Wireless Code - Motion for Leave to Appeal - Book of Authorities

7/28/2019 Wireless Code - Motion for Leave to Appeal - Book of Authorities

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Court File No.

FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

B E T W E E N:

BELL CANADA, BELL MOBILITY INC., MTS INC., NORTHERNTEL,LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS PARTNERSHIP,SASKATCHEWAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, TLBEC, SOCIT EN

COMMANDITE and TELUS COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY

Applicants- and -

AMTELECOM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, BRAGG COMMUNICATIONS INC., DATA &AUDIO-VISUAL ENTERPRISES WIRELESS INC., GLOBALIVE WIRELESS

MANAGEMENT CORP., HAY COMMUNICATIONS CO-OPERATIVE LIMITED, HURONTELECOMMUNICATIONS CO-OPERATIVE LIMITED, MORNINGTON

COMMUNICATIONS CO-OPERATIVE LIMITED, NEXICOM MOBILITY INC.,NORTHWESTEL INC., PEOPLES TEL LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, PUBLIC MOBILE INC.,

QUADRO COMMUNICATIONS CO-OPERATIVE INC., QUEBECOR MEDIA INC.,SOGETEL MOBILIT INC., THUNDER BAY TELEPHONE, VAXINATION

INFORMATIQUE, CONSUMERS COUNCIL OF CANADA, DIVERSITYCANADAFOUNDATION, MEDIA ACCESS CANADA, MOUVEMENT PERSONNE DABORD DU

QUBEC, PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY CENTRE, CONSUMERS ASSOCIATION OFCANADA, COUNCIL OF SENIOR CITIZENS ORGANIZATIONS OF BRITISH

COLUMBIA, OPENMEDIA.CA, SERVICE DE PROTECTION ET DINFORMATION DU

CONSOMMATEUR, UNION DES CONSOMMATEURS, CANADIAN WIRELESSTELECOMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION, COMMISSIONER FOR COMPLAINTS FORTELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES INC., COMPETITION BUREAU OF CANADA,

GLENN THIBEAULT, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF ALBERTA,GOVERNMENT OF MANITOBA, GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES,

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF ONTARIO, ATTORNEY GENERAL OFQUEBEC, GOVERNMENT OF YUKON, OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OFCANADA, CATHERINE MIDDLETON, TAMARA SHEPHERD, LESLIE REGAN SHADE,KIM SAWCHUK, BARBARA CROW, SHAW TELECOM INC., TERRY DUNCAN, GLENN

FULLERTON, TANA GUINDEBA, NASIR KHAN, MICHAEL LANCIONE, ALLANMUNRO, FREDERICK A. NAKOS, RAINER SCHOENEN and DANIEL SOKOLOV

Respondents

BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF THE APPLICANTS

(Motion for leave to appeal, to expedite, to authorize service by email

and to dispense with further service)


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- 2 -

Torys LLP

79 Wellington St. W., Suite 3000Box 270, TD CentreToronto, ON M5K 1N2

John B. LaskinTel:416.865.7317 / Fax: [email protected]

Myriam SeersTel: 416.865.7535 / Fax: [email protected]

Lawyers for the Applicants


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Tab

1.

Martin v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), [1999] F.C.J. No.1972

2. Dikranian v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 733. R. v. Walker, [1970] S.C.R. 6494. Bell Canada v. C.T.E.A., [2003] 1 S.C.R. 8845. British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Parklane Private Hospital Ltd., [1975] 2

S.C.R. 47

6. Apotex Inc. v. Merck & Co., 2011 FCA 3297. Bell Canada v. Canada (C.R.T.C.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 17228. Bell Canada v. Bell Aliant Regional Communications, 2009 SCC 409. R. v. S.(S.), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 25410. Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd., [1998] F.C.J. No. 859 (C.A.)11. Del Zotto v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue -M.N.R.), [2000] F.C.J. No.

57312. Telewizja Polsat S.A. v. Radiopol Inc., 2005 FC 117913. Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed. (Markham, Ont.:

LexisNexis, 2008)


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TAB 1


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1999 CarswellNat 2765, 178 F.T.R. 159 (note), 252 N.R. 141, [1999] F.C.J. No. 1972

Martin v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development)

Mervyn K. Martin, Appellant and The Minister of Human Resources Development, Respondent

Federal Court of Appeal

Malone J.A., Robertson J.A., Strayer J.A.

Heard: December 16, 1999Judgment: December 16, 1999

Docket: A-229-98

Thomson Reuters Canada Limited or its Licensors (excluding individual court documents). All rights re-served.

Proceedings: reversing (1998), 1998 CarswellNat 336, 153 F.T.R. 124, C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8334 (Fed. T.D.)

Counsel: Mr. Ronald Cronkhite , for Appellant.

Mr. Jan Brongers , for Respondent.

Subject: Public; Labour and Employment

Social assistance --- Federal pension plans Types of benefits Disability pension Entitlement Criteria

Applicant was physical labourer with grade 8 education Applicant injured back and applied for disability be-nefits Doctors advised applicant to avoid bending, lifting or twisting Minister refused to pay benefits andreview tribunal dismissed appeal on ground that most of medical reports indicated applicant was capable of do-ing some kind of sedentary work Pension Appeals Board denied leave to appeal to it on basis that Boardwould not come to any different conclusion from that of tribunal Board found that applicant had not shownhe was incapable of doing any gainful employment Applicant sought judicial review of refusal of leave to ap-peal Application granted Proper test in reviewing decisions relative to leave to appeal to Pension AppealsBoard was whether appellant could show some arguable ground upon which proposed appeal might succeed In refusing leave on basis that appellant had not shown he was incapable of doing any type of work Board had

gone much further and considered whether appellant could succeed on merits It was arguable the CanadaPension Plan's requirement for severe disability that claimant be incapable regularly of pursuing any substan-tially gainful occupation meant something less than claimant showing he was incapable of doing any type ofwork Board had erred in law in applying incorrect test and placing too heavy burden on appellant Appealshould be allowed and application for leave to appeal remitted for reconsideration.

Cases considered by Malone J.A. :

Page 11999 CarswellNat 2765, 178 F.T.R. 159 (note), 252 N.R. 141, [1999] F.C.J. No. 1972

2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works
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Ernewein v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 639, 103 D.L.R. (3d)1, 14 C.P.C. 264, 30 N.R. 316 (S.C.C.) referred to

Kerth v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development) (1999), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8363 (headnote

only) (Fed. T.D.) applied

Kurniewicz v. Canada (Minister of Manpower & Immigration) (1974), 6 N.R. 225 (Fed. C.A.) applied

MacDonald v. Montreal (City), [1986] 1 S.C.R. 460, 27 D.L.R. (4th) 321, (sub nom. Montreal (City) v.MacDonald) 67 N.R. 1, 25 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.) referred to

Statutes considered:

Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8

s. 42(2)(a)(i) considered

Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7

s. 27 pursuant to

APPEAL from order dismissing application for judicial review of decision of Pension Appeals Board refusingappellant's application for leave to appeal to Board.

