1

DevelopmentandPoliticalPartyCleavage:ATurkishStory

ResearchThesis

PresentedinpartialfulfillmentoftherequirementsforgraduationwithresearchdistinctioninInternationalStudiesintheundergraduatecollegesofTheOhioStateUniversity

by

OliviaNejedlik

TheOhioStateUniversity

April2016

ProjectAdvisor:ProfessorKevinCox,DepartmentofGeography

2

I.Introduction

Turkey’s Justice and Development Party, known as the AKP in Turkish, has been the

majoritypartyofTurkey’sparliamentandgovernmentsinceitfirstcontestedTurkishelections

in2002.TheAKPpartyfollowsaconservative,Islamistplatformandisespeciallypopularwith

Muslim businessmen from Central Turkey. Recep Tayip Erdogan, the party’s initial Prime

Ministernow-turnedPresident,hasbeen themaindecision-makerand leader, increasing the

responsibilitiesandroleofTurkey’sPresidentinthenationalandinternationalcontext.Hehas

been a source of concern for Turks and other governments around the world, from his

numerouscorruptionscandals,violentsuppressionsofprotestsand limitationsof freedomof

pressandspeech.Yet,throughallofhisinternationallyknowndisastersandmess-ups,theAKP

continuestobeaflourishingpartyinTurkey.

ThemajorsocialcleavageinTurkey,representedthroughpoliticaldivisions,isbetween

the more developed, secular, Western Turkey and the less developed, less secular, Eastern

Turkey. TheCHP (RepublicanPeople’s Party), the liberal, secular oppositionparty in Turkey,

veryclearlyfollowsthiscleavage.AsseenintheCHPsupportmapbelow,Figure1,themajority

of their support is located inWesternTurkey,where thepopulation isgenerallymore liberal

andsecular. TheAKP,though,doesnotfollowthistraditionalcleavage,asshowninFigure2.

TheyhavesupportineveryregionofTurkey,rangingfromwesterncitiestoeasterntowns.This

inturnisinquiteseverecontrasttothegeographyofsupportfortheCHP.

3

Figure1:

Figure2:

256.6

6.7

7.8

22.9

14.2

38.3

25.5

27.1

22.7

42.7

42.7 31 31

31

Aegean

Mediterranean

Central AnatoliaWest Anatolia

West Black Sea

Southeast Anatolia

Centraleast Anatolia

Northeast Anatolia

East Marmara East Black Sea

West Marmara

West Marmara

IstanbulIstanbul

Istanbul

¯Percentage of Votes for CHP in NUTS RegionsLegendPercent CHP

6.600000 - 8.000000

8.000001 - 15.000000

15.000001 - 22.000000

22.000001 - 30.000000

30.000001 - 42.700001

56

51

40.8

34.9

37.8

35.4

51.7

37.948.4

57.6

34.3

34.3 43.8 43.8

43.8

Aegean

Mediterranean

Central AnatoliaWest Anatolia

West Black Sea

Southeast Anatolia

Centraleast Anatolia

East Marmara

Northeast Anatolia

East Black Sea

West Marmara

West Marmara

IstanbulIstanbul

¯Percentage of Votes for AKP in NUTS RegionsLegendPercent Votes AKP

34.300000 - 40.800000

40.800001 - 50.000000

50.000001 - 58.000000

4

Theobjectiveof this thesis is therefore tounderstandaproblem in thegeographyof

voting inTurkey:whysupport fortheAKP isseemingly indifferenttoregionwhilethatofthe

CHPishighlyconcentratedgeographically.Otherwiseput,whyisitthatthesecularizingforces

in Turkey are so limited in their geographic support while the more traditional, Islamic

opposition enjoys a more widespread support base. To answer these questions, I will be

addressingmanyissuesofTurkishsociallifeincludingruraltourbanmigrationandEasttoWest

migration, the Anatolian Tiger phenomenon, various degrees and statistics of development

acrosstheTurkishregions,andsupportfortheotherthreemainTurkishpoliticalparties:CHP,

HDP,andMHP.Ihypothesizethattherearethreereasonsforthepuzzlingdegreeofnational

support for the AKP, andwhy, as onewould expect from a traditional conservative,mildly-

Islamistparty,theyhavenorelationshipwithunderdevelopedregions:

Reason1.HDPSupportinEasternAnatolia

Reason2.TheAnatolianTigerPhenomenon

Reason3.ThePoliticsofDifferenceinWesternCities

In the first section of this thesis, I describe Turkey’s party political relationships with

development, and which regions are more developed over others and why, through a

developmentindexthatIcreated.IalsoexplainwhytheAKPdoesnothaveaconcentrationof

supportinunder-developedregions,unlikewhatonewouldexpectfromaconservative,mildly-

Islamist party. HDP support in Southeastern Anatolia, is a large reason for this, and I will

explainfurtherwhyonecanassumethis. ThesecondsectionwilladdresstheAnatolianTiger

phenomenon,andIwillprovidemyreasoningfortheirhighlevelsofsupportfortheAKP,which

5

will be evident in themaps and data that I provide. In the third section of the thesis Iwill

explainwhythepoliticsofdifferenceinWesterncitiesincreasesAKPsupportinareasofTurkey

whereonewouldotherwisenotexpectthemtodowell.

II.UnevenDevelopmentandTurkey’sElectoralGeography

Turkeyisalandofquitesevereunevendevelopment.DifferencesbetweentheWestern

cities and the Eastern towns are extreme, and obvious through the statistics of the NUTS1

regions. Because development is usually a major political stake, there is an association

betweenthesupportfordifferentpartiesandlevelsofdevelopment.Electoralgeographyand

unevendevelopmenthavehadalong,historicalrelationshipinTurkey.

DevelopmentinTurkey:

Development is first and foremost an economic process, a matter of developing

people’s capabilities to produce. This economic process created today’s modern economy,

originally an agricultural centric world that gradually shifted to industry and then to the

expansionoftheservicesectorthroughtheincreaseoftechnology.Theoveralltendencyisfor

people’s ability to produce to increase over time through technical innovation. Goods and

servicesbeingproducedall enter the competitiveeconomicmarket,where jobsandproduct

1NomenclatureofTerritorialUnitsforStatistics(NUTS)

6

markets are fiercely fought over. In turn, wages and incomes rise for those who create,

produceandsellthegoods.

In Turkey, a traditional social view preceded the development process. Based on

traditionalgender,age,andnobilityrolesconnectedtoreligion,peoplewereassignedranked

roles within their society and community. Traditional society functioned through the

reinforcementoftheserankedroles,whichkepteveryoneintheir“place”doingtheirassigned

job, like a woman as a caretaker and housewife or an African slave as subordinate to their

master. Turkish traditional societyalso functionedon thebeliefandpracticeof religion,and

thiswasasignificantinfluenceoverthedailylivesofthemajorityofTurks.Inotherwords,the

social order of genders, ages and the nobility/commoner relationshipwas as itwas because

religionendorsedit.Becauseoftheeffectreligionhadonpeople’slives,thesocietywasstatic,

leavingtraditionalvaluesinplaceforgenerationstohelpsomeandhurtothers.

Whenfacedwiththedevelopmentprocess,thistypeofsocietyquicklydissolves.While

somemembersof the traditional societyareable toadapt to theirnewandmodernsociety,

othersstruggle. Achangetoanincreasinglymodernsocietythreatensthelivesofthosewho

have a stake in traditional values and society, andwhobenefit from religionbeingpracticed

and followedbyall. Notonlydoes thedevelopmentprocessdissolve the traditional societal

relationsandvalues,italsoprovokesacounterreactionfromthosewhowillbelosingthemost

fromthesocietalchange: themen, theold, the religioushierarchy, thenobilityor traditional

land-owningclasswhoselandownershipwaslegitimatedbyideasofsocietalsuperiority.What

isatstakeisnotjustmaterialoramatterofmenwantingwomentowaitonthembutalsoa

matterofstatusandpreservingtraditionalmannersofrespect(Ex.“respectyourelders”).

