Within Limits The U.S. Air Force and the Korean War

8/7/2019 Within Limits The U.S. Air Force and the Korean War

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Within LimitsThe U.S . Ai r For ce

and the K or ean War

Wayne Thompsonand Bernard C. Nalty

Air Force History and Museums Program

1996

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Within LimitsThe U.S . Ai r For ce

and the K or ean War

Despite America n success in preventing th e conq uest ofSouth Korea by communist North K orea , the Korea nWar of 1950-1953 did not satisfy Americans whoexpected t he kind of tota l victory t hey h a d experiencedin World Wa r II . In t ha t ea rlier, lar ger wa r, victory overJ a pan cam e a fter tw o a tomic bombs destroyed theci t ies of Hiroshima a nd Naga saki . B ut in Korea f iveyears la ter, the U nited Sta tes limited i tself to conven-t iona l weapons. Even af ter communist China enteredthe w a r, America ns put Ch ina off-l imits to convention-a l bombing as w el l a s nuclea r bombing. Operat ingw ithin t hese l imits, the U.S. Air Force helped to repeltwo invasions of South Korea while securing control ofth e skies so decisively th a t oth er U nit ed Na tions forcescould fight w ithout fea r of air a tt a ck.

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I nvasi onB efore daw n on Sunda y, J une 25, 1950, communist North Korea

a tt a cked South Korea, storming across the improvised border tha tdivided the peninsula into tw o count ries. Some five yea rs ea rlier,

when J apan surrendered , the Uni ted S ta tes had proposed tha tAmerica n forces disarm J a pa nese forces in Korea sout h of th e 38thpara llel a nd S oviet troops perform t he sam e ta sk north of tha t l ine.Once the J a panese ha d been disarmed and repa tr ia t ed, Korea w a sa t last to become independent a fter a lmost fifty years of domina tionby J a pa n. This scena rio depended on cont inued cooperat ion betw eenthe Soviet U nion a nd the United St a tes, but the wart ime a l liancesoon col la psed. Instead of a un ified na t ion, tw o r ival s ta tes ca me toshare th e Korean peninsula . The Soviet U nion supported theDemocra tic Peoples Republic of Korea , or North Korea, under the

lea dership of Kim I l Sung, a shadowy f igure who had fought theJ a pan ese and fled to the Soviet U nion w here he appa rently servedin th e arm ed forces. The Un ited St a tes stood behind the Republic ofKorea , or South Korea , headed by seventy-year-old Sy ngma n Rhee,a n impla ca ble foe of the J a pan ese w ho ha d ea rned a doctora te atP rinceton U niversity before World Wa r I, retur ned to his homelan donly to be expelled in 1921 by t he J a panese, a nd spent th e nexttwenty-five years in exile campaigning for Korean independence.When the newly constituted national assembly elected Rhee presi-dent of South K orea in August 1948, the U nited Sta tes terminat edthe mili tary government tha t ha d ruled the South a nd began with-dra w ing its occupa tion forces.

Sy ngma n Rhee a nd Kim Il Sung, headed opposing governmentson a n a rbitra rily divided peninsula. The 38th para llel did not con-form to an y na tura l fea ture tha t might h ave separa ted North fromSouth . In fac t , the tw o Korea s complemented each other; in theNorth w ere the industries developed by the J a panese, w hile in theSouth, w here tw o-th irds of the people l ived, th e principa l activitywa s farming. G iven th e interdependence of the tw o regions a nd th ea mbitions of their leaders, some sort of clash w a s inevita ble. Sooninsurgent s directed from the North w ere cha llenging t he a uth orityof P resident Rh ee, w ho responded by t rying t o suppress a ll dissentin the S outh , w hether communist-inspired or not.

To ma inta in t he independence of S outh Korea , America n m ili-ta ry a dvisers t ra ined a nd equipped a l ight ly a rmed force, basica l lya consta bulary, believed capa ble of ma inta ining order a nd if neces-sa ry resisting a n invasion, a lthough too w eak to emba rk on the l ib-erat ion of North Korea. Confidence in t he defensive a bili ty of theSouth K orean a rmed services la ter seemed ha rd to justify, for th e

na tion ha d only 100,000 soldiers, w ho lacked ta nks an d heavy

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ar t i ll ery ; a smal l coas t guard ; a nd an a i r force tha t cons is ted offew er tha n 20 lia ison a ircra ft or tra iners, w ith just 36 of 57 pilotsfully qual i fied to f ly them. In contra st , North K orea ha d an a rmy ofa t lea st 130,000 comba t t roops, w ho were support ed by some 500ta nks a nd a rti l lery pieces ra nging in size to 122 mill imeters. TheNorth Korean air arm possessed 132 combat airplanes supplied bythe S oviet U nion, a ll f irst-l ine t ypes during World Wa r II , includingthe I lyushin Il10 a tt a ck a ircra ft a nd the Ya kovlev Ya k3 a nd Ya k7fighters.

Although North K orea depended on th e Soviet U nion a nd S outhKorea needed the a ssis ta nce of the U nited St a tes, both Kim I l Sunga nd S yngma n Rh ee w ere ca pable of independent a ction. Rhees pop-ular ity st emmed in pa rt from his denuncia tion of an America n pla n,revealed in D ecember 1945, for t he creat ion of a provisiona l govern-ment under a five-year international trusteeship as a step toward

self-government. Rhee succeeded in ma rsha ling demonstra tionsa gainst w ha t he considered a new form of colonial ism, a nd thescheme collapsed, undermined a s much by increasing hostil i tybetween the United States and the Soviet Union as by the opposi-t ion of the South Korea n leader. Similar ly, Kim could ignore the fa ctthat his Soviet sponsors considered him a counterweight to theinfluence of Ch inese communism a nd t urn to China w hen t he SovietU nion seemed lukewa rm to his a mbitions for unifying Korea.

As th e deca de of th e 1940s drew t o a close, Korea seemed lessimportant than several potentially dangerous areas that competed

for the a tt ention of the America n government. In t he afterma th ofthe B erlin blocka de, the Truma n a dministra tion ha d concentr a tedon Eur ope, even t hough its ba sic na tiona l policy called for opposingthe sprea d of communism a nyw here in the w orld. The Un ited Sta teshad already begun to invest heavily in the economic recovery ofwestern Europe and encouraging a mili tary all iance against possi-ble Soviet a ggression th ere. Accomplishing th ese goals in Eu ropewhile strengthening the American position in the Far East at thesa me time seemed impossible, for t he P resident w a s determined toprevent th e budget deficits t ha t h e believed would produce inflat ionand economic d is loca t ion . In As ia , therefore, the wises t courseseemed to be t o a void specific commit ment s, except t o t he defense ofJ a pan, in hope of crea t ing uncerta inty among the Chinese a ndSoviet leaders as to how the United States might react in a crisis.U nfortuna tely, America n a mbigui ty did not ca use hesi ta t ion, butinstea d ga ve the clear im pression of indifference to th e fat e of SouthKorea.

Often singled out a s being especia lly unfortun a te in its proba bleinterpreta tion by North K orea a nd its a ll ies is a speech by S ecreta ryof St a te Dea n G . Acheson in w hich he declared th a t t he P hilippines,

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the Ryukyus, J apa n , and the Aleu t ians formed the l imi t of theAmerica n defensive a rc in t he western P a cific. Whether try ing tocreate uncertainty among the communist leaders or to emphasizeAmerica s belief in th e possibility of a pea ceful sett lement of th e fric-tion betw een t he tw o Koreas, he ma y w ell ha ve given t he impressiontha t S outh K orea w ould not be defended. Such a conclusion, howev-er, might a lso have been dra w n from t he withdra wa l of America noccupat ion t roops an d, a fterwa rd, from congressiona l indifference toeconomic a id for S outh K orea .

B eca use of the s t ra t egic importa nce of J a pan, the Un ited St a tesma inta ined there a seemingly lar ge occupat ion force, consisting offour of the Armys t en divisions, but a ll four w ere understrength ,only par t ia l ly equipped w ith ta nks and a r t i l lery, a nd poorly pre-pared for comba t. These divisions formed th e Eighth Army, underLt . G en. Wa l ton H. Walker, who wa s d irect ly respons ib le to the

Commander in Chief, Far E as t Command, G enera l of the ArmyDouglas Ma cArthur, who a lso served a s Supreme Commander,Allied Powers, in the continuing occupat ion of J a pan. When NorthKorea a t ta cked the South , MacArthur s Far Ea s t Command w a srespons ib le for the defense of J a pan , the Phi l ippines , and theRyukyus. Since the w ithdra wa l of the occupa tion troops from S outhKorea , the general wa s concerned only w ith th e administ ra t ive a ndlogistic support of the Korean Military Advisory Group and theAmerica n embassy a t t he ca pita l city of Seoul. To a ssist w ith th emission of the Fa r Ea st Command, the Navy provided the Naval

Forces, Far E a st, under Vice Adm. C. Turner J oy. The equiva lent AirForce orga nizat ion w a s the Far E a st Air Forces, comma nded by Lt.G en . G eorge E . S t ra temeyer.

Described a s resembling a genia l college professor, G enera lStratemeyer bore responsibili ty for maintaining a mobile strikingforce in support of Army and Navy operat ions throughoutMacArthur s Far Ea st C omma nd. To accomplish t his, he had a vai l -a ble more tha n 400 comba t a ircra ft a ssigned to air bases in J a pan ,Okinawa , a nd G uam, and the P hi lipp ines . As wa s t rue of the groundforces , the largest concentrat ion of a er ia l s t rength w a s in J a pan,where the F if th Ai r Force, under Maj. G en. Ea r le E . Pa t Pa r t r idge,wa s flying eight squa drons of F80s, tw o of B 26 light bombers(known a s A26s during World Wa r I I), a nd th ree of F82 Tw inMusta ng a ll-w eat her interceptors. One squa dron of F51s from t heRoya l Austra lian Air Force sha red Iw a kuni a irfield on th e isla nd ofHonshu w ith P a rtridges B 26s, but t he Austra lia ns reported direct-ly to Ma cArth ur a s Supreme Comma nder, Allied Powers, a nd mere-ly ma inta ined l ia ison with St ra temeyer s headqua rters. Assigned t othe Far E a st Air Forces a nd loca ted in J a pan w ere a va riety of res-cue aircraft a nd th ree squa drons of tra nsports. A group of B 29s,

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equipped solely for conventiona l bombing, wa s based on G ua m a ndbelonged to th e Tw entieth Air Force, a lso a pa rt of St ra temeyer s FarE a st Air Forces.