Malone J.A.:

1 This is an appeal pursuant to section 27 of the Federal Court Act from the order of Madame JusticeTremblay-Lamer dated March 6, 1998. Madame Justice Tremblay-Lamer dismissed an application for judicialreview of the decision of the Vice-Chairman of the Pensions Appeal Board ('PAB") dated November 26, 1996

who had refused the appellant's leave to appeal to the PAB.2 Briefly the facts relevant to this appeal as found by the motions judge are as follows:

The Applicant has worked all his life as a physical labourer. He has a grade 8 education. In September 1994,he applied for disability benefits. He was forced to stop working in June 1993 after experiencing severeback pain. His doctors advised him to avoid bending, lifting or twisting, and to walk 2 or 3 miles a day tohelp alleviate the pain. The Applicant contends that his pain is constant and, in order to obtain relief, hemust lie down on two to three occasions a day for approximately one half-hour at a time. The pain also in-terferes with his sleep.

The Minister refused to pay the Applicant benefits. An appeal of the Minister's decision was filed with theReview Tribunal, which eventually dismissed it. The Tribunal held that the Applicant was not entitled todisability benefits because there was no objective medical evidence that he was incapable of doing any typeof work. In fact, most of the medical reports indicated that he was capable of doing some kind of work.

The Applicant appealed the decision to the Pension Appeals Board. However, leave was denied by the Vice-Chairman who felt that the Board could not come to any different conclusion from that reached by the Re-view Tribunal. Specifically, he stated:


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The medical evidence does not support the contention that the applicant is incapable regularly of pursu-ing any gainful occupation. It shows he is limited as to what work he can do, but supports the Minister'scontention that less physically demanding work would be within his capacity. As to the applicant's edu-cational qualifications, any limitations flowing from the that consideration are not based on disability.

3 In dismissing the application for judicial review Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer held that the proper testfor determining whether the Court can overrule a decision in such cases is the legality of the decision and not itscorrectness, citing Ernewein v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 639(S.C.C.) . In other words, unless the Vice-Chairman considered irrelevant factors or acted contrary to law, theCourt should show deference towards its decision (MacDonald v. Montreal (City), [1986] 1 S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.)at p. 507. Based on the foregoing principles Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer concluded:

I do not agree with the Applicant that the Review Tribunal applied the wrong test in determining whether hewas deemed disabled. While the Review Tribunal did not mention the specific words "substantially gainfuloccupation", it does not necessarily mean that it did not apply the correct test. In my opinion, when it stated

that there was no objective medical evidence that the Applicant was incapable of doing 'any type of work",it was referring to sedentary work as opposed to manual labour. The Applicant's medical condition does notrestrict him from pursuing sedentary work.

The fact that the Vice-Chairman refused to grant leave because the medical evidence supported the conclu-sion that less demanding work would be within the Applicant's capacity was not unreasonable. I find thatthere was sufficient material to support his conclusion.

4 Subsequent to the above decision, Madam Justice Reed in Kerth v. Canada (Minister of Human ResourcesDevelopment) (1999), C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8363 (headnote only) (Fed. T.D.) August 13, 1999, also considered thestandard of review to be applied by the Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division in reviewing decisions relativeto leave to appeal applications to the PAB.

5 Justice Reed found that a leave to appeal proceeding is a preliminary step to a hearing on the merits. Assuch "it is a first and lower hurdle for the applicant to meet than that that must be met on the hearing of the ap-peal on the merits" (see page 6 of decision). The Court relied on the case of Kurniewicz v. Canada (Minister ofManpower & Immigration) (1974), 6 N.R. 225 (Fed. C.A.) at p. 230 for the proposition that some arguablegroundupon which the proposed appeal might succeed is needed in order for leave to be granted.

6 On examination of the reasons given by the PAB Vice-Chairman in refusing leave to appeal it is evidentthat he went much further than merely considering whether an arguable case or question of law or jurisdictionhad been raised and instead considered whether the appellant could succeed on the merits. This is an error oflaw. The Vice-Chairman stated (Appeal Book , page 60):

It is difficult to see how the Board could come to any different conclusion from that reached by the ReviewTribunal. The medical evidence does not support the contention that the applicant is incapable regularly ofpursuing any gainful occupation. It shows he is limited as to what work he can do, but supports the Minis-ter's contention that less physically demanding work would be within his capacity. As to the applicant's edu-cation qualifications, any limitation flowing from that consideration are not based on disability. Leave to ap-peal cannot be justified.


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7 We are of the respectful view that the Vice-Chairman of the PAB in making his decision applied an incor-rect test and placed too heavy a burden on the appellant when assessing the application for leave to appeal. Inour view there is at least an arguable case as to the proper interpretation of subparagraph 42(2)(a)(i) of theCanada Pension Plan which requires that for a disability to be severe the claimant must be "incapable regularlyof pursuing any substantially gainful occupation". The Review Tribunal, however, assumed that the appellanthad to show that he is "incapable of doing any type of work".

8 The appeal should be allowed and the order of Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer dated March 6, 1998 setaside. The application for judicial review shall be allowed and the application for leave to appeal to the PABshould be remitted for reconsideration.

Appeal allowed.

END OF DOCUMENT




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TAB 2


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2005 CarswellQue 10752, 2005 SCC 73, 260 D.L.R. (4th) 17, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 530, 342 N.R. 1

Dikranian c. Qubec (Procureur gnral)

Harry Dikranian, Appellant v. Attorney General of Quebec, Respondent

Supreme Court of Canada

Abella J., Bastarache J., Binnie J., Charron J., Deschamps J., LeBel J., McLachlin C.J.C.

Heard: March 10, 2005Judgment: December 2, 2005

Docket: 30243

Thomson Reuters Canada Limited or its Licensors (excluding individual court documents). All rights re-served.

Counsel: Leon J. Greenberg, Guy St-Germain, for Appellant

Mario Normandin, for Respondent

Subject: Public; Contracts; Corporate and Commercial

Education law --- Colleges and universities Students Student loans

Under Act respecting financial assistance for students, Minister of Education issues to students loan certificatesauthorizing students to enter into loan with financial institution, guaranteeing loan and paying interest during ex-emption period after completion of studies Student entered into student loans with bank; final certificate,signed in 1996, provided that student had to start paying interest in January 1999 Act enacted in 1997 re-duced exemption period by one month Other Act enacted in 1998 provided that student had to pay interestright upon completion of studies Student completed studies in January 1998 and learned, in June 1998, thatinterest was already being charged and that loan was payable as of December 1998 Student was authorized tostart class action against Attorney General of Qubec for reimbursement of interest paid on loans Class actiondismissed Student's appeal dismissed Student's appeal to Supreme Court of Canada allowed Vestedrights only exist where juridical situation is individualized, concrete and is materialized Signing of loan certi-

ficate by bank and student transformed certificate into contract and crystallized parties' rights and obligations Act of 1997 contained no transitional provision revealing legislature's clear and unambiguous intent to applynew provisions to reduce borrowers' rights Mere fact of favouring immediate and future application of Act of1997 did not authorize government to violate rights conferred by contract to student Act of 1997 did not ap-ply to contracts already entered into as it did not mention them Act of 1998 stated in s. 13 that Act only ap-plied to "juridical situations in progress" at time of Act's coming into force "[J]uridical situations in progress"meant student who has received but not yet signed loan certificate Legislature distinguished between "juridic-

Page 12005 CarswellQue 10752, 2005 SCC 73, 260 D.L.R. (4th) 17, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 530, 342 N.R. 1



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al situations in progress" and "contractual situations in progress", and s. 13 did not say it applied to latter or tocontracts Loan contract was signed and entered into before Act of 1998 came into force and continued to pro-duce effects despite Act, as contract's conclusion fixed, crystallized and finalized contract's rights and obliga-tions, which included repayment terms Principle against inteference with vested rights applied given ambigu-ity of s. 13 of Act of 1998 Right to not pay more interest acquired upon formation of contract Matter wassent back to Superior Court in order to determine claims method for affected students, amounts owed by govern-ment and payment procedures.

