Wilson and a World Safe for Democracy - cuni.cz

CHAPTERFOUR

WilsonandaWorldSafeforDemocracyWeareglad…tofightthusfortheultimatepeaceoftheworldandfortheliberationofthepeoples,theGermanpeoplesincluded;fortherightsofnationsgreatandsmallandtheprivilegeofmeneverywheretochoosetheirwayoflifeandofobedience.Theworldmustbemadesafefordemocracy.Itspeacemustbeplanteduponthetestedfoundationsofpoliticalliberty.Wehavenoselfishendstoserve.Wedesirenoconquestordomination.Weseeknoindemnitiesforourselves,nomaterialcompensationforthesacrificesweshallfreelymake.Wearebutoneofthechampionsoftherightsofmankind.Weshallbesatisfiedwhenthoserightshavebeenmadeassecureasthefaithandfreedomofthenationscanmakethem.

—WoodrowWilsonrequestingthattheCongressdeclarewaronGermany,April2,1917

ALTHOUGHAMERICANEFFORTS topromotedemocracyabroadhaveoften focusedon a singlecountry (as in the case of the Philippines or the Dominican Republic discussed in earlierchapters), thepresidencyofWoodrowWilsonhadfarmoreambitiousobjectives.HispolicytowardLatinAmericahadbeenregionalinscope,butwiththeentryoftheUnitedStatesintowaragainstGermanyin1917,hishorizonexpandedtoEurope,andWilsonsteppedforwardwithspecificproposalsforaglobalsystemofpeaceandsecurity.

Wilson’s recommendationsmarked the first time that theUnited States had elaborated aframework forworld order. It proposed that governments recognize each others’ legitimacywhentheywereconstitutionaldemocracies,andthattheyshouldmaintainthepeacethroughasystem of collective military security and liberal economic exchange. Envisioned as acomprehensive framework for world order,Wilson’s program constituted the foundation ofwhatafterwardcouldbecalledAmericanliberaldemocraticinternationalismor,moresimply,Wilsonianism.1

Wilson’sliberaldemocraticinternationalismwasnotaradicaldeparturefromtraditionalAmericannationalsecuritypolicy.ThomasJeffersonhadinsistedthattheUnitedStatescouldonly participate in a world community dominated by democratic states. With the MonroeDoctrine in 1823, the United States had declared itself opposed to the reimposition ofEuropeanruleintheWesternHemisphereandsoaligneditselfwithnationalistforcesinLatinAmerica,whosestatesWashingtonwouldrecognizeassovereign.WiththeOpenDoorNotesoftheturnofthecentury,Washingtonreaffirmeditscommitment(asoldastheRevolution)toanondiscriminatory international tradingsystem,hostile tomercantilismand imperialismalike(a position used again in the 1930s, especially to protest Japanese incursions on Chinesesovereignty).WhileWilson’sproposalstorestructureworldpoliticswerefarmoreboldthan

Smith, Tony. America's Mission : The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy, Princeton University Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/natl-ebooks/detail.action?docID=851019.Created from natl-ebooks on 2017-10-22 03:58:09.

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anyAmericanleaderhadeverbeforelaidout,theywerenonethelessquiteinlinewithbasicpropositionsofUnitedStatesforeignpolicysetlongbeforehistime.

Todaywecanappreciatemoreclearly thanwaspossible in1917–9theenormousstakesinvolvedbytheentryoftheUnitedStatesonthecentralstageofworldhistoryunderWilson’sleadership.Nationalism,whichhadbeguntoaffectworldpoliticsinthelateeighteenthcenturywiththeFrenchRevolution,wasnowaglobalforce,fuelingnotonlytheanimositiesofWorldWarIbutalsothebreakupoftheRussian,Ottoman,andAustro-Hungarianempiresthereafter.Newstateswereemerging,strugglingtoachievesupportfromtheirpopulationsthroughmassbased political parties. With the victory of the Russian Revolution in 1917, communismoffereditselfasanideologyofstatebuildingandnationalistconsciousnessattheverymomentWilsonwasproposingliberaldemocracytothesameend.Inshortorder,MussoliniandHitlerwouldofferyetathirdmodernalternativewithfascism.