Alth ough th e Fifth Air Force gave th e impression of a erial m ightloca ted near t he scene of the fighting in South K orea, this wa s large-ly an i llusion. Most of i ts a ircra ft w ere F80 jet f ighters, w hich didnot have the range to intervene effectively from their normal basesin J a pan; a nd Pa rtr idges a i rmen ha d li t t le pract ice support ingtr oops in comba t. This deficiency result ed from t he recent empha sisw ithin t he Air Force on st ra tegic bombing; the merger of the ta cticala nd a ir defense missions in the Continenta l Air Comma nd, w hichgrea t ly complica ted t ra ining in the United Sta tes; a nd the lack ofspace for large-scale exercises involving air and ground units onJ a pan s densely populat ed islan ds.

In Korea the kind of local attack anticipated by the framers of

NSC 68 had indeed occurred. Clearly t he policy of the Truma nadministration to resist the further expansion of communismdeman ded intervention, regardless of the region a nd t he possibleimpact on t he defense budget a nd t he na tions economy. Yet, even a sthe P resident a nd his a dvisers drew a para llel betw een communista ggression in t he Fa r E a st a nd t he Na zi conqu est of Czechoslova kia(where the western democracies had failed to take a stand thatmight h a ve prevented World Wa r II ), th e adm inistra tion rea lizedtha t other wa rs might erupt, possibly in western Eu rope, consideredth e principa l object of Soviet a mbitions. Aggression in Asia ha d t o be

stopped, though n ot a t th e risk of losing E urope to communism.When n ews of t he North K orea n offensive rea ched Wa shingt on

on t he evening of J une 24, Secreta ry of St a te Acheson informed t heP resident , wh o wa s visi t ing his hometown , Independence, Missouri .Mr. Trum a n a greed to invoke the principle of collective security a ndtry to internationalize the response to the North Korean attack bya ppeal ing to the U nited Na t ions, then meet ing in a tempora ry head-qua rters a t La ke Success , New York. B eca use the Soviet delega te tothe United Nations Security Council had walked out in protest ofthe refusa l to a ccept a representa tive from communist C hina , hecould not exercise his na tions right of veto, a nd in his a bsence theU nited Nat ions called on North K orea t o w ithdra w beyond the 38thpara llel . When tha t resolution wa s ignored, w ith the Soviet delegat esti l l absent, the S ecurity Council on J une 27 ca lled on t he membersof the Un ited Nat ions to provide South K orea w ith w ha tever a ssis-tance might be required to repel the invasion and restore peace tothe peninsula . The resolution formed t he ba sis for a U nited Na tionsCommand, ac t iva ted on J u ly 24, headed by MacArthur wi th thea ssis ta nce of the s ta ff of the Fa r Ea st Comma nd. Even as UnitedNa tions comma nder, however, he wa s responsible ult ima tely to th e

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P resident of the United Sta tes ra ther tha n to the Secretary G enera lof th e U nited Na tions or t he Security Council.

By the time the Security Council had called for the UnitedNa tions to join forces in defense of South Korea, America n a ircra fta lrea dy w ere flying missions over the embatt led country. Afterreturning from Missouri to Wa shington on J une 25, P residentTruman approved the use of American air and naval forces to helpdefend S outh Korea. The J oint C hiefs of St a ff set up a telety pe con-ference w ith Ma cArth ur a nd relayed t o him th e P resident s decisionto intervene. While the Ch ief E xecutive wa s rea ching t his decision,the question of neutralizing Soviet air bases had been addressed.G en. Hoyt S. Va ndenberg, the Air Force Chief of St a ff, ra ised the pos-sibility th a t a tomic bombs might be necessary for this purpose, butTruma n sa w no need to do more th a n dra ft plan s for th e event ua lity.

The a uth orizat ion t o employ a ir pow er, even th ough a rmed only

w ith conventiona l weapons and limited to ta rgets in S outh K orea a sthe P resident directed, seemed to have a dra ma tic effect on G enera lMacArthur, a t a t ime when Seoul, the South Korean cap ita l wasa bout t o be aba ndoned to the a dvancing enemy. G enera l Pa r t r idgefound Ma cArth ur t o be a lmost jubilan t a nd confident tha t vigorousa ction by t he Fifth Air Force w ould drive th e Nort h K orea ns ba ck indisorder. MacArthur directed Pa rtr idge to a t t a ck ta nks, t roop con-centrat ions, a nd other mil ita ry t a rgets south of the 38th para l le l,w hile a lso ma inta ining the aerial defenses of J a pan in t he event t heSoviet U nion should extend th e wa r t here.

Partridge promised that l ight bombers would hit targets inSouth K orea on Tuesday, J une 27, the third da y of the North Korea na tt a ck, but h e could not m eet h is self-imposed deadline. A ha lf-dozenof the B 26s were providing a ir cover for a ship pressed int o serviceto evacua te America n civilian s from th e port of Inchon, a nd ba dwea ther forced those sent a gainst enemy armor to turn back. Notunt i l Wednesday morning , J une 28, a f te r 1s t L t . B ryce Poe in a nRF80 ha d flown th e Air Forces first jet comba t reconna issa nce mis-sion, did tw elve B26s ma ke the first America n a ir strike since th einva sion. The bombers hi t the ra i l roa d ya rd a t Munsa n near t he38th pa ra l le l a nd then s t ra fed t ra cks and highwa ys nearby. La ter inthe day four B29s patrolled the four main routes over which theNorth K orean s were a dvan cing, a tt a cking ta rgets of opportun ity.

Despi te weather tha t ha d forced the B 26s to turn back, onTuesday, J une 27, Air Force t ra nsports , escorted by f ighters , beganflying American civilia ns out of Kimpo a irfield nea r S eoul. At a boutnoon, five Nort h American F82s encount ered five Ya ks over Kimpoa nd downed t hree of th e Russia n-built f ighters. A few hours lat er,eight North Korean Il10s tried to stra fe the a irfield, but fourF80s, opera t ing a t extreme range to protect t he evacuat ion,

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destroyed four of the a tt a ckers. S ome 2,000 America ns w ere eva cu-a ted, ha lf by ship a nd half by air.

A few minutes before the F82s had destroyed the first of theYa ks over Kimpo, th e comma nder of the Far E a st Air Forces, G enera lSt ra temeyer, returned to J a pan from a visit to Wa shington. Althoughth e initia l victories of th e Fifth Air Force in a eria l comba t over Kimpoencoura ged him, he believed th a t t he airfields in North Korea w ouldha ve to be at ta cked a s q uickly a s possible. The importa nce of a irfieldswa s confirmed on J une 28, wh en Ya ks stra fed Suw on a irfield, somefifteen miles south of Seoul, a nd destroyed or da ma ged a B 26, a nF82, and a C54. Despi te the danger a t Suw on, MacArthur wa sdetermined to visit t he pla ce. It ha d become the comma nd post forth e liaison group tha t he ha d sent t o Korea t o report on th e situa tion;a nd one member of the group, Air Force Lt . Col . J ohn McG inn, hadimprovised a tactical air control center to handle American aircraft

in the vicinity. En route to Suw on on Thursda y, J une 29, MacArthura pproved S tr a temeyer s request for a uth ority to strike airfields northof the 38th para l lel . La te that same day, a s MacArthur wa s dr ivingback to Suwon from the Han River where he had seen the flood ofSouth K orean troops and refugees stream ing aw a y from S eoul, eigh-teen B26s dropped fragmentat ion bombs on the airf ie ld a tP yongya ng, the North Korea n ca pita l . The B 26s returned withoutloss, th eir crew s claiming t o ha ve destroyed or da ma ged tw enty-fivea ircra ft on the ground a nd one in th e air. News of Ma cArth ur s deci-sion a nd t he resulting a tt a ck ha d not reached Wa shington several

hours lat er wh en Truma n a pproved air st rikes north of the 38th par -a llel. The aut horizat ion reached MacArthur on J une 30 when hereturned from Suwon.

Na val a ircra ft soon joined in at ta cking the North . When the wa rbroke out , tw o aircra f t carr iers , the America n Valley Forge and theBri t ish Triumph , a long with their support ing wa rships , were ava i l-a ble in Fa r Ea stern wa ters. The two ca rriers a nd their escorts meta t B uckner B ay, Okinaw a , a nd s teamed toward K orea a s Ta sk Force77, comma nded by Vice Adm. Arthur D. St ruble of the U.S. Navy.Admira l J oy, w ho had discussed possible future opera tions withSt ruble, conferred with G enerals MacArthur a nd St ra temeyer andagreed to use carrier aircraft against targets in the vicinity ofP yongyang , f a r beyond the ba t t l eline. Consequen t ly, on J u ly 3,Brit ish and American squadrons based on the carriers raided theairf ie ld a t Haeju and the airf ie ld and rai l faci l i t ies a t Pyongyang;a nd on the 4th, St ruble la unched a second da y of st r ikes a gainst t a r-gets near the North Korea n capi ta l . From t he west coa st of Korea,Ta sk Force 77 stea med by wa y of Okinaw a to the S ea of J a pan ,where on July 18 its aircraft blasted the oil refinery and storageta nks at Wonsa n, North K orea, touching off specta cular fires.

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Although these early naval air operations were largely confinedto the North, Pa rt r idge ha d the mission of a t ta cking the enemythroughout t he Korean peninsula , a nd St ra temeyer set a bout pro-viding him the necessary men and a ircra f t , draw ing fi rs t on theresources of the Far E a st Air Forces. While Pa rtr idge shifted hisF80ssome fitted with locally manufactured jettisonable fueltanks to extend their rangeto airfields in Japan nearer Korea,St ra temeyer brought in other F80s from the P hilippines a nd t ooksteps to a cquire F51 Musta ngs. The compar a tively slow Musta ngwith its liquid-cooled piston engine was vulnerable to ground fireduring s t raf ing missions, but i t could opera te f rom t he short ,unpaved a irstrips in southern S outh Korea . The Austra lian govern-ment ent rusted t o Str a temeyer s contr ol a squa dron of F51s basedin J a pan, the f irs t mili tary uni t ma de a vai lable by a member of theUnited Nations other than the United States for the defense of

South Korea , a nd the Fa r E a st Air Forces began ta king Mustangsfrom storage for assignment to the South Korean Air Force or to aprovisiona l squa dron being formed by the Fifth Air Force in J a pa n.Generals Stratemeyer and Partridge could not expect immediatehelp from t he U nited St a tes, for no reserve of comba t-ready a ircra fta nd t ra ined crews wa s immediately ava i la ble. G enera l Va ndenbergwa s a ble, however, to send t w o groups of B 29s not scheduled forincorporation into the Strategic Air Commands atomic strike forceas reinforcements for the group that had deployed from Guam toOkinaw a to be nea rer ta rgets in Korea. Also a t ha nd were some

1,500 F51s, ha lf in stora ge and h a lf assigned to the Air Na tionalG uard . On J u ly 5, the fi rs t Amer ican ground unit sen t to SouthKorea , a reinforced ba tt a lion of perha ps 500 men, pla ced itself in thepat h of an a dvan cing North K orean division 20 times i ts size. B ytha t t ime, a tota l of 145 Musta ngs ha d been retrieved from th e AirNat iona l Gua rd a nd prepared for shipment by sea to J a pan w hereAir Force pilots would undergo transitional training before flyingthe a ircra ft in comba t.

