Workshop 2 Report: Riots & Mass Gatheringsmedia4sec.eu/downloads/d2-4.pdf · 2017-08-21 · line...

Workshop2Report:Riots&MassGatheringsDeliverable2.4

CenterforSecurityStudies

(KEMEA)

Co-funded by the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme of the European Union

MEDI@4SECTheEmergingRoleofNewSocialMediainEnhancingPublicSecurityGrantAgreementno700281

PLEASENOTETHATTHISREPORTISAFINALDRAFTANDISAWAITINGFINALACCEPTANCEBYTHEEUROPEANCOMMISSION.

Whencitingpleaseuse:MEDIA4SEC(2016)ReportonStateoftheArtReview

Authors:NikosMoustakidis,DebraWhyte,KatHadjimatheou,RobProcter,MarijnRijken,SerenaOggero, JonCoaffee,ChrisMcWilliams, SebastianDenef,TomSorell,PilarDeLaTorre,Anže Žitnik, Klaudia Tani, Jose LuisDiego, Arnold Roosendaal,Myassa Djebara, RianneDekker,JordiDiego,ManolisKermitsis..

CoverImageSource:http://thunderinthewilderness.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/mass-1518843_1920.jpg

TheresearchleadingtotheseresultshasreceivedfundingfromtheEuropeanUnion’sHorizon2020ResearchandInnovationProgramme,underGrantAgreementno700281.


ContentsExecutiveSummary............................................................................................................................................i

1. Introductiontotheproject...................................................................................................................1

1.1 MEDI@4SEC......................................................................................................................................1

1.1 Work Package 2: Implementation: Improved Dialogue, Collaboration andPractices.............................................................................................................................................................1

2. Workshopdesign,methodologyandevaluation.........................................................................2

2.1 Workshop&Participants’analysis..........................................................................................2

2.2 Thethemesoftheworkshop......................................................................................................4

2.3 Workshopmethodology...............................................................................................................6

2.4 Workshopevaluation....................................................................................................................9

3. ThetopicofRiotsandMassGatherings.......................................................................................11

3.1 Definition.........................................................................................................................................11

3.2 Theuseofsocialmedia..............................................................................................................11

3.3 Theimpactsofsocialmediause............................................................................................11

3.4 Opportunities,challenges,legalandethicalconsiderations.....................................12

3.5 Stakeholderidentification........................................................................................................13

3.6 Practicepatterns&stakeholdermapping.........................................................................14

4. SWOTAnalysis........................................................................................................................................16

4.1 SWOTAnalysisforProtests/Demonstrations.................................................................16

4.2 SWOTAnalysisforLargeScaleEvents................................................................................21

4.3 SWOTAnalysisforMigration..................................................................................................24

4.4 SWOTSummarybefore,duringandafteramassgathering.....................................27

5. Currentsituationandrecommendationsforthefuture.......................................................31

5.1 Stakeholderanalysis...................................................................................................................31

5.2 Methods,proceduresandbestpracticesanalysis..........................................................36

5.3 Toolsanalysis.................................................................................................................................37

6. ConclusionandOutlook......................................................................................................................39

Appendix1 WorkshopAgenda..............................................................................................................41

Appendix2 ParticipantList....................................................................................................................43


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ExecutiveSummary

ThisdocumentprovidesresultsfromtheworkshoponSocialMediaandPolicingofRiots&MassGatherings,heldonMay9,2017inAthensGreeceaspartoftheEuropeanresearchproject MEDI@4SEC. The workshop brought together 57 people from 15 Europeancountriesfromvarioussectorsincludingsecurity,academic,research,socialmovement,localgovernmentandotherauthoritiesaswellastheindustrysectors.

Theworkshopcovered3mainthemes,specifically:• Protests, demonstrations and riots where civilians can mobilise and organise

themselvesintogroupsquicklyandwheresocialmediacanenablethemtocoordinatetheirmovements.

• Large-scaleevents(e.g.sportingandculturalevents)wherelargenumberofpeoplecongregateforaparticularactivityandcanbetargetedbycriminalsorterrorist.

• MassMigration,an increasingchallengeacrossEurope,whichoften leadstomassgatherings during their movements through the crossing countries or their finalsettlementsatthedestinationplaces.

Additionally, all relevant time-frameswere examined:before, during andafter amassgatheringsituation.

Basedon18groupdiscussions, theauthorshavecollated feedbackon the ideal futuresituation,theexistinglimitationsandrestrictionsandalistofchangeproposalsineachoftheabovethematical.Morespecifically,thisdocumentcomprisesadetaileddescriptionoftheworkshopanditsmethodology(Section2),anintroductiontothetopicofriots&massgatherings(Section3),thefollowinganalyses:

a) SWOTanalysisforusingsocialmediabefore,duringandafteramassgathering,foreachtheme(Section4);

b) Analysisofthestakeholdersinvolvedineachthemewiththeircurrentandfuturerolesandresponsibilities(Section5);

c) Analysisofcurrentandfutureprocessesandmeansincludingmethods,procedures,practicesandtoolsasroadmaprecommendations(Section5).


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1. Introductiontotheproject

1.1 MEDI@4SEC

MEDI@4SECfocusesuponenhancingunderstandingoftheopportunities,challengesandethicalconsiderationofsocialmediause forpublicsecurity: thegood, thebadandtheugly. The good comprises using social media for problem solving, fighting crime,decreasing fear of crime and increasing the quality of life. The bad is the increase ofdigitisedcriminalityand terrorismwithnewphenomenaemerging through theuseofsocialmedia.Theuglycomprisesthegreyareaswheretrolling,cyberbullying,threats,orlive video-sharing of tactical security operations are phenomena to deal with duringincidents.Makinguseofthepossibilitiesthatsocialmediaoffer,includingsmart‘work-arounds’iskey,whilerespectingprivacy,legislation,andethics.Thischangingsituationraisesaseriesofchallengesandpossibilities forpublicsecurityplanners.MEDI@4SECwill explore this through a series of communication and dissemination activities thatengageextensivelywith a rangeof end-users tobetterunderstand theusageof socialmediaforsecurityactivities.Activitiescentrearoundsixrelevantthemes:DIYPolicing;Everyday security;Riots andmassgatherings:Thedarkweb;Trolling; and Innovativemarket solutions.MEDI@4SECwill feed into, support and influence changes in policymakingandimplementationinpublicsecuritythatcanbeusedbyend-userstoimprovetheirdecisionmaking.Bystructuringourunderstandingoftheimpactofsocialmediaonpublicsecurityapproachesinauser-friendlywayMEDI@4SECwillprovideanevidence-baseandroadmapforbetterpolicymakingincluding:bestpracticereports;acatalogueofsocialmediatechnologies;recommendationsforEUstandards;futuretrainingoptions;and,ethicalawarenessraising.

1.1 Work Package 2: Implementation: Improved Dialogue, Collaboration andPractices

Followingtheresultsofthefirstworkpackage,whichfocusedonprovidingastate-of-the-artoverviewandidentifyingbestpractices,thesecondworkpackageoftheMEDI@4SECprojects aims to identify opportunities and challenges in social media use, analyseavailable technologies and the need for standards distributing the above findings andengagingdiscussionswiththewidercommunityofpublicsecurity.

Thecorecomponentoftheworkpackagetwoisaseriesofpolicyandpracticedialogueworkshops,onededicatedtoeachofthethemes,inordertointerrogatekeyissuesrelatedtosocialmediauseforsecuritypurposes.

TheworkshoponthePolicingofRiotsandMassGatheringswiththeuseofsocialmediathatwe report on in this deliverable is the second in this series andmarks onemoreimportantmilestone for thegrowthof thecommunity thatMEDI@4SECcreates in theareaofsocialmedia.Interestedpartiescanfollowtheactivitiesoftheprojectandregisterforupcomingworkshopsontheprojectwebsitewww.media4sec.eu,andinourLinkedIngroup:https://www.linkedin.com/groups/12000103.


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2. Workshopdesign,methodologyandevaluation

2.1 Workshop&Participants’analysis

Figure1:RiotsandMassGatheringsWorkshopinAthens

TheworkshoptookplaceonMay9,2017inAthens,Greece(Figure1).Theworkshopwashosted by the MEDI@4SEC partner Centre for Security Studies (KEMEA) with thecollaborationoftheMEDI@4SECconsortium.


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Interestedparticipantsneededtoapplytotheworkshopbyfillingandsubmittinganon-lineapplicationformonMedi@4secworkshop’swebpage.Afterthesubmissiondeadline,applicants were selected based on their relevance to the topic, their background. Inaddition,genderandcountrycoveragewerealsofactoredinduringtheselectionprocess.

Intotaltheworkshopbroughttogether57participantsincludingPoliceoffers,academics(universities),municipalstaff,researchers(researchinstitutes), industrymembersandsocial movement activists from 15 different countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland,France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain,Switzerlandand theUK)withbackgroundandrolesaspoliceofficers,public relationsspecialistsandpressofficers,researchers,professors,civilservantsandconsultantsfromboththeprivateandthepublicsector.

AnanonymisedlistofparticipantscanbefoundinAppendix2.

Figure2:Workshopparticipants’distributionperrole

Table1:Participantspercountry

COUNTRIES Participants COUNTRIES ParticipantsBelgium 3 Slovenia 1Denmark 1 Spain 5Finland 2 Switzerland 1France 3 UK 11Germany 4 Portugal 1Greece 9 Ireland 1Italy 4 Latvia 1Netherlands 10 Total 57

Academic23%

Industry7%

Municipality16%

Police32%

Research19%

SocialMovement3%

Workshopparticipants'distributionperrole


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2.2 Thethemesoftheworkshop

TheworkshopexaminedthetopicofRiots&MassGatherings,withinthecontextoftheuseofsocialmedia,undertheprismofthreesufficientlydistinctthemesinordertogaina grasp of the intricacies involved in the various forms that mass gatherings as aphenomenoncantake.Thethemesthatqualifiedforselectionfeaturevariedparameterssuch as duration, size, time of notice before they manifest, purpose and its relevantspecificity vs. inclusivity, likelihood of turning violent, potential forpolitical/economical/social impact,etc.Thisdiverserangeofparametershelpedcoverandunderstandawidespectrumofpotentialmassgatheringevents.