Statutes --- Retroactivity and retrospectivity Vested rights General

Under Act respecting financial assistance for students, Minister of Education issues to students loan certificatesauthorizing students to enter into loan with financial institution, guaranteeing loan and paying interest during ex-emption period after completion of studies Student entered into student loans with bank; final certificate,signed in 1996, provided that student had to start paying interest in January 1999 Act enacted in 1997 re-duced exemption period by one month Other Act enacted in 1998 provided that student had to pay interestright upon completion of studies Student completed studies in January 1998 and learned, in June 1998, thatinterest was already being charged and that loan was payable as of December 1998 Student was authorized tostart class action against Attorney General of Qubec for reimbursement of interest paid on loans Class actiondismissed Student's appeal dismissed Student's appeal to Supreme Court of Canada allowed Vestedrights only exist where juridical situation is individualized, concrete and is materialized Signing of loan certi-ficate by bank and student transformed certificate into contract and crystallized parties' rights and obligations Act of 1997 contained no transitional provision revealing legislature's clear and unambiguous intent to applynew provisions to reduce borrowers' rights Mere fact of favouring immediate and future application of Act of1997 did not authorize government to violate rights conferred by contract to student Act of 1997 did not ap-ply to contracts already entered into as it did not mention them Act of 1998 stated in s. 13 that Act only ap-plied to "juridical situations in progress" at time of Act's coming into force "[J]uridical situations in progress"meant student who has received but not yet signed loan certificate Legislature distinguished before between

"juridical situations in progress" and "contractual situations in progress", and s. 13 did not say it applied to latteror to contracts Loan contract was signed and entered into before Act of 1998 came into force and continuedto produce effects despite Act, as contract's conclusion fixed, crystallized and finalized contract's rights and ob-ligations, which included repayment terms Principle against inteference with vested rights applied given am-biguity of s. 13 of Act of 1998 Right to not pay more interest acquired upon formation of contract Matterwas sent back to Superior Court in order to determine claims method for affected students, amounts owed bygovernment and payment procedures.

Statutes --- Interpretation Particular words Miscellaneous words

Under Act respecting financial assistance for students, Minister of Education issues to students loan certificatesauthorizing students to enter into loan with financial institution, guaranteeing loan and paying interest during ex-

emption period after completion of studies Student entered into student loans with bank; final certificate,signed in 1996, provided that student had to start paying interest in January 1999 Act enacted in 1997 re-duced exemption period by one month Other Act enacted in 1998 provided that student had to pay interestright upon completion of studies Student completed studies in January 1998 and learned, in June 1998, thatinterest was already being charged and that loan was payable as of December 1998 Student was authorized tostart class action against Attorney General of Qubec for reimbursement of interest paid on loans Class actiondismissed Student's appeal dismissed Student's appeal to Supreme Court of Canada allowed Act of




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1998 stated in s. 13 that Act only applied to "juridical situations in progress" at time of Act's coming into force "[J]uridical situations in progress" meant student who has received but not yet signed loan certificate Le-gislature distinguished before between "juridical situations in progress" and "contractual situations in progress",and s. 13 did not say it applied to latter or to contracts Loan contract was signed and entered into before Actof 1998 came into force and continued to produce effects despite Act, as contract's conclusion fixed, crystallizedand finalized contract's rights and obligations, which included repayment terms Principle against inteferencewith vested rights applied given ambiguity of s. 13 of Act of 1998 Right to not pay more interest acquiredupon formation of contract.

Droit de l'ducation --- Collges and universits tudiants Prts tudiants

Selon la Loi sur l'aide financire aux tudiants, le ministre de l'ducation dlivre aux tudiants un certificat deprt qui les autorise contracter un emprunt auprs d'une institution financire et qui garantit le prt et paie lesintrts pendant une priode d'exemption aprs la fin des tudes tudiant a contract des prts tudiants avecune banque; le dernier certificat, sign en 1996, prvoyait le paiement du prt et des intrts partir de janvier1999 Loi adopte en 1997 a raccourci d'un mois la priode d'exemption Autre loi adopte en 1998 a prvule paiement des intrts ds la fin des tudes tudiant a fini ses tudes en janvier 1998 et a appris, en juin1998, que les intrts avaient dj commenc tre imputs et que le prt tait payable partir de dcembre1998 tudiant a t autoris intenter un recours collectif contre le Procureur gnral du Qubec afind'obtenir le remboursement des intrts pays Recours collectif rejet Pourvoi de l'tudiant rejet Pour-voi de l'tudiant la Cour suprme du Canada accueilli Droit acquis n'existe que si la situation juridiqueconsidre est individualise et concrte et qu'elle est matrialise Signature du certificat de prt par labanque et l'tudiant a transform ce dernier en un contrat et a cristallis les droits et obligations des parties Loi de 1997 ne contenait aucune disposition transitoire rvlant l'intention claire et non ambigu du lgislateurd'appliquer les nouvelles dispositions pour rduire les droits des emprunteurs Seul fait de prconiserl'application immdiate et future de la Loi de 1997 n'autorisait pas le gouvernement porter atteinte aux droitsconfrs l'tudiant par son contrat Loi de 1997 ne mentionnant pas les contrats dj conclus, elle ne

s'appliquait pas eux Selon son art. 13, la Loi de 1998 s'appliquait aux situations juridiques en cours lorsde son entre en vigueur [S]ituations juridiques en cours s'entendait d'un tudiant qui a reu son certificatde prt mais ne l'a pas encore sign Lgislateur a dj distingu entre les situations juridiques en cours etles situations contractuelles en cours , et l'art. 13 ne disait pas s'appliquer ces dernires ou aux contrats Contrat de prt a t sign et conclu avant la Loi de 1998 et continuait de produire ses effets malgr celle-ci,puisque ses droits et obligations, dont les modalits de remboursement, ont t fixs, cristalliss et arrts par laconclusion du contrat Principe du respect des droits acquis s'appliquait vu l'ambigut de l'art. 13 de la Loi de1998 Droit de ne pas payer plus d'intrts a t acquis la formation du contrat Dossier tait renvoy laCour suprieure afin qu'elle dtermine le mode de rclamation des tudiants touchs, les montants dus par legouvernement et les modalits de paiement.