S tr ateg i c B omber s and T acti cal P r oblemsAlong w ith t w o groups of B 29s, Va ndenberg sent t o the Fa r

Ea s t a vete ran of Wor ld Wa r I I , Maj. G en. Emmet t ODonnel l, whohad commanded B17s during the unsuccessful defense of theP hi lippines and la ter led B29 s t r ikes a gainst J a pan. After arr ivingin J a pan, he esta blished the Bomber Comma nd, Fa r E a st Air Forces,consistin g init ia lly of th ree groups of B 29s. The mission of bombercommand encompassed long-range interdiction and destruction ofs t ra tegic targets , essent ia l ly the w ork done by a s imila r orga niza-tion in World Wa r I I , a nd ODonnell brought w ith h im a n a ppropri-

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a te l ist of ta rgets. Ta ctical a ir opera tionsa ir superiority, close airsupport, a nd int erdiction in th e vicinity of the ba tt lefieldw ere theresponsibility of Fifth Air Force under G enera l Pa rt ridge.

The situa tion on the ground w a s becoming t oo dan gerous t o per-mit th e division of la bor betw een OD onn ells bomber comma nd a ndFifth Air Force tha t St ra temeyer h a d a pproved on t he ba sis of AirForce doctrine. In the first gr ound comba t of th e wa r by America nsoldiers, the reinforced ba tt a lion a ssigned t o slow the North Koreana dvance ha d been overwh elmed in a ma t ter of hours , a nd a ha rd-fought delaying action by an entire regiment might gain no moretha n seventy-tw o hours. A race wa s developing betw een America ntroops arriving in greater numbers and the advancing enemy.MacArthur and his staff believed that every available aircraftshould be used to slow th e Nort h K orea ns un til a defensive perime-ter could be esta blished a round th e port of P usa n in south ernmost

South Korea . On occa s ion the hea dquar t ers of the Fa r Ea s tCommand insisted that the B29s attack areas close to the battle-l ines through w hich th e enemy wa s a dvancing. St ra temeyer com-plied but objected t o th e use of th e big bombers a ga inst t a rgets bet-ter suited to fighter-bombers . Va ndenberg, in the Fa r E a st on a ninspect ion, supported his subordinate , a ccording to Stra temeyer,very explicit ly a nd m a sterfully expla ining th e difference betw eenta ctical a nd st ra tegic a ir operat ions. After l istening t o the Air ForceChief of St a ff, MacArthur conceded th a t i t w a s indeed wa steful touse B 29s aga inst t he ha rd-to-loca te ta rgets normally hit by fight-

er-bombers, but in the present emergency he felt he ha d t o hit th eenemy with every ava i la ble a i rplane. As a resul t , his headqua rtersdirected th a t t he B 29s be dispat ched in mid-J uly a ga inst bridges,road junctions, a nd t roop concent ra tions with in sixty miles of a crit-ica l segment of th e front lines.

The a rgument a ga inst using str a tegic bombers in t his basicallyta ct ica l role wa s taken up by Ma j. G en. Otto P. Weyla nd, chosen byVandenberg to serve as Stratemeyer s vice commander for opera-tions. Weyla nd h a d ea rned a brill ia nt reputa tion for providing closea ir support during World Wa r I I , w hen his XIX Ta ctical AirComma nd fun ctioned a s a pa rt of Va ndenbergs Nint h Air Force dur-ing the thrust thr ough Fra nce in 1944. Confident tha t his job wa s torun the air wa r, the new vice comma nder reached J a pan in la t eJ uly 1950 a nd immediately bega n w hitt l ing aw a y a t t he influence ofM a cAr t hu rs ch ief of st a f f, M a j. G e n. E d w a r d M. Alm on d, in t h eselection of ta rgets for the B 29s. Like a lmost everyone else onMacArthur s joint s ta ff, Almond w a s a n Army off icer. He ha d, how -ever, a tt ended the Air Corps Ta ctica l School a t Ma xw ell Field in t he1930s and therefore considered himself an expert in military avia-tion, a nd for him milita ry a viat ion included the B 29s, w hich he felt

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free to use a s he deemed necessa ry. S ince Almonds principal con-cern wa s the ground forces fighting in Korea , he tended to ignorethe need to disrupt the flow of North Korean supplies and rein-forcements, a nd he concent ra ted a lmost exclusively on t he bat tle-field. Convinced tha t St ra temeyer s discussions with Ma cArth ura nd Almond were going nowh ere, Weylan d took ma tt ers into his ow nha nds. Without te ll ing Stra temeyer, he sent a cr i t ique of targetselection to Ma cArt hur s deput y for operat ions. As Weylan d expect-ed, the memora ndum wa s pa ssed to Almond, w ho responded byrepeating the argument that he needed the B29s to meet batt le-field emergencies. Weyla nd count ered by pointing out t ha t, eventhough the Pusan per imeter was tak ing shape and growingstronger, emergencies w ere becoming almost rout ine. Perha ps, hesuggested, Almond needed a n a irma n t o determine how the B 29scould be most effective. The a rmy officer a greed tha t th is sort of help

might be useful, but h e would not give up his a ccess to th e bombers.In stea d he compromised, reta ining cont rol over one group of B 29swhile releasing the other two to attack targets chosen by Far EastAir Forces. As th e Nort h K orea ns rush ed supplies sout hw a rd t o sus-ta in the offensive, Ma cArth ur a greed th a t a ll three groups should beused for long-ra nge interdiction, a nd B 29s hea vily da ma ged sever-a l railroa d ya rds a nd bridges during August.

While Weyla nd w a s w orking in Tokyo t o shift t he focus of B 29operations away from the battlefield to targets in North Korea,Va ndenberg w a s ma king prepara tions in Wa shington for a stra tegic

bombing campaign against the North that was modeled after simi-lar opera tions in World Wa r I I . He persuaded th e J oint C hiefs ofStaff to send to the Far East two additional groups of B29s fora t ta cking industr ia l ta rgets north of the 38th pa ra l le l, increasingBomber Command to f ive groups to ta l ing more than 100Superfortresses. The J oint Chiefs a lso provided a ta rget list , pre-pared like the one already given General ODonnell by intelligencespecialists of the St ra tegic Air Comma nd. The principa l ta rgets onthe second list w ere th e chemica l plan ts a t H ungna m, believed toproduce ra dioa ctive ma teria l (for th e Soviet a tomic energy progra m)a s w ell a s conventiona l explosives a nd ferti l izer; the mun itions fa c-tor ies a t P yongya ng; a n oi l refinery a t Wonsan; a nd the oi l s tora gefacili t ies a t Ra shin. B efore his B29s w ere diverted a lmost exclu-sively to ta rgets closer to the bat tlelines, ODonnell ha d bombed theport of Wonsan a nd a ni t rogen plant a t Hungna m. B eca use of theircompact sizeonly th e ca pital of P yongyan g, w ith a populat ion of500,000, ha d more tha n 100,000 inha bita nt sa nd la ck of fireproofbuildings, North Korean t ow ns seemed a lmost a s vulnera ble to firebombs a s the cit ies of J a pan , w hich ODonnell ha d helped reduce toa shes during World Wa r II . This t ime, however, the Truma n a dmin-

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istration would not let him use incendiaries against cit ies and

instructed him t o minimize civil ia n ca sua lties, depriving t he enemyof a propa ga nda issue. The use of fire bombs proved unnecessa rytha t sum mer, for in mid-September a fter a bout one mont h of sys-temat ic bombardment , St ra temeyer a nnounced tha t pract ica l ly a l lthe stra tegic industria l ta rgets in the count ry ha d been destroyed byhigh explosives a lone. Since America n fighters ha d w iped out th eNorth Korean air force and the enemy had few antiaircraft guns,B 29 crew s could concent ra te on a ccura te bombing. The big problemwa s wea th er, for clouds often closed in over the B 29 ba ses durin gthe course of a mission, a nd in such conditions, lan ding wa s the mostda ngerous pa rt of the fl ight.

One of the t a rgets on the l ist a pproved by the J oint C hiefs ofS t a ff, Rash in , escaped des t ruct ion . B ecause t he t own , loca t ed innortheast ern North Korea , wa s wit hin 20 miles of Soviet terri tory,the Depa rtment of St a te insis ted tha t a ny a t t a ck on th e oi l s tora geta nks th ere be carr ied out in good w eat her using optical bombsight s.The J oint C hiefs of St a ff agreed, but w ord of the requirement forvisual a iming failed to reach G enera l ODonnell . When his B 29sa t ta cked on August 12, they a t t empted to bomb w ith ra dar througha th ick overca st but succeeded only in scat tering th eir explosives on

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A Boeing B29 Superfortress takes off from J apan to bomba target in Korea.


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with t he cha ra cter is t ics of the support ing aircra f t , a nd with t hemunitions they carried. As a pilot , he wa s able to communicat e w ithother pilots in lan guage they understood. Such in br ief was t hemecha nism for contr olling ta ctical avia tion th a t P a rtr idge intendedto use in Korea.

