WittgensteinandNietzsche:TwoCriticsofPhilosophyby

AnuKoshal

GraduatePrograminLiterature

DukeUniversity

Date:July23,2010

Approved:

___________________________TorilMoi,Supervisor

__________________________RichardFleming

__________________________

V.Y.Mudimbe

__________________________MichaelHardt

DissertationsubmittedinpartialfulfillmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeofDoctor

ofPhilosophyintheGraduatePrograminLiteratureintheGraduateSchoolofDukeUniversity

2010

ii

ABSTRACT

WittgensteinandNietzsche:TwoCriticsofPhilosophy

by

AnuKoshal

GraduatePrograminLiterature

DukeUniversity

Date:July23,2010

Approved:

___________________________TorilMoi,Supervisor

__________________________RichardFleming

__________________________

V.Y.Mudimbe

__________________________MichaelHardt

AnabstractsubmittedinpartialfulfillmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeofDoctor

ofPhilosophyintheGraduatePrograminLiteratureintheGraduateSchoolofDukeUniversity

2010

iii

CopyrightbyAnuKoshal

2010

iv

ABSTRACT

FewphilosophershavebeenmorecriticaloftheWesternphilosophical

traditionthanFriedrichNietzscheandLudwigWittgenstein.Nietzscheand

Wittgensteindidnotjustrejecttheconclusionsoftheirphilosophicalpredecessors;

theyrejectedtheirmostbasicassumptions.Theyrejectedtheveryideaof

philosophyastheattempttorationallydevelopobjectivetheoriesoftheworld.And

yetWittgensteinandNietzschehavenowbeenabsorbedintothedisciplinethey

wantedtoabolish.Thisdissertationattemptstorecapturetheforceandextentof

theirrespectivecriticismsofphilosophy,andevaluatetheirconceptionsofwhat

philosophyshouldbe.

IbeginbyexaminingWittgenstein’sclaimthatphilosophicalproblemsrest

onamisunderstandingoflanguage.Ishowthatthisclaimdoesnotentailaquietist

refusaltoengageinphilosophicalproblems,asmanyhaveargued.Rather,itoffers

newinsightsintotheseproblems,insightswhichIdemonstratebyconsidering

Wittgenstein’sanalysisofG.E.Moore’sattempttorefuteexternalworldskepticism.

InthecaseofNietzsche,Iarguethathiscriticismofphilosophyextendsbeyondthe

metaphysicsofPlato,Descartes,andKanttoincludeeventhoseanti‐metaphysical

philosophicalmovementswithwhichheisnowassociated:post‐structuralismand

naturalism.Inthisway,hiscriticismofphilosophyismoreextensivethanhasbeen

recognized.Iconcludebydescribinghisalternativeconceptionofphilosophyasthe

creationofnewconcepts,andcompareitwithWittgenstein’sconceptionof

philosophyasremindingusofhowweordinarilyusewords.

v

Formyparents

ArtiandArvindKoshal

vi

Therearemorethingsinheavenandearth,Horatio,Thanaredreamtofinyourphilosophy.

Hamlet1.5(165‐167)

vii

TABLEOFCONTENTS

Abstract iv

Acknowledgments viii

Introduction 1

PART1:WITTGENSTEIN

Chapter1:Wittgenstein’sCritiqueoftheAugustinianPicture 23

1.1. HowtheAugustinianPictureArises

1.2. HowtheAugustinianPictureLeadstoParadox

1.3. Platonism

1.4. Mentalism

1.5. Conventionalism

1.6. TheParadoxDissolved

1.7. Conclusion

Chapter2:Wittgenstein’sPositiveConceptionofPhilosophy 86

2.1.Wittgenstein’sResponsetoMoore

2.2.WhereandWhyJustificationsCometoanEnd

2.3. TheSignificanceofEverydayWordsandConcepts

2.4. Conclusion

PART2:NIETZSCHE

Chapter3:Nietzsche’sCritiqueofPhilosophy 130

viii

3.1. NietzscheandMetaphysics

3.2. NietzscheandPost‐structuralism

3.3. NietzscheandNaturalism

3.4. Conclusion

Chapter4:Nietzsche’sPhilosophyoftheFuture 185

Conclusion 210

Bibliography 220

Biography 227

ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Iwouldfirstliketothankthemembersofmycommittee.Mysupervisor,

TorilMoi,hasoverseenthisprojectsinceitsinception,inherseminar,inmyfirst

yearingraduateschool.Shehasbeeneverythingonecanaskforinanadvisor:

critical,supportive,honest,andopen.Ifeelfortunatetohavebeenherstudent,and

evenmorefortunatetocallherafriend.V.Y.Mudimbehasbeenaconstantally,both

personallyandprofessionally,sincemyfirstyearatDuke.Hetaughtmeeverything

fromDescartestoDerrida,andwhenmyintereststurnedtoWittgenstein,hesent

metoCambridgetolearnitthere.RichardFleminghassavedmefrommany

interpretiveerrors,withoutanypersonalorprofessionalobligationtodoso.His

insightsintoWittgensteinandCavellhaveprovidedmanypromptsandchallenges

fortheideasdiscussedhere.AndMichaelHardt’sutterreasonablenessand

sincerityintheoftenunreasonableworldofacademiahasbeenbothrefreshingand

inspiring.

ManyothersatDukehavesupportedthisprojectinvariousways.Fredric

JamesonfirstinvitedmetotheLiteratureProgramandencouragedmeasmy

interestsevolved.TiwondaJohnson‐Blounthelpedwithinnumerablelogistical

issues,freeingmetowrite.AtCambridge,themembersoftheFacultyofPhilosophy,

inparticularJaneHealandRaymondGeuss,hostedmeasavisitingstudentin2007.

TheirrespectivelecturesonWittgensteinandNietzsche,aswellasfruitful

discussionsinindividualmeetings,havegreatlyinfluencedtheideashere.

x

ThisprojectisalsoborneoutofthepersonalandintellectualcommunityI

havesharedwithfriendsandfamilyforyears.

Iwouldnothaveenrolledingraduateschoolwereitnotforthe

encouragementandexampleofAimeeShen.Iamgratefulforhercontinued

support,eventhroughdifficulttimes.

RyanHoskins,JaiShah,JamesRowe,MarkCormier,JasonCurran,andNick

Leonghavebeenmypersonalandintellectualanchorsforfifteenyearsnow:never

lettingme,ormythoughts,drifttoofarastray.Thoughtheyknowlittleofthe

detailsofthisproject,theirmarkiseverywhereonthesepages.

ArjunandAmitKoshalalwaysprovidedawelcomedistraction,puttingmeup

andtakingmeoutwhenItravelledtoNewYorkandBoston.Theirsisthekindof

supportthatonlysiblingscanprovide:unspoken,butconstantandrefreshing.

ErinPosthasmadeeveryaspectofmylife,includingthisdissertation,a

sourceofjoy.Shealsoreadeverychapteranddiscussedeverypoint,andthis

dissertationismuchbetterasaresult.Iamluckytohavetherestofmylifetoshow

hermygratitude.

Andfinallymyparents,ArvindandArtiKoshal,havesupportedmeatevery

stageofthisproject,eventhoughtheyneverunderstoodit.Alltheyknewwasthat

itwassomethingIwantedtodo,andthatwasenoughforthem.

Idedicatethisdissertationtothem.

1

INTRODUCTION

FriedrichNietzscheandLudwigWittgensteinoccupyadistinctplaceinthe

historyofphilosophy.Theirwritingsareendlesslydebatedbyprofessional

philosophers,andtheyfeatureindebatesaboutthenatureoftruth,objectivity,

knowledge,language,ethics,andtheself.Inthisrespecttheyareamongthemost

influentialphilosopherstohaveeverlived.AndyetWittgensteinandNietzsche

werebothvirulentlycriticalofthephilosophicaltraditiontowhichtheynowbelong.

Nietzschebelievedthatphilosophy,“howeversolemn,conclusive,ordefiniteits

manner,mayhavebeennothingbuttheinfantilehigh‐mindednessofabeginner.”1

AndWittgensteinwritesthat“[w]henwedophilosophywearelikesavages,

primitivepeople,whoheartheexpressionsofcivilizedmen,putafalse

interpretationonthem,andthendrawthequeerestconclusionsfromit.2Theseare

nottheusualattemptstobuildonorcorrectthemistakesoftheirpredecessors.

WittgensteinandNietzschebelievethattraditionalphilosophy,sinceitsinception,

hasbeenbesetbyfundamentalerrorsandfaultyassumptions,andthatanewkind

ofphilosophyisneededinitsplace.

Myaiminthisdissertationissimple:toexaminewhyWittgensteinand

Nietzschearecriticaloftraditionalphilosophy,andwhattheyadvocateinitsplace.

Thisprojectismotivatedbymybeliefthat,despitethemassiveamountofsecondary

literatureoneach,thedepthandextentoftheircriticismsofphilosophyhavenot

1BeyondGoodandEvil.Trans.MarionFaber.OxfordUP,1998,§5.(HereafterBGE)2PhilosophicalInvestigations.Thirdedition.Ed.G.E.M.AnscombeandRushRhees.Oxford:Blackwell,2001,§194.(HereafterPI)

2

beenfullyappreciated.Wittgenstein’sremarksaboutrule‐followingandprivate

language,forinstance,haveprovenexceptionallyfertileforcontemporary

philosophers,butfewtakeseriouslyhismoregeneralcriticismsphilosophy.And

thegrowinginterestinNietzsche’sdoctrineofperspectivism,hisperfectionist

ethics,andhispsychologicalanalysesofhumanmotivationcorrespondswithan

increasingneglectofhiscriticismsofphilosophy.Idonotwishtocriticizethese

interpretivepractices.Thesecondaryliteratureonbothphilosophershasdeepened

ourunderstandingofthemandprovidednewinsightsintophilosophicalproblems.

ButIhopethatbyconsideringWittgensteinandNietzsche’sdiscussionsofspecific

philosophicalissuesinlightoftheirmoregeneralcriticismsofphilosophy,wecan

illuminateadifferent,andnolessphilosophicallysignificantaspectoftheirwritings:

thequestionofwhatphilosophyisandshouldbe.

ItwouldbeusefultobeginwithanaccountofwhatWittgensteinand

Nietzschemeanby“philosophy,”butthisisdifficultfortworeasons.First,bothuse

“philosophy”torefertowhattheycriticizeandwhattheyadvocate.Thiscanbe

confusing.ForthisreasonIoftenusethephrase“traditionalphilosophy”toreferto

whateachcriticizes,whetheritbePlatonism,foundationalism,orconceptual

analysis.TheexceptionsarewhenIdiscusshoweachwouldrespondtonon‐

traditionalphilosophieslikepost‐structuralismandnaturalism.InthiscaseI

specifythekindofphilosophyunderdiscussion.

Theseconddifficultyislesseasilyresolved.Therearemanydifferentkindsof

philosophy,andwhatcountsas“traditionalphilosophy”changesovertime.For

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Platophilosophyisthesearchforthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsunderlying

awordorconcept.ForDescartes,Locke,Hume,andKantitisthesearchforthe

foundationsunderlyingourknowledgeoftheworld.ForRussell,Frege,andthe

earlyWittgensteinitisthesearchforthelogicalbasislanguage,thought,andreality.

Forcontemporarynaturalistsitisthesearchfortheempirical,causaldeterminants

ofagivenphenomenon(consciousness,language,ethicalbehaviour,etcetera).For

post‐structuralistsitisthesearchfortheheterogeneityunderlyingthesupposed

unityoressenceofthings.Someofthesemovementsaremutuallyexclusive,butall

arerightfullycalled“philosophy,”andmostcanbecalled“traditional.”Howdowe

findadefinitionthatfitsthemall?

Iwillnotattemptsuchadefinitionhere.Tryingtofindonemerelytakesus

awayfromourproject,whichistounderstandwhatWittgensteinandNietzscheare

against,whattheyadvocate,andwhy.Theimportantpoint,whichIdemonstratein

theensuingchapters,isthatwhatWittgensteinandNietzschecriticizeas

“philosophy”encompassesallofthesemovements,eventhosemovements(like

naturalismandpost‐structuralism)whichcameafterthem,andeventhosewhich

claimthemasprecursors.

Surprisingly,giventheamountofsecondaryliteratureonWittgensteinand

Nietzsche,thisdissertationisthefirstbooklengthstudyofthesetwophilosophers.

Thereare,however,eightarticlesandbookchapterslinkingthem.Ofthesefour

dealwiththecultural,historical,andexistentialaspectsoftheirthought(theirviews

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onRomanticism,Viennesemodernism,andnihilism,forinstance).3Theseissuesare

notmyconcernhere.Theotherfourarticlesaremoredirectlyrelevanttothis

project.ThreeofthesecompareaspecificaspectofWittgensteinandNietzsche’s

respectivephilosophies(theirviewsonmeaningandmetaphysicsforinstance),but

theydonotaddresstheirmoregeneralcriticismsofphilosophy.4Meredith

Williams’sarticleistheloneexception.5WilliamsexaminesWittgensteinand

Nietzsche’srespectiveapproachestophilosophy,contrastingWittgenstein’s

supposedphilosophicalconservatismwithNietzsche’ssupposedphilosophical

3ErichHellerwritesthatWittgensteinresemblesNietzsche“inonephilosophicallymostimportantrespect.LikeNietzscheheknewthatphilosophicalopinionwasnotmerelyamatteroflogicallydemonstrablerightorwrong…itwasaboveallamatterofauthenticity.“WittgensteinandNietzsche,”TheImportanceofNietzsche.UniversityofChicagoPress,1988,pp.141‐157.GordonBearnfindsthatbothphilosophersaimto“wakeustothewonderofexistence.”WakingtoWonder:Wittgenstein'sExistentialInvestigations,NewYork:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1997.NicholasBurbulesshowsthatNietzschewasamajorinfluenceonViennesemodernism,whichinturninfluencedWittgenstein.HealsoarguesthatWittgensteinandNietzschesimilarlyconceiveofthemselvesas“physiciansofculture.”“NietzscheandWittgenstein:PhilosophersoftheFuture,”Wittgenstein:Philosophy,Postmodernism,Pedagogy.Ed.MichaelPetersandJamesMarshall.Westport,CT:Bergin&Garvey,1999,pp.33‐51.ChristopherJanawayillustratesSchopenhauer’sinfluenceonbothphilosophersin“RemarksonWittgensteinandNietzsche,”SelfandWorldinSchopenhauer'sPhilosophy.Oxford:ClarendonPress,1989,pp.317‐357.4AydanTuranli,"NietzscheandtheLaterWittgenstein:AnOffensetotheQuestforAnotherWorld."JournalofNietzscheStudies.26.1(2003):55‐63.M.J.Bowles,"ThePracticeofMeaninginNietzscheandWittgenstein,JournalofNietzscheStudies.26.1(2003):12‐24.MariaAlvarezandAaronRidley,"NietzscheonLanguage:BeforeandAfterWittgenstein."PhilosophicalTopics.33.2(2005):1‐18.5MeredithWilliams’s“TranscendenceandReturn:TheOvercomingofPhilosophyinNietzscheandWittgenstein,”InternationalPhilosophicalQuarterly,38.4(1988):403‐419.BernardWilliamscomparestheanti‐theoreticalstancesofWittgensteinandNietzschein“Nietzsche’sMinimalistMoralPsychology,”SensesofthePast.CambridgeUP,1995,pp.299‐310,butthecomparisonisnotsustained.

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radicalism.ThisdissertationsharesWilliams’sfocus,buthasadifferentapproach

andreachesdifferentconclusions.

Myapproachisnotprimarilycomparative.IexamineWittgensteinand

Nietzsche’srespectiveapproachestophilosophyindependentlyofeachother,and

onlycomparethemintheconclusion.Therearetworeasonsforthis.First,a

primaryaimofthisdissertationistoclarifyourunderstandingof,andcontributeto

theexistingliteratureon,eachphilosopher.Myreadingofeachismeanttostand

alone.Second,thoughWittgensteinandNietzschearesimilarinsomerespects–

bothrailagainstphilosophy’stendencytowardsmetaphysics,itstendencyto

assumethatthereisonetruerealityunderlyinglanguage,anditstendencyto

generalizeaboutparticularcases–thesesimilaritiesarerelativelysuperficial.They

areinterestingprimarilytotheextentthattheyilluminatemoresubtledifferences.

Focusingtooquicklyorheavilyontheirsimilaritiesdistractsfromthesubtletyand

complexityofbothwriters.

Accordingly,thisdissertationproceedsintwoparts.PartOneconsistsoftwo

chaptersonWittgenstein(oneonhiscriticismofphilosophy,oneonhispositive

conceptionofphilosophy),andPartTwoconsistsoftwochaptersonNietzsche

(arrangedinthesameway).Organizingthedissertationbyauthorratherthan

theme(i.e.firstthetwocriticisms,thenthetwoproposals)givesmethespaceto

examineeachauthorindepthandconsiderargumentsandcounter‐argumentsto

theissuestheyraise.Intheconclusionthefocusismoredirectlycomparative.

HererIconsiderhoweachphilosopherwouldrespondtotheother’sconceptionof

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philosophy.Readersawaitingadeterminationofwhichconceptionissuperior,

however,willbedisappointed.WhileIdisagreewithWilliamsthatthesetwo

conceptionsaremutuallyexclusive,Iconcludethattheyaresodifferentastobe

incommensurable.Eachonerestsonentirelydifferentassumptionsaboutwhat

philosopherscanandshouldaspiretowards.Still,thecomparisonisusefulin

sheddingfurtherlightonwhatisdistinctiveabouteach.

Intheend,thisprojectaimsnotjusttoanalyzeandcompareWittgenstein

andNietzsche’srespectiveapproachestophilosophy.Itaimstoinquireastowhat

philosophyisandshouldbe,andwhether(andhow)ourcurrentmodesof

philosophizingmeetthiscriteria.ThislargeraimisnotoneIaddressdirectly,nor

doIansweritdefinitively.ButitformsthebackgroundofthespecificaimsthatI

pursue.FewhaveexploredthislargerissuemoredeeplythanWittgensteinand

Nietzsche,andIhopethatbyunderstandingtheirviewswecanbetterunderstandit.

ForthisreasonIhopethatthisdissertationwillbeofinterestnotjusttoscholarsof

Wittgensteinand/orNietzsche,buttoanyoneinterestedinphilosophy,inthe

attempttocriticallyreflectonhowwethinkaboutourselvesandtheworld.

Tosummarize,thisdissertationhasthreespecificaims:

• ToexplainWittgenstein’scriticismoftraditionalphilosophy,andtheconception

ofphilosophyheadvocatesinitsplace.

• ToexplainNietzsche’scriticismoftraditionalphilosophy,andtheconceptionof

philosophyheadvocatesinitsplace.

• Tocomparethesetwocriticismsandproposedconceptions.

7

Andthesespecificaimsaredirectedtowardsonelargeraim:

• Toinquireastowhatphilosophyisandshouldbe.

IntherestofthisintroductionIexplainhowIpursuetheseaims,whyIpursuethem

asIdo,andtheresultsoftheseinvestigations.

0.1. Wittgenstein

MyreadingofWittgensteinisrestrictedtohislaterwritings,especiallyhis

PhilosophicalInvestigations.AlthoughWittgensteinwascriticalofphilosophyinhis

earlywritings,onlyinthelaterwritingsdoesthiscriticismbecomecomprehensive;

onlythendoesitincludeallthevariouskindsofphilosophypreviouslymentioned,

includinghisearlierwritings.Sincehislatercriticismofphilosophyincludeshis

earlierone,itmakessensetostartthere.6

6IntheTractatusWittgensteinarguesthattraditionalphilosophy,includingmetaphysics,ethics,andaesthetics,isafutileattempttothinkbeyondthelimitsoflanguage.“Thustheaimofthebook,”Wittgensteinwrites,“istodrawalimittothought,orrather–nottothoughtbuttotheexpressionofthoughts….Itwillthereforeonlybeinlanguagethatthelimitcanbedrawn.”TractatusLogico­Philosophicus.Trans.D.F.PearsandB.F.McGuiness.London:RoutledgeClassics,2001,pp.3‐4.Proponentsofthe“resolute”interpretationarguethatthedifferencebetweenWittgenstein’searlyandlaterwritingsisnotasgreatasitappears.SeethearticlesinTheNewWittgenstein.Ed.AliceCraryandRupertRead.London:Routledge,2000.IagreethattherearegeneralsimilaritiesbetweentheearlyandlaterWittgenstein,butthereremainimportantdifferences.WedowelltorecallWittgenstein’sclaimintheprefacetotheInvestigations:“IhavebeenforcedtorecognizegravemistakesinwhatIwroteinthatfirstbook.”(x)

8

MyreadingofWittgensteintakesseriouslyhisgeneralcriticismof

philosophy.Thismarksasignificantdeparturefrommuchofthesecondary

literature.Thisliteraturetendstofocusonthespecificphilosophicalproblemsthat

Wittgensteininvestigatesratherthanthecriticismitself.Judgingfromthis

literatureonewouldthinkthatWittgenstein’saimindoingphilosophywasto

presentuswiththeproblemsofrule‐followingandprivatelanguageasthoughthey

requiresomesolution,justasDescartespresenteduswiththeproblemofhowwe

knowtheexistenceofGodorKantpresenteduswiththeproblemofhowweform

empiricalknowledge.Wittgenstein’sclaimthatphilosophicalproblemsreston“a

misunderstandingofthelogicoflanguage”havebeenbrushedaside(PI§92).7Thus

SirMichaelDummett,oneofWittgenstein’smostfamouscommentators,writes:

Weallstand,orshouldstand,intheshadowofWittgenstein,inthesameway

thatmuchearliergenerationsoncestoodintheshadowofKant….Some

thingsinhisphilosophy,however,Icannotseeanyreasonforaccepting:one

isthebeliefthatphilosophy,assuch,mustnevercriticizebutonlydescribe.

Thisbeliefwasfundamentalinthesensethatitdeterminedthewhole

mannerinwhich,inhislaterwritings,hediscussedphilosophicalproblems;

notsharingit,itcouldnotrespecttheworkasIdoifIregardedhis

argumentsandinsightsasdependingonthetruthofthatbelief.8

7SeealsoPI§108,§111,§115,§116.8TheLogicalBasisofMetaphysics.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUP,1991,xi.

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DummetthasnoproblemextractingWittgenstein’sdiscussionsofparticularissues

(meaning,understanding,rule‐following)fromthelargercriticismofwhichtheyare

apart.InthesamebookhegoesontodevelopaWittgensteiniantheoryofmeaning

whichheusestosolvemetaphysicalproblems.Thatis,hedevelopsa

WittgensteiniansolutiontotheveryproblemsthatWittgensteinclaimsdonot

requiresolutions.

AsimilarapproachisfoundinSaulKripke’sinfluentialWittgensteinonRules

andPrivateLanguage.UnlikeDummett,however,Kripkebelievesthatheis

consistentwithWittgenstein’sintention.9Aftersummarizingtheproblemofrule‐

followinginthefirsthalfofthebook,Kripkebeginsthesecondhalfbyassumingthat

Wittgenstein“doesnotwishtoleaveuswiththisproblem[ofrule‐following],butto

solveit”(60).Hethenproceedstodevelopasolutiontotheproblemwhichhesays

Wittgensteinwouldendorse.Kripke’sreadinghassinceinspiredreamsoffurther

argumentsandcounter‐arguments,alldesignedtosolveWittgenstein’sproblemof

rule‐following.10ThefactthatWittgensteinbelievesthatthisproblemrestsona

misunderstandingandrequiresnosolutionhasbeenlargelyignored(Cf.PI§201).

9WittgensteinonRulesandPrivateLanguage.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUP,1982.Idiscussthisworkinchapteronesectionfive.10CrispinWrightisthemostprominentcontributortohisdiscussion.HedevelopsanalternativeresponsetoKripke,andarguesthatWittgensteinwouldhaveendorsedhisresponse.“Wittgenstein’sRule‐FollowingConsiderationsandtheCentralProjectofTheoreticalLinguistics,”ReflectionsonChomsky.Ed.A.George.Oxford:BasilBlackwell,1989,pp.233‐264.ForacriticismofWright’sresponsethatfitswiththeinterpretationofWittgensteinIofferhere,seeDavidFinkelstein,

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Whatexactlyisthismisunderstanding?Andwhyhasitbeenlargelyignored?

Iexplorethesetwoquestionsinpartoneofthisdissertation.AsIhavesuggested,

Wittgensteinbelievesthatphilosophersmisunderstandhowhumanbeingsactually

uselanguage,andthatthismisunderstandingproducesthephilosophicalproblems

(rule‐following,privatelanguage,skepticism)whichtheytrytosolve.Wittgenstein

believesthattheseproblemscanbedissolved(ratherthansolved)byclarifyingthe

initialmisunderstandingfromwhichtheyarise.ThatWittgensteinheldthisview

canbeestablishedbypointingtothetext.Moredifficultistoexplainwhyheheldit,

andwhetheritisjustified.Thisisthegoaloftheopeningtwochapters.

Thefirstchapterexplorestheoriginsofthismisunderstandinginwhathas

cometobecalledtheAugustinianpictureoflanguage.Istartbyshowinghowthis

picturearisesfromthetendencytomakeourordinaryobservationsbearmore

explanatoryweightthantheycan.Thistendency,commontophilosophers,isa

maintargetoftheInvestigations.Ithenshowhow,onceformed,thispictureleads

totheproblemofhowwordsconnectwiththeirmeanings,andinvitesphilosophical

solutionstothisproblem(Platonism,mentalism,conventionalism),noneofwhich

solvetheprobleminquestion.Iconcludebyshowinghowtheproblemdisappears

whenweundotheinitialover‐readingthatledtothem.

AmajorthemeoftheInvestigations,then,isthataproperunderstandingof

languageisneededtoproperlydealwithphilosophicalproblems.Itseemslikeit

“WittgensteinonRulesandPlatonism.”TheNewWittgenstein.Ed.AliceCraryandRupertRead.London:Routledge,2000,pp.53‐73.

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shouldbefairlystraightforwardtoexplainhowhumanbeingsuselanguageinthe

courseoftheirdailylives,butthethrustofthefirstchapteristoshowjusthow

difficultitis,especiallyforphilosopherswhoarepronetolookforageneraltheory

oflanguage.Wittgensteinshowsthatourlanguageissimplytoovariegatedand

unpredictabletobemeaningfullycapturedbytheusualtheoreticalapproaches.

Thevarietyandunpredictabilityofordinarylanguageisamajorthemeof

StanleyCavell’sinterpretationofWittgenstein,andmyreadingofWittgensteininis

largelyindebtedtoCavell’swork.IfeelthatCavellcapturesthesubtletyand

originalityofWittgenstein’svisionoflanguagebetterthanmost,andIturntoCavell

atkeymomentstoexplainthisvision.Cavell’skeycontributionstothe

understandingofWittgensteinaretwo‐fold.First,heshowsthatWittgensteindoes

notbelievethatlanguageisgovernedbyasetoflogical,transcendentalruleswhich

existoutsideoflanguage,buthe(Wittgenstein)neverthelessbelievesthatlanguage

followsitsownkindofinternallogicorrules.Thislogic,theserules,followacertain

kindofnecessity,onewhichcannotbeviolatedexceptatthecostof

misunderstandingandincoherence,andCavellfollowsWittgensteinintryingto

describethisnecessity.Second,CavellshowsthatWittgensteindoesnotaimto

refuteskepticism,assomeearlycommentators(Malcolm,forinstance)hadargued.

Rather,Wittgensteinshowsthatskepticismcannotberefutedbytraditional

philosophy,andthatourinabilitytorefuteskepticismrevealsthelimitsofour

languageandourknowledge.OnCavell’sreading,Wittgensteindoesnotrefute

skepticism,heexploresitsoriginsandenduringappeal.

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MyinterpretationofWittgenstein’sresponsetoskepticisminchaptertwo

followsfromthisCavellianinsight.However,whileIrelyonCavellformany

insights,myreadingofWittgensteinisnotproperly“Cavellian.”Itdoesnotpursue

manyorevenmostofthethemeshediscusses,anditdepartsfromhis

interpretationofWittgensteinatvariousplaces.11Cavell,forinstance,isconcerned

withthequestionofwhyhumanbeingsareattractedtoprivacyandskepticism,

evenwhentheyarenotdoingphilosophy.12Thisisafascinatingexistential

question,whichCavellexploresbrilliantly,butnotonewithwhichWittgensteinis

primarilyconcerned.MyinterestisinWittgenstein’sresponsestotraditional

philosophicalquestionsaboutthenatureofknowledge,truth,language,meaning,

andtheself.AlthoughWittgensteinrejectedtheusualapproachtothesequestions,I

believethathismajorconcerninwritingphilosophywastograpplewiththese

questionsanddevelopnewapproachestothem.Forthisreason,myuseofCavellis

largelyrestrictedtohis(Cavell’s)accountsoflanguageacquisitionandphilosophical

skepticism.13

11ThereareusefulstudiesofCavellbyRichardFlemingandMichaelPayne,TheSensesofStanleyCavell.LewisburgPA:BucknellUP,1989,andStephenMulhall,StanleyCavell:Philosophy’sRecountingoftheOrdinary.OxfordUP,1999.12Cavellalsopursuesquestionsofethicsandself‐knowledgewhich,thoughinspiredbyWittgenstein,arenotdirectlyatissueinWittgenstein’slaterwritings.

13IthereforefocusonCavell’s“MustWeMeanWhatWeSay”and“TheAvailabilityofWittgenstein’sLaterPhilosophy,”bothinMustWeMeanWhatWeSay.Secondedition.CambridgeUP,2002,andparttwoofTheClaimofReason.OxfordUP,1979.ThatIrelyonthispartofthebookandnottheotherthreeistellingoftheuseImakeofCavell.Itisthemost“traditional”partofthebook.

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Thefirstchapter,then,explainsWittgenstein’saccountoflanguage.

Understandingthisaccountisnecessarytounderstandhisclaimthatphilosophical

problemsarisefrommisunderstandinghowlanguageworks.Inthesecondchapter

Iexamineaconcretecaseofthismisunderstandingandthephilosophicalproblemit

produces:G.E.Moore’sclaimtorefuteexternalworldskepticism.Wittgenstein’s

analysisofMooreinOnCertaintyshowsWittgensteinapplyinghisphilosophical

approachtoaspecific,well‐knownphilosophicalproblem.14Itthereforeprovides

anexcellentexampleofjustwhatthisapproachdoesanddoesnotentail.

SomearguethatOnCertainty,whichcomprisesWittgenstein’swritingsover

thelasttwoyearsofhislife,marksathirdphaseinWittgenstein’sthought,one

whichbreaksfromtheInvestigations.15ThisisnotmyunderstandingofOn

Certainty.Ibelievethetwotextscomplementeachotherwell:theInvestigations

setsoutWittgenstein’sgeneralapproachtophilosophy,whileOnCertaintyapplies

thisapproachtoaspecificphilosophicalargumentbyMoore.Thusafterexplaining

Wittgenstein’sgeneralapproachtophilosophyinchapterone,Iexaminehis

particularuseofthisapproachinchaptertwo.Iarguethatthisapproachdoesnot

14OnCertainty.Ed.G.E.M.AnscombeandG.H.vonWright.Trans.DenisPaulandG.E.M.Anscombe.Oxford:Blackwell,1975.(HereafterOC)15TheleadingproponentofthisreadingisAvrumStroll,MooreandWittgensteinOnCertainty.OxfordUP,1994.Stroll’sclaimthatthereisa“third”WittgensteinisbasedonhisclaimthatWittgensteinturnstoakindoffoundationalisminhislaterworks,afoundationalismofaction.Seealsothecollection,TheThirdWittgenstein.Ed.DanieleMoyal‐Sharrock.Hampshire,UK:Ashgate,2004.ForareadingofOnCertaintymorealongthelinesofmyown,seeRushRhees,Wittgenstein’sOnCertainty.Ed.D.Z.Phillips.Oxford:Blackwell,2003.

14

entailcommonsensenorarejectionofphilosophyaltogether,asmanyreadershave

suggested.Rather,itoffersanovelandcompellingcontributiontotheproblemof

externalworldskepticism.

AttheendofchaptertwoIanalyzeWittgenstein’spositiveconceptionof

philosophy:hisconceptionofphilosophyas“assemblingremindersforaparticular

purpose”(PI§127).BothcriticsandadmirersofWittgensteintendtoreadthis

conceptionasentailingtheclaimthatphilosophicalwaysofspeakingonlyleadto

problemsandconfusion,whileordinaryusesoflanguagedonot,andthatweare

thereforebetteroffabandoningphilosophyaltgoether.SeveralofWittgenstein’s

ownremarksseemtosuggestthisreading.Hewrites,forinstance,thathis

approachtophilosophy“simplyleaveseverythingasitis”(§1240.Still,Iarguethat

thisreadingismistaken.Sincethemisunderstandingsthatleadtophilosophical

problemsariseinthecourseofoureverydaylives,thereisalwaysaneedforthe

kindofphilosophyWittgensteinadvocates.Furthermore,Wittgenstein’sapproach

tophilosophydoesnot“leaveeverythingasitis,”itoffersnewinsightsintothe

natureofourlanguage,ourconcepts,andtraditionalphilosophicalproblems,andit

explainswhyphilosophysooftenfailstohaveanypurchaseoveroureverydaylives.

Inthisrespectitmarksasubstantialcontributiontophilosophy.

InchaptertwoIalsoconsiderwhyWittgenstein’sgeneralcriticismof

philosophyhasbeenlargelyignored.Thereason,Isuggest,isthatWittgenstein’s

criticalremarksaboutphilosophyhavenotbeenadequatelyunderstood;theyhave

notbeenshowntobepersuasive,eitherbyWittgensteinorhisdefenders.When

15

Wittgensteinsaysthatphilosophicalusesofwordsare“nonsense,”forinstance,he

hasnotmadeclearwhythatis.AndeventhoseinterpretersofWittgensteinwho

subscribetothisviewandhavedonemuchtoclarifyit,havenotsucceededin

conveyingitsforce.Dummett,forinstance,writesthathe“cannotseeanyreason

foraccepting”Wittgenstein’sgeneralcriticismofphilosophy.ThisissomethingI

hopetorectify.ThoughIcannotbesurethatmyreadingofWittgensteinwill

persuadeDummettorothers,Ihopethatitcompelsthem–andus–totake

Wittgenstein’scriticismsofphilosophymoreseriouslythanwehavesofar.

0.2. Nietzsche

Nietzsche,evenmorethanWittgenstein,hasalwayshadanambiguous

relationtophilosophy.WittgensteinstudiedwithRussellinCambridge;helearned

therulesofthegame,sotospeak.Nietzschewasalwaysanoutsider.Trainedin

philology,hehadlittlepatiencefortheacademicphilosophyofhisday,andhis

writingsroutinelyfloutthebasicrulesofthediscipline:hisanalysisofmorality

seemstopartakeinthenaturalisticfallacy,heunashamedlydeploysadhominem

arguments;heoftenseemstocontradicthimself.Andyethisreflectionsonthe

natureoftheself,consciousness,language,andmoralityareofobvious

philosophicalinterest.Perhapsbecauseofhisambiguousrelationtothediscipline,

admirershavetriedtoshowthatheisinfactaphilosopher.ArthurDantoisacase

inpoint:

Iwantedtoshowthatwhateverelse[Nietzsche]wasornot,hewascertainly

aphilosopherinjustthewaythateveryonewhoisoneisone:thathe

16

thoughtsystematicallyanddeeplyabouteachoftheclosedsetofquestions

whichdefinewhatphilosophyis,andthathegaveserious,original,and

coherentanswerstothemall.Whateverelsehewas,hewasaphilosopher.16

SinceDantowrotethisin1965,scholarshavecontinuedtotryandmakeNietzsche

philosophicallyrespectable.Thisefforthasproducedsignificantinsightsinto

Nietzsche’sthought,insightstowhichthisstudyisindebted.ButIbelieveithasalso

obscuredthenatureandextentofhiscriticismofphilosophy.

Forinstance,NietzschescholarstodaygenerallyagreethatNietzsche’s

disparagingremarksaboutphilosophyapplyonlytometaphysicalphilosophy:

philosophy,likethatofPlato,Descartes,andKant,whichdistinguishesanoumenal

fromaphenomenalworld.Onthisview,Nietzscheisattackingphilosophyasitonce

was,notphilosophyasitcurrentlyis.Andsincecontemporaryphilosophyhaslong

sincedisownedthesemetaphysicalpresumptions,philosopherscannowclaim

Nietzscheasoneoftheirown.Thuspost‐structuralistslikeFoucaultandDeleuze

findinNietzschetheseedsoftheirownanti‐metaphysicalphilosophies.Their

Nietzscheisonewhoexposesthecontingencyandmultiplicityunderlyingthe

supposedunityandessenceofmetaphysics.Similarly,Anglo‐American

philosopherslikeMaudemarieClarkandBrianLeiterarguethatNietzschecriticizes

metaphysicaltruth,notempiricaltruth.17AndtheyalignNietzschewith

16NietzscheasPhilosopher.NewYork:ColumbiaUP,1965,pp.9.17MaudemarieClark,NietzscheonTruthandPhilosophy.CambridgeUP,1991.BrianLeiter,NietzscheonMorality.London:Routledge,2002.

17

contemporaryphilosophicalnaturalism.FoucaultandDeleuze’sreadingsof

NietzschearecompletelyatoddswithClark’sandLeiter’s,butallagreethat

Nietzsche’scriticismofphilosophyisrestrictedtometaphysics.

PartTwobeingsbyarguingthatNietzsche’scriticismofphilosophyextends

beyondmetaphysicstoincludeeventhosephilosophicalmovements,likepost‐

structuralismandnaturalism,whichhaveappropriatedhimintheirname.Ishow

thatpost‐structuralismissusceptibletoNietzsche’scriticismintworespects.First,

Nietzschedoesnotsimplyprivilegecontingencyoveressence.Asrecentscholars

haveshown,hebelievesthatthereissomethingfixed,pre‐given,inourbodies:

namely,acertainarrangementofdrivesandinstincts(triebundinstinkt).Andhe

arguesthatthesedrivesandinstinctshelpdetermineourthoughts,feelings,and

actions.UnderstandingthisaspectofNietzsche’sthoughtiscrucialto

understandinghiscriticismofphilosophy.IfNietzscheisrightthatourconscious

thoughtscomefrominstinctsoverwhichwehavenocontrol,thenwecannotbe

confidentthatrationaldeliberationorlogicalargumentationwilldelivertheinsights

wehope.Second,Nietzschedoesnotsimplyprivilegemultiplicityoverunity.While

hebelievesthattheunityoftheselfisnotpre‐given,hemaintainsthataunifiedself

issomethingwhichmustbeachieved.Aunifiedself,forinstance,iswhat

distinguishestheÜbermenschfromthecurrentraceofmen.

Thenaturalistreading,whichemphasizestheessentialiststrainin

Nietzsche’sthought,hasservedasausefulcorrectivetothepost‐structuralist

interpretation.Butitgoesfurtherthanthis.Onthisreading,Nietzsche’scriticismof

thevalueoftruthisrestrictedtometaphysicaltruth,notempiricaltruth.Clark,for

18

instance,arguesthatonceNietzschebrokefromtheKantian/Schopenhauerian

distinctionbetweenthephenomenalandnoumenalworld,hisskepticismabout

truthdissipated.Withoutthepossibilityofanoumemalworld,thewilltotruthis

notawilltoescapethephenomenalworld;itisnotlife‐denying.Hislastsixbooks,

Clarkwrites,“exhibitanunambiguousrespectforfacts,thesenses,andscience”

(105).Thereismuchevidenceforthisreading.Nietzschewrites,forinstance,that

“theidealscholarinwhomthescientificinstinct,afterthousandsoftotalsemi‐

failures,foronceblossomsandbloomstotheend,iscertainlyoneofthemost

preciousinstrumentsthereare”(BGE207).Clark,Leiter,andotherscombine

remarkslikethesewithNietzsche’snotionoffixeddrivesandinstinctsandhis

sympathyforhistoricalandpsychologicalanalysistoportrayhimasaprecursorto

contemporarynaturalism.

AlthoughClark’sreadinginauguratedthenaturalistinterpretationof

Nietzsche,BrianLeiterhasbeenitsmoststaunchandsubtledefender.Idevotea

substantialpartofchapterthreetodebunkingLeiter’sreadingofNietzsche(andby

extensionClark’s).LeiterarguesthatNietzscheseekstoexplainphenomena

(morality,consciousness,action)bylocating(orspeculatingasto)theirempirical,

causaldeterminants.IarguethatthisreadingreducesNietzschetothekindof

philosopherhecriticizes:onewhoover‐valuestruthandpartakesintheascetic

ideal.IagreewithLeiter,againstRortyandothers,thatNietzschevaluesthe

scientificperspectiveaboveothers.ButIdisagreethatNietzschedoesnotvalue

scienceforitsownsake.Hevaluesitonlytotheextentthatitfurthershislarger

19

project:are‐valuationofvalues.Onitsown,ascientificperspectiverequiresusto

subordinateourindividualinstinctsandperspectivetoanauthorityotherthan

ourselves.Inthisrespectitpartakesintheasceticideal.

TheattentionIgivetothenaturalistreading,andespeciallytoLeiter,might

seemunduetothoseunfamiliarwithrecentNietzschecriticism.Butthisreading

hasbecomeveryinfluentialinrecentyears.KenGemes,arespectedNietzsche

scholar,writesthatLeiter’sNietzscheonMorality,whichpresentsLeiter’sreadingof

Nietzscheasanaturalist,is“simplythebest,mostsustained,booklengthexposition

ofNietzsche’sGenealogyofMorality.Assuchitwillbethereferencepointforall

furtherscholarlyworkonthesubject.”18MyreadingofLeiterillustratesGemes’s

secondpoint.Leiter’sdetailed,systematicreadinghasinfluencedmyown,and

thoughIdisagreewithitonsomefundamentalpoints,Ifeelcompelledtoarticulate

thesedisagreementscarefullyandthoroughly.

InchapterfourIturntoNietzsche’s“philosophyofthefuture”:his

alternativeconceptionofphilosophyasthecreationofconcepts.Thisconception

differsfrombothtraditionalphilosophyandNietzsche’sskepticalandpsychological

analyses.Andyetittoohasreceivedlittleattentioninthesecondaryliterature.

Thereareseveralreasonsforthis,whichIoutlineinthechapter,twoofwhichstand

out:first,Nietzschesaysverylittleaboutthisconceptionofphilosophy,makingit

hardforscholarstopiecetogetheracoherentpictureofit.Second,thisconception

isvirtuallyunrecognizableasanythingweordinarilycall“philosophy.”Itisa

18Thisquotationappearsontheinsidecoverofthepaperbackversion.

20

creativepractice,notananalyticalone.Itisnotmeanttobeunderstoodor

adjudicatedasmuchasfeltandexperienced.Forthisreasonitprovesresistantto

theusualphilosophicalanalysis.Iconcludebyconsideringwhat,ifanything,is

distinctivelyphilosophicalaboutNietzsche’sphilosophy.

Finally,ImustaddressthequestionofhowIuseNietzsche’sunpublished

writings(hisNachlass),especiallyTheWilltoPower.Somescholarscullfreelyfrom

thesewritings,takingthemassomethingNietzschewouldhavepublishedhadhe

notgonemadin1889.Ifindthispracticeunjustified.Ithasbeenestablished(by

Montinari)thatNietzscheabandonedtheprojectforamajorworkonTheWillto

Poweranddidnotwanthisnotebookspublished.19HissisterElizabeth,who

compiledandpublishedhisnotesafterhewentmad(andwhowaskeentopromote

herfascistsympathies),tookmanylibertieswiththeselectionandarrangementof

them.Furthermore,duringhislifetimeNietzschetookvolumesofnotesbut

publishedfewofthem.Thissuggeststhathedidnotwanteverythinginhis

notebooksattributedtohim.Mypracticeisthereforetousematerialfromthe

NachlassonlytobolsterpointsNietzschepublishedduringhissanelife.ThiswayI

canbesurethattheviewsIattributetohimareoneshedidwantpublished.20

* * *

19ReadingNietzsche.Trans.GregWhitlock.ChampaignIL:UniversityofIllinoisPress,2003.SeealsoR.J.Hollingdale,Nietzsche:TheManandhisPhilosophy.Revisededition.CambridgeUP,1999.20ThispracticeisconsistentwithmyuseofWittgenstein’sunpublishedwritings,particularlyOnCertainty.

21

Eachpartofthisdissertation,then,triestoanswertwobasicquestions:What

areWittgenstein/Nietzschecriticizing?Andisthiscriticismjustified?Answering

thefirstquestionisanexegeticaltask.Itrequireselaboratingandclarifying

WittgensteinandNietzsche’srespectiveapproachestophilosophy.Answeringthe

secondquestionisaphilosophicaltask.Itrequirestryingtodefendeachapproach

againstchallenges,realandimagined,fromvariousphilosophicalperspectives.

ButwhilethisdissertationtriestodefendWittgensteinandNietzsche’s

criticismsofphilosophy,itshouldnotbereadasanendorsementofthesecriticisms.

ItisratheranattempttounderstandeachthinkerasIthinktheywouldhaveliked

tobeunderstood.ThoughIamlargelysympathetictotheircriticisms,Iamnoless

sympathetictowhattheycriticize.Thisincludesnotjustacknowledgedclassicsof

traditionalphilosophybyPlatoandKant,butalsorecentandcurrentworkinthe

field.ItisdifficulttoreadKripke’sdistinctionbetweennecessityandaprioricity,or

JohnRawls’sTheoryofJustice,withoutadmirationandrespectbothfortheresultsof

theirinvestigationsandthemethodsunderlyingthem.AndyetIcannothelpbut

feeltheforceofwhatWittgensteinorNietzschewouldsayabouttheirwork.The

impetusforthisdissertationemergesfromthistension,fromthecompeting

sympathiesIhaveforthetraditionanditstwomosttrenchantcritics.

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PARTONE

WITTGENSTEIN

23

1.WITTGENSTEIN’SCRITIQUEOFTHEAUGUSTINIANPICTURE

“Uponthewhole,Iaminclinedtothinkthatthefargreaterpart,ifnotall,ofthosedifficultieswhichhavehithertoamusedphilosophers,andblockedupthewaytoknowledge,areentirelyowingtoourselves.Wehavefirstraisedadustandthencomplainwecannotsee.”

GeorgeBerkeley1

Wittgenstein’sPhilosophicalInvestigationshasattractedconsiderable

disagreement,butfewdisagreethatitcomprisesasustainedattackontraditional

philosophy.TheInvestigationsislitteredwithremarkssuchas,“Philosophymayin

nowayinterferewiththeactualuseoflanguage;itcanintheendonlydescribeit”

(§124),“Philosophysimplyputseverythingbeforeus,andneitherexplainsnor

deducesanything”(§126),andmoststrikingly,“Whenwedophilosophywearelike

savages,primitivepeople,whoheartheexpressionsofcivilizedmen,putafalse

interpretationonthem,andthendrawthequeerestconclusionsfromit”(§194).A

recurringthemeoftheInvestigationsisthattraditionalphilosophyhasnot

adequatelygraspedthesubtlety,complexity,andpolyphonyofeverydaylanguage

andlife,andthatanewkindofphilosophicalapproachisneededinitsplace.But

whatexactlydoesWittgensteinmeanby“philosophy”inthesequotations?Ishe

referringjusttotheanalytictraditionoftheearlytwentiethcentury,ordoeshis

targetincludethephilosophicaltraditionsincePlato?Ifthelatter,ishesimply

defendingourdaily,largelyunreflectivepracticesandthoughts?Andisthisa

defenseofcommonsense?

1TreatiseConcerningthePrinciplesofHumanKnowledge,OxfordUP,1998.

24

Myaiminthesefirsttwochaptersistoanswerthesequestionsbyreading

theInvestigationsinthecontextofWittgenstein’sotherlatewritings.Ibegin,inthis

chapter,byexploringwhatWittgensteinconsiderstobethefundamentalproblem

withtraditionalphilosophy:itsfailuretoadequatelyaccountforhowweactually

uselanguageinoureverydaylives.ForWittgensteinthisfailureistheoriginalsinof

thediscipline;themistakethatdoomsitsinvestigationsfromthestart.Inthenext

chapterIshowhow,forWittgenstein,thisfailureleadstraditionalphilosophersto

makeclaimswhichdonothavetheforceorimplicationtheyintend,andthus

explainswhytraditionalphilosophysooftenfailstohaveanypurchaseoverour

everydaylives.

Howandwhydotraditionalphilosophersfailtoaccountforhowweactually

uselanguage?Wittgenstein’sanswer,Iwillsuggestinthischapter,isthattheyare

pronetothreemethodologicaltendencies.Firstisthetendencytoleapfromthe

particulartothegeneral,todevelopuniversalexplanationsthataccountfor

particularphenomena(i.e.themeaningsofwords)outsidethesocialandhistorical

circumstancesoftheirvariousinstantiations.Wittgensteincallsthistendency“the

cravingforgenerality,”or“thecontemptuousattitudetowardstheparticularcase.”2

Second,philosopherspresumethatthingsmustbeacertainwayratherthantryto

seehowtheyactuallyare.Theypresumethatlanguage,forinstance,mustbe

reducibletosimple,discrete,logicalrules,andthencriticizeitforfailingtomeetthis

standard.WittgensteinsummarizesthisviewwhenhewritesthatforRussell,Frege,

2TheBlueandBrownBooks:PreliminaryStudiesforthe‘PhilosophicalInvestigations.’Secondedition.NewYork:HarperandRow,1965,18.

25

andtheTractatus,“thecrystallinepurityoflogicwas,ofcourse,notaresultof

investigation:itwasarequirement”(PI§107).Third,havingassumedthatthe

arrangementofwordsandthingsmustfollowcertainrulesorbearrangedina

logicalorder,philosophersposithiddenprocessesinordertofitobserved

phenomenaintotheframeworktheyhaveadopted.ForWittgenstein,thesethree

aspectsoftraditionalphilosophyleadtoadistortedpictureofourlanguage,our

selves,andourworld.

Thischapterproceedsinsixmainsections.FirstIoutlinetheAugustinian

pictureoflanguage:thepictureoflanguagethatWittgensteinbelievesunderlies

traditionalphilosophicalinvestigations.Ishowhowthispictureemergesfromthe

philosophicalimpulsetomakeotherwiseinnocuousobservationsbearmore

explanatoryweightthantheycan.Second,Ishowhow,forWittgenstein,the

Augustinianpictureleadstoaparadox.Inthethird,fourth,andfifthsectionsI

considerthreetraditionalphilosophicalwaysofresolvingthisparadox–Platonism,

mentalism,andconventionalism–andshowwhynonearesatisfactory.Finally,I

explainWittgenstein’sanswertotheparadox.Thisanswerillustrateshis

conceptionoflanguageasadistinctivelyhumanactivity,oneborneoutinpractices

ratherthanthoughts.