7

Changes in the economy are fundamental to developing a society. To promote the

developmentprocess,technologicalchangesandexpansionsmustoccur. Thesetechnological

changes require an advanced scientific knowledge and skillset. The increase in scientific

understanding leads to skepticism towards religion and other traditions. The constant

competitionforjobs,employees,andproductmarketsinthemoderneconomicsystemleadsto

inequalitybetweendifferentgroupsofpeople,asocialhierarchyofpeopledependentonrace,

gender, sexual orientation, ability, etc. This inequality creates a countermovement, one for

equalityforall,leadingtothedevaluationofthetraditionalsocialhierarchy.Asanemployeror

seller of goods and services, this move towards equality will only benefit your cause. The

employerwantsanyonewhowouldbeabletodothejob,regardlessofraceorgender,andthe

selleronlywantshisproducttobebought.

To accurately portray levels of uneven development across Turkey, I have created a

developmentindexofvariousvariablesthatarerelatedtothelevelofdevelopmentofanarea.

This index was created by calculating the z-score, a statistical measurement of a variables

relationshipwith themean (in this case, themean is zero), combining all of the z-scores for

eachvariableineachregion,andcomparingtheregionsoverallz-scores.Thisindexallowsfora

numerical analysis of levels of development across Turkey and the ability to compare two

regionseasilyandquickly.Belowisananalysisofthevariablesusedinthedevelopmentindex,

why they were used and what their relationship to development is. The variables for the

developmentindexareasfollows:

8

IncomePerCapita:

Economic development is absolutely crucial when creating a development index,

allowing the index to address all aspects of society. Income Per Capita is informative of a

society’s level of economic development, with high averages exhibiting a more developed

society. A person with higher levels of education, living and working in a competitive,

industrializedsocietywillhavehigherincomelevelsthanoneworkingintheagriculturalsector

ofasocietythatstruggleswithloweducationlevels.

NetIn-Migration:

Themoredevelopedaregionis,themoreimmigrantsitwillreceivefromotherregions.

This is because there aremore jobs available due to high industrialization, better education

opportunities,andadiverseculturefrompreviousmigrants.

LaborForceParticipation:

Thisvariable isrelevanttocreatingadevelopment indexthatencompassesallaspects

of society. The bigger the percentage of citizens involved in formal labor sectors, themore

industriallyadvancedtheregionis.Thisisbecausetherearefewerpeopleparticipatinginthe

agriculturesector,whichisonlyneededifindustrializationhasn’tyettakenplaceinthesociety

andfoodimportationandmassproductionarenotbeingimplemented.

FertilityRate:

It is very common to see lessdeveloped countrieswithdemographic charts that look

like pyramids, with a large section of their population aged 20 and below. This is because

9

peopleneedmorechildrentoworktheirlandforagriculture.Themoreindustrializedanarea

grows,though,thelessprofitableitbecomestohavemorechildren. School isexpensiveand

landdoesnotneedtobeharvested.Therefore,thehigherthefertilityrateofaregion,theless

developedtheregionis.

BrideAge:

UsingBrideAgeasavariableonTurkey’sdevelopmentindexisusefulindeterminingthe

levelofmodernizationthatacertainsocietyhasreached.Theyoungertheaveragebrideage

foraprovince, themoretraditional,conservative,andusually Islamic thepeople living in the

specificregionare.Youngbridesarewomenwhonormallydonothaveachoiceofwhothey

aremarryinganddonotreceivehighlevelsofeducation,whichreflectunder-developmentin

theregionswheretheaveragebrideageislow.

DivorceRate:

Aregion’saveragedivorcerateisaninformativewaytoanalyzewomen’srightsinthe

area.Thehighertheaveragedivorcerateis,themoresaywomenhaveintheirmarriageand

the more choice they have to stay in it or not. Higher divorce rates show high levels of

development.

BridePrice:

Thesimplepresenceofthisvariablewithinadevelopment indexexhibitsatraditional,

conservativesociety,thatlooksatwomenasobjectstobesoldandbought.Thisvariablegives

thereaderperspectiveintothedailylives,cultural,andsocialnormsofconservativeTurkey.

10

ReligiousWeddings:

While religious weddings take place regularly in states that are considered highly

developed,thehigherthepercentageofreligiousweddingstonon-religiousweddingsaregion

has,themore likely it istobe lessdeveloped. Thisvariableshowsthattraditionalvaluesare

stillimportanttothecitizensoftheareabeinganalyzed.

MarriagetoCloseRelatives:

Ahighpercentageofthisvariablepresentinaregion’sdevelopmentindexshowsavery

traditional and under-developed society. Marriage to family happens in very conservative

areas,usuallylocatedinCentralandEastAnatolia.

Belowisamapofthedevelopment levelsforeachregion. Afterfindingregionaldata

foralloftheabovevariables,Iusedanequationtomakeeachstataz-score,sotheywouldall

havethesamelevelsofmeasurement. Then,Iaddedallthez-scoresforeachvariableupfor

eachprovincetocreateadevelopmentscore.Thisscorewasthenmapped.Onecanseeavery

clear relationship in Figure 3 between development and geography, with Western Turkey

scoringhigherandthescoresgettinglowerasyoumoveEast.

Figure3:

2.58

4.37

0.67

4.61

-0.95 -4.43

-4.67

-4.673.29

1.91

3.39

3.39 6.15 6.15

6.15

Aegean

Mediterranean

Central AnatoliaWest Anatolia

West Black Sea

Southeast Anatolia

Centraleast Anatolia

East Marmara

Northeast Anatolia

East Black Sea

West Marmara

West Marmara

IstanbulIstanbul

¯Levels of Development in NUTS RegionsLegendDevelopment Index Total:

-4.670000 - -2.000000

-1.999999 - 0.670000

0.670001 - 2.000000

2.000001 - 4.000000

4.000001 - 6.150000

11

PoliticalPartiesinTurkey:

Turkish political parties are unlike the typical left/right division found in the United

States and around the world. The parties are much more closely associated with cultural

divisionswithintheTurkishpopulation,andtheyfighttorepresentthevalues,religion,rights,

andwantsof thecultural group that supports them. This isevident in theCHPparty,which

supportsaseculargovernmentthatbenefitstheWestern,urbanTurks.Theseculturaldivisions

areclearlygeographic,andCHPpartysupportisgeographicallyconcentratedintheirpredicted

baseofsupport,theWest(seeFigure1above.)

The nature of Turkish party politics has changed very little since the creation of the

TurkishRepublic in1923. Asmentionedabove,politicalparties represent cultural cleavages.

Cultural cleavages include: secular / Islamic, gender equality / gender inequality, and

Westernizing/traditional.ThesecleavageshavebeenpresentinTurkishpartypoliticssincethe

formation of the Republic, stemming from the Young Turkmovement and the rapid, forced

Westernizationofthenewcountry.

TheYoungTurks,agroupformedin1889intheOttomanEmpire,werethefirstgroupof

people to call for a Westernized, nationalistic, and industrialized empire. They heavily

disagreed with Sultan Abdulhamid II, an authoritarian leader who ran the empire through

policiesofextremecensorship,Islamicvaluesandrelationships,andusedasecretpoliceforce

toscareOttomansintofollowinghisrules.TheYoungTurksbegantoplotarevolution,andin

1908startedanempire-widerebellionandforcedtheempiretoreinstatetheconstitutionand

call Parliament back to session. Then, in 1913, the Young Turks gained control of Ottoman

12

politics,eventuallyleadingtothedissolutionoftheOttomanEmpireafteritsweakeninginthe

wakeofdefeatinWorldWarI,andthecreationofasecularTurkishRepublic.

MustafaKemal,aYoungTurkandgeneral in theTurkisharmy,carriedout theYoung

Turks’goalsforaTurkishRepublic,andin1919startedarebellionagainstWesterncontrolof

Turkey after their World War I loss. After numerous victories, Mustafa Kemal created a

provincialgovernmentinAnkaraandformedtheRepublicofTurkeyayearafterin1923.Asa

YoungTurk,MustafaKemal,latercalledAtaturk(“FatherofTurks”),wantedasecular,Western,

andmodernRepublic. HerapidlyWesternizedTurkeybyemancipatingwomen,abolishingall

Islamicinstitutions,andforcingWesterncodes,dress,education,andcalendar.Healsocalled

foranewTurkishlanguage,onethatusedtheLatinalphabetandlessArabicandPersianwords.

