1 ACMC Paper 2/2012 > Conflict prevention in practice: from rhetoric to reality

Conflict prevention in practice: from rhetoric to reality

It is natural for policy makers, public officials and even think tanks to focus primarily on violent conflicts that are already occurring. With people being killed daily and horrific images being shown in real time across the globe, today’s conflicts simply cannot be ignored. Yet what about tomorrow’s conflicts, those we can envisage but that are not inevitable?

Today there is broad agreement on the importance of preventive action. An array of actors—the United Nations, regional organisations, national governments (including that of the United States) and a host of civil society bodies—have identified preventing violent conflict as a strategic priority. As the Obama administration’s National Security Strategy states, ‘The untold loss of human life, suffering, and property damage that results from armed conflict necessitates that all responsible nations work to prevent it’. This is well put, although it might be asked, ‘Do “all responsible nations” treat the prevention of armed conflict as a “necessity”?’ It is undeniable that far too often the answer is ‘no’. The fundamental challenge is to narrow the gap between rhetoric and reality, proclamations and actions, in preventing violent conflict.

The current global climate of austerity and the growing awareness of the economic, strategic and moral imperatives of prevention are increasing the momentum for preventive action. But, while political support has spread, the institutional capacity for preventive action remains

inadequate. Furthermore, both practitioners and scholars continue to lament the absence of a framework allowing them to think systematically about the design of effective prevention strategies.

The idea that violent conflict can be prevented is an old one. It is a foundational concept of the United Nations and a feature of the charters of most regional and subregional organisations. More than 50 years ago former UN Secretary‑General Dag Hammarskjold coined the term ‘preventive diplomacy’ at the height of the Cold War. He saw preventive diplomacy as a way of helping to stop local and regional disputes drawing in the superpowers and sparking global war. After the Cold War was over and the optimism in its wake had waned, the idea of conflict prevention gained new life. Preventive diplomacy was at the centre of Boutros Boutros‑Ghali’s landmark 1992 report An Agenda for Peace. Boutros‑Ghali noted that the ‘timely application of preventive diplomacy is the most desirable and efficient means of easing tensions before they result in conflict’.1

> PaPer 02/2012

Dr abiodun Williams US Institute of Peace

2 ACMC Paper 2/2012 > Conflict prevention in practice: from rhetoric to reality

The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict did path‑breaking work on conflict prevention, expanding both the argument for prevention and its conceptual dimensions. The commission made three important observations in its influential 1997 report:

> Deadly conflict is not inevitable.

> The need to prevent such conflict is increasingly urgent.

> Successful prevention is possible.

The report described ‘conflict prevention’ as including actions and policies designed to prevent the emergence of violent conflict, prevent continuing conflicts from spreading, and prevent the re‑emergence of violence.2 The narrower term ‘preventive diplomacy’, which is more commonly used in the UN context, refers specifically to diplomatic action taken to prevent disputes from escalating into violence and to limit disputes’ spread when violent conflict does erupt.3

The Carnegie Commission’s report also distinguished between structural and operational prevention efforts. ‘Structural prevention’—also known as conflict risk reduction—refers to long‑term initiatives aimed at mitigating tensions by augmenting local, regional and global capacity to peacefully resolve disputes, strengthening normative frameworks conducive to peace, and confronting the underlying causes of specific conflicts; examples of such efforts are regional integration, human rights protection, and support for democratic principles and equitable development. ‘Operational prevention’—often referred to as direct prevention or crisis management—involves both cooperative and coercive efforts aimed at short‑term risk reduction in conflict situations where violence is considered imminent; examples of such mechanisms are third‑party mediation, sanctions, demobilisation, and preventive deployment. Although a number of conflict prevention mechanisms are often used to alleviate tensions between countries, most prevention strategies are specifically attuned in order to increase stability between political, ethnic, religious or social groups.

Conflict prevention was also a priority for Kofi Annan during his tenure as UN Secretary‑General. It was the theme of his 2001 report Prevention of Armed Conflict and his 1999 annual report to the General Assembly, which urged member states to move ‘from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention’.4 This was, however, a fiendishly difficult task because it posed a transformational challenge. A separate but related challenge was to bring together those political and security actors in the UN system engaged primarily in preventive diplomacy or operational prevention and the development and governance actors engaged in structural prevention.