OnefinalnotebeforeIdiveintothetext.TheInvestigationshasgivenriseto

amassiveamountofsecondaryliterature,andmuchofthisliteraturehasdivided

thetextintoaseriesofproblemssuchas“theprivatelanguageargument”and,most

famously,“therule‐followingconsiderations.”Whilethisliteraturehasbeenuseful

26

andimportant,Iabjureanydetaileddiscussionofit,relegatingittothefootnotes

evenasIrelyonittodevelopmyownthoughts.Myreasonsforthisaretwo‐fold:

first,mygoalistoelucidatehowWittgensteinbreaksfromthetraditionthat

precededhim,notthesubsequenteffectsofthisbreak.Secondly,aproper

understandingoftheInvestigationsrequiresstayingclosetothetextitself–notjust

itscontentbutalsoitsform.3Byitsform,Imeannotonlyitsdialogicstyle,its

apparentlackofcoherenceornarrative,butalsoWittgenstein’suseofparticular

examplestogroundtheoftenesotericpointshemakes.Gettingimmersedinthe

detailsofthesecondaryliteraturenotonlyrisksturningtheInvestigationsintoa

3HowonereadstheInvestigationsdependsonhowonereadsthedifferentvoicesinthedialogue.Ifonereadsthenarrator’svoiceasrebuttingtheskepticalinterlocutor,thenitappearsthatWittgensteinisadvancinghisownphilosophicalthesesandrefutingskepticism.ThiswouldcontradictWittgenstein’sclaimnottobeadvancingphilosophicaltheses(PI§128).MyreadingisgenerallyconsistentwiththeapproachesofStanleyCavellandDavidStern.Cavelldescribesthetwovoicesinthedialogueas“thevoiceoftemptation,”whichseducesusintoacceptingaphilosophicalpositionandleadsusintofurtherconfusion,anda“voiceofcorrectness”whichsnapsusoutofthattemptationandgetsustoseehowtheconfusionisproducedinthefirstplace.Cavellwritesthatthedebatebetweenthesevoices“isnottobedecidedbuttobedismantled.”“TheAvailabilityofWittgenstein’sLaterPhilosophy,”MustWeMeanWhatWeSay.Secondedition.CambridgeUP,2002,pp.71.DavidSternwritesthatthetextdoesnotprivilegeonevoiceoranother,butproducesadeflationaryeffectaccordingtowhichwecannotprivilegeanyvoice.SterncomparesthisdeflationaryeffecttoPyrrhonianskepticism:itleavesusunabletoadoptanypositionwithcertainty.Wittgenstein’sPhilosophicalInvestigations:AnIntroduction.CambridgeUP,2004.Onthequestionofdialogueinthetextmoregenerally,seeJaneHeal’s"WittgensteinandDialogue"PhilosophicalDialogues:Plato,Hume,Wittgensteined.T.J.SmileyProceedingsoftheBritishAcademy851995,pp.63‐83.

WhileIagreewithCavellandSternthatneithervoiceisstraightforwardlyWittgenstein’s,thereareexceptionstothis.AttimesWittgenstein’svoiceemergesclearlyandforcefully.Forinstance,whenhewrites,“Whatwedoisbringwordsbackfromtheirmetaphysicaltotheireverydayuse”(§116);in§201;andindeedthroughoutthesections§90‐133.

27

seriesofphilosophicalproblems,whichispreciselywhatWittgensteinwantedto

avoid,italsoriskselidingtheimportanceoftheformofthetext,andfurther

obfuscatingthealreadydifficultsimplicityofhisideas.

1.1.HowtheAugustinianPictureArises

InoneofthemostcitedpassagesintheInvestigations,Wittgensteinwrites,

“Apicturehelduscaptive.Andwecouldnotgetoutsideofit,foritlayinour

language,andourlanguageseemedtorepeatittousinexorably”(§115).This

pictureistheAugustinianpictureoflanguageWittgensteindescribesin§1.Thefirst

partoftheInvestigations,andthebulkofthischapter,isdevotedtoshowinghow

thispictureleadstraditionalphilosophersintoconfusion.Ibegininthissectionby

illustratinghowthispicturefirstemerges:throughasubtleandunwarrantedleap

fromtheobservationofaparticularphenomena–namely,achildlearninglanguage

–toageneralexplanationforthisphenomena.Suchleaps,Iwillargue,area

primarytargetofWittgenstein’scritiqueoftraditionalphilosophy.

TheAugustinianpictureconsistsofthreerelatedassumptions:“Everyword

hasameaning.Thismeaningiscorrelatedwiththeword.Itistheobjectforwhich

thewordstands”(§1).Thebasicideaisthatthefunctionofwordsistoreferto

objectsorideas,andtheproblemitintroducesforphilosophersishowthis

referenceoccurs.Althoughnophilosopherhasactuallyarticulatedthese

assumptions,Wittgensteinsuggeststhatsomethinglikethispictureunderlies

28

traditionalphilosophicalinvestigations.Indeedthispicturecanbefoundinvarious

philosophicalattemptstothinkaboutlanguage,includingthoseofSocrates,Locke,

Frege,Russell,Saussure,Wittgenstein’sownTractatusLogico­Philosophicus,and

evenJacquesDerrida.4Eachofthesephilosophersconceiveoflanguageas

4IntheTheaetetus,Socratesarguesthatlanguageconsistsof“primaryelements”oruniversals.Forsuchuniversalsthereisnodistinctionbetweenthenameandtheconceptorobject–thenameistheconceptorobject.WittgensteindiscussesthisatPI§46.Plato,Theaetetus.Trans.RobinWaterfield.London:PenguinClassics,1987.

ForJohnLocke,wordsstandforideaswhichstandforobjects,andweunderstandtheparticularinstantiationsofawordbyrelatingittotheideaunderwhichitfalls.EssayConcerningHumanUnderstanding.Ed.RogerWoolhouse.London:PenguinClassics,1987.Book3,Chapter3,Sections1and6.

AccordingtoRussell,Inalogicallyperfectlanguagetherewillbeonewordandnomoreforeverysimpleobject,andeverythingthatisnotsimplewillbeexpressedbyacombinationofwords,byacombinationderived,ofcourse,fromthewordsforthesimplethingsthatenterin,onewordforeachsimplecomponent.Alanguageofthatsortwillbecompletelyanalytic,andwillshowataglancethelogicalstructureofthefactsassertedordenied.

IdiscussRussell’sconceptionofnaminginmoredetailbelow.ThePhilosophyofLogicalAtomism.Ed.DavidF.Pears.London:OpenCourtClassics,1985.WittgensteinadoptsthisRussellianviewofnamingintheTractatus.

ForWittgensteinlanguageisreducibletoprimaryelements,or“simplesigns,”whichhaveadirect,unmediatedconnectiontotheirreferents:“Therequirementthatsimplesignsbepossibleistherequirementthatsensebedeterminate”(3.022).TractatusLogico­Philosophicus.Trans.D.F.PearsandB.F.McGuiness.London:RoutledgeClassics,2001.

FerdinanddeSaussureadoptsthesamepicture,buthedepartsfromtheothersinpositingconventionasthatwhichconnectsthewordwiththeobject.Idiscussthisviewbelowinsection1.5.CourseinGeneralLinguistics.Trans.RoyHarris.London:OpenCourt,1998.

JacquesDerridamayseemlikeanunusualadditiontothisgroup,ashearguesthatthereisnoconnectionbetweenawordandanobject,andthatlanguageandmeaningarethereforeunstable,subjecttoaplayofsignifiersandamyriadofinterpretations.InsomeoftheserespectsheresemblesWittgenstein.ButWittgenstein’sviewoflanguageiscruciallydifferentinthatDerridafocusesprimarilyontheconnectionbetweenwordandobject.ThisfocusiswhatWittgensteinistryingtoshift.ForDerrida,asforPlatoandSaussure,whatismostimportantaboutlanguageiswhetherthereis(orisnot)aconnectionbetweenword

29

consistingofwordsononehandandthings(orconcepts)ontheother,andthentry

todeterminehow(ifatall)thetwoconnect.InAugustine,Wittgensteinseemsto

havefoundaclearexpressionofthebasicassumptionsunderlyingeventhemost

disparateattemptstophilosophizeaboutlanguage.

WittgensteinhasthreecriticismsoftheAugustinianpicture.First,although

itseemstoaccountfornouns,itdoesnotaccountforprepositions,adjectives,

conjunctions,andmanyotherkindsofwords.Second,evennounsarenotalways,

orevenoften,usedasnames.Wittgensteinlists,amongotherexamples,“Water!”

and“Help!”andasks,“Areyoustillinclinedtocallthesewords‘namesofobjects’”

(PI§27).Eventhefewwordsthatcomprisethelanguage‐gameof§2,thefamous

“builders”storythatcorrespondstotheAugustinianpicture,canbeusedinvarious

ways.5Thewordslab,forinstance,canbethenameofanobject(“Thisiscalled

andreferent.Theothersfindaconnectionandthisformsthebasisoftheirtheories.Derridaarguesthatthereisnoconnectionandthisformsthebasisofhistheory.ForWittgenstein,thisundueemphasisontheconnection(orlackthereof)isamistake.ThisisthepicturewhichWittgensteinbelieveholdsuscaptive.

ForamorecompleteaccountofthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenWittgensteinandDerrida,seeTorilMoi,“TheyPracticeTheirTradesinDifferentWorlds:ConceptsinPoststructuralismandOrdinaryLanguagePhilosophy.”NewLiteraryHistory.40.4(2009):801‐824,andMartinStone,“WittgensteinandDeconstruction,”TheNewWittgenstein.Ed.AliceCraryandRupertRead.London:Routledge,2000.HenryStatendrawsthecomparisonbetweenWittgensteinandDerridatooclosely,inmyview,inWittgensteinandDerrida.Lincoln,NE:UniversityofNebraskaPress,1984.5Inhis“NotesandAfterthoughtsontheOpeningofthePhilosophicalInvestigations,”StanleyCavellpointsoutthattherearetwowaysofreadingthelanguagegameof§2.Firstwecanimagineaworld,aformoflife,inwhichthelanguage‐gameof§2wastheonlyformofcommunication.Thisworldiscompletelyalientoourown.Second,wecanimagineourselvesbehavinglikethebuilders,forwhateverreason.ItisnotclearwhichreadingWittgensteinendorses:heseemstoofferbothwhenhe

30

‘slab.’”),arequestbythebuilderforaslab(“Slab!”),oragesturesuggestingthere

arenomoreslabsleft(“Slab?”).Third,WittgensteinshowsthattheAugustinian

pictureoflanguagedoesnotevenaccountforhowwelearnnames.Iwilladdress

thisthirdcriticisminthefollowingsection.Whatinterestsmeinthissection,and

whatIthinkinterestsWittgenstein,ishowapictureoflanguagesoclearlylimited

andflawedretained,andcontinuestoretain,suchadeepholdoverus.Answering

thisquestionwillgoalongwaytowardsunderstandingWittgenstein’scriticismof

traditionalphilosophy.

WecanbegintoansweritbyaskinghowtheAugustinianpicturearises.

Whatisstrikingaboutthispicture,especiallyinlightofWittgenstein’ssubsequent

critique,ishowintuitiveitseems,hownaturallyitfollowswhenwethinkabouthow

welearnlanguage.Acloserlookat§1,however,revealsthatthispicturedoesnot

emergefromAugustinehimself.Itemerges,rather,fromWittgenstein’s

interpretationofwhatAugustineactuallysays.Thispointhasbeenmadebefore,

buttheimplicationsofithavenotbeenfullydrawnout.WhiletheAugustinian

pictureispresentedassobasic,sofundamental,thatitcannotbebrokendowninto

simplercomponents,itdoesnotliefullyformedinthebackofourminds.Asseveral

scholarshavepointedout,Wittgenstein,notAugustine,drawstheAugustinian

writes,“Thatphilosophicalconceptofmeaninghasitsplaceinaprimitiveideaofthewaylanguagefunctions.Butonemayalsosaythatitistheideaofalanguagemoreprimitivethanours”(§2).SeeCavell,“NotesandAfterthoughtsontheOpeningofthePhilosophicalInvestigations,”CambridgeCompaniontoWittgenstein.Ed.HansSlugaandDavidStern.CambridgeUP,1996,pp.261‐295.

31

picture,anditisnotaveryaccurateportrayalofthelatter’swords.6Onitsown

Augustine’saccountisunobjectionable–aninnocuousobservationthatchildren

learnthenamesofsomethingsbyhavingobjectspointedouttothem:

Whenthey(myelders)namedsomeobject,andaccordinglymovedtowards

something,IsawthisandIgraspedthatthethingwascalledbythesound

theyutteredwhentheymeanttopointitout.Theirintentionwasshownby

theirbodilymovements,asitwerethenaturallanguageofallpeoples:the

expressionoftheface,theplayoftheeyes,themovementofotherpartsof

thebody,andthetoneofvoicethatexpressesourstateofmindinseeking,

having,rejecting,oravoidingsomething.(Augustine,Confessions,quotedin

Wittgenstein§1)

Thisisalargelydescriptiveaccount.Augustinedoesnotgeneralizeaboutlanguage

orpositanessentiallinkbetweentheobjectandtheword.Wittgenstein,however,

doesnotsimplyrecountwhatAugustinewrote,hetriestoinferthedeeper

6AnthonyKennywritesthat“AugustineisacuriouschoiceasaspokesmanfortheviewswhichWittgensteinattackssinceinmanyrespectswhathesaysresemblesWittgenstein’sownviewsratherthantheviewsthatareWittgenstein’starget.”TheLegacyofWittgenstein.Oxford:Blackwell,1984,10.RobertFogelinwritesthatWittgenstein’spictureis“morenaïvethantheviewactuallypresentedbyAugustine.”Wittgenstein.Secondedition.London:Routledge,1999,109.SimilarviewsareexpressedinM.F.Burnyeat,“WittgensteinandAugustine‘DeMagistro,’”ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety,SupplementaryVolume(1987)61:1‐24;,WarrenGoldfarb.“IWantYoutoBringMeaSlab:RemarksontheOpeningSectionsofthePhilosophicalInvestigations,”Synthese(1983)56:265‐82;PeterKing,“AugustineontheImpossibilityofTeaching,”Metaphilosophy(1998)29(3):179‐195;ChristopherKerwin,“Augustine’sPhilosophyofLanguage,”TheCambridgeCompaniontoAugustine.Ed.E.StumpandN.Kretzman.CambridgeUP,2001.

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assumptionsunderlyinghiswords.HetakesAugustine’sobservationtoimplya

moregeneraltheoryoflanguage:

Thesewords,itseemstome,giveusaparticularpictureoftheessenceof

humanlanguage.Itisthis:theindividualwordsinlanguagenameobjects–

sentencesarecombinationsofsuchnames.–Inthispictureoflanguagewe

findtherootsofthefollowingidea:Everywordhasameaning.Thismeaning

iscorrelatedwiththeword.Itistheobjectforwhichthewordstands.(§1)

Wittgenstein’sglossneglectsthesubtletyandcolorofAugustine’sdescription,

includingthoseaspectsthatechohisownviews.7Wittgenstein’spicturetakes

Augustinetoreducethequestionoflanguagetotheassociationbetweenawordand

itsreferent,andignorestheemotiveaspectofteachingthatAugustineiscarefulto

include(the“seeking,having,rejecting,andavoidingsomething”).Andwhereas

Augustinesimplydescribestheactionsandpracticesbywhichhewastaughtsome

words,WittgensteintakesAugustinetoprovideapictureof“theessenceofhuman

language.”Wittgenstein,inshort,takesAugustinetosayandmeanmorethanhe

actuallydoes.

7JustasAugustinespeaksofthe“naturallanguageofallpeoples,”Wittgensteinwillwritethat“wordsareconnectedwiththeprimitive,thenaturalexpressionsofsensationandusedintheirplace”(§244).SeealsoOnCertainty§475,whichIdiscussinsection1.4.below.

33

Whydoeshedoso?HasWittgensteinsimplymisreadAugustine?Idonot

thinkso.8Wittgensteinwillcriticizethiskindofover‐reading,theleapfroma

particularaccounttoageneraltheory,throughouttheInvestigations.9Heseemsto

bealertingus,attheoutset,tothetendencytomakeourordinarydescriptionsbear

moreexplanatoryweightthantheycan.Heseemstobealertingustotheimpulseto

turnanordinaryobservationintoaphilosophicalone.Thistendency,andnot

Augustine’swords,isthesourceoftheAugustinianpictureoflanguage.Augustine’s

observationsdonotnecessarilyleadtothepicturethatWittgensteincriticizes;itis

whatwemakeofsuchobservations,theexplanatoryorconceptualburdenthatwe

imposeonoureverydaywords,observations,andpracticesthatleadtosuch

pictures.ThatWittgensteinopensbydoingtheverythinghewilllatercriticizedoes

notdetractfromhissubsequentclaims;itillustratesthemevenmorepoignantly.

Oneoftheimplicationsofhiscritiqueofphilosophy,Iwillsuggest,isthatthe

temptationtophilosophizecannotbeavoided,thoughitcanberemedied.

IndeedWittgensteinwarnsagainstthistendencyjustafewsectionslaterin

§6.Hewrites,“Thisostensiveteachingofwordscanbesaidtoestablishan

8InthisrespectIdisagreewithNormanMalcolm’sclaimthatWittgenstein“decidedtobeginhisInvestigationswithaquotationfrom[Augustine’s]Confessions,notbecausehecouldnotfindtheconceptionexpressedinthatquotationstatedaswellbyotherphilosophers,butbecausetheconceptionmustbeimportantifsogreatamindheldit.”LudwigWittgenstein:AMemoir.Secondedition.OxfordUP,1984,59‐60.9LaterintheInvestigationsWittgensteinwritesthatthe“problemsarisingthroughamisinterpretationofourformsoflanguagehavethecharacterofdepth….Whatisessential,however,wasnothiddenbeneaththesurface”(§111).Seealso§90and§92.

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associationbetweenthewordandthething.Butwhatdoesthismean?”(§6).In

questioningthisseeminglyinnocuoussentenceWittgensteinalertsustothe

temptationtomakethissentencemeanmorethanitdoes,toturnthisobservation

intoageneralexplanation.Wemustbecarefulaboutthinkingthatthisassociation

underliesallusesoflanguage,orthatexplainingthisassociationexplainshowwe

learnlanguagemoregenerally.Whileostensiveteachingofwords“canbesaid”to

establishanassociationbetweenawordandathing,thisdependsonwhatwemean

by“association.”Doesthisassociationexistapriori?Doesittranscendthevarious

contextsinwhichthewordissubsequentlyused?Orisitjusttheresultofthe

particularcircumstancesthatAugustinedescribes(thegestures,thesounds,the

intonations,thecontextinwhichtheyoccur,therelationshipbetweenteacherand

student,etcetera)?Andifthelatter,doesthismeanlanguageissimplyamatterof

convention?Wittgensteindoesnotanswerthisquestionhere,buthisraisingit

suggeststhathewantstopausebeforeleapingfromtheclaimthatanassociationis

establishedbetweenawordandanobjectinparticularcircumstancestothebelief

thatthisassociationunderlieslanguage,ortothebeliefthatthisassociationis

permanentoressential.

ThishesitationaboutphilosophicalleapsrecursthroughoutWittgenstein’s

laterwork.Hebelievesthattraditionalphilosophyisoverlypresumptivein

groupingdisparatethingsunderthesamerubric:“Assimilatingthedescriptionsof

theusesofwords…cannotmaketheusesthemselvesanymorelikeoneanother.

Foraswesee,theyareabsolutelyunlike”(§10).Insteadofgettingaclearviewofa

35

givenphenomenon,observingandappreciatingitinallofitssubtletyand

complexity,philosophersoverlookdifferencesinsearchofsomethingcommon,with

theassumptionbeingthatwhatiscommonexplainswhatisessentialabouteach

particular.Wittgensteinbelievesthatthistendencyobscuresmorethanitclarifies.

Thisdoesnotmeanthatheisadoptingananti‐realistmetaphysics:Wittgensteinis

notdenying(orasserting)thatthereareuniversals,orassertingthatthereareonly

particulars.Heisaskingustoshiftourfocusawayfromsuchphilosophicaldebates,

andtryingtoshowuswhatwefailtoseewhenwearefocusedonsuchmetaphysical

questions.

Thusafterasking,“Whatdoesitmeantosaythatostensiveteachingofwords

canestablishanassociationbetweenawordandthething?”Wittgensteinoffersa

deliberatelyellipticalresponse:

Well,itmaymeanvariousthings;butoneverylikelythinksfirstofallthata

pictureoftheobjectcomesbeforethechild’smindwhenithearstheword.

Butnow,ifthisdoeshappen–isitthepurposeoftheword?–Yes,itmaybe

thepurpose.–Icanimaginesuchauseofwords….Butinthelanguageof§2

itisnotthepurposeofthewordstoevokeimages.(Itmay,ofcourse,be

discoveredthatthathelpstoattaintheactualpurpose.)(§6)

Theanswerhebrieflyconsiders,beforerejecting,isthatamentalimageestablishes

theassociationbetweenawordanditsobject.Iwilldiscussthisparticularanswer

inmoredetailinsection1.4.WhatisimportanthereisthatWittgensteindoesnot

answerthequestion.Herejectsit.Thequestionpresumesthattheansweristhe

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sameinallcases,andthispresumptioniswhatWittgensteinwantstochallenge:the

almostimperceptibleleapfromtheobservationthatwelearnwordsostensively,

thatostensiveteachinghelps“establishanassociationbetweenawordandathing,”

totheassumptionthatthisassociationexplainshowweacquireanduselanguage,

andthatthereissomethingnecessaryorpermanentaboutthisassociation.This

leapleadsphilosopherstoinquireafterthenatureofthisassociation,tostare

alternatelyatthewordandthethinginordertoseehowasoundorink‐markcan

haveanypurchaseoveranobject.Wittgensteinistryingtopre‐emptthisinquiry.

Hewillshowthatitleadstoadistortedpictureoflanguage.

Wittgensteinreturnstothissamequestionatkeymomentsinthe

Investigationsinordertoclarifyvariousphilosophicalproblems.Theseproblems

derivefromthetemptationtorespondtothequestion“Whatistheassociation

betweenawordandthething”withananswerthatis“givenonceandforall,

independentlyofanyfutureexperience”(§92).In§6heasksthisquestioninthe

contextoflanguageacquisitionasheexamineshowtheinitialassociationbetweena

wordandathingisformed.Heasksitagainin§37ashemovesfromdiscussing

languageacquisitiontolanguageuse:

Whatistherelationbetweennameandthingnamed?–Well,whatisit?Look

atlanguagegame(2)oratanotherone:thereyoucanseethesortofthing

thisrelationconsistsin.Thisrelationmayalsoconsist,amongmanyother

things,inthefactthathearinganamecallsbeforeourmindthepictureof

whatisnamed;anditalsoconsists,amongotherthings,inthename’sbeing

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writtenonthethingnamedorbeingpronouncedwhenthatthingispointed

at.

Andheasksitagainin§244withrespecttotheideathatlanguagerepresentsinner

thoughtsorsensations.

Buthowistheconnectionbetweenthenameandthethingnamedsetup?

Thisquestionisthesameas:howdoesahumanbeinglearnthenamesof

sensations?...Hereisonepossibility:wordsareconnectedwiththeprimitive,

thenatural,expressionsofthesensationandusedintheirplace.Achildhas

hurthimselfandhecries;andthenadultstalktohimandteachhim

exclamationsand,later,sentences.

Iwilllookmorecloselyateachofthesequotationsthroughoutthecourseofthis

chapter.ButfornowthecontextinwhichWittgensteinasksthequestionisless

importantthanthefactofitsrecurrence.Eachtimeheasksthequestion,

Wittgenstein’sansweristorejectit,toshowthatnooneanswercoversallcases,

andtogetustolookattheparticularcircumstancesinwhichthisquestionarises.

TheopeningoftheInvestigations,then,doesnotjustpresentapictureof

languagethatWittgensteinwillcriticize;itillustrateshowthispicturearises.The

Augustinianpictureoflanguagetransformsaninnocuousobservationaboutachild

learningwordsintoageneraltheoryoflanguage.Thisover‐readingexemplifiesthe

verytendencyWittgensteinwarnsagainstthroughouttherestoftheInvestigations.

Wittgensteindoesnotdenythatwelearnwordsostensively,orthatostensive

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teachingofwords“canbesaid”toestablishanassociationbetweenawordanda

thing,buthewantstoresistmakingthisassociationbearmoreexplanatoryweight

thanitcan.Hewantstoresistleapingfromtheclaimthatostensiveteaching

establishesanassociationbetweenawordandathingtotheclaimthatthis

associationisthekeytolanguageacquisitionanduse,ortotheclaimthatthis

associationpre‐existsthepracticewhichestablishesitorthatonceestablisheditis

permanent.Toseewhyhewantstoresistthistemptation,weneedtotaketheleap

andseewhereweland.

1.2.HowtheAugustinianPictureLeadstoParadox

“Theideanowabsorbsus,thattheideal‘must’befoundinreality.Meanwhilewedonotasyetseehowitoccursthere,nordoweunderstandthenatureofthis‘must.’Wethinkitmustbeinreality;forwethinkwealreadyseeitthere.”(PI§101)

Thetendencytomakeourordinaryobservationsbearmoreexplanatory

weightthantheycanisthefirstofthreephilosophicalimpulsesWittgensteinwarns

against.Thisimpulseleadstothemistakenideathattheprimaryfunctionofwords

istonameobjects,andthatallusesofnounsareasnames.Thesecondtendency

thatWittgensteinwarnsagainstisthetendencytobelievethatlanguageadheresto

alogical,systematicstructureofrules,whichthephilosophershouldseekto

uncover.ThistendencyleadstothemostsignificantproblemwiththeAugustinian

picture:itdoesnotevenaccountforhowwelearnnamesofobjects.

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AccordingtotheAugustinianpicture,wefirstlearnwordsbyhavingour

elderspointtoobjectsastheypronouncethewordsthatrefertothem.This

practice,whichWittgensteincallsan“ostensivedefinition,”establishestheinitial

associationbetweenwordandobject.Thisseemsstraightforwardenough.But

Wittgensteinquestionswhetherweactuallylearnwordsinthisway.Heshowsthat

foranostensivedefinitiontoworkwemustfirstknowsomeofthelanguage,andif

wemustalreadyhavelanguagetolearnostensively,thenostensivedefinitions

cannotbethebasisforlanguageacquisition.Heillustratesthispointthroughthe

dialoguebetweenanarratorandaskepticin§26‐32.Thenarratorinvitesusto

acceptostensivedefinitionsasanexplanationforlanguageacquisition,whilethe

skepticquestionsourtemptationtoacceptthem:

Thedefinitionofthenumbertwo,“Thatiscalled‘two’”–pointingtotwonuts

–isperfectlyexact.–Buthowcantwobedefinedlikethat?Thepersonone

givesthedefinitiontodoesn’tknowwhatonewantstocall“two”;hewill

supposethat“two”isthenamegiventothisgroupofnuts!(§28)10

HowdidAugustine,asachild,knowhewasbeingtaughtthewordforallblocks,and

notjustthisblockinparticular?Howdidheknowwhethertheelderwaspointing

totheparticularobjectwecalla“block”ratherthanitsshape,color,orsize?

10WittgensteinoffersasimilarexampleintheBlueBook.Therehedescribesthepossiblewaysinwhichanostensivedefinitionofapencilcanbeinterpreted:“Letusthenexplaintheword‘tove’bypointingtoapencilandsaying‘thisistove’….Nowtheostensivedefinition‘thisistove’canbeinterpretedinallsortsofways….Thedefinitionthencanbeinterpretedtomean:‘Thisisapencil,’‘Thisisround,’‘Thisiswood,’‘Thisisone,’‘Thisishard,’etc.etc.”(2).

40

Wittgenstein’sskepticconcludes,“anostensivedefinitioncanbevariously

interpretedineverycase”(§28).Ostension,itseems,cannotbethebasisfor

languageacquisition,sincenothinginsuresthatanostensivedefinitionwillbe

correctlyinterpreted.Eventheactofpointingisnotimmunetodoubt.Onecould

reasonablyask:howdidthechildlearnedtointerpretthataction?11

Wittgensteinconcludes,“Onehasalreadytoknow(orbeabletodo)

somethinginordertobecapableofaskingathing’sname.”Hethenasks,“Butwhat

doesonehavetoknow?”(§30).Wittgensteinventuresapreliminaryanswertothis

questionintheensuingremark.Heclaimsthat“onlysomeonewhoalreadyknows

howtodosomethingwithitcansignificantlyaskaname”(§31).Ostensive

definitionscanbecorrectlyinterpretedifthechildknowswhatkindofwordisbeing

defined.Ifthechildknowstheelderisdefiningagenericobjectthenhecaninfer

thatthegenericobjecttheelderispointingtoiscalleda“block”;ifheknowsthe

elderisdefininganumberthenhecaninferthatwhatisbeingpointedtoisthe

number“one,”andsoon.Similarly,whenonetriestodefinethekinginchessby

pointingtoitandsaying,“Thisistheking,”thisdefinitiononlymakessenseifthe

studentknowswhatchessis,whataboardgameis,whattherulesare,etcetera(Cf.

11Cf.§85:Oneideaisthatcorrectlyinterpretinganostensivedefinitionisamatterofcorrectlyunderstandingit,whereunderstandingmeanshavingacertainmentalstate.Wittgensteindoesnotdenythatcertainmentalstatesaccompanycertainactions,butheresiststheideathesestatescompelustoactincertainways.Idiscussthiscritiqueofunderstandinginsection1.3.Atthispoint,Wittgensteinonlydeniesacertainkindofmentalism–theideathatelderintendssomethingthatthechildinterpretscorrectly(Cf.§35).

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§31).Wittgensteinconcludes“anostensivedefinitionexplainstheuse–the

meaning–ofawordwhentheoverallroleofthewordinthelanguageisclear(§30).

Inordertolearnanduselanguage,somepriorknowledgemustalreadybeinplace.

Thisanswerraisesasmanyquestionsasitresolves.Howdochildrenacquire

thebackgroundknowledgenecessarytolearnawordostensively,ifnotby

ostensivedefinitionsofotherwords(suchas“kind,”“number,”“color”)?Howdoes

onelearnto“alreadyknowhowtodosomethingwithit[aname]?”Wittgenstein

hasshownhowanostensivedefinitioncanbecorrectlyinterpreted,butthe

questionremains:howdowefirstlearnthemeaningofwords?Wittgenstein

venturesanansweratPI§32.Hewrites,

Augustinedescribesthelearningofhumanlanguageasifthechildcameinto

astrangecountryanddidnotunderstandthelanguageofthecountry;thatis,

asifitalreadyhadalanguage,onlynotthisone.Oragain:asifthechild

couldalreadythink,onlynotyetspeak.And‘think’wouldheremean

somethinglike‘talktoitself.’(§32)

ThisresponseexplainswhatiswrongwiththeAugustinianpicture’saccountof

languageacquisition:itdescribesastrangerlearningasecondlanguage,notachild

learningafirstone.Buteventhisresponse,whileinstructive,doesnotanswerthe

questionweareafter,namely,“Howdoesthechildfirstacquirelanguage?”What

doessomeonehavetoknowinordertolearnaword?

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Wittgensteinneverdirectlyanswersthisquestion.Thismarksarecurring

themeoftheInvestigations.Wittgensteinintroducesawayofthinkingaboutan

everydayphenomenon,suchaslearningaword,providinganexplanation,or

continuingamathematicalseries,andthenshowsthattheusualwayofthinking

aboutthisphenomenonleadsusintoaparadoxorregress:welearnwords

ostensively,andyettolearnwordsostensivelyweneedtohavelearnedother

words,andyettohavelearnedthoseotherwordsweneedtohavelearnedstill

others,andsoon.Theparadoxofostensionisjustthefirstofthreesimilar

paradoxesthatariseintheInvestigations:therearealsotheparadoxesof

explanation(§88)andrule‐following(§201).12Eachparadoxemergesoutofa

dialecticbetweenanarrator,whooffersanexplanationforthephenomenonin

question,andaskepticwhochallengestheexplanation.Ineachcasethenarrator

failstoadequatelyrebuttheskeptic,leadingtoastandoffbetweenskepticismand

12In§84‐88,forinstance,askepticdemandsanexplanationforawordwhichcoversallitspossibleusesandprecludesanydoubtaboutitsuse.Wittgenstein’snarratorrespondsthatsuchanexplanationisneitherpossiblenorrequired.Anyexplanationmaybeopentointerpretation,andmightrequireanotherexplanationtoexplainit.Andeventhatexplanationmayrequireanother,andsoon.Thisviewisechoedintheparadoxofrule‐following.In§185Wittgensteinimaginesastudentwho,whentoldto“continuethesequencethatbegins:2,4,6,8…”,generatesthecorrectsequenceupto1000,butthenbeginstoaddbyfours.Itiscleartousthatthestudenthaserred,yetwecaneasilythinkofaninterpretationoftheinstructionsaccordingtowhichthestudent’sbehaviouriscorrect.Perhapsthestudentthoughtwemeant,“Addbytwouptoonethousand,thenaddbyfour.”Howshallweprovehimwrong?Anywordswecanoffertopreventsuchamisinterpretationhavenomoreforcethantheinitialinstruction.Thereisnoguaranteethatthestudentwillcorrectlyfollowtheinstruction,andnofurtherinterpretationorexplanationoftheinstructioncanruleoutmisunderstandingWittgensteindescribes.Eachinterpretationcontentsusforamomentuntilwethinktheremustbeanotherone,asitwere,hidingbehindit(§201).

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Platonism.Theskepticinsiststhatwecannotshowwithcertaintythatwelearn

ostensivelyorgraspanexplanationorfollowaseries,andthatwearenottherefore

justifiedinsayingthatwehavelearnedorunderstood.ThePlatonistarguesthatthe

merefactthatwelearnostensively,orsuccessfullyexplainthings,orfollowaseries,

showsthattheremustbesomeelementbeyondtheword,theexplanation,orthe

series,whichisimmunetodoubtandinsuresthatoureverydayactivitiessucceed.13

This“must”leadsustosearchforthatthing,thatelementthatexplainsthe

phenomenaweobserve.Inthecaseoflanguage,itleadsustosearchforsomething

thatconnectsawordtoitsreferentandstopstheregressofinterpretations.

Thequestion“Howdoesachildfirstlearnlanguage?,”likemostofthe

questionsWittgensteinraisesintheInvestigations,isdesignedtoslowdownour

thinking,toshiftourfocusfromtheassociationbetweenwordandobjecttothe

circumstancesinwhichthisparticularassociationoccurs.Wittgenstein’saimisless

toprovidedefinitiveanswersthantoundoourusualwayofthinkingaboutthese

questions.Thisisakeypartofhisphilosophicalmethod,whichIwillexplaininthe

restofthischapter.Forthose(likemyself)lookingforanswers,theanswer

emergesthroughthecourseoftheInvestigations.Iwilltrytoexplainthisanswerin

13Therearemanyphilosophicalviewsthatfallunderthename“Platonism”(aswith“skepticism”).ByPlatonismhereImeanthepositingofsometranscendentobject,existingoutsidespaceandtime,immunetofurtheranalysisorinterpretation.DavidFinkelsteinoffersausefulexplanationofWittgenstein’scriticismofPlatonismin“WittgensteinonRulesandPlatonism,”TheNewWittgenstein.Ed.AliceCraryandRupertRead.London:Routledge,2000.

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thefinalsectionofthischapter–nottobesuspenseful,butbecausemuchmore

needstobeclearaboutWittgenstein’sthoughtbeforetheanswerwillmakesense.

First,weneedtoseewhathappensifwetrytoanswerthisquestionfrom

withintheframeworkoftheAugustinianpicture;ifwefailtoshiftourfocusand

maintaintheassumptionthatthekeytotheproblemofostensionliesindeciphering

theassociationbetweenwordandobject.Wittgensteinshowsthatifwemaintain

thispicture,wedevelopabstractandunsatisfyingexplanationsforthequestion

introducedin§6:Whatisthenatureoftheassociationbetweenawordandits

object?Theseexplanationstaketheformofasearchforwhatunderliesouruseof

languageandinsurescorrectunderstanding.InthenextthreesectionsIconsider

threeresponsestotheparadox,allofwhichacceptthebasicpremiseofthe

Augustinianpicture:thatthechildlearnslanguagebylearningtoassociateaword

withanobject.Thefirsttworesponses,Platonismandmentalism,areconsidered

andrejectedbyWittgenstein.Thethird,conventionalism,isnotdirectlyaddressed

byWittgensteinbutisnolessproblematic.

1.3.Platonism

Theskeptichasintroducedaregressthatweseemunabletostop:inorderto

correctlyinterpretanostensivedefinitionweneedtoknowwhatkindofwordis

beingtaught,toknowwhatkindofwordisbeingtaughtwemusthavepreviously

beentaughtotherwords,andyettohavebeenpreviouslytaughttheseotherwords,

45

wemusthavebeenpreviouslytaughtothers,andsoon.Thefactthatwelearn

wordsostensively–afactthatWittgensteinacknowledgesin§6–suggeststhat

theremustbesomethingthatstopstheregress,andforthissomethingtobe

immunetofurtherinterpretation,itcannotbeopentointerpretationorfurther

analysis.ItmustbesomekindofPlatonicorself‐explanatoryfact.Withoutsucha

fact,itseems,wecannotexplainhowwefirstacquirelanguage,orhowweuseit.

Platonism,itseems,istheonlyescapefromskepticism.

ThisisthesituationinwhichFrege,Russell,andWittgenstein(inthe

Tractatus)foundthemselvesintheearlypartofthetwentiethcentury.Allthree

rejectedtheskepticalconclusionthatnothinginsuresthatweinterpretameaning

onewayratherthananother.Buoyedbytheobservationthatweroutinelyuse

wordstosuccessfullyconveymeaning,allthreesoughttoofferanexplanationofthe

processbywhichthisoccurs.In“OnSenseandReference,”Fregearguedthatthe

associationbetweenawordanditsreferentisestablishedbyanintermediarysense

whichaccompaniesawordineachofitsuses,thusenablingwordstohavethesame

meaningindifferentcontexts.Thissense,accordingtoFrege,isneitherpartofthe

physicalworldnorpurelysubjective.Itcannotbetheformerbecauseitisnot

boundbyspaceortime,anditcannotbethelatterbecauseitisaccessibleto

everyone.14Itexistsina“thirdrealm”ofobjective,non‐physicalthings.Fregean

14ThateachnamehadacorrespondingsensewasevidentforFregeinthefactthatthephrase“HesperusisPhosphorus”conveysgenuineknowledgewhereas“HesperusisHesperus”doesnot,eventhoughHesperus(theeveningstar)andPhosphorus(themorningstar)refertothesameobject.Ifthemeaningsofthesetwonameswerereducibletotheirreferents,thetwosentenceswouldconveythe

46

senseispreciselythekindofmysticalsolutiontoafalseproblemthatWittgenstein

attacksintheInvestigations:

Andwedoherewhatwedoinahostofsimilarcases:becausewecannot

specifyanyonebodilyactionthatwecallpointingtotheshape(asopposed,

forexample,tothecolor),wesaythataspiritualactivitycorrespondsto

thesewords.Whereourlanguagesuggestsabodyandthereisnone;there,

weshouldliketosay,isaspirit.(§36)

Wearetalkingaboutthespatialandtemporalphenomenonoflanguage,not

aboutsomenon‐spatial,non‐temporalphantasm.(§108)15

ThetemptationtodescendintoPlatonismstemsfromourbeliefthattheskeptic

mustbewrong,thattheremustbesomethingthatstopstheregressof

interpretationsandsecuresthemeaningsofourwords.Thissourceofthismust,

whatWittgensteincalls“thehardnessofthelogicalmust,”isthesimpleobservation

sameinformation.ThattheydonotledFregetoclaimthateachnamehasanassociated,extra‐linguisticelementconnectinganametoitsreferentthatallowsustodistinguishnameswithidenticalreferents.“OnSenseandReference,”MeaningandReferenceed.A.W.Moore.OxfordUP:1993.

15Wittgenstein’salsocriticizesFrege’snotionofsenseat§117:“Yousaytome:‘Youunderstandthisexpression,don’tyou?Well,then–Iamusingitinthesenseyouarefamiliarwith.’‐Asifthesensewereanatmosphereaccompanyingtheword,whichiscarriedintoeverykindofapplication.”

47

thatweuselanguagetoconveyourintendedmeaningseveryday,withoutthinking

twiceaboutit.16

Russellproposedanalternativetheoryofnaming,whichWittgenstein

adoptedintheTractatus.ThistheoryisequallysubjecttothelaterWittgenstein’s

attack.Russellclaimedthatlanguagecouldbereducedtoprimaryelementsthat

formthebasicbuildingblocksoflanguage,andwhich,whenarrangedincertain

ways,correspondtocertainstatesofaffairs.17Theseprimaryelements,or“genuine

names,”arewordsthathaveanunmediatedandthereforenecessaryconnectionto

theirreferents.Theyarenotopentointerpretationortovariationsinmeaning

dependingontheircontext.Russellattemptedtoreducelanguagetotheseprimary

elementsandthenarrangethemtocorrespondisomorphicallywithobjectsinthe

world,withthegoalofproducingaperfectrepresentationoflanguageandthe

world.

Thisattempttodescribeanimmediateconnectionbetweenwordsand

referents,todigdownandfindthebasicconstituentsoflanguage,islessmystical

thanFregeansense,butnolessPlatonic,sinceforgenuinenamestobegenuine,

16RemarksontheFoundationsofMathematics.Trans.G.E.M.Anscombe.CambridgeMA:MITPress,1983,Book6§49.17In“OnDenoting,”Russellargues,contrarytoFrege,thatnameshaveanunmediatedreferencetothings.That“HesperusisPhosphorus”hasadifferentmeaningthan“HesperusisHesperus”revealsonlythat“Hesperus”and“Phosphorus”arenotgenuinenames.Thattheyseemlikenamesmerelyillustratesthatourlanguagerequiresfurtherphilosophicalanalysistodistinguishtruefromfalsenames.IntheTractatusWittgensteinadoptedRussell’sviewoftherelationshipbetweenwordsandtheirreferents.“OnDenoting,”Mind.NewSeries.Volume14(56),1905,479‐493.

48

accordingtoRussell,theycannotbebrokendownintosimplerparts;theycannotbe

analyzedfurther.Butifthereisaperfectisomorphismbetweennamesandobjects,

thentheobjectstowhichthenamesrefercannotbebrokendownintosimplerparts

eitherwithoutthecorrespondingnamelosingsense,andthisisobviouslyfalse.

TakingWittgenstein’sexample,wecansaythat“Excalibur”isapropernamethat

referstoanobjectconsistingofpartscombinedinaparticularway,andthatifthe

partsarecombineddifferentlythenExcaliburdoesnotexist.But,asWittgenstein

writes,“itisclearthatthesentence“Excaliburhasasharpblade”makessense

whetherExcaliburisintactornot”(§44).Similarly,whensomeonewithaname

dies(Mr.N),thebearerofthenamediesbutthemeaningdoesnot.Russelltriedto

avoidtheseproblemsbyclaimingthatnameslike“Mr.N”and“Excalibur”arenot

genuinenames.Heeventuallyconcludedthattheonlygenuinenames,theonly

namesthatconnectedimmediatelywithitsreferent,arethedemonstratives“this”

and“that,”sincetheirmeaningisalwaysfixedintheparticularcontextinwhich

theyareused.

HereitbecomesclearthatRussellistryingtodescribelanguageashethinks

itmustbe–logical,simple,brokendownintodiscreteunits,freeofcontingency–

ratherthanhowitactuallyisusedeveryday.Wittgensteincriticizesthisattemptto

makelanguagelogicallyperfectas“atendencytosublimethelogicofourlanguage”

(§38)–atendencytoaccountforlanguagebyfirsttransformingitintosomethingit

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isnot,somethingsupposedlymore“genuine.”18Wesawthistendencytosublime

earlierwithrespecttotheshiftfromwhatAugustineactuallysaystothe

Augustinianpictureoflanguage.Russell,theTractatus,Socrates’sThaetetus–all

worksthatcorrespondtothispicture–explainlanguagebytransformingitinto

somethingitisnot.AsWittgensteinwrites,“thecrystallinepurityoflogicwas,of

course,notaresultofinvestigation:itwasarequirement”(§107).19Rathertryingto

understandhowlanguageactuallyworks,thesephilosopherstrytomakeitfittheir

pre‐establishedviewofhowitmustbe.Theythereforeendedupwithadistorted

viewoftheverythingtheysoughttoexplain.

Itiseasytoseeinretrospect,andwiththehelpofWittgenstein’slater

writings,howRussell,FregeandWittgenstein’sTractatuswerecaptivetoa

particularpictureoflanguage(cf.§115).Butwhatseducesusintothispictureinthe

firstplaceistheseeminglyinnocuousleapWittgensteinmakesin§1–thesameleap

hewarnsagainstin§6–fromtheobservationthatwelearnwordsostensivelytoa

moregeneraltheoryoflanguage;fromtheobservationthatostensiveteaching

establishesanassociationbetweenawordandathingtoafocusonthenatureof

18“Sublime”canbeinterpretedintwoways:intheRomantic,aestheticsense,asarealmofbeautyaccessibletoaprivilegedfew,orinthesenseof“sublimation,”thescientificprocessbywhichasolidturnstoagaswithoutaliquidphase.ThesecondreadingismoreconsistentwiththeGermanoriginal(Wittgensteinusessublimierenrathererhaben),aswellasthethrustofhiscritique.ForaRomanticreadingofWittgenstein’ssublime,seeStanleyCavell,ThisNewYetUnapproachableAmerica:LecturesAfterEmersonAfterWittgenstein.Albuquerque:LivingBranchPress,1989.19“Forwecanavoidineptnessoremptinessinourassertionsonlybypresentingthemodelaswhatitis…notasapreconceivedideatowhichrealitymustcorrespond.(Thedogmatismintowhichwefallsoeasilyindoingphilosophy.)”(§PI131)

50

thisassociation.Thisleap,combinedwiththeideathatlanguagemustbeacertain

way(logical,systematic)leadstoastandoffbetweenskepticismandPlatonism,

eachonefeedingtheother:thatwelearnsomewordsostensivelyleadsustoinsist

thatthereisacontext‐independentassociationbetweenthewordandathing,and

theskeptic’slegitimatequestioningofthisassociationpushesustolookharder,dig

deeper,developincreasinglyelaborateandsophisticatedexplanationsforit.But

theseexplanationsonlytakeusfartherawayfromwhatwearetryingtoexplain.

They“surroundtheworkingsoflanguagewithahazethatmakesclearvision

impossible”(§5).AndasBerkeleyremindsus,itisahazethatwecreatedourselves.

1.4.Mentalism

WeneednotpositaPlatonicorotherworldlyobjectinordertostopthe

regressofinterpretations.Itcouldbethatwhatenablesustounderstandaword,to

connectthewordtoitsreferent,isthatwedevelopamentalimageoftheobjectin

questionwhenweheartheword,eveniftheobjectisnotpresent.Onthisview,

correctlyinterpretinganostensivedefinition,understandingit,isamatterofhaving

therightmentalimage.ThisnotionisimpliedbytheAugustinianpicture:welearn

toassociateaparticularwordwithacorrespondingobject,andamentalimageof

thatobjectisthenstoredinourmemory.Thestoredmentalimagecomestoserve

asastandard,orrule,againstwhichwechecktheuseofaword.Thismentalimage

stopstheregressofinterpretationswhileavoidingthemetaphysicalbaggageof

Platonism.

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Consider,forinstance,usingandunderstandingawordlike"cube."Inmost

cases"cube"referstoathree‐dimensional,six‐sidedstructure.Welearntheword

byassociatingthesoundwiththeobjectinquestion.Wesubsequentlyuseor

understandtheword,evenintheabsenceoftheobject,bybringingtominda

mentalimageofacube.This“bringingtomind”isjustwhatunderstandingthe

word“cube”amountsto.Wittgenstein’snarratorexpressesthispoint:

Butweunderstandthemeaningofawordwhenwehearorsayit;wegraspit

inaflash,andwhatwegraspissurelysomethingdifferentfromthe'use'

whichisextendedintime!...Whensomeonesaystheword'cube'tome,for

example,Iknowwhatitmeans.(§138‐139)

Thatweunderstandtheword"cube”whenwehearit,evenifwehearit

independentlyofotherwords,seemstoshowthatthemeaningof“cube”liesnotin

itsuse,butsomewhereinourminds."Whatreallycomesbeforeourmindwhenwe

understandaword”theinterlocutorasks,"Isn'titsomethinglikeapicture?Can'tit

beapicture?"(§139).Thequestionimpliesnotjustthatapictureoftheobject

comesbeforeourmindswhenweheartheword,butthatthispictureisthe

understanding.Itimpliesthatwithoutthecorrectmentalpicturewecouldnot

understandtheword.

Onthisview,understandingisatwo‐stepprocess:onceweheartheword

"cube,”wedevelopamentalimageofacube,andthisimagethencompelsusto

pointtoacube(andnot,say,atriangularprism).Oncethementalimageisformed,

thenextstep,thecorrespondenceofimagetoobject,followsautomatically.Thereis

52

nopossibilityofmisapplication.Wittgenstein’sskepticchallengesthenecessityof

thesecondstep.Heacceptsthatamentalpicturemaycomebeforeourmindwhen

weheartheword,buthedeniesthefurtherimplicationthatthismentalpictureis

theunderstanding.Itisentirelypossiblethatwhenweheartheword“cube”we

formamentalimageofacubeandneverthelesspointtoatriangularprism."Ihave

purposelysochosentheexamplethatitisquiteeasytoimagineamethodof

projectionaccordingtowhichthepicturedoesfit.Thepictureofthecubedid

indeedsuggestacertainusetous,butitwaspossibleformetouseitdifferently"

(§139).Developingthecorrectmentalimageofacubedoesnotnecessitatethatwe

pointtoacube,orusethewordinacertainway,anymorethanthesound“cube”

itself.Positingamentalimageasthesourceofmeaningmerelypositssomeinner,

hidden,mentalphenomenainsteadofanouterone.Eachisassusceptibletoerror

astheother.

Why,then,dowesoresorttoinnerprocessestoexplainouterphenomena?

