Macroeconomic management, project preparation and statistics. The UNDP provided two technicalassistants to the MPS. One advisor, a macroeconomist, participated in the drafting of the 1983-1987Development Plan and left Cotonou in March 1984 for another assignment The other advisor, an investmentprogrammer, introduced some improved procedures for the monitoring of public investnent.

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Appendix CPage 2 of 4

industrial projects, (ii) supervise and advise existing industrial companies especially publicenterprises, and (iii) carry out studies leading to the formulation of coherent strategies forindustrial subsectors. This assistance is required given (a) the limited experience of theDI's staff and the major responsibilities entrusted to this directorate, and (b) the poorperformance of public enterprises and the large projects completed over the last few years(Onigbolo cement, Savc Sugar). The adviser would work closely with the chiefs ofservice of the DI who would assume a leading role after the term of the expatriate advisor.

6 A Livestock Advisor would be recruited to strengthen the livestock directorateand help prepare a project which would be a coordinated follow-up operation to livestockactivities.

B. Public Finance Management

7 The assistance foreseen in the area of public finance management consisted ofshort and medium-term expertise to assist in: (i) improving the structure of the budgetand strengthening the Treasury Department; (ii) creating the capacity to monitor andmanage the public debt; and (iii) improving the data collection process for public financestatistics. The credit would finance the services of consultants to help the Budget andTreasury departments introduce the systematic budgetary nomenclature for the operatingand investment budgets so that they are compatible with IMF nomenclature. The use ofnew nomenclature in budgeting would allow for proper budget execution and expenditurecontrol. A Public Finance System Specialist would be recruited to allow proper follow-upafter the initial design of a new budget framework. In addition, an Accountant and aSystems Specialist would be recruited to help adapt the Treasury's accounting system tothe new budget nomenclature and supervise the computerization of the Treasury'soperations.

8 Two short-term Consultants would be attached to the Caisse Autonomed'Amortissement (CAA) of the Ministry of Finance. The first, an Accountant would helpthe CAA adapt its accounting system to conform with the National Accounting Plan andgenerally improve accounting procedures. The second, a Computer Specialist, wouldassist the CAA in computerizing its external debt statistics and-accounting system. Thiswould supplement the efforts of the Debt Specialist seconded by the Bank to improve theCAA's debt-management capacity, in particular its knowledge of debt stock, its evolutionthrough time, and projections of debt service obligations.

9 An Economic Statistician specialized in public finance and acting as an advisorwould be recruited to assist the Direction des Etudes et de la Planification (DEP) of theMFE to establish procedures for prompt data collection on revenue, expenditure, andpublic debt so that a consolidated picture of Benin's financial situation could be obtainedand kept up to date. One of the outcomes of this exercise would be the establishment ofmonthly economic indicators. During negotiations, the Government confirmed that itwould assign two public finance statisticians to work full time with the advisor. Theadvisor and the local team would be expected to begin their work by doing a joint

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Appendix CPage 3 of 4

diagnosis of procedures for producing the required statistics. Other short term programswould be financed in the area of customs collection.

C Statistics

10 A Statistician would be recruited to strengthen the capacity of the InsfitutNational de la Statistique et de I'Analyse Economique (INSAE) to compile nationalaccounts. He would help to improve the collection and analysis of data for nationalaccounts, and would be complemented by short-term consultants in the areas of externaltrade, prices and public finance statistics. Two Statisticians would assist INSAE inconducting a household budget and expenditure survey, as well as publishing the results.A demographer would also be recruited to analyze the 1979 population census and the1983 survey and to publish the results.

D Training

11 In addition to the streamlining of responsibilities of selected Government agenciesand the introduction of improved procedures, the project included training activities whichare an integrated part of a strategy for long lasting institutional strengthening. Whilesubstantial work had been done to assess the training needs in technical fields under thetwo IDA financed Education Projects and with the assistance of UNESCO and ILO, thetraining needs in key ministries and agencies are yet to be properly assessed.Consequently the assistance foreseen in the area of training included the provision of theservices of a resident training advisor and preparation of an in-service training program inthe priority area of project analysis, preparation, and supervision. The project included ataining prograrn in business accounting and training of a linited number of tax auditors.

12 The training sub-component included the service of a Training Advisor to beattached to the project coordinator's office. He would, at project inception, beresponsible for assessing the training needs of all agencies involved in the project andhelping each technical assistant design on-the-job training programs and identify' formaltraining opportunities for national staff. During project implementation, he wouldcoordinate training activities under the project and monitor their execution.

13 Training in project analysis, preparation, and supervision. An in-house serviceprogram for medium-and high-level staff from various ministries, government agencies,and state enterprises. The training program would cover all stages of the project cycle,placing emphasis on calculation of financial and economic rates of return, determination ofrecurrent costs and debt-service implications, and methods of proper project supervision.

14 The business accounting program would be a continuation of an ILO-assistedprogram initiated in 1982 to implement the system of standardized enterprise accountingintroduced by the Government in 1981. ELO assistance would end in December 1984,IDA would then financed the continuation of the program for three years. Theparticipants would come from both public and private companies in Benin. The programwould improved in three respects: (a) clear distinction would be made in the curriculum

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Appendix CPage 4 of 4

between three levels of qualifications in the field of accounting: certified accountants,accountants, and junior accountants; (b) the programn would be designed to ensureeffective follow-up of the participants in their enterprises to help them apply properaccounting procedures; and (c) although MLO would continue to assist in the managementof the program, local and foreign consultants would be utilized to a greater extent tocomplement the expertise made available by the "Centre National de FornationComptable" (CENAFOC) at Cotonou and the lLO. A short-term consultant would trainabout ten Beninese professionals of the Taxation Directorate of the MFE in the area ofenterprise tax auditing. This training program would aim at establishing two tax auditingbrigades of about five members each, to strengthen Government's ability to collectcorporate taxes.