Because Ataturkwas a general in the army, the army became the enforcers of his Kemalist

policies. The relationship between the army and Kemalism is still alive today, as historically

theyhavedeposedleadersandpartiesthattheyregardedasunsecularorAnti-Kemalist.

While Ataturk was in control of Turkish politics, many parties were shut down and

censored.Ataturkwantedtoensurethathismodernizationmissionwouldsucceedandrefused

to letanyotherparty impedeit. FromthispartycensorshipgrewtheAnti-Kemalismpolitical

movement. This movement has lasted since the formation of the Republic, because not

everyonebenefittedfromTurkey’sintenseWesternization.Today’smodernpartiesareperfect

examplesofthesocialcleavageslongaffectingTurkey’spoliticalparties.

SinceTurkeyhasbeenademocraticcountry,theCHPandtheTurkisharmyhavealways

represented the liberal, secular, wing of party politics, carrying on Ataturk’s legacies and

13

Kemalistpolicies.Thisisobviousfromthetablebelow,whichshowsasteadyrepresentationof

Kemalist political attitudes by the CHP, often referred to as the party of Ataturk. The Anti-

Kemalistparties,ontheotherhand,areconsistentlychangingthroughoutTurkishpartypolitics

history.ThisisduetorepeatedinterventionsfromtheTurkisharmy(aKemalistideal-enforcing

agency)andthenforcedrebirthtoamoremoderatevoice.

Table1:PoliticalPartyHistoryinTurkey

PERIOD MODERNIZING CONSERVATIVE

1940s CHP DP,MP

1990s CHP,HADEP RP,DP

POST-2000 CHP,HDP AKP

Today’sKemalistandAnti-Kemalistpartiesarealsostartingtodividealongthelinesof

economic interventionby thegovernment. TheKemalistparty (CHP) supportsa strongstate

role in the economy because their supporters are entrepreneurs and businessmen running

alreadyhighlyindustrializedcompanieswhohavebenefittedfromgovernmentinterventionin

thepast.TheAnti-Kemalistparty(AKP)are,ofcourse,ontheoppositeside.Theysupportthe

relaxationofstatecontroloftheeconomy.BecausemanyoftheIslamicCalvinistslivinginthe

Anatolian Tiger provinces support the Anti-Kemalist party, provinces which are not yet fully

industrialized,theysupportderegulationtoincreaseeconomicefficiencyandsuccess.

14

The Kemalist and Anti-Kemalist parties are not the only parties in Turkey. There are

cleavagesother than thatbetween themore secular andWesternizedand themore Islamic,

traditional and patriarchal that affect the party system. The Kurds, an ethnic group in

Southeastern Anatolian Turkey, have been fighting and negotiating for autonomy and

independencefromTurkey,Syria,IraqandIran,thefourcountriesthatholdthemajorityofthe

world’s Kurds. To attempt to gain a political voice, the Kurds have consistently been

representedbyKurdishpoliticalparties.Historically,theyhavenotsucceededingettingmany

votesoutsideoftheKurdishregionandtheyhavebeenconsistentlyshutdownbythearmyand

government. But, they add a new cleavage to Turkish party politics. Instead of the typical

Turkishsecularvs. Islamiccleavage,theKurdsaddanationalvs.separatistdivision. Totryto

gain national support from their Turkish counterparts, they also support other causes; like

HADEP’ssupportforgreenindustrializationandenvironmentalprotectionandHDP’ssupportof

increased equality for women. For these reasons, HADEP and HDP are placed in the

Modernizing column of the above table. For the first time, a Kurdish party, the HDP, won

enough votes in both the June and November 2015 elections to have representation in

Parliament, amajor victory for theKurdish separatistmovementandablow fornationalistic

Turks. These party political differences do indeed relate to Turkey’s geography of uneven

development,aswewillnowsee.

15

Turkey’sContemporaryElectoralGeography:

InTurkishpoliticstoday,thereare4partiesthatreceivevotesacrossthecountry.The

AKP,aconservative,mildlyIslamistparty,isthemainpartyandhasbeensinceits2002debut

onthenationalpoliticalstage.Theyhavehadmajorpoliticalvictoriesandusuallygainsucha

largemajority that they have the ability to change the constitution alone. Next, the CHP, a

secularandliberalpartyisthemainoppositionandhavenotwonamajorvictorysincetheAKP

gainednationalsupport. TheMHP,anationalistic, fundamentallyconservativeparty,andthe

HDP, a Kurdish nationalist party, pick up the remainder of the votes and because of their

relativelysmallsupportbaseandpercentagesofvotesgained,theywillonlybebrieflyincluded

in this analysis. Per usual, the majority of these Turkish parties have a specific geographic

supportbase.TheCHPgainsmostoftheirvotesfromtheWesterncitiesofTurkey,theMHPin

Central SouthAnatolia, and theHDPdominates in theKurdish regionsofEastandSoutheast

Anatolia.

TheAKP,though,istheoutlierfromthetraditionalelectoralgeographyofTurkey.Ithas

alargesupportbaseacrossthecountry,evenintheareaswheretheotherthreepartieshave

strongholds.Aslistedaboveinothersections,thisisbecauseofthepresenceoftheAnatolian

TigerprovincesandtheIslamicCalviniststhattheseprovincesproduceandmigrantsfromrural

TurkeywhomovetotheWesterncitiesandbringtheirtraditionalvalueswiththem.

16

Figure4:AKP%vs.CHP%

Overall,theAKPpartydoesremarkablywellineveryregionofTurkeycomparedtothe

CHP.Noticethenumbersoneachaxis,bothxandy,ontheabovegraph.Onecanseethatthe

CHPaxisstartsat10%andstopsat50%,eventhoughnoneoftheregionsactuallyreachthat

highofapercentageinsupport. TheAKP,onthexaxis,showsamuchdifferentstory. Their

axisstartsat30%,witheveryregionsupportingtheAKPwithat least35%oftheirvotes,and

ends at 60%. Even the HDP’s support is evident on this graph. The group of three at the

17

bottom left corner of the graph (Southeast, Northeast, and Central East Anatolia) are the

strongholdsofHDP support, andwhile they still give theAKPa largepercentageof support,

theycomplicatethepartypoliticsofTurkey.

HDPSupportinSoutheasternAnatolia:

Asstatedabove,theHDPistheethnicKurdishparty,andafterhavingpassedthe10%

thresholdtogainseats inTurkey’sparliament,hasagrowingpoliticalvoiceandpower inthe

country. In the Southeast Anatolian, Northeast Anatolia, and Central East Anatolia regions,

Kurdish party support is extremely high due to the high percentage of ethnic Kurds. These

regionsalsoscorethelowestonthedevelopmentindexandiftheyweretovotefortheAKPin

largenumbers,thenastrongerrelationshipbetweenAKPsupportanddevelopmentwouldbe

apparent.ButhowcanoneassumethatAKPsupportintheKurdishregionswouldgrowifthe

HDPdidnotexist? Thereareanumberof reasons. First,Kurdsareconservative, traditional

Muslims, and many of their Islamic values are present in the AKP’s platform. Second, by

comparingCHPandAKPsupportintheKurdishregionsinTurkey’s2015elections,theAKPstill

managestoget30%morevotesthantheCHPdoes.Therefore,onecanassumethatiftheHDP

did not exist, the AKP’s vote percentage in the Kurdish regions would rise, and thereby

strengtheningtherelationshipbetweentheAKPanddevelopment.

Inordertotestthesestatementstobetrue,weplottedthedevelopmentindexesforall

twelve of theNUTS regions of Turkey andparty support. Below are three graphs exhibiting

partysupportandlevelsofdevelopmentfortheCHP,theAKP,andtheAKP+theHDP,thetwo

18

conservative parties of 2015 Turkish politics. Combining the vote percentage for the two

partiesinoneanalysisthenprovidesalookattheconservativeTurkishpartyvoteandsupport

baseandthelevelofdevelopmentfortheregionsthatvotedconservatively,eitherAKPorHDP,

intheNovember2015elections.