Thereason,ItakeWittgensteintosay,isthatwearelookingforsomethingimmune

toskepticismwhichconnectsthewordtoitsreferent.Themereactofspeakingis

susceptibletoskepticism,tomisunderstanding,evenwhenitseems,atfirstglance,

tobesuccessful.Sowesearchforsomethingdeeper,somethingunderlyingour

ordinaryresponseswhichestablishesthatwehavereallyunderstood.Butsimply

positingsomethingdeeperdoesnotmakethatthinganylessimmunetoskepticism.

NeitheramentalimagenormymemoryguaranteesthatwhenIheartheword

“cube”Ipointtoacubeandnotaprismanymorethantheobservablebehaviorthat

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weordinarilyassociatewithunderstanding.

Wemightbeinclinedtoask:Whatifthereisanactual,physiologicalprocess

goingonbeneathourskineverytimewereallyunderstandsomething,aprocess

whichsciencehasyettodiscover?WhyisWittgensteinrejectingeventhe

possibilityoffindingit?Wittgenstein’sskepticexpressespreciselythispoint:

Butisn’tthatonlybecauseofourtooslightacquaintancewithwhatgoeson

inthebrainandthenervoussystem?Ifwehadamoreaccurateknowledge

ofthesethingsweshouldseewhatconnectionsareestablishedbythe

training,andthenweshouldbeabletosaywhenwelookedintohisbrain:

“Nowhehasreadthisword,nowthereadingconnectionhasbeensetup.”

(§158)

Thisviewiscommontodayamongscientistsandphilosophers.Aidedby

advancementsinneuro‐imaging,recentstudieshaveshownthatwecanmap

linguisticabilitytocertainregionsofthebrain.20Whatif,usingafunctional

magneticresonanceimagingmachinethatmapsbrainactivity,wecouldshowthat,

allotherthingsbeingequal,everytimeadultnativespeakersofEnglishusethe

word“cube”acertainregionofthebrain,perhapsevenoneparticularneural

pathway,showsamarkedincreaseinactivity.Imaginefurtherthatoncethisneural

pathwayiscut,thesameadultslosetheabilitytounderstandtheword“cube.”

20JeffreyR.Binder,JulieA.Frost,ThomasA.Hammeke,RobertW.Cox,StephenM.Rao,andThomasPrieto,“HumanBrainLanguageAreasIdentifiedbyFunctionalMagneticResonanceImaging.”JournalofNeuroscience.Volume17,Number1,January1997pp.353‐362.

54

Whenaskedtopointtoacube,theypointtoatriangularprismorsomeotherobject.

Wouldthisnotshowthatunderstandingtheword“cube”isafunctionofthis

particularphysicalprocess?Inthiscase,couldwenotdeterminewhetherachild

understandsanostensivedefinitionof“cube”bytestingwhetherthissameneural

pathwayshowstheappropriateamountofincreasedactivity?

Thereisnodoubtthatinordertounderstandlanguageoneneedstohave

certainphysicalprocessesinworkingorder.Butthesephysicalprocessesare

necessary,notsufficient,forunderstanding.Wecanimagineascenarioinwhicha

childistoldtopointtoacubeandthesameneuralpathwayshowsincreased

activity,buthepointstoatriangularprisminstead.Whatthisshowsisthatevenif

thereisaparticularmentalprocesswhichoccurswheneversomeoneunderstandsa

particularword,thisprocessdoesnotconstitutewhatwecallunderstanding.Itis,

atmost,oneaspectofit.

AndthisiswhatWittgensteinisrejecting:notthepossibilitythatamental

(orphysical)processaccompaniesourvarioususesoflanguage,buttheimplication

thatsuchaprocessistheunderstanding.“ForevensupposingIhadfound

somethingthathappenedinallthosecasesofunderstanding,”Wittgensteinwrites,

…whyshoulditbetheunderstanding?Andhowcantheprocessof

understandinghavebeenhidden,whenIsaid,“NowIunderstand”becauseI

understood?AndifIsayitishidden–thenhowdoIknowwhatIhaveto

lookfor?(§158)

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Wittgensteinisnotrejectingtheideathattherearementalprocessesatwork.Heis

rejectingthepictureoflanguage,ofourselves,andofphilosophy,throughwhichwe

approachthequestion.Thispictureleadsustobelievethatthereissomething

deeper,somethingunderlyingourordinaryexpressionsandpractices,which

guaranteestheirsuccess;somethingwhichinsuresmeaningandunderstandingand

refutesskepticism.

“Theessenceishiddenfromus”:thisistheformourproblemnowassumes.

Weask:“Whatislanguage?”,“Whatisaproposition?”Andtheanswerhasto

begivenonceandforall,independentlyofanyfutureexperience.(PI§92)

Thispictureleadsustolocateeverydayphenomenainhiddenprocesses,orin

mysterious“thirdrealms,”orinPlatonicobjects,ratherthansimplydescribingwhat

weseeorfeelwhenthephenomenainquestionoccur.Weareseducedintotothis

picturebytheskeptic,whochallengesustofindsomethingirreducibletofurther

interpretation,whetherPlatonicormental.

Insteadofpositingsomethinghiddenasthesourceofwhatwearelooking

for,Wittgensteinsuggeststhatwesimplylookcloselyatwhathappensonthe

surface.“Trynottothinkofunderstandingasa‘mentalprocess’atall….Butask

yourself:inwhatsortofcase,inwhatkindofcircumstances,dowesay,‘NowIknow

howtogoon.’”(§154).Listingthesevariouscircumstancesprovidesapictureof

whatcountsas“understanding.”Therearemanydifferentthingswecountas

“havingunderstoodsomething,”noneofwhichinsurethattheunderstandingin

questionispermanent.Thispictureisnomoresusceptibletoskepticismthana

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hiddenmentalprocess.Todeterminewhethersomeonecorrectlyunderstands

somethingornot,weneedtoseewhatactuallyhappensonthesurface,asitwere,

whensomeoneunderstandssomething.Perhapshesays,“NowIunderstand”and

hisactionsconformtothoseweexpectfromsomeonewhounderstands.Thisdoes

notguaranteeunderstanding(hemightstillthinkheunderstandswhenheactually

doesnot)butneitherdoespositingahiddenprocess.

Myclaim,inthepreviousparagraph,that“todeterminewhethersomeone

correctlyunderstandssomethingweneedtoseewhathappenswhensomething

understandssomething,”soundscircular.Don’tweneedtofirstestablishwhat

“understanding”isbeforewecansaywhethersomeonehasunderstoodornot?

Otherwise,arewenotsimplyadoptinganuncritical,ordinaryconceptionof

understanding?HerewebegintoseeakeyaspectofWittgenstein’sapproachto

philosophy,onewhichIexploreindetailinthefollowingchapter:Wittgenstein

believesthatourordinary,uncriticalusesofwordsandconceptsareadequate.Such

wordsandconceptsdonotfirstrequirephilosophicaljustificationinordertobe

meaningfullyused.Inordertoevenaskthequestion,“Doesthechildcorrectly

understandtheostensivedefinition?”weneedtoalreadyhavesomeideaofwhat

understandingmeans.Thisideaissimplytheonethatweuse,unreflectively,inour

dailylives.

IntheBlueBookWittgensteinusestwoexamplestoillustratethesuperfluity

oftheideathatunderstandingisaninnerprocess.Hisanswertothequestionof

howweacquirelanguagebeginstoemergehere.

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SupposeIteachsomeonetheuseoftheword“yellow”byrepeatedlypointing

toayellowpatchandpronouncingtheword.OnanotheroccasionImake

himapplywhathehaslearntbygivinghimtheorder,“chooseayellowball

outofthisbag.”Whatwasitthathappenedwhenheobeyedmyorder?Isay

“possiblyjustthis:heheardmywordsandtookayellowballfromthebag.”

Nowyoumaybeinclinedtothinkthatthiscouldn’tpossiblyhavebeenall;

andthekindofthingthatyouwouldsuggestisthatheimaginedsomething

yellowwhenheunderstoodtheorder,andthenchoseaballaccordingtohis

image.ToseethatthisisnotnecessaryrememberthatIcouldhavegiven

himtheorder,“Imagineayellowpatch.”Wouldyoustillbeinclinedto

assumethathefirstimaginesayellowpatch,justunderstandingmyorder,

andthenimaginesayellowpatchtomatchthefirst?(BlueBook12)

And,similarly:

IfIgivesomeonetheorder“fetchmearedflowerfromthatmeadow,”howis

hesupposedtoknowwhatsortofflowertobring?Nowtheanswerone

mightsuggestfirstisthathewenttolookforaredflowercarryingared

imageinhismind,andcomparingitwiththeflowerstoseewhichofthem

hadthecolorofthatimage.Nowthereissuchawayofsearching,anditis

notatallessentialthattheimageweuseshouldbeamentalone.Infactthe

processmaybethis:Icarryachartcoordinatingnamesandcoloredsquares.

WhenIheartheorder“fetchmeetc.”Idrawmyfingeracrossthechartfrom

theword“red”toacertainsquare,andIgoandlookforaflowerwhichhas

thesamecolorasthesquare.Butthisisnottheonlywayofsearchingandit

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isnottheusualway.Wego,lookaboutus,walkuptoaflowerandpickit,

withoutcomparingittoanything.(BlueBook3)

Wittgensteiniseffectivelyasking:Whypositamentalprocessinthefirstplace?

Whypresume,whenaskedwhathappenswhenweareaskedtofetcharedflower,

thatsomethinginsideusisresponsibleforfetchingaredflower?Whynotpresume

thatthecause,thesource,istherequesttofetchtheflower,andourwillingnessto

abidebysucharequest?

Theideathatoureverydayuseoflanguageistheresultofaninnerprocess

stemsfromourperceptionofourselvesasprimarilyrational,cognitivebeings;as

beingsthatthinkbeforetheyact.Thisiswhatdistinguishesusfromanimals,who

actinstinctively,withoutforesightorreflection.IsWittgensteindenyingthis?No.

Whathedeniesisthatinallaspectsofourlives,includingthemostfundamental

aspects,weareprimarilyrational,cognitivebeings.Indeedthelessonof

Wittgenstein’scriticismoftheAugustinianpictureisnotjustofthepictureof

languageitoffers,butalsoitspictureofourselves–ofthekindsofbeingswetake

ourselvestobe.ImplicitintheAugustinianpictureistheideathatthehuman,

particularlythehumanbrain,islikeahighlyadvancedmachinethatinputsvarious

data(wordscorrespondingtoobjects)aswemovethroughtheworld,encountering

sounds,objects,andcircumstances.Thismachinethenstoresthisdatainour

memory,andprocessesitasoutput(language)aswecarryonintheworld.Partof

theappealofthispictureisthatitexplainshowwehandlethemillionsofpossible

permutationsandcombinationsofwordsavailableinourlanguage.Onthispicture,

thefallibilityofourlanguageinthemostquotidiancircumstances(ourslipsof

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tongue,ourtendencytospeakatcross‐purposes,ortostumbleoverourwords)are

eitherinstanceswhichshowthatourbrainsarenotadvancedenough,thatthey

requiregreaterinputorcapacity,ormomentswherethecomplexityofthedatahas

causedamomentarylapse,likewhenacomputerstallswhileprocessingalarge

download.Onthispicture,whatwesaywhenismerelyafunctionofwhathas

previouslybeeninputted.Theout‐putisautomatic.

Thispictureisappealing,butitstillleavesopenthequestionofwhat

constitutescorrectinterpretationorunderstanding,anditdoesnotexplainhowwe

interpretanostensivedefinitiononewayratherthananother.Inplaceofthis

picture,Wittgensteinwantstoconceiveoftheabilitytocommunicatewitheach

otherasanabilityborneoutinpracticesratherthaninnerprocesses.The

possibilityofendlessinterpretationsonlyappearstobeaproblemifwehavea

certainpictureofwhatunderstandingsomethingis–thatis,ifwethinkof

understandinglanguageasacognitiveachievement.Thefactthatweunderstand

ostensivedefinitions,despitethethreatofskepticism,shows“thatthereisawayof

graspingarulewhichisnotaninterpretation,butwhichisexhibitedinwhatwecall

‘obeyingtherule’and‘goingagainstit’inactualcases”(§201).Thisdoesnotrefute

skepticism.Butitsuggeststhatwehavebeenpursuingthequestioninthewrong

way.Wehavenotjustadoptedacertainpictureoflanguage,butacertainpictureof

whatitmeansforhumanbeingstolearn,understand,andspeak.

Wittgensteinwantstoimpressonusthatinmostcircumstancesusing

languageisnotacognitiveachievement;itispartofwhatitmeanstobehuman.At

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timeshestrikesadeeplynaturalistictoneindescribingthishumancapacityfor

language:

Iwanttoregardmanhereasananimal;asaprimitivebeingtowhichone

grantsinstinctbutnotratiocination.Asacreatureinaprimitivestate.Any

logicgoodenoughforaprimitivemeansofcommunicationneedsnoapology

fromus.Languagedidnotemergefromsomekindofratiocination.(OC

§475).

Wordsareconnectedwiththeprimitive,thenatural,expressionsofthe

sensationandusedintheirplace.Achildhashurthimselfandhecries;and

thenadultstalktohimandteachhimexclamationsand,later,sentences.

Theyteachthechildnewpainbehavior.(Investigations§244)

Inthesequotationsonedetectsbothanaturalist(“wordsareconnectedwiththe

primitive”)andaconventionaliststrain(“adults…teachthechildnewpain

behavior”),butneitherencompasseswhatWittgensteinisafter.21Tocall

Wittgensteinaconventionalististosuggestthathehasatheoryoflanguageas

conventional.ButWittgensteinrejectstheconventionalistpremisethatwelearnor

tacitlyagreethatcertainwordswillhavecertainmeanings.Newusesandmeanings

ofwordsariseinallkindsofcontexts,usesandmeaningswhichwesimplycouldnot

21FormoreonthedifficultyofapplyingeitheroftheselabelstoWittgenstein,seeStanleyCavell’schapter,“TheNaturalandtheConventional”inhisClaimofReason.

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havelearnedoragreeduponbeforehand,eventacitly.22AndyetWittgenstein’s

focusontrainingandconditioningindividualsintoformsoflife,andhisopennessto

thepossibilityofskepticism,illustratethatheisnotsimplysayingthathumanshave

aninnatecapacityforlanguagethatguaranteesmeaningandunderstanding.There

isstillthequestionofwhatwedowiththiscapacityintheparticularcircumstances

inwhichwefindourselves.

ItmayseemherethatinavoidingthetwinpolesofPlatonismandskepticism

–theScyllaandCharybdisoftraditionalphilosophy–Wittgensteinhasendedupin

anevenworseposition:dogmatism.Inrespondingtothequestionofhowwelearn

ostensivelywiththeanswer,“Wesimplydo,”insuggestingthatinsteadofsearching

forthesourceofunderstandingwesimplylookatthevariousthingswecountas

understanding,andininsistingthatwestayonthesurfaceofthingsratherthan

plumbtheirdepths,Wittgensteinseemstoberejectingphilosophyinfavorof

common‐sense.IntherestofthischapterandthenextItrytoshowthatthis

responseisnotdogmatic;thatthereismoredepthtothisresponsethanitfirst

implies.ButfirstIwanttoexamineonelastattempttoresolvetheparadoxfrom

withintheAugustinianpictureoflanguage.

1.5.Conventionalism

22Isaymoreaboutconventionalismbelow.

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Conventionalismseemslikeanidealsolutiontotheparadoxofostension.23

ConventionalismavoidsthemystificationsofPlatonismandmentalismwhile

rebuttingtheskeptic:wearejustifiedinusingwordsaswedobecauseweare

trainedtodoso.Ifwedidnotadheretothistrainingwewouldnotbeableto

communicatewithothersintheworld,andthisaloneissufficienttoinsureour

adherence.Onthisview,thefactthatwedonotvariouslyinterpretostensive

definitionsisnotafunctionofaPlatonicormentalconnectionbetweenwordand

object,itisafunctionofthesocialnecessitybywhichwearelinkedtoothers.

Conventionalismisappealingformanyreasons.Itstopstheregressof

interpretationswithoutpositingamysteriousPlatonicfactorhiddenprocess.It

doesnotpresupposeanineffable,logicalstructureunderlyinglanguage.Andit

appearstoinvolvealesscognitive,moresocialandpracticalconceptionoflanguage

thanPlatonismormentalism.Furthermore,Wittgensteindoesnotreject

conventionalism,ashedoesPlatonismandmentalism.Itisunsurprising,then,that

23ThelinguistictheoryofFerdinanddeSaussureisoneexampleofaconventionalisttheoryoflanguage.AccordingtoSaussure,theconnectionbetweenawordandaconcept–whathecallsthesignifierandsignified–isarbitrary.Thisisevidentinthefactthatdifferentlanguageshavedifferentwordsforthesameobject.Membersofalinguisticcommunitytacitlyagreetousecertainsoundstorefertocertainobjectsorideas,andthistacitagreementfunctionsasakindofsocialcontract,insuringthatcommunicationdoesnotbreakdown.ForSaussure,learningalanguageisstillamatteroflearningnames;theprimaryfunctionofwhichistorefertoconcepts;andoncewelearnaname,welearnhowtouseit.Onthisviewoflanguage,thereissomethingcommontoallthevariousinstantiationsofaword:ameaningarbitrarilydefinedbythelinguisticcommunity.ThisaccountissusceptibletoWittgenstein’sinitialcritiqueoftheAugustinianpicture.ForSaussure,learningalanguageisstillamatteroflearningnames,theprimaryfunctionofwhichistorefertoconcepts;andoncewelearnaname,weknowhowtouseit.

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severalreaderstakeWittgensteintoadvocateconventionalism.24

ThemostprominentconventionalistreadingofWittgensteinisSaul

Kripke’s.25InthefirsthalfofhisbookKripkepresentsthebasicproblemofthe

Investigations.Theproblem,forallrelevantpurposes,isthesameproblemthatI

havealreadypresented:theskeptichaschallengedustoexplainhowtointerpretor

understandarule(anostensivedefinition),andwecannotseemtoprovidean

interpretationthatprecludesfurtherinterpretation.Kripkedevotesthesecondhalf

24SeeforinstanceDavidBloor,Wittgenstein:ASocialTheoryofKnowledge.NewYork:ColumbiaUP,1983.Othersattributearelated,nominalistviewtoWittgenstein.Thisapparentnominalismisstrongestin§57‐59.ThereWittgensteinusestheexampleofthecolorterm“red”tohighlightthetemptationtoconfusemetaphysicalquestionsaboutwhethertermsstandforobjectsexistingaprioriintheworldwithconsiderationsthatliemorewiththenatureofthelanguageweusetoexpresssuchinquiry.Thatis,heasksustodistinguishbetween“Redexists”asastatementaboutwhat“red”refersto,andastatementabouthowweusetheterm“red.”Wittgensteinisappealingtoabackgroundofphilosophicaldisagreementoverthequestionoftherealityofuniversals.Fortherealist,universals(like“red”)existindependentlyoftheirvariousinstantiations(thatis,thepossessionofthatpropertybyanobject).Forthenominalist,thereisnothingwhichcanbesaidtoexistoverandabovetheobjectsthathavetheproperty.WeshouldbewaryofsuggestingthatWittgenstein’sapparentanti‐realismamountstomorethanareminderoferror:itisnotanendorsementofnominalism.

Nevertheless,somescholars,namelyMichaelDummettandCrispinWright,haveusedWittgenstein’sargumentsagainstrealismasthebasisoftheirownanti‐realistphilosophies.SeeDummett’sTheLogicalBasisofMetaphysics.Cambridge:HarvardUP,1991,andWright’sRailstoInfinity.Cambridge:HarvardUP,2001.25WittgensteinonRulesandPrivateLanguage.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUP,1982.KripkewritesthathisbookisnotdesignedtogiveanaccurateaccountofWittgenstein'sviews,butratheranaccountofWittgenstein'sargument"asitstruck[him],asitpresentedaproblemfor[him]"(5).However,KripkedoessaythatWittgensteinbelievesthattheparadoxrequiressomekindofsolution.Seemyfootnote28below.

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ofhisbooktoarticulatingwhathecallsWittgenstein’s“solution”totheproblem.26

Thesolution,Kripkesays,liesinthedistinctionbetweentheindividual,considered

inisolation,andtheindividualconsideredaspartofalargercommunity.Kripke

takesWittgensteintoagreewiththeskepticthatthereisnofactthatmakesone

interpretationoftherulecorrectorincorrect.Consideredinisolation–thatis,not

justbeingalone,buthavingneverbeensocialized–theindividualcannotappealto

anysuchfacttohelphercorrectlyfollowarule.“Ifsofarweareright,”Kripke

writes,“arulehasnocontent/isnon‐bindingforanisolatedindividual.Butifwe

widenourgazetothecommunity,thentherewillbejustificationconditions”(89).

Asamemberofacommunitywitharelativelyuniformpracticeoffollowingrules,

theindividualcanbetrainedtodistinguishcorrectfromincorrectapplications.

Insteadofsearchingforanobjectivefact,immunetofurtherinterpretation,which

givesourwordsafixedmeaningandnecessitatessomeanswersratherthanothers,

weneedonlylookaroundusatthecommunityinwhichwelive.Ourpracticesare

justified(ornot)bythecommunityinwhichtheytakeplace.

AndforKripke,hereinliesthesignificanceofWittgenstein’sconceptsof

agreementandformsoflife.Wittgensteininvokestheseconceptsatvariouskey

26AsImentionintheintroduction,KripkeassumesthatWittgenstein“doesnotwishtoleaveuswiththisproblem,buttosolveit,”since“theskepticalconclusionisinsaneandintolerable”(60).Thisassumptionisnotobvious.Infact,thisassumptionrendersKripke’saccountofWittgenstein’ssolutionflawed.AsIhavesuggested,Wittgensteinagreeswiththeskepticthatmeaningandunderstandingarenotimmunetoskepticism,butherejectsthefurtherinferencethatwearenotthereforejustifiedinusinglanguageaswedo.

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pointsintheInvestigationstoexplainhowachildlearnslanguage.Kripkereads

themasindicationsofWittgenstein’sconventionalism:

Thesetofresponsesinwhichweagree,andthewaytheyinterweavewith

ouractivities,isourformoflife.Beingswhoagreedinconsistentlygiving

bizarre…responseswouldshareadifferentformoflife.Bydefinition,such

anotherformoflifewouldbebizarreandincomprehensibletous.(Kripke

96)

ForKripke,Wittgenstein’sappealtoformsoflifeandagreementaremeanttoshow

thecentralityofthecommunityindeterminingmeaningandunderstanding.

Agreementamongmembersofacommunityprovidesthestandardbywhichthey

candistinguishcorrectfromincorrectinterpretationsofarule.Onthisreading,

whatstopstheregressofinterpretationsisthethreatofnotbeingableto

communicatewiththemembersofone’scommunity.

However,Wittgensteindoesnotusetheconceptsof“agreement”or“formsof

life”toindicateatacitsocialcontractamongmembersofalinguisticcommunity.He

distinguishesbetweentwokindsofagreement.Theinterlocutorofthe

Investigationsespousesthefirst:“Soyouaresayingthathumanagreementdecides

whatistrueandwhatisfalse?”(§241).ThisisthenotionofagreementthatKripke

uses.Wittgensteinrespondswithadifferentnotion:

Itiswhathumanbeingssaythatistrueandfalse;andtheyagreeinthe

languagetheyuse.Thatisnotagreementinopinions,butinformsoflife.

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Iflanguageistobeameansofcommunicationtheremustbeagreementnot

onlyindefinitionsbutalso(queerasthismaysound)injudgments.This

seemstoabolishlogic,butdoesnotdoso.–Itisonethingtodescribe

methodsofmeasurement.Butwhatwecall“measuring”ispartly

determinedbyacertainconstancyinresultsofmeasurement.(§241)

Wittgensteindistinguishesbetweentwolevelsofagreement.Thefirst,agreement

inopinions,isamatterofconvention:membersofaparticularsocietydecideto

agreeonsomethings(toelectsoandso;tobuildschools;tohaveawritten

constitution).Thesecond,agreementinformsoflife,isnotconventionalinthe

sameway.Weagreethatcertainactivitiescountas“feeding”andothersdonot,that

certainthingscountas“chairs”whileothersdonot,butthenatureofthisagreement

isdifferent:itisnotsomethingwedecidedtoagreeon,norisitsomethingwecan

change.Wedonotdecideonthemeaningsofourwordsanymorethanwedecide

wherewearebornortowhom.Thereisapossibleworldinwhichtheword“feed”

or“chair”referstosomethingotherthanitdoesforus,andwhilethisshowsthat

ourlanguageiscontingentinonesense,itisnotcontingentinanother.27Our

languageisconventionalorarbitraryinthesensethatitcouldhavebeenotherwise;

27Talkofpossibleworldsraisesthedifficultquestionofwhetherweconceiveofaworldwithradicallydifferentconceptsthanourown.Some,likeBernardWilliams,arguethatWittgensteinaimstoshowthatwecannot.“WittgensteinandIdealism,”UnderstandingWittgenstein.Ed.GeorgeVesey.Ithica,NY:CornellUP,1976.MichaelForsterchallengesthisreadinginhisWittgensteinontheArbitrarinessofGrammar.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUP,2004.Itouchonthisissueinchaptertwosectionthree.

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inthesensethatthereisnopermanent,logicalstructurekeepingitasitis.Butitis

notarbitraryinthesensethatitiscapriciousoreasilychanged.28

Andhereinliesoneproblemwithcallinglanguage“conventional’:itfailsto

accountforthenecessityinherentinourlanguage.Wittgensteinalludestothis

pointwhenhewritesthathisnotionofagreement“seemstoabolishlogic,butdoes

notso.”Thisnecessityisnottheusualkind.Itisnotlogical.StanleyCavell

illustratesthenatureofthisnecesssityinhisessay“MustWeMeanWhatWeSay.”29

Toborrowhisexample:IfanativespeakerofEnglishasks,withoutanyspecial

reasonfordoingso,“Doyoudressthatwayvoluntarily?”andifyouareanative

speakerofEnglish,thenyouwillbemadetofeelawkwardordefensive,regardless

ofhisintention(9).Thegrammarofthephrasenecessitatesacertainimplication

beyondthedictionarydefinitionofthewordsinthesentence.Tonotfeelthiswayis

tonotunderstandthequestion.Itistonotknowthemeaningoftheword

28Wittgensteinwrites:“Therulesofgrammarmaybecalled“arbitrary,”ifthatistomeanthattheaimofthegrammarisnothingbutthatofthelanguage”(PI§497).“Grammarconsistsofconventions.”PhilosophicalGrammar.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.§138.SeealsoPG§133:“Grammarisnotaccountabletoanyreality.Itisgrammaticalrulesthatdeterminemeaning(constituteit)andsotheythemselvesarenotanswerabletoanymeaningandtothatextentarearbitrary.”AndZettel§331:“…sayingthattherulesofgrammararearbitraryisdirectedagainstthepossibilityofthisjustificaiton,whichisconstructedonthemodelofjustifyingasentencebywhatverifiesit.”

29“MustWeMeanWhatWeSay?”MustWeMeanWhatWeSay?SecondEdition.CambridgeUP,2002,1‐43.

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“voluntarily”asitishereused.30Tolearnalanguagemeanstolearnwhatone’s

wordsmustmeanintheparticularcircumstancesinwhichtheyareuttered,andnot

justthedictionarydefinitionsofwords.Thismustisnotthe“hardnessofthelogical

must”thatWittgensteinspeaksofwithrespecttoPlatonism(Remarksonthe

FoundationsofMathematics,Book6§49).Butitisalsonotmerelyamatterof

convention.

SoWittgensteindoesnotbelievethatlanguageisconventionalintheusual

sense.Theusualnotionofconventionoragreementdoesnotcapturethenecessity

inherentinourlanguage.ButIhavenotshownthatWittgenstein’snotionof

agreement,whichdoescapturethisnecessity,isnotasolutiontotheparadoxwe

havebeentryingtosolve.Infact,itseemstoofferasolution.Itseemsthatwhat

Wittgensteincalls“agreementinformsoflife”maybewhatenablesthechildto

correctlyinterpretanostensivedefinition.

Thereissomethingrightaboutthisresponse.AsIwillargueshortly,

Wittgenstein’snotionsofagreementandformsoflifearecentraltounderstanding

hisconceptionofhowweacquirelanguage.Butthisnotionofagreementdoesnot

simplysolvetheskepticalparadox.Foronething,thisnotionisstillfuzzy.Invoking

30Wittgensteinwasnotalwayssensitivetothevarietyofmeaningsofourwords.FaniaPascal,oneofWittgenstein’s(few)friends,recountsthefollowingstoryfromtheirtimeinCambridgeinthe1930s:

IhadmytonsilsoutandwasintheEvelynNursingHomefeelingsorryformyself.Wittgensteincalled.Icroaked:"Ifeeljustlikeadogthathasbeenrunover."Hewasdisgusted:"Youdon'tknowwhatadogthathasbeenrunoverfeelslike."(quotedinHarryFrankfurt,OnBullshit,PrincetonNJ:PrincetonUP,2005,page12).

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itnowistosimplystipulatethatWittgenstein’syettobeexplainednotionof

agreementisimmunetofurtherinterpretationandstopstheregressof

interpretations,withoutactuallyexplaininghowthisoccurs.Inthisrespectitisnot

unlikeresortingtoPlatonismormentalism.

Indeedthereasonwhyconventionalism,whetherintheKripkeanor

Wittgensteiniansense,isnotasolutiontotheskepticalparadoxissimilartothe

reasonwhyPlatonismandmentalismarenotsolutions.Theyallpartakeinthe

Augustinianpictureoflanguage.Theyallpresumethatthereissomethingcommon

tothevarioususesofaword,otherthantheworditself,thatmandatesthatweuse

thatwordandnotanotherinparticularcircumstances.31ForthePlatonist,this

somethingisthePlatonicobject,existingoutsidespaceandtime.Forthementalist,

itisaninnerprocess,hiddeninsideourbody.Fortheconventionalist,itissocial

convention,howeversounderstood.Wittgensteinchallengesthisassumption.He

arguesthatthereisnothingcommontothevarioususesofawordthatmakesususe

thatwordaswedo.ThisassumptionisatthecoreoftheAugustinianpictureof

language.ToappreciateWittgenstein’snotionsofagreementandformsoflife,to

resolvetheskepticalparadox,weneedtofirstexamineWittgenstein’scriticismof

thisassumption.

Theideathatthereissomethingcommontothevarioususesofaword

(otherthantheworditself)thatmakesususeitinvariouscircumstancesseems

31Thiscaveat,“otherthantheworditself,”isimportanttopreventacommonmisreadingofthephrase.InwhatfollowsIwillnotalwaysaddit,butthisisnotanoversightbutratheranattemptat(stylistic)clarity.

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intuitive,evenobvious.Afterall,itcannotbecompletelyrandomthatwecallboth

footballandsolitaire“games,”forinstance.Weneednotadopttherealistviewof

theTractatus,accordingtowhichthereissomethingfundamentalthateachgame

shares,orthebeliefinnecessaryandsufficientconditions,tobelievethatthereis

somethingcommontoeachuseoftheword“game”whichmakesususeitaswedo.

Thissomethingmaybeconventional–atacitlyagreedupondefinitionofwhat

countsasa“game,”forinstance.

Wittgensteininsistsotherwise.Heclaimsthatthevariousinstantiationsofa

wordhavenothingincommonthatmakesuscallitwhatwedo.Hedemonstrates

thisclaimbyaskingwhatthevarioususesoftheword“game”haveincommon

otherthanthattheyarecalled“games.”Helistsvariousgames,fromfootball,chess

andtennistosolitaire,patience,andring‐a‐ring‐a‐roses,andasks,whatiscommon

toalltheseactivities?Footballrequiresteams,whilesolitaireinvolvesjustone

person;tennisrequiresphysicalactivity,whilepatiencedoesnot;mostgamesseem

toinvolvewinningorlosingorgettingbetter,butring‐a‐ring‐a‐rosesinvolves

neither.Inconsideringwhatiscommontoallthethingswecall“games,”wefind

thatsomefeaturesoverlap,butanysetofconditionswecomeupwithfailstocover

somecasesthatwehappilycall“games.”Sowhatmakesuscallalltheseactivities

“games”?Wittgenstein’sansweristhatthereisnoonething,nosinglesetof

necessaryandsufficientconditions,butthatgamesrelatetoeachotherintheway

membersofafamilyhavevariousdegreesofsimilarities.Wittgensteincallsthis

groupofsimilaritiesa“familyresemblance”(§67).Thephraseisnotideal,as

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familieshaveasharedgeneticbasisunderpinningtheirsharedfeatures,whilethe

ideaofanessentialsubstrateunderpinningthevarioususesofawordisprecisely

whatWittgensteinwantstodeny.Wittgensteinisreferringonlytheexternal

featuresoffamilymembers–theeyes,thefacialexpressions,thegait,the

temperament–allofwhichvaryacrossmembersofafamily,butarenevertheless

consistentenoughtoformavisibleunity.Theconceptoffamilyresemblancesisapt

tomisleadifwetakeitasasubstantivepositionoranalternativetotherealismof

theTractatus.32ItisoneofWittgenstein’s“objectsofcomparison”(§129),designed

tounfixanentrenchedviewoflanguage.

Wittgenstein’sclaimthatthereisnothingcommontothevarioususesofa

wordotherthantheworditselfisintendedbothempiricallyandmethodologically.

32SomereadWittgenstein’sconceptoffamilyresemblancesasofferingasubstantivephilosophicalposition,onethatnotonlycorrectsbutreplacestherealismoftheTractatus.RenfordBambrough,forinstance,arguesthatWittgenstein“solvedtheproblemofuniversals.”ForBambrough,Wittgenstein’snotionoffamilyresemblancesprovidesajustificationfortheuseoftermswhich,whilenotsharingacommonfeature,haveenoughinterconnectedpropertiestowarrantsharingthesamename.ButWittgensteinisnottryingtojustifyhowweusewords,buttoshowthatthephilosophicalrequirementofjustificationisnotneededtoexplainhowweusewordsaswedo.RenfordBambrough,“UniversalsandFamilyResemblances,”Wittgenstein:The‘PhilosophicalInvestigations.’Ed.GeorgePitcher.GardenCity,NY:Doubleday,1966,186‐204.ColinMcGinnreadstheconceptoffamilyresemblancesasadvocatingabiologicaldeterministposition.ThisreadingdoesnotaccountforthefactthatWittgenstein’sexampleincludestraitsthatarelearnedaswellasinborn.ColinMcGinn,WittgensteinonMeaning,NY:Blackwell,1984,108.BakerandHackerarguethatWittgensteiniswrongtosaythatgameshavenocommonproperties.ButBakerandHackertakeWittgensteintowrite“gameshavenoonethingincommon”ratherthan“gameshavenoonethingincommonwhichmakesususethesamewordforall.”Thequalifyingclauseiscrucial.G.P.BakerandP.M.S.Hacker,Wittgenstein:MeaningandUnderstanding.NY:Blackwell,1983,192.

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Thatis,hechallengesboththebeliefthatonecommonelementunderliesaword

andthephilosophicalimpulsetofindone.Hefirstmakestheempiricalclaim:

Insteadofproducingsomethingcommontoallthatwecalllanguage,Iam

sayingthatthesephenomenahavenoonethingincommonwhichmakesus

usethesamewordforall.Anditisbecauseofthisrelationship,orthese

relationships,thatwecallthemall“language.”(§65)

Andthenhemakesthemethodologicalclaim:

Don’tsay:‘Theremustbesomethingincommon…butlookandseewhether

thereisanythingcommontoall.–Forifyoulookatthemyouwillnotsee

somethingthatiscommontoall,butsimilarities,relationships,andawhole

seriesofthematthat.Torepeat:don’tthink,butlook!”(§66)

Theempiricalclaiminsiststhatthereisnothingcommontothevariousactivitieswe

calla“game”otherthantheword“game.”Themethodologicalclaimimploresusnot

tosearchforthatwhich,accordingtoWittgenstein,doesnotexist.Thesequenceof

theclaimsisimportant,asthesecondpre‐emptsacertainreadingofthefirst.In

claimingthatthereisnothingcommontowhatwecalllanguage,Wittgensteinisnot

sayingthatwhilenoonecommonelementhasbeenfound,onecouldbefoundbya

moresubtleandprobinganalysis.33Heisquestioningthepictureofphilosophythat

33Hans‐JohannGlock,forinstance,writesthatbecauseWittgensteinpokesholesintheexplanationsofothersbutdoesnotprovideanalternativetheory,heis“opentothechargethat,withpersistence,agamecanbeanalyticallydefined,forexample,asarule‐guidedactivitywithfixedobjectivesthatareoflittleornoimportancetothecontextofthegame.”“PhilosophicalInvestigations:PrinciplesofInterpretation.”

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leadsustosearchforthiselement,thepicturethatleadsustobelievethatthere

mustbesomethingincommon–whetherbiological,conventional,orPlatonic.

WhyisWittgensteinsoconfidentthatnothingcommontoallgameswillbe

discoveredinthefuture?Whynotletothersinvestigatefurther?ThomasHurka

askspreciselythesequestions.HeconcludesthatWittgenstein’sclaimisnotjust

unwarranted,itisintellectuallyirresponsible:

…ananti‐theoreticalpositionisproperlyopenonlytothosewhohavemade

aseriousefforttotheorizeagivendomainandfoundthatitcannotsucceed.

Anti‐theoristswhodonotmakethiseffortaresimplybeinglazy,like

Wittgenstein.Hiscentralexampleofaconceptthatcannotbegivena

unifyinganalysiswasthatofagame,butinoneofthegreatunder‐

appreciatedbooksofthe20thcenturyBernardSuitsgivesperfectly

persuasivenecessaryandsufficientconditionsforsomething’sbeinga

game.34

AlookatSuitsrevealsasubtleandpersuasivedefinitionofagame:

Playingagameisthevoluntaryattempttoovercomeunnecessary

obstacles….Toplayagameistoattempttoachieveaspecificstateofaffairs,

usingonlymeanspermittedbytherules…wheretherulesprohibittheuseof

Wittgenstein:TowardsaRe­evaluation.Eds.RudolfHallerandJohannesBrandl.Vienna:Holder‐Pchler‐Tempsky,1996,152‐162.34ThomasHurka,“NormativeEthics:BacktotheFuture,”TheFutureofPhilosophy.Ed.BrianLeiter.OxfordUP,2004,page249.

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moreefficientinfavoroflessefficientmeans,andwheretherulesare

acceptedjustbecausetheymakepossiblesuchactivity.35

Inthegameofgolf,forexample,onetriestogethisballintheholeinthefewest

numberofstrokes(the“specificstateofaffairs”),butoneisprohibitedfrompicking

uptheballandplacingitinthehole(the“moreefficientmeans”ofdoingthis).Ifthe

golferweretodosohewouldnotbeplayinggolf.Thisdefinitionseemstoholdfor

almostallthingsweconsidergames.Suitsgoesontoarguethatplayinggamesis

partofleadinganethicallyvaluablelife.36Hedoesnot,then,justpresentacounter‐

exampletoWittgenstein;heputsthiscounter‐exampletogooduse.Hepresentsan

enrichinganalysisofwhatgamesareandhowtheycontributetohumanflourishing;

ananalysiswhichwouldbeunavailablehadheheededWittgenstein’sempiricaland

methodologicaladvice.

WhatdowemakeofWittgenstein’sclaiminlightofthiscounter‐example?Is

he“simplybeinglazy,”asHurkasuggests?Perhaps.Orperhapsheisnotas

perceptiveasSuits.ButwhileSuitshasclearlyunderminedhisempiricalclaimthat

thereisnoonethingcommontoallgames,Wittgenstein’smethodologicalclaimstill

35BernardSuits,TheGrasshopper:Games,LifeandUtopia.UniversityofTorontoPress,1978,page41.

36SuitsmentionsWittgensteinonlyinpassing:‘Don’tsay,’Wittgensteinadmonishesus,‘theremustbesomethingcommonortheywouldnotbecalledgames–butlookandseewhetherthereisanythingcommontoall.’Thisisunexceptionableadvice.Unfortunately,Wittgensteinhimselfdidnotfollowit.Helooked,tobesure,butbecausehehaddecidedbeforehandthatgamesareindefinable,hislookwasfleeting,andhesawverylittle.(x)

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holds.Wittgensteinisnoturgingusnottolookforacommonelementsimply

becausehedoesnotbelievethereisone.Heischallengingtheideathatevenifthere

isonecommonelementtoallinstantiationsofaword,findingitgivesusthebest

(mostaccurate)understandingoftheconceptinquestion.Suitshasfounda

somethingcommontoallgames.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatthiscommonelement

isthemeaningofthatwordinall(orevenmost)ofitsinstantiations,orthat

understandingwhatagameisinvolvesrecognizingthiscommonelement.Ihave

usedtheconcept“game”formostofmylifewithoutanydifficultyeventhoughIonly

recentlylearnedofSuits’sdefinition.Doesthismeanthat,unbeknownsttome,Ihad

Suits’sdefinitionlurkingsomewhereinthebackofmymind?Ifnot,doesthismean

thatIdidnotreallyunderstandtheconceptofagamewhenIusedit?Both

suggestionsareimplausible.Thefirstpresumesthementalistpicturethatwehave

alreadyrejected,onlyitisevenmorequestionableinthatinthiscaseIhad,storedin

mymind,adefinitionthatIneverinfactlearned.Thesecondentailstheideathat

everyonewhousesorhasusedtheword“game”butwhoisunawareofSuits’s

definitiondoesnotreallyunderstandwhatagameis.Toassertthisistosublime

ourconceptofunderstandingbeyondrecognition.

SowhileSuitsshowsthatWittgensteiniswrongtoclaimthatthereisnoone

thingcommontoallinstantiationsofawordorconcept,Wittgenstein’sgeneral

claimremainsdefensible.WhatWittgensteinshowsisthatwhileonecommon

elementmightbefound,thereisnoreasontobelievethatthiscommonelement

explainsorunderliestheparticularinstantiationinquestion.Inarguingthatthere

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isnothingcommontothevarioususesofawordotherthantheworditself,

Wittgensteinismakingtwopoints.First,aswehaveseen,heisquestioningwhether

developingnecessaryandsufficientconditionsforallthevariousinstantiationsofa

wordorconceptreallygivesusthebestinsightintoparticularinstantiationsofthat

wordorconcept.Theanswer,hejustifiablysuggests,is“no.”Second,heisarguing

thatbecauseofthevariegatedandopen‐endednatureofourwordsandconcepts,

noonesetofconditions,nogeneraltheory,cananticipatetheinfinitenumberof

imaginablecontextsinwhichwemightuseaword.Notheorycananticipatethe

shapethatourconceptsmighttake.

StanleyCavellhasdrawnseveralvividillustrationsofjusthowcomplexand

unpredictableourlanguageis.Theseillustrationsshowthatourwordsand

conceptsareopen‐ended;theycontainlayersofmeaningandunderstanding,many

ofwhichareunpredictable,notallofwhicharecontainedintheinitialassociation

betweenwordandobject,andnotallofwhicharereducibletoasinglecommon

element.Theseillustrationsshowthatevenifwecandeveloprulesforwordsprior

toouractualuseofthem,suchexplanationsfailtocapturethesubtletyand

complexitywithwhichweusethesewordsinthecourseofourlives.Cavellbegins

byrespondingtotheclaim,fromphilosophers,thatbecauseourordinaryusesof

wordsdonothaveclearrulesfortheirusetheyareambiguous,theylackthe

precisionorstabilityofphilosophicaldefinitions:

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Butmaybetheveryambiguityofordinarylanguage,thoughsometimes,some

places,aliability,isjustwhatgivesitthepower,ofillumination,ofenriching

perception,itspartisansarepartialto.(ClaimofReason180)

Howcanambiguityenrichperception?Cavelloffersthefollowingexample:wecan

projectthewordfeedfromthephrase“feedtheanimals”or“feedthebaby”toa

differentlanguagegameandsay“feedthemeter.”37Aphilosophythattriesto

reducethemeaningofwordstoonecommonelementwouldconsiderthe

replacementof“put”with“feed”aseitheranequivalentsubstitutionoralossof

precision.Buttheprojectionof“feed”isneither.“Feed”conveysshadesofmeaning

thatarelostwith“put.”“Feed”accentuatesthesenseofobligationweexperience

withparkingmeters,andsuggeststhattherelationshipwesharewiththemisnot

impersonalorunemotional.Indeedparkingmeters,aswerelatetothem,frequently

evokeemotionsrangingfrombitterness–WhydoIhavetofeedyouagain?Didyou

notjusteat?–tohope–MaybeifIdon’tfeedyounoonewillnotice–toexcitement–

HowfortunateIamtofindameterthathasalreadybeenfed!Igotawaywithnot

feedingyoufortwohours!Theabilitytoprojectwordsfromonecontexttoanother

illustrateshowwecommunicateeverydayexperienceswithsubtletyandattimes

poeticlanguage.Itisbecausethemeaningsofwordsarenotreducibletoacommon

element,asetofnecessaryandsufficientconditions,thatwecanprojectwordsin

thisway.Totrytoreduceourvarioususesofwordstoonecommonelement

merelyobfuscatesthevariabilityandpossibilityofourwordsandconcepts.Far

37Cf.Cavell,ClaimofReason181‐182.

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frombeingahindrance,thisvariability,thisambiguity,allowsustocreateshadesof

meaningthatgivecolorandtexturetooureverydaylanguage.

Wittgenstein’scriticismoftheAugustinianpictureisthereforestrongerthan

itinitiallyappears.Atfirstglancehiscriticismofthispictureseemstobethatit

doesnotaccountforthevariouswaysweuselanguage–indeedWittgenstein

acknowledgesthatAugustine“doesdescribeasystemofcommunication;onlynot

everythingwecalllanguageisthissystem”(§3).Thissuggeststhatthispictureis

partlycorrect,onlylimited.ButifthecritiqueoftheAugustinianpictureissimply

thatitislimited,thenwemightbetemptedtothinkthatsomewords,suchasnouns,

fittheAugustinianpicture,whileotherwords,suchasprepositions,conjunctions,

adjectives,etcetera,donot.Thisisnotright.WhatfitstheAugustinianpictureare

certainusesofwords(suchasnaminganobject),notcertainkindsofwords(suchas

nouns).ThisisthethrustofWittgenstein’sclaimthat“foralargeclassofcases–

thoughnotforall–inwhichweemploytheword‘meaning’itcanbedefinedthus:

themeaningofawordliesinitsuseinthelanguage”(§43).38Thecaveathere–“for

alargeclassofcases–thoughnotforall”–isimportant.Itistemptingtoexempt

nounswithclearreferentsfromthisclass.ButWittgensteinsays“alargeclassof

cases,”not“alargeclassofwords”;evennounswithapparentlyclearreferentsdo

nothaveacontext‐independentmeaning.Whatgivestheappearancethattheydois

38Sometakethisclaimtoimplya“use‐theory”oflanguage.ButWittgenstein’snotionthatthemeaningofawordis(often)itsuseisdesignedtoattackthepossibilityofatheoryoflanguage,notadvocateone.JohnSearle,forinstance,readsWittgensteinassuggestingsuchatheoryinhisSpeechActs:AnEssayinthePhilosophyofLanguage.CambridgeUP,1969,148.

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theiroccasionaluseasnames(inthecontextoftellingsomeone,“Thisiscalled

‘slab,”forinstance).

Theclaimthatthemeaningofawordis(generally)itsuseismeanttobring

ourperceptionoflanguageinlinewithhowitactuallyworks.Itismeanttoawaken

ustothevarietyofwaysweusewords,andthefailureofphilosophicaltheoriesto

accountforthisvariety.TheproblemwiththeAugustinianpictureoflanguageis

notjustthatitproducesanunpalatableregress.Itdoesnotaccountforthevarious

waysweusethesameword–eventhesamenoun.

Insection1.1IsuggestedthatWittgensteinwantsustobewearyofmaking

toomuchoftheinitialassociationbetweenawordanditsmeaning.Itisnaturalfor

ustoaskwhatthisassociationconsistsin.Thisisthequestionwehavebeen

pursuinginthepastfewsections.Andwehavebeenpursuingitinthehopethatit

wouldleadtoananswertothequestionwe’vebeenasking:Howdoesachildfirst

learnlanguage?AppreciatingWittgenstein’sclaimthatthereisnothingcommonto

thevariousinstantiationsofawordotherthantheworditselfhelpsillustrateakey

point:answeringthefirstquestion–Whatisthenatureoftheinitialassociation

betweenwordandobject?–willnotsatisfactorilyanswerthesecondquestion–

Howdoesachildlearnlanguage?Forunderstandinghowwelearnlanguage

involvesmuchmorethanunderstandingthisinitialassociation.

1.6.TheParadoxDissolved

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“Thefirststepistheonethataltogetherescapesnotice….(Thedecisivemoveintheconjuringtrickhasbeenmade,anditwastheveryonethatwethoughtquiteinnocent.)”

PI§308

Wearenowinapositiontoanswerthequestionwithwhichwebegan.I

havealreadysuggestedwhatthisanswermightbe.Sohowdoesachildfirstlearn

language?Whatdoesthechildhavetoknowinordertofirstlearnlanguage?The

question,toparaphraseWittgenstein,containsamistake.Itimpliesthatlearninga

word,orusingaword,requiresacertainknowledge–where“knowledge”means

somethinglike,“informationstoredinourmind.”ThethrustofWittgenstein’s

scenesofinstruction,hisdiscussionoftheparadoxesofostension,explanation,and

rule‐following,istodemonstratethatwhatwedoeverydayisnotafunctionof

knowledgeinthissense.Ourmostquotidianactionsarenottheresultof

computationorratiocination;theyarenotcognitiveachievements.

Theuncertaintybroughtonbyskepticismdoesnotrequirethepositingofa

hiddenprocess,amysteriousthirdrealm,aPlatonicobject,orevenconventionto

explainhowmeaningandunderstandinghappen.Weneedonlydescribewhat

happensonthesurface,asitwere,inthevariousspecificinstancesinwhichachild

beginstouseorunderstandaword.Observingtheseinstances,onefindscertain

responses,reactions,andpracticesrecurringdependingonwhetherthechild

correctlyorincorrectlyusesorunderstandstheword.Overtime,suchresponses

andpracticesbecomerelativelyuniformandincreasinglymatchupwithourown.