Thechosenthemesarediscussedbelow.

Theme1:SocialmediainProtests/Demonstrations

Changes as well as incidents of importancecanhaveaprofound impactonsocieties forany number of economic, political, social,religious and ethical factors. These factorscan mobilise citizens, political parties,organisations, trade unions, activists andothergroupsofpeopleintocollectiveactionsthatinvolvegatheringinordertoprotestanddeclare opposition to the current situation,

resistupcomingchangesordemonstrateagainstanincident.

In this context, social media enable citizens to organise themselves into largedemonstrations or riot groups very quickly; it also enable them to coordinate theirmovementsandevenprotectthemselvesincasesofconflict.Consequently,predictingandreactingtoriotsandmassgatheringsphenomenahaschangedsignificantlyinoursocialmediaera.

This theme focuses on the potential uses of social media in the context of publicdemonstrations,protests,marches,ralliesandcrowdprotectionbefore,duringandaftertheincidentsincludingpotentialemergencysituationsthatmaydevelop.


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Theme2:SocialmediainLarge-scaleEvents

Large-scale events can be varied in natureand can span the entire spectrum of social,economic, educational, cultural, political,religious, entertainment, sporting or othercharacters;theycanevenbeacombinationoftheabove.

Event management and social mediaplatforms and tools enable citizens to beinvited and join such events prior to their

scheduleddate,raisetheirawarenessandsharetheirexperiencefromthevenueduringandaftertheevent.Inaddition,sucheventshaveaveryspecifictimeframeandarewidelydisseminated for quite a long time before the actual event. This combination ofmassparticipationandspecifictimeframesmakesthistypeofeventaveryalluringtargetforterroristattacks.Thisthemeexplorestheuseofsocialmediainthiscontextinordertoidentifywaysinwhich they can be used to ensure the safety of the participants and to help eventorganisers and public authorities prevent, respond and mitigate potential securitythreats.

Theme3:SocialmediainMigrationMassmigrationinvolvesthemovementofalargenumberofcitizenstoanothercountry.Migrant gatherings in that sense can havesignificant social, political and economicimpactonthecountrieswherethesecitizenstravelto.Moreover,thesegatheringscanbeless temporary in nature and persist forweeksorevenmonthsandassuch,theycan

have an ever shifting character (peaceful aggregation, temporary settlements, internalconflictsamongmigrantsorevenprotestsagainstauthoritiesorlocalpopulations).

Intheframeofmigration,socialmediaplaysasignificantroleasmigrantscanusethemto organise themselves before and during transit aswell as after resettlement. Socialmediainthiscasecanplayanevenmoresignificantroleastheycanbeusedtocirculatenewsaboutpolitical or administrative changesveryquickly amongmigrants and thusaffectmigrationflows.

Ourworkshopexaminedhowsocialmediaareused toprepareandorganisemigrantsbefore,duringandaftertheirjourneyaswellashowmigrantsrespondcollectivelytothevarioussituationsthattheycomeacross.


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2.3 Workshopmethodology

Figure3:Speakers’presentations

Theworkshop’sdesignwasbasedonthe5-Dmethod(Define,Discover,Dream,DesignandDevelop)andwassplitamongthefollowingsections:

1. IntroductiontotheMEDI@4SECProject2. Presentationsrelatedtovariousrealcasestudiesonthethreethemesfromkey

notespeakersanddifferentstakeholdersperspectives(Figure3)3. FocusGroupsdiscussionsessionsonthethreethemes(Figure4)4. Roundtablewithparticipants’testimonials(Figure5)5. Conclusionsandpresentationsofthemessummaryresults

Initially,tosetthetoneandintroducetheparticipantstotheprojectandtheworkshopitselfaplenarysessionwasdesigned.Then,informationwasprovidedonlogisticsalongwithdetailsoftheflowandwhereeachparticipantisexpectedtobeduringthevarioussessionsandhowtheyshouldmovebetweensessions.

Later on, in order to provide participants with food for thought and provide acomprehensiveoverviewoftherangeofthetopicathand,keynotespeakersfromvariousstandpointsandbackgroundsgavepresentationsonanumberofrelevanttopics.

Whatfollowedweretwosessions,eachfeaturingasetof9differentfocusgroups;2pereachtheme.

Morespecificallytheprocessduringtheworkshop’ssessionswasorganizedasfollows:• Workshopfocusgroupswereorganizedin2Sessions(9groupspersession).


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• Eachsessionlasted60minutesandwasheldin9differentroundtables.• Eachtablecorrespondedtoonethemeforbothsessions.i.eeachthemewascovered

by3tables(3tablesx3themes–Figure4)• Eachtablehosted4participantsand2hosts/moderatorsfromproject’sconsortium.• Eachparticipantwasassignedtoonetheme/tablepersessionbasedontheirthemes

ofinterestdeclaredontheirinitialapplication.• Each table/theme went through the Dream, Design and Develop steps of the 5-D

methodthroughasetofquestionsregardingtheidealandcurrentrolesofallactorsinvolved,themethods,procedures,practices,regulationsandsocialmediatoolsusedtoday.Subsequently,participantswereaskedto‘dream’whattheidealfuturewouldlookliketakingintoconsiderationthecurrentsituationandtheexistingrestrictionsaswellas thestrengths,weaknesses,opportunitiesandthreatsof thesocialmediacharacteristicsanduseineachtheme.Questionssuchaswhichpieceoftechnologywouldbehelpfulmoving forwards,what themaingapsareandhowwecanbringabouttheintendedchangewereasked.

• ATwittermoderatorfacilitatedthecommunicationofthemainworkshop’smessagescomingoutfromthediscussionsinbothsessions,withtheoutsideworld.

Latersectionsofthisreportarebasedontheresultsderivedfromthe18differentfocusgroups.

Participantswereallocatedtothefocusgroupsbasedonasetofrulesinordertoachievethemaximumamountofinteractionwiththemaximumnumberofotherstakeholders:

1. Everyonemustgettoparticipateinthethemeofpreferencetheyhavedeclaredwhentheyappliedfortheworkshopinoneofthesessions(iftheyhavedeclaredone)

2. If possible, theremust be at least one participant in each focus groupswhoseprimary interest is the theme at hand in order to always gather relevantinformationandfacilitatethediscussionwithotherparticipantswhomightnotbeasfamiliarwiththetheme

3. Whenswitching focusgroupsbetween the twosessionsparticipantsshouldbeallocatedtoadifferentthemesoastoexperiencetwooutofthethreethemesandremaininterestedinbothdiscussions

4. WhenswitchingfocusgroupsbetweenthetwosessionsparticipantsshouldnotencounteranyoftheparticipantsthatwasalreadymetduringtheirpreviousfocusgroupinordertomaximiseexposureandinteractionamongdifferentmembersoftheMEDI@4SECCommunity


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Figure4:FocusGroupSessions

(3tablesx3themeswithintwosessions)

Afterthefocusgroupdiscussions,thesessionthatfollowedfeaturedaroundtablewhereallparticipantshadtheopportunitytointroducethemselvestooneanother,talkabouttheirspecificbackgroundsandinterestsandalsoelaborateontheirexperiences intheworkshop and their interactions with the Medi@4Sec Community. This session wasdesignedtohelptheCommunitymemberstobettergettoknoweachotherandtojump-startnetworking.Also,itwasaneffectivewaytogatherfeedbackonhowtoimproveonupcomingworkshopsandontheCommunityitself.

Figure5:Participants’Roundtable

Finally,theworkshop’slastsessioncomprisedofthreepresentationswherethesummaryand key points from the focus group discussions of each theme were shown to theparticipants.

The conclusion of the workshop included a social event where participants had theopportunitytosocialiseandtalkfreelywithoneanotherinordertofurtherincreasethechancesofnetworkingamongCommunitymembers.

TheDetailedAgendacanbefoundinAppendix1.


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2.4 Workshopevaluation

All participantswere asked to complete an evaluationquestionnaire at the endof theevent.Overall,thefeedbacktheworkshopreceivedwasverypositive.Theaverageratingoftheworkshop,onascaleof1(verypoor)to10(excellent)was8.3

AnoverviewofthescoresisprovidedinFigure6below.

Figure6:SummaryofEvaluationScores

In addition, the level of agreement was quite high for almost all critical parts of theworkshopassessment(5-Stronglyagree,1-Stronglydisagree)

Figure7:SummaryofEvaluationScores


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Whenaskedaboutwhattheyenjoyedmostintheworkshopparticipantsrepliedwith:

• OpportunitytoNetwork,Learnaboutrecentdevelopments• The 8 introductional presentations were useful and in balance with the

workshops• Practitionerswithrealworldexperience• The chance to share knowledge and experiences from people/countries with

moreexperience• Thediscussiongroupforotherinput• Newtechnologiesandimplementationatothercountries• Roundtableconversation• Host,sessions,smallergroups• The variety of different country's present, this gave a good insight in other

workingprocesses• Thevarietyoftopicsandsubtopics,theinterestinginsightsthatwerebroughtto

thetable• Theorganisationandtheopportunitytomeetpeoplewhoworkinthesamedpt

inEurope• Thepresenceofparticipantsfromdifferentareas• Theformat• Iliketolearnwhatotherorganisationsdo,theirresources&useofSM• Goodgroupdiscussions• Social,relaxingevent.Veryfeelgoodenvironment• Thenetworking and community building. Sukey-> looking on the use of social

mediafromtheotherside• Differentcountries/organisations/pointsofview.Motivatedcolleagues• Theexpertiseandtheeffectivenessthatcomesasresultofthemesessions• Themostinterestingpartwastheworkshopandtheopportunitytointeractwith

otherparticipants• Theatmosphere• Thesubject• Theexchangeofrelevantinformationaboutsocialneedsanditsuses• Presentationsaboutprevioususeofsocialmediaduringmassgatherings,World

cafémethod• Interestingtalks,brilliantpresentationsandIwouldhavelikedtohearmorefrom

eachandeveryoneofthem


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3. ThetopicofRiotsandMassGatherings

Research conducted inpreviousdeliverableshasbeen validated and integrated in theworkshopdesignandmethodology. In thissectionweprovideasummaryof theworkearlierreportedforeasyreferencealongwithrelevantdefinitions.1

3.1 Definition

Amassgatheringiswhenalargenumberofpeoplecometogetherinaparticularlocation,indoorsoroutdoorsforaspecificcommonpurposeeitherinanorganizedandplannedwayforadefinedperiodoftimeorinaninstantaneousorspontaneousmanner,possiblymotivatedbyorganizers,participantsorthirdpartiesorduetoanunexpectedresponsetoan incidentoremergencysituation.Massgatheringcanbeeventsofanykind, type,scopeandcontent,includingconcerts,sportevents,protests,demonstrations,migrantsandrefugeemovements.

