Wjatr; Adam Przeworski -- Control Without Opposition

Control without Opposition

Jerzy J. Wjatr and Adam Przeworski

In all organizations but especially in the States, the problem of government is twofold. From the point of view of the government, the problem is to secure acquiescence from the governed; from the point of view of the governed, the problem is to make the government take account, not only of its own interests, but also of the interests of those over whom it has power. If either of these problems is completely solved, the other does not arise; if neither is solved, there is revolution. But as a rule a compromise solution is reached. (Bertrand Russell, Power. A New Social Analysis, London, 1957, pp. 197-8.)

The historical development of western civilization has produced several patterns of political opposition deeply rooted and relatively well established in the political systems. This opposition is usually identified with the control of the governed over the government : it is maintained that opposition is at the same time a sufficient and a necessary condition for the existence of such control. Opposition, as the term is commonly used, has the following characteristics : (a) it is political; (b) it is institutionalized in the form of a party or parties; and (c) it is often said that it is also ‘responsible’, i.e., it does not extend to obstruction of the government’s actions. In order to define more precisely the relationship between opposition and control, we must ask two questions of a more specific nature: (i) is opposition a sufficient condition for effective control? And (ii) is it a condition sine qua non for any kind of political control? In spite of some ideological assertions, it seems clear that the answers to both questions are negative. Since the problem of opposition in the two- and multi- party systems is discussed elsewhere, we shall focus here on those mechanisms of control which present an alternative to opposition as institutionalized in the party system.

The development of institutionalized opposition in the Western countries is a historical, regional phenomenon. This pattern of opposition has not been successfully repeated in other parts of the world. Neither the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Asia nor the majority of the so-termed ‘developing’ nations have had a successful

227

GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION

experience with political opposition similar to that known in Western Europe and North America. Is this a proof that the ‘new nations’ have not learned the lesson offered to them by the ‘older nations’, for example by the United States ?1 Or is it the result of a diabolic con- spiracy which deprives Western-type democracy of its position outside the economically developed region of the world? Since both explanations seem somewhat naive, we are inclined to seek the explanation of this phenomenon in the economic and social conditions prevailing in the ‘non-Western’ world. Four hypotheses on the emer- gence of one-party systems in the under-developed countries aremost often put forward :

(i) multi-party systems are associated with high levels of economic development2 ;

(ii) multi-party systems are said to slow down the process of economic development3;

(iii) multi-party systems cannot function effectively when the country is not integrated ethnically and linguistically4;

(iv) multi-party systems cannot function effectively if they are alien to the cultural traditions of a nation.5

The extent to which these hypotheses have been confirmed varies and is still not sufficient. Przeworski has demonstrated that the corre- lations between the type of party system and the level of economic development, as well as between the party system and the rates of economic development are non-linear.6 Nevertheless, it can be assumed that a minimum level of economic growth must be achieved before a country can successfully develop a pluralistic party system. It can also be expected that the absolute level of economic development does not provide a sufficient explanation of the type of party

1 For example, S. M. Lipset, The First New Nation, New York, 1963. 2 S.M. Lipset, Political Man, New York, 1960. J. S. Coleman in G. A. Almond

and J. S. Coleman, eds., Politics ofthe Developing Areas, Princeton, 1960. 3 UNESCO, ‘Rapport de la Reunion d’Experts sur les Conditions Sociales de la

Croissance Gconomique’, 1963, pp. 31ff. Walter Galenson, ed., Labor and Economic Development, New York, 1959, p. 16. Robert Heilbroner, Future as History, New York, 1959, p. 35. Maurice Duverger, La Dictature, Milan, 1960, p. 104.

4 Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation, Cambridge, Mass., 1960, pp. 329-30. S.M. Lipset, The First New Nation, p. I I. W.H. Wriggins, ‘Impediments to Unity in New Nations: the Case of Ceylon’, APSR, 55, 1961.

5 R.F. Gray, ‘Political Parties in New African Nations’, and the comment by Lucy Mair, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 5, 1963; Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation, pp. 284K

6 Adam Przeworski, Party System and Economic Developmmt, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1965. 228

CONTROL WITHOUT OPPOSITION

system existing in a given society; other factors, especially the stability of the socio-economic conditions, should also be taken into account.

