April 8, 2005SBD

Workplace Safety: Design and Implement an Effective Job Safety Analysis

Presented by

Dean Frakes

Safety Specialist , CFI, CEHSM, CSTS

With

Safety by Design

April 8, 2005

April 8, 2005SBD

Purpose

This procedure covers the steps involved in carrying out a Job Safety Analysis, often referred to as a “JSA”. The Job Safety Analysis serves two functions:

Providing written documentation as to the safest and most environmentally sound manner in which to perform a task or job.

Providing an outline for instructing new or reassigned employees in the hazards of their new job, and the procedural or equipment safeguards they must use in order to avoid the hazards.

Since the written Job Safety Analysis is of limited value without being utilized as a part of job instruction training, this procedure covers both functions

April 8, 2005SBD

JSA Definition

A Job Safety Analysis is a stepwise procedure of identifying the basic steps of a job, uncovering the hazards and recommending personal protective equipment (PPE) and safe job procedures to circumvent the hazards. The primary steps in carrying out an analysis are:

Determine the job (s) to be analyzed,

Break the job down into a sequence of steps,

Identify actual or potential hazards and environmental risks associated with each step, and

Recommend procedural, environmental, equipment controls or personal protection to minimize the hazards.

Each of these basic steps will be discussed separately, followed by a discussion of the application of the written analysis to job training and a listing of specific plant responsibilities for the Job Safety Analysis (JSA)

April 8, 2005SBD

Selecting Job (s) to be Analyzed

Jobs should be selected for analysis on the basis of actual or potential incident and injury experience. Prioritizing jobs for analysis in this manner will maximize the program’s effectiveness in terms of reducing accidents, incidents, environmental risks and costs.

The job to be analyzed should be limited in scope; that is, neither too broad nor too narrow. For example, “maintenance mechanic” would be too broad, but one of the jobs performed by a person in that job classification (such as replacing the packing in a pump seal) would be suitable. On the other hand, “tightening a screw” would be too narrow in scope.

Manually-performed jobs are good subjects for analysis, particularly those involving repetitive work. Such jobs are often the ones with the highest incident experience. There are four factors to be considered in selecting a job for analysis

April 8, 2005SBD

1. Past Incident/Injury Experience: Past experience may indicate jobs with a history of frequent incidents and injuries. Such jobs would be given high priority, even if resulting injuries and/or environmental releases have been relatively minor.

2. Potential or Actual Injury or Release Severity: Those jobs that have actually produced Recordable injuries or toxic releases should be given priority over those that could produce such injuries or releases. The potential for serious injury or catastrophic releases should be evaluated in making this determination, even if the injuries or releases that have actually occurred have been minor.

3. Probability of Recurrence: Both actual and potential incidents and injuries should be considered in terms of how often they can be expected to recur. This may depend upon production scheduling, numbers of personnel assigned to a particular job, and other factors.

4. New or Revised Jobs: When a new job is created or changes are made to an existing job, there may be unknown or unfamiliar risks involved.Front line supervisors and their work crews should jointly identify jobs in their work area that will be included in the JSA program. This can be accomplished in special meetings or during the regularly scheduled safety meetings for that work crew. The priorities for JSA completion in the work area will be determined by the responsible front line supervisor.

Selecting Job (s) to be Analyzed Cont.

April 8, 2005SBD

Once a specific job has been selected for analysis, it must be broken down into basic sequential job steps in order to identify potential hazards. This is the first of the three major phases involved in conducting a Job Safety Analysis, and is best accomplished by direct observation of the job being performed. For conducting an on-site analysis, the supervisor and an employee may use a JSA (worksheet/form) for the purpose of documenting the observations. The Job Safety/Environmental Analysis worksheet/form is illustrated in (Exhibit 1). Once the top section is filled out, giving pertinent data about the job being observed, the supervisor proceeds to list the sequence of basic job steps in the left-hand column.There is no standard or requirement for the number of steps involved in any job. A job step is a logical segment of the operation wherein something happens to advance the work. Some jobs may require only two or three steps while others may need many more. The average job can be expected to fall in the range of five to eight steps; few should have more than ten. If many more steps are needed to accurately describe the work, then it may be advisable to split the job into major segments and analyze one segment at a time.Once the job has been broken into steps, the supervisor should discuss the breakdown with the employee actually doing the job and resolve any differences so that the steps listed are as accurate as possible.

Breaking the Job into Steps

April 8, 2005SBD

Each of the job steps listed must next be studied for hazards or potential incidents. The supervisor and an employee should again watch the job being performed and jointly determine what hazards may exist or which types of accidents or incidents could result from each step of the jobs. The following is a partial listing of the prevalent accident/incident types, with abbreviations that can be used in the JSA worksheet/form when entering accident/incident types in the center column, “Potential Safety Hazards/Environmental Concerns”:Struck-By (SB), Contact By (CB), Contact With (CW), Caught On (CO)Caught In (CI), Caught Between (CB), Foot-Level Fall (FLF), Fall-To-Below (FTB)Over-Exertion (OE), Personal Exposure (PE), Environmental Release (ER)The objective of this phase of the Job Safety Analysis procedure is to identify all actual and potential hazards and/or environmental concerns, whether they could result from an unsafe act or unsafe condition or both. Whenever possible, hazards should be recorded on the worksheet/form as potential incidents or environmental concerns. Determining potential hazards, incidents or environmental concerns requires close observation and attention; no effort should be made to develop recommended actions or procedures simultaneously with observation. The potential hazards, incidents or incident types should be recorded in the center column of the worksheet/form for each hazard identified in each step of the job.