Figure5:

Figure6:

CORRELATION:0.905

2.5

7.7

37

1.7

5.5

11.2

48.2

4

50.6

4

5.5

1.613.4 13.4

13.4

Aegean

Mediterranean

Central AnatoliaWest Anatolia

West Black Sea

Southeast Anatolia

Centraleast Anatolia

Northeast Anatolia

East Marmara East Black Sea

West Marmara

West MarmaraIstanbul

Istanbul

¯Percentage of Votes for HDP in NUTS RegionsLegendPercent Votes HDP

1.600000 - 10.000000

10.000001 - 19.000000

19.000001 - 29.000000

29.000001 - 39.000000

39.000001 - 50.600000

19

Theabovegraphexhibitsthealmostperfectrelationshipbetweenlevelofdevelopment

of a region (determined by using the development index) and CHP party support. As CHP

supportgrowshigher, the levelofdevelopmentdoesaswell. Thegraphsupports theclaims

made earlier in the section, that the CHP has a very geographical support base ofWestern,

urbanTurks.

Figure7:

CORRELATION:0.206

The graph above is evidence for the claimmade that the AKP’s support base is not

geographically concentrated and is strong across the various regions. The AKP has a strong

supportwith regions of varying development levels and, as pictured, does not receive lower

than 30% of the vote in any region of Turkey. The AKP is extremely successful in gaining

20

supportacrossthecountry,yetbecauseof thepresenceofKurdishseparatistparties likethe

HDP, they lose in the lessdeveloped regions. This leads to a lackof a relationshipbetween

underdevelopmentandAKPsupport.

Figure8:

CORRELATION:-0.880

Theabovegraphgivesoneaviewofthetotalconservativevote inTurkey,andhowit

correlates to levelsof development in theNUTS regions. As seen from thegraph, themore

conservativesupportaregionhas,thelessdevelopeditisonthedevelopmentindex.Thisalso

proves thepredictionofunevendevelopment, and that Turkishdevelopment is geographical

andrelevanttoconservativepartysupport.

21

III.TheAnatolianTigerPhenomenon

ThepurposeofthisthesisistoexplainwhytheAKPissuccessfulacrossdifferentregions

ofTurkey.IntheregionsofCentralTurkey,AnatolianTigerprovincesprovidelargepercentages

ofsupportfortheAKP,asnotedinvotingstatistics.Othershavenotedaconnectionbetween

theAKPandtheTigers,butthissectionaimstoexplainwhythisconnectionoccurs.

AnAnatolianTiger,contrarytoitsname,isnotaTurkishmemberofthebigcatfamily.

Instead, an Anatolian Tiger is the name for any of the rapidly industrializing Central Turkish

citiesandregions.Accordingtoonesite’sdefinition,thetermalsoreferstolargenumbersof

entrepreneurs and a growing middle class in these newly industrializing regions

(Investopedia.com).TheirorigingoesbacktoTurkey’s1980’spolicychangestowardeconomic

liberalization. This created a space for investment and growth in regions that were still

dominatedbyanagrarianwayoflife.Sincethesechangesineconomicpolicy,someofTurkey’s

CentralAnatolian regionsare industrializing, theeconomyandmiddle class are growing, and

urbanization isexpanding. Thepopulationsof theTigerprovincesarealsoquicklygrowing,a

consequence of the industrialization and urbanization that they are experiencing. This

populationincreaseisobviousinTable2,locatedbelow.Thistableanalyzespopulationsofthe

capital cities of the Tigers in 1990 and 2014 and then calculates the percent increase. This

reflectsthegrowthexperienced intheTigers,asonecanseethattheprovincetoexperience

the lowest percent increase of growth still grew by 48.46%. One can also see that the

populationgrowthoftheTigers’capitalcitieshelpedincreasetheurbanpopulationofTurkey

as awhole. Thebusinesses thathave succeeded in the Tigerprovinces since the1980’s are

being run by a new class of Muslim entrepreneurs called the “Islamic Calvinists”. These

22

businessmenassist in the industrializationof theTigerprovincesandcontinuetheuseof the

Islamicvaluesintheirbusinessesandcommunities.Theycontributetheireconomicsuccessto

these Islamicvalues, thereforetakinganameaplayedoffofProtestantCalvinismof the18th

century. Buttheyalsoexpressanon-secularbusinesspracticethatWesternTurksandother

countrieshavenot seen fromTurkey; somethingcontrary to theWestern ideaof thesecular

businessperson.

Table2:TigerCapitalCities’PopulationIncreasesfrom1990-2014

AnatolianTigers: CapitalCities: Population1990: Population2014: PopulationIncrease:Denizli Denizli 203,741 557,300 173.53%Gaziantep Gaziantep 603,434 1,510,270 150.28%Kayseri Kayseri 425,776 904,699 112.48%Balikesir Balikesir 170,011 272,569 60.32%Konya Konya 513,346 1,174,536 128.80%K.Maras Kahraman 228,129 475,793 108.56%Ordu Ordu 102,107 154,895 51.70%Samsun Samsun 304,176 541,330 77.97%Çorum Corum 116,810 243,698 108.63%Trabzon Trabzon 161,886 240,333 48.46%Kütahya Kutahya 130,944 232,123 77.27%Nigde Nigde 55,035 127,980 132.54%Adiyaman Adiyaman 100,045 230,630 130.53%Afyon Afyon 95,643 209,406 118.95%Çankiri Cankiri 45,496 76,490 68.12%Giresun Giresun 67,604 105,748 56.42%Isparta Isparta 112,117 207,266 84.87%Karaman Karaman 76,525 148,362 93.87%Kocaeli Izmit 190,741 310,973 63.03%Malatya Malatya 270,412 438,000 61.98%TurkeyTotal Ankara 59%Urban 73%Urban 23.72%

23

Table3:AKPvs.CHPSupportintheAnatolianTigerProvinces

AnatolianTigers %AKP %CHP RatioCHPtoAKP

Denizli 39.78 34.76 87.38%

Gaziantep 47.03 16.37 34.81%

Kayseri 52.35 12.54 23.95%

Balikesir 39.12 33.67 86.07%

Konya 65.09 9.91 15.22%

K.Maras 60.76 8.72 14.35%

Ordu 52.92 28.21 53.31%

Samsun 52.86 22.99 43.49%

Çorum 54.28 22.28 41.05%

Trabzon 55.29 17.01 30.76%

Kütahya 54.49 12.01 22.04%

Nigde 47.9 21.29 44.45%

Adiyaman 58 11.49 19.81%

Afyon 52.3 16.75 32.03%

Çankiri 59.2 6.9 11.65%

Giresun 53.46 21.91 40.98%

Isparta 44.24 22.15 50.07%

Karaman 55.4 15.55 28.07%

Kocaeli 46.38 24.24 52.26%

Malatya 58.42 16.61 28.43%

TheTigerstendtohavehighAKPvotingpercentages,especiallyrelativetotheCHP.Why

doesthisconnectionoccur? TherearetwopossiblereasonsforAKPpopularity intheTigers.

First,rapideconomicgrowthintheseprovinceshasbeenassociatedwithaperiodofAKPrule

and the Tigers’ see AKP policies as beneficial to their success. Second is an Islamic form of

24

integrationofthepeoplemovingfromthecountrysidetotheTigersthathasbeenpromotedby

theIslamicCalvinists. ThisisreferredtohereasIslamicurbanization.Whilethisnewtypeof

urbanizationhasbenefitted the IslamicCalvinists in theirpromotionof Islamicvalues in their

communitiesandbusinesses,italsoassiststheAKP,asitisseenasamildlyIslamistparty.As

seen in Table 3 above, the Tigers’ averageAKP vote percentage is also higher than Turkey’s

entire average, suggesting that the AKP and the Tigers have a strong connection. The CHP,

though,isclearlylackingthisconnection.In8ofthe19provinceslistedinthetablebelow,the

ratioofCHPpercentagetoAKPpercentageislessthan30%:alargedifferencebetweenthetwo

parties,therefore.ThisagainexhibitsthesignificanceoftheAKP/Tigerconnection

WhentheTurkishRepublicwasfoundedin1923,astateruneconomyandstrictcontrol

overtheprivatesectorwereusedtoinducethedevelopmentofinfrastructureandtopromote

economicprosperity.Thesedidnotsucceedasplanned,though.Thingsstartedtochangewith

Democratic Party rule in the early 1950’s: agricultural development was emphasized, taxes

lowered,andmajorroadandotherinfrastructureprojectswereimplemented.Theagriculture

taxdecreaseallowedfarmerstospendmoremoneyandmechanizetheirfarmingtechniques,

while newly constructed roadways connected villages and cities spurred growth that

unindustrialized areas had not yet seen. Import-substitution policies were implemented to

assist with development and protect new businesses and industries against foreign

competition. But when private investment did not increase as the party had hoped, and

inflationincreasedduetogrowthinthemoneysupply,theTurkisheconomysufferedandthe

DemocraticParty lostcontrolaftera1960militarycoup. TheTurkisheconomythensuffered

throughout the1960s-70sdue to the failureof the import-substitutionprogram to speedup

25

development across the country, until complete economic liberalization and

internationalization were implemented in the 1980s. Small-scale Anatolian businesses may

have been the biggest beneficiaries from the emphasis of these internationalization and

liberalization policies on the export of manufactured goods. The cities that would become

known as the Anatolian Tigers were particularly advantaged: “dynamic, highly computerized

andnewlyequipped…”withflexibleproductionpatternstomeetdemand(Karakaya).