TheresponsesandpracticeshelpmakeupwhatWittgensteincallsa“formoflife”

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(Lebensform).Theyincludepointing,gesturing,expressing,andsmiling,speaking

andfollowingwithgreaterandlesserdegreesofconfidence,allfostered(or

discouraged)bythebehaviourofothers.Thesepracticesandresponses,thisform

oflife,transcendslinguisticandculturaldifference.39Theyarepartofthe“common

behaviorofmankind”whichmakesitpossibletocommunicateacrossdifferencein

thefirstplace(§206).Anyformofcommunication,evenskepticaldoubt,only

makessenseagainstabackgroundofsharedpracticesandjudgments.Thisiswhat

Wittgensteinmeansbyagreement.“Iflanguageistobeameansofcommunication

theremustbeagreementnotonlyindefinitionsbutalso(queerasthismaysound)

injudgments….Thatisnotagreementinopinionsbutinformoflife”(§206,241‐

242).Theconcept“formsoflife”isapttomislead.Aformoflifeisnotaspecific

cultureorahistoricalmoment.Thefactthatweuseandunderstandlanguage

withoutreflectionandwithoutrulestocoverallcases,inspiteofthepossibilityof

variousinterpretations,appliestoanyonewhoismasterofalanguage.Thisisnota

philosophicalthesisbutaconstitutivefactofhumanhistory.

39…ifapersonhasnotyetgottheconcepts,Ishallteachhimtousethewordsbymeansofexamplesandbypractice.AndwhenIdothisIdonotcommunicatelesstohimthatIknowmyself.InthecourseofthisteachingIshallshowhimthesamecolours,thesamelengths,thesameshapes,Ishallmakehimfindthemandproducethem,andsoon.Ishall,forinstance,gethimtocontinueanornamentalpatternuniformlywhentoldtodoso.–Andalsotocontinueprogressions.Andso,forexample,whengiven:......togoon:….…..…… Idoit,hedoesitafterme;andIinfluencehimbyexpressionsofagreement,rejection,expectation,encouragement.Ilethimgohisway,orholdhimback,andsoon.(PI§208)

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Ifwethinkofusingorunderstandinglanguageasprimarilyamental

phenomenon,oninwhichonepersonsomehowusestheirvoicetotransfera

thoughtfromtheirmindintothemindofanother,thenwewillindeedwonderhow

thisoccurs,andwewillneedtodevelopahighlysophisticatedexplanationforhow

ithappens.Butthisexplanationwillbenolesssusceptibletoskepticismthanour

ordinarypractices,andnomoreinformative.Infact,Wittgensteinbelievesthatitis

likelytoleadusfartherawayfromthephenomenonwearetryingtounderstanding:

ourlanguage,ourconcepts,andhowtheyoperateinthecourseofourdailylives.

Toreturnthen,tothequestionweaskedearlier:Howdoesthechildacquire

language?Whatdoesthechildhavetoknowinordertocorrectlyinterpret

ostensivedefinitions?Theanswer,Itakeit,isthecommon‐behaviorofmankind.

Howdoeshelearnthis?Notbyanyprocessofratiocination,butbyobserving,

mimicking,followingandrespondingtothosearoundus;bybeingencouragedat

somemomentsanddiscouragedatothers.Welearnwordsindifferentcontextsand

indifferentways–sometimesbyhavingthemostensivelydefinedforus,sometimes

bylisteningtoadultsorwatchingtelevision,sometimesbydoingexercisesinschool

–andwhetherwehavelearnedthemornotisborneoutintheuseswemakeof

thesewordsinsubsequentcontexts.Thuslearninglanguagecannotbereducedtoa

singlemoment,aparticularaction,oramethod.Thechildcanbesaidtohave

learnedawordwhenshecanuseitinvariouscontexts,andwhenshecanfollow

alongwhensomeoneelsedoesthesame.Thereisnoonepointintimewhenwecan

saythishappens.Indeedinonesensewealwaysremainstudentsoflanguage,for

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newcontexts,newpossibleusesofwordsarealwaysemerging,requiringorinviting

newusesofoldwords.

ReturningtoWittgenstein’sglossofAugustinein§1,wecanseethatthefirst

stepthataltogetherescapesnotice,“thedecisivemoveintheconjuringtrick”

(§308),isthesubtleshiftfromwhatAugustineactuallysaystotheAugustinian

pictureoflanguage.InmakingAugustinemeanmorethanhedoes,insubliminghis

words,theAugustinianpictureomittedcrucialaspectsofAugustine’sdescriptionof

howachildlearnslanguage:“theexpressionoftheface,theplayoftheeyes,the

movementofotherpartsofthebody,andthetoneofvoicewhichexpressesour

stateofmindinseeking,having,rejecting,oravoidingsomething.”Instead,the

picturenarrowlyfocusesontheassociationbetweenawordandathing,elidingthe

intangibleelementsoftrust,disappointment,happiness,sadness,rejectionand

acceptancethatinitiateachildintoaformoflife.Theseaspectscomprise“the

commonbehaviorofmankind.”Nothingmoreorlessisrequiredinthatparticular

casetoestablishaninitialassociationbetweenthewordandathing,andtherefore

nothingmoreorlessisrequiredtounderstandorexplaintheassociation.Thisdoes

notmeanthattheassociationispre‐existingorthatitwillnowbepermanent.Other

particularcasesmaybedifferent(Imayputalabelonanobjectsothatsomeone

unfamiliarwithitscontentscanidentifythem,forinstance),buttoexplainhowwe

firstlearnthemeaningofaword,weneedonlyrecountwhathappenedinthe

particularcasesinwhichwefirstbegantouseandunderstandtoit.

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ItakeWittgenstein’sanswertothequestionofwhatsecuresmeaningand

understandingtobe:wedo.Not“we”thecommunity,but“we”aspeople,asany

kindofpeople,regardlessofwhatcommunitywehappentobein.Theideathat

somethingotherthanourselvesisthesourceofmeaningandunderstandingelides

thisirreduciblyhumanaspectoflanguage.TheAugustinianpicturetakeslanguage

toconsistofwordsontheonehandandmeaningandunderstandingontheother,

andaskswhatbridgesthegapbetweenthem.Thevariouscandidatesforthis

bridge,aPlatonicobject,amentalimage,thecommunity,allpresumetheinitial

picturethatWittgensteinrejects.Theyalloverlooktheinflectionofthevoice,the

facialexpression,therelationshipbetweenlistenerandspeaker–thoseelements

withoutwhichwecouldnothavelearnedlanguageinthefirstplace.Wittgenstein

wantstorecuperatethishumanaspectoflanguagebecausewithoutitwecan

describealanguage,butnotourlanguage–notthelanguageweuseeveryday.

1.7.Conclusion

InthischapterIhavetriedtoexplainWittgenstein’sviewthattraditional

philosophyfailstoadequatelyaccountforhowhumanbeingsuselanguageinthe

courseoftheirdailylives.Thisfailurestemsfromthreetendenciescommonto

philosophers:thetendencytomakeourordinarywordsmeanmorethantheywere

intendedtomean;thetendencytopresumethatthingsintheworldmustbe

arrangedinacertainway(i.e.logical,rule‐bound,systematic);andthetendencyto

searchforhiddenexplanationsinplaceofvisibleones.Thesetendenciesareinter‐

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related.Wesearchforhiddenprocessesbecausewebelievethattheremustbe

somethingimmunetoskepticismunderlyingourwordsandactions,andwhatwe

seeonthesurfaceseemsobviouslysusceptibletoskepticism.Andweleapfromthe

particulartothegeneralforthesamereason.Takentogether,thesetendencieslead

traditionalphilosophersintoadistortedconceptionofourlanguage.Inthenext

chapterIexplainhow,forWittgenstein,thisdistortedconceptionisthereason

traditionalphilosophysooftenfailstohaveanypurchaseoveroureverydaylives.

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2.WITTGENSTEIN’SPOSITIVECONCEPTIONOFPHILOSOPHY

“Whatwedoisbringwordsbackfromtheirmetaphysicaltotheireverydayuse.”

PI§116

UnderstandingWittgenstein’scriticismoftheAugustinianpictureis

necessarytounderstandbothhiscriticismoftraditionalphilosophyandthe

approachtophilosophyheadvocatesinitsplace.Thiscriticismandapproachhave

beenthesourceofmuchdebate.Manyinterpretthiscriticismasevidencethat

Wittgensteinwantstoabandonphilosophyaltogether;asevidencethathethinks

thatourordinary,unreflective,non‐philosophicalmodesofunderstandingprovidea

betterpictureoflanguageandtheworldthanphilosophicalones.1Attimes

Wittgensteinseemstosuggestsuchareading.Hewrites,forinstance,that

philosophyis“likeapairofglassesonournosethroughwhichweseewhateverwe

lookat.Itneveroccurstoustotakethemoff”(PI§103).Wittgensteindoesnotsay

weneedanother,betterpairofglasses;hesuggeststhatouruncorrectedwayof

1ThisinterpretationiscommontobothcriticsandadmirersofWittgenstein.AnotablecriticisGillesDeleuze,whoderisivelycallsWittgenstein“theendofphilosophy.”SeehisabécédairewithClaireParnet.Accessedherehttp://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=438091653681675611#docid=‐9009902138061209670onOctober14th,2009.Admirersincludeadvocatesofordinarylanguagephilosophy,suchasGilbertRyle,TheConceptoftheMind.UniversityofChicagoPress,2002.J.L.Austin’swritingisalsoparadigmaticofthemethodsofthisschool,andmanyofhiscriticismsoftraditionalphilosophyresemblethoseofWittgenstein,thoughhedidnotwriteonWittgenstein.SeeespeciallyAustin’sPhilosophicalPapers.Thirdedition.EditedbyJ.O.UrmsonandG.J.Warnock.OxfordUniversityPress,1979.

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lookingatthingsisallweneed.2ButWittgenstein’spracticeisnotalwaysconsistent

withthisandsimilarassertions,andheroutinelyusestheword“philosophy”ina

positivesense,suggestingthatheisnotgivingupontheenterprisealtogether.In

theBlueBook,forinstance,hewrites,“Philosophy,asweusetheword,isafight

againstthefascinationwhichformsofexpressionexertuponus”(25).3Theseand

similarremarkssuggestthatdespitehiscriticismoftraditionalphilosophyand

suggestionslikethosein§103,Wittgensteintriestorecuperateanotionof

philosophy–apracticeofcriticalreflectionontheworld–thatisatonce

sympathetictoyetdistinctfromeverydaythought.Thisnotionofphilosophy,which

Wittgensteinendorses,mustbedistinguishedfromthenotionofphilosophywhich

hecriticizes.

Myaiminthischapteristomarkthisdistinction,andtoexplain

Wittgenstein’spositivenotionofphilosophy.IbeginbyanalyzingWittgenstein’s

responsetoG.E.Moore’sattempttorefuteexternalworldskepticism.4Buildingon

theaccountoflanguageofferedinthepreviouschapter,IshowhowMoore’sfailure

tograspwhatitmeanstouselanguageleadshimtomakeclaimswhichdonothave

theforceorimplicationhethinkstheyhave.AndIarguethatWittgenstein’s

2RobertFogelinarguesthatforWittgenstein,ournormal,uncorrectedwayofviewinglanguageisadequate.“Wittgenstein’sCritiqueofPhilosophy,”CambridgeCompaniontoWittgenstein.ed.HansSlugaandDavidStern.CambridgeUP,1996.3SeealsoPhilospohicalInvestigations§52,§109,§121,§124,§125,§127,and§129.4LudwigWittgenstein,OnCertainty.Ed.G.E.MAnscombeandG.H.vonWright.Trans.DenisPaulandG.E.M.Anscombe.London:Blackwell,1969.

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responsetoMooremarksanovelcontributiontotheproblemofskepticism.Inthe

secondsectionIexaminethequestion,introducedinthepreviouschapter,ofwhere

andwhyjustificationscometoanend.HereIdefendWittgensteinagainstcharges

ofdogmatismbyexplainingwhywecannotbecriticizedforbeingcertainofsome

thingsforwhichwelackphilosophicaljustification.Takentogether,thesetwo

sectionsillustratethekindofphilosophicalpracticeWittgensteinadvocatesinplace

oftraditionalphilosophy.InthethirdsectionIelaborateanddefendthispractice

fromcriticismsbybothtraditionalandnon‐traditionalphilosophers.Iarguethat

thispracticedoesnotentailaquietisticendtophilosophy,asmanyhavesuggested.

Rather,itoffersawayofthinkingphilosophicallythatavoidstheabstractionsof

traditionalphilosophyandismoreattunedtooureverydaylives.

2.1.Wittgenstein’sResponsetoMoore

Wittgenstein’slastwritings,publishedposthumouslyasOnCertainty,

constituteasustainedresponsetotwopapersbyG.E.Moore.5Inthefirstpaper,“A

DefenseofCommonSense,”Mooreoffersalistoftruisms,eachofwhichheclaims

“toknow,withcertainty,tobetrue.”6Suchclaimsinclude,“Thereexistsatpresenta

5G.E.Moore,“ProofofanExternalWorld,”PhilosophicalPapers.London:GeorgeAllenandUnwin,1959,pp.127‐150.“ADefenseofCommonSense,”PhilosophicalPapers.London:GeorgeAllenandUnwin,1959,pp.32‐59.6NoteMoore’slinkingofknowledgeandcertainty.Iwillsuggest,inthefollowingsection,thatthesearetwodistinctstates(ordispositions).

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livinghumanbody,whichismybody”and“Theearthhasexistedformanyyears

beforemybodywasborn.”7ThesesortsofclaimsareknownasMooreanclaimsor

Mooreanpropositions.Inthesecondpaper,“ProofofanExternalWorld,”Moore

triestoprovetheexistenceoftheexternalworld.Hebeginsbydefiningan“external

object”asanobjectwhoseexistenceisindependentofourperception.Hethen

offersthefollowingproof:“Icanprovenow,forinstance,thattwohumanhands

exist.How?Byholdingupmytwohandsandsaying,asImakeacertaingesture

withtheright,‘Hereisonehand,’andadding,asImakeacertaingesturewiththe

left,‘andhereisanother.’”Mooretookthisargumenttorefuteexternalworld

skepticism.

Atfirstglance,thishardlysoundsconvincing.Butconsidertheargument

moreclosely.Theskeptic’sargumentrunsasfollows:

1) IfIcannotrefutetheskepticalchallenge,Idonotknowthatthisisahand

2) Icannotrefutetheskepticalchallenge

Therefore,

3) Idonotknowthatthisisahand

7Moore’spreciseargumentin“ADefenseofCommonSense”isnotreleventtomydiscussion(orWittgenstein’s).WhatmattersisMoore’sclaimtoknow,withcertainty,thepropositionshestates.Healsosaysthateveryoneelseknowssuchthingsaboutthemselves,andthatheknowsthattheyknowsuchthings.Giventhatweallknowsuchthings,thesethingsconstituteacommonsense,andMooredefendsthiscommonsenseagainstskepticism.

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Mooredoesnotattackeitherpremise,nordoeshequestionthevalidityofthe

argument.Hesimplydeniestheconsequentofthefirstpremiseratherthanaffirm

itsantecedent.Moore’sargumentlookslikethis:

1) IfIcannotrefutetheskepticalchallenge,Idonotknowthatthisisahand

2) Iknowthatthisisahand

Therefore,

3) Icanrefutetheskepticalchallenge

Moorehasshiftedtheargumentfrommodusponenstomodustollens.Theresultisa

validargument,butisitsound?DoesMooreknowthatthisisahand?

Wittgensteindidnotthinkso,thoughheadmiredMoore’seffort.8Atthe

beginningofOnCertainty,hewrites:“Now,canoneenumeratewhatoneknows?

Straightofflikethat,Ibelievenot.Forotherwisetheexpression‘Iknow’gets

misused”(OC§6).Thisseemslikeanoddresponse.WhenMooresays“Iknowthis

isahand,”themeaningofthephraseseemsclear.Surelywemightquestion

8AccordingtotheeditorsofOnCertainty,WittgensteintoldMoorethatthesewerehistwobestpapers.Mooreagreed.

MydiscussionofWittgenstein’sresponsetoMooreinthissectionisindebtedtoStanleyCavell’sdiscussionoftraditionalepistemologyinparttwoofTheClaimofReason,aswellastoJamesConant’sdiscussionofOnCertaintyin“WittgensteinonMeaningandUse,”PhilosophicalInvestigations,Volume21(3),July1998,222‐250.Thisisnottosay,ofcourse,thatCavellandConantnecessarilyagreewithmyconclusionsinthischapter.Cavell,forinstance,doesnotdiscussOnCertainty.AndConantdoesnotseemtodistinguishbetweenMooreanclaimstoknowledgeandordinary,groundlevelMooreanclaims.HisfocusismoreonWittgenstein’sconceptionofmeaning.

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Moore’sargument,butnothisuseoftheword“know.”WhydoesWittgensteinsay

otherwise?ConsiderasimilarremarkbyWittgensteinjustafewparagraphslater:

Iknowthatasickmanislyinghere?Nonsense!Iamsittingathisbedside,I

amlookingattentivelyintohisface.–SoIdon’tknow,then,thatthereisa

sickmanlyinghere?Neitherthequestionnortheassertionmakesense.Any

morethantheassertion“Iamhere,”whichImightyetuseatanymoment,if

asuitableoccasionpresenteditself….Itisonlyinusethatthepropositionhas

itssense.And“Iknow,”usedinanunsuitablesituation,seemsnottobe

nonsensebutratherseemsmatter‐of‐course,onlybecauseonecanfairly

easilyimagineasituationtofitit.(OC§10)

Thispassagehasbeenreadindifferentways.AccordingtoMarieMcGinn,

Wittgensteinissayingthatthephrase“Iknowthereisasickmanlyinghere”makes

senseonitsown,butlosesitssensewhenusedinanunsuitablecontext.9An

unsuitablecontextisoneinwhich,forinstance,thereisnosickmaninsight,or

whenitispatentlyobviousthatasickmanislyingthere.If,forinstance,Isay“I

knowthatasickmanislyinghere”whenyouandIaresittingattheedgeofour

father’shospitalbed,andIhavenoreasontopointthisouttoyou,thenthephrase

doesnotmakesense.Itis,asWittgensteinsays,“nonsense.”Butinothercontexts

thephrasemaymakeperfectsense.Onthisreading,thephrasehasaclearsense

unlessitisusedinanunsuitablecontext.

9MarieMcGinn,SenseandCertainty:ADissolutionofSkepticism.Oxford:Blackwell,1989.ConantoffersadetailedcritiqueofMcGinn’sreadingin“WittgensteinonMeaningandUse.”

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Theproblemwiththisreading,however,isthatpresumesthatwordshave

meaningindependentoftheiruseinparticularcircumstances.Thispresumptionis

whatWittgensteincriticizesabouttheAugustinianpicture.Sounlessheis

contradictinghimself,hemustmeansomethingelsewhenhesaysthatMoore’s

claimisnonsense.Sureenough,Wittgensteindoesnotsaythattheproposition“I

knowasickmanislyinghere”makessenseunlessisusedinanunsuitablecontext.

Hesaysthepropositiononlymakessenseifusedinasuitablecontext:“itisonlyin

usethatthepropositionhasitssense”(OC§6).Herepeatsthispointelsewherein

OnCertainty:

Justasthewords“Iamhere”haveameaningonlyincertaincontexts,and

notwhenIsaythemtosomeonewhoissittinginfrontofmeandseesme

clearly,‐andnotbecausetheyaresuperfluous,butbecausetheirmeaningis

notdeterminedbythesituation,yetstandsinneedofsuchdetermination.

(OC§348)

HemakesthesamepointintheInvestigations:

If,forinstance,someonesaysthatthesentence“Thisishere”(sayingwhich

hepointstoanobjectinfrontofhim)makessensetohim,thenheshouldask

himselfinwhatspecialcircumstancesthissentenceisactuallyused.Thereit

doesmakesense.(PI§117)10

10Conantdiscussesthesetwopassages,andmanyothers,in“WittgensteinonMeaningandUse”(seepage239andfollowing).SeealsoOC§349,§350,§352,§393,andPI§514.

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Again:thewords“Iamhere”havemeaning“onlyincertaincontexts.”Ontheirown,

independentlyofanycontext,theyhavenomeaningatall;theirmeaning“standsin

needofdetermination.”RecallfromthelastchapterthatforWittgensteinthe

meaningofawordorphraseis(usually)determinedbyitsuse(Cf.§43).Soin

sayingthattheclaim“Iknowasickmanislyinghere”isnonsense,Wittgensteinis

notsayingthatthisphraseissoobviousthatthereisnoreasontosayit.Heis

sayingthatthephrasehasnoclearmeaning.

Thisseemsobviouslyfalse.WhenMooregavehislecturetoaroomfullof

philosophers,noneobjectedtoMoore’suseof“Iknow.”Nonefeltthathismeaning

wasunclear.Whatmeaningdidtheyallseemtounderstand?11Itisjustnotclearin

whatsense,ifany,Moore’sclaimshowsthatheiscaptivetoaflawedpictureof

language.

ToseewhatWittgensteinisgettingat,weneedtodistinguishthreedifferent

levelsofmeaningforthephrase“Iknowthisisahand.”Firstisthedictionary

definitionsofthewordsinthephrase”Iknowthisisahand.”Secondisthemeaning

thesewordshaveinthecontextinwhichtheyareuttered.Thirdisthemeaningthat

Mooreintendstoconveywiththesewords.Thedictionarydefinitionsofthewords

“I”,“know,”“this,”and“hand”areclearenough.Weknowwhatthesedefinitions

11ThisisRichardRorty’sobjectiontoWittgenstein.ForRorty,itisjustnotclearinwhatsensephilosophicalusesoflanguage,likeMoore’s,arenonsense:“WittgensteinwritesasifhisreaderswillfinditobviousthatthinkerslikeDescartes,Locke,Hegel,andHeideggerwerevictimsof‘thebewitchmentofourintelligencebymeansofourlanguage,’ratherthanoriginalthinkerswho,byusingwordsinnewways,brokenewpathsofinquiry.”“WittgensteinandtheLinguisticTurn,”PhilosophyandCulturalPolitics.CambridgeUP,2007,pp.167.

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roughlyare,andwecancombinethemtogetapictureofwhatthephrasemeans.

Butthispicture,thesedefinitions,donotdeterminewhatthesewordsmeaninthe

particularcircumstancesinwhichtheyareuttered,orwhatMooreintendsthemto

mean.Consider,forinstance,asimplesentencesuchas,“Thecowsareinthebarn.”

AccordingtotheAugustinianpicture,weunderstandwhatthissentencemeans

becauseweunderstandthedictionarydefinitions(theonecommonelement)of

eachword:weknowthatacowisasomewhatlargemammalwithfourlegsanda

barnisarectangularstructuremadeofwood,andbyputtingthemeaningsofthe

wordstogetherwegetthemeaningofthesentence.Butthemeaningofthe

sentenceisnotalwaysorevenoftenreducibletothesumofthedictionary

definitionsofeachwordinthesentence.Themeaningofthesentencechanges

accordingtothecircumstancesinwhichitappears.PerhapsIsay“Thecowsarein

thebarn”asyouarepreparingtoroundupthecowsfromthefieldandherdthem

intothebarn.Inthiscase,thesentenceisnotmerelyadescriptivestatement,italso

means“youdonothavetogobringthecowsintothebarn.”Itcouldevenmean“sit

downandrelax,yourworkisfinishedfortheday,”and/or“thosecowsarewell‐

trained:theyknowthatatthishourtheyareusuallyherdedintothebarn,sothis

timetheywentontheirown,”andsoon.Themeaningofasentencelike“Thecows

areinthebarn,”variesdependingonmanyfactors,fromthetimeofdaytothe

relationshipbetweenthespeakerandlistener(amiable?spiteful?),thekindofwork

required,theintonation(“Thecowsareinthebarn?”isobviouslymuchdifferent

than“Thecowsareinthebarn!!!”),andthewordsprecedingthesentence.If“The

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cowsareinthebarn”isprecededbyyoutellingme“Ibettergooutsideandputthe

cowsintothebarn,”forinstance,ittakesonadifferentforce.

Sothesecondlevelofmeaningisthemeaningasdeterminedbythecontext

oftheutterance.Thethirdlevelofmeaningisthatintendedbythespeaker.Thisis

notnecessarilyidenticaltoeitherthedictionarydefinitionorthemeaningas

determinedbythecontext.Imightask,“Doyoudressthatwayvoluntarily?”notto

suggestthatyourattireispoorlychosen,butintendingtofindoutwhetherornot

youexercisedyourfreewillinchoosingyourclothes.Butregardlessofmy

intention,ifIaskthisinordinarycircumstances,theimpliedmeaningofthe

questionholds.Youwillbeoffendedbythequestion,andjustifiablyso.

WhenWittgensteinsaysthatMoore’sclaimis“nonsense,”hemeansthat

Moore’sclaimdoesnothavethemeaningthatMoorethinksithas.Themeaningof

Moore’swordsinthecontextinwhichheusesthemdoesnotmatchhisintentionin

usingthesewords.Indeed,WittgensteindoesnotbelievethatMoore’swordshave

anyclearmeaning.Toseethis,wehavetostepbackforamomentandconsiderthe

circumstancesinwhichheisspeaking.First,considerinwhatcircumstanceswe

mightsay,“Iknowsuchandsuch”:perhapswhenItellmyfiancée,afterhavinglost

ourwayinaforeigncity,“NowIknowwhereweare!”,orwhenascientistsays,after

debatingthefunctionofaparticularproteinwithacolleague,“Ijustknowthatthis

isanenzyme!”Themeaningsof“Iknow”herearenotidentical.Inthefirstinstance

“Iknow”signalsanewfoundawarenessofsomething.Intheseconditexpressesan

emphasisofsomethingalreadyknown(thoughperhapsrecentlydiscovered).Butin

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eachcasethespeaker’sintentioninutteringthisphrasefitsseamlesslywiththe

circumstancesofhisutterance.Thereisnoquestionofthemeaningor

appropriatenessofeitherutteranceinthesespecificcircumstances.

NowconsiderthecircumstancesinwhichMooreisspeaking.Heis

respondingtoaskeptic.Theskeptic,inturn,isrespondingtoaneverydayclaim,

suchasthescientist’sclaim,“Iknowthatthisisanenzyme.”Theskepticresponds,

“Howdoyouknowthatisreallyanenzyme?Howdoyouknowthatitisareal

enzyme,andnotsomefakeonemadetolookjustlikearealone?Unlessyoucan

refutethispossibility,youdon’treallyknowthatisanenzyme.Youdon’tknow

whatyouclaimtoknow.”Noticethesubtleshiftfromthescientist’suseof“Iknow”

totheskeptic’s.Whenthescientistsays,“Iknowthatthisisanenzyme”,hemeans

thathecanprovideevidenceinsupportofhisclaim.Hecanshowthatthisprotein

speedsupacertainchemicalreaction,asonlyenzymesdo.Thatis,hecanprovide

evidenceshowingthattheproteininquestionisanenzymeandnotsomeotherkind

ofprotein,orthattheobjectinquestionisaproteinandnotsomeotherkindof

cellularmaterial.12Butwhentheskepticsays,inresponsetothescientist,“You

don’tknowthatthisisanenzyme,”hedoesnotmeantochallengetheclaimthatthis

proteinisanenzymeandnotsomeotherkindofprotein.Hemeansthatthe

scientistdoesnotknowthatthisisevenarealprotein(asopposedtoafakeone).

12Cf.Cavell’sdistinctionbetweencriteriafortheexistenceofsomethingandcriteriafortheidentityofthatthing.Cavellshows,followingAustin,thatthereisnotcriteriaforsomething’sexistenceoverandabovethecriteriaforitsidentification.SeethefirsttwochaptersofTheClaimofReason,especially“AustinandExamples.”

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Sowhentheskepticsaystothescientist,“Youdon’tknowthatthisisan

enzyme”hemeans“know”inadifferentsensethanthescientistmeans.13Hehas

sublimedthescientist’sconceptionofknowledge,andisnowusingadifferent

conception.Inthisrespecttheskepticandthescientistarespeakingatcross‐

purposes,andthescientistneednotacquiescetotheskeptic’schallenge.This

differencegetslostifwefocussimplyonthefactthattheybothusethesameword–

“know”–andpresumethatithasthesamemeaningregardlessofthecircumstances

ofitsuse.Inordertounderminethescientist’sclaimtoknowledge,theskepticmust

usethesameconceptionofknowledgethatthescientistinvokeswhenhesays“I

know.”Hemustmean“know”inthesamesenseasthescientist.

Sowhydoesn’ttheskepticjustusethesameconceptionofknowledgeasthe

scientist?Becauseinthiscase,asStanleyCavellhasshown,theskepticfacesa

dilemma.14Ifheusesthesameconceptionofknowledgeasthescientist,thenhe

onlychallengesthescientist’sclaimtoknowthatthisisanenzymeandnot

somethingelse.Thischallengeisnotgeneralenoughtoleadthescientisttodoubt

theexistenceoftheprotein,andbyextensiontheexternalworld.If,ontheother

13ByskeptichereImeanaphilosophicalskeptic.Anon‐philosophicalskepticmightchallengethescientist’sclaimanduse“know”inthesamesenseasthescentist.Anon‐philosophicalskeptic,sayacolleagueofthescientist,mightsimplywantmoreevidenceinsupportoftheclaimthattheproteininquestionisanenzymeandnotsomethingelse.Inthiscasethescientistcanrespondbyprovidingevidenceindefenseofhisclaim:anenzymeisaproteinwhichspeedsupchemicalreactions,hereisthemicro‐scopicandexperimentaldataIhavetoshowthatthisparticularproteinspeedsupthisparticularreaction(i.e.whenyouremovetheproteinandkeepallotherthingsequal,thisreactionoccursatamuchslowerrate).

14“ThePhilosopher’sProjectionPosesaDilemma,”TheClaimofReason,page199.

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hand,theskepticretainshissublimedsenseof“know,”thenhischallengemissesthe

mark.Inthiscaseheisnotchallengingthescientist’sspecificclaim,heis

challengingthescientist‘sclaimtoknowanythingatall.Tothischargethescientist

mightjustifiablyrespond,“Maybethereisnoexternalworld.MaybeIamdreaming.

Nevertheless,inthisdreamIknowthatthisisanenzymeandnotsomeother

cellularmaterial,”andthencontinuegoingonasusual.Theskeptic’schallengeonly

hasbiteifthescientistclaimsthathedoesinfactknowthatthereisanexternal

world.Butthisisadifferentclaim–andadifferentkindofknowledge–thanthe

onethescientistmakeswhenheclaimstoknowthatthisparticularproteinisan

enzyme.

ReturningnowtoMoore:heuses“Iknow”inthesamesenseastheskeptic,

notthescientist.WhenMooresays,inresponsetotheskeptic,“Iknowthatthisisa

hand,”hemeanstoestablishtheexistenceofthehand,notmerelythatthisisahand

andnotsomethingelse.Moore’suseof“Iknow”constitutesa“misuseoflanguage”

becauseheusesadifferentconceptionofknowledgethantheoneheaimstodefend

(OC6).Mooreisconfusedastowhatheissaying,eventhoughneitherhenorhis

audiencemembersseemtorealizeit.Aswiththeskeptic,Mooreisfacedwitha

dilemma:eitherhemeans“Iknow”inthesamesenseasthescientist,inwhichcase

hisclaimdoesnotapplygenerally,orhemeansitintheskepticalsense,inwhich

caseitdoesnotapplytotheparticularclaimfromwhichitarises.Wehaveseenthat

theskeptic’schallengetothescientistfailsbecausetheskepticusesadifferent

conceptionofknowledge.Moore’sattempttorefutetheskepticandaffirmthe

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originalclaimtoknowledgefailsbecauseheinvokestheskeptic’sconceptionof

knowledgetoestablishthescientist’sclaim.Theskepticisspeakingatcross‐

purposeswiththescientist;Mooreisspeakingatcross‐purposeswithhimself.

Wittgensteinbelievesthatthisconfusedwayofspeakingischaracteristicof

traditionalphilosophy.Hebelievesthattraditionalphilosophyleadsustouse

wordsinwayswhichdrainthemoftheforceorimplicationwewantthemtohave.

Itleadsustospeakoutsideofthespecificcircumstancesinwhicheverydayclaims

aremade,andyetaimstopronounceontheseeverydayclaims,eitherbycriticizing

them(astheskepticdoes)orbyaffirmingthem(asMooredoes).Traditional

philosophyspeaksoutsidethespecificcircumstancesofeverydayclaimsbecauseit

assumesthatthereisonetruemeaning(of“knowledge,”or“game,”or

“understanding”)whichthephilosophermustdiscoverbeforehecanbesurethathe

isdealingwithacaseofknowledge,oragame,orunderstanding.Heassumesthis

becauseheistryingtoshowthathisaccount(of“knowledge,”or“game,”or

“understanding”)appliesinallcircumstancesinwhichthewordorconceptappears.

Wittgenstein’sresponsetoMoore’sclaim“toknow,withcertainty,”the

existenceoftheexternalworldillustratesbothwhyexternalworldskepticismgets

nogripwithusandwhyweseemunabletorefuteit.Notbecausewesimplydecide,

irrationally,togoaboutourdailylivesdespitetheskeptic;notbecausewehavea

lowerstandardofrationalityorjustificationthanhedoes.Butbecausehischallenge

hasmisseditstarget.Hiswordsarenotdoingtheworkheintendsthemtodo.This

isalsowhyMoore’sattempttorefuteskepticismisbothappealingand

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unconvincing.Appealingbecauseitseemstoexplainsomethingwearerightto

believe:thattheskeptichasgonewrongsomewhere.Unconvincingbecausewe

sense,rightly,thattheskepticcannotbedismissedsoeasily.

IntheInvestigations,Wittgensteinwrites,“Theconfusionswhichoccupyus

arisewhenlanguageislikeanengineidling,notwhenitisdoingwork”(PI§132),

and,“philosophicalproblemsarisewhenlanguagegoesonholiday”(PI§38).

Mooreanclaimsareparadigmaticexamplesoflanguageonholiday,ofwordsidling.

TheyarenotdoingtheworkthatMooreintendsthemtodo;theyarenotaffirming

ourordinaryintuitionsorrefutingskepticism.Wittgenstein’sresponseistoremind

usofthevariouscircumstancesinwhichwemightusethewordsinquestion.15He

providesvariouscircumstancesinwhichwemightusethephrase“Iknow,”and

therebyprovidesMoore(andtheskeptic)withvariouspossibilitieshemightmean

byhiswords.UnfortunatelyforMoore,asfortheskeptic,noneofthesepossibilities

enablehimtomeanwhathewantstomean.

Tosummarize:TheproblemwithMoore’suseof“Iknow”isnotsimplythatit

isusedinanunusualoruncommonsense.Someinterpretorsarguethat

Wittgensteinbelievesthatonlycommonusesoflanguagemakesense,whiletherest

arenonsense,butthisisnottheinterpretationofWittgensteinIamadvancing.The

reasonwhyWittgensteincallsMoore’suseof“Iknow”“nonsense”isbecauseMoore

isclaimingtomeanonethingwhenhiswordsmeananother.OnWittgenstein’s

15“Theworkofthephilosopherconsistsofassemblingremindersforaparticularpurpose”(PI§127).Idiscussthismethodinsection2.3below.

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viewbothcommonanduncommonusesoflanguagecanmakeperfectsense.What

mattersaretheparticularcircumstancesinwhichtheyareuttered.Uncommon

circumstancesnotonlyallowbutinviteuncommonusesofwords.Recallfromthe

previouschapterthatthoughwelearnwordsinparticularcontexts,weusethemin

manycontexts,notallofwhichareexpectedorpredictable.Sincewecannotpredict

inadvancewhatcircumstanceswemightfindourselvesin,wecannotrestrictour

usesofwordstoonlythosecircumstanceswhichusuallyarise.Wittgensteinmakes

thispointwithrespecttoMoore’suseof“Iknow”:

Butnowitisalsocorrecttouse“Iknow”inthecontextwhichMoore

mentioned,atleastinparticularcircumstances.(Indeed,Idonotknowwhat

“IknowthatIamahumanbeing”means.Buteventhatmightbegivena

sense.)ForeachoneofthesesentencesIcanimaginecircumstancesthat

turnitintoamoveinoneofourlanguage‐games,andbythatitloses

everythingthatisphilosophicallyastonishing.(OC§622)

Imagine,forinstance,thatMooreisbadlyinjuredinacaraccident.Heisknocked

unconscious,haslostfeelinginhisextremities,andhisrighthandispartially

severed.Underanaesthetic,hisrighthandissurgicallyreplacedwithasynthetic

onewhichlooksandfeelsjustlikeMoore’soriginal.Imaginefurtherthatwhen

Moorewakesup,hisfriendalertshimtowhatjusthappened.Hisfriendsays:“I’m

sorryG.E.,butthat’snotreallyahand,”towhichMoorereplies,lookingdownathis

handindisbelief,“Iknowthatthisisahand!”Inthiscasethephrasemakesperfect

sense.

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ItiscrucialtounderstandingWittgenstein’sclaimthatMoore(andthe

skeptic)isspeakingnonsensethattheskepticisrespondingtoaspecificclaimmade

byaspecificpersoninaspecificcontext.Thisclaimmaybesomethinglikethe

scientistsaying,inresponsetoachallengefromacolleague,“Iknowthatthisisan

enzyme.”Theskepticstraysfromthesenseinquestionwhenheexpectshis

challengetoaparticularclaimtogeneralizetoallclaims.AndMoore,inresponding

totheskeptic,adoptstheskepticalsenseratherthantheordinarysense.His

mistakeistothenusehisownsenseof“Iknow”asthoughitwerethescientist’s.

2.2.WhereandWhyJustificationsCometoanEnd

Youmustbearinmindthatthelanguagegameissotosaysomethingunpredictable.Imean:itisnotbasedongrounds.Itisnotreasonable(orunreasonable).Itisthere–likeourlife.(OC§559)

InthelastsectionItriedtoexplainwhy,onWittgenstein’sview,external

worldskepticismhaslittleifanypurchaseoverourordinaryclaimstoknowledge.

Butquestionsremain.Theskepticisnotalwayschallengingspecificclaims.Healso

challengeswhetherwecanknowanythingatall.Forinstance,rightnowIbelieve

thatthereisabookonthecoffeetable,andthisbeliefisasignificantreasonwhyI

willwalkovertothecoffeetabletocollectthebook.IalsobelievethatIhavetwo

functioninghands,andthisbeliefunderliestheconfidencewithwhichIputmy

handsonthekeyboardtotypethesewords.ThesearenotclaimsImake,theyare

simplythingsItakeforgranted.TheskepticarguesthatunlessIcanestablishthe

truthofthesebeliefstohissatisfaction,Iamnotjustifiedinholdingthemoracting

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onthem.Herethereisnomisuseoflanguage,nospeakingatcrosspurposes.What,

ifanything,justifiessuchbeliefs?What,ifanything,justifiesourgoingoninthe

worldasweordinarilydo?

Thetemptationistosay:atacertainpoint,justificationscometoanend.In

practice,wejustdonotgoondebatingforever.IntheInvestigations,Wittgenstein

seemstoleaveoffhere(Cf.PI§217).ThisresponseiswhatIwouldliketoexamine

inthissection.Wheredojustificationscometoanend?Andwhy?Anddoesthis

constituteavalidresponsetotheskeptic?

Atissueisnotwhetherwecanrightlyclaimtoknowthings,butwhetherwe

arejustifiedinsimplyacceptingthemwithoutfurtherjustification.Atissue,inother

words,isthenatureofourcertaintyaboutordinary,groundlevelbeliefs,beliefs

expressedbyMooreanpropositionslike,“Thisisahand”and“Theearthhasexisted

foralongtimebeforemybirth.”Certaintyisdifferent,thoughrelated,to

knowledge.16Havingknowledgeofapropositionentailsthetruthofthat

proposition.17Thisiswhatdistinguishesknowledgefrommerebelief.Beingcertain

ofaproposition,ontheotherhand,doesnotentailthetruthofthatthing.Certainty

16AlthoughMooreseemstolinkthetwowhenhesaysthathe“knows,withcertainty,”thattheearthhasexistedforalongtimeetcetera.17Onthetraditionalanalysisof(propositional)knowledge,SknowsthatPiff:

1) SbelievesthatP2) ItisthecasethatP3) SisjustifiedinbelievingthatP

EdmundGettierfamouslyprovidedcounter‐examplestothisanalysisin“IsJustifiedTrueBeliefKnowledge?”Analysis23(1963):121‐123,leadingtoreamsoffurtheranalyses.

104

isratheraverystronglyheldbelief.IcanbecertainthatArsenalwonthematchlast

night,giventhattheywereupbytwogoalsintheninetiethminute,butsinceI

turnedoffthetelevisionbeforethefinalwhistle,Idonotactuallyknowthatthey

won.Certaintyisasubjectivestateofmind;knowledgeisobjective.18

Sohowdowejustifyourcertaintyaboutordinary,groundlevelbeliefs?

Threeresponsespresentthemselves.Thefirstresponseisdogmatism.Thisis

Moore’sview.Onthisviewwecanandshouldjustinsistthattheskepticiswrong.

Mooreinsiststhathereisahand,thatmaterialobjectsexist,etcetera,andthatisthe

endofthematter.Heisrightthatwearecertainofthesethings(thoughheisnot

rightinusingtheword“know”ashedoes).Hemayberightthattheskepticdoes

notdeserveorcannotbegivenananswer,andthatourinabilitytoanswerhim

shouldnotworryus.Buthehasnotshownwhythisisso.Hencehisresponseleads

merelytoastandoff,andourquestions(Whyarewecertain?Whatisthenatureof

thiscertainty?)remainunanswered.19

Thesecondresponseisepistemologicalfoundationalism.ThisisDescartes’

view.20Onthisview,thereisawayofapprehendingbeliefswhichguaranteesthe

truthofthatbelief.ForDescartes,having“clearanddistinct”ideasconstitutesuch

anapprehension.Butthisonlyraisesfurtherquestions.How,forinstance,dowe

18SeeOC§8and§308.19ThisisalsoJ.L.Austin’sviewin“OtherMinds,”PhilosophicalPapers.OxfordUP,1961,44‐84.20MeditationsonFirstPhilosophy.Ed.JohnCottingham.CambridgeUP,1996.

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determinethecriteriathatconstitutessuchanapprehension?Farfromrebutting

theskeptic,thisviewonlyfurtherinvitesskepticism.

Athirdresponseispragmatism.ThisisRorty’sview.21Thisview

acknowledgesthateveryposition,takenindividually,isdubitable,butmaintains

thatunlesswetakesomethingforgrantedweshallneversettleanyquestion,

theoreticalorpractical,sinceanydeterminationofonequestionpresupposessome

premisesinlightofwhichitissettled.Unlessweagreetoactasifcertainthingsare

infactthecase,wewillneveractatall.Sinceactingintheworldisimportant,doing

whatisnecessaryforitisjustified,andrelyingonsomepropositionsis(practically)

justified.Theonesweshouldrelyonarethoseforwhichwehavethemostevidence

forandlittleornoneagainst.

Pragmatismisperhapsthemosttemptingandintuitivephilosophical

responsetotheskeptic.Wittgensteinattimescomesveryclosetothisview.He

writes,

Onecannotmakeexperimentsiftherearenotsomethingsthatonedoesnot

doubt.Butthatdoesnotmeanthatonetakescertainpresuppositionson

trust…IfImakeanexperimentIdonotdoubttheexistenceoftheapparatus

beforemyeyes.Ihaveplentyofdoubts,butnotaboutthat…..Thatistosay,

21Wittgenstein’sinfluenceonRortyismostapparentinhisPhilosophyandtheMirrorofNature.PrincetonUP,1979.Rorty’spragmatismisbestexpressedinObjectivity,Relativism,andTruth:PhilosophicalPapers,Volume1:CambridgeUP,1991.

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itbelongstothelogicofourscientificinvestigationsthatcertainthingsarein

deednotdoubted.(OC§337,§342)22

ButWittgensteindoesnot,intheend,settleonthisview.

Butitisn’tthatthesituationislikethis:Wejustcan’tinvestigateeverything,

andforthatreasonweareforcedtorestcontentwithassumptions.IfIwant

thedoortoturn,thehingesmuststayput.(OC§343)

SoIamtryingtosaysomethingthatsoundslikepragmatism.HereIam

beingthwartedbyakindofWeltanschauung.(OC§422)

Whyisn’tthesituationjustlikethis?Pragmatismsuggeststhatwehaveoptions,

thatwechoosewhattoacceptwithoutjustification.Thisisfalse.Wedonotchoose

ordecidethatwewillbelieveinanexternalworld,wesimplyacceptthatthereis

one.Furthermore,pragmatismdoesnotexplainthecertaintywefeelwithrespect

toMooreanpropositions;itonlyexplainswhywebehaveasiftheyarecorrect.

SowhatisWittgenstein’sview?Howdoeshejustifyourcertaintyabout

ordinarybeliefs?Asusual,Wittgensteindoesnotstatehisviewoutright.He

believesthattheproblemarisesfromaflawedpictureofhowwethinkandactin

theworld.Hebeginstounravelthispicturebyremindingusthatjustificationcomes

toanendinacting,notthinking.Wittgenstein:

Givinggrounds,however,justifyingtheevidence,comestoanend;‐butthe

endisnotcertainpropositionsstrikingusimmediatelyastrue,i.e.itisnota

22SeealsoPI§241.

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kindofseeingonourpart;itisouractingwhichliesatthebottomofthe

languagegame.(OC§204)

Aswesawinthelastchapter,acentralthemeoftheInvestigationsisthathavinga

thought–graspingameaning,forinstance–doesnotconsistinhavingadistinct

mentalstate.Itconsistsinexercisinganabilitytodocertainthings,torespond

appropriately(pickaredflower,followasignpost,continueaseries,etcetera).

Theseresponsesarespontaneousandunhesitating.IntheInvestigations

Wittgensteintalksofresponsesbeing“blind”(§217).Thepointisnotthat

individualsactingintheworlddonotunderstandwhattheyaredoing,butthatone

neednothavecognitiveawarenessofwhatoneisdoingateachmomentinorderto

besaidtobecompetentlydoingthings,orinordertobesaidtoadequatelypossess

theconceptinquestion.Understandinganostensivedefinitiondoesnotrequire

firsthavingtheconcept“understanding”;sittingonachairdoesnotrequirehaving

theconcept“chair”inone’smind.Noraretheseordinaryactionsfoundational

eventsthatcanbethoughtofatomistically.Theyarenottheequivalent,inaction

terms,ofthesupposedlyindubitablejudgmentsoffoundationalistepistemology.

Theyareratherpartofalargestreamoflife(Whatledmetowantthatbookinthe

firstplace?WhoaskedthequestionandwhyamIansweringit?Whogavethe

orderandwhy?).

Moorebelievesthathisclaimsrefuteskepticism;theyshowthatour

ordinary,groundlevelbeliefsarejustified.Wittgensteinarguesotherwise.The

reasontheydonotrefuteskepticism,heshows,isthatMoorepartakesinthesame

flawedpictureofhumanactionandjustificationastheskeptic.Bothpresumethat

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whatisneededtojustifyourcertaintyaboutordinary,groundlevelbeliefsisthe

recognitionofsometruthsabouttheworld.Thispresumptionisfalse.Ifwethink

ofactionasgroundedinorprecededbycertaintruths,setoutasstatementsofthe

kindMooreadvances(“Thisisahand,”“Thereismybook,”“Theearthhasexisted

foralongtimebeforemybirth”),thenwewillthinkthatreasoningrequiresfirst

registeringcertaintruthsabouttheworld.Thisisthepictureofhumanthoughtand

actionthatwechallengedinthepreviouschapter.Aswesawinthecaseoflanguage

acquisition,thereisawayofactingthatdoesnotfirstrequireaninterpretation.Itis

notthinkingbutactingthatistheprimaryphenomena.

ButwhileWittgensteindoesnotbelievethatMooreanclaimsrefute

skepticism,hedoesbelievethattheyarenonethelessphilosophicallysignificant.He

arguesthatsuchclaimsarenotempiricaldiscoverieswhichunderlieour

subsequentactions,asMooresuggests.Theyratherarticulateandrevealourability

toactintheworld,torespondappropriately.Wittgenstein:

Theexistenceoftheearthisratherpartofthewholepicturewhichformsthe

startingpointofbeliefforme.(OC§209)

Nowitgivesusourwayoflookingatthings,andourresearches,theirform.

Perhapsitwasoncedisputed.Butperhaps,forunthinkableages,ithas

belongedtothescaffoldingofourthoughts.(OC§211)

Onthisview,Mooreanclaimsarenotdiscoveriesabouttheworld;theyarticulate

thingswemustknowinordertomakeanyjudgmentsatall.Theyarenot

judgmentswemakeusingourrationalcapacities;theyarticulateourcapacityto

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makejudgments.Thestatewecometobein,ofhavingmatureunderstanding,may

naturallygiverisetocertainclaimswhichlooklikeordinary,empiricalclaims,but

theseclaimsaredifferentthanthosewhichexpresstheresultsofparticular

investigations.AsWittgensteinwrites,“Iaminclinedtobelievethatnoteverything

thathastheformofanempiricalpropositionisone….ruleandpropositionmerge

intooneanother”(OC§308‐9).Mooreanclaimslooklikeordinaryempiricalclaims,

buttheyactuallyarticulatetherulesunderwhichordinaryempiricalclaimscanbe

made.

Whyisthisdistinctionimportant?ForWittgenstein,beingcertainabout

Mooreanclaimsisnotamatterofbelievingsomethingtobetrueorfalse;itispartof

havingtheconceptswithwhichwecanmakeempiricalclaimsinthefirstplace.

BeingcertainofaspecificMooreanclaimlike“Thisisahand”demonstratesthatone

hastheconcept(of“handedness”)inquestion.Askepticcanalwaystestwhether

onehastheconceptsonethinksonehas.Butifhedoestherearelimitstohowfar

onecandefendone’sclaimtoactuallyhavesuchconcepts.IfIquestionwhetherI

havetheconceptsIthinkIhave,Icould,presumably,gothroughthemotionsof

checking,buttheonlywayIcouldprovethatIhavetheconceptinquestionisby

showingtheskeptichowIuseit.Thisisunlikelytosatisfyhim.Heislookingfor

somethingunderlyingmyeverydayuseofconcepts.Wittgensteinadmitsthatwe

cannotalwaysprovidesuchgrounds:“AndherethestrangethingisthatwhenIam

quitecertainofhowthewordsareused,havenodoubtaboutit,Icanstillgiveno

groundsformywayofgoingon.IfItriedIcouldgiveathousand,butnoneas

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certainastheverythingtheyweresupposedtobegroundsfor”(OC§307).23If,

underordinarycircumstances,someonequestionssomethings(i.e.whetherIhave

theconceptof“handedness”),thenthereislittleIcandoorsaytocommunicate

withthem.Eventheskeptic,inexpressingdoubtsaboutsomeempiricalproposition

(“Thisisahand”),takesforgrantedindiscussingthatdoubtthathepossessesthe

conceptinquestion(theconceptof“hand”).