3.2 Theuseofsocialmedia

Socialmediacanbeusedasamulti-purposetooltomonitoramassgatheringeventandreactappropriatelythroughoutitsentiredevelopmentphase(before,duringandafter).

InformationIntelligencetool:Massgatheringscreatemassivedatagatheringsgeneratedwithinsocialmedianetworksdirectlyfromthefieldwhichneedfurtheranalysis,filteringandevaluationensuringtrustandreliabilitybetweeninformationexchangers.

CommunicationandCoordinationtool:SocialmediaisusedbythePolicetosendmessagesandpostcontentinapositive,friendly,instructiveandhelpfultonetendtoencouragesafeeventsanddiscouragefurtherpotentialdisorders.

Organizingtool:Socialmediacanbeusedasanorganizationaltooltoencourageandformpart of both riot and anti-riot forces. It is also frequently used to organise irregularmigrationvianetworksofvariousplayerssuchasmigrants/refugees,smugglers/humantraffickersandrescue/aidorganizations

3.3 Theimpactsofsocialmediause

IdentifyingIndividuals:Socialmediamessagesproducedinmassgatheringscancontainsignificantinformationthatcanbeindicativeofthesender'spersonaldetailsandlocation.Impactsonidentifyingindividualsinthefieldcouldvarydependingonthecausefortheirparticipationandactionse.g.,peoplemightwant theiraccounts tobe identified in theeventsbutnotindemonstrationsasopponentstoapoliticalregime.

(Dis)InformationSpreading:Informationpushedtothecrowdisinfluencingindividuals'decisionswhethertoengageornotinriotingoranti-riotingactivitiesandcampaigns.

Citizengeneratedcontent:Thecrowd-generatedcontentcanaddpressuretothepolicetoappearefficientindealingwithandrespondingtopublicconcernandmayalsohavethe

1 For a more in depth description please refer to MEDI@4SEC D1.1 ‘Report on State of the Art Review’, MEDI@4SEC D1.2 ‘Worldwide Mapping of Best Practices and Lessons Learnt’ and MEDI@4SEC D1.3 ‘Ethics and Legal Issues Inventory.


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effect of peer pressure as a motivating factor for the youths’ decisions under fear ofostracismandtheirneedforinclusion.

3.4 Opportunities,challenges,legalandethicalconsiderations

Opportunities include the fact that social media can bridge the communication gapbetween citizens and police and increase citizen involvement with organizeddata/information management during a mass gathering. This can provide significantadditionaloptionstoLEAsforrespondingtoaparticularincidentandobtainingadetailedandconciseoperationalimage.

Threatsincludethefactthatsocialmediaenabletherapidorganizationandexpansionofrioting, finding the crowd and the authorities unprepared. Overloaded false rumours,disinformationandtrollingarealsothreatsthatcanmisleadcitizensandauthoritiestotakewrongdecisionsandactions.Legalrestrictions forcollecting,sharing,storingandutilisingdatafromsocialmediaduringmassgatheringsmustalsobetakenintoseriousconsideration.

Anymassgatheringhasthepotentialtoturnviolent,getoutofcontrolanditisnotalwayspossible nor desirable to categorise events in advance as ‘risky’ or ‘non-risky’. Someevents that are not inherently risky, such as religious gatherings, may neverthelessbecomepredictably so if, for example, there iswidespread prejudice against religiousgroups in a society. In such cases, the protection of individuals at such events is veryimportant. This inherent, unpredictable, ever-shifting character of mass gatheringsentailspotentialthreatsandthereforeneedstobeaddressedwithparticularattention.

One challenge for public security providers is determining what level of monitoring,interference,andpolicepresenceisproportionateinrelationtosuchevents.Technologydevelopersmaybeabletohelpinthisrespectifdataanalyticscanpredicttheextenttowhichaneventislikelytoaffectpublicorderorturnugly.Poorjudgementsinthisrespectcanhaveseriousethicalconsequences ifeventsbecomeviolentandpeoplegethurtorpropertydamaged.Thecooperationwithpoliceofpeopleateventscanbevitaltotheirsuccessfulmanagementsogoodcommunicationstrategiesonsocialmediaisvital.Incaseoftheorganizationofbigevents,cooperationwithauthoritiesisusuallyrequiredaspartof the permission granted by authorities to hold the event. Political protests are alsoorganized, discussed, and reported from on social media. Police have an additionalobligation to facilitate peaceful political protest, given the need to protect freedomofassociation,belief,andexpression.Butpolicealsohasadutytodealwithanyanticipatedpublicorderrisk.Theremaybeinpracticeatensionbetweenthedutytosecurepublicorder and theduty to protect freedomof expression and association and this poses achallenge to local authorities, who must ensure that public order responses do notinterferewiththesedemocraticrightsanymorethanisnecessary.

Detailed legal and ethical considerations on the topic of Riots and Mass GatheringsderivedfromtheworkshopwillbeavailableintheDeliverable:D4.2Workshop2EthicsandLegalIssues.


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3.5 Stakeholderidentification

Basedon the researchconductedand thepracticepatterns thatwerestudied,a listofstakeholderswasidentifiedforeachofthethemesselectedfortheworkshop:

PROTEST/DEMONSTRATIONSSTAKEHOLDERS

● Protestors/Demonstrators● LawEnforcementAgencies(LEAs)/Authorities● Public/Citizensoutsidetheprotests/demonstrations

LARGESCALEEVENTSSTAKEHOLDERS

● EventOrganizers● LawEnforcementAgencies(LEAs)/Authorities● Eventparticipants● Non-ParticipatingCitizens

MIGRATIONSTAKEHOLDERS

● Migrants● LawEnforcementAgencies(LEAs)/Authorities● Citizens/LocalPopulation

OTHERSTAKEHOLDERS

● NationalandLocalGovernments● Industry:SocialMediaPlatformProviders


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3.6 Practicepatterns&stakeholdermapping

ThefollowingpatternsdescribetheuseofsocialmediaforRiots&MassGatherings:

• ORGANISEPROTESTS:Citizensmayopposeactionsofgovernmentor issues insociety. Therefore, citizens use social media to organise protests or massgatherings. (Stakeholders: Protestors/Demonstrators, Law EnforcementAgencies -LEAs/Authorities, Non-Participating Citizens, National and LocalGovernments)

• SOCIALMEDIAANALYTICS:High volumes of unstructureddata and traffic aregenerated from various social media before, during and after an event or anemergencyincidentperiod.Therefore,LEAsusesoftwaretoolsfordataanalyticsfor unstructured data, such as machine learning-based tools that search andanalysetext,image,audio,andvideofromvirtuallyanysourceuncoveringtrends,patterns and relationships. (Stakeholders: Event Organizers, Law EnforcementAgencies -LEAs/Authorities, National and Local Governments, Industry: SocialMediaPlatformProviders)

• SOCIALMEDIAMONITORING:Socialmediaprovideasenseofwhatisgoingonfor public security planners (before, during or after incidents for example).Therefore,LEAsmonitorsocialmediaonvarioussecuritytopics.(Stakeholders:Event Organizers, Law Enforcement Agencies -LEAs/Authorities, National andLocalGovernments)

• INCIDENTMONITORING:LEAsneed toknow thedevelopmentsof an incident.Therefore, LEAs use social media to monitor ongoing incidents or events.(Stakeholders: Protestors/Demonstrators, Event Organizers, Law EnforcementAgencies -LEAs/Authorities, Event participants, Non-Participating Citizens,Migrants)

• ORGANIZE VOLUNTEERING: Places and properties affected from the publicdisorder caused by rioting need cleaning, recovery and restoration. Therefore,LEAs use social media to organize volunteers in helping to clean and makecontribution to public safety. (Stakeholders: Protestors/Demonstrators, EventOrganizers, Law Enforcement Agencies -LEAs/Authorities, Event participants,Non-ParticipatingCitizens,Migrants,NationalandLocalGovernments)

• CROWD MANAGEMENT: Large events require organizers to manage crowds.Therefore, LEAs can use socialmedia tomanage crowds. (Stakeholders: EventOrganizers, Law Enforcement Agencies -LEAs/Authorities, Non-ParticipatingCitizens,Migrants)

Thetablebelowpresentsthemappinginamoreconcicemanner:


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Table2:Practicepatterns&stakeholdermapping

Protestors/Dem

onstrators

EventOrganizers

LawEnforcementAgencies

(LEAs)/Authorities

Eventparticipants

Non-ParticipatingCitizens

Migrants

NationalandLocalGovernm

ents

Industry:SocialM

ediaPlatformProviders

ORGANISEPROTESTS

X X X X

SOCIALMEDIAANALYTICS

X X X X

SOCIALMEDIAMONITORING

X X X

INCIDENTMONITORING

X X X X X X

ORGANIZEVOLUNTEERING

X X X X X X X

CROWDMANAGEMENT

X X X X


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4. SWOTAnalysis

Althoughstrengthsandweaknessesareofteninternal,whileopportunitiesandthreatsare usually related to external parameters, the use of social media (with thecharacteristics they provide and the impact they create), additionally introducesstrengthsandweaknesseswhichcanbeexternalandopportunitiesandthreatswhichcanbeinternal.