Lois --- Retroactivit et rtrospectivit Droits acquis Gnral

Selon la Loi sur l'aide financire aux tudiants, le ministre de l'ducation dlivre aux tudiants un certificat deprt qui les autorise contracter un emprunt auprs d'une institution financire et qui garantit le prt et paie lesintrts pendant une priode d'exemption aprs la fin des tudes tudiant a contract des prts tudiants avecune banque; le dernier certificat, sign en 1996, prvoyait le paiement du prt et des intrts partir de janvier1999 Loi adopte en 1997 a raccourci d'un mois la priode d'exemption Autre loi adopte en 1998 a prvule paiement des intrts ds la fin des tudes tudiant a fini ses tudes en janvier 1998 et a appris, en juin




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1998, que les intrts avaient dj commenc tre imputs et que le prt tait payable partir de dcembre1998 tudiant a t autoris intenter un recours collectif contre le Procureur gnral du Qubec afind'obtenir le remboursement des intrts pays Recours collectif rejet Pourvoi de l'tudiant rejet Pour-voi de l'tudiant la Cour suprme du Canada accueilli Droit acquis n'existe que si la situation juridiqueconsidre est individualise et concrte et qu'elle est matrialise Signature du certificat de prt par labanque et l'tudiant a transform ce dernier en un contrat et a cristallis les droits et obligations des parties Loi de 1997 ne contenait aucune disposition transitoire rvlant l'intention claire et non ambigu du lgislateurd'appliquer les nouvelles dispositions pour rduire les droits des emprunteurs Seul fait de prconiserl'application immdiate et future de la Loi de 1997 n'autorisait pas le gouvernement porter atteinte aux droitsconfrs l'tudiant par son contrat Loi de 1997 ne mentionnant pas les contrats dj conclus, elle nes'appliquait pas eux Selon son art. 13, la Loi de 1998 s'appliquait aux situations juridiques en cours lorsde son entre en vigueur [S]ituations juridiques en cours s'entendait d'un tudiant qui a reu son certificatde prt mais ne l'a pas encore sign Lgislateur a dj distingu entre les situations juridiques en cours etles situations contractuelles en cours , et l'art. 13 ne disait pas s'appliquer ces dernires ou aux contrats Contrat de prt a t sign et conclu avant la Loi de 1998 et continuait de produire ses effets malgr celle-ci,

puisque ses droits et obligations, dont les modalits de remboursement, ont t fixs, cristalliss et arrts par laconclusion du contrat Principe du respect des droits acquis s'appliquait vu l'ambigut de l'art. 13 de la Loi de1998 Droit de ne pas payer plus d'intrts a t acquis la formation du contrat Dossier tait renvoy laCour suprieure afin qu'elle dtermine le mode de rclamation des tudiants touchs, les montants dus par legouvernement et les modalits de paiement.

Lois --- Interprtation Mots particuliers Divers mots

Selon la Loi sur l'aide financire aux tudiants, le ministre de l'ducation dlivre aux tudiants un certificat deprt qui les autorise contracter un emprunt auprs d'une institution financire et qui garantit le prt et paie lesintrts pendant une priode d'exemption aprs la fin des tudes tudiant a contract des prts tudiants avecune banque; le dernier certificat, sign en 1996, prvoyait le paiement du prt et des intrts partir de janvier

1999 Loi adopte en 1997 a raccourci d'un mois la priode d'exemption Autre loi adopte en 1998 a prvule paiement des intrts ds la fin des tudes tudiant a fini ses tudes en janvier 1998 et a appris, en juin1998, que les intrts avaient dj commenc tre imputs et que le prt tait payable partir de dcembre1998 tudiant a t autoris intenter un recours collectif contre le Procureur gnral du Qubec afind'obtenir le remboursement des intrts pays Recours collectif rejet Pourvoi de l'tudiant rejet Pour-voi de l'tudiant la Cour suprme du Canada accueilli Selon son art. 13, la Loi de 1998 s'appliquait aux situations juridiques en cours lors de son entre en vigueur [S]ituations juridiques en cours s'entendaitd'un tudiant qui a reu son certificat de prt mais ne l'a pas encore sign Lgislateur a dj distingu entreles situations juridiques en cours et les situations contractuelles en cours , et l'art. 13 ne disait pass'appliquer ces dernires ou aux contrats Contrat de prt a t sign et conclu avant la Loi de 1998 et con-tinuait de produire ses effets malgr celle-ci, puisque ses droits et obligations, dont les modalits de rembourse-ment, ont t fixs, cristalliss et arrts par la conclusion du contrat Principe du respect des droits acquis

s'appliquait vu l'ambigut de l'art. 13 de la Loi de 1998 Droit de ne pas payer plus d'intrts a t acquis laformation du contrat.

In Quebec, the student loan scheme is governed by An Act respecting financial assistance for students (AFAS)and by the Regulation respecting financial assistance for students (RFAS). The scheme provides for the issuanceto the student of a loan certificate in which the Minister of Education authorizes the student to take out a loanwith a financial institution. The certificate guarantees the loan in case of a student's failure to pay and pays the




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interest during the exemption period stated in the certificate. The student then enters into a contract with a finan-cial institution; the government is not party to the contract but does dictate some terms of the contract. In 1997,the National Assembly enacted a law reducing by a month the exemption period for payment of the interest andreimbursement of capital by the student. In May 1998, the National Assembly enacted legislation stating that thestudent would have to pay the interest as soon as his or her studies were completed.

Student D obtained his last student loan in 1996. The loan certificate provided that D had to start reimbursingthe capital and pay the interest on the loan upon the expiry of the exemption period, i.e. January 1, 1999. D com-pleted his studies in January 1998. He learned from his bank, in July 1998, that the interest on his loan had star-ted to run on June 1, 1998 and that the capital would be payable as of December 1, 1998. In August 1998, Dpaid the loan's capital and paid, under protest, the interest incurred from June 1st to the reimbursement day. Dwas then authorized to bring a class action against the Attorney General of Quebec. His action was dismissed.His appeal was dismissed by the majority of the Court of Appeal. He appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Held: The appeal was allowed.

Per Bastarache J. (McLachlin C.J.C., Binnie, LeBel, Abella, Charron JJ. concurring): The scheme put in placeby the AFAS and the RFAS is complete, and does not require the application of the Civil Code or its applicationAct. The Quebec Interpretation Act should apply, which establishes the acquired (or vested) rights principle inits s. 12. Vested rights exist where the juridical situation examined is tangible, concrete, distinctive and where itis constituted at the time the new legislation enters into force. The mere possibility of invoking legislationshould thus not base a vested rights claim.