Wilsonwasnot fullyawareof themagnitudeofhisundertaking,ofcourse.LikeLincolnduringtheCivilWar,Wilsoncouldonlysensethatthestrugglehewasengagedinconcernedmore than the traditional ends of state policy, and that the character of the peace to beestablishedafterthewarwouldbecriticaltoworldaffairsinamorelastingwaythanvictoryinbattleoftenentailed.HisreactiontotheBolshevikRevolutionwashesitant,andhehadleftofficebeforefascismtookpowerinItaly.Nonetheless,inhisambitiousinitiativesof1917–9,WilsonlaidthegroundworkformanyofthefundamentaltenetsofAmericannationalsecuritypolicyfortherestofthetwentiethcentury:thatnationalismshouldberespectedasoneofthemostpowerfulpoliticalsentimentsofourtimes;thatdemocracyisthemostpeace-lovingandonlylegitimateformofmoderngovernment,andthattheUnitedStateshasaself-interestedaswellasamoralobligationtofurtheritsprospectsabroad;thatdemocracyandcapitalismaremutuallyreinforcingsystemsofcollectiveactionsolongaslargeaccumulationsofwealthdonotcontrolthepoliticalprocess;thatinaworlddestinedtobecomposedofmanystates,theneedformutualunderstandingandcommonpurposecalls foranewrespect for internationallaw sustained by multilateral institutional arrangements; that a nondiscriminatory worldeconomicsystemthatisantiprotectionistandantimercantilistpromotesgeneralprosperityandpeace;andthataglobalsystemofcollectivesecurityisnecessarytostopaggression.

Thenasnow,however,twoobviousquestionsarise.Thefirstwaswhetheraworldorderdominated by democratic states could, in fact, be established. If democracy’s prospects forsinkingrootsabroadweredim,wouldAmericanotbebetteradvisedtofollowthepracticesoftraditional statecraft, which dictatedworkingwith foreign governments as theywere ratherthanbecomingengagedindifficultandprotractedstrugglestochangetheirdomesticcharacter?The second question was whether, once in place, a world community of democratic stateswouldinfactoperateanydifferentlythanotherstatesystemshadinthepast.IfChristianandMuslimstateswenttowarwiththeirownkind,whynotdemocracies?

The first question asks whether there are boundaries set by culture and history to theexpansion of democratic government. Perhaps one could dispensewith the requirement thatagrarian societies become democratic. Their predisposition to authoritarianism was strong,theirabilitytodisruptthepeaceoftheworldminimal,anditwasonlyatalaterstageintheir


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political development that a choice for democracywouldbe possible.Butwhy assume thatotherindustrialcountriesmustbecomedemocraticbeforetheUnitedStatescouldresteasy?Ifliberaldemocracyhadlessthanuniversalappeal,mightnottheUnitedStatesbewelladvisedto avoid pushing its ways too hard, both for the sake of peace and for the purpose ofsafeguarding democratic government where it had naturally developed? The first argumentagainstWilson’shopetomaketheworldsafefordemocracy—whetherin1919,1945,or1995—is that it misdirects American attention from the essential question with respect to theconductofstatesintheinternationalarena—aretheyhostiletotheUnitedStatesornot?—toquestionsof their internal order. It incites an antipathy towardnon-democratic governments,whichmaybeill-advised.Itindulgesthecountryinamoralisticandself-righteousmissionarycrusade,whichisaquixoticuseofpowerthatcanbecruelandself-defeating.

Evenshouldanorderofdemocraticstatesinfactbecreated,thesecondquestionaskswhyweshouldassumeitcould indeedbeorganizedsoas tooperatefor thesakeof thecommongood.Whatreasonistheretoassumesomespecialdispensationfordemocracytoredeemtheworldwhennoothercommoncode,be itmonarchical,Christian,or Islamic,hadsucceededbefore? Why should democracies necessarily be more cooperative and peace-loving thanempires, for example? May not popular passions be as easily aroused as those of anaristocracy?Will themodernworldwith its economic and environmental interdependenciesnot breed asmany sources of conflicting interest as at any time in the past, perhapsmore?Mightnottheensuingstrugglesbetweenpeoplesratherthanprincesbeespeciallycruel?