Thisraisesthedifficultquestionofwhetherandhowwecanchangethe

conceptswhichwehave.AttimesWittgensteinseemstosuggestthatwecannot.In

theInvestigations,recall,hewrites,“IfIhaveexhaustedthejustificationsIhave

reachedbedrock,andmyspadeisturned.ThenIaminclinedtosay:“Thisissimply

whatIdo”(PI§217).Whenfacedwiththeskeptic,atacertainpointwecannot

appealtoanythingotherthan“thecommonbehaviourofmankind”(§208)andthe

conceptswehaveinherited.Theseformthebedrockofourbeliefsandjudgments.

Sincewedonotknowhowtothinkoutsideoftheseconcepts,thisiswhere

justificationscometoanend.

Butthisdoesnotmeanthatourbedrockistheonlypossibleone.Theidea

thatthereisoneandonlyoneunderlyingrealityispartofthemetaphysicalpicture

oftheTractatusthatWittgensteinrejectsinhislaterwritings.Notonlyareother

conceptualworldspossible,ourconceptsaresubjecttochange.Thisfollowsfrom

23Seealso,OC§340:“Weknow,withthesamecertaintywithwhichwebelieveanymathematicalyproposition,howthelettersAandBarepronounced,whatthecolourofhumanbloodiscalled,thatotherhumanbeingshavebloodandcallit‘blood.’”

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hisclaimthatourwordsandourconceptsarenoteverywhereboundbyrules.

Accordingly,inOnCertaintyhereplacestheimageofbedrockwiththeimageofa

riverbedwithshiftingsands.Hewrites,

Itmightbeimaginedthatsomepropositions,oftheformofempirical

propositions,werehardenedandfunctionedaschannelsforsuchempirical

propositionsaswerenothardenedbutfluid;andthisrelationalteredwith

time,inthatfluidpropositionshardened,andhardonesbecamefluid.(OC

§96)

Themythologymaychangebackintoastateofflux,theriver‐bedofthoughts

mayshift.ButIdistinguishbetweenthemovementofthewatersonthe

river‐bedandtheshiftofthebeditself;thoughthereisnotasharpdivisionof

theonefromtheother.(OC§97)

Andthebankofthatriverconsistspartlyofhardrock,subjecttono

alterationoronlytoanimperceptibleone,partlyofsand,whichnowinone

placeinanothergetswashedaway,ordeposited.(OC§99)

Wittgensteinhereentertainstheideathatourinheritedframeworkofconceptsis

notfixed;itconsistsofgeological‐likelayersofsedimentwhichmayshiftovertime.1

Thisimageisrifewithpotentiallinesofinquiry:Howdoesthischangeoccur?Can

weinitiateitorhelpitalong?Whatwouldanalternativeformoflifelooklike?1I

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exploresomeofthesequestionsinfollowingsection,aswellasintheconclusionto

thisdissertation.24

FornowIwanttoreturntoWittgenstein’sreadingofMoore.Ifthisreading

isright,thentherearepropositionsfromwhichwecannotsensiblydissent,

propositionswhichwerelyonaspremisesinallourargumentsandreasoning,but

whichwecannotsubstantiateorprove.AsWittgensteinwrites,

Itmaybeforexamplethatallenquiryonourpartissetsoastoexempt

certainpropositionsfromdoubt,iftheyareeverformulated.Theylieapart

fromtheroutetraveledbyenquiry….Everythingspeaksforitandnothing

againstit.(OC§88‐89).

ItisbecauseMooreanpropositionsarticulateaspectsoftheconceptualframework

whichweusetoinvestigateclaims,nottheresultsofsuchinvestigations,thatwe

simplyhavetoacceptthem.Wecouldnotgoonintheworldwithouthavingfirst

assumedthemtobetrue.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatsuchpropositionsaretruths

discoveredinthesamewaylogicalorscientifictruthsarediscovered–thatis,

throughaprocessofreasoning.

SotheanswertoourquestionaboutMooreanclaims–“Howcanwebeso

certainofthem?Isthiscertaintyjustified?”–isthis:gettingonintheworldrequires

actingwithconfidence,andthesepropositionsarticulatesomeaspectsofthatability

toact.Hencewecannotbecriticizedforthiscertainty.SowhileMooreiswrongto

thinkthathisclaimsareempiricalpropositionswhichcanrefuteskepticism,his

24MichaelForsterexploresthesedifficultissueswithremarkableclarityinWittgensteinontheArbitrarinessofGrammar.PrincetonUP,2004.

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errorisinstructive.Hisclaimsrevealpartoftheconceptualapparatuswhichmakes

upourformoflife.Theyillustratethecontours,thelimits,ofourthought.

IntheprevioussectionItriedtoexplainwhy,onWittgenstein’sview,Moore

isnotjustifiedinclaimingto“know”theexistenceoftheexternalworld.Inthis

sectionIhavetriedtoexplainwhy,onWittgenstein’sview,wearejustifiedinbeing

certainofMooreanpropositions.Thesetwoexplanationsseemtoconradicteach

other.Surely,itwouldseem,ifwearejustifiedinbeingcertainofsomething,then

wecanclaimtoknowit.ButWittgensteininsistsotherwise.

ThequeerthingisthateventhoughIfinditquitecorrectforsomeonetosay

“Rubbish!”andsobrushasidetheattempttoconfusehimwithdoubtsat

bedrock,‐neverthelessIholdittobeincorrectifheseekstodefendhimself

(using,e.g.thewords“Iknow”).(OC§498)

Ishouldliketosay:Mooredoesnotknowwhatheassertsheknows,butit

standsfastforhim,asalsoforme;regardingitasabsolutelysolidispartof

ourmethodofdoubtandenquiry.(OC§151)

Iwanttosay:mynothavingbeenonthemoonisassureathingformeas

anygroundsIcouldgiveforit….Andisn’tthatwhatMoorewantstosay,

whenhesaysheknowsallthesethings?–Butishisknowingitreallywhatis

inquestion,andnotratherthatsomeofthesepropositionsmustbesolidfor

us?(OC§111‐112)

Onesays“Iknow”whenoneisreadytogivecompellinggrounds.“Iknow”

relatestoapossibilityofdemonstratingthetruth.Whethersomeoneknows

somethingcancometolight,assumingheisconvincedofit.Butifwhathe

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believesisofsuchakindthatthegroundsthathecangivearenosurerthan

hisassertion,thenhecannotsaythatheknowswhathebelieves.(OC§243)

Whatiswrongaboutusing“know”inconnectionwithMooreanclaimsisthatthese

claimscannotbeinvestigated.Usingtheconceptof“knowledge”inrelationto

Mooreanclaimstemptsustoseethemasmoresimilartootherclaimsthantheyare.

ItleadsustoassumethatMooreanclaimsaretheresultofourjudgment‐making

capacitiesratherthanreflectionsofthesecapacities.Thisleadsustoassumethat

thereoughttobesomewayoftestingwhetherwehavereallyachievedwhatwe

claim,anditmaytemptusintoactuallytestingit,inwhichcaseweworrywewhen

wecan’tfindit,whichleadsusbackdownthepathtoskepticism.Or,weare

temptedtopostulatementalstateswhichguaranteethetruthoftheircontent,

whichleadsustowardsafoundationalismwhich,again,leadsusbackdownthepath

toskepticism.Reamsofcomplicatedandinconclusivephilosophyarisefromthese

usesof“know.”

InthepasttwosectionsIhavetriedtoexplainWittgenstein’sresponseto

externalworldskepticism.Itshouldnowbeclearthatthisresponseisnota

straightforwardsolutiontotheproblem.Rather,onWittgenstein’sview,theskeptic

isrightinsomerespectsandwronginothers.Theskepticisrightinthinking:

1) Thatclaimstoknowledgecanbejustifiablyquestioned.

2) Thatourcerntaintyaboutordinarybeliefscanbejustifiablyquestioned.

3) Thatwecannotalwaysanswerquestionsaboutknowledgeorprovidefurther

justificationsforourcertainty.

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4) Thatsincewecannotalwaysanswerquestionsorprovidejustifications,there

arethingswetakeonfaith,atthebottomofourlives,includingourintellectual

lives.

Theskepticiswrong,however,inthinking:

1) ThatthecertaintywefeelwithregardtoMooreanclaimsishelpfullyexpressed

by“Iknow.”

2) ThatourcommitmenttoMooreanclaimsaretheresultofsomeexerciseofour

cognitivefacultyinformingjudgmentsratherthananarticulationofourability

toformsuchjudgments.

3) Thatitissensibletoquestionanyclaimwhatsoever.

4) Thatwecouldachievethekindoftotalself‐justificationheseeksandhencethat

thereissomethingtoberegrettedorcriticizedinnothavingit.

Insum,Wittgensteinneitherprovidesthejustificationthattheskepticseeksnor

acquiescestohim.Heinsteadchallengestheskeptic’s(andMoore’s)conceptionof

howhumanbeingsactinandrelatetotheworld.Thisrelationisnotalwaysor

oftenoneofknowledge,andtothinkofitinthatwayobscuresimportantfeatures

aboutourselvesandourrelationtotheworld.25

2.3.TheSignificanceofEverydayWordsandConcepts

25ThisisamajorthemeofCavell’swork.ForCavell,skepticismisnot,asitistraditionallyunderstood,astancewhichquestionswhetherweknowwhatweclaimtoknow.Itisanystancewhichtakesourrelationtotheworldtobeoneofknowledge.Onthisaccount,Mooreisnolessskepticalthantheskeptic.

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SofarinthischapterIhavetriedtoshowWittgenstein’sphilosophical

practiceatwork;howherespondstotraditionalphilosophersdoingwhat

traditionalphilosophersdo.InthissectionIwanttoelaborateanddefendthis

practice.

Recallthat,forWittgenstein,traditionalphilosophicalproblemsemergefrom

misunderstanding,fromhavingafalsepictureoflanguageandourselves.These

problemscanthereforebedissolved,ratherthansolved,byclarifyingtheinitial

misunderstanding.ThisprocessofdissolutionconstitutesWittgenstein’spositive

conceptionofphilosophy.Itconsistsinremindingusofwhat,inthephilosophical

searchfordepthandcertainty,wehaveoverlooked.“Theworkofthephilosopher,”

hewrites,“consistsinassemblingremindersforaparticularpurpose”(PI§127).

Whatweneedtoberemindedofdependsontheparticularproblemwearedealing

with.InthecaseofMoore’sclaimtoknowtheexistenceoftheexternalworld,

WittgensteinremindsMoorewhathemightmeanby“know,”andthen

demonstratesthatnoneofthesemeaningsaccomplishesMoore’saim.Inthecaseof

skepticismaboutourordinary,groundlevelbeliefs,Wittgensteinremindsusofhow

thesebeliefsoperateforus.Onceweseethis,weseewethatthesebeliefshavea

differentstatusthanordinaryempiricalclaims,andthatwecannotquestionor

justifytheminthesamewaywecanquestionorjustifyordinaryempiricalclaims.

Wittgensteinwrites,“Thereisnotaphilosophicalmethod,thoughthereare

indeedmethods,likedifferenttherapies”(PI§133).Whathemeans,Itakeit,isthat

sincethemethodortherapyneededdependsontheparticularproblemathand,

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thereisnogeneralformulaforhowtodissolveallphilosophicalproblems.Thisis

onlypartlytrue.SteppingbackfromtheparticularproblemsWittgenstein

addresses,wecanseethathisprocedureisroughlythesameineachcase:he

providesaspecificcontextinwhichweusethewordsorconceptsinquestion.This

isthefunctionofhislanguage‐games:theyare,hesays,“objectsofcomparison,”

designedto“throwlightonthefactsofourlanguage”(PI§130).Languagegames

imagineinwhatcircumstances,andtowhatend,onemightusethewordsor

conceptsinquestion.ThepurposeofthelanguagegameofPI§2,forinstance,isto

imaginewhatalanguagemodeledontheAugustinianpictureoflanguagewould

looklike.Whenconsideredinlightofthelanguagegameofthebuilders,wequickly

seethelimitationsoftheAugustinianpicture.Wittgensteinusesthissamemethod

indealingwiththeparadoxesofostension,explanation,andrule‐following,aswell

aswithMoore’sinfelicitoususeof“Iknow.”Ineachcaseheshowsthatthe

phenomenoninquestiononlyseemsproblematicbecausewehaveadopteda

philosophicalpictureofit,becausewehaveconsidereditoutsideofitsparticular

instantiations.Oncewerecognizethis,theproblemfadesaway.26

WittgensteinsummarizesthismethodinPI§116:

Whenphilosophersuseaword–“knowledge,”“being,”“object,”I,”

“proposition,”“name,”–andtrytograsptheessenceofthething,onemust

26“Fortheclaritythatweareaimingatisindeedcompleteclarity.Butthissimplymeansthatthephilosophicalproblemsshouldcompletelydisappear.”(PI§133)

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alwaysaskoneself:isthewordeveractuallyusedinthiswayinthelanguage

whichisitsoriginalhome?—

Whatwedoisbringwordsbackfromtheirmetaphysicaltotheireveryday

use.

WhatWittgensteinmeansbythe“everydayuse”ofwordsisdeceptivelysimple.It

meansallthevariouswordsandexpressionsthathumanbeingsuseinthecourseof

theirlives,whethertheyarebuyinggroceriesorplottingarevolution,gossiping

withfriendsorresearchingquantumphysics.Itisnotreducibletocommonsense

orthedominantideology.Itincludesnearlyallthethingsthathumanbeingssayin

thecourseoftheirdailylives.Theonlythingitexcludesarephilosophicalusesof

language(suchasMoore’suseof“Iknow”).

Whyprivilegeeverydayusesofwordsoverphilosophicaluses?Isnot

philosophyitsownlanguagegame,withitsowninternalsetofrules,withmeanings

whicharecleartothosewhoarespecialistsinthegame?Considerwhata

philosohpicallanguagegamewouldlooklike.Imaginewedevelopthenecessary

andsufficientconditionsforvariousconcepts(“game”or“knowledge”or

“understanding”),andthenstipulatethat,whendoingphilosophy,onemeansby

“game”“thevoluntaryattempttoovercomeunnecessaryobstacles,”by“knowledge”

“justifiedtruebelief”(orsomevariantthereof),andsoon.Onecoulddothat.And

inthiscasesuchconceptswouldnotbenonsense.Nonsenseariseswhenwe

conflatethephilosophicalconceptwithoureverydayuse.Thisoccurswhenwe

thinkthatthephilosophicalconceptistherealonewhiletheeverydayuseismerely

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apoorcopyofthisrealconcept,andthenimposetheformeronthelatter.Inthe

caseofthephilosophicallanguagedescribedhere,wearenotconfusedastowhat

wearesaying(likeMoore).Butwehavecutourselvesofffromthewords,concepts,

thoughtsandfeelingsthatweuseandexperienceinthecourseofourdailylives.27

Thisphilosophicallanguageisnotnonsense.Itsimplyhasnobearingoveranyof

ourordinary,non‐philosophicalclaims.28

InPI§106Wittgensteinwrites,

27Cavellputsthepointnicely:

“Themeaningistheuse”callsattentiontothefactthatwhatanexpressionmeansisafunctionofwhatitisusedtomeanortosayonspecificoccasionsbyhumanbeings.Thatsuchanobviousfactshouldassumetheimportanceitdoesisitselfsurprising.Andtotracetheintellectualhistoryofphilosophy’sconcentrationonthemeaningofparticularwordsandsentences,inisolationfromasystematicattentiontotheirconcreteuseswouldbeaworthwhileundertaking.Itisaconcentrationoneofwhoseconsequenceisthetraditionalsearchforthemeaningofawordinvariousrealmsofobjects,anotherofwhichistheideaofperfectlanguage.Afittingtitleforthishistorywouldbe:PhilosophyandtheRejectionoftheHuman.

Wittgenstein’smotive…istoputthehumananimalbackintolanguageandtherewithbackintophilosophy….Whatisleftoutofanexpressionifitisused“outsidelanguagegames”isnotnecessarilywhatthewordsmean(theymaymeanwhattheyalwaysdid,whatagooddictionarysaystheymean),butwhatwemeaninusingthemwhenandwherewedo.Thepointofsayingthemislost….Whatweloseisnotthemeaningofourwords….Whatweloseisafullrealizationofwhatwearesaying;wenolongerknowwhatwemean.(Claim206‐207)

28AsRortysays:“Wittgensteindidnotshowmetaphysicstobenonsense,heshowedittobeawasteoftime….ItwouldhavebeenbetterforWittgensteintohavecriticizedthekindofphilosophyhedislikedonthegroundsofuselessnessratherthannonsense”(“WittgensteinandtheLinguisticTurn,”163,166).NotethatwhileIagreewithRortyonthisparticularpoint,IdonotsubscribetohisgeneralreadingofWittgenstein,asthischaptermakesclear.

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Hereitisdifficultasitweretokeepourheadsup,‐‐toseethatwemuststick

tothesubjectsofoureverydaythinking,andnotgoastrayandimaginethat

wehavetodescribeextremesubtleties,whichinturnweareafterallquite

unabletodescribewiththemeansatourdisposal.

Thekeyphrasehereis“meansatourdisposal”–whichistosay,thewordsand

conceptswealreadyhave.Manyphilosophers,traditionalandnon‐traditional,see

thesemeansasinadequate,perhapsevencorrupt.Wehavealreadyseenwhy

traditionalphilosophersaresuspiciousofeverydayconcepts:becausesuchconcepts

aresusceptibletoskepticism.Traditionally,philosophyhasviewedordinaryforms

ofexpressionaspoorcopiesofmoreperfectconcepts.Ithasthereforesetitselfto

discoveringthesupposedlytruenatureoftheconceptsthatalreadyexist,isolated

andpurifiedfromtheirparticularinstantiationsinthemessyworldofeverydaylife.

Wittgensteinshowsthatthiseffortdistortsmorethanitreveals.Heshowsthatthe

natureoressenceofourconceptsliesinoureverydayusesoflanguage,notaboveor

beneathit.Thisiswhathemeanswhenhewrites,“Essenceisexpressedby

grammar”(PI§371).Conceptslike“knowledge,”“hand,”and“kitty”arenotdistinct

fromthewordsweusetoexpressthem;theyexistonlyinsofarastheyareusedby

humanbeings.Andhowtheyareusedinconcretecircumstancesgivesthemtheir

shapeandcontent.Toseetheessenceoftheseconceptsweneedonlyremind

ourselvesofwhenandhowweusethem.

Consideragaintheconceptofknowledge.Foryearsphilosophershavebeen

tryingtodeterminethenecessaryandsufficientconditionsforwhatcountsas

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“knowing”agivenproposition.29Theassumptionunderlyingthiseffortisthatthere

isonesetofconditionsthatcoversallinstancesofknowledge,andthatsetof

conditionsiswhatknowledgereallyconsistsin.Inuncoveringtheseconditions,we

figureoutwhatknowledgereallyis.Andunlessweuncovertheseconditions,wedo

notreallyknowwhatknowledgeis.30Wittgenstein’sapproachismuchdifferent.

Tofindoutwhatourconceptofknowledgeconsistsin,weneedonlydevelopa

sketchofthevariouswaysweusethewordanditscognates(“know,”“knew,”

etcetera).Thissketchmaynotbeasneatororganizedasatraditionalphilosophical

analysis,butthisisbecauseourconceptofknowledgeisnotsoneatororganized.It

ismalleableandopen‐ended,subjecttounusualandunexpectedusesdependingon

thecircumstancesinwhichwemightfindourselves.Oursketchwillthereforehave

variousdegreesofshading,somelineswillbemoreprominentthanothers,andthis

isbecauseourvarioususesoftheconcepthavevariousdegreesofprominence.In

thisrespectoursketchwillmoreaccuratelyreflecthowweusetheconceptin

questionthanatraditionalphilosophicalanalysis.

Non‐traditionalphilosophers,particularlyfromtheContinentaltradition,are

nolesssuspiciousofeverydayconcepts,butfordifferentreasons:theybelievethat

theseconceptspreventusfromapprehendingoursituationinnewandpotentially

liberatingways.GillesDeleuzeandFelixGuattari,forinstance,arguethattheaimof

29Seefootnote19above.30Recentfrustrationswiththisefforthaveledoneprominentphilosophertodeclarethatknowledgeis“unanalyzable.”TimothyWilliamson,KnowledgeandItsLimits.OxfordUP,2001.

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philosophyshouldbeto“createnewconcepts,”andDeleuzechastisesWittgenstein

asmarking“theendofphilosophy.”31ButWittgensteindoesnotbelievethatweare

stuckwiththeconceptswehave,regardlessofwhathappensintheworldaround

us.Sinceourlanguageandourconceptsaremalleableandopen‐ended,sincethey

arenoteverywhereboundbyrules,theycanadapttochangingsocialorhistorical

circumstances.Theonlycaveatisthatwecannotsimplychangeourlanguage,or

ourconcepts,inanywaywelikeandstillexpectthemtomakesense.Nothing

preventsusfromusingthewordsandconceptswehavetodevelopuncommon

beliefsormakeradicalclaims.TheonlyrestrictionimpliedbyWittgensteinisthatif

theseclaimsaretomakesense,iftheyaretohavetheforceandimplicationwewant

themtohave,thentheymustproceedfromoursharedmeanings.Otherwisethey

will,liketheskeptic’schallenge,simplymissthemark.Theywillhavenopurchase

overtheworldtheyaremeanttocriticize.

Wittgenstein’sdefenseoftheeverydayusesofwordshasbeenreadas

claimingthatwecanonlymeaninfullysaywhathasalreadybeensaid,andthatthis

amountstoadefenseofcommonsense.32Thisreadingmisunderstandswhat

31DeleuzeandGuattarigetthisideafromNietzsche,asIdiscussinmoredetailinchapterfour.SeetheirWhatisPhilosophy.Trans.GrahamBurchell.NewYork:ColumbiaUP,1996.Thequotation(fromNietzsche)aboutcreatingnewconceptsisonpage5ofthepreface.Deleuze’scriticismsofWittgensteinaremadeinhisabecedairewithClaireParnet(seefootnote1ofthischapter).32Onthisinterpretation,theideathatformsoflifeare“given,”thattheymustsimplybe“accepted,”impliesthattheyareimmunenotonlyfromskepticism,butalsofromrationalcriticism.ThisimplicationhasbeenusedbybothcriticsandadmirersofWittgensteinasevidenceofhisrelativismand/orconservatism.RichardRorty

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Wittgensteinmeansby“theeverydayuseofwords.”This“everydayuse”isnotthe

sameascommon‐sense.Common‐senseconsistsofbeliefswhicharecommonly

held.Wittgensteinbelievesthatwearejustifiedinholdingsomebeliefsevenifwe

cannotjustifytheminthewaytheskepticwants.Buttheseincludebeliefslike“the

earthhasexistedforalongtimebeforeIwasborn”and“Ihaveahand,”not

“capitalismistheidealformofsocialandeconomicorganization”and

“representationaldemocracyisthebestsystemofgovernance.”WhatWittgenstein

defends,whatheinsistson,isnotcommonsensebutthesharedmeaningsofour

wordsandoursharedconcepts:thefactthatwhenIsay,“Doyoudressthatway

voluntarily?”Imeantoimplythatyoushoulddressdifferently;orthefactthatwhen

thescientistsays“Iknowthisisanenzyme”inordinarycircumstanceshemeans

thatheknowsthisisanenzymeandnotsomeothercellularmaterial.Theseshared

drawsthisconclusionbutpointsoutthatwecanstillusenon‐rationalmeanstopersuadeindividualstoadoptoneformofliferatherthananother.SeeRorty’sContingency,Irony,Solidarity.CambridgeUP,1993.SimilarreadingsareadvancedbyDavidBloorinWittgenstein:ASocialTheoryofKnowledge.NewYork:ColumbiaUP,1983.JamesKlagge,“WhenAreIdeologiesIrreconcilable?CaseStudiesinDiachronicAnthropology,”PhilosophicalInvestigations21(3),July1998andStephenHilmy,TheLaterWittgenstein:TheEmergenceofaNewPhilosophicalMethod.Oxford:Blackwell,1987.AliceCrarychallengesthisreadingin“Wittgenstein’sPhilosophyinRelationtoPoliticalThought,”TheNewWittgenstein,ed.AliceCraryandRupertRead.London:Routledge,2000,118‐146.

ThereisnonecessarylinkbetweenWittgenstein’sapparentrelativismandhisapparentconservativism,thoughsomedrawtheconnection.C.J.Nyiridefendsthisrelativistandconservativereadingin“Wittgenstein’sLaterWorkinRelationtoConservatism,”WittgensteinandHisTimes.Ed.BrianMcGuiness.Oxford:Blackwell,1982.44‐68.ForcriticismsofWittgenstein’ssupposedconservatism,see:ErnstGellner,WordsandThings:AnExaminationof,andAttackOn,LinguisticPhilosophy.London:Routledge,1959andOnoraO’Neill,“ThePowerofExample,”ConstructionsofReason:ExplorationsofKant’sPracticalPhilosophy.CambridgeUP,1989,165‐186.

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meaningsarenotthingsthatwedecideonorthingsthatwecanignore.Theyare

thebasisforanykindofsense,commonoruncommon.

OthersreadWittgensteinasadvocatingphilosophicalquietism,asgivingup

ontheproblemsofphilosophyaltogether33SometimesWittgensteinseemsto

suggestjustthis.34Hewrites,forinstance,thathispositiveconceptionof

philosophysimply“leaveseverythingasitis”(PI§124).Itdoesnotteachus

anythingnew.Inthiscaseitseemsthatwearebetteroffavoidingphilosophical

questionsinthefirstplace.Thenwewillnotbecomecaptivetophilosophical

picturesandtherewillbenoneedtoberemindedofanything.Othertimes,

however,Wittgensteinsuggestsanongoingneedforthekindofphilosophical

practiceheadvocates.Hiscompetingremarksonthesubjectsuggestthathewas

unsureofwhatdirectionhewantedphilosophytotake.Regardlessofhisprecise

feelingsonthesubject,thereareseveralreasonswhywecannotsimplyavoid

traditionalphilosophy,andhencewhythereisanongoingneedforthekindof

philosophyheadvocates.

33SimonBlackburnintroducedthisnowpopularcharacterizationofWittgenstein’sphilosophytodescribe“thebelief…thatproblemsrequiretherapyratherthansolution.”SpreadingtheWord:GroundingsinthePhilosophyofLanguage.Oxford:ClarendonPress,1984,146.Blackburn’sdefinitionofquietismincludesmanyprominentWittgensteinianstoday,includingStanleyCavell,fewofwhomembracethischaracterization.34AsImentiononpage1above,Wittgensteinwritesthatphilosophyis“likeapairofglassesonournosethroughwhichweseewhateverwelookat.Itneveroccurstoustotakethemoff”(PI§103).Hedoesnotsayweneedanother,betterpairofglasses;hesuggeststhatouruncorrectedwayoflookingatthingsisallweneed.

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Thefirstreasonisthatphilosophicalproblemsariseorganicallyinthecourse

ofourordinarylives.35ConsideragaintheAugustinianpicture.Thispicture,once

formed,canbeundonethroughcarefulanalysis,butthepictureitselfariseseasily

enoughwhenweconsiderhowachildlearnslanguage.Subtleshiftsinperspective

oremphasis,likethosefromAugustine’swordstotheAugustinianpicture,occurin

allkindsofcircumstances.Ourordinary,unreflectivewaysofthinkingarenoless

susceptibletothepitfallsoftraditionalphilosophyIdescribedinthefirstchapter:

theprivilegingofabstractgeneralizationsratherthanfocusingonparticularcases;

mistakinghowthingsactuallyarewithhowwethinktheymustbe;andpositing

hiddenprocessestoexplainvisiblephenomena(God,genetics,brainwaves,

etcetera).TheassumptionsunderlyingtheAugustinianpicture,forinstance,are

perfectlyordinaryandintuitive,astheirrecurrenceovertwomillenniaindicates.

Thesecondreasonwhythereisanongoingneedforthekindofphilosophy

Wittgensteinadvocatesisthatthereissomethingaboutourlanguageitselfwhich

seducesusintoaconfusedunderstandingofit.AsWittgensteinwrites,

Philosophy,asweusetheword,isafightagainstthefascinationwhichforms

ofexpressionexertuponus.(BlueBook25)

35CavellsuggeststhatthereasonwhytherewillalwaysbeaneedforthekindofphilosophyWittgensteinisbecausethereitisnaturalforhumanbeingstowanttoknowmorethanourconceptsandlanguageallowustoknow.ForCavellthereis“anaturaldisappointmentwiththeconditionsofhumanknowledge”(quotedinRorty173).

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Apicturehelduscaptive,andwecouldnotgetoutsideof,foritlayinour

languageandlanguageseemedtorepeatittousinexorably.(PI§115)

Amainsourceofourfailuretounderstandisthatwedonotcommandaclear

viewoftheuseofourwords.–Ourgrammarislackinginthissortof

perspicuity”(PI§122).

Philosophyisabattleagainstthebewitchmentofourintelligencebymeans

ofourlanguage”(PI§109).

“Ourformsofexpressionexertafascinationonus”;“languagebewitchesour

intelligence”:Wittgenstein’sphrasingimpliesthatthefaultliespartlyinthenature

ofourlanguage.Indeedtheuniformappearanceofwordsandthefactthateach

appearstohavealimitedfunctionmakesitseemasthoughlanguageissystematic,

logical,rule‐boundwhenitisnot.Andthisappearanceseducesusintotryingto

uncoveritssupposedunderlyingstructure.

Butthefaultalsoliesinus,inourfailuretogetaclearviewofourlanguage.

Thisfailurestemsfromourimpulsetosearchforsomethinguniversal,something

immunetoskepticismwhichunderliesourordinaryexpressions.Andthisimpulse

istiedupwithourbeliefofwhatphilosophyisorshouldbe.Wetendtobelievethat

philosophyshoulddiscoverthings(underlyingstructures,forinstance).Itshould

increaseourknowledgeoftheworld.36Thatis,wetendtothinkofphilosophyas

36“Itwastruetosaythatourconsiderationscouldnotbescientificones.Itwasnotofanypossibleinteresttoustofindoutempirically‘that,contrarytoour

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likescience.ThisconceptionofphilosophyleadstothetendenciesIdiscussedinthe

previouschapter:thetendencytoconsiderwordsindependentlyofthe

circumstancesoftheirusestemsfromthebeliefthatphilosophy,likescience,should

produceobjectiveknowledgeoftheworld,independentofhumaninfluence,and

applicabletoallpossiblecircumstances.Thetendencytoconceiveofwordsand

actionsatomistically,apartfromtheirinterconnectionswithotherthings,isalso

similartoscientificanalysis.Traditionalphilosophershaveadoptedthese

tendenciesastheyhavesoughttoincreaseourknowledgeofthelanguageandthe

world.

Wittgensteindoesnotaimtoincreaseourknowledgeoftheworld,heaimsto

augmentourunderstandingofit.Andinthisrespecthesucceeds.AsIhavetriedto

showinthischapter,heprovidesabetterunderstandingofhowourlanguage

works;ofwhytheproblemofskepticismgetsnogripwithus,eventhoughwe

cannotseemtorefuteit;ofthenatureandlimitsoftheconceptswhichweuseto

navigatethroughtheworld;ofwhyandwherejustificationsmustcometoanend;

andofthefactthatourrelationtotheworldisnotprimarilyoneofknowledge.In

short,welearnalotaboutourselvesandourplaceintheworldthrough

Wittgenstein’sapproachtophilosophy.Thisdemonstratesthatalthoughtraditional

philosophyoftenleadsusintoconfusion,thevoyageintophilosophicalconfusion

preconceivedideas,itispossibletothinksuch‐and‐such’–whateverthatmaymean.(Theconceptionofthoughtasagaseousmedium.)”(PI§109)

Wittgenstein’scriticismofthescientisticpretensionsofphilosophyprovidessomeinsightintotheoftenoverlookedepigraphtotheInvestigations,aquotebytheAustrianplaywrightNestroy:“Anyway,thethingaboutprogressisthatitlooksmuchgreaterthanitreallyis.”

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andbackdoesnotleaveuswherewebegan.Returningtoeverydayconceptsis

differentthanhavingneverleftthem.Inthisrespect,Wittgenstein’spositive

conceptionofphilosophyisnotquietistic.Itdoesnotsimply“leaveeverythingasit

is”(PI§124).

2.4.Conclusion

InthischapterIhavetriedtoillustrateWittgenstein’spositiveconceptionof

philosophy.Wittgenstein’smethodof“assemblingreminders”isnotadefenseof

common‐senseorareturntoordinary,unreflectivethought,norisitaquietistic

abandonmentofcriticalthought.Rather,itmakesimportantconceptualdistinctions

andenablesustoseetraditionalphilosophicalproblemsinanewlight.Inthe

process,ithelpsusbetterunderstandourlanguage,ourconcepts,ourselves,and

ourplaceintheworld.

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PARTTWO

NIETZSCHE

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3.NIETZSCHE’SCRITIQUEOFPHILOSOPHY

“Soletusbecautiousforonce,letusbeunphilosophical.”

BGE19

LikeWittgenstein,Nietzsche,usestheword“philosophy”anditscognatesin

differentways.Sometimesheusestheminapositivesense,aswhenhewrites,“My

kindofphilosopherisoneforwhomacreativemodeofthoughtdominates.”1Other

timesheusestheminanegativesense,asintheepigraphtothischapter,orwhen

hewrites,

Whatprovokesustolookatallphilosopherswithamixtureofdistrustand

contemptisnotthatwearealwaysuncoveringhowguilelesstheyare–how

oftenandeasilytheylosetheirgrasportheirway,inshorthowchildishand

childliketheyare.Itisratherthattheyarenothonestenough….(BGE5)

Inthefirstinstance,Nietzscheuses“philosopher”asanhonorificforthosewho

challengetheestablishedhierarchyofvaluesandcreatenewones.These

“philosophersofthefuture”or“freespirits”arerare,andNietzscheaimstoinspire

moreofthem.Inthesecondinstance,Nietzscheuses“philosopher”contemptuously

torefertothose,likePlato,Descartes,andKant,whoseekarational,objective

understandingoftheworld.These“traditional”philosophersareafrequenttarget

1TheWilltoPower.Trans.WalterKaufmanandR.J.Hollingdale.NewYork:Vintage,1968,§464.(HereafterWP)

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ofNietzsche’swritings.Myaiminthischapteristoexplainwhyheiscriticalof

thesephilosophers,andtoseehowfarthiscriticismextends.

Ibegin,inthefirstsection,byexplainingNietzsche’scriticismofmetaphysics.

MyaccountofNietzscheinthissectionisrelativelystraightforwardand,Ibelieve,

uncontroversial.ItisdesignedtoprovideageneraloverviewofwhyNietzscheis

criticaloftraditionalphilosopherslikePlato,Descartes,andKant.Inthenexttwo

sectionsIdeepenthisaccountbyconsideringtworecent,prominentinterpretations

ofNietzsche:thepost‐structuralistinterpretationandthenaturalistone.These

interpretationsaccountforNietzsche’scriticismofmetaphysics,butIarguethat

theydonotcapturetheextentofNietzsche’scriticismofphilosophy.Weavingour

waythroughtheseinterpretations,showingwhatiswrongwitheach,demonstrates

theproblemswiththecurrentinterpretiveparadigmsandfillsouttheinitial

accountofNietzsche’scriticismofphilosophy.Itshowsthatthiscriticismextends

beyondNietzsche’simmediatetargettoincludebothmetaphysicalandnon‐

metaphysical,traditionalandnon‐traditionalbranchesofphilosophy.

3.1.NietzscheandMetaphysics

IntheAnti­Christ,Nietzschecallsmetaphysicsoneof“themostviciouserrors

thathaseverexisted”(3).InTwilightoftheIdols,hecallsthedistinctionbetween

appearanceandthethinginitself,thedistinctiononwhichallmetaphysicsrelies,

“thelongesterror”(50).TheopeningchapterofHuman,AllTooHumanisdevoted

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toanattackonthemetaphysicalphilosophiesofPlato,KantandSchopenhauer.The

openingchapterofBeyondGoodandEvilchallenges,amongotherthings,the

Cartesiansubjectandtheideaoffreewill.ThefifthchapterofTheGayScienceseeks

torootoutremnantsofChristianmetaphysicsinmodernscience.OntheGenealogy

ofMoralityaimstodemystifyallcontemporarymetaphysicalideals,bothreligious

andsecular,byuncoveringtheiroriginsinconcretesocialpractices.Inshort,

Nietzsche’smaturewritingsconstituteasustainedattackonmetaphysics.2Myaim

inthissectionistotrytounderstandthisattack.Iproceedbyansweringtwobasic

questions:Whatismetaphysics,forNietzsche?Andwhydoeshecriticizeit?

Answeringthefirstquestioniseasyenough.ForNietzsche,anexplanationis

metaphysicalifitassumesorappealstoatranscendentrealm,outsidespaceand

time,toexplainandjustifythetemporal,phenomenalworld.3Onthisaccount

2By“maturewritings”ImeanthewritingsfromofHuman,AllTooHuman(1878)onwards.ThesewritingsbreakfromTheBirthofTragedy(1872)andtheUntimelyMeditations(1874),whichuncriticallyadoptSchopenhauer’smetaphysicalpicureoftheworld.3Ifmetaphysicsistakentomeannotanappealtoatranscendentrealmbutratherthestudyoftheessenceorbeingunderlyingallthings(thatis,ontology),thenitcanbearguedthatNietzscheisametaphysician.Heideggeroffersonesuchinterpretation,famouslycallingNietzsche“thelastgreatmetaphysicianoftheWest.”Nietzsche.Volume3.Ed.DavidFarrellKrell.NewYork:HarperOne,1991.Heidegger’sreading,however,isunderminedbyhisover‐relianceonNietzsche’sNachlass.Thisleadshimtoclaim,forinstance,thatNietzsche’sdoctrineofeternalreturnisametaphysicalnotion.Iargueinthefollowingchapterthatitisbestreadasatestofone’sperspectiveonlife,onewhichneednotimplyanymetaphysics.

JasonRichardson,avoidingthevariouspitfallsofHeidegger’sreading,arguesthatNietzscheisametaphysicianinsofarashelocatesthewilltopowerastheessenceofallthings(Nietzsche’sSystem.OxfordUP,1996).OnRichardson’sinterpretation,Nietzsche’sclaimthatthewilltopoweristheessenceofallthings

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Platonicforms,theCartesiansubject,animmaterialsoul,theChristianGod,Kantian

noumena,Schopenhauer’swill,andFregeansenseareallmetaphysical.Theyappeal

tosomethingoutsidethenaturalworldtoexplainwhathappenswithinit.

Answeringthesecondquestionismoredifficult.Wehaveseenthat

Nietzschecallsmetaphysicsan“error,”butitisunclearwhathemeansbythis.

“Error”impliesthatmetaphysicalrealmsdonotactuallyexist,orthatthearguments

fortheirexistenceareunsound.ButNietzschedoesnotseemtomean“error”in

eitherofthesesenses.Attimeshechallengesthereasoningbehindmetaphysical

beliefs,asinhiscriticismoftheCartesian“I.”Othertimesheaskswhyweare

constitutesametaphysicalclaim,eventhoughwilltopowerremainsimmanentinthisworld.

MyownviewisthatNietzscheiscriticaloftranscendentmetaphysics.Thatis,heiscriticaloftheideathatthereisanidealworldwhichactsonandinformsthephenomenalone.ItseemsclearthatthisiswhatNietzschemeansby“metaphysics”whenheactuallyusestheterm,andthatRichardsonisusingadifferentsenseofthetermthanNietzscheuses.(See,forinstance,thefamouspassagefromTwilightoftheIdols,“HowtheRealWorldatLastBecameaMyth.”)IndeedRichardsonacknowledgesthathisinterpretationgoes“beyondwhatcanbefoundinNietzsche’swords”(6).Inthisrespecthisargumentisnotinconsistentwithmine.

MyaccountofwhatNietzschemeansbymetaphysicsissimilartoMaudemarieClark’saccount,thoughmyinterpretationofNietzsche’scriticismofmetaphysics(andphilosophy)differsfromhers(seetheintroductionandsectionthreeofthischapter).ClarkarguesthatbymetaphysicsNietzschemeansKantiannoumena,andthenarguesthatNietzscheadvocatesneo‐Kantianempiricisminitsplace.MaudemarieClark,NietzscheonTruthandPhilosophy.CambridgeUP,1990.

ThoughitisuncontroversialtosaythatNietzschewantstorejecttranscendentmetaphysics,whetherornotheissuccessfulisanothermatter.InadditiontoHeidegger,MichaelHaarandArthurDantoquestionwhetherNietzschesimplyreplacespreviousmetaphysicalphilosophieswithhisown.MichaelHaar,NietzscheandMetaphysics.Trans.MichaelGendre.Buffalo:SUNYPress,1996.ArthurDanto,NietzscheasPhilosopher.NewYork:ColumbiaUP,1965.PeterPoellneranalyzesNietzsche’spositiononvariousmetaphysicalissues(substance,being,causality,etcetera)inhisNietzscheandMetaphysics.OxfordUP,1995.HisotherwisecarefulstudyoverlooksthefactthatNietzschewantedtodiscardthesekindsofmetaphysicaldebatesaltogether.

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disposedtoadoptmetaphysicalbeliefsinthefirstplace,asinOntheGenealogyof

Morality.4Andstillothertimeshequestionstheutilityofmetaphysics,aswhenhe

writes,

Itistrue,theremightbeametaphysicalworld;onecanhardlydisputethe

absolutepossibilityofit….Nomatterhowwellproventheexistenceofsucha

worldmightbe,itwouldstillholdtruethattheknowledgeofitwouldbethe

mostinconsequentialofallknowledge,evenmoreinconsequentialthanthe

knowledgeofthechemicalanalysisofwatermustbetotheboatmanfacinga

storm.(HAH1.9)

ThefirstsentenceofthisquotationindicatesthatNietzschedoesnothaveaknock‐

downargumentagainstmetaphysics.Hedoesnotcompelus,onpainof

contradiction,torejectit.Insteadhecastsdoubtonsomemetaphysicalarguments,

questionswhywearedisposedtobelievethem,andprovidespragmaticreasonsfor

rejectingthem.Letuslookatthesethreestrategiesmoreclosely.

IntheopeningchapterofBeyondGoodandEvil,entitled“OnthePrejudicesof

Philosophers,”Nietzschechallengesthereasoningunderlyingperhapsthemost

pervasivemetaphysicalbelief:thebeliefthatthereisasubjectindependentofthe

bodyresponsibleforitsthoughtsandactions.Thisbelief,heargues,stemsfrom

4AndalsoinDaybreak(D),BeyondGoodandEvil,TheGayScience(GS),andHuman,AllTooHuman(HAH)Inthelatter,hewrites:“Tofeellessresponsible,andatthesametimetofindthingsmoreinteresting:thatisthetwofoldbenefit[man]owestometaphysics.”Human,AllTooHuman:ABookforFreeSpirits.Trans.MarionFaberandStephenLehmann.Lincoln:UniversityofNebraskaPress,1996,1.17.

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mistakingthegrammaticaldistinctionbetweensubjectandpredicateforanactual

distinction,basedinreality.Thatis,weareledbythegrammarofthephrase“I

think”tobelievethatthe“I”referstoanactualexistingthing,separatefrombut

somehowwillingthethought.Nietzscheshowsthatthisinferenceisunwarranted.

Thegrammaticaldistinctionbetweensubjectandpredicatemayjustaswellservea

pragmatic,notdescriptivepurpose:itdistinguishesthethoughtthatarisesinmy

bodyratherthanyours.5Itdoesnotnecessarilymeanthatthereisan“I”distinct

fromtheactofthinking.

Nietzschepresentsadifferentpictureofthissamephenomena.“Athought,”

hewrites,“comeswhenitwantsto,notwhen‘I’wantitto.”Hecontinues,

Thereisthinking,buttoassertthat“there”isthesamethingasthatfamous

old“I”is,toputitmildly,onlyanassumption,ahypothesis,andcertainlynot

animmediatecertainty.(BGE17)6

5In“OnTruthandLiesinanExtra‐MoralSense”(1873),Nietzschearguesthatwordsdonotreflectanalreadyexistingrealitybutratherserveapragmatic,socialpurpose.Werefertoroughlysimilarthings(i.e.differentkindsoftrees)bythesameconcept(i.e.“tree”)inordertodevelopacertainreliabilityinourrelationswithothers.Fromthispragmaticpurposeaconceptualedificedevelops.Overtimewewronglycometothinkthatthisconceptualedificereflectsactualdistinctionsintheworld,ratherthandistinctionsthatweimposeontheworld(i.e.thatthereissomenecessarydistinctionbetweentreesandbushes,forinstance).Idiscussthisessayinsectionthreeofthischapter.6SeealsothefamouspassagefromOntheGenealogyofMorality:

Aquantumofforceissimplysuchaquantumofdrive,will,action—rather,itisnothingbutthisverydriving,willing,actingitself—anditcannotappearasanythingelseexceptthroughtheseductionoflanguage(andthefundamentalerrorsofreasonpetrifiedinit),whichunderstandsandmisunderstandsall

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Nietzsche’smethodofcriticismhereisworthnoting,asitanticipatesWittgenstein’s

methodintheInvestigations(amethodHumeperfectedinhisdiscussionof

causation).Thereisanobservablephenomenon:theactofthinking.Thisthinking

occurswithinthebodyofanindividual.Sofarthereisnodifficulty.Butthenthere

is,inthephilosopheraswellasintheordinary,relativelyunreflectiveindividual,a

subtleleapfromtheobservationthatthinkingoccurstothebeliefthatthereisa

subjectwhowillsthethought.Thisleapisunwarranted.Ithasnoempiricalor

logicalbasis.Yetitunderliesourmostfundamentalunderstandingofourselves.

Asimilarcombinationofgrammaticalandlogicalerrorleadstothebelief

thatwehavefreewill.The“actofwilling,”Nietzschewrites,“onlyhasunityasa

word”(BGE19).Itisreallya“multifariousthing”consistingofthreecomponents:a

feelingofmovingawayfromonethingandtowardsanother;a“commanding

thought”thatisnotpriortoordistinctfromtheprocessofwilling,butpartofit;and

thefeelingofpleasureatthesuccessoftheactionthatwebelievearisesfromour

command.Theideathatwefreelywillthoughtsandactionsstemsfromthinking

thatthesethreecomponentsarecausallyrelated:thatthecommandingthought

producesthefeelingofmovingfromonethingtowardsanother:

actionasconditionedbysomethingwhichcausesactions,bya“Subject.”For,injustthesamewayaspeopleseparatelightningfromitsflashandtakethelatterasanaction,astheeffectofasubject,whichiscalledlightning,sopopularmoralityseparatesstrengthfromthemanifestationsofstrength,asifbehindthestrongpersontherewereanindifferentsubstrate,whichisfreetoexpressstrengthornot.Butthereisnosuchsubstrate;thereisno“being”behindthedoing,acting,becoming.“Thedoer”ismerelymadeupandaddedintotheaction—theactiseverything.(GM1.13)

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Freedomofthewill–thatisthewordforthatcompletepleasurable

conditionexperiencedbythepersonwillingwhocommandsand

simultaneouslyidentifieshimselfwiththeonewhoexecutesthecommand–

assuchhecanshareinenjoyingatriumphoverresistance,whilesecretly

judgingthatitwasactuallyhiswillthatovercamethatresistance.(BGE19).

Theonlyevidenceforthissupposedcausalrelationisthatweobservethesethree

componentsoccurringaroundthesametime.Thisobservationalonedoesnot

warranttheinferencethatthesecomponentsarecausallyrelated.Forallweknow,

theyoccuratthesametimebecausethereisanothercauseunderlyingthem.In

short,thebeliefthatouractionsarefreelywilledstemsfromtheclassicalflawof

mistakingcorrelationforcausation.

Theseflawsaresosubtle,ourunderstandingofourselvesasconscious,

agentialbeingssodeeplyentrenched,thattheconcept“I”maynotseem

metaphysical.ButkeepinmindthatforNietzsche,asforWittgenstein,ordinary

beliefsarenotnecessarilydistinctfrommetaphysicalones.Somethingis

metaphysicalifitcannotbeexplainedbyorisnotcontinuouswiththenatural

world.OurordinarybeliefsintheCartesiansubjectandfreewillaremetaphysical

forpreciselythisreason.

Indeedmanybeliefsunderlyingtheacademicdisciplineofphilosophy,beliefs

thatNietzschecriticizesasmetaphysical,arealsoconstitutiveofordinary,everyday

thinking.Itiscommonlyassumed,notjustbyphilosophers,thattruthispreferable

tountruth,objectiveknowledgepreferabletosubjectiveknowledge,andthat

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reasonedargumentationisagoodthing.7What,then,isdistinctiveabout

philosophy?Nietzschebelievesthatphilosophersappropriateandexaggeratethese

“commonprejudices”astheydeveloptheirtheories(BGE19).Philosophersthereby

helpjustifyandentrenchthesebeliefs.Descartes,forinstance,justifiesthecommon

beliefthatthereisasoulinsidethebodywhichisour“true”self.Kantjustifiesthe

commonbeliefthattemporalactionsandthoughtsareinformedbyanunknowable

worldbeyondourown.Nietzsche’stargetisboththesecommonprejudicesand

theirappropriationbyphilosophers.Hesinglesoutphilosophersbecausethey,of

allpeople,shouldnotbesusceptibletoprejudicegiventheirclaimstoinvestigate

everything.Hencethetongue‐in‐cheekclaimwhichservesastheepigraphtothis

chapter:Nietzschewantstobe“cautiousforonce…unphilosophical”soastoavoid

theunwarrantedassumptionsandinferencesthatplaguephilosophers.

NotethatNietzschehasnotshownthatthereisnoCartesiansubjectorfree

will.Hehasonlyshownthatourbeliefinthemisunjustified.Inthisrespect,his

argumentsagainstthesebeliefsresemblethatofphilosophicalskepticism.8This

7Nietzschecallstheassumptionthattruthispreferabletountruth“themostpoorlyprovenassumptionintheworld”(BGE34).SeealsoBGE2:“Howevermuchvaluewemayascribetotruth,truthfulness,oraltruism,itmaybethatweneedtoattributeahigherandmorefundamentalvaluetoapperance,tothewilltoillusion,toegoismanddesire.”8Thoughtheformoftheseparticularargumentsresemblethatofskepticism,Nietzscheisnotaskeptictoutcourt,ashemakesclearinBGE208:“skepticismisthemostspiritualexpressionofacertaincomplexphysiologyconditionthatincommonparlanceiscalledbadnervesorsickliness.”Theproblemwiththeskepticisthatheonlysays“no,”anddoesnotaffirmanything.Still,Nietzscheacknowledgesthattheskeptic,withhisnay‐saying,canplayauseful,preliminaryfunctioninclearingtheairofbadarguments,asNietzschedoeshere.