In this case, D and his bank signed the loan certificate provided by the Minister, thus transforming it into a con-tract and crystallizing the parties' rights and obligations. Moreover, the Act implicitly recognizes the contractualrelationship established between the student and the financial institution. The Act of 1997, which reduced theexemption period by one month, did not contain any transitional provision revealing the intent of the legislature.Thus, nothing allowed a finding that the legislature had a clear and unambiguous intention to apply the new pro-visions to reduce the borrowers' rights. Merely favouring an immediate and future application of the Act of 1997did not authorize the government to infringe the rights granted to D by his contract. The Act of 1997 did notmention the contracts already entered into and could thus apply to them. Moreover, there was nothing in the re-cord that could show the legislature intended to infringe vested rights.

As for the Act of 1998, its s. 13 provided that it applied to "juridical situations in progress". That expressioncould not concern all student loans entered into before and after the new provisions came into force. Section 13did not clearly state the legislature's intent to alter the terms of the loan contracts entered into prior to May 1,1998. D properly submitted that, in the scheme's general context, "juridical situations in progress" means a stu-dent who has received his or her loan certificate, but who has yet to sign it with the financial institution. Section13 did not provide that the Act of 1998 applied to "contracts" or "contractual situations", and the Quebec legis-lature had made a distinction in the past between "juridical situations in progress" and "contractual juridical situ-ations in progress". These expressions thus had to refer to different realities. In this case, the contract was signedand entered into before the Act of 1998 came into force. Its effects continued despite that Act, since the rightsand obligations flowing from it, including the repayment terms, were fixed and crystallized as soon as it wasentered into.

As s. 13 of the Act of 1998 was ambiguous, the principle against interference with vested rights should apply.




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The right was provided for by the legislation but was later put in the private contract. Therefore, the rights andobligations were granted to the parties not by the legislation, but by the contractual agreement upon its forma-tion. The right not to pay more interest and the right to the exemption were thus vested upon the contract's form-ation. They were no longer in progress as they had been definitely crystallized, determined and established bythe contract.

Finally, the administrative reasons given by the government, such as a uniform and equal treatment of studentswho complete their studies at the same time, could not allow ignoring the private contract's explicit wording. Itwas quite normal that students who obtained their loans at different times and signed the loan contracts know-ingly would be treated differently. The government expressed its intent in the loan certificate and nothing justi-fied ignoring the private contract's explicit wording. The class action was therefore allowed. The student bor-rowers whose loans were in progress on July 1, 1997 or on May 1, 1998 had a vested right in respect of thelength of the exemption period provided for by the contract; that right was not affected by the Acts of 1997 or of1998. The matter was sent back to the Superior Court to determine the claims method for affected students, theamounts owed by government and the payment procedures.

Per Deschamps J. (dissenting): By declaring that s. 13 of the Act of 1998 applied to juridical situations in pro-gress, the Quebec legislature clearly indicated that that Act immediately applied to the exemption period for theinterest payable by D to his financial institution. The expression "juridical expressions in progress" includedboth situations in the process of being formed as well that the effects of any given juridical situation. The ex-pression "juridical expression" is large; it encompasses both the constitution of the situation as well as its extin-guishment and effects. Nothing justified finding that the legislature, in using "juridical situations in progress",intented to refer to juridical situations in the process of being formed, but not to juridical situations in the pro-cess of producing effects.

The juridical situation is created as soon as the student is granted the loan certificate. It does not cease to be "inprogress" when the student signs the loan certificate with the financial institution, thus transforming it in a loan

contract. An interpretation that denies that a juridical situation is still "in progress" when it has been formed, hasnot been extinguished and is producing effects is not consistent with the theory on which the legislature relied.In this case, the obligation to pay the interest flowed from the contract, and the interest exemption period wasclearly in progress. As the duration of the exemption period was legislated, it could be modified by legislation ofimmediate application. Moreover, the interpretation of Bastarache J., i.e. that transitional provision concernedonly the received but unsigned certificate, was so narrow that one could not believe the legislature could haveintended the scope of the Act to be so restricted. An interpretation that restricts the application of new legislationto a very limited number of cases should be rejected. The exemption period was modified for the future. It isopen to the legislature to state in its laws provisions that may seem harsh. It is not up to the courts to interfere inthe legislative process.

Au Qubec, le rgime de prt tudiant est rgi par la Loi sur l'aide financire aux tudiants (LAFE) et par le

Rglement sur l'aide financire aux tudiants (RAFE). Ce rgime prvoit la dlivrance l'tudiant d'un certificatde prt dans lequel le ministre de l'ducation autorise l'tudiant contracter un emprunt auprs d'une institutionfinancire reconnu. Le certificat garantit le prt en cas de dfaut de paiement par l'tudiant et prend sa chargele paiement des intrts pendant la priode d'exemption stipule dans le certificat. L'tudiant conclut alors uncontrat de prt avec une institution financire auquel le gouvernement n'est pas partie, mme s'il dicte certainesdes modalits du contrat. En 1997, l'Assemble nationale a adopt une loi raccourcissant d'un mois la prioded'exemption du paiement des intrts et du remboursement du capital par l'tudiant. En mai 1998, l'Assemble




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nationale a adopt une autre loi spcifiant cette fois-ci que l'tudiant devait payer les intrts ds la fin de sestudes.

L'tudiant D a a obtenu son dernier prt tudiant en 1996. Le certificat de prt prvoyait que l'tudiant devait

commencer rembourser le capital et payer les intrts sur le prt l'expiration de la priode d'exemption, soitle 1er janvier 1999. D a termin ses tudes en janvier 1998. En juillet 1998, il a appris de sa banque que lesintrts sur le prt taient dbits depuis le 1er juin 1998 et que le capital serait exigible compter du 1erdcembre 1998. En aot 1998, il a rembours le capital du prt et a pay, sous prott, les intrts courus du 1erjuin au jour de son remboursement. Il a ensuite t autoris intenter un recours collectif contre le Procureurgnral du Qubec. Son recours a t rejet. Son appel a t rejet la majorit de la Cour d'appel. Il a interjetappel en Cour suprme du Canada.

Arrt: Le pourvoi a t accueilli.

Bastarache, J. (McLachlin, J.C.C., Binnie, LeBel, Abella, Charron, JJ., souscrivant son opinion): Le rgimemis en place par la Loi et le Rglement est complet, ne ncessitant pas l'application du Code civil ou de sa loi

d'application. Il y avait lieu d'appliquer la Loi d'interprtation du Qubec, qui consacre le principe des droits ac-quis son art. 12. Il y a droits acquis lorsque la situation juridique considre est individualise, concrte,singulire et lorsqu'elle tait constitue au moment de l'entre en vigueur de la nouvelle loi. La seule possibilitde se prvaloir d'une loi ne saurait donc fonder une prtention de droit acquis.