P roblems a rose a t t he out set. B a sed on experience in World Wa rII , Pa r t r idge pla nned to esta blish an a dvance headqua rters a long-side Wa lker s comma nd post in K orea , but t his could not be donebefore the North K orea n offensive ha d been slow ed, if not st opped.Not u ntil J uly 24 did the t w o hea dqua rters begin functioning side byside in t he compar a tive security of Ta egu. Dur ing th e first w eek ofAugust , however, the enemy threatened even tha t t ow n, forcing theEighth Army to move i ts comma nd post ha lfwa y to P usan. B eca useth e site selected by G enera l Wa lker w a s crowded a nd la cked ade-qua te communica t ions with J a pan, the advan ce headqua rters of the

Fifth Air Force continued a ll the wa y t o Pu sa n.Mea nw hile, Pa r t r idge ha d opened in Korea a joint opera t ionscent er to ta ke the place of th e improvised ta ctica l a ir cont rol syst emthat had functioned at Suwon until the airfield there was overrun.He placed t he center a t Ta ejon, site of the hea dqua rters of the firstAmerica n infant ry division sent t o th e peninsula. At th e t ime, mid-J uly, the division w a s so desperat e for officers in i ts ba tt a lions th a tnone could be assigned permanently to the joint operations center,although the staff sections did share information with the airmen.When t he Nort h K orea ns overw helmed Ta ejon, th e center shift ed to

Ta egu, remaining there after higher headq ua rters ha d left th e town.While th e joint operat ions center w a s being set up in K orea, theFifth Air Force sent a ha ndful of ra dio-equipped jeeps to th e penin-sula for use by forwa rd a ir contr ollers. To ca ll in a strike, however,the contr ol part ies ha d to drive far enough forwa rd t o see the t a rget,for t he ra dios w ere too heavy t o ca rry a nd la cked t he equipment forremote tra nsmission. Since the sight of a jeep on t he skyline wa s a ninvita tion for t he enemy t o open fire, the ta ctical a ir contr ol part iessusta ined heavy losses during the ea rly fighting. To repla ce them,the Fifth Air Force turned to airborne controllers in light aircraft.When these observation craft proved easy prey for propeller-drivenNorth Korea n f ighters, the North America n T6 t ra iner, known a sth e AT6 during World Wa r I I, w a s pressed into service a s a vehiclefor forwa rd a ir contr ollers. This a ircra ft h a d t he speed to esca pe theSoviet-built Yaks and the maneuverability to enable the controllerto peer beyond ridge lines into valleys hidden from a control partyon the ground. The Mosqu itoes, a s th e controllers in th e T6s w erecalled, cam e to provide the principa l mea ns of controlling close-ina ir strikes, eclipsing th e jeep-mount ed control pa rt ies th a t ha d beenso successful dur ing World Wa r II .

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A further complication not experienced by tactical airmen dur-ing the l iberation of Europe was partnership with the Navy andMarine Corps. Difficul t ies began on J uly 4, wh en Admiral St rublecontinued for a second da y h is ca rrier-based a tt a cks on P yongyan g.B efore t he previous d a ys bombing, th e comma nder of Ta sk Force 77ha d a dvised Admiral J oy of the planned a t ta cks at Ha eju a ndP yongyang, and J oy passed the in format ion to S t ra temeyer, whoa sked only tha t t he nava l aircraft confine a ctivity on J uly 3 to thevicinity of the ca pita l a nd leave the rest of the peninsula to the FifthAir Force. St ruble, however, decided on his own to hit P yongya nga ga in, a decision th a t compelled St ra temeyer to ca ncel a B 29 strikeplan ned for t ha t city on t he sa me da y. The incident convinced the AirForce general that he needed tighter control over air strikes by theNa vy, especially th ose tha t m ight be delivered a ga inst t a rgets closeto the front l ines. St ra temeyer t herefore a sked Ma cArth ur for oper-

a tional contr ol over th e Navys ca rrier aircraft , in effect a ssigningthem a status similar to the squadrons of the Fifth Air Force.Admira l J oy objected on doctrina l as w ell a s practica l grounds. Hedid not believe that the recent agreements on roles and missionswould permit another service to exercise direct control over navalaviat ion, especial ly when opera t ing at sea , or tha t t he joint opera -tions center could ma inta in a dequa te cont rol of Na vy a s w ell a s AirForce a ircra ft . From the Navys point of view, th e joint operat ionscent er seemed best su ited to a erial opera tions scheduled in ad va ncea nd sprea d over a wide front . G ra nted tha t the center could juggle

a ssigned a ircra ft in an emergency, doubt persisted a mong na va l avi-ators that i t could funnel any large number of strikes into a smalla rea w ithout overloa ding its communicat ions chan nels. Although hewanted no part of Air Force control and remained wary of the jointopera tions center, Admira l J oy recognized t he need for closer coor-dinat ion of tact ica l aviat ion. Consequent ly, on J uly 15 he a greed topla ce the carr ier a ircra ft un der the coordina tion contr ol of th e Fa rE a st Air Forces, a n i l l-defined arr a ngement under w hich he did l i t-t le more than provide Stratemeyer s headquarters with AdmiralSt rubles plan s for ca rrier st rikes. He t hus a voided Air Force cont rol,but naval aircraft approaching the battlefield had to report to thejoint operat ions center for a ssignment to a Mosqu ito cont roller.

S ome of t he Na vys fea rs concerning t he joint operat ions centerproved just ified. The volume of ra dio tr a ffic a t t imes inund a ted th esyst em, a nd import a nt m essages intended for Ta sk Force 77 some-times fa iled to ar rive in t ime. Moreover, th e job of ha ndling close a irsupport by naval aircraft fell to already overburdened controllers,w ho might be trying t o meld F80 fighter-bombers, ba sed in J a pana nd a lrea dy short of fuel, w ith longer ran ge, propeller-driven a tt a ckplanes that despite their greater endurance had to return to their

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ca rriers a nd lan d before dark. After this sha ky beginning, coopera -tion improved. The ca rriers t ried to send a more even flow of a ircra ftover the ba t t lefront , a nd na val a i rborne controllers in Douglasa tt a ck a ircra ft joined t he Air Force cont rollers in T6s t o direct a ir

str ikes. Not un til 1951, however, did Ta sk Force 77 send pilots to th ejoint opera tions center on a regula r ba sis as l ia ison officers, a nd t heestablishment of direct communicat ions betw een t he center a nd t heta sk force was s imila r ly delayed. The wa r wa s within a month ofending before the Navy in 1953 allowed its representative at thejoint operations center to make binding commitments on targetsa nd sorties.

Meanw hile, centra lized contr ol of ta ctical a viat ion a s prescribedin Air Force doctrine had also been challenged by the arrival earlyin August 1950 of a Marine brigade and its supporting aircraftgroup. The Marine Corps believed th a t i ts ground uni ts , wh etherregiments, a hurriedly formed briga de like the one sent to Korea , ordivisions, should opera te in conjunction w ith a n a ircra ft group or, inthe ca se of a division, a n aircra f t wing. B eca use of the na ture ofamphibious warfare in which the marines specializeda smallbea chhea d seized with t he help of na val gunfire an d a ir support a ndthen expanded to a ccommodat e a rti l leryMar ine Corps a irmen ha dextensive tra ining in the close support of infan try. P ilots, a ir con-trollers, a nd comma nders on t he ground w ere a ccustomed to w ork-ing togeth er an d understood th e benefits a nd da ngers of a ir strikes

16

General Douglas MacArthur ( second fr om left) visits an airbase in Korea:Maj. Gen. Earle E. Partridge, commander of Fifth Air Force, is second from the right.


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in close proximity to friendly tr oops. Wherea s Ma rine Corps avia tionthought in terms of supporting Marine ground units fighting on acompar a tively na rrow front, the Air Force in Korea employed air-cra ft for interdiction, reconna issance, a nd close air support from t heP usa n perimeter nea r t he south ern t ip of th e peninsula to the Ya luRiver in the North and from one end of the battleline to the other.In terms of interest a nd t ra iningclose air support ha d a low er pri-ority in the Air Force than in the Marine Corpsas well as geo-gra phic concent ra tion, Ma rine Corps pilots supported ground forcesbett er tha n th eir Air Force count erpa rts. B eca use th e skills ofMarine airmen w ere so highly pr ized, G eneral Pa r t r idge soughtclose coopera tion w ith t he Mar ine squa drons, w hich a t f irst w ere fly-ing missions from a ircra ft carriers off the South K orean coa st. Herequest ed an d received a lia ison officer from th e aircra ft group wh ohelped the joint operations center find suitable targets for any

Ma rine strike a ircra ft t ha t w ere surplus to the needs of the brigade.To the a nnoyan ce of G enera ls Stra temeyer a nd Va ndenberg, theAmerican press lavished praise on Marine airmen for doing anexcellent job of close air support, a s indeed th ey were, a lbeit on acompar a tively sma ll sca le. However skilled these first Ma rine Corpspilots to fight in Korea were in their specialty of close air support,th ey could not by th emselves ma int a in cont rol of th e skies over thepeninsula or carry the weight of ordnance delivered by the muchlar ger F ifth Air Force over a much larger a rea. Like close air sup-port , int erdiction contribut ed to the defense of the P usa n perimeter,

sometimes specta cular ly, a s w hen a motorized column w ent up inf la mes, a t other t imes al l but invis ibly, a s when down ed br idgesdelayed the arrival of badly needed ammunition or reinforcements.G enera l Wa lker, moreover, expressed sa tisfaction w ith t he work ofthe Air Force, declar ing: I w ill lay my ca rds r ight on t he ta ble andsta te th a t if i t ha d not been for t he air support w e received from t heFifth Air Force w e would not ha ve been a ble to sta y in K orea .

F r om I nchon to P yong yang

By mid-September the North Korean offensive had clearlyfai led; the U nited Na t ions forces ha d survived sava ge blows a ndgrow n stea dily stronger. The first pha se of the Korean fighting ha dended. Ma cArth ur s belief, expressed to Pa rtr idge in the ea rly day sof the conflict , tha t America n a ir pow er would preva il, turn ed out t obe mistaken. Fight ing the North K oreans to a s ta ndst i ll requiredthe combined effor ts of the a ir, land, a nd sea forces of severa lna t ions, with South Korea and the United St a tes ma king the grea t-est contr ibutions. Air pow er did, however, provide essential help asthe Un ited Na t ions Command s topped the enemy drive. The

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burned-out hulks of hundreds of tanks destroyed by air strikesma rked the inva sion route , a nd B 29s had da ma ged the NorthKorean transportation network and destroyed whatever industrythe n a tion possessed. Although ha ndica pped by primitive a irfieldsin South Korea , the Comba t Ca rgo Command of Fa r E a st Air Forcesf lew in men and cargo from J a pan a nd eva cua ted almost a third ofth e 13,000 America n soldiers sent to J a pa n t o recupera te from t heirw ounds. The Milita ry Air Tra nsport Service flew the t ra nspacificroutes, delivering am ong oth er th ings a new a nd more pow erfulrocket launcher used by American infantrymen against NorthKorean t a nks in th e fight for Ta ejon during m id-J uly. In a ddition,the t ra nsport service conducted wea ther reconna issance, providedw eat her foreca sts for use by the Army a nd Air Force, a nd dispat chedrescue deta chments tha t served under th e opera tional contr ol of th eFar E a st Air Forces. The Air Force ha d dra w n hea vily on t he experi-

ence of t he Arm y Air Forces in helping check th e a dva nce of a Nort hKorean a rmy t ha t fought w ith t he wea pons a nd t a ctics of World Wa rII . Est a blishing the P usan per imeter wa s just the beginning, how-ever; a s ea r ly as t he fi rs t week of J uly, MacArthur ha d been think-ing of employing the basic tactics that had served him so wella gainst th e J a panese in the South P a cific. He ordered tha t planningbegin for an amphibious landing in Korea well beyond the battle-front.