The degree of ethnic and political integration of a society is an important determinant of control. It should be noted that not every kind of pluralism is functional for this purpose, at least not when pluralism means disintegration. A political system must exist if control is to be exercised within this system. This is often not the case in those countries in which pluralism is still ‘pre-modern’. This is true, for example, in such multi-party systems as those of the Congo, Nigeria or Sudan where the parties are organized on tribal bases. When no authoritative decisions are considered binding, it is difficult to speak about control over the government.

Whatever the reason, it is clear that opposition is a phenomenon limited to a minority of political systems. We are concerned here with the possibilities for effective control in those systems where the opposition is not institutionalized in the form of parties and, therefore, we shall focus our attention on those channels of control existing in systems other than the multi-party system. These systems can be gouped into three categories based on their respective party systems7 :

(a) mono-party systems, (b) hegemonic party systems, (c) dominant party systems.

The dominant party systems constitute a borderline case between ‘opposition’ and ‘non-opposition’ systems since in some cases the potential of the smaller parties is sufficiently large to constitute a mechanism of control. However, in general such systems conform to the description by Blanksten:

a single political party holds an effective monopoly of public power and controls access to government offices. In some one-party systems, this may be provided by law, in which case other political parties are considered illegal or subversive; in another type of one-party system, other parties may

7 For the concept of dominant party system see Maurice Duverger, Les Partis Politiques, Paris, 195 I and ‘Sociologie des partis politiques’, in George Gurvitch, ed., Traite‘ de Sociologie, Vol. 2, Paris, 1960. Also G. I. Blanksten, ‘The Politics of Latin America’, in Almond and Coleman, em., Politics of the Developing Areas. For the concept of hegemonic party system see Jerzy J. Wjatr, *One-party Systems - The Concept and Issue for Comparative Studies’, in E. Allardt and Y . Linunen, eds., Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systeins, Helsinki, 1964.

229


exist legally but, for reasons largely unrelated to legal questions or government coercion, find themselves unable to challenge effectively the dominant party’s hold on public power.*

However, the typologies based exclusively on the form of a party system are clearly one-sided. Taking into account the nature and the ideology of the ruling party and the relationship between the party and the society, we may introduce another typology of political systems without opposition. As an illustration we may distinguish here such systems as the ‘revolutionary movement-regime’ described by Tucker,g the conservative ‘authoritarian regimes’ of which Spain may be a good example,lO and oligarchical regimes existing in many underdeveloped countries, especially in those Latin American countries where the process of development has been very slow.

The case of ‘totalitarianism’ should be considered separately. The use of the word ‘totalitarian’ to describe one clearly defined and well stabilized political regime obscures both the basic ideological and socio-economic differences among various ‘totalitarian’ regimes and the fact that totalitarian phenomena appear in various political systems, under various conditions, etc. But if we use the term to describe an ideal type, we may then analyse totalitarian tendencies and/or elements in various regimes. In this sense it is possible to identify totalitarianism with the disappearance of all kinds of political pluralism. So defined, totalitarianism occurs either as a result of rapid revolutionary changes or as a result of conservative, or even counter- revolutionary attempts to stop these changes. It may result from the unchecked power of the state and/or party machinery, or from mass political hysteria. The cases of revolutionary and of fascist totalitarianism are well documented and usually treated as typical. The authors who point to the existence of a ‘democratic totalitarianism’ are less numerous but they are concerned with an important socio- political tendency to liquidate dissent by the pressure of conformity and political hysteria.”

We have pointed out the variety of totalitarian tendencies because they are relevant to the present subject. Control over the government

8 Op. cit., p. 479. 9 R. C. Tucker, ‘Towards a Comparative Politics of Movement-Regimes’, APSR,

10 Juan J. Linz, ‘An Authoritarian Regime: Spain,’ in E. Allardt and Y. Littunen,

11 Barrington Moore, Jr., Political Power aiid Social Theory, Cambridge, Mass.,

~ 5 , 1 9 6 1 .

eds., Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems.

1958.