TheAKPhasembracedtheseeconomicpolicies,andaccordinglyassistedinopeningup

foreignmarkets forTurkishbusiness; the same internationalization that the IslamicCalvinists

areinfavorofandseeascrucialforthecontinuedgrowthoftheTigers.TheAKP’ssupportfor

Turkish membership in the European Union exhibits their commitment to the

internationalization of the Tigers’ markets, since membership would eliminate the barriers

whichcurrentlylimitentryofTurkishproductsintotheEU.

Theseeconomicpolicypositions, though,deepenthedividebetweentheAKPandthe

CHP. This division has its origins in the Kemalist development and Westernization policies

institutedaftertheformationoftheTurkishRepublic.ThesepoliciesforcedaWesternization,

secularization and modernization of Turkey’s citizens, which the city residents tended to

supportandthemoretraditionalAnatolianresidentsstruggledtoimplement.TheCHP,known

asaKemalistparty,carrieswith it theconsequencesof theKemalistpolicies implementedat

theRepublic’sformation.ThisdividestheAKP,supportedinlargepartbythemoretraditional

AnatolianTurks,fromtheCHP,thepartyknowntohavecomplicatedtheirlivelihoods.TheCHP

has also had difficulties gaining popularity in the Tigers due to their support of economic

policies that benefit Western cities. These cities, already industrialized and economically

26

prosperoussupportindustryprotectionistpolicies.Becausetheirgoodsandservicesaremainly

produced for Turkey’sdomesticmarket and tourism industries, theyalsodonot support the

sameinternationalizationpoliciesandEUintegrationthattheAKPandtheTigersdo.TheCHP

didnotadapttheireconomicpoliciestosupportthebusinesswantsofthenewlyrisenIslamic

Calvinists,who are not in favor of and do not benefit fromprotectionist policies. The CHP

followedthisstrategybecausetheydidnotwanttolosetheirWesternurbansupport.

AKPsupportforfreetradehasbeenathreattotheindustriesofWesternTurkeyaswell.

These free trade agreements with other countries require quid pro quos which open up

Turkey’smarket to foreign competition. Theolder, longer established industries ofWestern

Turkeystandtobehurtbythisbecauseoftheirmarkets’historicalrootsinTurkeyitself.These

industriesdonotwantcheaperproductsfromothercountriesundercuttingtheirprices.Now,

theAKPandCHParedividedbybothasecular/Islamistcleavage,andaneconomicone.

This economic divide is apparent in the structure of business associations in Turkey.

Therearetwomainbusinessassociations,TUSIADandMUSIAD.TUSIAD(TurkishIndustryand

BusinessAssociation) supports theirmembers, themajorityofwhomare located inWestern

Turkish cities, by fighting for theprotectionist economicpolicies thatWestern industries and

companiesbenefitfrom.TheyalsoclaimtoberepresentativesofTurkey’ssecularelite.These

policies, though, do not support the rising Anatolian Tigers and the values or wants of the

IslamicCalvinists,andTUSIADdidnotadaptthemselvestoincludetheAnatolianbusinesses.In

responsetotheirexclusion,theIslamicCalvinistsandotherAnatolianbusinessmenformedthe

IndependentIndustrialistsandBusinessmenAssociation,MUSIAD.Whileit isnotinherentlya

religious organization, MUSIAD is commonly referred to as the Muslim Industrialists and

27

BusinessmenAssociation,duetothereligiouspreferencesandbusinesspracticesofmanyofits

members. MUSIAD gives the previously excludedAnatolian businessmen a voice in Turkey’s

economicandlaborpolicies.

The AKP have been prominent supporters of MUSIAD since its formation in 1990.

Because theAKPandMUSIADsupporteconomic liberalizationand Islamicbusinesspractices,

MUSIAD’s formation gave the AKP another platform for political success. While TUSIAD

businesses are largely supporters of the CHP, the AKP gives MUSIAD members a way to

counteract TUSIAD’s influence on national economic policy. The AKP and TUSIAD have also

gotten into public disputes, like in January 2014. In a speech to TUSIAD’s 44th General

Assembly,theChairmancommentedthatduetoTurkey’srecentstrayfromtheruleoflawand

useoftaxpenaltiestopressurecompaniestosupportcertainpolicies,foreigninvestmentwill

decreaseandTurkeywilllosemoney.Erdogan,PresidentofTurkeyandtheleaderoftheAKP,

reacted to this statement by accusing the Chairman of treason and said “From now on, we

won’tassistyou,butwillimpedeyou”(Gursel).Table3belowshowsthepercentageofTUSIAD

and MUSIAD members in provinces around Turkey. This is an important table, because it

portraysagreaterdiversityofMUSIADmembersfromarangeofprovincesinallregionsofthe

country. It also gives the ratio of MUSIAD members in a province to TUSIAD members,

reflectingdifferences inbusinesspracticesandparty supportbased inprovinces. Where the

ratio isabove1,TUSIADmembership isgreater thanMUSIAD. Below1 is theopposite. The

provinceswitharatioabove1arelargelylocatedinWesternTurkey,includingAdana,Eskisehir,

Izmir,Ankara, and,mostof all, Istanbul. Mostof TUSIAD’smembersare located in Istanbul,

Turkey’smain industrialcenter,but there isstilla largeMUSIADrepresentation inthecityas

28

well. Thissuggests that thereare industriesandbusinesses in Istanbul thatbenefit fromthe

AKP’s economic policies. Judging from the ratios below 1, MUSIAD support is higher than

TUSIADinCentralAnatolianprovinces,includingtheTigers.

Table4:TUSIADvs.MUSIADinTurkishProvinces

Province: %TUSIADMembers %MUSIADMembers TUSIAD/MUSIAD

Adana 2.95 1.63 1.81

Ankara 5.07 10.19 0.49

Antalya 0.42 0

Balikesir 0 4.83

Bilecek 0.63 0

Bolu 0 0.06

Burdur 0 0.06

Bursa 1.06 5.77 0.18

Çankiri 0 1.63

Çorum 0 0.99

Denizli 0 4.37

Erzurum 0 0.06

Eskisehir 1.06 0.06 17.67

Gaziantep 0 3.55

Isparta 0 0.06

Hatay 0 0.12

Istanbul 68.29 28.42 2.40

Izmir 12.9 6.64 1.94

K.Maras 0 3.15

Karaman 0 0.35

Kayseri 0 6.52

Kirklareli 0.42 0

29

Kocaeli 0.85 5.18 0.16

Konya 3.59 8.91 0.40

Malatya 0 2.04

Manisa 1.27 1.46 0.87

Sakarya 0.21 0

Samsun 0 1.28

Sanliurfa 0 0.93

Sinop 0.21 0

Tekirdag 0.21 0.12 1.75

Tokat 0 0.06

Yozgat 0 0.12

Zonguldak 0 1.46

There isneverthelesssomegeographicdifference inTUSIADandMUSIADsupportdue

totheirassociationwithcertaintypesofbusinesses.TUSIAD,whosemembersaremainlylong

establishedWesternTurkishbusinessesthatfollowthesecularbusinesspolicies,hasmembers

mainly located in themajor Turkish cities of Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, and some in other

Western Turkish provinces. MUSIAD, on the other hand, has a more diverse membership,

rangingfrombusinessesisWesternTurkeytotheTigerprovinces.Belowyouwillfindtwo

maps of TUSIAD and MUSIAD membership in provinces across Turkey, and which of the

provinces in both maps are Tiger provinces. These maps also are evidence of MUSIAD’s

relationship with the Tiger provinces, if a somewhat nuanced relationship, and reflect the

economicdividebetweentheAKPandCHP.