The objective t ha t Ma cArt hu r selected t o open th e second pha seof the wa r wa s Inchon on Korea s west coa st, the ocean ga tewa y to

Seoul. His a mphibious spea rhead w a s the 1st Ma rine Division, w hicha bsorbed th e brigade th a t ha d fought t o defend th e Pusa n perimeter.Ma cArt hur pla ced his chief of sta ff, G enera l Almond, in comma nd ofth e 40,000-ma n inva sion force, designa ted X Corps, w hich includedthe ma rines a nd a n Army division from J a pan. The at ta ck at Inchoncut off the North K orean forces retrea ting from th e P usa n perimeter,w here the E ighth Army la unched its own offensive on S eptember 16,the day follow ing the a ssault a t Inchon. Less tha n a third of a NorthKorean force numbering 100,000 escaped from the trap and againcrossed t he 38th para llel, this t ime in headlong retreat . So completewa s th e enemys collapse tha t on September 27, not quit e tw o w eeksa fter the Inchon la nding, P resident Truma n a uthorized Ma cArthurto pursue the bea ten enemy north of the pa ra llel separ a ting t he tw oKorea s, a nd S outh Korea n t roops promptly a dvanced into the North.The United Nations never explicitly approved an invasion of NorthKorea , how ever. The General Assembly, reflecting the concern ofsome members tha t t o advan ce northw a rd w a s to invite the Chineseto intervene, a dopted a n a mbiguous compromise resolution to th eeffect that all appropriate steps should be taken to ensure condi-tions of sta bility t hroughout Korea.

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As t he U nited Na tions forces a dva nced beyond t he 38th para l-lel , a i r power performed a var iety of missions. Navy a nd MarineCorps avia tors ha d provided cover for the In chon landings, w hile theFifth Air Force supported t he E ighth Army t hroughout the a dva ncefrom th e P usan per imeter to the border w ith North Korea . Oncea cross the pa ra llel , easily the most specta cular a ir opera tion wa s thedropping of the 187th Airborne Regiment a l Comba t Team a t t w oroad junctions north of Pyongyang to cut off a retreating NorthKorean column and free a large number of American prisoners ofwa r t ra vel ing with i t in two t ra ins. A sharp f ight occurred, but thesudden a ppea ra nce of th e airborne force did not prevent th e enemyfrom murdering a hundred prisoners on one of the tr a ins; the othercont inued northwa rd w ith i ts capt ives . B esides dropping the a ir-borne infant ry, th e roughly 140 tra nsport a ircra ft of the Fa r E a st AirForces parachuted supplies to the advancing United Nations troops

and flew men and cargoas much as 1,000 passengers and 1,000tons of supplies on a busy da yfrom J a pan to a irfields in K orea.With the North Korean Peoples Army straggling in small groupsinto the north ern mount a ins of Korea a nd town a fter tow n fall ing toWa lker s adva ncing a rmy, few w orth w hile ta rgets existed for thefighter-bombers of the Fifth Air Force or for ODonnells B29s.Aerial reconna issa nce, so helpful in cha rt ing th e defenses of In chon,now faced the infinitely more difficult task of locating the enemya mong the mount a ins of north ernmost K orea.

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For a short time in the fall of 1950, Fifth Air Force made itsheadquarters here in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital.Soon a Chinese offensive would force American units to

scramble southward.


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The advance that carried the Eighth Army to Pyongyang andbeyond formed one a rm of a nother pincers movement, planned a s arepetit ion of the assa ult a t I nchon. While the E ighth Army pushednorthw a rd, G enera l Almonds X Corps w ould reembark a t In chonand P usan , sa i l a round the peninsu la , and land a t Wonsan on theeast coa st. Once ashore it w ould cross the mounta inous spine ofKorea to l ink up w ith t he ma in body of the Eighth Army a t K oreasna rrow wa ist . The plan w ent badly a wry, however. While res is ta ncebefore the E ighth Army wa s crumbling, minefields off Wonsa ndelayed t he la nding of X Corps for t w o weeks; Almonds tr oops didnot come ashore unt il November 4, a fter South Korean forcesa dva ncing a long th e coa st ha d ca ptured the port . The plan ned pin-cers movement now became a race to the northern border of NorthKorea , the Ya lu River, by para l le l columns with a rugged mountainra nge betw een them.

The separa tion of the E ighth Army a nd t he X Corps, w hich sti l lincluded the 1st Ma rine Division, brought a bout a cha nge in therelat ionship betw een th e Fifth Air Force a nd Ma rine Corps a via tion,w hich ha d been reinforced to become t he 1st Ma rine Aircraft Wing.In October, G enera l Weyland, s t i ll serving a s St ra temeyer s vicecomma nder for opera tions, ra ised the question w hether the Mar inea ircra f t wing, wh en support ing X Corps in northeastern NorthKorea , w ould come under t he cont rol of th e Fifth Air Force. Init ia llyMacArthur s headqua rters said no, a ppa rent ly intending to repea ta t Wonsan t he arra ngement a t Inchon, w here Marine Corps a nd

Na vy squa drons supported the lan ding. Weyla nd th ereupon a rguedth a t t he Fifth Air Force wa s responsible for support ing X Corps a ndshould contr ol the Ma rine Corps a ircra ft , w hich w ould opera te frombases ashore during the adva nce to the Ya lu. He proposed th a tPartridge extend his coordination control over the 1st MarineAircra f t Wing, a greeing, however, to commit the w ing pr ima ri ly t othe support of X Corp and to provide from the Fifth Air Force anya dditiona l sorties tha t Almonds comma nd might require. Dur ingthe f ina l adva nce by the U nited Na t ions Command t o the Ya lu, theNa vys ca rrier-based a ircra ft , l ike the B 29s of the Far E a st AirForces, would conduct genera l support . On October 16, wh en thefirst elements of X Corps set sa il for Wonsa n, Ma cArth ur s hea d-qua rters approved the a rra ngement , which w ent into effect f ivedays la ter a s the a mphibious force wa s s teaming offshore, wa i t ingfor the minefields to be cleared.

The plan to have the Fifth Air Force exercise coordination con-tr ol over the Ma rines did not work a s w ell a s Weyla nd ha d hoped.Communications between the joint operations center and the XCorps comma nd post proved unr eliable, a nd Almond declined t oa ssign officers to the center on a perma nent basis. Pa r t r idge

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imposed a further burden on the fragile communications net byinsisting that X Corps submit each day a formal request for airstrikes; th is long a nd complica ted message beca me the basis for adeta iled order directin g t he 1st Ma rine Aircraft Wing t o fly m issionstha t i t w ould ha ve f low n a nywa y. According to Robert Fra nkFut rells hist ory of th e Air Force in K orea , th is procedure repre-sented an unrealistic compliance with accepted air-ground doc-trine. In t he middle of October, resista nce in north eastern K oreawa s light, a nd the cumbersome excha nge of messages am ount ed toli t t le more tha n a n inconvenience. At the end of November, howev-er, China intervened in force, a t t a cking t he t roops adva ncing fromWonsa n a nd t hose pushing towa rd th e Ya lu af t er ca ptur ingP yongya ng, ending the pursuit of the defea ted North Korea n a rmytha t ha d begun on September 15 a nd 16 w ith t he la nding a t I nchona nd th e count erat ta ck from th e Pusa n perimeter.

C hi nese I nter venti onThe Chinese intervention jolted a United Nations Command

that already had begun canceling requisit ions for ammunition andclea rly wa s thinking of victory par a des ra ther tha n further comba t.Indeed, tw o of the five groups of B 29s a ssigned to Fa r E a st AirForces returned t o the Un ited St a tes in October. On th e 15th of tha tmonth, before the Wonsan inva sion force had lef t port , G eneralMa cArth ur ar rived at Wa ke Isla nd where he a ssured P resident

Truman that if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang therewould be the greatest s laughter. China ha d threat ened to enter thewa r if the Un ited Nat ions forces drew t oo nea r to the Ya lu, but t hesewa rnings were dismissed as propaga nda . Not even the sighting onOctober 18 of 100 fighters parked on the airfield at An-tung (now roma nized as Da ndong) in Ma nchuria ca used ala rm; St ra temeyerinterpreted t heir presence a s a n a tt empt t o lend color a nd credenceto menacing sta tements a nd t hreat s of Chinese communist lea ders,who probably felt that this display of strength involved no risk inview of our a ppar ent d esire to avoid border incidents.

When the Chinese struck, they a tt a cked piecemea l. On October25 and 26, they hi t South Korea n t roops who had probed a s far a sthe Ya lu, a nd on the 29th t he South K oreans w ho ha d ca pturedWonsa n report ed encountering C hinese troops a long t he east coa st.Oth er more serious conta cts occurred on November 1. When F 80sattacked the airfield at Sinuiju on the southern bank of the Yalu,they found 15 Yaks on the ground there and lost one of their num-ber to an tia ircraft fire, some of it believed to have come from An-tung a cross the border in Ma nchuria . On tha t sa me day, a lso in thevicinity of Sinuiju, Ya k fight ers of a reconstitu ted North K orean a ir

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a rm a tt a cked a B 26 a nd a T6 but fa iled to dow n either, a nd fourMiG15 jet f ighters bearing Chinese markings darted across the

Ya lu a nd jumped four F 51s, a ll of w hich esca ped. When night fella t U nsan , some 75 miles ea st of Sinuiju , Chinese infant ry a t ta ckedboth America n a nd S outh Korea n un its, inflicting severe ca sua lties.The Chinese were not merely reinforcing the defeated NorthKoreans but w ere ta king over the wa r. Inst ead of some 17,000troops, a s MacArthur s s taff bel ieved, a s many a s 180,000 ha da lrea dy entered North Korea , t ra vel ing by night w hen America na eria l reconna issance could not detect th em a nd rema ining hiddenduring day l ight .

America n a t tent ion focused on Sinui ju , the br idges there, a ndthe other spans t ha t crossed th e Ya lu elsewh ere. Pa rt r idge want edto avenge the loss of the F80 on November 1 by setting the towna bla ze with incendiary bombs, cha sing back into Manchuria a nyChinese MiG s that might intervene, a nd at ta cking the a irfieldsfrom wh ich the Chinese jets had come. U ntil the extent of theChinese involvement beca me clea r, Ma cArth ur wa s relucta nt tocha llenge the administra tions prohibition a ga inst a tt a cking China ,a nd he vetoed the bombing of Sinuiju, w hich he hoped to ca ptureinta ct a nd tur n over to the government of a unified Korea . With apeacetim e popula tion a pproa ching 100,000, ma ny of whom ha d fled

22

F51 Mustang pilots await debriefing after attackingChinese forces near Seoul, South Korea.