230


is not possible if the system is completely monolithic. On the other hand, any elements of pluralism imply, by their very existence, a basis for some kind of control over those who hold power. The problem of control is a quantitative one : since absolutely monolithic systems are a nightmare rather than a reality, we should attempt to identify not the mere fact of the existence of control but its nature and degree.

‘Control’ may have at least two meanings. In the legal sense of the word, ‘control’ means the legal power to supervise the controlled domain, to delegate power and withdraw such a delegation, to make final decisions in controversial issues, etc. . . . In this sense of the concept we can speak of judicial control of the constitutional nature of political decisions, civilian control over the military, central government control over local authorities. Such forms of control do exist in some countries where institutionalized opposition does not exist, but they do not constitute the main and politically most important aspect of control. In the political sense, by ‘control’ we mean the possibility of influencing those who hold power in such a way that they take into account the interests of groups exerting this control. Thus control is a very general notion. It must remain general because the actual forms of control in various systems are greatly differentiated. Nevertheless, one aspect should be made clear. Control means an actual and not only a formal possibility of exercising influence. Those who ‘control’ may sometimes be unsuccessful. But if they are never successful it means that control has ceased to exist. The test of political control must be sought in the actual functioning of the political system, not in the laws.

Since, as was said above, one-party systems generally arise in the less developed countries, we can make some observations concerning the matters to which ‘control’ extends in these countries. The concept of ‘control’ should not be considered merely in political categories but should be placed in the concrete socio-economic setting in which it occurs. It seems that in the underdeveloped countries, ‘control’ is basically limited to the issues of allocation of the scarce resources to the various politically significant sectors of the population and to the issues connected with the projected pace and character of change.

Having defined ‘control’ in terms of political (but not only party) pluralism and pressures exercized by the ‘ruled’ on the ‘rulers’, we should distinguish two basic channels of pressure to be found in the political systems considered here. The first channel includes pressures and influences exerted within the ruling party, the second those exercized outside this party.

231


Control within the party The role of the ruling party in regimes in which it does not face an opposition is twofold. On the one hand, the ruling party acts as the centre of power and in this character it bears the responsibility for the functioning of the entire system, and comprehensivelyrepresents the national interests. On the other hand, in some systems, simultaneously with the general interests, the ruling party represents some interests of particular groups and social strata. Either they exclude some groups from the comprehensive coalition or they feel more responsible for the interests of some groups within the coalition than of other groups. The dominant and the hegemonic parties are the most comprehensive: they perceive themselves to be the representatives of the entire nation and assume in their official ideology a basic harmony of interests of the entire nation. The broad range of such a coalition results in the situation in which the party is both a representation of some sectors of the population and the forum where interests of various groups are balanced against each other. The revolutionary mono- party systems in their early stages are usually less comprehensive: official ideology assumes a basic struggle against the ‘reactionary’ forces, and the criteria for inclusion in the coalition are distinctly narrower than in the former systems. Finally, the oligarchical systems have the narrowest social support. However, no party is so parochial that it represents only one group of interests. The empirical question is to find to what extent and in what fashion the various interests are expressed and balanced within the party.

In posing these questions we challenge a simplified view of the nature of the ruling parties in the regimes under discussion. Those who accept the extreme version of the division between those ‘in power’ and those ‘out of power’ see the ruling party as an apparatus through which the collective interests of the power elite are expressed and realized. If this were true, the problem of control would be limited only to the question of how far those in positions of authority would submit themselves to the influences of the social group to which they belong. But the problem is much more complex. The group interests of those who hold power certainly influence the decisions they make but the interests of other groups significantly influence those decisions. Moreover, those who actually hold power very often consider themselves as merely representative of the broader groups of the population or, eventually, the entire population. There is no convincing argument that such a feeling is solely a false pretension: on the contrary, the inner differences within the

232


ruling groups do not represent their own interests only and the empirical data seem to indicate that they are subject to pressure from various ‘outside’ groups. In this sense, the interests of the stratum of professional politicians should be considered as being only a part of those different interests which are expressed within and through the party. The party itself strives to combine in its ideology the tradi- tional liaison with a given part of society with the attempt to serve as a representation of the interests of all, or nearly all, segments of the population. In the case of the communist parties, this is the antinomy between their role as worlrers’ parties and their role as representatives of the socialist society as a whole. This is the way in which the Yugoslav Communist programme perceives this dual function: The Communist Party of Yugoslavia always faithfully served working class interests and aspirations which themselves correspond to the objective interests of all other sections of the working people of Yugoslavia. The league of Yugoslav Communists has been, and continues to be under present conditions, the representative of the interests and aspirations ofthe working class and all other working people in Yugoslavia.12