For this reason, SWOT is sometimes called Internal-External Analysis and the SWOTMatrixisoftencalledanIEMatrix.

Below,wepresentSWOTanalysesontheuseofsocialmediaforeachofthethemesthatwereselectedfortheworkshop.

4.1 SWOTAnalysisforProtests/Demonstrations

SWOTMATRIX/INTERNAL-EXTERNALANALYSIS

THEME:PROTESTSANDDEMONSTRATIONS

STRENGTHS

S1INFLUENCECITIZENS’EMOTIONSTOBRINGABOUTRESOLUTION&ORDER

S2DEFINETHEAPPROPRIATECONTEXTWITHSPECIFICDO’s&DON’Ts

S3MANAGEEXPECTATIONS

S4PROVIDEGUIDANCE&ADVICETOCITIZENS

S5RUMOURHANDLING

S6CLEANUPCAMPAIGNSAFTERANEVENT

S7CITIZENS’FEEDBACKIMPROVESPOLICING

S8CRIMINALPROSECUTION

S9SUPPORTINVESTIGATIONS

S10DIRECTCOMMUNICATIONBETWEENLEAsANDCITIZENSCANFOSTERTRUST,PUBLICIMAGEANDCOLLABORATION

S11CITIZENCOORDINATION

WEAKNESSES

W1NOTEVERYONEHASMOBILEDEVICES&INTERNETCONNECTION

W2RELIANTONFUNCTIONINGTECHNICALEQUIPMENT

W3NEGATIVEBIASINTHEUSEOFMATERIALAGAINSTTHEPOLICE

W4EASIERTOSPREADFAKECLAIMS/NEWSORSPREADPANIC

W5LACKOFTRUSTBETWEENTHEPOLICEANDCITIZENS

W6PROBLEMSDEALINGWITHMULTIPLELANGUAGES

W7ALGORITHMSANALYSINGSMCANNOTDETECTSARCASM


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OPPORTUNITIES

O1MONITORING&ANALYSISOFSMDATACANPROVIDEUSEFULINSIGHTS

O2PROVIDEABETTERNARRATIVE/CORRECTIVETONEGATIVEPOLICEBIAS

O3ESTABLISHNORMALITY&ASSISTINEMOTIONALRECOVERY

O4RUMOURHANDLING

THREATS

T1AVOIDCAPTURE

T2HARDTOKEEPUPWITH

T3FALSEACCUSATIONS

T4INVESTMENTINSMWITHOUTPROPERCOST/BENEFITANALYSISCANBEDAMAGING

T5UNDERMININGOFACTUALPOLICEWORK

T6POLICEDUTIESAREINCREASEDANDMIGHTOVERBURDEROFFICERS

StrengthsforProtests/Demonstrations

S1 INFLUENCE CITIZENS’ EMOTIONS TO BRING ABOUT RESOLUTION & ORDER:Spreadingpositivecontentthroughsocialmediamayinfluencetheemotionsofthecrowdbeforeaneventprotectingandestablishingapeacefulprotestordemonstration.

S2DEFINETHEAPPROPRIATECONTEXTWITHSPECIFICDO’s&DON’Ts:Socialmediagivethechancetodescribewhatisallowedandwhatisnotinanevent,settinglimitsandinformingpeopleonpermittedandprohibitedactions.

S3MANAGEEXPECTATIONS:Intentionsandexpectationsfromthecrowdforascheduledprotest/demonstrationcanbeidentifiedandmanagedatanearlystagebeforeanevent,enablinglocalgovernmentandauthoritiestoprepareandreactaccordinglyduringandaftertheevent.

S4PROVIDEGUIDANCE&ADVICETOCITIZENS:GivingadvicesandguidelinestocitizenssuchasinformingthemtoavoidcertainareasandenableLEAstoavoidandhandleriotsituationsmoreeffectively.

S5 RUMOUR HANDLING: Broadcasted information on one media can be validated,identifiedasfakeandcontradictedusingothermedia.

S6CLEANUPCAMPAIGNSAFTERANEVENT:Citizensonavolunteerbasismayorganize,eitherbythemselvesor incoordinationwith localauthoritiesandemergencyservices,clean-upcampaignsthroughsocialmediaforcleaning,recoveryandrestorationofplacesandpropertiesafterincidentswithdamages.


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S7CITIZENS’FEEDBACK IMPROVESPOLICING:Citizenscangive their feedback to thepoliceduringorafteraprotestandthuscontributetoimproveoverallsecurity.

S8CRIMINALPROSECUTION: Social networkingplatformsprovide themeans and thecontenttobeusedasevidencefortheprosecutionofcriminalsduringoraftertheriots.

S9SUPPORTINVESTIGATIONS:Thevastamountofsocialmediadatagathered fromaprotestisusedasatooltosupportfurtherinvestigationsforsuspectsidentifiedduringoraftertheevent.

S10 DIRECT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN LEAs AND CITIZENS CAN FOSTER TRUST,PUBLICIMAGEANDCOLLABORATION:SMcanestablishamoredirectcommunicationframework between citizens and the Police which additionally helps build trust andpromotesahealthierrelationship.

S11CITIZENCOORDINATION:Protesterscanmakeuseofopenandclosedsocialmediaplatformstocoordinatewithoneanother,getinformationaboutincidentsastheyoccurandavoiddangerousareas.

WeaknessesforProtests/Demonstrations

W1 NOT EVERYONE HAS MOBILE DEVICES & INTERNET CONNECTION: Not allparticipants in protests have smartphones up and running and/or connected to theinternet.

W2RELIANTONFUNCTIONINGTECHNICALEQUIPMENT:Althoughparticipantsmightbe equipped with mobile h/w and s/w resources, technical problems related totechnologyandcommunicationissuesmightbeanobstacleforsocialmediauseduringprotestsespeciallywhentheoperativeconditionsandrequirementsaredemandingduetothehighvolumeofthecrowdgatheredandtheoutcomeproduced(e.g.LackofWi-Fiaccess points; mobile internet network overload; social media platform unavailable,hardwaretechnicalmalfunctions,etc.)

W3 NEGATIVE BIAS IN THE USE OF MATERIAL AGAINST THE POLICE: Social mediacontentcanfacilitatenegativeframing/biasagainstthepolice.

W4EASIERTOSPREADFAKECLAIMS/NEWSORSPREADPANIC:Thespeedwithwhichsocialmediaspreadcan facilitateuncheckedfalse informationbeingdisseminatedandpanicresponsefromthepublicinturn.


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W5LACKOFTRUSTBETWEENTHEPOLICEANDCITIZENS:It’sonlyveryrecentlythatPolicestartedusingsocialmediainmassgatheringsituationssuchaspoliticalprotestsand demonstrations and therefore the proper trust has not been established yet. Inaddition, socialmedia cannot substitute the sense of security derived from the actualphysicalpresenceofLEAstaffinpatrols,neighborhoods,etc.

W6 PROBLEMS DEALING WITH MULTIPLE LANGUAGES: As the synthesis of crowdgatherings nowadays is gettingmore andmoremultinational, the socialmedia use isgettingmultilingualandthereforeonlinerealtimetranslationprocessesareneededtobedeployed.

W7ALGORITHMSANALYSINGSMCANNOTDETECTSARCASM:Detectingundertones,orspecific pop references to understand humor or sarcasm can be a daunting, or evenimpossible at times, task even for humans (manual detection); more so for relevantanalyticalsolutions.

OpportunitiesforProtests/Demonstrations

O1MONITORING & ANALYSIS OF SM DATA CAN PROVIDE USEFUL INSIGHTS: SocialMedia intelligence gives theopportunity to transform large amountof data generatedfrom various sources in the field into valuable information for policing and safetypurposes.

O2PROVIDEABETTERNARRATIVE/CORRECTIVETONEGATIVEPOLICEBIAS:Socialmediaoffersan importantcorrectivetoexistingnegativebiasandcanhelptoreframestoriesthathavebeenpresentedinaone-sidedmannerorblownoutofproportion.

O3ESTABLISHNORMALITY&ASSISTINEMOTIONALRECOVERY:Socialmediatacticswithhashtagssuchas#lastTweetmayclosedowntheprotestgivinganendtoastorythathasnothingmoretotellrestoringnormalityandhelprecoveryefforts.

O4 RUMOUR HANDLING: Social media analytics may give improved methods forautomaticcrosscheckingofinfoandtheidentificationofrumoursspreadinsocialmediaplatforms.


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ThreatsforProtests/Demonstrations

T1 AVOID CAPTURE: Vandals and criminals may use their own closed social mediaplatformsandapplications for their communication,notaccessibleby theother socialnetworkusers inordertoavoidgettingarrestedandprosecutedbycoordinatingtheirmovementsandescaping‘kettling’attempts(policeconfinementtechnique).

T2HARDTOKEEPUPWITH:LEAscanfinditverychallengingtomonitorevolutionsinthe use of social media and adjust to current use trends. SM tools and their use areconstantlychanging.Demonstratorsandriotersareoftenearlyadopters.Thepoliceasbureaucraticinstitution,boundedbyregulationandlaw,andoftenwithaworkforcewithanolderageandlimitedresourcesandcompetencies,isnotabletokeepup.

T3FALSEACCUSATIONS: "Pre-court judging"of suspectsvia socialmediaoutletsmayleadtofalselyaccusedcitizens.

T4 INVESTMENT IN SM WITHOUT PROPER COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BEDAMAGING:Socialmediatechnologyisrelativelynewandnotfullytested.CostagainstbenefitsanalysisoftheuseofsocialmediafortheinvestmentsneedtobemadebytheLEAsisstillunclearandmightnotbeworthit.