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a cross the Ya lu, the town w ould serve as t he an chor of a defensiveline esta blished along t he river.

Even as he sought to spare Sinuiju for use by the new Koreasa rmed forces, Ma cArth ur a pproved the destru ction by a eria l bom-bar dment of the other t ow ns a nd villa ges in th e border region t ha tmight ha rbor enemy t roops or supplies. To compensa te for the w ith -dra wa l of the tw o groups of B 29s, ODonnells bomber comma ndrelied on incendiaries to multiply the damage done by the remain-ing thr ee groups. The a dministra tion appa rently w a s no longer con-cerned by the propaganda advantage that might accrue to the gov-ernment of North Korea if fire bombs were used. Dur ing the firstw eek of November, the bombers ignored S inuiju in t he west a ndRashin in the east but hit the other two large towns in the borderregion, leveling Ka ngye a nd da ma ging Chonjin.

Although sti l l confident that he faced a comparatively small

number of Chinese, Ma cArth ur could not ignore the passa ge of a ddi-tiona l troops over the bridges l inking China w ith North Korea. OnNovember 5 he therefore directed S tr a temeyer to deva sta te th e a reabetw een the front l ines a nd th e Ya lu River, a tt a cking the town ofSinuiju, dropping the Korean end of all the bridges lea ding fromManchuria , a nd then destroying every vi llage, town, factory, or mil-i tary insta l la t ion, exempting only Rashin a nd the hydroelectr icpla nts tha t suppl ied current t o China . Sent in a rout ine ta rget ingreport filed a few h ours before th e B 29s were to ta ke off on t he firstof th e missions, the directive might h a ve gone unnoticed until a fter

the first strike had Stratemeyer not alerted Vandenberg that straybombs aimed at Sinuiju or the bridges might explode on Chineseterri tory. The issue rea ched th e desk of P resident Truma n, w ho felta n a tt a ck like th is should be delivered only if th e lives of America nsoldiers were a t sta ke. Thus fa r, the C hief Executive ha d received nosuch justifica tion. Ma cArth ur w a s therefore asked w hy t he series ofopera tions wa s suddenly so importa nt. He responded by giving theJ oint Ch iefs of S ta ff a vivid description of Ch inese tr oops pouringa cross the bridges in da ys to come. To delay t he bombing, he wa rned,would threaten the ultimate destruction of the forces under mycomma nd. D espite the possibility of provoking Chin a int o broaden-ing the conflict , perha ps by a move a gainst Ta iwa n, the P residentfelt he ha d no choice but t o approve the strikes aga inst S inuiju a ndth e bridges.

On November 8, 79 B29s s t ruck Sinuiju , nine t rying unsuc-cessfully to drop the bridges and the other 70 saturating the cityw ith more tha n 500 tons of incendiary bombs, released in clusters.G enera l ODonnell indica tes, St ra temeyer recorded in his dia ry,tha t t he tow n wa s gone. Aeria l reconna issance found th a t a bout 60percent of th e city h a d been destroyed. No B29s w ere lost on t he

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ra id aga inst S inuiju a nd i t s br idges , and 1st L t . Russel l B rown, f ly-ing cover in a n F 80, shot dow n a MiG15 during t he first a ll-jetdogfight. E nemy a ntia ircra ft a rt i l lery kept t he B 29s a bove 18,000feet, a n a lt i tude tha t ma de it impossible to hit the Korean end of thetw o br idges, highway a nd rai l roa d, betw een An-tung a nd Sinui ju . Afurther complication was MacArthur s insistence that the bombersfollow the course of the stream to avoid violating Chinese airspace.At da ys end both bridges rema ined open, a lthough the a pproachesfrom the Korea n side ha d susta ined da ma ge.

Throughout th e rest of November 1950, th e dozen bridges overthe Ya lu proved to be dura ble targets . Navy a ircra f t ma na ged todestroy th e highwa y span a t S inuiju , but seven other s t ructures,including the ra ilroa d bridge at Sinuiju, defied a ll efforts to destroyth em, even w ith r a dio-cont rolled bombs, relics of World Wa r II th a tha d a guidan ce system prone to fa ilure. Few B 29 bomba rdiers ha d

a ny experience using the bombs, w hich th ey had t o tra ck all the wa yto t he t a rget , d is rega rd ing MiGs a nd an t i a i rcr a f t f ir e. Even i fgreat er a ccura cy h a d been a tt a ined, the 1,000-pound guided bombslacked the explosive power to destroy these solidly built bridges.Before heavier guided bombs could be sent to the Far East andcrews t ra ined to use them, the Ya lu froze, enabl ing men and sup-plies to cross w ithout using th e bridges. One of the first of the12,000-pound guided bombs to arrive in the theater of operationsbadly da ma ged a ra i lroa d br idge at Ka ngye, some 25 miles insideN or t h K or ea . I n Ma r ch , a f t er t he ice h a d t ha w e d, t h e B 29s

resumed their at ta cks on th e bridges across the Ya lu, da ma ging afew but n ot t he railroa d span a t S inuiju.

Dur ing the ea rly strikes a ga inst th e Ya lu bridges, fighters fromnorth of the r iver f requent ly c l imbed to high al t i tude overManchuria , dived into North K orea to make a f ir ing pa ss a t t heAmerica n bombers, a nd t hen fled ba ck a cross th e border. Ma cArth urcomplained about allowing the enemy to enjoy this Manchuriansa nctua ry, but t he possibil ity t ha t a eria l incursions north of th e bor-der might trigger a violent response by China or the Soviet Unionhad become a source of concern to Americas European allies.American aircraft had already violated Chinese or Soviet airspacethree t imes: on August 27, tw o Mustangs ha d mista ken a n a irfielda t An-tun g for one at Sinuiju a nd st ra fed th e Chinese a erodrome; onthe night of September 22, a B 29 dispat ched to bomb S inuiju hitthe ra ilyard a t An-tung; a nd on October 8, tw o F80 pilots beca melost a nd repea tedly stra fed a Soviet a ir base in Siberia . Violat ions ofcommunist air space were considered potentially dangerous provo-ca tions of a n enemy w hose intentions w ere not yet clea r. A Chineseprotest on August 28, w hich a lleged five incursions, moved G enera lSt ra temeyer to warn Pa rtr idge a nd ODonnel l that intervent ion w a s

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a distinct possibili ty, but t he America n a dvan ce continued a ndsoon t he concerns of the lat e summer w ere forgott en. After thea tt a ck on Soviet terri tory, the comma nder of the fighter groupinvolved was reassigned to Fifth Air Force headquarters and theoffending pilots fa ced a court -ma rtia l tha t a cquitt ed them.

S ince th e extent of Chinese involvement in K orea wa s only gra d-ua lly becoming understood, the U nited Sta tes agreed w ith i ts all iestha t extending the air w a r beyond the Ya lu would be unwise, espe-cia lly in light of rumors t ha t t he S oviet Air Force w ould respond t oAmerica n a tt a cks aga inst a irfields in China . The Truma n a dminis-t ra t ion, a l though i t a lmost cer ta inly would have reta l ia ted aga instthe air bases had the Chinese mounted an aer ia l a t tack on theU nited Nat ions forces, did not w a nt t o provoke ra ids of tha t kind.Never during the war were American flyers authorized to enterChinese or S oviet a irspa ce. P ilots sometimes ignored t his prohibi-

t ion w hen in hot pursuit of a MiG seeking refuge over Ch ina , a nd onat least one occasion they confused facilities across the Soviet bor-der w ith ta rgets in North K orea.

After the first attacks by Chinese troops in late October andearly November, quiet sett led over t he North Korean ba tt lefields;the new enemy seemed to have vanished as suddenly as heappeared . Af ter paus ing tw o weeks to regroup, MacArthur onNovember 24 la unched a n offensive th a t he believed w ould drive th eenemy a cross the Ya lu and into China. He wa s confident t ha t t heU nited Nat ions Comman d could rout th e Chinese, now estima ted to

number a bout 70,000, a nd th e slightly la rger remna nt of the NorthKorean P eoples Army. In fa ct, some 300,000 Chinese, a long w ith th e

25

Marshal Peng Dehuaicommanded Chinese

forces during theKorean War.


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defea ted North Korea ns, opposed a U nited Na tions force of 200,000men, ha lf of them South K orean t roops.

The Chinese count erat ta cked on November 25, striking thema in body of the E ighth Army a nd th en X Corps. After four da ys,MacArthur ordered the forces north of Pyongyang to withdraw,although he hoped that Almond could maintain a salient in theflank of the a dva ncing enemy. Ma rine Corps aviat ion a nd th e Navyscarrier task force concentrated on assisting the troops in the north-east , wh o were fal l ing ba ck on Hungna m, a port a bout f if ty milesnorth of Wonsa n. In t he emergency, Pa rtr idge suspended the exist-ing procedures for coordination and allowed the commander of the1st Ma rine Aircra ft Wing to direct a ir operat ions in tha t sector, a ct-ing independent ly of the joint opera t ions center. In a ddit ion, theFifth Air Force placed varying numbers of sorties by fighter-bombers a nd light bombers a t t he disposa l of the Ma rine Corps offi-

cer. Pa r t r idges remain ing a i rcra f t , a ided by the B 29s, t r ied torelieve the pressure on G enera l Wa lker s E ighth Army. Comma ndedby Maj . G en. Will ia m H . Tunner, who ha d directed the recent B erl inAirlift, th e combat car go element of the Far E a st Air Forces flew intoa irfields tha t w ere a bout t o be a ba ndoned in the retrea t a nd broughtout equipment a nd supplies th a t Wa lker s tr oops would otherw iseha ve had t o destroy. Along the east coa st , Tunner s a i rmen pa ra -chuted the components of a br idge tha t , wh en a ssembled, ena bledth e 1st Ma rine D ivision t o cross a gorge blocking t he line of retrea tto Hungna m. Without the bridge, th e unit might w ell have lost much

of i ts hea vy equipment . After a gal lant f ight t o rea ch th e port ,Hungna m ha d to be abandoned, with the las t of Almonds t roopssa iling sa fely from t he ha rbor on D ecember 24. The presence of themarines and soldiers on the Chinese flank no longer made sense;they were needed in South Korea to stabilize the front as UnitedNa tions forces aba ndoned P yongyan g, retreat ed a cross the 38th par-a llel , a nd a ban doned Seoul. E a ch successive retreat further compli-ca ted ta ctical a ir support by depriving P a rtr idge of his adva nce a ir-fields and reducing the time that fighter-bombers could harry theenemys a dva nce.