For the majority of the movement-regimes in the developing countries the problem does not exist on the level of ideology: the ruling parties act officially as representative of all the people. How- ever, to the extent to which the societies are differentiated, the same problem of balancing conflicting interests also appears in those parties.

For political scientists the most interesting is the problem of open expression of interests. The extent and the forms in which interests are openly expressed vary. Where factionalism exists and is officially accepted, it functions as a substitute for the multi-party system, although the factions are less free to appeal for outside support. Where factionalism is banned, groups, tendencies or ‘cliques’ may operate at various levels of the political systems. Indirectly, they may also represent the interests of various groups located outside the party. To use an example, we may recall the history of pro-peasant opposition within many communist parties in the period of rapid collectivization.

Thus the controversial problem is not whether such differences and divisions within the party exist, but whether they may be sufficiently strong to exercise effective control. Does the expression presuppose control? In the long term, the answer is affirmative. Those who hold

12 The Programme of the League of Yu~oslav Communists. Adopted by the VIII Congress held from 22 to 26 April 1958. Belgrade, 1958, p. 239.

233


power may not respond immediately to various kinds of criticism but such criticism, supported by electoral pressure inside the party, influences decision-making. 1 3 In extreme cases, we observe drastic changes in policy under the influence of rank and file members, or more specifically under the influence of the middle levels of the party hierarchy, as in Poland in 1956.

The control exercized within the party constitutes at the same time a control of the state administration. The ruling party is nearly identical with the government and comprises within its ranks a great proportion (often a majority) of those who hold public power. How- ever, in a much greater proportion, the party also includes persons who occupy subordinate positions in the administration. Thus the articulation within the party constitutes an instrument for control of the government when, within the party, the political and professional interests and opinions diverge. The influence of the rank and file on the party leadership constitutes indirectly a kind of control over the functioning of the state administration at various levels.

Control outside the party When political participation becomes widespread, popular control over the administration may assume two basic directions, depending upon the intensity of articulation through the various channels of the political system. Assuming that a political system which has a high degree of mobilization comprises a set of vertically organized social and political organizations with a mass membership and that these organizations interact horizontally at various territorial and adminis- trative levels of the political system, we can examine the direction of integration of interests, their articulation and aggregation. Tradition- ally, we are inclined to think of a political system as one in which the government is under the pressure of parties and interest groups which transmit vertically the interests articulated at the lower levels of the political system. However, it seems that such a model of a political system, which puts the emphasis on vertically rooted pressure groups organized around the government, corresponds only to those societies which either have a low degree of political participation or are permeated with class and functional conflicts. In the countries where participation is high and in which there are no basic conflicts of

1 3 Cases of party elections in which former office-holders or officially supported candidates were defeated are not infrequent in Poland and Yugoslavia. The ‘rota- tion’ system, recently introduced in the latter country may intensify this phenomenon but it is still too early to anticipate its consequences.

234


interests among the various groups of the population, the integration of interests is much more likely to occur horizontally at each separate level and independently of the structure of political organizations. In such a situation, opposition and control aredecentralized : competition takes place at each level of the political system but it is not integrated nationally along the vertical lines of political organizations, whether these be parties or other political and social institutions. The recent election which took place in Poland in May 1965 provides an illustration of such a competition. According to the speech of the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers Party, Wladyslaw Gomulka, seven per cent of the candidates to the Village Councils were rejected at the pre-electoral meetings. These candidates were replaced by persons who were put forward during these meetings. However, the structure of party membership of the rejected candidates and those who were added was nearly identical. Control and competition was independent from the party structure.