T5 UNDERMINING OF ACTUAL POLICEWORK: Police is constantly on the stand andunder themicroscope. Police is accountable to the promises itmakes to the public insocial networks. Police officers canmakemistakes in using socialmediawhichmightaffecttheirimage.

T6POLICEDUTIESAREINCREASEDANDMIGHTOVERBURDEROFFICERS:EvenmoredutiesforthePolicetohandleduetotheirinvolvementinthenewsocialmediaprocesses.


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4.2 SWOTAnalysisforLargeScaleEvents


THEME:LARGESCALEEVENTS

STRENGTHS

S1EXISTINGEXPERIENCEOFSOCIALMEDIA

S2EXISTINGTRUSTINTHEORGANIZATIONS

S3LEARNINGSFROMPREVIOUSEVENTS

S4MOREEFFICIENTINTERACTIONTHROUGHSM

WEAKNESSES

W1DIFFICULTYTOPROVIDEREALTIMEINFO

W2NOUSEORCOMPETENCIESOFSMBYPEOPLE

W3USEOFDATAISPROHIBITED

W4LACKOFCLARITYOFSOCIALMEDIAUSEFORLEAs

W5LACKOFPROPERITINFRASTRUCTURE

W6LACKOFFUNDINGFORFUTUREDEVELOPMENTS

OPPORTUNITIES

O1FIGHTFALSEINFORMATIONANDRUMOURSTHROUGHSOCIALMEDIAAPPSANDTRAINING

O2INFORMATIONINTELLIGENCESUPPORTSDATATASKS&BETTERANALYTICS

O3STAKEHOLDERSCONNECTION&CROSSCOUNTRYKNOWLEDGEEXCHANGE

O4CONVENTIONALMEDIAASINFOVALIDATOR

O5INADEQUATEPOLICEFORCESTOPOLICELARGEEVENTS

THREATS

T1EXTERNALINFLUENCES

T2FAKENEWSANDRUMOURS

T3CROWDMANAGEMENTDIFFICULTYWITHINFOFROMVARIOUSSOURCES

T4PRIVACYISSUESMAYSTOPSMPRESENCE

T5COORDINATEDDISORDER

T6SMUSERSMIGRATIONTOANOTHERNON-MONITORABLESM

StrengthsforLargeScaleEvents

S1EXISTINGEXPERIENCEOFSOCIALMEDIA:Thereisalreadyanexperiencefromsocialmedia which was not present a few years ago. Participants use them extensivelynowadays to get notified of upcoming events, their content, schedule andwho else isplanning to attend. This point is also valid for protests and demonstrations and alsomigration.

S2 EXISTING TRUST IN THE ORGANIZATIONS: Building a loyal community offollowers/subscriberswiththeinfotheyprovideonsocialmedia(incombinationwiththecredibilitythatthisinfobears),LEAscanestablishedadegreeoftrustandreliabilitywithcitizens.


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S3LEARNINGSFROMPREVIOUSEVENTS:Thereisaportfolioofsocialmediaexperiencesfrompreviouseventswhichiscontinuouslyenrichedwithnewlearnings.

S4MOREEFFICIENTINTERACTIONTHROUGHSM:Theinteractionusingsocialmediaismoreefficientthanthetraditionalandconventionalcommunicationmeans.Interactionwithanetworkinggroup(e.g.,groupofjournalists)ismoreefficientthanspeakingwithindividuals(e.g.,individualjournalists).

WeaknessesforLargeScaleEvents

W1 DIFFICULTY TO PROVIDE REAL TIME INFORMATION: The adverse and badconditionsunderlargescaleeventmakesthebroadcastingofinfodifficultinon-linerealtime.

W2NOUSEORCOMPETENCIESOFSMBYPEOPLE:Notalleventsparticipantsusesocialmedia.Importantmessagesneedtobespreadonmultiplechannels.Lackofdigital-nativepoliceofficersorpoorSMdigitalliteracyisalsoanotherissueforLEAs.

W3USEOFDATAISPROHIBITED:Dataprivacyandprotectionissuesoftenmakeitsuseprohibited.

W4LACKOFCLARITYOFSOCIALMEDIAUSEFORLEAs:There isa lackof clarity forwhichpurposeandhowsocialmediashouldbeusedbyLEAs.

W5 LACK OF PROPER IT INFRASTRUCTURE:Most LEAs do not have the appropriaterobust technology infrastructure needed to handle social media processes and vastamountofdatainhighspeeds.

W6 LACKOF FUNDINGFORFUTUREDEVELOPMENTS: Significant investmentswhichneed funding have to be made for developing and maintaining new social mediatechnologyinfrastructures,applicationsandorganizationalresourcesandprocedures.

OpportunitiesforLargeScaleEvents

O1FIGHTFALSEINFORMATIONANDRUMOURSTHROUGHSOCIALMEDIAAPPSANDTRAINING:

Educatepeopleonfalsesocialmediainformationanduseappstocorrectfalserumours.


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O2 INFORMATION INTELLIGENCE SUPPORTS DATA TASKS & BETTER ANALYTICS:Enablesthesupportofcomplexdatatasksandprovidebetterdataanalytics(sentimentanalysis)

O3 STAKEHOLDERS CONNECTION & CROSS COUNTRY KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE: Allstakeholdersfromvariouscountriesusethesamesocialmediaplatformsandtheyhavemore or less the same issues. Direct connection and interaction between differentstakeholdersfromvarioussectors(police,academics,researchers,practitioners,securityetc)enable themtoexchangeknowledge,experiencesandbestpracticesused in theirorganizationsandregions.

O4CONVENTIONALMEDIAASINFOVALIDATOR:Infogeneratedthroughsocialmediaplatforms can be checked for its validity against the information produced from thetraditionalmedia.

O5INADEQUATEPOLICEFORCESTOPOLICELARGEEVENTS:Policinglargescaleeventsvia socialmedia ismuchmore feasible than policing on the physical field due to thelimitedcapacityofpoliceforcestohandlesuchcrowdedevents.

ThreatsforLargeScaleEvents

T1 EXTERNAL INFLUENCES: Groups that oppose a large-scale event or groups thatparticipateintheeventwiththeaimtodisruptitcanbehelpedintheirgoalsbysocialmedia.

T2 FAKE NEWS AND RUMOURS: These might lead to disruptions to the event byspreadingpanicamongparticipants.

T3CROWDMANAGEMENTDIFFICULTYWITHINFOFROMVARIOUSSOURCES:Peopleget large volume of information from various sources, from and formany persons orgroups,makingthecrowdcontrolandmanagementverydifficult.

T4 PRIVACY ISSUESMAY STOP SM PRESENCE: The publicmay stop approving socialmediapresence(e.g.oncertainpoliticalevents)duetoprivacyissues.


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T5COORDINATEDDISORDER:Theuseofsocialmediabygroupsinsocietythatplantocausecoordinateddisordersposesathreattolargescaleevents.

T6SMUSERSMIGRATIONTOANOTHERNON-MONITORABLESM:Broadlyusedsocialmediaplatformsmightshrinkinthefutureandusersmightmovetoothermorededicatedandclosedplatformswhichwillbenon-monitorable.

4.3 SWOTAnalysisforMigration


THEME:MIGRATION

STRENGTHS

S1ORGANIZINGANDGATHERINGCAPACITY

S2GUIDINGINFOFORSAFEROUTES&SETTLEMENTS

S3ROUTETRACEABILITY&SITUATIONALAWERENESS

S4COMMUNICATION/CONTACTWITHRELATIVES

S5IDENTIFYKEYCOMMUNICATORS&LEADERS

WEAKNESSES

W1TARGETSOFORGANIZEDCRIME

W2FAKEINFOGOESVIRAL

W3NOTALLMIGRANTSREACHED

W4LANGUAGEBARRIERS

W5TECHNICALISSUES–LACKOFMOBILENETWORK

OPPORTUNITIES

O1PLATFORMWITHRELIABLEINFO

O2AFFECTINGPUBLICOPINION

O3DIRECTCOMMUNICATION

O4IDENTIFYTRENDSONATTACKINGMIGRANTS

THREATS

T1ENCOURAGING/ENHANCINGHUMANTRAFFICKING

T2DISINFORMATIONMISLEADSMOVEMENTS

T3TERRORISTRECRUITMENT&RADICALISATION

T4HATESPEECH

T5PEOPLEASKFORMONEYTOPROVIDEHELPINFO

StrengthsforMigration

S1ORGANIZINGANDGATHERINGCAPACITY:Socialmedianotonlyfacilitatemigrantstoorganize themselves for their movements and settlements but also help otherorganizationssuchasNGOsorcitizencommunitiestoorganizethemselvesandtocollectprimarygoodstoshare(clothes,food…).


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S2 GUIDING INFO FOR SAFE ROUTES & SETTLEMENTS: Social media can provideinformationandtools(translations,maps,etc.)aboutthejourney,hencehelpingmigrantsto cross countries and reach the destination following safe routes. It gives them alsoguidancewithasylumandotherprocedural issuestheywill faceinordertoliveintheforeigncountries.

S3ROUTETRACEABILITY&SITUATIONALAWERENESS:Thelocationbasedsocialmediatechnologyprovides the capability to trace the route themigrants follow, identify thelocationandthestatusinwhichtheyareatanytimeduringtheirmovements.

S4COMMUNICATION/CONTACTWITHRELATIVES:Usingsocialmediahelpsmigrantstomaintainstrongtieswithfamily,relativesandfriendswhiletravellingandkeepingthemcalmer.

S5IDENTIFYKEYCOMMUNICATORS&LEADERS:Throughsocialmediacommunicationofthemigrants,keyactorsfortheinitiationandleadershipofmigrationprocesscanbeidentified.

WeaknessesforMigration

W1 TARGETS OF ORGANIZED CRIME: Migrant’s reliance on social media is also asignificantvulnerabilitysincecriminalcanusethemtoexploitthemorentrapthem(e.g.humantrafficking)

W2FAKEINFOGOESVIRAL:Fakeinformationisnotusuallyrecognizedbymigrantsandcanbecome“viral”intheirnetworkinaveryshorttime.