En l'espce, D et son institution financire ont sign un certificat de prt fourni par le ministre, le transformantde ce fait en un contrat et cristallisant les droits et obligations des parties. D'ailleurs la LAFE reconnat impli-citement le lien contractuel tabli entre l'tudiant et l'institution financire. La Loi de 1997, qui rduisait d'unmois la priode d'exemption, ne contenait aucune disposition transitoire rvlant l'intention du lgislateur. Rienne permettait donc de conclure l'intention claire et non ambigu du lgislateur d'appliquer les nouvelles dispos-itions de faon rduire les droits des emprunteurs. Le seul fait de prconiser une application immdiate et fu-ture de la Loi de 1997 n'autorisait pas le gouvernement porter atteinte aux droits confrs D par son contrat.La Loi de 1997 ne mentionnait pas les contrats dj conclus et pouvait donc s'appliquer eux. D'ailleurs, rien audossier ne permettait d'imputer au lgislateur la volont de porter atteinte des droits acquis.

Quant la Loi de 1998, elle prvoyait son art. 13 qu'elle s'appliquait aux situations juridiques en cours .Cette expression ne pouvait viser tous les prts tudiants conclus avant et aprs l'entre en vigueur des nouvellesdispositions. L'article 13 n'nonait pas clairement l'intention du lgislateur de changer les conditions des con-trats de prts conclus pralablement au 1er mai 1998. D avait raison de prtendre que, dans le contexte gnraldu rgime, l'expression situations juridiques en cours s'entendait d'un tudiant qui avait reu son certificat deprt, mais qui ne l'avait pas encore sign conjointement avec son institution financire. L'article 13 ne prvoyaitpas que la Loi de 1998 s'appliquait aux contrats ou aux situations contractuelles et le lgislateurqubcois a dj fait une distinction par le pass entre les situations juridiques en cours et les situationsjuridiques contractuelles en cours . Celles-ci devaient donc se rapporter des ralits diffrentes. En l'espce,le contrat a t sign et conclu avant l'entre en vigueur de la Loi de 1998. Il continuait de produire ses effetsmalgr celle-ci, puisque les droits et obligations en dcoulant avaient t fixs et cristallis ds sa conclusion.Ces droits et obligations comprenaient bien sr les modalits de remboursement, des clauses essentielles de toutcontrat de prt.

L'article 13 de la Loi de 1998 tant ambigu, il y avait lieu d'appliquer le principe du respect des droits acquis.




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Le droit tait prvu par la loi, mais il tait ensuite insr dans un contrat priv. C'tait donc l'accord contractuelqui, ds sa formation, a confr les droits et obligations aux parties, et non la loi. Le droit de ne pas payer plusd'intrts et le droit l'exemption ont donc t acquis la formation du contrat. Ils n'taient plus en cours, ilsavaient t cristalliss, arrts et tablis dfinitivement par le contrat.

Finalement, les raisons administratives invoques par le gouvernement, comme un traitement uniforme et galdes tudiants terminant leurs tudes en mme temps, ne pouvait permettre de faire abstraction du libell explicitedu contrat priv. Il tait tout fait normal que des tudiants qui ont obtenu leurs prts des moments diffrentset ont sign en pleine connaissance des cause des conventions de prt diffrentes soient traits diffremment. Legouvernement a exprim sa volont dans le certificat de prt et il n'y avait pas lieu d'ignorer le libell explicitdu contrat priv. Le recours collectif tait donc accueilli. Les tudiants emprunteurs dont le prt tait en cours au1er juillet 1997 ou ceux dont le prt tait en cours au 1er mai 1998 bnficiaient d'un droit acquis quant ladure de la priode d'exemption prvue par le contrat, ce droit n'tant pas touch par les Lois de 1997 et de1998. Le dossier tait renvoy la Cour suprieure pour qu'elle dtermine le mode de rclamation, les montantsdus par Qubec, ainsi que les modalits de paiement.

Deschamps, J. (dissidente): En dclarant que l'art. 13 de la Loi de 1998 s'appliquait aux situations juridiques encours, le lgislateur qubcois a clairement indiqu que cette loi s'appliquait avec effet immdiat la prioded'exemption de paiement des intrts payables par D son institution financire. L'expression situations jur-idiques en cours incluait tant les situations en cours de formation que les effets d'une situation juridiquedonne. L'expression situation juridique est vaste; elle englobe tant la constitution de la situation que son ex-tinction et ses effets. Rien ne permettait de conclure que, en utilisant l'expression situations juridiques encours , le lgislateur voulait dsigner les situations juridiques en cours de constitution mais non les situations juridiques en cours d'effet .

La situation juridique est cre ds que le certificat de prt est accord l'tudiant. Elle ne cesse pas d'tre encours lorsque l'tudiant signe le certificat de prt conjointement avec l'institution financire, transformant le

certificat en contrat de prt. Une interprtation qui nie qu'une situation juridique est encore en cours lor-squ'elle est forme, non teinte et produit des effets ne respecte pas la thorie sur laquelle le lgislateur s'estfond. En l'espce, l'obligation de payer les intrts dcoulait du contrat et la priode d'exemption du paiementdes intrts tait clairement en cours. La dure de la priode d'exemption tait d'origine lgislative, elle pouvaittre modifie par une loi d'application immdiate. De plus, l'interprtation du juge Bastarache, soit que seul lecertificat reu mais non sign tait vis par la disposition transitoire, tait si troite que l'on ne pouvait croireque le lgislateur avait pu vouloir limiter ainsi la porte de la LAFE. Il y avait lieu de rejeter une interprtationqui limitait l'application d'une loi nouvelle un nombre trs limit de cas. La priode d'exemption tait modifiepour l'avenir. Le lgislateur est libre d'noncer dans ses lois des dispositions qui peuvent paratre dures. Iln'appartient pas aux tribunaux de s'immiscer dans le processus lgislatif.

Cases considered by Bastarache J.:

Abbott v. Minister forLands (1895), [1895] A.C. 425 (Australia P.C.) referred to

Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex (2002), 2002 SCC 42, 2002 CarswellBC 851, 2002 CarswellBC 852,100 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1, [2002] 5 W.W.R. 1, 212 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 287 N.R. 248, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 289, 166B.C.A.C. 1, 271 W.A.C. 1, 93 C.R.R. (2d) 189, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.) referred to

Dikranian c. Qubec (Procureurgnral) (1999), 1999 CarswellQue 2360 (Que. S.C.) referred to


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piciers unis Mtro-Richelieu inc., division "Econogros" c. Collin (2004), (sub nom. piciers Unis Mtro-Richelieu Inc. v. Collin) 326 N.R. 89 (Eng.), (sub nom. piciers Unis Mtro-Richelieu Inc. v. Collin) 326N.R. 89 (Fr.), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 257, 2004 SCC 59, 2004 CarswellQue 2400, 2004 CarswellQue 2401, 244D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.) followed

Gustavson Drilling (1964) Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue (1975), [1977] 1 S.C.R. 271, [1976] C.T.C.1, 75 D.T.C. 5451, 66 D.L.R. (3d) 449, 7 N.R. 401, 1975 CarswellNat 330, 1975 CarswellNat 376 (S.C.C.) considered

Holomis v. Dubuc (1974), 56 D.L.R. (3d) 351, 1974 CarswellBC 380 (B.C. S.C.) referred to

Ishida v. Itterman (1974), [1975] 2 W.W.R. 142, 1974 CarswellBC 283 (B.C. S.C.) referred to