ThequestionssurroundingWilsonianismthereforeconcernnotonlyhisadministration,buttheconductofmuchofAmericanforeignpolicyinthiscentury.Theanswerstothesequestionsremainasurgentforourtimesasfortheworldof1919.

WILSONIANISMINTHEORYTheessentialgeniusofWilson’sproposalsforanewworldorderafterWorldWarIwasthatithadavisionoftheproperorderingofdomesticaswellasinternationalpoliticsthatwaswellsuitedtothedevelopmentofpoliticalandeconomicforcesworldwideinthetwentiethcentury.Here was a period in Germany, Russia, and Eastern Europe where social forces werestrugglingoverthemodernizationofthestate,whererivalconceptionsofnationalunityweretrying tomake government responsive through party government to nationalistic appeals forpopular sovereignty. In domestic terms, Wilson respected the power of nationalism andfavored national self-determination. Stateswere presumed to be legitimatewhen theyweredemocraticallyconstituted,anditwasexpectedthatinmostinstancesethnicboundarieswouldmakeforthefrontiersofcountries.Inthecontextof theworldof1918,suchaproposalwasradical; it accepted the dismemberment of empires (those of Austria-Hungary, Russia, andTurkeyimmediately; thoseof theWesternEuropeanpowersbyimplicationthereafter),anditworkedforthereplacementofautocracieswithdemocraciesinGermanyandthenewnation-statestotheEast.2

For international relations,Wilsoncalled fora liberaleconomic regimeanda systemofSmith, Tony. America's Mission : The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy, Princeton University Press, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/natl-ebooks/detail.action?docID=851019.Created from natl-ebooks on 2017-10-22 03:58:09.

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collective security designed to preserve the peace. Again, his initiative was radical for itchallengedthecompetitivemercantilisticpracticesthatdictatedmuchofworldcommercewitha more open trading system, just as it proposed to replace competitive balance of powerthinkingpoliticallywithwhathecalled“aconvenantofcooperativepeace.”

In short, the foundation of Wilson’s order was the democratic nation-state; itssuperstructurewas an international order of economic,military, andmoral interdependence.Nationalismwed to democracy; democracies wed in peace, prosperity, andmutual respectembodiedininternationallawandinstitutions:suchwasWilson’sessentialvision,aformofliberalismhefelt tobebothnecessaryandappropriateforhiseraandessential toguaranteeAmericannationalsecurity.Eachoftheseinterlockingpropositionsdeservesacloserlook.

Inhisviewson theproperorganizationofdomesticaffairs,Wilsonwasamanof1848.Thatyearmarkedthefirstfloweringofthat“springtimeofnations”when,followingupheavalsin Paris, populist uprisings confronted the German and Austro-Hungarian monarchies withdemandsdemocracyandnationalself-determination.Overandagain,Wilsoninsistedthatthepeace treaties signed in Paris in 1919 had as their “central object … to establish theindependenceandprotecttheintegrityoftheweakpeoplesoftheworld.”3Oragain,“TheheartandcenterofthistreatyisthatitsetsatlibertypeoplealloverEuropeandinAsiawhohadhithertobeenenslavedbypowerswhichwerenottheirrightfulsovereignsandmasters.”4AshedeclaredinacelebratedaddresstotheAmericanCongressinJanuary1917:

Nopeacecanlast,oroughttolast,whichdoesnotrecognizeandaccepttheprinciplethatgovernmentsderivealltheirjustpowersfromtheconsentofthegoverned,andthatnorightanywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they wereproperty.Itakeitforgranted…thatstatesmeneverywhereareagreedthatthereshouldbeaunited, independent, andautonomousPoland, and thathenceforth inviolable securityoflife, of worship, and of industrial and social development should be guaranteed to allpeopleswho have lived hitherto under the power of government devoted to a faith andpurposehostiletotheirown.…IwouldfainbelievethatIamspeakingforthesilentmassofmankindeverywherewhohaveasyethadnoplaceoropportunity to speak their realheartsout.…nonationshouldseektoextenditspolityoveranyothernationorpeople,buteverypeopleshouldbeleftfreetodetermineitsownpolity,itsownwayofdevelopment,unhindered,unthreatened,unafraid,thelittlealongwiththegreatandpowerful.5