30

In conclusion, Table5belowdivides theAKPandCHPby their economicpolicy,main

supportbase,andbusinessassociationconnection.TheAKPissopopularinCentralTurkeyand

theTigerprovincesbecauseoftheireconomicpolicies,andthereforeisalsosupportedbythe

Tigers’businessassociation,MUSIAD.

Figure9:

Figure10:

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

3.59

0

0

00

0

0

0

5.07

0

0.420

2.95

1.06

1.27

12.9

0.21

0.42 0.21

0.210.85

68.29 68.29

68.29

**

*

*

*

*

*

**

**

*

Percentage of TUSIAD Member Companies

±

Legend%TUSIAD Members

0.000000 - 0.420000

0.420001 - 1.270000

1.270001 - 5.070000

5.070001 - 12.900000

12.900001 - 68.290000

* = Anatolian Tiger Province

0

8.91

0

0.06

0

10.19

0.931.63

6.52

0

4.83

3.15

0.120.06

1.46

0.99

6.642.04

0.06

4.37

1.28

0.061.63

0.35

0.06

3.55

0.12

0.06

0.12

5.1828.42 28.42

28.42

**

*

*

*

**

*

**

*

*

Percentage of MUSIAD Member Companies

±

* = Anatolian Tiger Province

Legend

%MUSIAD Members0.000000 - 0.350000

0.350001 - 2.040000

2.040001 - 5.180000

5.180001 - 10.190000

10.190001 - 28.420000

31

Table5:EconomicPolicyandPartySupportinTurkey

IslamicUrbanization:

TheIslamicCalvinists,though,arenottheonlyreasonthatAKPsupportissohighinthe

Anatolian Tiger provinces. There are noticeable trends that are important to discuss when

acknowledging the high percentages of votes for the AKP in these provinces. First, living

standardshaveincreasedrapidly intheAnatolianTigersasaresultoftheireconomicgrowth.

These living standardupgradeshave takenplaceduring theAKP’s tenure,potentially leading

these Turks to vote with their pocket-books and follow the “why fix what isn’t broken?”

mindset.Second,rapideconomicgrowthhasledtorapidurbanizationofAnatolianTigercities.

This urbanization has created higher levels of in-migration to the cities on the part of Turks

living in less urbanized and developed towns and regions. Thesemigrants are, on average,

morereligiousandtraditional,andthereforewouldbemorelikelytovoteforanIslamistparty.

Third, the Islamic practices of imece and himaye help spread AKP support throughout their

employeesandcommunitymembers.Imecereferstothe“collaborationandsupportwithina

socialgroup,originallythevillagecommunity”whilehimayeis“averticalprincipleofprotection

by and loyalty to the family, the religious group or brotherhood, or the region of origin”

AKP CHP

Economicpolicy Freetrade Protectionist

Heartlandofsupport CentralTurkey WesternTurkey

Majorbusinessassociation MUSIAD TUSIAD

32

(Joppien). These values are practiced for a sense of comradery between Muslims in a

communityorworkplace.EmployersinIslamicCalvinistbusinessesregularlytakeonapaternal

role towards their employees, and through these roles, they spread traditional values and,

therefore,makethemassesmoresympathetictotheAKP’sIslamistcause.Brotherhoodisnot

theonly goal of imece andhimaye, though. They are also used to preempt labor unrest by

creatingasenseofdependencyandfriendship.

III.ThePoliticsofDifference

Inanysociety,peoplecarrywiththemunderstandingsofhowtheirsocietyisstructured.

Oftenthereisadominantviewthatpeopleincorporate,aviewwhichgivesaprivilegedposition

tosomeinrespecttoothers.Anexampleofthisisgender.Menareconsideredthedominant

gender:theyareconsideredasstronger,smarter,andthemajorbreadwinners,leavingwomen

to be the weaker, more emotionally driven of the two genders and who exist primarily as

homemakers–andshould! Theseunderstandingshavebeenconstructedovertime,often in

such a way as to work to the advantage of those who have been able to prevail in their

construction. These privileges then get normalized and so perpetuate advantage and

disadvantagebetweengroups.

This cangeneratewhat is calledapoliticsofdifference.This isusuallyexperienced in

twomovements. Thefirstmovementisthecreationofthe“other”. Here,agroupinpower,

usuallywithbetter educationandmoney,defines a groupofpeople in anegativeway. The

“other”isconsideredtobe,forexample,lacking,uneducatedandbackward.Thisdefinitionis

33

usedasajustificationoftheprivilegethatonegroupexperiencesoverthe“other”.Members

ofthisprivilegedgroupattributestheirsuccessto,forexample,theirhardwork,andclaimsthat

if the “other” had worked as hard, they too would be successful. Social constraints and

discriminations are not taken into account in explaining the economic and social disparities

between the two groups; rather some fundamental ‘difference’ attributable to personal

shortcomings,likerace,isusedtojustifythatdiscrimination.

Thesecondmovementinthepoliticsofdifferenceistheempowermentofthe“other”.

Inthismovement,the“other”stigmatizedgroupdefinesanewidentityforitselfandusesthe

traitsandvaluesthattheprivilegedgroupstereotypedthemforasawaytopromptprideanda

creationofanew,counter identity. This identity isbasedona redefinitionofwho theyare,

denyingtheclaimsof theprivilegedgroupabout them. Theyprovideadifferentexplanation

forwhytheyarenottheprivilegedgroupthemselves,placingtheblameontheexploitiveand

discriminatory actions of the privileged. The stigmatized group demonstrates their own

worthiness in terms of their past and present contributions to society: artists, businessmen,

politicians,etc.

Turkey’smodern day politics of difference stemsoriginally from the formation of the

TurkishRepublic in 1923. The Young Turks, a groupof young, nationalist, liberal, secularists

stagedarevolutionagainsttheOttomanEmpireafteritsdefeatinWorldWarI.Theyformeda

newgovernmentandeventuallybannedtheOttomancaliphate. Thisbanningalso ledtothe

dissolutionofmanyIslamicinstitutionsinTurkey,fromschoolstolawcourts.Thenew,secular

government,runbyageneralnamedMustafaKemal,alsobannedIslamicdressinpublicplaces,

created a new Turkish language with the Roman alphabet, and changed Turkey’s calendar

34

system to Gregorian. These were influential, rapid changes that had large effects on the

Turkishsociety.

AfterthebanningofmanyIslamicinstitutions,conservativeruralMuslimsacrossTurkey

wereforcedtoadapttothesecular,modernizingpolicies.Verysuddenly,theycouldnotspeak,

educate, or dress as they had previously been doing. They were stigmatized by the urban,

secularTurks for resisting thewesternizingchanges thatMustafaKemalenforcedwhile long-

termcity residents,on theotherhand,easilyadaptedtohispolicies. Thechangescreateda

differencebetweentwogroupsofpeople:conservativeruralMuslimsandurban,secularTurks.

The urban, secular Turkswere thereby placed at an advantage and justified this in terms of

Westernvirtuesthatotherslacked:enlightenment,rational,evencivilized.

The politics of difference creates twomovements. The first is stigmatization of one

groupbyanother,asshownabove.Thesecondisthestigmatizedgroup’scounter-movement.

This counter-movement was present in Turkish society through the formation of Islamic,

conservativepoliticalparties.BecauseMustafaKemalandtheYoungTurksbasedtheRepublic

onsecularpolicies,successiveIslamistpoliticalpartieswereoftenshutdownbythe(Kemalist)

military.ButtheAKPhasbeenapartoftheAnti-Kemalistcounter-movement,andbecauseof

itseconomicandpoliticalsuccess,hasnotbeenbanned.