W3NOT ALLMIGRANTS REACHED: Not allmigrants are equippedwith socialmediarelatedtechnology,notallmigrantsarefamiliartosocialmediadependingonage,class,placeofresidenceandgender.Thiscanthereforelimitthecapabilitiestoreachapartofthemigrantcommunity.

W4 LANGUAGE BARRIERS: Communication and monitoring issues arise with themultilingualuseofsocialmediabymigrantsandtheirleaders.

W5TECHNICALISSUES–LACKOFMOBILENETWORK:Notallplacescrossedorvisitedbymigrantshavemobileandinternetnetworkingcapabilityandavailability.


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OpportunitiesforMigration

O1 PLATFORM WITH RELIABLE INFO: There are many internet platforms speciallydedicated to migrants providing reliable information for safer trips and settlementswhichenhancethesocialmediatrust.

O2AFFECTINGPUBLICOPINION:Newsaboutmigrantscirculatedinsocialmediakeepthepublicinformedbutmayalsoinfluencethepublicopinioninfavororagainstmigrants.

O3DIRECTCOMMUNICATION:Internet-basedtechnologyandsocialmediaareputtingdifferentgroupsofmigrantsandnon-migrantpopulationsindirectcontact.

O4 IDENTIFY TRENDS ON ATTACKING MIGRANTS: Social media can help identifyincidentsofxenophobia,hatespeechandhostilebehaviourtowardsmigrants.

ThreatsforMigration

T1ENCOURAGING/ENHANCINGHUMANTRAFFICKING:Socialmedianotonlyfacilitatesthecommunicationformigrantsbutalsoforhumantraffickersandsmugglersenablingthedevelopmentandtheexpansionofmigration.

T2 DISINFORMATION MISLEADS MOVEMENTS: Fake information from unreliableplatformsmightmisleadaccidentallyordeliberatelymigrants’movements.

T3TERRORISTRECRUITMENT&RADICALISATION:Arealandimminentdangeristhepossibilityofelementsoftherefugeediasporabecomingvulnerabletoradicalisationandbeingspecificallytargetedbyextremistandterroristrecruiters.

T4 HATE SPEECH: Triggers and mechanisms of hate speech creating and spreadingnegativenarrativesagainstmigrantsandrefugeesthroughsocialmedia.

T5PEOPLEASKFORMONEYTOPROVIDEHELPINFO:Someproviderstakeadvantageofthevalueofinformation,byaskingmoneytothemigrantsinreturnforthehelptheyneed.


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4.4 SWOTSummarybefore,duringandafteramassgathering

Thefollowing4tablesgatherallthecorrespondingStrengths,Weaknesses,OpportunitiesandThreatsfromthe3themeswiththeindicationiftheyappearbefore,duringor/andafteramassgatheringsituation.

STRENGTHS BEFORE DURING AFTER

INFLUENCECITIZENS’EMOTIONSTOBRINGABOUTRESOLUTION&ORDER

X

DEFINETHEAPPROPRIATECONTEXTWITHSPECIFICDO’s&DON’Ts

X

MANAGEEXPECTATIONS X

PROVIDEGUIDANCE&ADVICETOCITIZENS X X

RUMOURHANDLING X

CLEANUPCAMPAIGNSAFTERTHEEVENT X

CITIZENS’FEEDBACKIMPROVESPOLICING X

CRIMINALPROSECUTION X

SUPPORTINVESTIGATIONS X

DIRECTCOMMUNICATIONBETWEENLEAsANDCITIZENSCANFOSTERTRUST,PUBLICIMAGEANDCOLLABORATION

X

CITIZENCOORDINATION X X

EXISTINGEXPERIENCEOFSOCIALMEDIA X X X

EXISTINGTRUSTINTHEORGANIZATIONS X

LEARNINGSFROMPREVIOUSEVENTS X X X

MOREEFFICIENTINTERACTIONTHROUGHSM X

ORGANIZINGANDGATHERINGCAPACITY X X

GUIDINGINFOFORSAFEROUTES&SETTLEMENTS X X

ROUTE TRACEABILITY & SITUATIONALAWERENESS

X

COMMUNICATION/CONTACTWITHRELATIVES X

IDENTIFYKEYCOMMUNICATORS&LEADERS X X


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WEAKNESSES BEFORE DURING AFTER

NOTEVERYONEHASMOBILEDEVICES&INTERNETCONNECTION

X X

RELIANTONFUNCTIONINGTECHNICALEQUIPMENT X

NEGATIVEBIASINTHEUSEOFMATERIALAGAINSTPOLICE X

EASIERTOSPREADFAKECLAIMS/NEWSORSPREADPANIC X

LACKOFTRUSTBETWEENPOLICE&COMMUNITY X X

PROBLEMSDEALINGWITHMULTIPLELANGUAGES X

ALGORITHMSANALYSINGSMCANNOTDETECTSARCASM X

DIFFICULTYTOPROVIDEREALTIMEINFORMATION X

NOUSEORCOMPETENCIESOFSMBYPEOPLE X

USEOFDATAISPROHIBITED X

LACKOFCLARITYOFSOCIALMEDIAUSEFORLEAs X X

LACKOFPROPERITINFRASTRUCTURE X X

LACKOFFUNDINGFORFUTUREDEVELOPMENTS X X

TARGETSOFORGANIZEDCRIME X X X

FAKEINFOGOESVIRAL X X

NOTALLMIGRANTSREACHED X X

LANGUAGEBARRIERS X X

TECHNICALISSUES–LACKOFMOBILENETWORK X


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OPPORTUNITIES BEFORE DURING AFTER

MONITORING&ANALYSISOFSMDATACANPROVIDEUSEFULINSIGHTS

X X

PROVIDEABETTERNARRATIVE/CORRECTIVETONEGATIVEPOLICEBIAS

X

ESTABLISHNORMALITY&ASSISTINEMOTIONALRECOVERY X

RUMOURHANDLING X X X

STAKEHOLDERSCONNECTION&CROSSCOUNTRYKNOWLEDGEEXCHANGE

X X

CONVENTIONALMEDIAASINFOVALIDATOR X

INADEQUATEPOLICEFORCESTOPOLICELARGEEVENTS X

PLATFORMWITHRELIABLEINFO X X X

AFFECTINGPUBLICOPINION X

DIRECTCOMMUNICATION X

IDENTIFYTRENDSONATTACKINGMIGRANTS X


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THREATS BEFORE DURING AFTER

AVOIDCAPTURE X

HARDTOKEEPUPWITH X X X

FALSEACCUSATIONS X X

INVESTMENTINSMWITHOUTPROPERCOST/BENEFITANALYSISCANBEDAMAGING

X

UNDERMININGOFACTUALPOLICEWORK X X X

POLICEDUTIESAREINCREASEDANDMIGHTOVERBURDEROFFICERS X X X

EXTERNALINFLUENCES X

CROWDMANAGEMENTDIFFICULTYWITHINFOFROMVARIOUSSOURCES

X

PRIVACYISSUESMAYSTOPSMPRESENCE X

COORDINATEDDISORDER X X

SMUSERSMIGRATIONTOANOTHERNON-MONITORABLESM X

ENCOURAGING/ENHANCINGHUMANTRAFFICKING X

TERRORISTRECRUITMENT&RADICALISATION X

HATESPEECH X

PEOPLEASKFORMONEYTOPROVIDEHELPINFO X


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5. Currentsituationandrecommendationsforthefuture

Massgatheringshavebeenanessentialcomponentofhumancivilisationandinfactakeydriverforsocietalevolutionthroughouttheages.Significantresearchhasbeenconductedon relevant aspects of the phenomenon including mob mentality, group identity,psychologicaltriggersandmore.However,atthistimeandage,socialmediaplatformsoffer themselves up as a game changer to how mass gathering are organised,communicated,scaledup,addressedanddeescalated.

Inthisnewenvironment,itisimportanttoholddiscussionsonhowweideallywanttoharnessthistoolinordertoimprovetheexistingstateofthings.Tothatend,futurerolesandresponsibilitiesneedtoberedefined.Inthefollowing,wesummarizethemaintrends,conceptsandideasdiscussedattheworkshop.

5.1 Stakeholderanalysis

Inthetablesbelowwepresenttheanalysisofthevariousstakeholdersofmassgatheringsintermsofboththeexistingsituationandtheroadmapforfutureimprovement:

Table3:Participantsinmassgatherings

Stakeholder Currentissues/limitations Futurerecommendations

Massgatheringparticipants(protestors,demonstrators,eventgoers,migrants,etc.)

Someprotestersdonotuseopensource or mainstream socialmediaplatforms

Establish & disseminate officialaccountswhere citizens can turn toforinformationandguidance

During events, non-participantsuse social media more thanparticipants. Also, participantsdon't read social media whileattendingevent

Identify and promote specificchannels or accounts as officialduring mass events so that citizensknow where to turn to when theyneedup-to-dateinformation

Fake news &rumours/unreliableinformation

Official accounts help as a source ofreliable information but needspecialised big data analysis andnoise filtering software support andstaffing in order to monitor, cross-validate, react and respond toevolvingsituationsastheyarise

Distrustinpolice Change in paradigm, attitude andmind set. Use of non-threateninguniforms. Development of


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collaborative initiatives amongcitizens and law enforcementagencies (i.e. community policing).Use of social media to promote thepositive impact of LEAs and theinitiatives they undertake for thebenefit of communities and assessthegeneralfeelingtowardsthem.

“Humanise” the police, create directcontactandenhancetrust.

Language barriers for non-localparticipants/migrants

Use multiple language to pass onimportantmessages.

Reachouttoinfluentialsocialmediaprofiles that can relay officialmessagesintheirownlanguage.

AsshowninTable3,massgatheringparticipantsneedtouniformlyidentifylawenforcementagenciesastrustedcollaborators.Forthistohappen,thereneedstobeachangeintheparadigmofpolicing.Also,fakenews,misreportingandunsubstantiatedrumoursneedtobecontrolledusingappropriatestaffandautomatedsupportsoftwareforthistask.