As these linessuggest,Wilsonwasa friend tonationalismeverywhere.Heendorsed theBalfourDeclaration,promisingtheJewishpeopleaplaceinPalestine.Hewassympathetictothe needs of the Armenians (and deliberated whether the United States should exercise amandate over this people). He gave repeated assurances to the Germans that, once theirautocratic leaderswere deposed, their national integritywould be respected. CzechoslovakpatriotsquotedWilson’swordsof1898astheirorganizingsloganintheUnitedStatesduringWorldWarI:“Nolapseoftime,nodefeatofhopes,seemedsufficienttoreconciletheCzechsofBohemia to incorporationwithAustria.Prideof race and thememoriesof a notable anddistinguished history kept them always at odds with the Germans at their gate and the


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government over their heads.”6As the president put it in 1919, “self-determination is not amerephrase.Itisanimperativeprincipleofaction,whichstatesmenwillhenceforthignoreattheirperil.”7

Respect for nationalism was not enough, however. Nations needed to be organizeddemocratically. From Wilson’s perspective, a major advantage of democratic governmentaside from itsmoral appealwas that itwasmore stable and less predatory than autocraticgovernment. Democracy was more stable because it provided a formula that couldaccommodatecontendingsocialforcesbyprovidingfororderlychangeundertheruleoflaw;it was thus a form of government appropriate to the increased specialization andinterdependenceofmodernlife.Democracywaslesspredatorybecausepublicopinioncouldsupervise official decision-making and prevent the kind of aggressions abroad that servedselfishprivateinterests.Aconstitutionalistfordomesticmatters,Wilsonwasaconstitutionalistfor theworld community aswell. Because no nondemocratic constitutional government hadestablishedtheruleoflawtothedegreeofthedemocracies,democracy’sinternalproceduresforconflictresolutionandcompromise—forprovidingunitywhilerespectingdiversity—mightbetransferredtoinstitutionsgoverningworldaffairs.

Wilson’sfaithinpopularsovereigntymadehimtheenemyofmonarchicalrule.Inthecaseof Germany, Wilson repeatedly distinguished between the German people and theirgovernment.AsheputittotheCongressinhisrequestforadeclarationofwar:

WehavenoquarrelwiththeGermanpeople.Wehavenofeelingtowardthembutoneofsympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their government acted inentering this war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. It was a wardetermined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the old, unhappy days whenpeopleswerenowhereconsultedbytheirrulersandwarswereprovokedandwagedintheinterestofdynastiesoroflittlegroupsofambitiousmenwhowereaccustomedtousetheirfellowmenaspawnsandtools.8

Or again: “German rulers have been able to upset the peace of theworld only because theGermanpeoplewerenot sufferedunder their tutelage to share the comradeshipof theotherpeoplesoftheworldeitherinthoughtorinpurpose.Theywereallowedtohavenoopinionoftheirownwhichmightbesetupasaruleofconductfor thosewhoexercisedauthorityoverthem.”9Thus, as thewar neared its end,Wilson indicated that theGerman surrender shouldcomefromrepresentativesof thepeople; inotherwords, that theKaiserbedeposedandthewayclearedfordemocracybeforepeacecouldbeconcluded.

Similarly, Wilson welcomed “the wonderful and heartening things” that transpired inRussiaduringMarch,1917,whentheCzarwasforcedtoabdicatetorepublicanforces:

Russiawasknownby thosewhoknewitbest tohavebeenalways in factdemocraticatheart,inallthevitalhabitsofherthought,inalltheintimaterelationshipsofherpeoplethatspoketheirnaturalinstinct,theirhabitualattitudetowardlife.Theautocracythatcrownedthesummitofherpoliticalstructure,longasithadstoodandterribleaswastherealityof