The bleak news from Korea deeply troubled President Trumana nd h is advisers. After a meeting a t t he White House on November28, wh en t he Chinese offensive wa s just beginning, the da nger ofsustained air a t tacks from the sanctuary of Manchuria was dis-cussed. The possibility of reta liat ion in th e event of such at ta cks wa svery much on th e Pr esidents mind, so much so tha t during a pressconference on November 30, he an sw ered a report er s questionabout the use of a tomic bombs by s ta t ing that there had alwaysbeen ac t ive cons idera t ion of the ir employment . This offha ndremar k, th ough clarified by a White House press relea se pointing

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out t ha t t he P resident ha d not a uth orized th e use of a tomic devicesa nd t ha t only wh en he did so w ould MacArth ur have cha rge of theta ctical delivery of t he w eapons, produced tw o immediat e effects.G enera l MacArthur, wh o had just a pproved a message request ingB 29s ca pable of dropping at omic bombs, set his hea dqua rters tow ork on a l ist of potentia l ta rgets in China a nd, should the conflictspread, in the Soviet Union. At th e same t ime, Mr. Truma ns wordsupset Americas allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,who initially supported the collective defense of South Korea asproof of American determination to abandon isolationism and par-ticipat e in th e defense of na tions threa tened by communist a ggres-s ion. The enthusiasm of the Europeans wa s fa st aba t ing, for theyfeared that the war in Korea might at best absorb Americanresources needed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or atworst give the Soviet Union an excuse to attack western Europe.

P r i m e M in i st e r C lem en t H . At l ee of G r e a t B r i t a i n f lew t oWa shington seeking reassura nce; the P resident provided it , tellingof his hope th a t w orld conditions w ould never ca ll for t he use of theatomic bomb.

Mi G A lley While Ma cArth ur plan ned, a lbeit tenta tively, for at omic wa rfa re

a nd Trum a n responded to th e concerns of th e Eur opean lea ders w horecoiled a t th e prospect of such a conflict, th e Air Force moved to

solve a ta ctical problem, count ering t he S oviet-built MiG15, w hichin terms of speed a nd ma neuvera bility out performed the F51s a ndF80s in action over Korea. E ven a s the Chinese drive ga th eredmomentum, the Fif th Air Force received an a ircra f t , the NorthAmerica n F86 Sa bre, th a t more tha n ma tched the MiG 15 in per-forma nce. Soon a fter Chinese MiGs (ma nned in the ea rliest da ys bySoviet pilots) first intervened in the a ir wa r, G enera l Va ndenbergordered a wing of seventy-five Sabres ferried by aircraft carrier tothe Far E a st. They ha d their first encount er with th e MiG15 onDecember 17, 1950, when Lt . Col. B ruce Hinton shot one down . Fiveda ys lat er, the comma nder of the 4th F ighter-Int erceptor Wing, Lt.Col . J ohn C. Meyer, led e igh t Sa bres aga inst f i ft een MiG s , downingsix of t he enemy a t th e cost of one F86.

D uring t he next 30 month s, F86 pilots r eceived credit for thedestruction of 792 MiG s a nd 18 other enemy a ircra ft . Of the 218Sa bres lost during the wa r, the Air Force a tt ributed 76 to MiG s, 19to ground fire, 15 to unknow n enemy a ction, 13 to unknow n opera-t iona l ca uses , a nd the rest t o mecha nica l fa i lure or a ccident .Although t he light er MiG could climb fa ster, th e Sa bre could out runit in a dive a nd w a s more responsive to the controls when a pproa ch-

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ing t he speed of sound . The S a bres can opy a fforded bett er visibilitytha n t ha t of the MiG, w hich suffered from a restricted field of visiona nd a n infer ior defrost ing system. Neither a i rcra f t ha d real ly ade-qua te arma ment . The Sa bres s ix machine guns did not causeenough dama ge, of ten hi t t ing the enemy without br inging himdow n, a nd th e MiG s ca nnon fired too slow ly to be a ccura te a ga insta fast -moving jet . Modifica tions to the F 86 enha nced its perfor-ma nce aga inst the MiG, wh ich did not improve much during thecourse of the wa r. To reduce drag during tight t urns, engineers a tNorth American Aviation replaced the wing slats that extendeda utoma tically at low speed with a fixed leading edge. Hy dra ulic con-trols also increa sed a gili ty, but t he great est boon t o man euvera bili-ty w a s the so-ca lled flying ta il, a horizonta l sta bilizer tha t moved a sa unit a nd wa s far more effective tha n th e sma ller elevat ors on th eear ly F86. A more powerful engine a nd a ra dar gunsight a lso

helped ma ke th e la ter F86 a m ore formida ble fighter. The MiG,however, sti l l had bett er accelerat ion a nd enjoyed the sa nctua ry ofthe Ma nchurian border.

Alth ough t he F86 wa s a splendid fight er, its overw helming suc-cess against the MiG in Korea resulted in large measure from itssuperior pilots, ma ny of them vetera ns of World Wa r II . ColonelMeyer, for exam ple, wa s a leading ace in the European Theat er ofOpera tions with tw enty-four kil ls; he a dded tw o victories in Korea.Simila r ly, Lt . Col. Fra ncis Ga breski a nd seventeen other a ces of theprevious w a r increa sed t heir t ota ls in th e Korea n fighting. Ten men

w ho ha d a t lea st a few victories in World Wa r II beca me a ces inKorea , including Ma j. J a mes J a bara , w hose f if teen kil ls earned himsecond pla ce a mong th e aces of th e Korean Wa r. The leading a ce,wi th s ix teen , wa s Capt . J oseph McConnel l, who had been a B 24na vigator during World Wa r I I . He survived t he a ir wa r over K oreaonly to die while testing a new m odel of the F86. Aga inst experi-enced pi lot s like G abreski , Meyer, a nd J a bara , the Chinese sen tclass a fter class of tra inees, a nd th e Soviets a lso rota ted inexperi-enced pilots into the theat er. E a ch group bega n timidly an d onlygradual ly made bolder forays across the Yalu as experienceincreased. Only a few of the Chinese a nd Soviet pilots a tt a ined thelevel of skill common among their opponents.

The F86 pilots had to devise new tactics for jet combat alongth e Ya lu. The big offensive fighter sw eeps of the la st yea rs of WorldWa r II ga ve wa y to small defensive pat rols. Since the Man churia na irfields could not be a tt a cked, the F 86s did not enga ge the enemyover his ba ses a s ha d been done in both World Wa rs. The initia tivethus passed to the Chinese, w ith the America ns react ing to theenemys incursions by esta blishing ba rrier pa tr ols or by scra mblinginterceptors when wa rned by ra dar. B eca use of the short ra nge of

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29

An Air Force ground crew unwrapsa North AmericanF86 Sabre on a cold winter day in Korea; this F86 willsoon fly north hunting for Chinese MiG15s.

Maj. Frederick BootsBlesse was one of thir-ty-eight USAF pilotsto become a KoreanWar aceby shootingdown at least five en-emy aircraft. Here heis shown in 1952 witheight stars on his F86indicating eight victo-ries; he will get twomore. Soon after thewar, Blesse publishedhis pioneering essayon jet air-to-air tac-tics: No Guts, No Glo-ry.He retired fromthe Air Force in 1975as a major general.


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the MiG15 a nd th e loca tion of the Chinese a irfields i t used, theheaviest f ighting t ook place in MiG Alley, in northw estern NorthKorea along the Yalu River from the Yellow Sea to the Sui-hoReservoir, a n a rea t ha t included th e tow ns of Sina nju a nd S inuiju .The short ra nge of the F86, less th a n 500 miles w ith jett isona blefuel ta nks, meant tha t no t ime could be wa sted in a ssembling largeforma tions. P a trols of four F86s ar rived in MiG Alley a t f ive-minute intervals a nd rema ined for a bout 20 minutes, less if theyengaged in comba t.

Alth ough American t a ctics proved successful, Ch inese a ir pow erremained a n ominous threat thr oughout the fighting. Soviet supportha d ena bled China to increa se i ts jet f ighter strength t o a s ma ny a s1,000 a ircra ft , thr ee t imes the peak number of F86s. MiGs occa -siona lly penetra ted the screen of F86s a long t he Ya lu, a nd U.S.fighter protection disa ppeared entirely for severa l w eeks. Ea rly in

1951, the U nited Na t ions forces a bandoned Seoul ; a nd on J a nua ry2, a bout to be deprived of Kimpo airfield just outside the capita l , theF86s withdrew t o J a pan. Not unt i l they returned to South K orea inFebrua ry could the Sa bres a ga in reach MiG Alley; but in the inter-im, America n bombers a nd fight er-bombers (including new RepublicF84 Thunderjets) achieved varying degrees of success poundingthe enemy and his lengthening supply l ines without the F86screen. B 29s cra tered P yongya ng a irfield aft er the enemy reca p-tured it and bombed towns suspected of sheltering Chinese troops.In J a nua ry a ra id on th e ci ty of P yongya ng set ra ging f ires but fa i led

to inflict the complete devastation that the bomber commandexpected. More encoura ging results were at tributed to ta ctical a ir-cra f t . Dur ing the f ir s t f ive days of J anua ry, the F if th Ai r Forceclaimed that some 2,500 daylight sorties by fighter-bombers hadkilled 8,000 Chinese, w hile B 26s, experimenting w ith fla res pro-vided by th e Navy a nd dropped from Air Force C47s, a dded to thedea th t ol l with night a t ta cks.

All in a l l , a i r support during the retreat wa s uneven, wea kest inthe west during December, w hen airf ields l ike those a roundPyongyang had to be abandoned and mountains of supplies andequipment destroyed, but more effective in t he ea st w here a ircra ftca rriers were close at ha nd a nd t he eva cua tion more orderly. OnceMarine Corps and Air Force fighter-bomber units reestablishedthemselves in sou the rn Sou th Korea i n ea r ly J a nua ry, t heylaun ched fiercer at ta cks tha n during the previous month . B 29sremained a powerful element in the American air armada becauseth e recently eva cuat ed air fields of Nort h K orea w ere in no conditionfor use by MiGs, w hose short r a nge kept t hem well to the north ofretreat ing U nited Na tions forces.