Interests are often integrated horizontally at the local level. This is particularly true when a local community decides to compete with other communities for the allocation of investment in their territory. Narojek describes the mechanism of articulation of such interests :

. . . a common front of a local community is formed. Proper supra-local authorities which are competent to decide a given matter are constantly visited by local delegations or population representatives. All channels of influence are used: through the PZPR (Polish United Workers Party) and other parties, through poviat and voivodship authorities, through former citizens of the town who are at present persons of influence in higher level authorities, etc. 14

The horizontal expression of interests finds its stronger expression in the factories. Although some socio-economic differences between the managerial and the engineering staff, on the one hand, and the workers, on the other hand, do exist, both groups are economically motivated to have an optimal plan. The basic economic incentives depend upon the fulfilment of the plan, and this concerns all employees regardless of their position in the factory. Thus, to an extent, in those countries where the basic industries are socially owned, the interests of all the employees of a factory are identical. On the other hand, the massive participation is organized in the form of Workers’ Self-Government. The Conferences of Workers’ Self-Government

14 Winicjusz Narojek, ‘The Structure of Local Power’, in K. Ostrowski and A. Przeworski, eds., Local Political System in Poland, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, P.A.N., Warsaw, 1965, mimeographed.

235


exist in 9,426 factories and involve participation of 21g,o25 persons. The most important decisions taken at the level of an enterprise - those concerning the plan - are discussed in the factories with nearly universal participation, at least passive, of ail the workers.’*

Integration of interests within a local political system or within a factory merits special attention. It evidences important channels of control and an important dimension of competition in those countries where control is not institutionalized in the form of nationally organized opposition.

However, in every political system some interests are expressed and transmitted vertically through the political and social organizations. In so far as control is exercised through such vertical national organizations, we can speak of interest groups and their control over the government. However, the role of specialized groups of interests must be re-examined in those countries in which the ruling party is a broad national coalition oriented toward rapid economic development and assuming a harmony of interest of the entire nation. In the multi- party systems , particularly those of the highly developed countries, interest groups are synonymous with ‘pressure groups’, i.e. groups operating outside the immediate scope of the government and attemp- ting to exert pressure on the government to accommodate the interests they represent. In the one-party systems, interest groups are located within, not outside, the government. Their functions are twofold. On the one hand, these groups articulate the interests which they represent, functioning to that extent as ‘pressure groups’. The contents of the demands vary, obviously, with the nature of the interests represented, but in general these demands concern specific issues of economic, social and cultural policies and are based on the consensus regarding the ideological and political bases of these policies. On the other hand, the specialized groups perform the mobilizing and edu- cating functions. They mobilize the social initiative in seeking the reserves which could be used for a more rapid economic development. And they are an instrument of political education - translating to the represented groups the general issues of national policies.16

The minor parties functioning in the dominant and hegemonic one-

15 K. Ostrowski and A. Przeworski, ‘Trade Unions and Economic Planning in Poland’, Polish Studies in Political Science, I. 1965. In press.

16 For example, in Mexico ‘virtually all types of firms are required to belong to one or another trade organization which represents that trade to the government and thmugh which the government can make its policy known to the industry’. Robert Edminster, ‘Mexico’, in A. Pepelasis, L. Mears, I. Adelman, eds., Economic Dmelop- tnent, New York, 1961.

236


party systems provide illustrations of the functioning of such specialized groups of interest. The minor parties in the dominant systems do not constitute alternatives to the major party. They function as interest groups. According to Kothari, the role of the minor parties in India is : constantly to pressurize, criticize, censure and influence it [the dominant party] by influencing opinion and interests inside the margin [of consensus] and, above all, exert a latent threat that if the ruling group strays too far from the balance of effective public opinion, and if the factional system within it is not mobilized to restore the balance, it will be displaced from power by opposition groups.17 On the national level, the position of dominant parties is so stable that the ‘opposition’ cannot hope for success in the foreseeable future. However, on the local levels the situation may be very different, as evidenced by the Indian experience.