The recent violence in Libya, Syria, Yemen and elsewhere underlines the difficulty of managing crises once they erupt and the importance of improving conflict prevention efforts. Even though not every war can be prevented, more effective use of the various conflict prevention mechanisms can reduce the number of new conflicts.

Strengthening institutional capacityThe current levels of political and rhetorical support for preventive action are unprecedented. In a recent report to the UN Security Council, Secretary‑General Ban Ki‑moon noted that preventive diplomacy will be a priority during his second term as Secretary‑General: ‘It is, without doubt, one of the smartest investments we can make’.5 The value of prevention is affirmed in important US policy documents such as the report of the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, the 2010 National Security Strategy, and the report of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. It is also endorsed by other major powers and international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development. Statements of this nature provide a sufficient normative foundation for strengthening institutions for preventive action but also create high expectations about the international community’s ability to prevent the onset and escalation of violent conflict.

Although there has been much progress in the institutionalisation of prevention at the global, regional and national levels in recent years, important gaps remain. In addition, the prevention mechanisms of the United Nations, the European Union, the US Government and other sizeable bureaucracies are spread across agencies, departments, funds and programs, and new structures are continually created. In view of its global mission, universal membership and technical expertise, the United Nations is currently the primary organisation engaged in the prevention of conflict between and within states.

There has been some progress in developing institutional structures for prevention within the UN system. In 2001 the UN Development Programme created the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, which provides development and technical support to countries so that they can strengthen their own capacity to prevent conflict. The UN Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action is a system‑wide mechanism that promotes interagency cooperation on early preventive action. Establishment of the Mediation Support Unit in the Department of Political Affairs in 2006 and the

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creation of a new joint office for the prevention of genocide and promotion of the responsibility to protect should strengthen the United Nations’ capacity for preventive diplomacy and early warning. There remains, however, a need to have a more systematic conflict prevention perspective in the UN’s multifaceted programs and activities, so that they can contribute to the prevention of conflict by design and not by default. The UN also needs to ensure that the several major streams of information that are disconnected from each other are better synchronised in order to improve the organisation’s early warning capability.

The European Union’s integration process is itself a conflict prevention tool. The EU has also developed an early warning centre, intelligence fusion centres, and a checklist of the root causes of conflict. A new European External Action Service has been created with the explicit purpose of improving the effectiveness and coherence of the EU’s foreign policy. This diplomatic service will include a Directorate for Conflict Prevention and Security Policy, designed to coordinate the EU’s prevention activities, and could place the EU’s operational impact on a par with its institutional capacity. Other regional and subregional organisations—such as the Organization for Security and Co‑operation in Europe, the African Union, the Organization of American States, and the Economic Community of West African States—have also strengthened their capacity to prevent violent conflicts from erupting. For example, the Economic Community of West African States has adopted a Conflict Prevention Framework, probably the best existing intergovernmental framework of its kind. The framework is, however, extremely ambitious given current capacities.

Within the US Government, the Department of State and the US Agency for International Development have prevention as their primary responsibility. The State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization was established in 2004 with a mandate to coordinate both prevention and reconstruction initiatives. Among the new tools that have been developed is the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework, which looks at the causes of conflict and mitigating factors. The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization conducts ICAF exercises but is constrained by capacity limitations and political sensitivities. Other assessments are agency or sector specific.

Important institutional developments relating to the prevention of conflict and mass atrocities are also under way. The August 2011 Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities alters the focus to strengthening the US Government’s capacity to prevent genocide and other atrocity crimes and authorised the creation of an

interagency Atrocities Prevention Board that will ‘coordinate a whole‑of‑government approach to engaging “early, proactively, and decisively” in situations at risk of mass atrocities’.6 The directive could improve America’s ability to analyse and prevent violent conflict more broadly and change the reactive culture that continues to prevail.

Conflict prevention in practiceEffective preventive action calls for knowing how, when and where to design and implement preventive strategies. The US Institute of Peace has developed a strategic framework for preventing violent conflict that helps practitioners start thinking systematically about the design of preventive action. The framework is organised in terms of the desired end state, primary objectives and leadership responsibilities. The desired end state—stable peace—does not necessitate the absence of disputes since the airing of differences can lead to constructive change if properly handled. Conflict prevention strategies are therefore not aimed at the avoidance of conflict per se; rather, they are aimed at the avoidance of violent conflict. The framework’s primary objectives are divided into three broad, potentially complementary categories—mitigation of global risks, mitigation of societal risks, and reversal of escalation. The crucial leadership responsibilities include planning and coordinating multifaceted strategies involving a diverse cast of actors and ensuring that short‑ and long‑term strategies are complementary. The framework should not be mistaken for a checklist or a ‘one‑size‑fits‑all’ template: for any strategy to succeed it must be tailored to the specific context and dynamics and based on a thorough conflict analysis.7