Table4:LEAsinmassgatherings


Lawenforcementauthorities

Issues with ability to identifyemergingsocialmediaplatforms

Provide training to increase socialmediaskills,conductrelevantresearchon performance and trends, employexperts

Lack of understanding of howsocialmediaoperate

Improve technical skills and digitalliteracy

Veryreactiveapproach Emphasiseproactivemeasures:setthetone, expectations, warn againstincidents and deliver on warnings(punctuality)


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Lackoflanguageskills Improvecommunicationandlanguageskills

Lack of properly trained/expertpersonnel

Usetrainingtoimprovetechnicalskillsofcurrentofficersandemployexperts

Lackofapopularstyleofmessageson social media (popularity vs.authority)

Consistencyofmessaging:switchfromthe sight of hard police lines to softsocialmediamessaging.

Establish a tone that’s conducive andeffectivetoensuresecurity.

LackofITintegration IncludeITaspartofanintegratedplanandstrategytoupgradeLEAscapacityinto a more evolved paradigm ofsecurity

Toomuchdatatobeanalysed Use of appropriate technological tool(seesection6)

Big data analysis methods andtechniquesbyexperts

Lackofresources Changeinpolicingparadigmandshiftof resources into more effectiveapproaches (from a cost/benefitperspective)

Difficulty in prosecuting socialmediausers

Use social media to check and proveclaims,gettestimonies

LackofcooperationbetweenLEAsofdifferentcountries

Establish EU standards for handlingand sharing of social media dataanalyses

Communication barriers betweenoperational and non-operationaldivisionofLEAdepartments

Developandelaborateacoherentandcomprehensive strategy to integratecommunicationandoperationteams

Problematic coordination withprotest/eventorganisers

Establish direct contact withprotest/event organisers and foster acollaborativerelationshipwiththem


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AsshowninTable4,LEAsfacequiteafewissuesintermsofintegratingsocialmediaintheir current mode of operations. Lack of resources, technical capacities, staff andunderstanding play an important role. To overcome them, improving technical skillsthroughtraining,employingexperts,makinguseofintegratedsystemsandappropriatesoftwareaswellasdevelopingacomprehensive,holisticstrategyplanwhichaddressesthe management of both communicational (including social media) and operationalcapacityisessentialtomoveforward.

Table5:Massgatheringnon-participatingcitizens


Non-participatingcitizens

Difficulty to reach outto/Irresponsiveness to urgentincidents

Police presence, i.e. patrolling, isnecessarytoinstilfeelingofsecurity(social media alone can't substitutethat).

Greater investment by social mediacompanies in police liaison andcollaboration.

Official social media accounts forlocal communities can facilitatereaching out to citizens of specificareasaffectedbymassgatherings.

Untrustworthinessofpolice Createanimageoftrust.

Pivot around influencing people onsocialmedia.

Amplification of messaging via keyinfluencers.

Misinformation Validationoftrustedsources

Implementation of a system toreport,blockandretractfakereports

Lack of information about current,evolving situation and appropriateactions

Establisharegularstreamofupdates,including sufficient informationaboutthesituationathandandwhattheappropriateactionswouldbefornon-participating citizens in thevicinity

AslistedinTable5,non-participatingcitizensinthevicinityofmassgatheringeventscanalsobeaffectedbythem.Asaparticulartypeofstakeholders,theyareindirectlyinvolved


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intheeventastheyhaveavestedinterestintheirsecurity.Also,astheyarenotdirectlyinvolvedintheeventtheyarehardertoreachonsocialmediathanactualparticipants.Assuch,thebestwaytoapproachthemwouldbevialocalofficialsocialmediaaccountsthatare part of a wider community policing scheme that fosters collaboration andcommunicationbetweenLEAsandcitizens.Theseaccountscanalsobeusedasameanstocontrolrumoursandmisinformationspreading.

Table6:Eventorganisersduringmassgatherings


Eventorganisers

Capacity to cover the event viasocialmedianotguaranteed

LEAscanprovideguidelinestoeventorganisersonhowtocovertheeventfrom a communication standpoint,what informationisneededforbothparticipating and non-participatingcitizens and how to distribute iteffectivelyinallphasesoftheeventtoensureorderandsecurity

Lack of coordination with LEAsandlocalauthorities

Provide a protocol on how tocoordinate and inform localauthorities before, during and aftertheeventincaseofneed.

Establish contact persons andsecuritystandards.

Security often overlooked /consideredasnotveryconduciveto“fun”events

Establishaminimumlevelofsecuritymeasures to be implemented anddisseminatethemtocitizenstoraiseawareness and create publicexpectations towards organisers tocomplywiththesestandards.

Eventorganiser,aslistedinTable6,havearatherdifferentviewpointonmassgatheringseventsthatisnotalwaysalignedwiththeprioritiesofLEAsandmaylackconcisesecurityawareness.Itisthereforevitaltocreateacultureofabaselinesecuritythatneedstobeimplementedduringlarge-scaleeventsorprotests.Thislevelofsecurityshouldincludeestablished contact pointswith authorities andLEAs alongwith guidelines onhow tocommunicate effectively with all stakeholders before, during and after the event. Inaddition, this baseline security level should be disseminated to the public in order tocreaterelevantexpectationsthatshouldpushorganiserstoadapttothisnewparadigmofsecurity-awarenessduringplanningandexecutionofamass-gatheringevent.


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5.2 Methods,proceduresandbestpracticesanalysis

In the table below we present the analysis of the various methods, procedures andpracticesandorganisationalissuesthatlimitLEAsengagementwithsocialmediaandlaydownaroadmapforfutureimprovement:

Currentissues/limitations Futurerecommendations

Police organization is slow ininnovating and usually conservativeinhowmuchinformationisshared.

Developadetailedframeworktoestablishroles,tools,datatobeusedandthemannerwithwhichtobeused,responsibilities,etc.

LEAscouldadoptamore“open”relationshipwithsociety at large and a more direct manner ofcommunication.

TrainingLEAstaffintheuseofsocialmediafromacommunicationstandpoint.

Lack of resources (staff, technology,etc.)andrelevantexpertise

Experience and relevant knowledgegets lost due job rotation withinpoliceorganisations.

Moreeffectivestaffallocationtospecifictasks.

Usespecialistgroupsforeachtask;especiallyonsocialmedias’front.

Incorporate more, better and more integratedtechnologicalsolutionandtrainpersonneltousethem.

Create"institutionalmemory"andamechanismfor training and transfer of knowledge (policetrainingfromthestartofpolicecareer)

Removal of inter-agency restrictions toinformationsharing.

Lack of best practice exchangebetweenLEAsintheEU.

Lack of cooperation with otheragencies, services, or internationalcounterparts(e.g.Interpol).

Establish a platform / method / approach formaximal sharing of information, insights andpracticesacrossEUpoliceunitsisinplace.

Create a platform for exchange of information(both technical and organizational), e.g., ISACSapproachorENLETSnetwork.

Jointeffortsofallcountries.

CommonstrategyatEUlevel.


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Development of consistent legislation regardingmonitoring.

Real exploitation of specifically addressed EUprojects´results

Clarity of event/social mediaobjectives. Ensuring there is a clearsenseofpurpose.LEAunderstandingoftheroleofsocialmedia.

Develop a coherent social media managementstrategy&operationplanandintegrateitintotheoveralloperationalresponse

Lack of community specificity andengagementwithlocalcitizens

Communication plan adapted to city (based ondemographics,levelofuseofsocialmedia,etc.).

Addition of cultural parameters to account forculturaltendencies.

5.3 Toolsanalysis

Inthetablebelowwepresenttheanalysisofthecurrentlyavailabletoolsforsocialmediamanagement and analysis along with their limitations and problems and lay down aroadmapforfutureimprovement:

Currentissues/limitations Futurerecommendations

Filteringoutnoiseisaproblem;

OpenSourceIntelligence(OSINT)notvery reliable in gathering crowdsourcedata

Improved noise handling techniquesincorporatedinfutureOSINTplatforms

Usesocialmediageo-analysis(e.g.ECHOSEC)

Sentimentanalysis

Naturallanguageprocessing

Imageanalysis

Textmining

Computervisiontechniques

Imageandvideoanalytics

Improved automatic translation tools / Crowdtranslating

Bigdataprocessing,integrationandmanagement


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Rumourandfakenewshandling Automatic systems that cross-referenceinformation from various sources to validatereportsandclaims

Citizens’needforincreasedprivacy Anonymoussocialmedianetworks

Encryption

LEAs’lackofpredictivecapabilities Build upon analytics that work for SituationalAwarenesstodeveloppredictivecapabilities/AIsystems to auto-detect abnormal/new/unusualeventsinordertorespondfaster

Lack of know-how exchange amongLEAs

Create a platform for exchange of information(both technical and organizational/lessonslearnt)

LEAs’limitedoperationalcapacity Platformstoanalysesocialmediaandfeedinfotopoliceunitsonsite

Integratedsystemtomonitormultipleplatformsandaccounts

ToolthatallowsLEAstosendamessagetopeopleinacertainarea,withguaranteeddelivery

MobiledevicesforallLEAstaff(e.g.smartphones,tablets)

Bodycams


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6. ConclusionandOutlook

InthisdocumentwedescribedresultsfromaworkshoponRiotsandMassGatherings,where 57 participants from the law enforcement agencies, universities, the industry,researchorganisationsandsocialmovementsdiscussedthefutureofsecurityformassgatheringevents.

Whilemassgatheringsisbynomeansanewphenomenon,theuseofsocialmediainthiscontextcanactasacatalystandfacilitatemanyofitsinherentparametersoraltersomeofitsqualitativeandquantitativecharacteristicssubstantially.

ThechallengeforLEAs,municipalauthoritiesandotherstakeholders is toharnesstheopportunitiesofferedbysocialmediaandtounderstandthechangeitcanproducebothintermsofensuringpublicsecurityandinshiftingtheparadigmofpolicingduringmassgatheringsinitsentirety.