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differsfromhisusualformofargument,whichislesstoshowthatmetaphysical

beliefsareunjustifiedthantoquestionthemotivationwhichleadstotheminthe

firstplace.Thatis,Nietzscheisusuallylessinterestedinthephilosophicalquestion,

Whatchainofreasoningleadstothebeliefthatthereisasubjectindependentofthe

body?,thaninthepsychologicalandhistoricalquestion,Whatleadsustowantto

believethis(andhencetohappilyoverlooktheunwarrantedinference)inthefirst

place?Whatkindofdispositionmustonehavetovaluethenotionofoneselfas

freelywillingsubject,andwheredoesthisdisposition,thisvaluation,comefrom?

NietzscheprovideshisfullestanswertothisquestioninOntheGenealogyof

Morality.Therehetracestheancestryofourcontemporarymetaphysicalbeliefs(in

Godandfreewill)backtomoralfeelings(namelyguilt),andtracestheoriginsof

thesemoralfeelingsbacktoourmostbasic,psychologicalneeds(suchastheneed

tomakesenseofoursuffering).Thestoryhetellsiscomplex,compelling,andnow

familiar.Still,Iwillsketchtherelevantpartshere.

ThestorybeginswithNietzsche’saccountofancientnoblesandslaves.9

Noblesandslaves,accordingtoNietzsche,areparticularkindsofpeople:theyhave

particular(i.e.different)psychologicalandphysiologicalconstitutions,andthese

9MydiscussionofnoblesandslavesfollowsJasonRichardon’sdiscussioninchapteroneofNietzsche’sSystem,OxfordUP,1996.Richardsonwasthefirsttoshowthatnoblesandslavesarecertainkindsofpeople(thatis,peoplewithparticularpsychologicalandphysiologicalconstitutions).Iamnotsure,though,thatNietzscherestrictshistypologytojustthenoble,slave,andÜbermensch,asRichardsonsuggests.ItseemsratherthatNietzsche’saccountofthesetypeswouldallowforotherkindsaswell.

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constitutionsdeterminetheirthoughts,feelings,andactions.Thereasonwhysome

individualsarenoblesisbecausetheyhavehadtostrugglefortheirsurvivalagainst

externalthreatstotheirexistence.10Individualswhofacesuchchallengesbecome

singularlyfocused.Theyalsotendtohaveacertainphysiologicalconstitution:they

haverelativelyfewerdrivesandinstincts,makingiteasierfortheirdrivesand

instinctstoworktogether.11Andsincesuchexternalchallengestendtothreaten

groupsofindividuals,suchgroupsunitetowardsthesingulargoalofovercoming

thesethreats.12Thusnoblesvaluestrength,survivalanddominance,andbecause

theyhaveasimple,easilyorganizedsetofinstinctsanddrivestheyareconditioned

toachievethesevalues.Theyarenottornbetweencompetingimpulses.Thisholds

forbothnobleindividualsandthecasteasawhole.

10“Aspeciescomesintobeing,atypegrowsstrongandfixed,bystrugglingforalongtimewithessentiallysimilarunfavorableconditions….Consideranaristocraticcommunity,suchastheancientGreekpolis,orVenice,anorganizationwhosevoluntaryorinvoluntarypurposeistobreed:therearepeoplecoexistinginit,relyingononeanother,whowanttofurthertheirspecies,chieflybecausetheymustfurtheritorrunsomeriskofextermination.Insuchacase,goodwill,excess,andprotection,thoseconditionsthatfavourvariation,aremissing;thespeciesneedstoremainaspecies,somethingthatbyvirtueofitsveryharshness,symmetry,andsimplicityofform,canbefurtheredandandingeneralendure….”(BGE262)11“Atypelikethis,withfewbutverystrongcharacteristics…”(BGE262).“Ifsomeoneactsfromafewmotiveswhicharealwaysthesame,hisactionstakeongreatenergy….Fewmotives,energeticaction,andgoodconscienceconstitutewhatiscalledstrengthofcharacter.Themanofstrongcharacterlacksknowledgeofthemanypossibilitiesanddirectionofaction.”(HAH228).12“Asagoodman,onebelongstothe“good,”acommunitythathasacommunalfeeling,becauseallindividualsareentwinedtogetherbytheirfeelingforrequital.”(HAH46).“Fromitsmostdiverseexperiencethespecieslearnswhichqualitieshaveparticularlycontributedtoitssurvival…thesequalitiesitcallsvirtues,andthesearetheonlyvirtuesthatitcultivates.”(BGE262)

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Slavesarenotunifiedinthesameway,eitherasindividualsorasagroup.

Theyhavenothadtofaceanyexistentialthreats,andthereforehavenothadto

strugglefortheirexistence.Theyhavelivedcomfortablyofftheworkoftheir

ancestors,whoestablishedasuccessfulsocietyinwhichtheirdescendantscan

pursuevariousinterestsinrelativepeaceandsecurity.13Theyare“weaker,more

civilized,morepeaceful”thanthenobles(BGE257).Nietzschebelievesthatthis

diversityofinterests,bothwithineachindividualandwithinthesocietyatlarge,

makestheslavesmorecomplexandinterestingthanthenobles(GM1.6,2.16).The

slaveshavea“greater,moredifferentiatedlife”(BGE262).Butitalsorendersthem

lessfocusedandlesscapableoforganizingaroundasinglegoal.Theirvarious

instinctspulltheminvariousdirections.Theyare“amultitude,likeparticlesof

dust.”(HAH45).Andthismakesthemeasypreyforthenobles:

…aconquerorandmasterrace,which,organizedonawarfooting,andwith

thepowertoorganize,unscrupulouslylaysitsdreadfulpawsonapopulace

which,thoughitmightbevastlygreaterinnumber,isstillshapelessand

shifting.(GM2.17)

Eachmemberofthenoblecastehasdeveloped,outofnecessity,instinctstowards

strength,survival,anddominance.Heorsheisnottornbetweencompeting

instincts,andthecasteasawholeisunifiedsinceeachmemberhashadtocultivate

13“…asweknowfromtheexperiencesofstock‐breeders,aspeciesthatisover‐abundantinnourishmentandextraprotectionandcaregenerallyshowsanimmediateandverypronouncedtendencytovariationsintype,andisrichinmarvelsandmonstrosities(andinmonstrousvicestoo).”(BGE262)

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thesameinstincts.AsNietzschewrites,their“dominancewasnotduetoits

physicalstrengthprimarily,buttoitsspiritual[strength]–thesewerethemore

completehumanbeings”(BGE257).Theslavecaste,conversely,is“shapelessand

shifting.”(“Woebetideitwhenitcomestowar!”(GM1.7)).Theyareunfocusedand

divided.Whenthetwomeet,theresultisahierarchicalsocietyinwhichnoblesrule

overslaves.

Slaveandnoblesarealikeinonerespect:bothhaveanaturaldesireto

releasetheirstrength.14Buttheslaves,weakenedfirstbytheirowndecadenceand

nowbytheirsubjugationbythenobles,areunabletodoso.Theireffortsatself‐

exertion,andself‐expression,arecontinuallyfrustrated.Andthisfrustrationleads

themtorevolt.Theslaverevoltdescribestheprocessbywhichtheslavesdevelop

themoralconcepts“good”and“evil”toreplacethenobles’sconceptsof“good”and

“bad.”Theconcepts“good”and“bad”weredescriptive:theyentailednoimplication

thatonecouldhaveacteddifferently.WhenHomerdescribesAchillesrunning

acrossthebattlefieldkillingTrojans,thereisnosuggestionthatAchillesdecidedin

advancetodothis,orthathecouldhavedoneotherwise.Achillesactedthisway

simplybecauseitwasinhisnatureasAchillestodoso.Andhisactionswere

considered“good”because“good”simplydenotedwhateverthenobleswere

(stronger,faster,dominant),while“bad”simplydenotedwhateverthenobleswere

not(weaker,slower,subordinate).

14“Alivingbeingwantsaboveallelsetoreleaseitsstrength;lifeitselfisthewilltopower,andself‐preservationisonlyoneofitsindirectandmostfrequentconsequences.”(BGE13)

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Theslavesreversedthisvaluation.Theybegantoconsiderthemselves

“good”fornotexertingpoweroverthenobles(eventhough,accordingtoNietzsche,

theirrestraintwastheresultofweakness,notchoice),andcalledthenobles“evil”

forexertingtheirdominanceovertheslaves(eventhoughtheirdominancewas

instinctive,notchosen).Indoingso,theslavescreatedanewrealmofmeaning,a

newsetofvalues,tojustifytheirinferiorstatusandcheckthepowerofthenobles.

Butthisreversalcameatacosttotheslavesaswell:itmadethemrepresstheir

naturaldesiretoreleasetheirstrength,sincedoingsois,ontheirown

interpretation,evil.Thisrepressionleadstoapainfulpsychologicalsplit:onone

handtheyhaveaninborndesiretoexertthemselves,ontheotherhandtheyhave

convincedthemselvesthatexertingoneselfisevil.

Sothedevelopmentoftheconceptofevildidnotalleviatetheslavesoftheir

suffering.Itbroughtaboutanewformofsuffering:thepainfulpsychologicalsplit

describedabove.Nietzschealsosuggeststhattheslavessufferbecausetheyinflict

painonthemselves,andtheydosobecauseeveryone(accordingtoNietzsche)

enjoysinflictingpain,andtheyaretooweaktoinflictitonothers.15Atthispointin

thestoryNietzscheaddsakeypremise,oneonwhichhiswholeargumentdepends:

sufferingisintolerable,hesays,unlessthosesufferingcangiveitsomemeaning(GM

15ForNietzschethepleasuretheslavesreceivefromthisself‐inflictionisnotfromreceivingpainbutfrominflictingofit.Theyaresadists,notmasochists,onNietzsche’sviewofthings(GM2.16;BGE78;D113).Nietzschearguesthatthissadismisrootedinhumannatureandoverdetermined(i.e.therearemanydifferentreasonswhywepunishourselvesandothers),andthatwecometointerpretpunishmentasservingsomesociallyusefulpurposeafterthefact.

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2.7;3.28).16OnNietzsche’saccount,theslavesjustifytheirsufferingbycomingto

believethattheysufferbecausetheyareindebted(Schulden)totheirancestorsfor

establishingthesocietyinwhichtheylive.17Theyalsocometobelievethattheycan

relievetheirsufferingbyrepayingtheirancestors,andtheycanrepaytheir

ancestorsbyobeyingthesocialcustomstheyinheritedfromthem.

Sotheslaveslearntovalueadherencetosocialcustoms.Notadheringto

customamountsto“evil.”Thisjustificationmakestheirsufferingmoretolerable,

butitdoesnotalleviateitentirely.Theslavescontinuetosufferbecauseoftheir

weakconstitutions,theirrepressedphysicalandpsychologicalstate,andthe

punishmenttheyinflictonthemselves.Sotheyseekafurtherjustification.Enter

thepriests:afactionoftheslavesdisposedtoeducationandinterpretation.The

priestsdeveloptheideathattheslavescanneveradequatelyrepaythebenefactors

oftheirsociety,sincetheirtrueancestorsarenotthehumanbeingswhofounded

theirsociety,butrathertheGodwhocreatedtheminthefirstplace.Accordingto

thepriests,theslavesareinherentlyguilty,orevil,fornotadequatelysubordinating

themselvestothewilloftheircreator.NietzschetracestheChristiannotionofguilt

(Schuld)fromthepre‐modernnotionofdebt(Schulden).Theslavesareindebtedto

16ForNietzschetogivesomethingmeaningistoconnectitwithsomeprojectofthewill(GM2.12,13)17AccordingtoNietzsche,inpre‐modernsocietiescommercialtransactionswereregulatedbyenforcinganequivlancebetweencreditoranddebtor:thecreditorwasallowedtomakeupforhislossesbyinflictingsufferingondefaultingdebtors.Throughthispractice,Nietzscheargues,anassociationofideasemerged(Ideen­VerhäkelungGM2.6)between“debt”andpossiblesuffering.

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Him,andthisdebtcanneveradequatelyberepaid.Onthisviewtheslavessuffer

notbecausetheyareweak,butbecausetheyareinherentlyguilty,andtheyare

inherentlyguiltybecausetheyarealwaysalreadyindebtedtoaGodthatis

responsiblefortheirveryexistence.18

Theslaverevoltiscompletewhenslavevaluesbecomedominant;wheneven

thenoblesadoptthem.Thisoccursgraduallyfollowingthedevelopmentofthe

slavesociety.Inthissocietytheslavescannolongerpursuetheirvariousinterests.

Theirpreviouslydecadentlivesbecomehardenedbysuffering,andtheyunite,

individuallyandcollectively,againstthenobles.Thenobles,meanwhile,become

comfortableintheirpositionofpower.Nolongerfacedwithanexternalthreat,they

arefreetopursuetheirvariousinterests.Theybecomedecadent.Thisleadstoa

reversal.19Theslavesimposetheirvaluesontothenobles.Thenobles,theyargue,

arenolessthechildrenofGodandhencenolessindebtedtoHimfortheirexistence.

Weakenedbydecadence,thenoblesgivein.Theyrepresstheirnaturalinstinctsin

anattempttobe“good.”Thereversaliscomplete.Theslavemoralityreigns.

18AsNietzschewrites,theChristianGodfulfills“thewillofmantofindhimselfguiltyandreprehensibletothepointthatitcannotbeatonedfor;hiswilltoimaginehimselfpunishedwithoutthepossibilityofthepunishmenteverbecomingequivalenttotheguilt”(GM2.22).SeealsoGM3.11,3.15,3.16,3.19.19Speakingofthenobles,Nietzschewrites:“Eventually,however,itarrivesataperiodofgoodfortune,thetremendoustensionrelaxes;perhapstherearenolongeranyenemiesamongitsneighboursanditsmeansofliving,evenforenjoyinglife,areplentiful.Atonesinglestrokethecoercingbondoftheolddisciplineistornapart:itisnolongerfelttobeessential,criticalforexistence….Variation,whetherasdeviance…orasdegenerationandmonstrosityissuddenlyonthescene.”(BGE262)

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Letmesummarizetheprocessbywhich,accordingtoNietzsche,the

metaphysicalidealofamaximal,ChristianGodemerged:

1) Anoblecaste,strengthenedandunifiedthroughstruggle,subjugatesaslave

castethathasbecomedecadentthroughgenerationsofcomfortandpeace

2) Ahierarchicalsocietyresultsinwhichthenoblecasterulesovertheslavecaste

3) Theslaves,unabletoexpresstheirdesires,repressthem.Theycallthenobles

“evil”fornotdoingso,andthemselves“good”fordoingso.

4) Theslavessufferduetotheirsubordinationandself‐repression(self‐

punishment)

5) Senselesssufferingisintolerable

6) Theslavesrationalizetheirsufferingbyconsideringthemselvesindebted

7) Thisnotionofindebtedness(Schulden)takestheformofguilt(Schuld)

8) Theslavescometobelievethattheirguiltcannotbeovercome

9) Tomaintainthisnotion,theypositametaphysicalideal(amaximalGod)which

theywillinevitablytransgress

Thisaccountreversesthetraditional,ChristianaccountofGod.Onthataccount,

thereexists,somewherebeyondthetemporalworld,anabsolutebeingtowhomwe

oweourexistence,andtowhomwealwaysthereforefeelguilty.20

20MyinterpretationhereishelpedbyJanaway’sdiscussionofGM2inBeyondSelflessness:ReadingNietzsche’sGenealogy.OxfordUP,2007,147‐148.IdifferfromJanawayinthatIdonotthinkNietzsche’sassumptionthatcrueltyisrootedinhumannatureistheprimarysourceofthedevelopmentofthemetaphysicalidealofGod.JanawaywritesthatforNietzsche,“crueltyisthebase:therestis

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Soitisnotthatindividualshavefreewillandthatwhenwhentheyexercise

thisfreewillincorrectlytheyare“guilty”insomemoralsenseanddeserve

punishment.21Originallypeopledidnotpunishbecausesomemadepooruseof

theirfreewillandthuswere“guilty.”Rather,thewholepsychological,moral

apparatusof“guilt,”“conscience”,and“freewill”arisesoutofapracticeof

punishmentthathascompletelydifferentroots.ThisisthereverseofDostoyevsky’s

viewthattheguiltyconsciencecriesoutforpunishment.22OnNietzsche’saccount

formsofthoughtariseoutofconcretesocialpractices,ratherthantheotherway

around.23

interpretationintheserviceofgivingmeaningtothesufferingwecannothelpgivingourselvesoncesocietyboxesusin”(147).AsaninterpretationofNietzsche,Janawayseemstobeonsolidground.InBGE229Nietzschewrites:“Almosteverythingwecall‘highculture’isbasedonthedeepeningandspiritualizingofcruelty–thisismytenet.”(Seealsomyfootnote11above).However,IthinkthatNietzsche’sargumentisstrongerwithoutthiscontroversialpremise.ThereconstructionIofferherereliesmoreonjustonecontroversialpremise:thatsufferingisintolerableunlessitcanbejustified.21ThetraditionalnotionsoffreewillandresponsibilityarecasualtiesofNietzsche’saccount.Wecanonlyberesponsibleforactionsifwefreelychoosethem.If,asNietzschebelieves,ouractionsaretheresultofinstinctsoverwhichwehavelittleifanycontrol,thenournotionsofresponsibility,andmoralitynolongerapply.Thisraisesseriousquestionsaboutourmostbasicintuitionsaboutmorality.SomeoftheseissuesareraisedinHarryFrankfurt’s,“AlternatePossibilitiesandMoralResponsibility,”ReasonandResponsibility:ReadingsinSomeBasicProblemsofPhilosophy.EditedbyJoelFeinbergandRussShafer‐Landau.California:ThomsonWadsworth,2008,486‐492.Nietzschehasadifferentaccountofresponsibility,whichIdiscusslaterinthischapterandthenext.22TheDostoevskyofCrimeandPunishment,atleast.23Notethatthisisnotakindofphilosophicalmaterialism.Theclaimisnotthatsocialpracticesarepriortoanythoughtwhatsoever,justthatthethoughtpriorto

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Wecannowsketchapreliminaryanswertothequestionwestartedwith:

WhatdoesNietzschemeanwhenhesaysthatmetaphysicsis“anerror”?

Metaphysicsisan“error”insofarasittakessomethingtobeidealandtranscendent

whenitisrootedinthematerialworld.Whatwethinkofasmetaphysicalideals,

thingsexistingoutsidethetemporalworld,aresimplyhumaninterpretationsof

concretesocialpracticeswhoseoriginshavebeenforgotten.

Thisanswer,however,isonlypreliminary.Furtherclarificationsareneeded.

Forinstance,onthisaccountitmightseemthatmodernscienceistheoppositeof

metaphysics.24Science,itseems,isconcernedwiththenatural,notthesupernatural

world,anditischaracterizedbyobjective,empiricalknowledge,notfaulty

inferencesorfalsebeliefs.ButwhileNietzscheacknowledgesthatmetaphysicsand

sciencearedistinct,hebelievesthatourbeliefinbothofthemaresymptomaticof

slavemorality.“Science,”hewrites,“isnottheoppositeoftheasceticidealbut

ratherthelatter’sownmostrecentandnoblemanifestation”(GM3.23);“Iwilltell

them[i.e.scientists]whattheythemselvescannotsee,becausetheyarestandingtoo

closetothemselves:thisidealissimplytheiridealaswell”(GM3.24);“science

representsthedrivingforceoftheinnerevolutionofthatideal”(GM3.25);science

andtheasceticideal“areonthesamefoundation”(GM3.25).Nietzschebelieves

thatscienceispartoftheasceticidealinsofarasitentailssubordinatingone’s

thepracticeismuchdifferentfromthethoughtthatcomesafter.NietzscheisclearestaboutthisinGM2.14‐15.24NietzscheusesWissenschaft,butitshouldberemindedthatthisdoesstrictlyrefertothephysicalsciences.InGermanWissenschaftincludesthehumansciences(philosophy,history,socialstudies)aswellasthephysicalsciences.

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naturalinstinctsandperspectivetoahigherauthority–notGodbutTruth.Inthis

respectitproceedsfromthesamevalues–ofselflessness,forinstance–

inauguratedbytheslaverevolt.25

Thisraisesanimportantpoint.Something’sbeingfalseisnot,forNietzsche,

reasonenoughtorejectit.Therelevantdistinctionisnotwhethersomethingistrue

orfalse,butwhetheritaffirmslifeornot.26Nietzscheisconsistentaboutthis

throughouthiswritings:“Wedonotobjecttoajudgmentjustbecauseitisfalse,”he

writes,“Thequestionisrathertowhatextentthejudgmentfurtherslife,preserves

life….togiveupfalsejudgmentswouldbetogiveuplife,todenylife”(BGE4).27For

Nietzsche,“untruthisaconditionoflife”:illusion,dream,andartarenotonly

necessarytomakeouroftenmiserablelivespalatable,theyarethesourceof

inspirationandcreativity.Thisfact,whichphilosopherssincePlatohavefailedto

appreciate,isakeyreasonwhyNietzscheprivilegesartoverphilosophyand

25IdiscussNietzsche’sviewsonscienceinmoredetailinsectionthreeofthischapter.26Formoreonthistopic,seeKenGemes,“Nietzsche’sCritiqueofTruth,”PhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearch,52(1992),47‐65.27SeealsoEcceHomo,EcceHomo:HowtoBecomeWhatOneis.Trans.R.J.Hollingdale.Ed.MichaelTanner.London:Penguin,1992.“WhyIamDestiny”7:“Itisnoterroraserrorthathorrifiesme,”andAntichrist56:“Ultimatelythepointistowhatendalieistold.”

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science.28ForNietzsche,thephilosophicalandscientificdesiretoescapeillusionis

adesiretoescapelife.Itispartoftheasceticideal.

IndeedNietzscheacknowledgesthatmetaphysicalbeliefshavehadpositive

effects,andheinsiststhataproperrefutationofmetaphysicsrequiressuchan

acknowledgment.Referringtothemanonthecuspofrejectingmetaphysics,he

writes,

Onceheatthislevelofliberation,hemuststillmakealastintenseeffortto

overcomemetaphysics.Then,however,aretrogrademovementisnecessary:

hemustunderstandboththehistoricalandthepsychologicaljustificationin

metaphysicalideas.Hemustrecognizehowmankind’sgreatest

advancementcamefromthemandhow,ifonedidnottakethisretrograde

step,onewouldrobhimselfofmankind’sfinestaccomplishmentstodate.

(HAH1.20)29

Nietzscheadmirestheslavesfordevelopingnewconcepts,andforthestrength,

creativity,andingenuityrequiredtoenactandsustaintheseconcepts.Hederides

theslavesforactingoutofressentiment,andthenoblesforadoptingamorality

whichsuppressestheirnaturalinstincts,butheisnotadvocatingareturntothe

28GM3.25:“Art,letmesayattheoutset,sinceIshalldealwiththisatlengthsomeday,‐‐art,inwhichlyingsanctifiesitselfandthewilltodeceptionhasgoodconscienceonitsside,ismuchmorefundamentallyopposedtotheasceticidealthanscienceis.”29SeealsothebeginningofGM3,whereNietzschereverseshisearliercriticismofChristianityandshowshowitcanbeusedtoaffirmlife.

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periodbeforetheslaverevolt.Withouttheirbeliefinsomethinggreaterthan

themselves,theslaveswouldhaveremainedsubordinatetothenobles.Andthanks

totheslaveswehaveaconceptionofourselvesashavinganinnerlife,andthe

promiseofself‐overcoming(GM2.16).30Nietzschebelievesthatwearedeeper,

morecomplexpeoplebecauseoftheslaverevolt.31AndChristianmetaphysicshas

inspiredgreatmusic,art,literature,architecture,evenwarandconquest–someof

Nietzsche’sfavoritethings.Nietzscherejectsmetaphysicsnotbecauseitisfalse,or

becauseithasnothadgoodeffects,butfortworeasons:first,becauseslavevalues

arereactiveandinvolvearepressionorournaturalinstincts.Andsecond,because

thesevalueshavestultifiedthedevelopmentofhumanexcellence.Thisiswhya

secondre‐valuationofvaluesisneeded.Nietzsche’srejectionofmetaphysicshas

thisaiminmind.

Nietzsche’sprimaryargumentagainstmetaphysics,then,isthatbelievingin

metaphysicalidealsentailssubordinatingournaturalinstinctstoanauthorityother

thanourselves.Aslongaswerelyonanauthorityotherthanourselvestoregulate

andjustifyourthoughtsandactions,wewillnotactspontaneouslyonournatural

instincts,andourstrength,creativity,andindividualitywillbeinhibited.Thisis

truenotjustofGod,butofallmetaphysicalideals,asNietzsche’sparableofthe

madmaninthemarketplaceremindsus:

30Idiscussthisissueingreaterdetailinthefollowingchapter.31Onlywiththeslaverevoltdidman“firstbecameaninterestinganimal”(GM1.6);“Thehistoryofmankindwouldbefartoostupidathingifithadnothadtheintellectofthepowerlessinjectedintoit”(GM1.7).SeealsoHAH1.136.

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Haven’tyouheardofthatmadmanwhointhebrightmorninglitalantern

andranaroundthemarketplacecryingincessantly,“I’mlookingforGod!I’m

lookingforGod!”SincemanyofthosewhodidnotbelieveinGodwere

standingaroundtogetherjustthen,hecausedgreatlaughter.Hashebeen

lost,then?askedone.Didhelosehiswaylikeachild?askedanother.Oris

hehiding?Isheafraidofus?...Thustheyshoutedandlaughed,one

interruptingtheother…..Herethemadmanfellsilentandlookedagainathis

listeners;theytooweresilentandlookedathimdisconcertedly.Finallyhe

threwhislanternonthegroundsothatitbrokeintopiecesandwentout.“I

cometooearly,”hethensaid,“mytimeisnotyet.”32

Themodern,“enlightened”meninthemarketplacemockthemadmanfornotyet

realizingthatGodisdead,thatthemedieval,ChristianbeliefinGodhasbeen

replacedbyamodern,secularbeliefinscienceandtruth.Butitistheonlookers,not

themadman,whofailtorealizethefullimplicationsofthedeathofGod.In

replacingtheirbeliefinGodwithabeliefinTruth,theyhavesimplyreplacedone

externalauthorityforanother.WhatNietzschewantsisforustobecomeourown

authorities,ourownGods.

Withthisclarificationinmind,wecannowanswerthequestionwithwhich

webegan.Nietzsche’sreasonforrejectingmetaphysicsisthathebelievesit

devalues,orinhiswords“slanders”earthlylife.Hismethodistoweakenour

allegiancetometaphysicalbeliefsbydemystifyingthem,bybringingthemdownto

32TheGayScience.Trans.WalterKaufman.NewYork:Vintage,1974.§125.

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earth.Weshouldnotconfusethereasonwiththemethod.Itwouldbemisleading

tosaythatNietzscherejectsmetaphysicalbeliefsbecausetheyarefalse,orbecause

wearemistakenastotheirtrueorigins.Thelattercommitsthenaturalisticfallacy

ofbelievingthatsomethingisfalsebecauseitdoesnothavetheoriginwethoughtit

has.Nietzscheisnottryingtoprove,onceandforall,thatmetaphysicalidealsare

false.Hewantstoshowthatwhatwethinkofasthemostelevated,high‐minded

conceptsarereallygroundedinbodilyinstinctsandconcretesocialpractices–that

istosay,inhuman,alltoohumanstuff.

3.2. NietzscheandPost‐Structuralism

SofarIhaveprovidedaninitialoverviewofNietzsche’scriticismof

metaphysics.Thisaccountis,Ithink,relativelyuncontroversial.Inowwantto

deepenthisaccountbyconsideringtworecent,prominentinterpretationsof

Nietzsche:thepost‐structuralistandnaturalistinterpretations.Iwillarguethat

bothoftheseinterpretationsareflawed;bothwronglyemphasizecertainaspectsof

Nietzsche’sthoughtandtherebydistorttheforceandextentofhiscritiqueof

philosophy.Theseflaws,however,areinstructive.MyownreadingofNietzsche

emergesfrommydisagreementwiththesetwointerpretations.

IntheprevioussectionwesawthatNietzschedoesnotbelievethatour

thoughtsemergefromasubjecthiddeninsideourbody,nordoeshethinkthatour

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actionsarefreelywilled.Thisleadstoanobviousquestion:Wherethendothinking

andwillingcomefrom?

Nietzsche’sansweristhatourthoughtsandactionsarisefrompsychological

andphysiologicaldrivesorinstinctswithineachofus,driveswhichweareonly

dimlyawareofandoverwhichwehavelittlecontrol.“Howeverfaramanmaygoin

self‐knowledge,”hewrites,“nothingcanbemoreincompletethanhisimageofthe

totalityofdriveswhichconstitutehisbeing”(D119).33Thesedrives,andnotour

freewill,arethesourceofourfeelings,thoughts,andactions.Theyarethehidden

causesunderlyingthevariouscomponentsofthewill(thecommandingthought,the

feelingofpleasure),causingthemtooccursimultaneously.“Thelargestpartof

consciousthinking,”Nietzschewrites,hastobeconsideredaninstinctualactivity”

(BGE3).“Ourthoughts,values,every‘yes’,‘no’,‘if’and‘but’growfromuswiththe

sameinevitabilityasfruitsborneonthetree”(GMPrologue2).34And:

Butatthebottomofeveryone,ofcourse,way“downthere,”thereis

somethingobstinatelyunteachable,agranite‐likespiritualFatum,

predetermineddecisionsandanswerstoselected,predeterminedquestions.

Inaddressinganysignificantproblemanunchangeable“That‐is‐I”hasitssay;

forexample,athinkercannotlearntochangehisideasaboutmanand

33SeealsoBGE6,10,12.PaulKatsafanasprovidesananalysisofNietzscheandrivesin“Nietzsche’sPhilosophicalPsychology,”forthcominginTheOxfordHandbookofNietzsche.Ed.KenGemesandJasonRichardson.OxfordUP,201034Seealso:“ressentimenthasan“actualphysiologicalcause”(GM1.15);sympathyis“justanotherexpressionof…physiologicalover‐excitability”(TI37).

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woman,butcanonlylearnhiswaythroughtotheend,onlydiscovertothe

limitwhatisfirmly“established”inhismindaboutthem…hisunteachable

essence.(BGE231)

Nietzschebelievesthattheideathatwearefree‐thinking,rationalbeings,thatwe

cometoconclusionsbyobjectivelyconsideringavailableevidence,isamyth.Our

thoughts,aswellasourfeelingsandactions,aregovernedbyunderlyingdrivesand

instincts.Thesedrivesandinstinctsmayconflictwithinthebodyofasingle

individual,buttogethertheymakeeachindividualpronetofeel,think,andactone

wayratherthananother.ThoseindividualsthatNietzschecalls“slaves,”for

instance,arepre‐disposedtomeeknessandressentiment.ThosewhomNietzsche

calls“nobles”arepredisposedtoactivityandself‐exertion.Thesecharactertraits

donotstemfromchoicesfreelymade,butfrompsychologicalandphysiological

mechanismsbeyondourcontrol.

Sincewearenot,andcannot,everbefullyawareofjusthowthesedrives

produceourthoughtsandfeelings,wedonothavethekindoftransparentwindow

intoourmindsthattraditionalphilosopherspresumewehave.“Oursocalled

consciousness,”Nietzschewrites,issimply“amoreorlessfantasiccommentaryon

anunknown,perhapsunknowable,butfelttext”(D119).Ourintellect,hesays,is

“onlytheblindinstrumentofanotherdrivewhichistherivalofthedrivewhose

vehemenceistormentingus”(D109).“Man,likeeverylivingcreature,thinks

unceasingly,butdoesnotknowit;thethinkingwhichisbecomingconsciousofitself

isonlythesmallestpartthereof,wemaysay,themostsuperficialpart,theworst

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part”(GS354).“Actionsareneverwhattheyappeartobe…allactionsare

essentiallyunknown”(D116).Andfinally,“ourmoraljudgmentsandevaluations…

areonlyimagesandfantasiesbasedonaphysiologicalprocessunknowntous”(D

119).Nietzschebelievesthatthephilosophicalsearchforatransparent,rational

pictureofourselvesandtheworldisafutileattempttoovercometheseprocesses.

Weare,atbottom,instinctivebeings.

Nietzsche’semphasisonthephysiologicalbasisofthought,action,and

characterisclearlyexpressedinhisstoryofCornaroinTwilightoftheIdols:

EverybodyknowsthebookofthefamousCornaroinwhichherecommends

hisslenderdietasarecipeforalongandhappylife….TheworthyItalian

thoughthisdietwasthecauseofhislonglife,whereasthepreconditionfor

hislonglife,theextraordinaryslownessofhismetabolism,theconsumption

ofsolittle,wasthecauseofhisslenderdiet.Hewasnotfreetoeatlittleor

much;hisfrugalitywasnotamatterof“freewill”;hebecamesickwhenhe

atemore.(6.1)35

35ThatthisstoryappearssolateinNietzsche’soeuvreillustratesthathisemphasisontheinstinctsisnotrestrictedtohismiddleperiod.Itsuggestsratherthatthepervasivenessofphysiologicalexplanationsinthemiddleworks(especiallyHuman,AllTooHumanandDaybreak)relativetothelaterworksisbestunderstoodasashiftinemphasisratherthanachangeinoutlook.InhismiddleperiodNietzschewastryingtodistancehimselffromtheSchopenhauerian,metaphysicalworld‐viewofhisearlyworks.Thisdistancingbecameincreasinglylessnecessaryashiscareerwenton.

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Cornarobelievesthathislonglifeiscausedbyhisslenderdiet,andhebelievesthat

hefreelycontrolshisdiet.NietzscheclaimsthatCornaro’sdietresultsfromaslow

metabolism–aphysiologicalprocessoverwhichhehasnocontrol–andthathis

dietaryprescriptionisthereforenotapplicabletoeveryone.Thesamecriticism

appliestoadvocatesofmorality,whofalselypresumethateveryoneisfreetoactas

theychooseandthenprescribeauniformsetofrulesforeveryonetofollow.36Like

Cornaro,theyfailtorecognizethateachpersonispre‐disposedtoactinsomeways

andnotothers.

Sotothequestion,“Wheredothinkingandwillingcomefrom?”,Iimagine

Nietzschewouldrespond,“Wheredoeshungercomefrom?Orthirst?Orsexual

desire?”Wedonotfeeltheneedtoresorttomysteriousormetaphysicalentitiesto

explainthesephenomena.Whydosotoexplainthoughtandaction?

ThisaccountofNietzsche’sconceptionofhumanthoughtandactionisat

oddsnotonlywithtraditionalphilosophy.Italsodifferssharplyfromthepost‐

structuralistinterpretationofNietzsche.Onthisinterpretation,foundindifferent

formsinthewritingsofGillesDeleuze,MichelFoucault,andJacquesDerrida,

Nietzscheisfundamentallyananti‐essentialistthinker,onewhoprivileges

36BGE221:“Inapersoncreatedanddestinedtocommand,forexample,self‐denialorhumbleretreatwouldnotbeavirtue,butratherthewasteofavirtue:soitseemstome.Anyaltruisticmoralcodethattakesitselfunconditionallyandaddressesitselftoeveryoneisnotonlysinningagainsttaste:itisincitingtosinsofomission,onemoretemptationbeneathamassofphilanthropy.”Andalso:“Awellturnedouthumanbeing,a‘happyone’,”Nietzschewrites,“mustperformcertainactionsandshrinksinstinctivelyfromotheractions;hecarriestheorder,whichherepresentsphysiologically,intohisrelationswithotherhumanbeingsandthings”(TI7.2.).

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contingency,multiplicity,anddifference.37HiscriticismoftheCartesiansubject,for

instance,amountstoarejectionoftheideaofaunifiedself.Andhisaccountofhow

seeminglyfixed,timelessaspectsofourlives(suchasmorality)areinfact

historicallycontingentshowsthatweshouldbesuspiciousofanyclaimsto

underlyingessences.Onthisreading,Nietzscheteachesustoseethevarious

contingentforcesthatmakeupwhatwethinkisfixedoreternal.ThusforDeleuze,

“ThesenseofNietzsche’sphilosophyisthatmultiplicity,becoming,andchanceare

objectsofpureaffirmation”(197).38ForFoucault,thelessonofNietzsche’swriting

isthatweshouldlookfor“notatimelessandessentialsecretbutthesecretthat

theyhavenoessence”(147).Thisinterpretationhasalsobecomeprominentonthis

sideoftheAtlantic.AlexanderNehemaswritesthat“Nietzscheseemsintenton

underminingpreciselytheideathatthereareantecedentlyexistingpossibilities

groundedin[our]nature”(LifeasLiterature175).AndheclaimsthatforNietzsche,

37GillesDeleuze,NietzscheandPhilosophy.TranslatedbyH.Tomlinson.ColumbiaUniversityPress,1983.JacquesDerrida,Spurs,Nietzsche'sStyles.TranslatedbyB.Harlow.UniversityofChicagoPress,1978.MichelFoucault,“Nietzsche,Genealogy,History,”Language,Counter­Memory,Practice:SelectedEssaysandInterviews,139‐164.Ed.DanielBouchard.Ithica:CornellUP,1977.SeealsoFoucault’sTheHistoryofSexuality,VolumeI.Trans.RobertHurley.NewYork:Vintage,1990.TheFrenchtitleforthisbookisLavolontédesavoir(thewilltoknowledge);aclearplayonNietzsche’swilltotruth/willtopower.SimilarviewsareexpressedbyRichardRorty,Contingency,Irony,andSolidarity.CambridgeUP,1989andAlexanderNehemas,Nietzsche:LifeasLiterature.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUP,1985.

38InthefollowingchapterIarguethatthoughDeleuzemischaracterizesNietzsche’scriticalproject,herightlygraspsNietzsche’spositiveconceptionofphilosophy.ThisconceptionisaptlysummarizedinDeleuze’sclaimthatNietzsche“turnsphilosophyintoanart”(197).

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“thereisnothingtheretoberepressedorliberated.”39RichardRortywritesof“the

pre‐Nietzscheanassumptionthatmanhasatrueselfwhich…existspriortobeing

shapedbypower.”40NehemasandRortyfollowFoucaultininterpretingNietzsche’s

rejectionoftheCartesianself,hisclaimthatthereisnodoerbehindthedeed,to

meanthatforNietzschethereisnothingunderlyinghumanthought,feeling,and

actionpriortoitscreationbyexternal,contingentforces.41

Whatthepost‐structuralistinterpretationemphasizes,then,isNietzsche’s

accountofhowcontingentfactorsdeterminehowwethink,feel,andact.Thisis

indeedasignificantaspectofNietzsche’sthought.Nietzschebelievesthattheinnate

driveswhichgovernourthoughtsandactionsareactivated(ornot)bythesocial,

historical,andgeographicalenvironmentinwhichwelive.Thesefactorsworkin

concertwithourpsycho‐physiologicalconstitutionsbystimulatingsomedrivesat

theexpenseofothers.AsNietzschewrites,

Howeverfaramanmaygoinself‐knowledge,nothingcanbemore

incompletethanhisimageofthedriveswhichconstitutehisbeing…and

aboveallthelawsofthetheirnutrimentremainwhollyunknowntohim.

Thisnutrimentisthereforeaworkofchance:ourdailyexperiencesthrow

39“HowOneBecomesWhatOneIs,”Nietzsche:OxfordReadingsinPhilosophy.Ed.BrianLeiterandJasonRichardson.OxfordUP,2001,pp.255‐280,pp.260.Idiscusstheissueorrepression/liberationinNietzscheinthefollowingchapter.

40“BeyondNietzscheandMarx,”LondonReviewofBooks.February19,1981.41BrianLeitercriticzesNehemasandRortyonthisscorein“TheParadoxofFatalismandSelf‐CreationinNietzsche,”inWillingandNothingness:SchopenhauerasNietzsche’sEducator.Ed.ChrisJanaway.OxfordUP,1998,217‐255.

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somepreyinthewayofnowthis,nowthatdrive,andthedriveseizesit

eagerly;butthecomingandgoingoftheseeventsasawholestandsinno

rationalrelationshiptothenutritionalrequirementsofthetotalityofthe

drives:sothattheoutcomewillalwaysbetwofold–thestarvationand

stuntingofsomeandtheoverfeedingofothers.Everymomentofourlives

seessomeofthepolyp‐armsofourbeinggrownandothersofthemwither,

allaccordingtothenutrimentwhichthemomentdoesordoesnotbearwith

it.(D119)

Certaininstinctsareactivatedwhileotherswitheraway,alldependingonthesocial,

historical,andgeographicalcircumstancesinwhichwefindourselves.Thisexplains

howthosewithmore“noble”psycho‐physiologicalconstitutionshavecometofeel,

think,andactinaccordancewiththevaluesoftheslaverevolt.Thenear

universalityofslavevaluesinmodernsocietyisonlypossibleifcontingentfactors

haveasmuchormoreinfluenceonourthoughtsandactionsasnatural,

physiologicalfactors.Butwhilethepost‐structuralistinterpretationisrightto

highlighttheimportanceofcontingentfactorsinNietzsche’sthought,Nietzscheis

not“intentonunderminingtheideathatthereantecedentlyexistingpossibilities

groundedin[our]nature”(Nehemas),nordoeshethinkthat“nothingexistspriorto

beingshapedbypower”(Rorty),orthatthereis“noessence”(Foucault).Nietzsche

saysexplicitlythateachindividualhasan“unteachableessence”which

“predetermines”boththequestionsthatindividualwillaskandtheanswershewill

provide(BGE231).AsIhavetriedtoshow,thetextualevidenceforthisaspectof

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Nietzsche’sthoughtisoverwhelming,42

Thepost‐structuralistinterpretationalsoelidesanotherimportantaspectof

Nietzsche’sproject..43Idiscussthisfurtherinthefollowingchapter,butmentionit

brieflyhere.Nietzschedoesnotstraightforwardlyaffirmcontingencyand

multiplicity,asDeleuzeandFoucaultsuggest.Rather,hiscriticismoftheCartesian

subjectispreliminarytohisultimateaim,whichishispositive,prescriptivenotion

ofthekindofselfhewantsustobecome.Nietzschedoesnotrejectallnotionsofthe

self,orevenoftheunifiedself.Nordoesherejectthatideathatcertainaspectsof

ourselvesarepre‐given.Whatherejectsistheideathattheunifiedselfispre­given.

Thisidea,exemplifiedbytheCartesian“I,”underliestheslavemoralitywhichhe

wantstoovercome.ForNietzsche,theunifiedselfissomethingthatmustbe

achieved:“Theselfdoesnotexist;heneedstobecreated”(TSZ120).44

42Itmightbeaskedwhy,giventhetextualevidencetothecontrary,post‐structuralistinterpretorsofNietzschehaveoverlookedhisclaimthatthereisafixedessencewithineachindividualandhisnotionoftheidealselfasonethatmustbeachieved.KenGemessuggeststhatNietzsche’scallsforaunityofwillandmotivationechoestheNaziinterpretationofNietzsche,whichpost‐warphilosophersinEuropewerejustifiablywearyof.BrianLeiterarguesthatDerrida’sandNehemas’semphasesonNietzsche’scommentsabouttheimportanceofthenotionof“interpretation”restsonamisunderstandingofwhat“interpretation”meantforNietzsche.“NietzscheandAestheticism,”JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy30,1992,pp.275‐290.

43KenGemesprovidesanoverviewof(andcriticismof)thisaspectofthepostmodernappropriationofNietzschein“Postmodernism’sUseandAbuseofNietzsche,”PhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearch,vol.LXII,No.2,March2001.HeshowsthatinsofaraspostmodernistsoverlookNietzsche’scallforunityandcreationoftheself,theyaremorelikeNietzsche’s“lastman”thanhisidealman.44TheideathattheselfmustbecreatedorachievedisdiscussedinNehemas(1985);Richardson(1996);andGemes(2001).Nehemasdoesnotacknowledgethe

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Comparedtothemetaphysicalphilosophyhecriticizes,then,Nietzscheisa

proponentofcontingencyandmultiplicity.Herejectstheideaofapre‐given,

unifiedselfresponsibleforourthoughtsandactions,andhegivesprominentplace

totheroleofhistoryandcultureindetermininghumanthoughtandaction.Buthe

doesnotprivilegecontingencyandmultiplicityforitsownsake.Nordoeshethink

thathumanbeingsdonothaveanunderlyingessence.Hebelievesthateachofus

hasapre‐givensetofdrivesandinstinctswhichdisposeustothink,feel,andactone

wayoranother.Thesedrivesarealimitingconditiononwhatkindofindividuals

wemightbecome.Thisconceptionoftheselfisincompatiblewithtwofundamental

tenetsoftraditionalphilosophy:thatwehaveclearaccesstoourthoughts,andthat

ourthoughtsaretheproductofrationalreflection.Itisequallyincompatiblewith

thepost‐structuralistinterpretationofhimasonewhoprivilegesmultiplicityover

unity,andcontingencyoveressence.

3.3.NietzscheandNaturalism

Inrecentyearsthepost‐structuralistinterpretationofNietzsche,

predominantinthe1980sandearly1990s,hasgivenwaytoanaturalist

interpretation.45Thisnaturalistinterpretationemphasizestheessentialiststrainof

naturalistaspectofNietzsche’sthought.Richardson’sinterpretation,bycontrast,emphasizesthisaspect.GemescontraststheNietzscheanidealofunitywiththepostmoderninterpretationofNietzsche.45Itisperhapsmisleadingtospeakofaorthenaturalistreading,sincetherearedifferentproponentsofthisreadingandtheyemphasizedifferentthings.ThemostprominentisBrianLeiter’sNietzscheonMorality.London:Routledge,2002.NaturalistreadingsarealsoevidentinMaudemarieClark,NietzscheonTruthand

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Nietzsche’sthought:hisclaimthatourthoughts,feelings,andactionsaregoverned

byinborndrivesandinstincts.Inthisrespectitservesasausefulcorrectivetothe

post‐structuralistinterpretation.Insomecases,however,itgoesfurther,arguing

Nietzscheisanaturalistinthesamewaypost‐Quineananalyticphilosophersare.

BrianLeiter,forinstance,arguesthatNietzschebelievesthat“philosophical

inquiry…shouldbecontinuouswithempiricalinquiryinthesciences.”46Leiter’s

Philosophy.CambridgeUP,1990;ChristopherJanaway,BeyondSelflessness:ReadingNietzsche’sGenealogy.OxfordUP,2007;JohnRichardson,Nietzsche’sNewDarwinism.OxfordUP,2004;RichardSchacht,“Nietzsche’sGayScience,or,HowtoNaturalizeCheerfully,ReadingNietzsche.Eds.KathleenHigginsandR.C.Solomon.OxfordUP,1988;NadeemHussain,“Nietzsche’sPositivism,”EuropeanJournalofPhilosophy12(2002):326‐368.46Leiter’smostsystematicarticulationofthisviewisinhisNietzscheonMorality.(hereafterNM).Heelaboratesthisviewandrespondstocriticsin“Nietzsche’sNaturalismRe‐Considered,”forthcominginTheOxfordHandbookofNietzsche.EditedbyKenGemesandJasonRichardson(hereafterNNR).

CriticsofLeiter’snaturalistreadingincludeChristopherJanaway(independentlyandtogetherwithKenGemes)andChristaAcampora.In“NaturalismandValueinNietzsche,”PhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearch71(2005),729‐740.GemesandJanawayarguethatLeiter’saccountofNietzsche’snaturalismistooweaktobephilosophicallysignificant.ThiscriticismmissesIthink,thelargerpointwhichIexplainbelow:namely,thatwhileNietzscheclearlyadmiresscienceforitsrigorandlackofmetaphysicalbaggage,heisprimarilycriticalofthevalueofscientificexplanations.Inher“NaturalismandNietzsche’sMoralPsychology,”inACompaniontoNietzsche.Ed.KeithAnsell‐Pearson.Oxford:Blackwell,2006,AcamporaarguesthatLeiterdoesnotrecognizethatNietzscheisaskepticaboutcausation–afundamentalaspectofscientific(andhencenaturalistic)explanation.ButAcampora’sargumentmistakesNietzsche’sskepticismaboutthecausalpowerofthefreelywillingsubjectwithskepticismaboutcausalitytoutcourt. InchapterfourofBeyondSelflessness,JanawayarguesforaweakernaturalismthanLeiter’s.HearguesthatNietzsche’sprimarymethodofargumentationisnottomarshalcausalorempiricalevidenceindefenseofhisclaims,asLeiter’sclaims,butrathertouseliteraryandrhetoricaldevicestomoveustowardsacceptinghisclaims.Ithinkthisisright,astheensuingpagesillustrate.InthissectionIcritiqueLeiter’sreadingfromadifferentangle:IquestionhowmuchweightweshouldplaceonNietzsche’spositiveremarksaboutscience.Still,Ihope

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readingissubtleandcompelling,andithasbecomeincreasinglyprominentin

recentyears.LikethepoststructuralistinterpretationofNietzsche,however,I

believeitover‐emphasizescertainNietzscheanclaimsattheexpenseofother,more

centralones,andtherebyobfuscatestheextentofhiscritiqueofphilosophy.

Naturalismencompassesadiversityofviews,buttheyareunitedinthatthey

seektoexplainphenomena(suchaslanguage,consciousness,ethics)byappealto

thenatural,causalworld.47Naturaliststaketheempiricalworldasgivenandseek

tofurtherourunderstandingofitbydevelopingtheoriesandrefiningourconcepts

inlightofempiricaldata.Inthisrespect,naturalismrejectsmetaphysicsanddiffers

fromfoundationalismandconceptualanalysis.PeterStrawsonusefullydivides

naturalistsintotwomaintypes.48“Hard”naturalistsbelievethatphilosophyshould

becontinuouswiththenaturalsciences.“Soft”naturalistsbelievethatphilosophy

shouldsimplyclarifyourconceptsandunderstanding.“Hard”naturalismdoesnot

supposethatphilosophersshoulduncriticallyaccepttheresultsofempirical

thatthisaccountprovidesfurthersupportfortheweakernaturalistreadingJanawayadvocates.47P.F.Strawsonwrites,“Thetermnaturalismiselasticinitsuse.ThefactthatithasbeenappliedtotheworkofphilosophershavingaslittleincommonasHumeandSpinozaisenoughtosuggestthatthereisadistinctiontobedrawnbetweenvarietiesofnaturalism.”ScepticismandNaturalism,SomeVarieties.NewYork:ColumbiaUP,1985.DavidPapineau:“Theterm‘naturalism’hasnoveryprecisemeaningincontemporaryphilosophy.”“Naturalism,”StanfordEncylopediaofPhilosophy.http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/.AndJohnRitchie:“Idoubtifthereisanysuchdefinitionfornaturalism.Likemostoftheother–ismsinphilosophy,naturalismembracesmanydifferingviews.”UnderstandingNaturalism.Stocksfield,UK:Acumen,2008,page1.