A wide array of parties engage in conflict prevention efforts, using a variety of cooperative and coercive tools. In his 2001 report UN Secretary‑General Kofi Annan emphasised that ‘the primary responsibility for conflict prevention rests with national governments, with civil society playing an important role’.8 Prevention starts with domestic efforts to build capacity for the constructive management of disputes, meet obligations under international peacebuilding norms, and accept assistance from external parties if needed. Several factors do, however, continue to impede the development of effective prevention strategies, among them governments’ unwillingness to acknowledge their country’s fragility, the interest of elites in exploiting ethnic differences for political gain and the absence of well‑established mechanisms for prevention and resolution of conflicts. This means external players are needed to encourage conflict‑mitigating behaviour using the available ‘carrots and sticks’.

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The United Nations and regional organisations remain the leading players in prevention activities worldwide. The UN’s prevention activities include the Secretary‑General’s good offices, provision of electoral assistance, fact finding, the involvement of UN regional offices, the use of political missions, and even the deployment of preventive military force. At the request of the UN Security Council, the Department of Political Affairs delivers ‘horizon scanning’ briefings that assess the situation in both ongoing conflicts and countries at risk.

Non‑government organisations—for example, the International Crisis Group, International Alert, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, and the West African Network of Peacebuilding—are also instrumental in the prevention of conflict. They provide early warning, build relations with local communities, draw attention to human rights abuses, and help to mobilise political will. They are often present in places after others have left and provide support to implement preventive projects in fragile environments.

Despite formidable impediments, progress has been made not only at the normative level but at the operational level. The UN Preventive Deployment Force was deployed in Macedonia from 1993 to 1999, and its work is generally regarded as one of the more successful UN peacekeeping operations. In an unprecedented move, UN peacekeepers were deployed before the outbreak of violent conflict, rather than after hostilities had broken out. This ground‑breaking preventive deployment in Macedonia ensured that war did not spill over into that fragile republic.9

One example of successful preventive action by a regional player concerns the involvement of the Organization for Security and Co‑operation in Europe in Estonia in the early 1900s, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country. The former OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel, effectively contributed to the prevention of a conflict relating to the Russian‑speaking minority through his discreet diplomatic engagement and by encouraging reform of citizen laws that discriminated against this minority in Estonia.

The upsurge in action to head off a potential conflict prompted by the Sudan referendum in January 2011 is also notable. The US Government, the United Nations, the African Union, civil society groups and others exerted tremendous energy with the goal of averting a return to major violent conflict. Although it is still too early to assess the ultimate value of these efforts, the case of Sudan generated much high‑level attention and activity in advance of a potential conflict, the alternative being a belated response after a

crisis has erupted. Three main factors contributed to the preventive push in Sudan:

> There was a clear, discrete event—the referendum—that, it was feared, could trigger major violence.

> The history of conflict in Sudan raised fears that, if war was not averted, the war could be extremely long and bloody.

> Atrocities in Sudan’s Darfur region in the preceding several years had led to a public outcry and forced Sudan onto the international political agenda.

Challenges for preventive actionAlthough much progress has been made in the field of conflict prevention, there remain some specific challenges.

The warning–response gap

The ‘disconnect’ between early warning and timely, decisive political action poses a major challenge for the prevention of armed conflict. New communication technologies allow analysts to detect and draw attention to signs of instability at an early stage. The number of organisations providing early warning has also increased rapidly in the past decade: early warning of armed conflict now comes from non‑government organisations, governments, regional organisations, risk assessment firms, and so on. But thus far the availability of so much information has had only a limited impact on prevention strategies. The gap between warning and response can be a consequence of ambiguous warnings, poor analysis or information overload. Responding to this challenge calls for adjustments on the part of both the producer and the receiver.

Conflict analysts and intelligence officials need to make sure their information is timely, precise and accurate. The warnings also need to be actionable—including not only diagnosis but also prescription—linking warning with concrete response options.10 Decision makers should be more receptive to the analytical capacity of the intelligence community and others who produce warnings and should set up new procedures that facilitate information sharing within their own governments and organisations, as well as externally with civil society, partner organisations and allies.