Kluz v. Massey-Ferguson Finance Co. (1973), [1974] S.C.R. 474, 41 D.L.R. (3d) 390, 1973 CarswellSask147, 1973 CarswellSask 147F (S.C.C.) referred to

Location Triathlon Inc. c. Boucher-Forget(1994), [1994] R.J.Q. 1666, 1994 CarswellQue 2093 (Que. S.C.) referred to

Marchand c. Duval (1973), [1973] C.A. 635 referred to

Nepean (Township) v. Leikin (1971), 1971 CarswellOnt 678, [1971] 1 O.R. 567, 16 D.L.R. (3d) 113 (Ont.C.A.) referred to

Qubec (Commission de protection du territoire agricole) v. Venne (1989), 4 R.P.R. (2d) 1, [1989] 1 S.C.R.880, 24 Q.A.C. 162, 95 N.R. 335, 1989 CarswellQue 63, 1989 CarswellQue 108 (S.C.C.) considered

Quebec (Expropriation Tribunal) v. Quebec (Attorney General) (1986), 66 N.R. 380, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 732,35 L.C.R. 1, 1986 CarswellQue 118, 1986 CarswellQue 111F (S.C.C.) considered

Scott v. College of Physicians & Surgeons (Saskatchewan) (1992), [1993] 1 W.W.R. 533, 95 D.L.R. (4th)706, 100 Sask. R. 291, 18 W.A.C. 291, 1992 CarswellSask 354 (Sask. C.A.) considered

Spooner Oils Ltd. v. Turner Valley Gas Conservation Board (1933), [1933] S.C.R. 629, [1933] 4 D.L.R.545, 1933 CarswellAlta 50 (S.C.C.) considered

Steele-Smith v. Acme (Village) School District (1932), [1933] S.C.R. 47, [1933] 1 D.L.R. 545, 1932CarswellAlta 79 (S.C.C.) considered

Upper Canada College v. Smith (1920), (sub nom. Smith v. Upper Canada College) 61 S.C.R. 413, (subnom. Smith v. Upper Canada College) [1921] 1 W.W.R. 1154, 57 D.L.R. 648, 1920 CarswellOnt 20

(S.C.C.) consideredCases considered by Deschamps J.:

piciers unis Mtro-Richelieu inc., division "Econogros" c. Collin (2004), (sub nom. piciers Unis Mtro-Richelieu Inc. v. Collin) 326 N.R. 89 (Eng.), (sub nom. piciers Unis Mtro-Richelieu Inc. v. Collin) 326N.R. 89 (Fr.), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 257, 2004 SCC 59, 2004 CarswellQue 2400, 2004 CarswellQue 2401, 244D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.) considered


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Medovarski v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (2005), 2005 SCC 51, 2005 CarswellNat2943, 2005 CarswellNat 2944 (S.C.C.) considered

Statutes considered by Bastarache J.:

Aide financire aux tudiants, et la Loi sur les Collges d'enseignement gnral et professionnel, Loi modifantla, L.Q. 1996, c. 79

en gnral referred to

Aide financire aux tudiants, Loi modifant la, L.Q. 1997, c. 90


art. 13 considered

Aide financire aux tudiants, Loi sur l', L.R.Q., c. A-13.3


art. 15 referred to

art. 23 [abr. et. rempl. 1997, c. 90, art. 4] referred to

art. 23 [mod. 1996, c. 79, art. 5] referred to

art. 24 referred to


art. 27 referred to

art. 28 referred to

art. 29 referred to

art. 40 referred to

art. 41 referred to

art. 62 referred to

Application de la rforme du Code civil, Loi sur l', L.Q. 1992, c. 57


art. 2 referred to

art. 3 considered

Code civil du Qubec, L.Q. 1991, c. 64


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art. 625 referred to





Interprtation, Loi d', L.R.Q., c. I-16


art. 12 referred to

Protection du consommateur, Loi sur la, L.R.Q., c. P-40.1


Statutes considered by Deschamps J.:

Aide financire aux tudiants, et la Loi sur les Collges d'enseignement gnral et professionnel, Loi modifantla, L.Q. 1996, c. 79


Aide financire aux tudiants, Loi modifant la, L.Q. 1997, c. 90


art. 13 referred to



art. 15 referred to

art. 23 referred to

art. 23 [abr. et. rempl. 1997, c. 90, art. 4] referred toart. 23 [mod. 1996, c. 79, art. 5] referred to

art. 24 referred to





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art. 27 referred to

art. 28 referred to

art. 29 referred to

art. 40 referred to

art. 41 referred to

art. 62 referred to

Application de la rforme du Code civil, Loi sur l', L.Q. 1992, c. 57


art. 4 referred to

Code civil du Qubec, L.Q. 1991, c. 64


Regulations considered by Bastarache J.:


Aide financire aux tudes, Rglement sur l ', R.R.Q., 1981, c. A-13.3, r. 1


art. 56 referred to

APPEAL by student from judgment reported at Dikranian c. Qubec (Procureur gnral) (2004), 2004CarswellQue 65 (Que. C.A.), dismissing his appeal from judgment dismissing his class action against AttorneyGeneral of Quebec seeking reimbursement of interest paid on student loans.

POURVOI de l'tudiant l'encontre de l'arrt publi Dikranian c. Qubec (Procureur gnral) (2004), 2004CarswellQue 65 (C.A. Qu.), qui a rejet son pourvoi l'encontre du jugement qui avait rejet son recours col-lectif contre le Procureur gnral du Qubec visant obtenir le remboursement des intrts pays sur des prtstudiants.

Bastarache J.:

1 Introduction

1 The class action giving rise to this appeal was instituted by Mr. Dikranian on behalf of approximately70,000 students; it concerns the recovery of interest paid on student loans granted under the former Act respect-ing financial assistance for students, R.S.Q., c. A-13.3 ("AFAS"), and the Regulation respecting financial assist-ance for students, R.R.Q., c. A-13.3, r. 1 ("RFAS").


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2 The problem in the case at bar stems from the fact that the loans were made under private contractsbetween individual financial institutions and students while the repayment terms have been set by the govern-ment in the AFASand the RFAS. The Minister of Education (the "Minister") has imposed these terms by incor-porating them into a loan certificate that must be obtained to enter into a contract of loan, to which the Ministeris not a direct party.

3 The instant case results from two amendments to the AFASand the RFAS- one in 1997 and the other in1998 - that reduced the period during which students are exempt from making interest payments and repaymentson the principal. It must first be established whether, considering that the first amendment contained no trans-itional provisions, that amendment applied to loans that had already been granted. It will then be necessary todetermine the meaning and scope of the transitional provision in the second legislative amendment, according towhich the new provisions apply to "juridical situations in progress".