35

Long-termResidentsvs.RuralmigrantsinWesternTurkishcities:

Thepoliticsofdifferenceandthecreationofthe“other”arewidelyapparentintheWestern,

industrializedcitiesofTurkey.Therearetwodistinctgroupsatplayinthesepolitics:thelong-

termresidentswhohave lived in thecities forgenerations,ormigrantswhoadaptedquicker

than the average rural migrant does; and then the rural migrants or the children of rural

migrants.Thereareafewwaysthatthesegroupsexperienceseparation,alltotheadvantage

of the urban Turks. The rural Turks are seen as uneducated, conservative, traditional, and

backwards by the long-term city residents, who thereby justify their economic and social

privilege.Theurbancontextexaggeratesthestereotypesthatthegroupsgivetoothersdueto

theirextremelyclosecontact.TheruralTurksseetheurbanTurksascut-throat,value-less,and

pretentiouscapitalists.Bothgroupswantadegreeofseparation,bothmaterialandsymbolic,

fromeachother,andthroughhousinglocations,joboptions,andpolitics,theyachieveit.

AnotherexpressionofthepoliticsofdifferenceinWesternTurkishcitiesisbetweenthe

WhiteTurksandBlackTurks.Thisdeepensthesenseofdifferencebetweentheruralmigrants

and long-term residents, and the AKP and CHP, in Western Turkish cities. While racist

connotationsare clearlypresent in thesenamechoices, and “BlackTurk” isused to createa

socialclassassociationforthepeoplewhoareawardedthelabel,bothareconsiderednegative

dependingonwhoisusingit. “WhiteTurks”areusuallyurbanpeoplewhoareconsideredby

theoppositegrouppretentiousandarrogant,while“BlackTurks”areruralTurksthoughttobe

uneducatedandunlawful.Because“WhiteTurks”arenormallythelong-termresidentsofthe

WesternTurkishcitiesandthe“BlackTurks”areAnatolianandruralmigrantTurks,theAKPand

36

CHPmake use of these racist stigmatizations tomobilize their constituencies. Recep Tayyip

Erdogan,thePresidentofTurkeyandaprominentleaderoftheAKP,recentlystated:

“According to them we don’t understand politics. According to them we don’t

understand art, theatre, cinema, poetry. According to them we don’t understand

aesthetics, architecture. According to them we are uneducated, ignorant, the lower

class,whohastobecontentwithwhatisbeinggiven,needy;meaning,weareagroup

ofnegroes”(Ogret).

ThisquoteexemplifiesthesignificanceofthedifferencesbetweentheruralandurbanTurksin

WesternTurkishcitiesandtheexistenceofacounter-movement,whereso-calledBlackTurks

arechallengingthedominantpoliticsofdifferenceinTurkeythathasbeenconstructedbythe

WhiteTurks.

HousingandneighborhoodlocationsareamajorwayinwhichtheruralandurbanTurks

areseparatedwithintheWesterncities.WhenmigrantsfirstmovetoWesterncities,theyhave

atendencytosettle inaneighborhoodwithothermigrants fromtheirowntown,villages,or

province of origin. This allows for a degree of comfort, assistance, and support for them

migrants after their move to a city, where a culture different than their own dominates.

Traditional values, cultures, and practices are still used in business and social interactions,

giving one a sense of home. These migrant neighborhoods, though, construct a barrier,

whetherpurposefulornot,between theirneighborhoodsand the restof thecity,where the

longtermurbanTurksarelocated.

37

The migrant communities addressed above are traditionally called Gecekondus,

meaning“builtatnight”. This isbecause,duetoa loophole inanoldTurkish law,buildinga

homeonaproperty thatwasnot thebuilder’sownwasonlydefinedas illegalwhile thesun

wasup.Afterdiscoveringthisloophole,newmigrantswouldmovetogovernment-ownedland,

buildtheirhouseovernight,andmoveinthenextmorningbeforethegovernmentcouldknock

itdown. Millionsofpeoplenowlive inGecekonduneighborhoods,whicharenotbuilt inthe

same way anymore, but are still associated with the negative connotations assigned to the

originalGecekondus.ThemigrantswholivedintheoriginalGecekondusettlementswerethose

whocouldnotaffordnormal,legalhousing,andtoday’sGecekonduresidentsarecontinuedto

bethoughtofasuneducated,poor,unlawful,andbackwardsbytheurbanTurks. Becauseof

thenegativeconnotationsattachedtoGecekondus,urbanTurksdonotcaretoassociatewith

the people living in them, leading to increased separation between themigrants and locals.

Manymigrants living in theGecekondus have reported feeling lesser and stigmatizedby the

urbanTurks for theirhousing location (Erman). TheGecekondu residentshavebroughtwith

them or adopted some of the traditional values and practices for business and social

interactions,creatingmoredifferencebetweenthemigrantsandurbanTurks.Theseindicators

suggest that housing location is a critical arena for the politics of difference between rural

migrants and urbanites in the cities of Western Turkey. Below is a picture of an Ankara

Gecekondu.Asonecansee,theGecekonducommunityisslum-like,consideredaneye-soreby

thelong-termcityresidents.

38

Figure11:AnkaraGecekondu(Smith)

Thedifferencescreatedthroughhousinglocationsandthesubsequentconsequencesof

separation between rural and urban Turks also reflects itself in Turkish politics. The CHP, a

liberal,secularTurkishpartyhashada largesupportbaseintheWesternTurkishcities. The

CHPalsosupportsapurelysecularandWesternizedTurkey,onethatchallengesthetraditional

views of the Anatolian Turks. The AKP, a conservative, mildly Islamist, economically liberal

party,providesapoliticalvoicetothesemigrantswhofeelnegativelyaffectedbyCHPpolicy.

Because thepopulationof ruralmigrants inWestern cities is growing, andbecoming a large

proportionofrespectiveurbanpopulations,theirpoliticalvoiceismakingahugedifferencein

politicsthere.TheCHP’ssupportisstillverystrongwiththeurbanTurks,butisbeingquickly

overshadowedbymigrantsupport fortheAKP. ThisgivestheAKPasupportbaseacrossthe

country.

39

Clientelismandthepoliciesofimeceandhimayealsoplayaroleinvotersupportinthe

WesternTurkishcities,wheretheAKPreachesouttomigrantcommunitiesandprovidesgoods

andservices. TheAKPhaspracticedclientelisminadifferentwaythanpastpartieshave,by

using the TOKI, Turkey’s Mass Housing Administration. TOKI builds government housing,

normallyoccupiedbylower-incomeTurks.TheAKPincreasedTOKI’spowerbyhavingitreport

straight to the Prime Minister and giving it a seat in the Turkish cabinet and decreasing

restrictionson itsoperations. TOKInowhasmorepower inpicking thecontractors, typesof

housingbeingbuilt,andwhere thehousing isbuilt. Themajorityofcontractorsselectedare

pro-AKPandAKPsupportersareusuallychosen first forconstruction jobs. NotonlydoTOKI

employees havemore decision-making power andAKP supporters havemore jobs, the local

municipalities that are chosen for TOKI housing projects have a stimulated economy. This

stimulatedeconomykeepsresidentshappywiththeAKPgovernment.

TheAKPalsoprovidesgoodsandservicesdirectly tomigrantcommunities inWestern

cities. Here, an AKP representative for themigrant community takes care of problems that

arise.ThemigrantsgettheideathattheAKPcaresaboutthem,andtakescareofthemlikethe

CHPdoesnot.Throughtheseactions,theAKPcreatesacommunityofloyal,trustingvoters.

Overall, theAKPprovidesacounter-identity forthemigrants living inWesternTurkish

cities.Afterbeingstigmatizedbythelong-termresidentsofthesemajorurbancenters,theAKP

allowsthemigrantstohavepoliticalvoicesandpower,andaffectchangeintheircommunity.

ThesemigrantsprovideamajorsupportbasefortheAKPinWesterncities,whereonewould

notoriginallyexpectAKPsupport tobesohigh. Thisalsoaffects theAKP’s relationshipwith

40

under-developedregions,becauseoftheWesternregions’highdevelopmentindexscores.The

migrantsinWesterncitiesareaveryimportantgroupofAKP’ssupportbase.