16 Because of the acute shortage of trained economists, and public and privateadministration specialists in Benin, the credit would financed fellowships for graduatestudies in these fields. The fellowships would offer twelve student-years of graduateeducation abroad, since no graduate-level training programs are offered in Benin andbilateral funds for these purposes had declined in recent years. The fellowships wouldserve to broaden knowledge and develop expertise of professionals who had graduatedfrom the university and have demonstrated strong potential in their work performanceover at least a three-year period.

E. Activities to be Identified

16 About 15 per cent of the credit would be reserved at the outset to finance activitiessubsequently to be identified in the above components or which otherwise would serve theoverall project objectives of strengthening macroeconomic management and preparingsound projects. Programming of such fund would be administered by the ProjectCoordinator in consultation with and subject to the approval of the Association. Technicalassistance, studies, training activities and equipment to be financed under the "Activities tobe identified" category can be determined precisely only during project implementation.However, funds are likely to be under for inter alia (i) policy-oriented macro-economicstudies in the MPS, (ii) sector reviews and feasibility studies;,follow-up actions whichwould be necessary for MFE; and technical assistance for certain aspects of a financialstabilization program foreseeable in the next two years.

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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORTREPUBLIC OF BENIN

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT FOR PLANNING AND ECONOMICMANAGEMENT

APPENDIX D:

AUDITORS REPORT (SUMMARY)

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ACCORD DE CREDIT DE DEVELOPPEMENT Appendix DN°1530/BEN du 28 fevrier 1985 Page 1 of 3

entre

LA REPUBLIQUE DU BENIN

et

L'ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DE DEVELOPPEMENT

PROJET D'ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE A LAPLANIFICATION ET A LA GESTION DE L'ECONOMIE

MJI EA 7 DU PLNA ETDE LA RESTRUCTUR417ONECONOmIQVE 3lfP.RE) - crO.vOU BEVIA

RAPPORTS D'AUDIT SUR LES COMPTESARRETES AU 31 JUILLET 1994

Prisertes .

CABIN ET: COMPANGIE FIDUCAMIREASSOCIEEDUBEJJINBRP J39 Triepho*e31 4w 90 COTONOU ._

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Appendix DPage 2 of 3

1 - Observations et remarques gen&rales

Les diligences que nous avons accomplies nous ont pernis de releve lesinsuffisances ci-apres:

- les decaissements effectu6s par la Banque Mondiale en vue de payerdirectement les foumnitures ou services n'ont pas ete enregistr6s dans les livres duprojet depuis le demarrage,

en consequence, les livres, bien qu'ils soient regulierement tenus, ne traduisentpas la gIobalite des operations du PAIPGE,

- les immobilisanons ntont pas ete amorties reguli&ement suivant les tauxconformes aux usages depuis le demarrage du projet,

- les etats de syntheses mis a notre disposition ne sont pas conformes , quant aleur forme , aux 6nonciations du Plan Comptable National, alors que le projet aadopts ce plan pour le traitement des informations comptables,

C'est ainsi que dans le cadre de cette revue des comptes, nous avons procede ades redressements afin que les comptes puissent traduire, tant dans leur globalitd_que dans leur exhaustivite, toutes les operations du Projet au 31 juillet 1994.

Le redressement le plus significatif porte sur les paiements directs effectues par laBanque Mondiale . Ces paiements se chiffrent a cfa 334.511.413 au titre de laperiode sous revue.

Pour ce qui concerne la forme des etats de synthese, nous avons repns lesdocuments mis a notre disposition, en les presentant,' d'une maniere simpliee,suivant les modeles prescnts par le Plan comptable National du Benin.

2 - Incertitudes et limitations

L'inventaire physique des immobilisations n'a pas ete effectue au 31 juillet 1994.

En effet le proces verbal de prise d'inventaire nous aurait pennis de proceder aurecoupement des biens inventories avec les elements inscrits dans les comptes envue de corroborer la valeur des imnnobilisations portee au bilan.

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Appendix DPage 3 of 3

En I'absence du proces verbal de prise d'inventaire physique, fl nous estraisonnablement impossible d'emettre une opinion quant a ce qui concemne, lamaterialite, 1'exhaustivit6 et la valeur des biens immobilises tels qu'ils sont port6sau bilan a la date du 31 juillet 1994.

D'autre part, la situation des foumitures non consommees au 31 julflet 1994 nenous a pas ete communiqu6e.

Par ailleurs , compte tenu de la duree limit6e qui s'imposait a notre intervention,nous n'avons pas pu adresser des demandes de confirmation de solde au tiers pournous assurer que tous les engagements du projet au 31 juillet 1994 ont Wtcorrectement comptabilises.

3 - OPINION SUR LES COMPTES ARRETES AU 31/07/1994

Sous r6serves des incertitudes et limitations ci-dessus mentionnmes, les *tatsfmanciers tels qu'ils sont presentes en annexe au present rapport, et dont ilsfont partie integrante , refletent la situation financiere du Projetd'Assistance Technique a la Plan;fication et a la Gestion de I'Economie et leresultat d'ensemble de ces operations pendant Ia periode allant du lerjanvier 1994 au 31 juillet 1994.

COTONOU, LE 15 OCTOBRE 1994

Pour la CompajIiiduciaireANoT' A sa

da Matha SA. Oscar

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I M AG I N G

Report No: 15031Type: ICR