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the new joint office for the prevention of genocide and promotion of the responsibility to protect are working to improve the UN’s early warning capability by signalling the risk of both conflict and mass atrocity crimes directly to the Secretary‑General, who in turn can alert the Security Council. In his recent report on preventive diplomacy

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Secretary‑General Ban Ki‑moon expressed cautious optimism about these developments. He also emphasised the need to improve the UN’s ability to anticipate ‘threshold moments’ that could rapidly trigger widespread violence in fragile countries.11

Preventing electoral violence

The five months of violence that followed Cote d’Ivoire’s presidential election in November 2010 tragically demonstrated why preventing electoral violence should be a priority. The moral imperative for preventing such violence is clear: electoral violence can lead to great loss of life and, in extreme cases, mass atrocities or civil war. There are also strategic reasons for making prevention of electoral violence an important objective: electoral violence undermines domestic support for representative democracy, and countries that have a history of electoral violence have a tendency to experience recurrences in a seemingly vicious circle.

Understanding the causes of electoral violence is the first step towards effective preventive action. An election can ignite violence in a country at risk, but the causes are usually more fundamental and structural. There is a need for a better understanding of the elements of an effective strategy for preventing electoral violence.

The role of rising global powers

The support of rising or emerging powers will be indispensable to strengthening international efforts aimed at conflict prevention. The so‑called BRICS—Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa—together with other regional powers such as Indonesia, Turkey, Nigeria, Mexico and Argentina can offer invaluable regional influence or experience and the necessary human, financial and diplomatic capacity to implement the global conflict prevention agenda. But advocates of preventive action face a sizeable challenge in encouraging the rising global powers to acknowledge that conflict prevention is in their strategic interest and ensuring they act accordingly.

Those rising powers that suffer from internal violence emphasise the primary responsibility of each sovereign state to prevent conflict within its own borders. Concerns about sovereignty erosion and the breakdown of the non‑intervention principle enshrined in the UN Charter still prevail over the perceived need to strengthen international and regional institutions so they can act preventively.

Making the case for conflict prevention

Generating political will—both within the target country and among external parties capable of mitigating the risk of conflict—is another crucial challenge for international prevention efforts. If the regime of a country at risk is

unwilling to compromise or acknowledge the potential for violence within its borders, or if the use of violence is considered the best policy alternative for safeguarding the country’s interests, outsiders will need to apply their diplomatic skills to produce incentives and disincentives and persuade the relevant parties that peaceful engagement is necessary and preferable to the use of violence.12 A number of countries in the UN General Assembly—particularly the most vocal members of the G‑77—still consider international conflict prevention an unwarranted interference with their sovereignty and lament the risk of unintended consequences, partiality and selectiveness associated with international engagements.

When tensions are rising it remains a challenge to sell the logic of prevention in some of the power centres of international politics, such as the UN Security Council or the US Congress. Conflict prevention is generally viewed as non‑urgent, invisible and extremely hard to evaluate because political leaders assign priority to action that allows them to produce tangible results before the end of their short electoral cycles.

When assessing the suitability of alternative foreign policy approaches, decision makers are often persuaded by previous success stories and quantitative evidence. A broad effort to analyse case studies of prevention successes and failures and existing measures that quantify the advantage of preventive action might help tip the balance in favour of prevention.

Notes1 A/47/277–S/24111, 17 June 1992.2 Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Final Report, Carnegie Corporation, New York, 1997, p. xviii.3 S/2011/552, 26 August 2011, p. 2.4 A/54/1, 31 August 1999, p. 13. 5 S/2011/552, 26 August 2011, p. 19.6 The White House, Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities, 4 August 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the‑press‑office/ 2011/08/04/presidential‑study‑directive‑mass‑atrocities. Viewed 17 October 2011.7 US Institute of Peace, Strategic Framework: preventing violent conflict, Peacebuilding toolkit, Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 2009.8 A/55/985‑S/2001/574, 7 June 2001, p. 2.9 See Abiodun Williams, Preventing War: the United Nations and Macedonia, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham MD, 2000.10 Christoph O Meyer, Florian Otto, John Brante et al., ‘Recasting the warning–response problem: persuasion and preventive policy’, International Studies Review, vol. 12, no. 4, 2010, pp. 556–78.11 S/2011/552, 26 August 2011, p. 13.12 S/2011/552, 26 August 2011, p. 12.