In the hegemonic party system the parties forming the coalition accept the domination of one party, for example, communist parties in the socialist countries.18 But in those countries where the ruling party is hegemonic (as opposed to being the only one) the existence of a coalition helps to exert influence or pressure on the ruling party. The allied parties do not compete for power but present their candidates jointly with the hegemonic party. They do not challenge its leadership in those fields which are vital for the state. But they are officially recognized as representatives of selected sectors of the population such as the peasants, craftsmen, etc. . . . and they are consulted whenever a decision concerns issues of vital interest for the groups they are supposed to represent. Occasionally the minor parties exert pressure on the hegemonic party with regard to policies outside their scope of representation. However, since there is no competition for power, the pressures are exercized through delicate negotiations and bargaining rather than public debate. As a result, the public is not aware of the role of the minor parties and their political potential is low since they do not have a popular appeal. But on the

17 Rajni Kothari, ‘The Congress “System” in India’, Asian Sumey, 4, 1964, p. 1162.

1 8 In Poland, United Peasant and Democratic Parties; in Bulgaria, Peasant Union; in Czechoslovakia, Peasant Party, Slovak Rebirth Party, and Slovak Free- dom Party. In addition some of these countries have political organizations which formally are not parties but which jointly with other parties and organizations participate in elections, publish newspapers, etc. In Poland, for example, there are three political organizations of Catholics differing in political philosophy, tactics, and affiliations.

237

GOVEKNMEN’I AND Ol’POSlTION

other hand, this type of bargaining provides the minor parties with a powerful trumpet in any negotiation : the hegemonic party would treat an open conflict as a collapse of the coalition and would, therefore, try to avoid it even at the cost of far-reaching compromise. In general, little is still known about the role of the minor parties in the hegemonic party systems and any generalization would still be premature.

Among the other groups of interests which can be expected to exert some control over the government, the bureaucracy, the trade unions, the army, mass media and universities usually enter the hegemonic coalition. Since research concerning the pressure and the mobilizing functions of these groups is still very scarce, a detailed analysis of the functioning of these groups is premature at this point.

Special attention should be devoted to the problem of elections as they occur in the one-party system. We have indicated above that elections do involve some competition on the local level. However, it seems that the very function of elections is different in the one-party systems and in multi-party systems. Elections serve as an occasion for expressing demands and for a review of the basic policies of the government. Thus, particularly in so far as the elections to the national bodies are concerned, their basic role is that of a referendum rather than of competition between parties. The meaning of elections for Soviet society has been described as follows :

It should be borne in mind that the Soviet people traditionally regard polling not only as an act of election of specific persons to a representative organ, but also as an act of appraisal of the Soviet Government’s activity for the past period and of launching a programme for the future. Having several candidates in one constituency would mean an artificial scattering of the votes and would run counter to this tradition.19

Both the Yugoslav and the Polish electoral systems allow for several candidates running for the same Electoral research conducted in Poland21 has emphasized the semi-plebiscitary aspect of the

19 V. Kotok, The Soviet Representative System, Progress Publishers, Moscow, no date, p. 37.

20 See Dragan Godic, ‘April Elections’, Review, Yugoslav Monthly Magazine, March 1965; F. W. Neal, Titoism in Action, The Reforms in Yugoslavia after I949; Berkeley, 1958; Z.A. Pelczynski, ‘Poland I957’, in David Butler, Elections Abroad, London, 1959.

21 Jeny J. Wjatr, Niektore problemy opinii priblicznej w swietle wyborow 1957 i 1958, Warsaw, 1959 and ‘Elections and Voting Behavior in Poland’ in Austin Ranney, ed., Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics, Urbana, 1962.

238


elections. While elections serve as an important instrument for popular participation, they also constitute a channel of expression and articulation of attitudes toward the government and its policies. Therefore, the frequency of voting, the proportion of votes cast for the lists of the Front for National Unity, and the extent to which people voted for the candidates on the list were studied as indicators of public attitudes toward the government. These studies evidenced the importance of the electoral process as one of the channels of political control.

Other channels may also exist and should be studied. It should be observed in general that knowledge concerning the process of articulation and control in the one-party systems is still greatly limited. The present paper attempts to provide some guide-lines for the study of political control in the countries which do not have institutionalized opposition. Since a systematic analysis of these phenomena is not yet possible, the tentative character of this paper should be strongly emphasized.

Wjatr; Adam Przeworski -- Control Without Opposition

Documents

Transcript of Wjatr; Adam Przeworski -- Control Without Opposition