V.Conclusion

TheAKPruinseveryassumptionthatonewouldhaveabouttheusualpoliticalpartyin

Turkey. As a conservative, mildly-Islamist party, they manage to gain high levels of voter

supportinallprovincesandregionsofTurkeyandacrossalllevelsofdevelopment.Thisisnot

what one would expect would happen, considering the traditional cleavages of Turkey’s

politicalpartiesthattheCHPfollows. Thishappens,asseenabove,becauseoftheAnatolian

Tigers and Islamic Calvinists in Central Turkey, the politics of difference in Western Turkish

cities, and HDP support in Southeastern Anatolia that decreases the AKP’s relationship with

development.

Astimepassesthough,itseemsthatTurkey’spoliticalpartycleavagesarebeginningto

change. There are signs of a shift from secular / Islamic and developed / under developed

divisionstowardsoneofclass.Differencesinsocialclassarebecomingmuchmoresignificant,

leading leftwingparties tohavemoreofanappeal. The futureof theAKP,becauseof their

numerouscorruptionscandals, repressionof freedomsofpress,assembly,andspeech,anda

hintofashiftinpartycleavages,isunknown.AsTurkey’sglobalimportanceandinfluencerises,

theworldshouldbewatching.

41

WorksCited

Acemoglu,Daron,andJamesRobinson."ThePoliticalEconomyofTurkey."(2013):n.pag.Web.

Akarca,AliT.,andCemBaslevent."PersistenceinRegionalVotingPatternsinTurkeyduringa

PeriodofMajorRealignment."ResearchGate.Sage,2011.Web.19Jan.2016.

Akcagun,Pelin,NadirOcal,andJulideYildirim."ReconsideringtheRegionalEmployment

ConvergenceProbleminTurkey:SpatialPanelDataEstimationinAnSurFramework."

Diss.MiddleEastTechnicalU/TEDU,2013.Print.

Alkhateeb,Firas."HowAtatürkMadeTurkeySecular."LostIslamicHistory.LostIslamicHistory,

11June2013.Web.25Feb.2016.

"AnatolianTigersDefinition|Investopedia."Investopedia.Investopedia,LLC.,27Oct.2011.

Web.12Apr.2016.

Baker,JamesA.,III."HasHousingFueledtheAKP’sDurabilityinTurkishPolitics?"BakerInstitute

Blog.InstituteforPublicPolicy,30Oct.2015.Web.28Mar.2016.

Beinin,Joel.PoliticalIslamandtheNewGlobalEconomy:APoliticalEconomyoftheIslamist

SocialMovementsinEgyptandTurkey.Rep.JoelBeinin,Sept.2014.Web.25Jan.2016.

Buğra,Ayşe."Class,Culture,andState:AnAnalysisofInterestRepresentationbyTwoTurkish

BusinessAssociations."InternationalJournalofMiddleEastStudiesInt.J.MiddleEast

Stud.30.04(1998):521-39.JSTOR[JSTOR].Web.12Feb.2016.

42

Demirtaş,Neslihan,andSeherŞen."VaroşIdentity:TheRedefinitionofLowIncomeSettlements

inTurkey."MiddleEasternStudies43.1(2007):87-106.JSTOR[JSTOR].Web.04Feb.

2016.

Dogan,Tayyar."AnAssessmentoftheSocialandEconomicDeterminantsofProvincialVoting

BehaviorinTurkey."Thesis.GeorgetownUniversity,2012.Web.

"EconomicHistoryofTurkey."EconomicHistoryofTurkey.SanJoseStateUniversity

DepartmentofEconomics,n.d.Web.12Feb.2016.

Erder,Sema."WhereDoYouHailFrom?LocalismandNetworksinIstanbul."N.p.:n.p.,n.d.

161-71.Print.

Erman,Tahire."Becoming“Urban”orRemaining“Rural”:TheViewsofTurkishRural-to-Urban

Migrantsonthe“Integration”Question."InternationalJournalofMiddleEastStudies

Int.J.MiddleEastStud.30.04(1998):541-61.JSTOR[JSTOR].Web.21Jan.2016.

EuropeanStabilityInitiative.IslamicCalvinists:ChangeandConservatisminCentralAnatolia.

Rep.EuropeanStabilityInitiative,19Sept.2005.Web.20Jan.2016.

Ferguson,Michael."WhiteTurks,BlackTurks,andNegroes:ThePoliticsofPolarization."White

Turks,BlackTurks,andNegroes:ThePoliticsofPolarization.ArabStudiesInstitute,29

June2013.Web.02Feb.2016.

Gunes-Ayata,Ayse."MigrantsandNatives:UrbanBasesofSocialConflict."N.p.:n.p.,n.d.234-

43

47.Print.

Gursel,Kadri."ErdoganAccusesTUSIADChairmanofTreason-Al-Monitor:ThePulseofthe

MiddleEast."Al-Monitor.Al-Monitor,27Jan.2014.Web.12Apr.2016.

Joppien,Charlotte."AReinterpretationofTradition?-TheTurkishAKPandItsLocalPolitics."

Thesis.HamburgUniversity,2011.(n.d.):n.pag.Print.

Karakaya,Abbas."MelihaBenliAltunışıkandÖzlemTür,Turkey:ChallengesofContinuityand

Change.LondonandNewYork:Routledge,ContemporaryMiddleEasternSeries,2005,

139Pages."NewPerspectivesonTurkeyNewPerspect.Turk.33(2005):158-61.Web.

Keyder,Caglar."ATaleofTwoNeighborhoods."N.p.:n.p.,n.d.173-86.Print.

Keyder,Caglar."GlobalizationandSocialExclusioninIstanbul."InternationalJournalofUrban

andRegionalResearch29.1(2005):124-34.Web.26Mar.2016.

Keyder,Caglar."TheTurkishBellJar."NewLeftReview28(2004):65-84.Print.

Kireev,Alex."TurkeyLegislativeElection2015."ElectoralGeography2.0.ElectoralGeography

2.0,2015.Web.26Jan.2016.

Marschall,Melissa,AbdullahAydogan,andAlperBulut."PartyVotinginTurkey:Explainingthe

DurabilityofAKPSupport."(2015):1-43.Marschall.rice.edu.InternationalSocietyfor

PoliticalPsychology,6Mar.2015.Web.27Mar.2016.

Ogret,Ozgur."WhiteTurks,BlackTurksandGreyDebate."HurriyetDailyNews.HurriyetDaily

44

News,22Nov.2010.Web.02Feb.2016.

Özler,Ş.Ilgü."PoliticsoftheGecekonduinTurkey:ThePoliticalChoicesofUrbanSquattersin

NationalElections."TurkishStudies1.2(2000):39-58.Web.17Mar.2016.

Shmuelevitz,Aryeh."UrbanizationandVotingfortheTurkishParliament."

MiddleEasternStudies32.2(1996):162-76.JSTOR[JSTOR].Web.

Smith,David."Turkey:Part4,TheGreatUnspokenRisk."AHI:UnitedStates.AffordableHousing

Institute,03May2007.Web.28Mar.2016.

Taspinar,Omer."Turkey:TheNewModel?"TheIslamistsAreComing:WhoTheyReallyAre.

Washington,D.C.:WilsonCenter/U.S.InstituteofPeace,2012.N.pag.Print.

Tremblay,Pinar."ClashoftheAnatolianTigers-Al-Monitor:ThePulseoftheMiddleEast."Al-

Monitor.Al-Monitor,28Apr.2014.Web.29Jan.2016.

"Turkey:ProvincesandMajorCities."Citypopulation.de.ThomasBrinkhoff,02Feb.2016.Web.

18Feb.2016.

"TurkishStatisticalInstitute."TurkishStatisticalInstitute(TurkStat)'sWebPages::..

Www.tuik.gov.tr,n.d.Web.20Sept.2016.

TheWorldBank.RiseoftheAnatolianTigers:TurkeyUrbanizationReview.Rep.no.87180-TR.

Washington,D.C.:InternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment/TheWorld

Bank,2015.Print.

45

Yalcintan,MuratCemal,andAdemErdemErbas."Impactsof"Gecekondu"ontheElectoral

GeographyofIstanbul."InternationalLaborandWorking-ClassHistory64(2003):91-

111.Web.27Mar.2016.