OurSWOTanalysesshowcasethestrengthsandopportunitiesofferedbysocialmediainthecontextofmassgatheringsbutalsotheimportantweaknessesandthreatsthatneedtobalanceoutinordertoadoptasuccessfulapproach.Thestakeholderanalysisrevealssignificantchallengesforstakeholdersinembracingsocialmediaformassgatherings.

More specifically, with regard to mass gathering participants (demonstrators, event-goersandmigrants)thekeyrequirementistohaveareliableandcrediblepointofcontactvia social media so official accounts for government, event organisers and LEAs areneeded.Moreover,disseminationoftheseofficialaccountsisalsoavitalissuetopromoterecognition and awareness. Another significant aspect is that these accounts need tocontainrelevant,up-to-dateandaccurateinformationandguidancetoestablishtrustandactasareliableinformationhubinordertominimisefakenewsandrumoursspreading.

ForLEAs,akeyrequirementistrainingfortheirrelevantstaff incommunicationskillsandexpertiseintheuse,managementandanalysisofsocialmedia.WhenusedproperlysocialmediacanhelpshiftthepolicingparadigmtowardsamorecollaborativeschemebetweencommunitiesandLEAs,fostertrustanddirectcommunicationwithcitizens.Inaddition, upgrading LEAs current technological equipment and seeking out improvedsocialmediamanagementandanalysissoftwaresolutionsisalsoessentialtokeepingupwithmoderndevelopments.

Asfarasnon-participatingcitizensandthepublicatlargeareconcerned,socialmediacanhelp establish a community policing paradigm that can increase feelings of security;although physical presence cannot be fully substituted by socialmedia. Having directcommunication channels between local communities and local LEA officers confers aseriesofbenefitssuchasupdateonsecurityincidentsthatmayoccurintheareaduringamassgatheringincident,maintainingorder,handlingpublicexpectationsandprovidingguidanceandreassurance.

Ontheotherhand,eventorganiserscanusesocialmediatodirectlycollaboratewithLEAsto ensure security and that order is upheld, directly report any security or safetyincidents, seek advice and guidance on designing the event with a minimum level ofsecurityinmindtoprotectparticipants.


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The recommendations we developed based on the workshop focus groups take theexperienceandbestpracticeofparticipantsandexpertstomakethispracticeactionableforallinvolvedstakeholders.

Overall, our workshop on Riots & Mass gatherings contributed to the overarchingconversation about the digital revolution in public security.Discussions such as theseilluminatedifferentfacetsoftheuseofsocialmediaandallowinvolvedstakeholderstoopenly and freely voice their concerns, highlight the opportunities that are beingpresented and teach others based on their personal experiences and backgrounds. Inaddition,thesere-occurringdiscussionshelpestablishtheMedi@4SecCommunityandbringtogetherandconnectitsmemberstooneanother.


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Appendix1 WorkshopAgenda

SocialMedia&PolicingofRiotsandMassGatheringsWorkshopAgendaAirotelStratosVassilikos

Athens,9May201709.00-09.15Registration(OLYMPIAhall)09.15-09.30Welcome(OLYMPIAhall)

• MEDI@4SECProject(JonCoaffee-UoW-UK)• IntroductiontotheWorkshop(NikosMoustakidis-KEMEA-GR)

09.30-10:30Presentations(OLYMPIAhall)

• HellenicPoliceandSocialMedia(PanagiotisDoumas-HellenicPolice-GR)• TheuseofsocialmediabyPSNIduringProtests/Events(DebraWhyte-PSNI-IE)• Socialmedia&behaviouralchangeduring2011Londonriot(CliffStott-KeeleUniv.-UK)• Readingtheriots:WhatwerethepolicedoingonTwitter?(RobProcter-UoW-UK)• SUKEYAppsforprotests,demonstrations(SamGaus-Sukey-UK)

10:30-10:40Shortbreak10.40-11:40Presentations–continued(OLYMPIAhall)

• SocialMediaandMigration(RianneDekker-UniversityofUtrecht-NL)• ProjectX-FacebookriotsinHaren2012(WouterJong-DutchAssociationofMayors-NL)• Riots&MassgatheringsRotterdam(JeroenSlikkerveer-PublicSafetyDept-NL)• OSINTTools&OnlineMonitoringMassGatheringEvents(TomiLiesimaa-FinlandPol.-FI)

11.40-12.00CoffeeBreak(OLYMPIAhallfoyer)12.00-12.55FocusGroupDiscussionSession1(Breakoutrooms/tables)Themes:Protest/Demonstrations,LargeScaleEventsandMigration12.55-13.55LunchBreak(StratosVassilikosrestaurant)13.55-15.00FocusGroupDiscussionSession2(Breakoutrooms/tables)Themes:Protest/Demonstrations,LargeScaleEventsandMigration15.00-15.15CoffeeBreak(OLYMPIAhallfoyer)15.15-16.00ParticipantsRoundTable(OLYMPIAhall)16:00-16:30PresentationofThemeSessionsSummaries(OLYMPIAhall)16:30-16:45Workshopevaluation(OLYMPIAhall)16.45-17.30SocialEvent-EndoftheWorkshop


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ThisprojecthasreceivedfundingfromtheEuropeanUnion’sHorizon2020researchandinnovationprogrammeundergrantagreementNo700281

THE WORKSHOP LOCATION

AIROTEL – Stratos Vassilikos Hotel

Michalakopoulou 114, Athens 115 27, Greece

http://www.airotel.gr/en/Stratos-Vassilikos-793.htm


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Appendix2 ParticipantList

Category Country Organization Theme External/Medi@4sec

Municipality Netherlands DutchAssociationofMayors General ExternalPolice Germany MunichPolice General ExternalAcademic UK KeeleUniversity Events ExternalSocialMovement UK SUKEY Protests ExternalPolice Netherlands ENLETS-Inpecties General ExternalPolice Italy ENLETS-ItalianPolice General ExternalPolice Finland ENLETS-POLKRP General ExternalIndustry Denmark ENLETS-Hedeselskabet General ExternalPolice Germany LowerSaxonyMinistryofInteriorandSports Events ExternalAcademic UK UniversityofEssex General ExternalMunicipality Netherlands CityofRotterdam-DepartmentofPublicSafety Protests ExternalMunicipality Belgium CUTA-CoordinationUnitforThreatAnalysis Protests ExternalMunicipality Portugal CΓΆmaraSetΓΊbalMunicipality Events ExternalAcademic Ireland UniversityCollegeCork Events ExternalMunicipality Netherlands MinistryofSocialAffiars,Employmentand

HealthcareMigration External

Police Germany PoliceofLowerSaxony Protests ExternalMunicipality Italy RegioneEmiliaromagna Events ExternalAcademic Netherlands UniversityofTwente Events ExternalMunicipality Latvia Rigamunicipalpolice Protests ExternalMunicipality Spain BarcelonaCityCouncil Protests ExternalMunicipality Italy RegioneUmbria Migration ExternalIndustry Italy ENGINEERING-INGEGNERIAINFORMATICA-S.P.A. General ExternalPolice Spain MOSSOSD'ESQUADRA Protests ExternalAcademic UK CollegeofPolicing Events ExternalIndustry Greece EUROTECS.A Migration ExternalPolice Spain AyuntamientodeLasPalmasdeGranCanaria Events ExternalPolice Switzerland ZurichCityPolice Protests ExternalPolice Finland PoliceofFinland Protests ExternalAcademic UK UniversityofEastLondon Events ExternalAcademic France Nationalsuperiorschoolofsuperitendentofpolice Protests ExternalSocialMovement Belgium Plateformecitoyennedesoutienauxréfugiés

BruxellesMigration External

Police Greece HellenicPolice General ExternalPolice Greece HellenicPolice General ExternalPolice Greece HellenicPolice General ExternalPolice Greece ENLETS-HellenicPolice General ExternalPolice Greece HellenicPolice General ExternalResearch Germany FraunhoferIAO Events Medi@4sec


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Industry Slovenia XLAB Events Medi@4secAcademic UK UniversityofWarwick Events Medi@4secAcademic UK UniversityofWarwick Events Medi@4secAcademic UK UniversityofWarwick Protests Medi@4secAcademic UK UniversityofWarwick Protests Medi@4secResearch Belgium EOS Migration Medi@4secResearch Netherlands TNO Protests Medi@4secResearch Netherlands TNO General Medi@4secResearch Netherlands TNO Migration Medi@4secResearch Netherlands TNO Protests Medi@4secAcademic Netherlands UniversityofUtrecht Migration Medi@4secResearch France EFUS Migration Medi@4secResearch France EFUS Migration Medi@4secAcademic UK UniversityofWarwick Events Medi@4secPolice UK PoliceServicesofNorthernIreland Protests Medi@4secPolice Spain ValenciaPolice Migration Medi@4secPolice Spain ValenciaPolice Migration Medi@4secResearch Greece CenterforSecurityStudies(KEMEA) Protests Medi@4secResearch Greece CenterforSecurityStudies(KEMEA) General Medi@4secResearch Greece CenterforSecurityStudies(KEMEA) General Medi@4sec

Thedatainthefollowingtablesillustratewhatwasthemixtureoftheparticipantsintheworkshopintermsofcountriestheycomefrom,thestakeholdercategoriestheybelongtoandthethemesofinterestinwhichtheygotinvolvedduringtheworkshop.

COUNTRIES Participants Participants THEMES Belgium 3 Category Events General Migration Protests TotalDenmark 1 Academic 8 1 1 3 13Finland 2 Industry 1 2 1 4France 3 Municipality 2 1 2 4 9Germany 4 Police 2 9 2 5 18Greece 9 Research 1 3 4 3 11Italy 4 Socialmovement 1 1 2Netherlands 10 Total 14 16 11 16 57Slovenia 1 Spain 5

Switzerland 1

UK 11 Portugal 1

Ireland 1

Latvia 1

Total 57

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