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S talemateThe cumulative effect of attacks on the enemys logistics net-

work, which intensified as D ecember ended a nd J a nua ry began;stiffening resista nce on t he ground, to wh ich close air support a nd

bat t lef ie ld interdict ion contr ibuted; a nd t he very speed of ana dva nce tha t outra n i ts supply l ines combined t o slow the C hinesea dvance beyond Seoul . B y mid-J a nua ry the long retrea t h a d ended.The front st a bilized some fort y miles sout h of the S out h K orea n ca p-i ta l , a nd the Eighth Army prepared to counterat ta ck under a new commander, Lt . G en . Mat thew B. Ridgway, who had ta ken over a f terG enera l Wa lker died in a jeep a ccident on D ecember 23, 1950. Rea dyto ta ke par t in Ridgwa ys pla nned advan ce wa s X Corps, w hich ha drejoined Eighth Army after the withdrawal from Hungnam.

Since X Corps had returned to the battlefield in South Korea,

P a rtr idge might ha ve vigorously r easserted coordina tion cont rol overth e 1st Ma rine Aircra ft Wing t hrough t he joint opera tions cent er, buthe did not. As a result of the savage fighting in northeast ern Korea ,he recognized that the Marine Corps air and ground componentsformed a un ified tea m. He therefore cont inued the pra ctice he hadesta blished during the retreat to Hungna m, exercising his a uthoritythrough the comma nder of the Marine aircra ft w ing, w ith the opera-tions center rarely making other than minor adjustments to planssubmitt ed by w ing hea dqua rters. In a n emergency Ma rine Corps air-cra ft could be directed to a tt a ck wherever th ey were needed, butbeca use Ridgwa y chose to ad va nce meth odica lly in successive sta ges,emergencies w ere few. Indeed, by the end of J une the Eighth Armyhad recaptured Seoul and advanced a short distance into NorthKorea . The wa r thereupon entered a n ew phase, a sta lema te brokenby limited though vicious a tt a cks, w hich la sted into 1953.

Air power proved invaluable in the limited United Nationsoffensives that established an essentially permanent battlefrontgenera lly along the 38th para llel north of Seoul. As the Un itedNat ions Command fought it s wa y nor thwa rd , the Far E as t Ai rForces flew a s ma ny a s 1,000 sorties in a single day. Ma rine Corpsa irmen joined them in close air support, under t he direction of a ir-borne controllers , a nd in ba t t lefield interdict ion. In terrain t ha t wa smore open t ha n a long t he Ya lu, a eria l reconna issance kept t ra ck ofhostile a ctivity, for insta nce, reporting t he enemys wit hdra wa l fromChunchon just south of the 38th pa ra l le l, thus fa ci li ta t ing thea dva nce. B 29s of the Far E a st Air Forces bombed the roa d a nd ra iljunctions through which supplies reached the Chinese and NorthKorea n uni ts , a nd t roop ca rr ier squa drons dropped the 187thAirborne Regimenta l Comba t Team in t he vicinity of Munsa n-ni,

some 25 miles nort hw est of S eoul. Assessing th e effectiveness of air

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pow er in front of his unit , especially t he strikes ha ndled by a irbornecontrollers in t heir T6s, Lt . Col. G ilber t J . Check, comma nder of the27th Regimenta l Combat Team , sa id, The close support a nd coordi-na t ion betw een a i r and ground uni t s . . . can w el l serve as a s tan-dard for future operations.

The Chinese intervention struck a mortal blow to the adminis-trations lingering hope that the budget could be balanced by rein-ing in defense spending. Amid the optimism of la te October, pla nswere being made to shift troops from the Far East to Europe oncethe last spark of North Korean resistance had been extinguished.The offensive designed to accomplish this goal began in lateNovember. If successful, Ma cArth ur declared, this should for a llpractica l purposes end t he wa r. Scar cely h a d he spoken before theU nited Nat ions Comma nd wa s everyw here retreat ing before a ma s-s ive and w ell -t ra ined Chinese army. On December 15, P resident

Truma n declared a na t iona l emergency, commit t ing the U nitedSt a tes to t he expense of a continuing milita ry buildup.This ma rsha ling of men a nd resources, however, wa s directed a s

much towa rd the defense of Europe a s towa rd th e wa r in Asia, forthe C hinese offensive had persua ded the a dministra tion t o sett le forless tha n victory in Korea. To la unch a nother drive to the Ya lua ga inst C hinese forces seemed far t oo costly, not only in term s ofAmerican lives lost but also because it would require troops andequipment that could better be used to bolster the defenses of amore vita l region, w estern E urope. P reserving the independence of

South Korea without allowing the conflict to spread replaced thedefea t of North K orea a s the aim of the wa r. B y the t ime the U nitedNations t roops had begun counterat tacking af ter hal t ing theChinese adva nce, the destruction of the enemys a rmy seemed pro-hibitively expensive. A bett er solution a ppea red to be a negotia tedsettlement that would end the fighting and ensure the continuedindependence of S out h K orea .

G eneral MacArthur, however, would a ccept nothing less tha nvictory. His concern t ha t t he Eighth Army w ould have to evacua tethe peninsula va nished by mid-Februa ry, a nd he denounced th ea ccepta nce of a s ta lema te in Korea . B y mid-March, a f ter Ridgwa ystroops had dea lt the Chinese several sha rp blow s, Ma cArth ur toldreporters that the mission of his command was to unify the twoKoreas. Although the P resident in the discoura ging days follow ingChinas intervention had issued a directive warning against unau-thorized sta tements on the conduct of the wa r, Ma cArth ur receivedno rebuke. Since Ridgwa ys E ighth Army w a s a pproaching the 38thpa ra llel, Trum a n hoped to ca pita lize on the reversa l of Chinese for-tun es, a nd possibly foresta ll a n enemy countert hrust , by offering tonegot ia t e a n end to the f ight ing. Learning in a dvance of the

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P residents plan , Ma cArth ur torpedoed it , issuing a ringing declar a -tion that in effect invited China to choose between surrender anddefeat . On Ma rch 24, Truma n reminded the general of the directivea gainst public s ta tements on the conduct of the wa r, but by tha tt ime Ma cArth ur h a d enga ged in a n even m ore serious a ct of insub-ordinat ion. Four da ys ear l ier he ha d repl ied to a request f romRepresenta t ive Joe Ma rt in , a Republ ica n from Pennsylvania , for hisview s on th e milita ry policy of the Democra tic a dministra tion. OnApril 5 Ma rtin released Ma cArth ur s response, w hich clashed w iththe view s of the Truma n a dministra tion on a lmost every point. TheFar Ea st , the general insisted, wa s more importa nt tha n Europe a nda negotia ted sett lement in Korea a mounted to a bject surr ender. Ifwe lose the war to Communism in Asia , the let ter w a rned, the fal lof Europe is inevita ble. . . . We must w in. There is no subst i tute forvictory. Differing publicly with t he administra tion wa s serious;

int erjectin g t hose differences int o domestic politics wa s outr a geous,especial ly s ince MacArthur had f l i r ted with the Republ icanPresidential nomination while serving in the Southwest Pacific in1944. On April 9, a fter obta ining th e concurrence of t he J oint Ch iefsof St a ff, the P resident directed the Depar tment of the Army t o reca llMacArthur.

Ridgway replaced MacArthur and Lt . G en . J ames A. Van Fleeta ssumed comma nd of Eighth Army. B oth Ridgwa y a nd Va n F leetha d great confidence in th e Eight h Army. Indeed, Va n F leet hoped toexecute a la nding similar t o tha t a t In chon, this t ime on the east

coa st , a nd repea t the success of September 1950. Ridgwa y sha redthe belief tha t t he Chinese in Korea could be defeat ed, a lthough ata grea t, perha ps prohibitive cost. The victory, moreover, might wellprove mean ingless, for Ridgwa y supported the a dministra tionsview tha t w estern E urope wa s th e decisive ideologica l a nd mili ta rybat tleground in th e fight a ga inst communism.

General MacArthur returned from the Orient at a t ime whenthe Republ ica n lea dership, which resented the loss of China t ocommunism, wa s at ta cking the Democra ts for becoming ent a ngledin the North Atla ntic Treat y Orga niza tion. His a ppeara nce seemeda godsend, for here wa s a popular h ero w ho rejected the idea ofEurope first and believed that the Chinese Nationalist armies,although driven from the mainland to a refuge on the island ofTa iwa n, ha d received sufficient t ra ining and equipment since tha tdeba cle to defeat th e more numerous Ch inese communists. Dur inga hear ing before the Armed Services and Foreign Relat ionsCommittees of the Senate on the subject of American policy in theFar Ea s t , MacArthur demanded tha t the adminis t ra t ion chooseamong three courses of ac t ion : sur render, s ta lemat e, or v ictory.Surrender w a s unthinkable. St a lema te, in effect cont inuing the kind

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of l imited opera tions begun by Ridgwa y in Februa ry, w ould kil lChinese, but a s t ime pa ssed America n ca sua lties would inevita blymount , ma king the w a r progressively less popula r a nd ha rder t osustain. The only a l terna t ive wa s victory, wh ich could be won byextending the wa r to mainland Ch ina, using Nat iona l is t t roops andAmerica n a ir a nd n a va l forces.

The J oint Ch iefs of Sta ff ra llied behind the P resident. Dur ingthe retrea t f rom t he Ya lu, they ha d considered a s t ra tegy s imila r toMa cArth ur s, but only as a last r esort if the Chinese overra n theKorean peninsula. The J oint C hiefs did not sha re Ma cArth ur s con-fidence in t he Na tionalist forces. The da nger of a Ch inese triumphha d pa ssed, the front ha d been sta bil ized, a nd the Eighth Army ha dreturned to the offensive. As a result , the uniformed lea ders of thea rmed forces w ere shift ing their a tt ention from a seconda ry t heat erto the ma in ta sk of protecting Eu rope a ga inst the Soviet Un ion, thena tion th ey considered the principa l ant a gonist . The J oint Ch iefsw ere w illing t o a ccept a limited wa r in Korea because th ey believedtha t extending the wa r into China w ould work to the advant a ge of

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On a visit to J apan in 1951, the Chief of Staff of the AirForce, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg ( thi r d f rom r i ght)inspects an airlift wing with the commander of Far East AirForces, Lt. Gen. George E . Stratemeyer ( second fr om left) ;the commander of Fifth Air Force, Maj. Gen. Earle E.Partridge (four th fr om r i ght) ; and the commander of FarEast Air Forces Combat Cargo Command, Maj. Gen. WilliamH. Tunner (second fr o

Within Limits The U.S. Air Force and the Korean War

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Transcript of Within Limits The U.S. Air Force and the Korean War