Selecting Job (s) to be Analyzed Cont.

April 8, 2005SBD

Unsafe / Hazardous conditions

Major Accidents

Incidents w/o Damage

Minor Injuries

Incidents w. Prop. DamageNear-Misses/Close Calls

Accidents

Incidents

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Main Points

Improvement opportunities – positive experiences

Include all operational disturbances

Includes not only events but also observations

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Key QuestionWhat is the Size of the Prize?

(Is the pay-off there?)

For a Comprehensive

NEAR-MISS/CLOSE CALL PROGRAM

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Exp. Hydro Electric Company(As of 1999) : Accidents vs. Near-Misses/Close Calls

198719861985

1988

1989

199019911992

19931994

19951996 1997

0

50

100

150

200

250

0 500 1000 1500 2000

Near-Miss Reports

Lo

st T

ime

Inju

ries

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Total Quality Management

Payoff from the implementation of the N/M Program has been Huge!

Publicly-Traded Baldrige Award

Winners 1990-2000

717% ROI

S&P 500

1990-2000

163% ROI

April 8, 2005SBD

NEAR-MISS/Close Call BASICS

Incidents Near-Misses/Close Calls

Accidents

Eight Step Process

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Unsafe / Hazardous conditions

Major Accidents

Incidents w/o Damage

Minor Injuries

Incidents w. Prop. DamageNear-Misses/Close Calls

Accidents

Incidents

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Operational Risk Management: Near-Miss/Close Call Process

1. Identification (recognition)

2. Disclosure (reporting)

3. Prioritization and Classification Using the Red, Green & Yellow identification process

4. Distribution

5. Analyzing Causes

6. Identifying Solutions

7. Dissemination

8. Resolution (wrap-up)

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Identification

Disclosure

Prioritization

Analysis

Solution ID

Dissemination

Resolution

Eight Steps of

Near-Miss Process

Distribution Each step impacts on the effectiveness of the others multiplicatively

April 8, 2005SBD

Identification

Disclosure

Prioritization

Analysis

Solution ID

Dissemination

Resolution

Identification (Recognition)

Distribution

Operational risk factors are not always well defined – and may require a broad definition.

Best to provide guidelines and examples to improve awareness.

Important to establish a culture sensitive to near-miss concept.

April 8, 2005SBD

Identification

Disclosure

Prioritization

Analysis

Solution ID

Dissemination

Resolution

Disclosure (Reporting)

Distribution

Simple reporting procedures

Capture as many as possible

Acknowledge and recognize

Reporter and discloser do not have to be the same person.

April 8, 2005SBD

Identification

Disclosure

Prioritization

Analysis

Solution ID

Dissemination

Resolution

Prioritization and Classification

Distribution

Critical for effectiveness

Determines follow-up process.

Requires well defined guidelines.

Must address all operational issues

April 8, 2005SBD

Identification

Disclosure

Prioritization

Analysis

Solution ID

Dissemination

Resolution

Distribution

Distribution

Directing information to the people who can act on it.

Priority/Classification matrix helps.

Central clearing post can be valuable.

Standard process will be developed in time.

April 8, 2005SBD

Identification

Disclosure

Prioritization

Analysis

Solution ID

Dissemination

Resolution

Analyzing Causes

Distribution

Carried out by knowledgeable people.

Priority determines the depth

Include root-causes as well as direct causes

Think broadly. Consider additional factors that would lead to an accident.

April 8, 2005SBD

Identification

Disclosure

Prioritization

Analysis

Solution ID

Dissemination

Resolution

Identifying Solution

Distribution

Matching solutions to causes.

Reviewing identified solutions for their potential to create new problems (management of change).

Including in the team members of departments that will implement the solutions.

April 8, 2005SBD

Identification

Disclosure

Prioritization

Analysis

Solution ID

Dissemination

Resolution

Dissemination

Distribution

Communicate corrective actions to appropriate departments.

Inform a larger group of the incident and the follow-up actions.

April 8, 2005SBD

Identification

Disclosure

Prioritization

Analysis

Solution ID

Dissemination

Resolution

Resolution (Wrap-Up)

Distribution

Track all actions.

Ensure closure of all open items.

Get additional permissions if necessary.

Feed-back to the original observer.

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NEAR-MISS MANAGEMENT

Management Structure

Prioritizing

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Near-Miss Management

Elements of Near-Miss Management Structure:

Near-Miss Management Strategic Committee (NMMSC)

Near-Miss Management Council (NMMC)

Managers, Supervisors and Employees

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NMMSC

M S E

NMMC

M S E

NMMC

M S E

NMMC

Near-Miss Management Structure

April 8, 2005SBD

Near-Miss Management Strategic Committee

Establish guidelines for corp. and site NM programs

Develop criteria for classification

Establish prioritizing procedures

Audit NM system

Identify tools to use (e.g. TQM)

Identify system gaps based on accident analysis

Develop training guidelines

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Near-Miss Management Council

Establish site NMMS based on criteria set by NMMSC

Monitor site NM practices

Promote the program

Provide resources for analysis and implementation

Continuous system improvement

Employee training

April 8, 2005SBD

Reality Check

Most NM’s will be low priority and will be resolved by the observer or the supervisor.

Being trained in the eight step process will allow employees to do a complete assessment.

NM system can increase productivity and efficiency; improving system operability.

Takes time and iterative assessment/modifications to achieve good NM system with all eight steps implemented.