48ScepticismandNaturalism,SomeVarieties.NewYork:ColumbiaUP,1985.

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research.Itmeansthattheyshouldusethediscoveriesofscienceintheirpursuitof

knowledgewhilealsocriticizingsciencewhenitsclaimsareungrounded,confused,

orinconsistent.Impliedinthischaracterizationisthattheaimofphilosophyisto

increaseourknowledgeoftheworld,notthroughempiricaldiscovery(thedomain

ofscience),butbyreconcilingourordinarywaysofthinkingandtalkingwith

developmentsinthesciences(forinstance,reconcilingourideaofthemindwith

recentdiscoveriesinneuroscience),andbyrevisingtheassumptionsandtheories

guidingscientificresearch,thusleadingtonewapproachestoscienceandhence

newdiscoveries.49

LeiterinterpretsNietzscheasahardnaturalist,onStrawson’sdefinition.50

HearguesthatNietzscheaimsto“constructphilosophicaltheoriesthatare

49Onethingnaturalistphilosophersdonotaimtodiscover,whichdistinguishesthemfromotherkindsofphilosophers,isnon‐empiricalorconceptualknowledge.Kripke’sdiscoverythatnecessityandaprioriticityarenotthesamething,forinstance,isthekindofknowledgethatnaturalistslikeQuinehavedifficultyexplaining.SaulKripke,NamingandNecessity.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUP,1980.W.V.O.Quine,“TwoDogmasofEmpiricism,”FromaLogicalPointofView.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUP,1953.JerryFodoroffersanoverviewoftheshiftfromconceptualanalysistoQuineannaturalismintwentiethcenturyphilosophyin“Water’sWaterEverywhere,”LondonReviewofBooks.Volume26,Number20‐21,2004.50Leiterdoesnotusethecharacterization“hard”and“soft”asStrawson(orI,followingStrawson)do.Butasthequotationinthefollowingsentence(ofthemaintext)indicates,LeiterbelievesthatNietzscheisa“hard”naturalistinthisStrawsoniansense.Leiterusesadifferentdistinctionbetweenhardandsoft,whichshouldnotbeconfusedwiththeoneIusehere.Hedistinguishesbetween“HardM‐Naturalists”and“SoftM‐Naturalists”:HardM‐Naturalistsbelievethatphilosophyshouldbecontinuouswith“onlythehardorphysicalsciences,”whileSoftM‐Naturalistsseekcontinuitywith“anysuccessfulscience,naturalorsocial”(NM3).LeiterarguesthatNietzscheisaSoftM‐Naturalist:hebelievesthatphilosophy

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continuouswiththesciences…invirtueoftheiremploymentofdistinctively

scientificwaysoflookingatandexplainingthings”(NM7).Leitercallsthisposition

“Methodological”or“M‐Naturalism.”Hequalifiesthisposition,however,bysaying

thatNietzscheisa“speculativeM‐Naturalist.”Thatis,Nietzschedoesnotrelyon

actuallyexistingscientificresultstoformulatehisphilosophicaltheories,heaimsto

develop“speculativetheoriesofhumannatureinformedbythesciencesanda

scientificpictureofhowthingswork”(NM5).WhatdoesLeitermeanby“a

scientificpictureofhowthingswork”?Hemeans,simply,aphilosophicalapproach

thatlocatesthecausaldeterminantsoftheparticularphenomenaunder

investigation(NM8).Thisdefinitionofscienceincludesbothphysicalsciences,such

asphysiology,andhumansciencessuchashistoryandpsychology.

LeiteralsoarguesthatNietzsche’sphilosophicalmethodisscientificina

strictersense.ThisisthesecondaspectofhisreadingofNietzsche’snaturalism.

LeiterwritesthatNietzsche’sphilosophicalmethod“involvesacertaintypeof

resultscontinuity[withthesciences],namely,continuitywiththe‘result’foremost

inthemindofmid‐19thcenturyGermans:thatmanisnotofa‘higher…[or]ofa

differentorigin’thantherestofnature”(NM7).Thereferencehereisto19th

centuryGermanmaterialists,namelyBüchnerandLange.Thissecondaspectof

Nietzsche’ssupposednaturalismmayseemtocontradictthefirst:whyinsistthat

Nietzscheisaspeculativenaturalistandthenemphasizehisrelianceonactual

scientificresults?AsIreadLeiter,thespeculativecausalexplanationsthat

shouldbecontinouswithanyscience.ThekeypointformypurposesisthatwhatLeitercalls“SoftM‐Naturalism”fallsunderwhatStrawsoncalls“hard”naturalism.

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Nietzscheprovides,thoughnotnecessarilyconfirmedbyscience,followfromwhat

sciencehasalreadydiscovered.Inthesameway,thetheoryofevolutionbynatural

selectionisbasedonempiricalevidence,butitcanalsobeusedtoexplainand

predictthingsforwhichempiricalevidencehasnotbeencollected.

Leitersummarizeshisreadingasfollows:

SoNietzsche,thephilosophicalnaturalist,aimstooffertheoriesthatexplain

variousimportanthumanphenomena(especiallymorality)andthatdosoin

waysthatbothdrawonactualscientificresults…,butarealsomodeledon

scienceinthattheyseektorevealthecausaldeterminantsofthese

phenomena,typicallyinvariouspsychologicalandphysiologicalfactsabout

persons.(NM8)51

IagreethatNietzscheseekstoidentifythecausaldeterminantsforphenomenasuch

asmorality,aslongasweunderstand“causaldeterminants”looselyasincluding

historical,andnotsimplypsychologicalandphysiological,factsaboutpersons.52My

51ThereisanambiguityinLeiter’sreadingwhichisworthmentioning.Leiterwritesthat,forNietzsche,“philosophicalinquiryshouldbecontinuouswithempiricalinquiryinthesciences”(NM3).The“should”hereissignificant.ThissoundsasthoughLeiterisattributingameta‐philosophicalclaimtoNietzsche,ratherthansimplydescribingNietzsche’sownpractice.ItisunclearwhetherLeitermeansthatNietzsche’sphilosophicalargumentsarecontinuouswiththeresultsofscience,orthatNietzschebelievesthatallphilosophicalargumentsshouldbecontinuouswiththeresultsofscience.Leiterclearlyimpliesthelatterbutonlyprovidesevidencefortheformer.52Leiterisnotsufficientlycarefulaboutthisqualification.Whilehisargumentaboutthephysiologicalbasisofactionisausefulcorrectivetothepost‐structuralinterpretationofNietzsche,itgoestoofarintheotherdirection:itdoesnot

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contentioniswiththefirstpoint.WhetherNietzschedrawsonactualscientific

resultsdependsonwhetherweconsidertheconclusionsofGermanmaterialist

writers“actualscientificresults.”Ithinkthischaracterizationisunwarranted.Even

ifitiswarranted,requiringNietzsche’sargumentsto“drawonactualscientific

results”conflictswithhissuspicionofscienceandhiscriticismofthewilltotruth.

ThereisnoquestionthatGermanmaterialismexertedaprofoundandlasting

influenceonNietzsche’sthought.53Thequestioniswhetherthisinfluencejustifies

adequatelyaccountfortheroleofcultureindevelopinghumanthoughtandaction.InresponsetocriticismonthisscorebyJanaway,Leiterwrites,“ThereisnoreasontodenythatNietzschethenaturalistisinterestedinculture,butthatshouldnotleadustolosesightoftherolethatpsycho‐physicalcausesplaysintheexplanationofmoralityheproffers”(NNR19‐20).Thisisanon‐sequitur.AcknowledgingtheimportanceofculturalcausesdoesnotleadJanawaytolosesightoftheimportanceofnaturalcauses.AnaccuratereconstructionofNietzsche’sphilosophicalpracticemustaccount,inproperproportion,fortherelativeinfluencesofnatureandcultureonhumanthoughtandaction.53AccordingtoRichardVitzhum,GermanMaterialism“tooktheGermanintellectualworldbystormduringthe1850s.”Materialism:AnAffirmativeHistory.Amherst,NY:Prometheus,1995,98.Thematerialistssoughttounifythephysicalandhumansciencesinlightofnewdevelopmentsintheburgeoningfieldofphysiology.Theydidthisbyprovidingpsychologicalandphysiologicalexplanationsofhumanbehaviour.LudwigBüchner,aleadingmaterialist,whose1855KraftundStroff(ForceandMatter)waspopularatthetime,wrotethat“theresearchanddiscoveriesofmoderntimescannolongerallowustodoubtthatman,withallthathehasandpossesses,beitmentalorcorporeal,isanaturalproductlikeallotherorganicbeings.”ForceandMatter.Trans.J.G.Collingwood.London:Trubner,1870,pagelxxviii,quotedinLeiter,“Nietzsche’sNaturalismRe‐considered.”

AsLeiterindicates,Nietzschewascertainlyawareofthesedevelopments.By1866NietzschehehadreadFriedrichLange’sHistoryofMateralism,whichprovidedanoverviewofthemovement.AccordingtoNietzchebiographerCurtJanzNietzscheviewedLange’sbookas“undoubtedlythemostsignificantphilosophicalworktohaveappearedindecades.”FriedrichNietzsche:Biographie(3volumes).Munich:Hanswer,1978.ThatsameyearNietzschewrotetoafriend,“Kant,Schopenhauer,thisbookbyLange–Idon’tneedanythingelse”(Janzvolume1;198,quotedinLeiterNNR6).

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theclaimthat,forNietzsche,philosophicalargumentsshouldbe“continuouswith

theresultsofscience.”Muchhingesonwhatismeantby“theresultsofscience.”

Presumably,itmeanssomethingstrongerthanspeculationastothecausal

determinantsofagivenphenomena;thatis,presumablyitmeansestablished,

empiricallyverifiableresults.Wereittomeansomethingweaker,thenwhatLeiter

calls“actualscientificresults”wouldbenodifferent,methodologicallyand

epistemically,fromthekindofspeculative,causalexplanationsNietzscheprovides

inhisownwritings.Inthiscaseitwouldnotwarrantanyspecialstatus,andthere

wouldbenothingspecialaboutNietzsche’scontinuitywithit.Leitermusttherefore

meanby“actualscientificresults”theresultsofempiricalscienceasweunderstand

thatdisciplinetoday.

ButinthatcasetheclaimthatNietzsche’sargumentsmustbecontinuous

withactualscientificresultsisunwarranted.Theresultsinquestion,accordingto

Leiter,aretheconclusionsdrawnbycontemporaryGermanmaterialists,namely

BüchnerandLange.Consider,forinstance,Büchner’sForceandMatter,amajor

workofthematerialistmovement,familiartoNietzsche.Büchnerargues,against

theidealismofKantandHegel,thatforceandmatterareindestructible,thatnature

ispurposelessandpurelyphysical,thattherearenosupernaturalentities,and

thereforenotranscendentalmoral(orother)laws.54ItisclearwhyNietzschewas

interestedinthisandrelatedworks.Itisequallyunclearthattheseworks

54Buchner,Ludwig,ForceandMatter.Trans.J.G.Collingwood.London:Trubner,1870.Seealsothepreviousfootnote.

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constitute“theresultsofscience.”Büchner’sconclusionsarenotdiscoveries

stemmingfromempiricalresearch,norhavetheybeenadoptedorconfirmedby

contemporaryscience.55Indeeditisunclearwhethertheyareassumptionsmade

beforethefactorconclusionsreachedbythekindoftheoreticalandobservational

analysiscommontootherwritersoftheperiod,likeFeuerbachandNietzsche.56

Nietzsche’swritingsarecontinuouswiththeworksofBüchner,Lange,andothers,

butitisunsurprising,andphilosophicallyuninteresting,thathiswritingsshouldbe

continuouswiththosewhoinspiredhim.Thiscontinuitydoesnotwarrantthe

claimthatNietzsche’sphilosophydrawson“actualexistingscientificresults.”

Leiter,however,doesnotjustclaimthatNietzschedrawsonactualscientific

results.HeclaimsthatNietzschebelievesthatphilosophyshoulddrawonactual

scientificresults(NM3).HerewegettothedeeperproblemwithLeiter’sreading.

EvenifwegrantthattheworkoftheGermanmaterialistscountsas“scientific”in

55LeiterclaimsNietzsche’sviews“fareratherwellinlightofthesubsequentresearchinscientificpsychology”(NNR4).Thissuggestion,however,ismisleading.Thedisciplineofscientific(andespeciallyexperiemental)psychologypresumes,fromtheoutset,thatthereareprimarilyphysiologicalcausesofouremotionsandbeliefs.Itdoesnotlookforother,contingentfactorswiththesamedegreeofinterest.Forthisreasonithasbeenthesubjectofcriticismfromotherbranchesofpsychology,aswellasbyscientistsandphilosophers.Butthisistangentialtothemainargument.Leiter’sclaimthatNietzsche’sphilosophyrequires“resultscontinuity”withtheempiricalsciencesdoesnotdependonbeingcontinuouswithrecentresearchinscientificpsychology(itonlydependsonnotbeingdiscontinuouswithit).Itdoes,however,dependonsomecontinuitywiththesciences,andLeiterfindsthiscontinuitywiththe19thcenturyGermanmaterialists.By“continuity,”hemeans,“continuitywiththe‘result’foremostinthemindofmid‐19thcenturyGermans:thatmanisnotofa‘higher…[or]ofadifferentorigin’thantherestofnature”(NM7).Iwillthereforerestrictmyargumenttothissupposedcontinuity.56ApointmadebyJanawayinchapterfourofBeyondSelflessness.

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therelevantsense,theideathatphilosophyshouldbescientificconflictswith

Nietzsche’scriticismofthevalueofscience.AsIexplainedinthefirstsectionofthis

chapter,Nietzschebelievesthatmodernscienceisthelatestmanifestationofthe

asceticideal.“Science,”hewrites,“isnottheoppositeoftheasceticidealbutrather

thelatter’sownmostrecentandnoblemanifestation”(GMIII23).Thisisbecause

science,insofarasitprivilegestruthaboveall,entailsthatwesubordinateour

instinctsandperspectivetoanauthorityotherthanourselves.Leiterseesthings

differently.HearguesthatNietzsche“endorsesascientificperspectiveasthe

correctortrueone”(NM21).Insupportofthisclaim,hemarshalsthreequotations

fromNietzsche’spublishedwritings.AccordingtoLeiter,

EvenintheoftenmisunderstoodThirdEssayoftheGenealogy–inwhich

Nietzscheattacksonthevalueoftruth,notitsobjectivityorourabilityto

knowit–Nietzscherefersto“therebeingsomuchusefulworktobedone”in

scienceandadds,regardingthe“honestworkers”inscience,that“Idelightin

theirwork”(GM3.23).Inworksfromearlierinthe1880s,hestilllauds

scienceforthe“severityofitsservice,itsinexorabilityinsmallasingreat

matters...”(GS293)andsaysthat“theidealscholarinwhomthescientific

instinct,afterthousandsoftotalsemi‐failures,foronceblossomsandblooms

totheend,iscertainlyoneofthemostpreciousinstrumentsthereare”(BGE

207).

ThesethreequotationsfromNietzschearetheonlyonesLeiterusesinsupportof

hisclaimthatNietzscheendorsesascientificperspectiveaboveallothers.Ofthese,

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twoaretakenoutofcontextofthespecificnumberedpassageinwhichtheyappear,

anddistortNietzsche’sactualpointinthatpassage(GM3.23andBGE207).The

third,fromGS293,isnottakenoutofthecontext,butitssignificance,when

consideredinthecontextofNietzsche’soeuvre,isambiguous.57Letuslookateach

carefully.

ConsiderfirstBGE207.Iquoteatlength.ThepartthatLeitercitesis

underlined:

Theobjectiveperson,onewhonolongercursesandscoldslikethepessimist,

theidealscholarinwhomthescientificspirit,afterthousandsoftotalsemi‐

failures,foronceblossomsandbloomstotheend,iscertainlyoneofthemost

preciousinstrumentsthereare:butheneedstobeputintothehandof

someonemorepowerful.Heisonlyatool;let’ssaythatheisamirror,notan

“enduntohimself…..Hismirroringsoul,eversmoothingitselfout,nolonger

knowshowtoaffirm,nolongerhowtodeny;hedoesnotcommand,neither

doeshedestroy….Norisheamodelhumanbeing;heneitherprecedesnor

followsanyone;ingeneralheputshimselfatsuchadistancethathehasno

groundsonwhichtotakeasidebetweengoodandevil.Ifwehaveforso

longmistakenhimforaphilosopher,foradictatorialbreederandtyrantof

57Leiter’stargetinthissectionofhisbookisRichardRorty’sclaimthatforNietzschescienceisjustoneperspectiveontheworld.MydisagreementwithLeiterheredoesnotvindicateRorty.Astheensuingdiscussionillustrates,Nietzscheadmiressciencemorethanotherdisciplines(religion,forinstance),butheneverthelessfindssciencetobeovervalued.

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culture,wehavedonehimfortoogreatanhonourandoverlookedthemost

essentialthingabouthim:heisaninstrument,aslave‐likeentity,ifcertainly

themostsublimesortofslave,butinhimselfnothing–presquerien!(BGE

207)

Thepurposeofthispassageisnot,asLeiterargues,toshowthatthescientific

perspectiveis“thecorrectortrueone.”Itistoshowthatdespitehisadmirationfor

science,thescientistisnota“modelhumanbeing”norevena“philosopher,”but

merely“aninstrument…aslavelikeentity…inhimselfnothing.”Thescientist,and

thescientificperspective,isasourceofcontemptforNietzsche.Qualifiedcontempt,

butcontemptnevertheless.

Leiter’suseofthequotationfromGM3.23issimilarlymisleading.Again,the

overarchingthemeofthelastfewsectionsoftheGenealogy,beginningwith3.23,is

thatscienceisthemoderndevelopmentoftheasceticideal.Aswiththefewlines

LeiterquotesfromBGE207,thefewlineshequotesfromGM3.23areimmediately

followedbytheword“but.”Onceagain,thelinesLeiterquotesareunderlined:

…sciencetodayhasabsolutelynofaithinitself,letaloneinanidealaboveit,‐

andwhereitisstillpassion,love,fire,suffering,itisnottheoppositeofthe

asceticidealbutratherthatlatter’sownmostrecentandnoblemanifestation.

Doesthatsoundstrangetoyou?Thereareenoughworthyandmodest

workersevenamongstthescholarsoftoday,wholiketheirlittlecornerand

therefore,becausetheylikebeingthere,areoccasionallysomewhat

presumptuousinmakingtheirdemandheardthatpeopletodayoughttobe

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contentingeneral,especiallywithscience–therebeingsomuchusefulwork

tobedone.Idonotdenyit:Iamthelasttowanttospoilthepleasureof

thesehonestworkersintheircraft:forIdelightintheirwork.Butthefact

thatnowadayspeopleareworkinghardinscience,andthattheyare

contentedworkmen,doesnotatallprovethattoday,scienceaswholehasa

goal,awill,anideal,apassionofgreatfaith.Theopposite,asIsaid,isthe

case:whereitisnotthemostrecentmanifestationoftheasceticideal‐there

aretoofewnoble,exceptionalcasesforthegeneraljudgmenttobedeflected

–thensciencetodayisahidingplaceforallkindsofill‐humour,unbelief,

gnawingworms,contemptofself,badconscience….(GM3.23)

Again,thepointofthispassageisnotthatNietzsche“endorsesascientific

perspectiveasthecorrectortrueone.”Thepointisthatscienceisthemostrecent

manifestationoftheasceticideal.Nietzsche’sclaimsthat“thereissomuchuseful

worktobedone”inscience,thathe“delight[s]intheirwork,”illustratesthat

Nietzschehaspraisefortheworkofscientists,butthispraiseisqualifiedbyhis

moregeneralcriticismofscience.AsIarguedintheprevioussection,andasis

evidentinthispassage,Nietzscheisthoroughlycriticalofscienceinthefinal

sectionsoftheGenealogy.Hewrites,“Iwilltellthem[i.e.scientists]whatthey

themselvescannotsee,becausetheyarestandingtooclosetothemselves:thisideal

issimplytheiridealaswell”(GMIII24);“sciencerepresentsthedrivingforceofthe

innerevolutionofthatideal”(GMIII25);scienceandtheasceticideal“areonthe

samefoundation”(GMIII25).

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LeiteracknowledgesthatNietzschequestionsthevalueoftruthandaligns

sciencewiththeasceticideal,buthemaintainsthatthisis“aminortheme”in

Nietzsche’sthought(NM265).LeiterarguesthatNietzsche’scriticismofthevalue

oftruthonlyappliesatthelimitingcaseinwhichatruthissoterriblethatit

threatensourabilitytoaffirmlife(NM267).ButNietzsche’scriticismofthevalueof

truthincludesmorethanjusttheseextremecases.Eventhosetruthswhicharenot

soterriblethattheythreatenlifeare,forNietzsche,notnecessarilytobeprivileged

overothernon‐truths.ThisiswhyNietzschecallstheassumptionthattruthis

preferabletountruth“themostpoorlyprovenassumptionintheworld”(BGE34),

andwhyhewrites:“Howevermuchvaluewemayascribetotruth,truthfulness,or

altruism,itmaybethatweneedtoattributeahigherandmorefundamentalvalue

toappearance,tothewilltoillusion,toegoismanddesire”(BGE2).Itisalsowhyhe

privilegesartoverscience:

Art,letmesayattheoutset,sinceIshalldealwiththisatlengthsomeday,‐‐

art,inwhichlyingsanctifiesitselfandthewilltodeceptionhasgood

conscienceonitsside,ismuchmorefundamentallyopposedtotheascetic

idealthanscienceis.(GM3.25)

WhatmattersforNietzscheisnotwhethersomethingistrueorfalse,buttowhat

endthetruth(orfalsity)isused:“Ultimatelythepointistowhatendalieistold”

(Antichrist56).Andtheendinquestionistheovercomingoftheasceticideal.

LeiteralsosaysthatwhatNietzschecriticizesaboutscienceisits“willtonon­

perspectivaltruth,”wherethisistakentomeanthewilltoknowtheworldbeyond

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ours(NM268).58ForLeiter,Nietzscheiscriticizingourdesiretoknowthe

noumenalworld:“thewilltonon‐perspectivalknowledgeoftruthisasceticorlife‐

denyingbecauseitdemeanstheactualworldasmereappearance”(NM278).On

thisreading,theproblemwiththewilltotruthisthatitisbasedonanerror,onthe

falsebeliefthatthereisadistinctionbetweenanoumenalandphenomenalworld.

ThisreadingagainmisplacesthethrustofNietzsche’sattack.Nietzschedoesnot

believethatsucherrorsaresignificantinthemselves:“Itisnoterroraserrorthat

horrifiesme,”hewrites(EcceHomo,“WhyIamDestiny?”7).Whatmattersisthe

extenttowhicherror,andtruths,affirmlife.Ifscienceandtruthisusedtofurther

life(asitisinthecaseofuncoveringtheoriginsofmorality)thenthatis

commendable.Ifillusionisusedtofurtherlife(asinGreektragedy)thenthatisalso

commendable.Whatmattersineachcaseisnotprimarilywhethersomethingis

trueorfalse,butwhetheritaffirmslifeornot:whetheritrequiresustosubordinate

ourinstinctsandperspectivetosomethingexternaltoourselves,whethera

noumenalworldorascientificunderstandingofthephenomenalworld.

Pointingoutthismisreading,however,onlygetsussofar.Weneedtoget

clearerontherolethatscienceandtruthplayinNietzsche’sthought.Howcan

Nietzsche“delight”intheworkofscientists,andyetcallthem“slavelike”

instruments?Thefollowingthoughtexperimentmighthelp.Imaginethat

Nietzsche’sclaimthathumanbeingshaveafixed,psycho‐physiologicalconstitution,

orhisgenealogicalanalysisofmorality,turnsouttobecontradictedbyscientificor

58InthisrespecthefollowsClark(1990).Seemyintroductionpage15.

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historicalresearch.Wouldthisrenderhiswritingsfalse?Woulditmeanthatwe

candowithoutthem?Thesearetwoseparatequestions.Thedistinctionbetween

themisinstructive.

AsIarguedintheprevioussection,therelevantpointforNietzscheinhis

criticismofmetaphysicsisnotthatmetaphysicalbeliefsarefalse,butthattheyare

life‐denying:theyleadustosubordinateourinstinctsandperspectivetoan

authoritybeyondourselves.Something’sbeingfalseisnot,forNietzsche,reason

enoughtorejectit.Forthesamereason,something’sbeingtrue,orcontinuouswith

science,isnotreasonenoughtoacceptit.TherelevantdistinctionforNietzscheis

notwhethersomethingistrueorfalse,butwhetheritaffirmslifeornot.Certainly,

Nietzschebelievesthathisgenealogicalanalysisofmoralityandhisnaturalist

accountofhumanthoughtandactionareaccuraterepresentationsofhowthings

reallyare–thatis,hebelievesthemtobetrue.Andcertainly,hebelievesthatthe

beliefinaChristianGodandaCartesiansubjectaremispresentationsofhowthings

reallyare–thatis,hebelievesthemtobefalse.Butthefactthathebelievesthe

formertobetrueandthelattertobefalsedoesnot,initself,explainwhyhewants

ustoadopttheformerandrejectthelatter.Tosuggestotherwiseistosaythat

Nietzschevaluestruthoverallotherconsiderations.Andtovaluetruthoverall

otherconsiderationsistopartakeintheaesceticideal.Itistoaffirmtheworld‐view

thatNietzscheaimstosubvert.

ThisisnottosaythatNietzscheisentirelyunconcernedwiththetruthor

falsityofhisarguments,orthattheirtruthorfalsityisirrelevanttoouradjudication

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ofthem.ThesuccessofNietzsche’sargumentsagainstmetaphysicsdependsonour

tacitpreferencefortruthoverfalsity.59Thereisanimportantdistinctionbetween

ourbelievingsomethingtobetrue(thatis,objectivelytrue,inaccordancewiththe

methodsandresultsofscience)andourbeingcompelledbysomething.Tobelieve

thatastoryorargumentistruepresumesadegreeofrationalityandobjectivityin

theacceptingofthatthing.Tobecompelledbyastoryorargumentdoesnot

presumethesamedegreeofrationalityorobjectivity.Imightbecompelledbya

fictionalportrayalofeventsmorethanbyapurelyfactualaccountofthosesame

events.Imayevenknowthattherearefactualinaccuraciesinthefictionalportrayal,

andyetstillbemorecompelled(thatis,moremovedbyit;morelikelytoactin

responsetoit)byitthanbyapurelyfactualaccount.60Wemustbalancethefact

thatNietzschepresentsargumentsthathebelievesaretrue,andwhosesuccessor

failuredependsonusbelievingthemtobetrue,withhisviewthatthetruthor

falsityofhisargumentsarenotthesoleorprimaryreasonforadoptingorrejecting

them.WhatmattersforNietzscheishowcompellinganargumentorstoryis,not

howtruthfulitis.Anargumentorbeliefismoreorlesscompellingdependingon

59HereitisimportanttoconsiderhowdifficultitwouldbetodisproveNietzsche’sclaims.Whatwoulditmeantoshow,empirically,thathumanbeingsdonotneedtojustifytheirsufferinginorderforittobetolerable,orthatourbeliefintheChristianGoddoesnot,infact,derivefromanattempttojustifyoursuffering?Whatwoulditmeantoshow,empirically,thathumanthoughtandactionisnot,infact,controlledatleastinpartbyfreewill?Theseargumentsarenotoneswhichlendthemselvestoempiricalconfirmation.60Filmisagoodexampleofthisphenomenon.ArecentexampleisthefilmTheHurtLocker,aboutanAmericanbombdisposalunitinIraq.Thefilmhasbeencriticizedbyveteransforitsunrealisticportrayal,butpraisedbycriticsandaudiences,atleastinpartforits“realism.”

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whetheritisthoughttobetrueorfalse,buttruthorfalsityalonedoesnot

determineitscompellingness.

TheproblemwithLeiter’snaturalistreading,then,isthatitmakesNietzsche

outtobeaphilosopherinthetraditionalsensethatNietzschecriticizes:onewho

aimstodevelopobjective,accuraterepresentationsoftheworld.Itmakes

Nietzsche’sargumentscontingentonthescientificresultsofhiscontemporaries,

andhostagetofuturediscoveriesintheempiricalsciences.Thisfailstosufficiently

accountforNietzsche’scritiqueofthevalueoftruth,anditpartakesintheascetic

idealthatNietzscheaimstosubvert.ThepointofNietzsche’spositiveaccountof

humanactionasderivingfromsub‐consciousdrivesisnottodevelop“ascientific

pictureofhowthingswork”buttounderminethemetaphysicalpictureofourselves

asprimarilyconscious,agentialbeingsandtoinspirethoseofuswithnoble

constitutionstobreakfromthestricturesoftraditionalmorality.Thatistosay,

Nietzscheisnotjustpresentingapictureofhowthingsreallyare,tobeadjudicated

astrueorfalse,inthewaythatscienceis;heistryingtocompelustowardsare‐

valuationofvalues.61

61LeiteracknowledgesthatNietzsche’snaturalismispartofhislargeraimtoinspireare‐valuationofvalues.Hewritesthatthe“thebulkof[Nietzsche’s]philosophicalactivityisdevotedtovariationsonthisnaturalisticproject”(NM11),butacknowledgesthat“itisequallyclearthatNietzsche’snaturalismisenlistedonbehalfofarevaluationofallvalues”(NNR11).HespecifiestworespectsinwhichNietzsche’snaturalistprojectissubordinatetohisrevaluationproject.OnecaseiswhenNietzscheemploysrhetoricalorstylisticdevicestounsettlehisreaders.Theotheriswhenheusestheterm“philosopher”torefertothosewhocreatenewvalues.Thepoint,however,isnotsimplythatNietzsche’snaturalistprojectis

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ChristopherJanawayoffersaweaker,andinmyviewmoreaccurate

characterizationofNietzsche’snaturalism.Nietzscheisanaturalist,Janawaywrites,

in“abroadsense”:

Heopposestranscendentmetaphysics,whetherthatofPlatoorChristianity

orSchopenhauer.Herejectsnotionsoftheimmaterialsoul,theabsolutely

freecontrollingwill,ortheself‐transparentpureintellect,instead

emphasizingthebody,talkingoftheanimalnatureofhumanbeings,and

attemptingtoexplainnumerousphenomenabyinvokingdrives,instincts,

andaffectswhichhelocatesinourphysical,bodilyexistence.(Selflesneess

34)

Leiterdoesnotthinkthischaracterizationgoesfarenough:

Thisislessa“broadsense”ofnaturalism,however,thanitis“LaundryList

Naturalism.”Whyaretheseasetofviewsaphilosophicalnaturalistoughtto

hold?Whatisitthatmakesthemtheviewsofaphilosophicalnaturalistat

all?(NNR2).

Janawaytellsmethathethinksoppositionto“transcendentmetaphysics”is

whatunitestheelementsonthelist….[This]wouldsimplypushthequestion

backonelevel:whyisoppositiontotranscendentmetaphysicsthemarkof

naturalism?Whatmotivatesthatoppositionitself?(NNRfn.3)

subordinatetohisphilosophicalone,butthatthenaturalistprojectisonlyimportantinsofarasitservesthephilosophicalproject.

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Wehavealreadyseentheanswer.Nietzsche’soppositiontotranscendent

metaphysicsismotivatedbyhisbeliefthatmetaphysicscontributesthelevelling,

andhencedecay,ofEuropeanculture.Itimposesauniformityofthoughtandaction

oneveryone,eventhosewith“noble”psycho‐physiologicalconstitutions,thereby

inhibitingtheirexpressionofstrengthandcreativity,andbyextensionthere‐

valuationofvalueswhichNietzscheaimstoinspire.62

ThereisafurtheraspectofNietzsche’scriticismofscience.Notonlydoes

scienceover‐valuetruth,italsopresumesthatthereisasingle,objective,

transparentwindowintoreality.ThispresumptionisakeytargetofNietzsche’s

critiqueofphilosophy.Thiscriticismismostclearlyarticulatedinanearly,

unpublishedpiece,“OnTruthandLiesinanExtra‐MoralSense”(1873).There

Nietzschearguesthatascientificworld‐viewlimitsthevarietyofperspectivesthat

wemightdevelopoftheworld,perspectiveswhichwouldbothincreaseour

knowledgeofandenrichourexperienceintheworld.63Hebeginsbyinvestigating

62Leiter’sothertwoquestions,“Whyaretheseasetofviewsaphilosophicalnaturalistoughttohold?”and“Whyisoppositiontotranscendentmetaphysicsthemarkofnaturalism?”aremisplaced.Thereisnoestablishedcriteriaforwhatviewsanaturalistoughttohold.Manyphilosopherswhoconsiderthemselvesnaturalistsholdarangeofdifferentviews,asStrawson,PapineauandRitchiehaveshown(seefootnote35),andthereisnooverridingneedtodefine,onceandforall,whichsetofviewsanaturalistoughttohold.

63ThisisNietzsche’sfamousdoctrineofperspectivism,articulatedmostclearlyinGM3.12:“wecanusethedifferenceinperspectivesandaffectiveinterpretationsforknowledge.Fromnowon,myphilosophicalcolleagues,letusbemorewaryofthedangerousoldconceptualfairy‐talewhichhassetupa‘pure,will‐less,painless,timeless,subjectofknowledge’….Thereisonlyaperspectivalseeing,onlyaperspectivalknowing;themoreaffectsweareabletoputintowordsaboutathing,

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theoriginsofournotionsoftruthandfalsity.Hisaccountrunsasfollows:

1) Weseesomething(atree)andexperienceanerveimpulse

2) Weformanimageandawordtocorrespondwiththisimpulse

3) Weassimilatesimilarimages/wordstogethertoformconcepts.Indoingsowe

overlookparticularitiesandfocusonsimilarities.

4) Theseconceptscometoregulatewhatcountsastruthandlying.Ifweusethe

conceptscorrectly(i.e.assimilatetreesortree‐likeobjectsundertheconcept

“tree”),thatcountsas“true.”Ifwedonotusetheconceptscorrectly(i.e.

assimilateobjectsotherthantreesundertheconcept“tree”),thatcountsas

“lies.”

Ifweusetheconceptscorrectly,webecomereliable,socialbeings.Ifwedonot,

thenwebecomeunreliable,asocialbeings.Nietzschebelievesthatinordertoexist

socially,inordertocommunicateatall,humanbeingsneedtodeviseconceptsfrom

thenerveimpulsesweexperience,butweneednothavedevelopedtheparticular

conceptswehave.Wemightjustaswellhavedevelopeddifferentconcepts,

groupedthingsdifferentlythanwedonow.Hadwedoneso,wewouldrelatetothe

worldandtoeachotherdifferentlythanwedonow.

Theproblem,accordingtoNietzsche,isnotwiththeconceptswehave

developedbutthefactthatwehaveforgottenthatitwasuswhodevelopedthem.

themoreeyes,variouseyesweareabletoputintowordsaboutathing,themorecompletewillbeour‘concept’ofthething,our‘objectivity.’”Notethatthepointofthispassageisnot,asisoftenthought,thatallperspectivesareequal.Thepointisthatthemoreperspectivesonehasofathing,themorecompleteandobjectiveourknowledgeofit.

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Wehaveremovedourconceptualedificefromitshistoricalcontextandcometo

believeitoffersatimeless,objectivepictureoftheworld.Wehaveforgottenour

roleasdevelopersofourownknowledge.Accordingly,weconsiderotherwaysof

perceivingtheworld,particularlyartisticways,asfalse.Thisviewofthematter

keepsuslockedintoourcurrentconceptualedifice,anditgetsinthewayofan

aesthetic,instinctive,spontaneousexperiencewiththeworld.Nietzschewantsusto

developnewconcepts,notbeboundbytheconceptswehaveinherited.64

Inthisrespect,Nietzscheisnottryingtoaugmentourknowledgeofthe

world,assciencetriestodo.Heistryingtounfixourestablishedwaysoflookingat

things.Thereisnotonetrueorcorrectperspectivewhichhewantsustoadoptin

placeoftheonewecurrentlyhave.Hewantstocompelustothrowofftheslave

morality,toembraceourowninstinctsandperspectiveandthevalueswhichflow

naturallyfromthem.TheonlyrestrictionNietzscheseemstoplaceonthesenew

valuesisthattheynotberootedinanauthorityotherthanourselves,whethera

transcendentaldeityoranempirical,objectivewayoflookingattheworld.

3.4.Conclusion

64Here,inthisearlyessay,Nietzscheremainsrelativelydescriptive,almostneutral.Thoughhecomparestherationalandtheintuitiveman,hedoesnotexplicitlyprivilegethelatter.Hisaimseemstobetodemystifytherationalmanandhisconceptualedifice.Heislessneutralwhenhereturnstothisthemeinhislaterwritings.SeeforinstanceBGE34.

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InthischapterIhavetriedtoexplainwhyNietzscheiscriticalof

metaphysics,andwhatthiscriticismdoesanddoesnotentail.Ihavetriedtoshow

thatitdoesnotentailtheclaimthatthereisnoessenceunderlyingourthoughts,

feelings,andactions,northeclaimthatdifferenceandmultiplicityareobjectsof

pureaffirmation.Italsodoesnotentailtheclaimthatphilosophyshouldbe

continuouswiththeempiricalsciences.Theformersetofclaimsfailstoappreciate

theessentialiststraininNietzsche’sthought,whilethelatterfailstoappreciatehis

critiqueofthevalueoftruth.Properlyunderstood,Nietzsche’scriticismof

metaphysics,slavemorality,andthewilltotruthincludenotjustPlatonism,

Cartesianism,andKantianism,butalsopost‐structuralismandnaturalism.

GettingclearontheseissuesisneededtoappreciatebothNietzsche’s

criticismoftraditionalphilosophyandthekindofphilosophyheadvocatesinits

place.If,asNietzscheargues,humanbeingsdonothaveaccesstowhatisintheir

consciousness,andiftheirthoughtsarenottheresultofrationalprocessesbut

ratherthesecondaryeffectofunderlyinginstinctsanddrives,thenoneofthemost

basicassumptionsoftraditionalphilosophyisflawed.Inthiscasewecannotbe

confidentthatclear,rigorous,rationalthoughtorlogicalargumentationwilldeliver

theinsightswehope.InthenextchapterIexaminetheconceptionofphilosophyhe

advocates,aconceptionwhichbuildsonandincorporatesthoseaspectsofhis

thoughtdiscussedhere.

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4.NIETZSCHE’SPHILOSOPHYOFTHEFUTURE

“Buttruephilosophersarecommandersandlawgivers…..Dophilosophersliketheseexisttoday?Havephilosophersliketheseeverexisted?Don’tphilosopherslikethesehavetoexist?...”

BGE211

AtthebeginningofthepreviouschapterIoutlinedtwowaysinwhich

Nietzscheusestheword“philosophy.”Inmostcasesheusesitdisparagingly,and

wehavenowseenwhy.Butinothercasesheusesitpositively,aswhenherefersto

“truephilosophers”or“mykindofphilosopher.”Whatdoeshemeanbythis?

Thisquestionhasreceivedsurprisinglylittleattentioninthesecondary

literature.Discussionsof“Nietzsche’sphilosophy”almostinvariablyfocusonhis

criticalpractice–thatis,themannerandmethodinwhichhedebunksmorality,

metaphysics,andthewilltotruth.TwoearlyclassicsofNietzschescholarship,

WalterKaufman’sNietzsche,Philosopher,Psychologist,Antichrist(1950)andArthur

Danto’sNietzscheasPhilosopher(1965)arecasesinpoint.Fromthetitlesofthese

worksonewouldexpectsomediscussionofthekindofphilosophicalpractice

Nietzscheadvocates.Insteadonefindsonlyadescriptionofwhat,how,andwhy

Nietzschecriticizes.ThesameistrueofrecentandcurrentNietzschescholarship.1

1Consider,forinstance,themostwell‐receivedrecentbooksonNietzsche:MaudemarieClark’sNietzscheonTruthandPhilosophy(1990);JasonRichardson’sNietzsche’sSystem(1996);SimonMay’sNietzsche’sEthicsandHisWaronMorality(1999);BrianLeiter’sNietzscheonMorality(2002);ChristopherJanaway’sBeyondSelflessness:AReadingofNietzsche’sGenealogy(2007).ThesebooksareoverwhelminglyconcernedwithNietzsche’scriticalpractice.Hispositiveconceptionofphilosophyisnotdiscussedinanydetail.

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Thephrase“Nietzsche’sphilosophy”isusedtodescribehispsychologicalanalyses

ofhumanbehaviour,hisskepticismabouttruth,hisperspectivism,andsoon.Little

attentionispaidtohispositivenotionofphilosophy.2

Thisisinmanywaysunderstandable.Nietzsche’scriticismsofmorality,

Christianity,andthevalueoftruthwarrantmoreattentionthanhisfewremarks

aboutanundetermined“philosophyofthefuture.”Therearealsoseveralobstacles

toexplaininghispositiveconceptionofphilosophy:Nietzschedoesnotdiscussthis

conceptionsystematically,sothemostonecandoispiecetogethervarious

fragmentsofhiswritings;thebestillustrationofthisphilosophyisThusSpoke

Zarathustra,atextrepletewithinterpretivedifficulties;andNietzsche’sphilosophy

highlightsthemoreunpalatablefeaturesofhisthought,especiallyhisunapologetic

anti‐egalitarianism.Itisnowonder,then,thatthisaspectofNietzsche’sthoughthas

beenlargelyignoredinthesecondaryliterature.

Myaiminthischapteristopiecetogetherthesefragments;toprovidea

sketchofNietzsche’s“philosophyofthefuture.”Thisphilosophydoesnotaimto

2ThreenotableexceptionsareRichardSchacht,Nietzsche(1983)(theopeningchapter);AlexanderNehemas,Nietzsche:LifeasLiterature(1985);andMichaelTanner,Nietzsche(1987).SchachtopenswithaclearandhelpfuloverviewofNietzsche’scriticismofandhispositiveconceptionofphilosophy.Iaimtobuildonthisoverviewhere.Nehemasoffersamorecreativeandcontroversialinterpretationwhichseemsrightinsomerespects(Nietzsche’snewphilosophyishighlyaesthetic)butwronginothers(Nietzschebelievesthat“writingisthemostimportantpartofliving”(109)).IdiscussNehemaslaterinthischapter.TannersubtlyexploresthedifficultiesassociatedwithNietzsche’spositiveconceptionofphilosophy,thoughhefindstheconceptionitselftooslipperytoproperlycharacterize.Seehischaptersix,“Prophecy.”

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analyze,understand,orgroundtheconceptsandvalueswehave(astraditional

philosophydoes).Nordoesitaimtoshowthattheseconceptsandvaluesare

ungroundedorunjustified(asNietzsche’scriticalpracticedoes).Itaims,rather,to

createnewconceptsandvalues.Thesenewconceptsarenottheresultofreasoning

fromestablishedpremises;theyaremorelikeaestheticcreationswhichseekto

apprehendtheworldinnewways,wayswhichreflecttheinstinctsandperspective

oftheircreator.

Thischapterproceedsinthreemovements,thoughforthesakeofcontinuity

theyarenotdividedintodiscretesections,asinthepreviouschapters.Ibeginby

explainingNietzsche’spositiveconceptionofphilosophyandhowitdiffersfrom

Nietzsche’scriticalpractice.Ithenexplainhowonebecomesaphilosopherofthe

future.AndIconcludebyexaminingoneofNietzsche’snewphilosophicalcreations:

hisconceptoftheeternalrecurrence.

* * *

WehaveseenwhyNietzscheiscriticaloftraditionalphilosophy.Insofaras

traditionalphilosophyprivilegestruthaboveallelse,insofarasitseeksan

impersonal,objectiverepresentationofthingsintheworld,itrequiresusto

subordinateourinstinctsandperspectivetoanauthorityotherthanourselves.But

wehavealsoseenNietzscheusephilosophicaltechniquestounderminetraditional

philosophy:heskepticallychallengesourassumptionsandinferences,andhe

exposesthetrueoriginsofourfalsebeliefs.Inthisrespectheseemslikeamore

strident,moreperceptivephilosopherthanonewhowantstoabandonthe

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disciplinealtogether.3Heevendescribesthenewphilosophyinawaythatsounds

liketheoldone.Hewrites,quotingStendhal:

Pourêtrebonphilosophe,ilfautêtresec,clair,sansillusion.Unbanquier,

quiafaitfortune,aunepartieducaractèrerequispourfairedesdécouvertes

enphilosophie,c’estàdirepourvoirclairdanscequiest.(BGE39)

Fewtraditionalphilosopherswouldobjecttothisdescription.Theypride

themselvesontheirabilitytoseeclearlythroughillusion(evenif,accordingto

Nietzsche,theyoftenfailinthisregard).Thisbegsthequestion:HowcanNietzsche

criticizephilosophyyetrelyonitsmethodsforhisowninsights?

Nietzscheadmiresmuchofwhatphilosophersdo:theirattemptstopierce

throughillusion,their(sometimes)rigorousmethods.Andhebelievesthattheir

methodsareusefulinunmaskingthevaluesunderlyingtheirowndiscipline.He

believes,forinstance,thatthewilltotruthwillunmaskitsownoriginsandleadto

itsowndemise.ButNietzschebelievesthattraditionalphilosophy,includingthose

practiceswhichheadopts,arevaluableonlyasapreliminarysteptothetruetaskof

philosophy,whichistocreatenewconceptsandvalues.Heinsiststhat“wemust

3Nietzscheisnotunawareofthisresemblanceandisthereforecarefultomarkthedistinction.Heassociatestraditionalphilosophicalskepticismwithweaknessandillhealth.Hisskepticism,ontheotherhand,isa“new,harsher,moredangeroussortofskepticism”(BGE209).Thisskepticism“withholdsbeliefbutdoesnotloseitselfintheprocess;tothespirititgivesadangerousfreedom,buttheheartitkeepsfirmlyinline”(BGE209).Itisnotuncertain,nordoesitnotbelieveinanything(whichwouldbenihilistic).Itquestionsandchallengessomebeliefswhileremainingcertaininitsown.

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stopmistakingphilosophicalworkers…fortruephilosophers”(BGE211).

Philosophicalworkersanalyzeandunderstandtheconceptsandvalueswehave;

truephilosopherscreatenewones.Becomingatruephilosopher“mayrequirethat

onepassthroughallthestageswhichhisservants,thelearnedworkersof

philosophymustremain,”butthesestages,theskepticismandanalysis,aresimply

precursorstothemaintaskofcreating(BGE211).Thesetruephilosophers“deemit

nolittleinsulttophilosophytodecree,aspeoplenowadaysliketodo,that

‘Philosophyiscriticismandcriticalscience–andthatisallitis!’”(BGE210).“My

kindofphilosopher,”Nietzschewrites,isoneforwhom“acreativemodeofthought

dominates.”4Andelsewhere:

Whatdawnsonphilosopherslastofallisthattheymustnolongeraccept

conceptsasagift,normerelypurifyandpolishthem,butfirstmakeand

createthem,presentthemandmakethemconvincing.(WP409)5

Thetraditionalphilosopherassumesthatthereisonetruewayofapprehendingthe

world,andsetsouttofindthisway.Hetriesto“mirror”theworldratherthan

shapeit(BGE207).Thetruephilosopherdoesnotassumethatthereisonlyone

4TheWilltoPower.Trans.WalterKaufmanandR.J.Hollingdale.NewYork:Vintage,1968,§464.(HereafterWP)5BGE211:“…alltheseareonlythepreconditionsforhistask:thetaskitselfcallsforsomethingelse–itcallsforhimtocreatevalues.”WP605:“Tointroduceameaning–thistaskstillremainstobedone.”Itrequiresa“creativepositing…aforming,shaping,overcoming,willing,suchasistheessenceofphilosophy”;AndWP605,wherehesaysthatphilosophersmustengagein“activeinterpretationandnotmerelyconceptualtranslation.”SeealsoBGE42,43,44,204,209,210,213,289.

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truewayofapprehendingtheworld,orthatwehaveaccesstotheworldasitreally

is.Hedoesnotthereforetrytograspthissupposedreality;hetriestoshapereality

accordingtohisownimage.AsZarathustrasaystohisdisciples,“Andwhatyou

havecalledworld,thatshallbecreatedonlybyyou:yourreason,yourimage,your

will,yourloveitshallitselfbecome!”(TSZ2.2).6

Howdoesonecreatenewconceptsandvalues?Howdoesonebecomea

philosopherofthefuture?Itisnotaseasyasitsounds.First,onemustbeacertain

kindofperson.“Itisnoteasytolearnwhataphilosopheris,”Nietzschewrites,

“becauseitcannotbetaught”(BGE213);“Wehavearighttophilosophy(takingits

wordinitsfinestmeaning)onlybecauseofourorigins.Heretoo,ancestors’

bloodlinesaredecisive.”7Recallfromthepreviouschapterthatwhatdetermines

thekindofpersononeisisone’spsycho‐physiologicaldisposition(one’ssetof

drivesandinstincts)andtheenvironmentinwhichonelives.Thisenvironment

includesthedominantsetofvalues,theclimate,nutrition,andsoon.Thesefactors

determinewhichinstinctswillbestimulatedandwhichwillberepressed.They

6AlsointhissectionofTSZ:“Creating–thatisthegreatredemptionfromsuffering,andlife’sbecominglighter.”Andelsewhere,invokingthedistinctionbetweenphilosophicalworkersandtruephilosophers:“Whoeverlearnsmuchwillunlearnallviolentdesiring”(TSZ3.12.16).Thesuggestionisthatweshouldnotlearnforitsownsake,butratherlearn“onlyforthesakeofcreating”(TSZ3.12.16).7OntheesotericismofNietzsche’sphilosophyofthefuture,seealsoBGE30:“Wheneverourloftiestinsightsinadvertentlyreachtheearsofpeoplewhoarenotconstitutedordestinedtohearthem,theymust–andshould!–soundfoolish,”BGE32:“Whatservestonourishorrefreshthehighertypeofpersonmustbealmostpoisontoaverydifferentandinferiortype,”andBGE228:“Thereisahierarchybetweenhumanandhuman.”SeealsoGS381,BGE43,EHPreface3.

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thereforedeterminewhichthoughtsandfeelingswewillhave.Theydetermine,in

otherwords,thekindofphilosophywewillproduce.