4 The student aid plan in place prior to the AFASwas based on administrative contracts (see the Web site ofQuebec's Aide financire aux tudes, www.afe.gouv.qc.ca/english); under that plan, the government set the termsof the contract and could amend them as it saw fit at any time. Under the current plan, however, a certificate isissued in which the Minister guarantees the loan should the student default on it (AFAS, ss. 27, 28 and 29) (seeAppendix) and pays the interest during the exemption period (AFAS, s. 24) (see Appendix). After the certificateis issued, the student enters into a private contract with a financial institution. Although the government dictatessome of the terms of the contract by incorporating them in the certificate it issues, it is not a party to the con-tract. The government neither grants the loan nor approves it. The government makes parallel commitments inaccordance with the AFAS. The issue here is whether, in the instant case, the changes to these legal obligationshave had the effect of limiting the rights conferred on the student in his or her contract with the financial institu-tion.

5 This means that there is no need for me to consider the exact nature of the legal relationship between thegovernment and the student. The substantive issue is whether the National Assembly can alter the private law re-

lationship between the financial institution and the student and, if so, whether the legislative amendments of1997 and 1998 satisfy the conditions under which it may do so.

2 Origin of the Case

6 Student loans in Quebec are governed by the AFAS. The Minister issues, to a student who is entitled to itunder the RFAS, a loan certificate authorizing the student to contract a loan with a financial institution recog-nized by the Minister within 90 days. The government pays the interest (AFAS, s. 24) and guarantees the repay-ment of the principal. Before 1997, the legislation exempted students who had completed their studies from pay-ing interest on their loans for a period specified in the loan certificate.

7 On July 1, 1997 (the day the first amending statute came into force), the National Assembly reduced theperiod during which student borrowers were exempt from making interest payments and repayments on the prin-

cipal by one month: An Act to amend the Act respecting financial assistance for students and the General andVocational Colleges Act, S.Q. 1996, c. 79, s. 5 ("Amending Act, 1997"). For students who, like the appellant,completed their studies during the winter trimester, the date on which interest payments and repayments on theprincipal were to begin was brought forward from January 1, 1999 to December 1, 1998. Effective May 1, 1998(the day the second amending statute came into force), students had to begin paying the interest as soon as theycompleted their studies: An Act to amend the Act respecting financial assistance for students, S.Q. 1997, c. 90,




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ss. 4 and 5 ("Amending Act, 1998").

8 The appellant obtained student loans between 1990 and 1996. He signed the last loan certificate with hisfinancial institution, the Royal Bank of Canada, on November 15, 1996. The certificate issued by the Minister

stated that the appellant could borrow an additional $4,255, which, after the amounts were consolidated, in-creased the total of his student loans from $22,510 to $26,765. The appellant completed his studies on aboutJanuary 31, 1998, in the winter trimester. According to clause 10 of the loan certificate, he had to begin repayingthe principal and paying the interest on the loan upon the expiration of the exemption period, that is, on January1, 1999.

9 Around July 21, 1998, the appellant inquired about the repayment of his loan. A Royal Bank representat-ive informed him verbally that interest on the loan had been debited since June 1, 1998 and that the principalwould be repayable as of December 1, 1998, in accordance with the directives issued by Aide financire auxtudiants. As a result of the 1997 and 1998 legislative amendments, the appellant was being charged interest onhis loan that, under the certificate signed in 1996, was supposed to have been paid by the Minister.

10 On August 7, 1998, the appellant repaid the principal of the loan and paid, without prejudice, $308.53 forthe interest accrued from June 1 to August 6, 1998.

11 The appellant was authorized to institute, on behalf of himself and other students forming a specificgroup, a class action against the respondent, the Attorney General of Quebec, seeking reimbursement of the in-terest paid on the loans that had been granted (Dikranian c. Qubec (Procureur gnral), [1999] J.Q. No. 2086(Que. S.C.), per Lvesque J.). He argued that Quebec's Ministre de l'ducation had to pay that interest in ac-cordance with the loan certificate issued before the legislative amendments were passed.

3 Judicial History

12 On December 13, 2001, Journet J. of the Superior Court dismissed the appellant's action. On January 27,

2004, a majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal, Rothman J.A. dissenting.

3.1 Superior Court ([2002] R.J.Q 969)

13 Journet J. began by rejecting the appellant's arguments based on the provisions of the Civil Code ofQubec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64 ("C.C.Q."), concerning contracts of adhesion as well as his arguments relating to theConsumer Protection Act, R.S.Q., c. P-40.1. He found that the rights and obligations of the financial institutionand the student were governed by the statute and the regulation, and not by the loan certificate. The rights andobligations were not imposed by one of the parties to the contract, as is the case with a contract of adhesion.They simply flowed from the exercise of statutory or regulatory powers. In his view, a mandatory provision of astatute or regulation cannot be nullified pursuant to the C.C.Q. on the ground that, because it is incorporated intoa contract, it is contractual in nature. This would be [TRANSLATION] "to confuse and distort concepts of

nullity that were incompatible with each other the rules of nullity applicable to contracts on the one hand andthe rules of nullity and invalidity applicable to statutes and regulations on the other..." (at para. 76). Journet J.was of the opinion that the loan certificate was not in itself a contract but rather a juridical act issued pursuant toan enactment governing the rights and obligations of the parties referred to therein.

14 Journet J. then addressed the question of the retroactivity of the legislation. In his view, the issue was theimmediate applicability of the legislation, not its retroactive application. He noted that the two amending stat-


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utes did not state that their provisions would take effect before they came into force. He added the following:

[TRANSLATION] Section 13 of the 1997 statute states that the new provisions of the Act are applicable tothe juridical situations in progress at the time of their coming into force. This statutory provision shows that

the legislature intended the new legislation to apply immediately to all existing and future loans.

The Court does not see how it could conclude that the two new statutes created different juridical situationsfor loans made before and after their enactment. In the absence of a provision to the contrary, every statutemust apply immediately, both to contracts entered into before and to those entered into after it comes intoforce.

The Court notes that there cannot be multiple sets of repayment terms for students completing their studiesin the same trimester unless specific legislative provisions so indicate.

The Court must favour an interpretation that results in the uniform application of one legislative schemerather than a multiplicity of schemes.

The interpretation suggested by [the appellant] for dealing with the temporal effect of the 1996 and 1997statutes on the [AFAS] leads to unfair and different treatment of students who are nonetheless in the samesituation, that is, who complete their studies in the same trimester and with the same loan amount to repay.If we accept the argument of [the appellant], only some of these students, he being one of them, would haveto pay less interest on their loans and would thus obtain benefits not granted to others. [at paras. 88-92]

15 Finally, on the issue of vested rights, Journet J. noted that none of the students concerned, the appellantincluded, had completed their studies at the time the two statutes giving rise to the conflicting interpretationswere enacted. The appellant had accordingly not taken advantage of the exemptions provided for in the originalstatute as of the time when the new provisions were enacted. He could not therefore claim to have vested rights.

3.2 Court of Appeal ([2004] Q.J. No. 303 (QL))

16 The appellant appealed from this judgment but was unsuccessful.

3.2.1 Forget J.A.

17 Forget J.A., Beauregard J.A. concurring, was of the opinion that the appeal should be dismissed. Hisbrief reasons for judgment read as follows:

[TRANSLATION]

Wireless Code - Motion for Leave to Appeal - Book of Authorities

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