Nietzscheillustratesthispointwithreferencetohimself.InEcceHomohe

attributeshisuniquephilosophicalinsightstohisuniqueconstitution.Hehas

“noblesbloodlines”andinstincts(“Iamapure‐bloodedPolishnobleman,inwhom

thereisnodropofbadblood”)whichhavebeenshapedbyunusualexternal

conditions.Theseincludehis“placeandclimate”(“geniusisconditionedbydryair,

clearsky,”hesays)andeventhevariousillnesseshehasendured.8Forinstance,

NietzschesaysthattheideasinDaybreakcametohimashesufferedthrougha

periodof“extremepovertyofbloodandmuscle,”yetneverthelessmanagedto

affirmlife(EH“WhyIamSoWise,”1).9ItisbecauseNietzschehasbothnoble

bloodlinesandtheexperienceofweaknessandsufferingthathehas“theskilland

knowledgetoinvertperspectives,”toseeboththeperspectiveofthestrongandthe

weak(EH1.1).Thisiswhy,hesays,“arevaluationofvaluesisperhapspossiblein

mealone”(EH1.1).

8NietzschecontracteddysenteryanddiphtheriawhileservingasanorderlyintheFranco‐PrussianWar.Heisalsothoughttohavecontractedsyphilis,whichWalterKaufmanhasspeculatedmightbethesourceofhismentalbreakdownin1889.LeonardSaxchallengesthisspeculationin“WhatwastheCauseofNietzsche’sDementia.”JournalofMedicalBiography,11(1),February2003,47‐54.9TheimmodestchaptertitlesofEcceHomo(“WhyIamSoWise,”“WhyIamSoClever,”“WhyIWriteSuchGoodBooks”)arebestreadasmockingthefalsemodestyofthosewhowriteautobiographieswithoutacknowledgingtheimmodestyinherentinthegenre.Immodesty,forNietzsche,ispreferabletofalsemodesty.

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Theproblemwithtraditionalphilosophers,ontheotherhand,isthatthey

arenottherightkindofpeople.Theyneedtobelievethattheirthoughtsandactions

aretheresultoftheirownfreewill,thatthereissomethingbeyondourearthly

existence,infusingitwithmeaning.Thisneedrunsdeeperthananddeterminesthe

contentoftheirphilosophicaldiscoveries.Thisexplainswhytheymake

assumptionsandinferenceswhichare,ontheirownterms,unjustified:becauseat

bottomtheyneedtobelievesomethingsratherthanothers:“Thatacertaintyis

worthmorethanuncertainty,forexample,orthatappearanceisworthlessthan

‘truth’”(BGE3).ThusDescartesandKant,totaketwofamousexamples,develop

newconcepts(theCartesiansubjectandthecategoricalimperative),butthese

conceptssimplyaffirmtheexistinghierarchyofvalues.Thisisbecause,on

Nietzsche’sview,theseconceptsdonotresultfromadisinterestedprocessof

reasoning.Theyaresecondaryeffectsofacertaindisposition,andanaccompanying

valuation,ofthosewhoholdthem.10Itisunsurprising,then,thattheyendof

affirmingtheasceticideal.

Theideathatphilosophicalconceptsaresimplyconsciousmanifestationsof

unconsciousdrivesseemsrelativistic.Howcansuchconceptsapplyuniversally?

10Thisiswhathemeanswhenhesaysthat“everygreatphilosophytodateisthepersonalconfessionofitsauthor”(BGE6).Hecontinuesinthesamepassage:“Aboutthephilosopher…thereisabsolutelynothingthatisimpersonal;anditisaboveallhismoralitywhichprovesdecidedlyanddecisivelywhoheis–thatis,inwhathierarchytheinnermostdrivesofhisnaturearearranged.“Thelargestpartofconsciousthinkinghastobeconsideredaninstinctualactivity,eveninthecaseofphilosophicalthinking”(BGE3).“Theconcept‘freewill’isinventedsoastoconfusetheinstincts,soastomakemistrustoftheinstinctssecondnature”EH“Destiny”8.Onthesupremacyoftheinstincts,seealsoBGE3,5,6,32,36,218,231

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Howmightweconvinceotherstoadoptsomeconcepts,somewaysofperceivingthe

world,ratherthanothers?Wecannot,onNietzsche’sviewofthings.Atleastwe

cannotinthewayweliketothinkwecan.Philosophicaldiscoveries,evenif

logicallysound,cannotcompelacceptanceontheirown.Theycanstircertaindrives

inus,butwhetherweacceptthemdependsonthedegreetowhichwearestirredby

logic,andthisisapurelycontingentmatter.Itisnotamatterofintellectualhonesty

oreffortbutofinstinct.Webelievethingsbecause,atbottom,weneedtobelieve

them,andnotprimarilybecausetheyaretrue.

Thetraditionalphilosopherrecoilsfromthissuggestion.Nietzsche’s

philosopherofthefutureembracesit.Herecognizesthatthereisnotonetruthout

therewaitingtobediscovered.Thereareasmanytruthsastherearepeopleand

perspectives.Accordinglyheaimstouncovernottruthsabouttheworldbutthe

truthswithinhimself;whatNietzschecalls“mytruths”(BGE231).“Canyougive

yourselfyourownevilandyourowngood,andhangyourwilloveryourselfasa

law?”,Zarathustraaskshisdisciples.“Canyoubeyourownjudgeandavengerof

yourlaw?”(2.16).Nietzsche’snewphilosopherswillbeopenandhonestaboutthe

factthattheirnewconceptsaretheirown,wouldnotexistwithoutthem,and

thereforeapplyonlytothemselves.Theywillbreakfromthebeliefthat

philosophicalconclusionsproceedfromimpersonal,dispassionate,objective

reasoningandthereforeapplyuniversally.

SothefirstpreconditionofNietzsche’sphilosophyofthefutureisthatone

mustbeacertainkindofperson.Thesecondisthatonemust,inNietzsche’sfamous

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phrase,“becomewhatoneis.”11Thisrequiresembracingone’svariousinstinctsand

drivesratherthanrepressingthem,andrecognizingthevalueofone’sperspective

ratherthansubordinatingittoanother.Thisismoredifficultthanitsounds.With

theriseofslavevalues,ournoblerinstinctsareunstimulatedandsuppressed.Our

inborninstincttoreleaseourstrengthhaswanedunderthebelief,nowdeeply

ingrained,thatpassivenessisgood.12Wearethereforetornbyconflictinginstincts

andimpulses.Wehavebecomeconfusedastowhatwereallywantandwhowe

reallyare.“Weare,”asNietzschesays,“unknowntoourselves”(GMP.1).Inorder

tocreatenewconceptswhichchallengetheexistinghierarchyofvalues,wemust

notonlybeacertainkindofperson,wemustactinaccordancewithourinstincts,

our“unteachableessence”(BGE231).Wemustnotsubordinatethemtoother,

supposedlymoreuniversalvaluesorperspectives.13

11ThesubtitleofEcceHomo:“HowOneBecomesWhatOneIs.”Theideaappearsasearlyas“SchopenhauerasEducator,”thethirdofNietzsche’sUntimelyMeditations:“Themanwhowouldnotbelongtothemassesneedsonlytoceasebeingcomfortablewithhimself;heshouldfollowhisconsciencewhichshouts:‘Beyourself;youarenotreallyallthatwhichyoudo,think,anddesirenow.”ItalsoappearsintheGayScience:“Whatdoesyourconsciencesay?–Youmustbecomewhoyouare”(270).SeealsoGS335andTSZ4.1.

12Notethatthisideaaffectsourdrivesataninstinctivelevel,notaconsciousorcognitiveone.Itisnotthecase,forNietzsche,thatweactinaccordancewiththisideabecausewearerationally“convinced”byit.13AlexanderNehemas’sdiscussionofthistopicisthemostwidelyknown.“HowOneBecomesWhatOneIs,”Nietzsche:OxfordReadingsinPhilosophy.Ed.BrianLeiterandJasonRichardson.OxfordUP,2001,pp.255‐280.BrianLeiteroffersanaturalistreadingofthisphenomenonwhich,tomymind,successfullyimprovesuponNehemas’sreading,in“TheParadoxofFatalismandSelf‐CreationinNietzsche,”WillingandNothingness:SchopenhauerasNietzsche’sEducator.Ed.ChrisJanaway.OxfordUP,1998,217‐255.

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Twocaveatsareneededhere.First,theideaisnotthestandardone,

attributedtoFreud,thatour“true”selves,locatedinourunconscious(andits

associateddrivesandinstincts)arerepressedbysociety.14Nietzschedoesnot

simplyvaluelackofrepressionoverrepression.Hevaluesanintegratedselfovera

non‐integratedself.ForNietzsche,repressionisbadbecauseitpreventsourvarious

drivesfromworkingtogetherasanintegratedunit.Itsplitsourselfintocompeting

parts;differentdrivespullindifferentdirections.Ourinborntendencytorelease

ourstrengthconflictswiththesocialdemandtosuppressourstrength,andthis

socialdemand,overtime,alsobecomesinstinctive.Theresultisaselfatoddswith

itself;aselfthatishaltingandconfusedratherthanfocusedandefficient.Suchaself

isincapableofcreatingandlegislating.IndeedforNietzsche,itisnotevenreallya

self.Zarathustra:

Verily,myfriends,Iwalkamonghumanbeingsasamongfragmentsand

severedlimbsofhumanbeings!

Thistomyeyeisthemostterriblething:thatIfindhumanbeingsinruins

andscatteredasifoverabattle‐andslaughterfield.

Andwhenmyeyefleesnowtothepast,italwaysfindsthesamething:

fragmentsandseveredlimbsanddreadfulaccidents–butnohumanbeings!

(TSZ2.20)

14ThisisFreud’sthesisinCivilizationandItsDiscontents.Trans.JamesStrachey.NewYork:W.W.Norton.1989.

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Zarathustra,andinthiscaseNietzsche,wantsto“composeintooneandbring

togetherwhatisfragment”(2.20;3.12.4).Hewantstocreateselvesfromthe

fragmentsthathefinds.Onlythencanwecommandandlegislate,as“true

philosophers”do(BGE231).15

Thesecondcaveatisalsoimportant.Wemightwonder:howdowebecome

whoweareifouractionsaredeterminedbydrivesandinstinctsbeyondour

control?Herewemustbecareful,asNietzsche’slanguageisapttoconfuse.

Nietzschecannothelpbutusingourordinarygrammar,whichdistinguishes

betweensubjectandobject(“Ithink,”“Iwill”)andthereforeimpliesthatwedecide

ifandhowtoact.Buthedoesnotsubscribetotherealitythisdistinction

presupposes.Tobecomewhoweareistohaveourvariousdrivesworkingtogether

ratherthanpullingindifferentdirections.Thisisnottheresultofanactofvolition.

Itistheresultoftherightkindofpersonhavingtherightkindofconditioning.

NietzscheisclearestaboutthisinDaybreak109,wherehediscussessixwaysof

“combatingthevehemenceofadrive.”16Wemight,hesays,learntoassociate

certaindriveswithnegativethoughts,oravoidactivatingadrivebycontrolling

one’ssurroundings.Buteventhislearningoravoidingissimplytheresultof

another,strongerdrive:

15ThisisonekeyaspectofNietzsche’sthoughtthatpost‐structuralistinterpretationsfailtoappreciate.Seechapterthreesectiontwoabove.16Leiterreliesonthissectioninhis“Paradox”todebunkNehemas’sreading.

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…thatonewantstocombatthevehemenceofadriveatall,however,does

notstandwithinourownpower;nordoesthechoiceofanyparticular

method;nordoesthesuccessorfailureofthismethod.Whatisclearlythe

caseisthatinthisentireprocedureourintellectisonlytheblindinstrument

ofanotherdrive,whichisarivalofthedrivewhosevehemenceistormenting

us….While“we”believewearecomplainingaboutthevehemenceofadrive,

atbottomitisonedrivewhichiscomplainingaboutanother;thatistosay:for

ustobecomeawarethatwearesufferingfromthevehemenceofadrive

presupposestheexistenceofanotherequallyvehementorevenmore

vehementdrive(D109).

ItisimportanttounderstandNietzsche’scalltocreateorovercomeoneselfinlight

ofhisconceptionofhumanaction.ForNietzschethereisno“I”overandaboveits

actions.Tobecomewhatoneisistohaveone’svariousdrivesandinstinctsworkas

anintegratedwholeratherthanasajumbledmessofcompetinginstincts.This

integrationdoesnotoccurbyexercisingsomecapacityofvolition,butbyhavingthe

rightpre‐dispositionandbeingappropriatelyconditionedbyexternalfactors.17

Nietzsche’swritingisdesignedtobeonesuchfactor:toinspire,cajole,affect,and

awakenournoblerinstinctsfromyearsofhibernation.

Ifwearetherightkindofperson,andifourdrivesandinstinctsarefully

integrated,thenwecancreatenewconceptsandvalues.Buthowdowedothat?

17Itisinthissensethattheselfiscontingent,forNietzsche.Notinthesensethatthereisnosuchthingastheself.

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Whatwillsuchconceptsandvalueslooklike?Sincecreativitycannotbeprescribed

inadvance,thisisadifficultquestiontoanswer.Fortunately,wehavetwoexamples

ofwhatNietzschemeansbycreatingnewconceptsandvalues,andeachoneis

instructiveinitsownway.Thefirstistheslaves’creationofgoodandevil.Thisisa

genuinelycreativeactthatestablishedanewhierarchyofvalues.Butitisnotthe

kindofcreationthatNietzscheenvisionsforhisphilosophersforthefuture.

Nietzscheadmirestheslavesforexercisingtheircollectivewillinacreative,

transformativeway,buthederidesthemforbeingmotivatedbyressentiment,and

forimposingtheirvaluesonothersundertheauspicesthatthesevaluesare

universal.18Thisisakeydifferencebetweennoblesandslaves.Noblesareactive:

theyactinaccordancewiththeirnaturaldrivesandinstincts.Slavesarereactive:

theiractionsaremotivatedbytheirsubordinationtothemasters,anddirectedat

them:

Thebeginningoftheslaves’revoltinmoralityoccurswhenressentiment

itselfturnscreativeandgivesbirthtovalues:theressentimentofthosebeings

who,deniedtheirproperresponsetoaction,compensateforitonlywith

imaginaryrevenge.Whereasallnoblemoralitygrowsoutofatriumphant

saying“yes”toitself,slavemoralitysays“no”onprincipletoeverythingthat

18BernardReginsterclarifieswhatexactlyiswrongwithactionsmotivatedbyressentimentin“NietzscheonRessentimentandValuation,”PhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearch,Vol.57,No.2(Jun.,1997),pp.281‐305.AccordingtoReginster,theproblemwithressentimentisthatitinvolvesself‐deception–onethinksoneismotivatedbyreasonsotherthanone’sactualreasons.ForNietzsche,suchself‐deceptionunderminestheintegrityoftheself,andisthereforetobecriticized.

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is“outside,”“other,”“non‐self”:andthis“no”isitscreativedeed….Inorderto

comeabout,slavemoralityfirsthastohaveanopposing,externalworld,it

needs,physiologicallyspeaking,externalstimuliinordertoactatall,‐‐its

actionisbasicallyareaction.Theoppositeisthecasewiththenoblemethod

ofvaluation:thisactsandgrowsspontaneously.(GM1.10)

Slavesarenotself‐motivated;theyrequire“externalstimuliinordertoactatall.”

Theydidnotsimplydevelopnewconceptsforthemselves;theytriedtosuppress

theirmasters.Itwasnotenoughforthemtoconceivetheworldintheirownimage;

theydemandedthateveryoneelseadoptthisimagetoo.Andtheircreation,though

itaccordedthemsomeleverageovertheirmasters,wasnotfullyinaccordancewith

theirowninstincts.Itthereforeledtothepsychologicalsplitwehavealready

described,asplitpreventsthemfrombecomingwhotheyare.Nietzsche’snew

philosopherswillbeactiveratherthanreactive,self‐motivatedratherthanother‐

directed,andthevaluesandconceptstheyproducewillapplytothemselvesandnot

everyone.19

EveniftheslaverevoltwasexemplaryofthekindofcreativityNietzsche

envisions,theconditionsarenolongerinplaceforit.Theslaveslivedinan

aristocratic,hierarchicalsociety.Inthissocietydifferentgroupswereinconstant

19“Buthehasdiscoveredhimselfwhocansay:‘Thisismygoodandevil’;withthathehasstruckdumbthemoleanddwarfwhosays:‘Goodforall,evilforall.’”Andalso:“…notgood,notbad,butmytaste,aboutwhichIamnolongersecretiveorashamed.Thisisjustmyway–whereisyours.ThusIansweredthosewhoaskedofme‘theway.’Fortheway–doesnotexist!”(TSZ3.11.2).

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tensionwithoneanother,andthistensioniswhatinspiredtheslavestorevolt.

Circumstancesaredifferenttoday.Nowslavevaluesareuniversal.Thearistocracy

hasgivenwaytodemocracyandegalitarianism,andeveryoneisconsideredequal

beforeGod.20Thereisnoconflictbetweengroups,notensionofthespirit,no

“pathosofdistance,”andhencenoengineforcreatingnewvalues.Complacencyand

decadencereign,andnihilism–therefusaltobelieveinanything–isnotfaroff.

Individualslivealifeofbovinecomplacency.Theynolongerbelieveinanything

greaterthanthemselves,andhencetheynolongerstriveforanything.Theirvarious

drivesarenotdirectedtowardsasinglegoal,butratherpullindifferentdirections,

pursuingvariouspassinginterests,butwithoutcommitmentorpurpose.21

Nihilismemergeswhenthewilltotruth,themostrecentmanifestationofthe

asceticideal,exposesthetrueoriginsofourmetaphysicalideals.Thisiswhat

NietzschecallsthedeathofGod.Nietzsche’sviewofnihilismiscomplex.22Onone

handheworriesthatnihilismwillmarktheendofhumanachievementand

excellence.“Beware!”Zarathustrawarns,“Thetimeapproacheswhenhuman

20OnNietzsche’sprivilegingofaristocracyandhisanti‐egalitarianism,seeBGE257:“Inthepast,everyelevationofthetype‘humanbeing’wasachievedbyanaristocraticsociety–andthiswillalwaysbethecase:byasocietythatbelievesinaladderofhierarchyandvaluebetweenpeopleandthatrequiresslaveryinonesenseoranother.”TSZ2.7:“Forhumanbeingsarenotequal:thusspeaksjustice.AndwhatIwant,theywouldhavenorighttowant!”21“Motley,allagesandpeopleslookoutofyourveils;motley,allcustomsandfaithsspeakoutofyourgestures”(TSZ2.14).SeealsoBGE200,215,224,242.22OnnihilismandthedeathofGodseeBernardReginster,TheAffirmationofLife:NietzscheonOvercomingNihilism.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUP,2006.

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beingsnolongerlaunchthearrowoftheirlongingbeyondthehuman,andthestring

oftheirbowwillhaveforgottenhowtowhir!”(TSZ.P.5).23ButNietzschealso

believesthatnihilismpresentsanunprecedentedopportunityforanew,higherkind

ofbeing:the“higherman”orÜbermensch.24Thishighermanishigherbecausehe

canbearwhatNietzschecalls“thegreatestweight”:hecanwillthateverymoment

ofhislifeiseternallyrepeated,inexactlythesamesequence,adinfinitum(GS341).

ThisnotionoftheeternalreturnisforNietzschetheultimatesignofaffirminglife.

Itisalsothesecond,positiveexampleofNietzsche’snewconceptsandvalues.Let

uslookatitclosely.

23AndGS56:Moderns,Nietzschesays,aresocomplacenttheyhavea“cravingtosuffer…tofindintheirsufferingaprobablereasonforaction,fordeeds….Needinessisneeded!”24“IwanttoteachhumansthemeaningoftheirBeing:thatistheÜbermensch,”Zarathustrasays(TSZ.P.7).ItisnotobviousthatNietzsche’shighermanandtheÜbermenscharethesamepersonorconcept.Afterall,theÜbermenschappearsonlyinThusSpokeZarathustra,whilethehighermanappearsinNietzsche’snon‐fictionallateworks.Furthermore,NietzschebelievesthatthetimeisnotyetripefortheappearanceoftheÜbermensch,hebelievesthatthereareandhavebeenhighermenalreadyonearth(Goetheishismainexample(TI9.49);Beethovenanother(BGE245);Nietzschehimselfisanother(EH“WhyIamSoWise.”).

ButitstrikesmeasconsistentwithNietzsche’swritingstointerprettheÜbermenschasanidealized,metaphoricalinstanceofthehigherman.Theidealized,metaphoricalportrayalinTSZfitswiththeidealized,metaphoricalnatureofthebookasawhole.ThiswouldexplainwhytheÜbermensch,thecentralconceptofwhatNietzscheconsideredtobehismostimportantwork,doesnotappearinthelaterworks(withtheexceptionofabriefbutinconsequentialappearanceintheAnti­Christ)butisratherreplacedwithdiscussionofthehigherman.Further,thefactthattherehavebeenhighermendoesnotnecessarilyconflictwiththeclaimthatthetimeoftheÜbermenschisnotyetuponus,for,asNietzscheremindsus,“somemenarebornposthumously.”

IprefertoleaveÜbermenschuntranslated,sinceIagreewithWalterKauffman’ssuggestionthattheGermanübercapturesthevariousconnotationsthatNietzscheseemstobeplayingwithinTSZ:across,over,beyond.

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TounderstandNietzsche’sconceptsofthehighermanandeternalreturnwe

needtorevisitourdiscussion,inthepreviouschapter,ofthedistinctionbetween

noblesandslaves.Slaves,recall,areajumbleofcompetinginstinctsanddrives.

Nobleshaveamoresimpleandthereforemoreeasilyunifiedsetofdrivesand

instincts.Thisenablesthemtoconquerandruleovertheslaves.Overtimea

reversaloccurs:theunityofnoblesweakenswhiletheslavesbecomeunified(both

individuallyandcollectively)againsttheirmasters.Slavevaluesbecomedominant.

Thesevalues,however,haveaparticularcharacter:theysplitsomeinstinctsoff

fromothers.Inasocietyruledbyslavevalueseveryone–thosewhowereonce

noblesandslaves–istornbetweentheircompetinginstincts.Inthissociety

everyoneisweakanddecadent.

ThisisthecircumstanceinwhichNietzscheiswriting,andthecircumstance

hewantstochange.ButNietzscheisnotadvocatingareturntotheperiodbefore

theslaverevolt.Heisnotcallingforthereturnofthenobles.Aswehaveseen,he

believesthattheslaverevolthasmadehumanbeingsdeep,complex,“interesting”

people(GM1.6,1.7).Nietzscheadmiresthenoblesfortheirunifiedwill,butthis

unitystemsfromtheirrelativelysimplesetofdrivesandinstincts.Thenoblesare

activeratherthanreactive,freeofressentiment,buttheyarerelativelysimplein

character.Achillesisagreatwarrior,butheisnotadeeporcomplexperson.

WhatNietzscheadvocatesinsteadisthehigherman.Thishighermanisnot

anotherworldlyideal,liketheChristiandeity,butratherahigherformoflifeon

earth.Thiskindofpersonisonlypossibleinanageofnihilism,anageinwhichour

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variousdriveshavebeenallowedtogrowinvariousdirections,likeweeds

overflowingagarden.Whatdistinguishesthehighermanfromothersisthathe

combinesthevarietyandcomplexityoftheslavewiththeunityofthenobles.25

Nietzsche:

Apersonwholivesinanageofdisintegrationthatmixesalltheraces

togetherwillcarryinhisbodytheheritageofhismultifariousorigins,thatis

tosay,contradictoryandoftenmorethanmerelycontradictorystandards

andinstinctsthatstrugglewithoneanotherandseldomcometorest.Sucha

person,inthedimminglightofalateculture,willgenerallybeaweak

person:hismostheartfeltdesireisthatthewarthatheembodiescometoan

end….Butifsomeonewiththiskindofanatureexperiencesthewarlike

oppositionswithinhimasonestimulantandincitementtolifethemore,and

ifontheotherhand,alongwithhispowerfulandirreconcilableinstincts,he

hasalsoinheritedthetrue,inbredexpertiseandcunninginwagingwarwith

himself…thenhemaydevelopintooneofthoseenchantinglyandelusiveand

unfathomablemen,thosemysteriouspeoplewhoaredestinedforvictory

andforseduction,expressedmostbeautifullyinAlcibiadesandCaesar…and

amongartists,perhapsLeonardodaVinci.Theyappearduringjustthose

epochswhenthatotherweaktype,withitsdesireforrest,comestothe

25IamherefollowingJohnRichardson’ssuggestionthatthereis“asortofdialecticalprogressionfrommastertoslavetooverman,”andthat“theovermanturnsouttobeasynthesis,inimportantways,ofthefirsttwotypes”(Nietzsche’sSystem68).

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foreground:bothtypesbelongtooneanotherandarisefromthesame

causes.(BGE200)

Thewisesthumanbeingwouldbetherichestincontradictions,whohas,asit

were,antennaeforallkindsofhumanbeings–andinthemidstofthishis

greatmomentsofgrandharmony.(WP259)

Thehighesthumanbeingwouldhavethegreatestmultiplicityofdrives,and

intherelativelygreateststrengththatcanbeendured.Indeed,wherethe

planthumanbeingshowsitselfstrongest,onefindsinstinctsthatdrive

powerfullyagainstoneanother.(WP966)

Phraseslike“richestincontradictions”and“instinctsthatdriveagainstone

another”seemtocharacterizetheslave.AndNietzscheadmitsthatsomeonewith

thiscomposition“willgenerallybeaweakperson.”Butinrarecasesthispersonis

notdividedinhimself,heisin“grandharmony.”26Suchindividualscomeaboutin

“anageofdisintegration,”anageinwhichonesetofvaluesbeginstoreplace

another:theriseofAthens,thetransitionfrommedievaltomodern,orthecurrent

ageofnihilism.Suchperiodsbreedmorecomplexcharacters,characterswith

“multifariousorigins”and“contradictorystandardsandinstincts.”Thiscomplexity

canleadintwodirections:toajumbledmessofcompetinginstinctslackingunityor

purposeoranunparalleledtensionandharmonyofthespirit.Itcanleadto

26AsRichardsonpointsout,Nietzschecallshisidealman“synthetic.”“Theonlyissueistheoccurrenceofthesynthetichumanbeing”(WP881).SeealsoTSZ3.12.3.

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Zarathustra’s“lastman”orNietzsche’shigherman(TSZP.5).Theformerispulled

apartbyhiscompetingdrives;thelatter“lead[s]thembythereins.”27

Becauseofhisuniqueconstitution,atoncecomplexandunified,onlythe

highermancanwilltheeternalreturn.Onlyhecanwillthateverythingthathas

happenedandwillhappenintheuniversewillhappenagainandagain,inexactly

thesamewayandexactlythesameorder,adinfinitum.ThisisforNietzschethe

ultimatetestofwhetheronecanaffirmlife.NietzschefirstdescribesthisideainGS

341:

Thegreatestweight:Whatif,somedayornightademonweretostealafter

youinyourloneliestlonelinessandsaytoyou:“Thislifeasyounowliveit,

andhavelivedit,youwillhavetoliveoncemoreandinnumerabletimes

more;andtherewillbenothingnewinit,buteverypainandeveryjoyand

everythoughtandsighandeverythingunutterablysmallorgreatinyourlife

willhavetoreturntoyou,allinthesamesuccessionandsequence–even

thisspiderandthismoonlightbetweenthetrees,andeventhismomentandI

27“Thehighertype,”accordingtoNietzsche,“representsanincomparablygreatercomplexity,”buthis“greatnessincharacterdoesnotconsistinpossessingtheseaffects…butinleadingthembythereins”(WP684,928).Nietzschesuggeststhatonlyinsuchcircumstancesareinsightslikehispossible:“Forthetaskofarevaluationofallvaluesmorecapacitiesmayhavebeenneededthanhaveeverdwelttogetherinasingleindividual….Ineverevensuspectedwhatwasgrowinginme—andonedayallmycapacities,suddenlyripe,leapedforthintheirultimateperfection.”(EH2.9)

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myself.Theeternalhourglassofexistenceisturnedupsidedownagainand

again,andyouwithit,speckofdust!”

Wouldyounotthrowyourselfdownandgnashyourteethandcursethe

demonwhospokethus?Orhaveyouonceexperiencedatremendous

momentwhenyouwouldhaveansweredhim:“Youareagodandneverhave

Iheardanythingmoredivine.”Ifthisthoughtgainedpossessionofyou,it

wouldchangeyouasyouareorperhapscrushyou.Thequestionineachand

everything,“Doyoudesirethisoncemoreandinnumerabletimesmore?”

wouldlieuponyouractionsasthegreatestweight.Orhowwelldisposed

wouldyouhavetobecometoyourselfandtolifetocravenothingmore

ferventlythanthisultimateeternalconfirmationandseal?(GS341)28

ThisideahasbeenthesourceofmuchdebateamongNietzschescholars,butIthink

theideaisstraightforward:onlyonewhosays“yes”tolife,wholiveswithoutregret,

whocommandsratherthanobeys,couldpossiblywilltheeternalrecurrence.29And,

accordingtoNietzsche,onlythehighermancanpassthistest:

28InEcceHomo,Nietzschecallstheideaofeternalrecurrence“thebasicideaofThusSpokeZarathustra”(EH.TSZ.1).InTSZ,theeternalrecurrencefeaturesprominentlyinthesectionson“TheConvalescent”(3.19)and“OntheVisionandtheRiddle”(3.2).SeealsoEH2.10andEH.BT.3.29IntheNachlassNietzschepresentstheideaofeternalrecurrenceasacosmologicaltheoryoftheuniverse.Manyhavetakenupthissuggestionandtriedtodeterminewhetheritisfeasibleornot.AlexanderNehemasoffersanextensiveoverviewofthesecondaryliteratureonthisissuein“TheEternalRecurrence,”PhilosophicalReview,89,1990,331‐356.IfullyagreewithNehemas’sclaimthattheethicalandexistentialimportoftheconceptdoesnotpresupposethetruthofthe

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…themostaudacious,lively,andworld‐affirminghumanbeing,onewhohas

learnednotonlytoacceptandbearthatwhichhasbeenandis,butwhoalso

wantstohaveitoveragain,justasitwasandis,throughoutalleternity.(BGE

56)

Thenobledoesnothaveenoughvarietyorcomplexitytowanthislifetorecur,

exactlyasitis,eternally.Heisactive(likeAchilles)butnotcreative(likedaVinci).

Fortheslave,weak,repressed,andsuffering,eternalreturnisunthinkable.Butthe

higherman,becauseofhisvariousinstinctsandinterests,canappreciatethevariety

ofexperiencesintheworld.Andsincemanyoftheseinstinctscompetewithone

another,thereistensioninhisspirit.Thistensionenableshimtocreateconcepts

andvaluesonhisownaccord.Hedoesnotneedressentimentasanengineof

creativity;heis“aself‐propellingwheel”(TSZ.2.15).Hecanshapetheworld

accordingtohisownimage.Heisthereforecapableofaffirminglifeinawaythat

othersarenot.30

cosmologicaltheory,aswellashisclaimthatwhatismostimportantabouttheconcept,forNietzsche,is“thepsychologicalusetowhichheputsit.”Itseemsquiteclearfromthequotedpassageabove,thefirsttimeNietzschepresentstheideainpublication,thattheeternalrecurrenceismeantasathoughtexperiment.Itbeginswiththequestion:“Whatif”?

30Somescholarshavearguedtheideaofendlessself‐creationwhichcharacterizestheÜbermenschconflictswiththeideaofeternalreturn.GeorgSimmel,forinstance,arguesthat“theinfinityoftheoverman’staskcannotbereconciledwiththefinitudeofcosmicperiods.”SchopenhauerandNietzsche.Trans.H.Loisknott,MichaelWeinstein,andDeenaWeinstein.Amherst:UniversityofMassachusettsPress,1986,page174.ErichHellerwritesthatthetwo“areaparadigmofincompatibility.”TheImportanceofNietzsche.UniversityofChicagoPress,1988,page12.Ithinkthiscriticismtakestheconceptofeternalreturntooliterally.The

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Nietzsche’sconceptofeternalreturnexemplifieshispositivenotionof

philosophy.Itdoesnotabidebyexistingvalues,astraditionalphilosophical

conceptsdo.Itdoesnottrytoaccuratelyrepresenttheworld,andisnottherefore

boundbythesamestandardofaccuracyorcorrectness.Itisnotadeductionbased

onestablishedpremisesoracleverinsightintoourunderlyingpsychology.Itisnot

evenclearwhatitwouldmeantoreviseorimproveuponthisconcept.Itdoes,

however,establishanewstandardforhumanstoaspireto,astandardtowhich

termslike“good”and“evil”donotapply.Wecannowseewhyphilosophersso

rarelydiscussNietzsche’spositiveconceptionofphilosophy.Nietzsche’sphilosophy

ismeanttobefeltratherthanunderstood,livedratherthanknown.Itsaimisto

activateournoblerinstinctsafteryearsofdormancy;tomakeourfragmented

selveswhole.Itisthereforeunrecognizableasanythingweusuallyunderstandby

theterm“philosophy.”

IndeedifthedistinguishingfeatureofNietzsche’snewphilosophyisthatit

createsnewconceptsandvalues,thenitisnotclearthatonemustevenbea

philosophertobeaphilosopherofthefuture.Writers,artists,musiciansandothers

cancreatenewconceptsandvalues.Itistellingthatofhisexamplesof“highermen”

(Goethe,Beethoven,daVinci)theonlyonewhoisaphilosopherisNietzsche.We

conceptmustbethoughtofasathoughtexperiment,asachallenge.Theconditional(Whatif?)isimportant.Theclaimisnot:Yourlifewillrecureternally,sobesureyouarelivinganaffirmative,higherlife.Theclaimis:Whatifyourlifewastorecureternally?Howwouldyoureacttothissuggestion?Wouldyoucelebrateorwouldyoubecrushed?Howonerespondstothequestionrevealsone’sapproachtolife.

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mightthereforequestionwhat,ifanything,isdistinctiveaboutphilosophyon

Nietzsche’saccount.

Nietzscheiscertainlymoreinterestedincultivating“highermen”thanin

advancingacertainideaofphilosophy.Butacertainideaofphilosophy,distinct

fromotherdisciplines,neverthelessemergesfromhiswritings.Thisphilosophy

combinestherigorandattentivenessoftheskeptic,theinsightofthepsychologist,

andthecreativityoftheartist.Itquestionsandanalyzes,notforitsownsake,but

forthesakeofcreatingandadvancingaparticularsetofvalues.Thisconceptionof

philosophydiffersfrombothtraditionalphilosophyandhisownskepticaland

psychologicalanalyses.TheformerisforNietzschemerelysymptomaticofthe

asceticideal.Itreflectsandaffirmsslavevalues.Thelatterareafirststeptowards

underminingthesevalues.Buttheydonot,ontheirown,constituteNietzsche’s

philosophyofthefuture.Thisphilosophyofthefutureentailscreatingconceptsand

values,notjustdebunkingthem.Itdestroys,butonlyinordretocreateanew.

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CONCLUSION

“Shouldn’tthephilosopherbeabletoriseaboveafaithingrammar?”

BGE34

SofarIhavetriedtoexplainwhyWittgensteinandNietzschearecriticalof

philosophy,andwhattheyproposeinitsplace.Iwanttoconcludebycomparing

thesetwocriticismsandproposals.

WittgensteinandNietzschehavedifferentaccountsofwhatphilosophyis

andwhyitshouldberejected.ForWittgenstein,philosophicalproblemsarebaseda

mistakenpictureofhowourlanguageactuallyworks.Themistakeistopresume

thatthewordsandconceptsweuseinthecourseofourdailylives(“knowledge,”for

instance,“or“game”)haveameaningindependentoftheirparticularinstantiations.

Wittgensteinshowsthatevenifthereissuchameaning,thereisnoreasontothink

thatoureverydayusessomehowinvokethatmeaning.Thephilosophicalsearchfor

thismeaningisthereforemisguided;anymeaningitdiscoverswillmerelydistort

thewordorconceptinquestion.Inordertobetterunderstandagivenwordor

concept,philosophersshouldsimplydescribetheparticularcircumstancesinwhich

itappears:They“mustdoawaywithallexplanation,anddescriptionalonemust

takeitsplace”(PI§109).Thisdescriptionwillnotproduceageneraltheory,butit

willdissolvetheconfusionthatledustoinquireintothatwordorconceptinthe

firstplace.Itwillgiveusa“clearview”ofthephenomenonwewereinitiallytrying

tounderstand.

211

Nietzschealsobelievesthatphilosophicalinvestigationsarebasedona

mistake,butthismistakehasentirelydifferentoriginsthantheoneWittgenstein

describes.Nietzschebelievesthatphilosophicalconclusionsstemnotfromrational

deliberationbutfromtheparticularinstinctsanddrivesoftheirauthor.Andthese

instinctsanddrivesareshapedbythedominantvaluesoftheauthorinquestion.

Thusourbeliefmetaphysicalideals,forinstance,whetherreligiousdeities,Platonic

concepts,theCartesianego,orKantiannoumena,stemnotfromcarefulreasoning

butfromattemptsbyweakermembersofsocietytomakesenseoftheirsuffering.1

Traditionalphilosophyisthereforeawayofrecusingoneselffromthedifficultiesof

lifeonearth.Thesamecriticismappliestonon‐metaphysicalphilosophers.Insofar

astheyprivilegeasupposedlyobjective,universaltruth,theysubordinatetheir

instinctsandperspectivetoanauthorityotherthanthemselves:notGodbut

(empirical)truth.InthisrespecttheyalsopartakeinvalueswhichNietzschewants

tooverthrow.

Wittgenstein’scriticismofphilosophy,then,isthatitisbasedonanerror,

onewhichleadstoaconfusedpictureofourlanguage,ourconcepts,andourselves.

Nietzsche’scriticismofphilosophyisnotprimarilythatisitbasedonanerror.

1TSZ2.13:“Verily,Ihaveoftenlaughedattheweaklingswhothinkthemselvesgoodmerelybecausetheyhavelamepaws.”

212

Whatbothersisthatthiserrorinhibitshumanflourishingandcontributestothe

decadenceofourtime.2

ThedifferencebetweenWittgensteinandNietzscheisstarkest,however,

whenitcomestotheirpositiveconceptionsofphilosophy.Wittgensteinwants

philosophytoremindusofhowweordinarilyuseparticularwordsandconcepts.

Nietzschewantsphilosophytoabandontheseconceptsandcreatenewones.

Interestingly,bothphilosophersagreethatsincethereisnounderlyingstructureto

ourlanguage,ourgrammar(andourconcepts)doesnotnecessarilyreflecttheonly

correctwayofthinkingabouttheworld.ButwhileWittgensteinmaintainsthat

philosophers(andeveryoneelse)mustspeakandthinkwithintherulesofthis

grammar,Nietzschearguesthatphilosophersshouldcreatenewconcepts,new

grammars,ratherthanusetheoneswealreadyhave.

Thesearetworadicallydifferentideasofwhatitmeanstodophilosophy.

Furthermore,itseemsthatwecannotacceptbothofthem.Itseemsthatifweare

convincedbyWittgenstein’sreasoningthenwemustrejectNietzsche’spositive

conceptionofphilosophy,andviceversa.ThisistheconclusionthatMeredith

WilliamsdrawsinherarticleonWittgensteinandNietzsche.3Shewrites:

2ThereisalsoanethicalcomponenttoWittgenstein’scriticismofphilosophy,andanepistemologicalcomponenttoNietzsche’s,butthesearenotprimary.IhavenotdiscussedtheethicalaspectofWittgenstein’sthought(forreasonsexplainedintheintroduction).AhelpfuldiscussionisintheAfterwordtoRichardFleming’sFirstWordPhilosophy:Wittgenstein,Austin,Cavell.Lewisburg,PA:BucknellUP,2004.

213

…noindividualcanstandfullyoutsidetheformoflifeofwhichheisapart

andgenerateafreshanewsetofvalues.Inthisway,Wittgensteinwould

attacktheNietzscheanhopeofannihilatingourformoflifethroughthe

creationofanewsetofvaluesthatwouldgivebirthtotheageofthe

overman.Inotherwords,theallegedcreativityoftheovermanisfoundedon

philosophicalerror:itisthecreationofsomethingradicallynewandin

oppositiontothenorm.(415)

ForWilliamsthiserrorexplainswhyNietzsche’snewphilosophicalconcepts(the

Übermenschandeternalreturn)seemso“thin”and“hollow”:becausewedonot

haveestablishedcriteriafortheiruse(416).Williamsisnotsayingthat

Wittgensteindeniesthepossibilityofnewconcepts.Sheissayingthat,for

Wittgenstein,inorderfornewconceptstobeunderstoodtheremustbesome

agreementastotheiruse.Sincethereisnoagreementastohowtousenew

concepts,Nietzsche’spositiveconceptionofphilosophyis“foundedonphilosophical

error.”

Thereisanobviousdifficultywiththisargument:itisjustnotclearthat

Nietzsche’snewconceptsareincoherent.Readershavegraspedthemfordecades.

InthepreviouschapterItriedtoexplainwhattheymean.4Williamsmight

respond:“Yes,butwhenwefirstheardMooresay‘Iknowthisisahand,’wethought

3“TranscendenceandReturn:TheOvercomingofPhilosophyinNietzscheandWittgenstein,”InternationalPhilosophicalQuarterly,no.38,vol.4,1988:403‐419.4ThisisRorty’scriticismofWittgensteinin“WittgensteinandtheLinguisticTurn.”

214

weunderstoodthistoo.ButWittgensteinhasshownthatMoorewasinfact

speakingnonsense.ThesituationissimilarwithrespecttoNietzsche.Hisnew

conceptsseemtomakesense,butwhenweconsiderthemmoreclosely,weseethat

theyareinfact‘hollow’(416);theydonotreallytellusmuch.”

Thereis,however,animportantdifferencebetweenMoore’suseof“know”–

thatis,betweentraditionalphilosophicalconcepts–andNietzsche’snewconcepts.

RecallthatWittgensteincallsMoore’sclaimtoknowthatthisisonehand

“nonsense”becauseMooredoesnotknowthatthisisahandinthesamesensethat

heknowsotherempiricalpropositions,andyetMooreisclaimingtoknowthisinthe

samesensethatheknowsotherempiricalpropositions.Mooreisusingadifferent

senseof“know”thanhethinksheisusing.WhenNietzschesaysthatthereisno

doerbehindthedeed,orwhenhesaysthatonlytheÜbermenschiscapableof

willingeternalreturn,hiswordsmeanwhatheintendsthemtomean.Heisnot

committingthesamemistakeasMoore.

ThenonsensethatWittgensteinspeaksofinrelationtotraditional

philosophyariseswhenthetraditionalphilosophertriestosayonethingbut,

becauseofthegrammarofthewordsheuses,saysanother.Thetraditional

philosopherconfuseshisphilosophicalconcept(of“knowledge,”say)withour

ordinaryone.Nietzschedoesnotconfusehisnewconcepts(Übermensch,eternal

return)withordinaryones.Heisperfectlyawarethathisconceptsareradically

different.HeisthereforenotvulnerabletoWittgenstein’scriticismoftraditional

philosophy.

215

Soitremainsunclearhow,ifatall,Nietzsche’snewconceptsarefoundedon

philosophicalerror.Itseemsthattheyarenot.Andiftheyarenot,thenthey

threatentoundermineWittgenstein’sclaimthatphilosophersmustspeakin

accordancewithourgrammarinordermakesense.Thatis,ifWittgensteindoesnot

serveasacounter‐exampletoNietzsche,thenitseemsthatNietzscheservesasa

counter‐exampletoWittgenstein.

Butthisisalsonotthecase.RecallthatattheendofchaptertwoIdiscussed

animaginedchallengetoWittgenstein’spositiveconceptionofphilosophyfrom

GillesDeleuzeandFelixGuattari.InresponsetoDeleuzeandGuattari’sclaimthat

philosophyshouldcreatenewconcepts(aclaimtheygetfromNietzsche),Isaidthat

forWittgenstein,theproblemwithnewconceptsisnotthattheyarenonsense,but

thattheyhavenopurchaseoveroureverydayclaims.Sincethesenewconceptsare

(bydesign)distinctfromourordinaryconcepts,andsinceweuseourordinary

conceptstothink,speak,andactinthecourseofourdailylives,thesenewconcepts

simplywillnothaveanypurchaseoverhowwethink,speakandactinthecourseof

ourdailylives.

AndthisseemstobeavalidcriticismofNietzsche:itisnotclearhowhisnew

conceptscanhavethetransformativeforcethathewantsthemtohave.Itseems

thathisnewconceptswouldsimplyfloatharmlesslyabovetheworldinwhichwe

ordinarilythink,speak,andact.

IdonotthinkNietzschewoulddisputethischaracterizationofhisconception

ofphilosophy.Thatthereisnotraction,sotospeak,betweenhisconceptsandour

216

ordinaryonesdoesnotworryhimasitworriesWittgensteinforonesimplereason:

becauseNietzscheisnotcompelledbythesamekindsofreasoningthatcompels

Wittgenstein.ThoughWittgensteinrejectsthetraditionalapproachtophilosophy,

heabidesbyitstraditionalstandards.Anequivocationbetweentwousesofthe

word“know”isallheneedstochargeMooreandtheskepticwithnonsense.

Nietzscheisnotinterestedinsuchdetails.Whatmatterstohimishowcompelled

wearebywhatwehear.Whetherwhatwehearisrationalisasecondary

consideration.

SothisisoneanswertothequestionofhowNietzsche’snewconceptsmight

havetransformativepower:heisnotappealingtoourrationalfaculties.Thismarks

afundamentaldistinctionwithWittgenstein.Thereisafurtherdifficultywith

Nietzsche’sconceptionofphilosphy,onewhichalsomarksakeydifferencewith

Wittgenstein.Consider:whatwouldourlivesbelikeifwerejectedourordinary

conceptsandtriedtoapprehendtheworldaccordingtoourconceptualcreations?

ItwouldpresumablybealifelikeZarathustra’s,markedbymisunderstanding,

isolation,andevensolipsism.Zarathustrawrites,

Farfromthemarketplaceandfamehappensallthatisgreat:farfromthe

marketplaceandfamehavetheinventorsofnewvaluesalwayslived.Flee,

myfriend,intoyoursolitude!Youhavelivedtooclosetothepettyand

wretched.Fleefromtheirinvisiblerevenge!

Flee,myfriend,intoyoursolitutdeandtowhererawandbracingairblows.

Itisnotyourlottobeaswatterofflies.(1.12)

217

OSolitude!Youaremyhome,Solitude!Howblissfullyandtenderlyyour

voicetalkstome!(3.9)5

Evenaftertenyearsofsolitude,oncehedescendsfromthemountain,Zarathustra

remainsmisunderstoodandalone.Heismockedbythemeninthemarketplaceand

retreatesbacktohiscave.Hecannotfindpeoplewhobelieveinhisteachings,andit

isnotevenclearthathewantstofindthem.Hemaybeaphilosopherofthefuture,

buthelivesaconfused,misunderstood,andisolatedexistence.

InTheClaimofReason,StanleyCavellexploreswhathecallsthefantasyof

privacy:thefantasythatourprivatethoughtsandfeelingsaresouniquethatthey

cannotbecapturedbyoursharedlanguage(354).BuildingonWittgenstein’s

analysisofthepossibilityofaprivatelanguage,Cavellexplorestheimpulsetothink

ofourthoughtsasexistingoutsideofourgrammar,andthecostsofindulgingthis

impulse.Thecosts,hefinds,areisolation,misunderstanding,andsolipsism.There

issomethingofthisfantasyofprivacyinZarathustra’scelebrationofsolitude,andin

Nietzsche’sphilosophyofthefuture.InrejectingourordinaryconceptsNietzsche

riskslosingtouchwiththeworldinwhichweordinarilylive,think,andspeak,the

worldinwhichweunderstandandempathizewithothers.Thisisapriceheis

5Andelsewhere:“Withyourlovegointoyourisolation,andwithyourcreating,mybrother:andonlylaterwillrighteousnesslimpalongafteryou.Withmytearsgointoyourisolation,mybrother.Ilovehimwhowantstocreatebeyondhimselfandtherebyperishes.”(1.17);“Doyouwant,mybrother,togointoisolation?Doyouwanttoseekthewaytoyourself?”(1.17);“Canyougiveyourselfyourownevilandyourowngood,andhangyourwilloveryourselfasalaw?Canyoubeyourownjudgeandavengerofyourlaw?”(1.17).

218

willingtopay.Itisapricehefeelswemustpayinordertoovercomethenihilismof

ourtimeandachievehumanexcellence.

ThedifferencebetweenWittgensteinandNietzschethereforestemsfrom

theirdifferentaimsandmotivationsinpursuingphilosophy.Nietzscheisconcerned

primarilywithhowtoliveacertainkindoflife,alifeheconsidersexcellent.His

criticismofphilosophyisnotthatitmisrepresentstheworld(thoughhebelievesit

does)orthatitsclaimsareunjustified(thoughhebelievestheyare),butthatit

emergesfromandencouragesvaluesthathewantstoovercome.Wittgensteinis

concernedprimarilywithexplaininghowandwhyphilosophicalproblemsarise,

whytheygripusastheydoyethavesolittlebearingoveroureverydaylives.

Thoughhedoesnotthinkthatphilosophicalproblemscanorshouldberesolved,he

takestheseproblemsseriously:heaimstodevelopabetterunderstandingofhow

theyariseandhowweshoulddealwiththem.

Logicallyspeaking,then,WittgensteinandNietzsche’sconceptionsof

philosophyarenotincompatible,asWilliamssuggests.Buttheyneverthelessentail

twoentirelydifferentapproachestophilosophy,andindeedtolife.Thisisperhaps

onereasonwhyphilosophersinterestedinNietzsche,suchasDeleuzeandGuattari,

seemtohavelittleinterestinWittgenstein,andviceversa.Butthoughonecannot

reasonablyholdWittgenstein’sandNietzsche’sapproachestophilosophyatthe

sametime,itisentirelypossibletobecompelledbybothofthem.IndeedIsuspect

thatmany,likemyself,aresocompelled.Theircompetingpicturesofwhat

philosophycanandshouldbereflectcompetingimpulsesofwhatmanywant

219

philosophytobe.Philosophy,weliketothink,shouldbothspeaktooureveryday

concernsandtranscendthem.Whetherandhowthismightbedoneremainsan

openquestion.

220

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BIOGRAPHY

AnuKoshalwasborninOttawa,OntarioandraisedinEdmonton,Alberta,Canada.

HereceivedaB.A.inEnglishLiteraturefromtheUniversityofAlbertain2001,

wherehewasawardedfirstclasshonoursandtheSalterPrizeinEnglish.He

receivedanM.A.intheHumanitiesfromtheUniversityofChicagoin2002,andan

M.A.inPhilosophy,withdistinction,fromUniversityCollegeLondonin2009.Heis

engagedtoErinAlstonPost.