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its power,was not in factRussian in origin, character or purpose; and now it has beenshaken off and the great, generous Russian people have been added in all their naivemajestyandmighttotheforcesthatarefightingforfreedomintheworld,forjustice,andforpeace.10

ThemarriageofdemocracytonationalismwasnotatallaforegoneconclusioninWilson’sthinking.InEasternEurope,theprospectsfordemocracyvariedwiththecountry.AsWilson’sexperience with Polish nationalists during the war taught him, not all were so favorablydisposed as the Czechoslovaks for a postwar consolidation of republican government.11ThroughoutmuchofCentralandEasternEuropeweretheoldright-wingmilitaristic“forcesoforder”embodied in the aristocracies andautocracies thatWilson somuchdeplored, againstwhomAmericahadgonetowar.12Thewarover,thesereactionarieswouldschemeonceagaintotakepowerandwagewar.Andontheleftwerethenew“forcesofmovement”embodiedinthe Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917. Here Wilson perceived an energy born ofoppressions centuries old, now demanding “world revolution,” which threatened to bringstruggle and suffering to thepeoplesofEast andCentralEurope—andperhapsbeyond, intoAsia—inthedisorderfollowingthedestructionofwar.IsaiahBowman,achiefadvisertothepresidentin1918–9,citesWilsonsayingthat“thepoisonofBolshevismwasreadilyacceptedby theworldbecause ‘it is a protest against theway theworldhasworked.’ Itwill beourbusinessatthePeaceConferencetofightforaneworder,‘agreeablyifwecan,disagreeablyifnecessary.’”13

In these politically polarized circumstances,Wilson preached the doctrine of the liberaldemocratic alternative to reaction and to revolution, a thirdway forward,which called forclear resolve. Insomemeasure,Wilsonunderstood thefullscopeofhisenormousambition:“Theconservativesdonotrealizewhatforcesarelooseintheworldatthepresenttime,”heobservedinJanuary1919.“Liberalismistheonlythingthatcansavecivilizationfromchaos.…Liberalismmustbemoreliberalthaneverbefore,itmustevenberadical,ifcivilizationistoescapethetyphoon.”14

Liberalism:herewasthetouchstoneonwhichWilsonbasedhishopesforaneworderofworldpeace.FollowinginthefootstepsofBritishandAmericanliberalsbeforehim,Wilsonviewed himself as a cosmopolitan as well as an American, a man able to understand andrespect the interests of others and to look forward to a structure ofworld order thatwouldpermitnationstoworktogethercooperativelyinasystemwheretheself-interestofeachwouldbe realized in terms of the common interest of all. Nationalism and democracy were notenough. Only international economic and political cooperation could preserve the peace.“Unlessalltheright-thinkingnationsoftheworldaregoingtoconcerttheirpurposeandtheirpower,thistreatyisnotworththepaperitiswrittenon,”hewarnedin1919,“becauseitisatreaty where peace rests upon the right of the weak, and only the power of the strong canmaintaintherightoftheweak.”15

The economic dimension of the new democraticworld orderwould bemodeled on thekindofmultilateral,nondiscriminatorysystemtheBritishhadpromotedsincethefirsthalfof


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the nineteenth century—a set of measures known as international economic liberalism. TheUnitedStateshadbackedsuchproceduresearlier,mostvigorously in internationalaffairsbytheOpenDoorNotesof1899–1900,whenWashingtonaskedthatChinabepermittedtoadoptauniformstandwith respect to tradeand investment, equalwith regard toallwithwhom ittreated. America did not endorse free trade, but it was most decidedly liberal and anti-imperialist in that, as the name Open Door suggested, states would deal with one anothereconomicallyinuniformtermswithoutspecialfavors(so-calledmostfavorednationtreatment,by which all trading partners would be extended themost generous terms provided any ofthem).

The political significance of this policy was even more important than its economicpromise.TheOpenDoorNoteswerethefunctionalequivalentoftheMonroeDoctrinefortheFarEast,sinceWashingtonsoughttopreservethepoliticalintegrityofChinaagainstdemandsthatitbedividedintospheresofinfluencebasedonEuropeanandJapaneseeconomicinterest.

Accordingly, inSeptember1916,speakingof theAmericanbusinessstake in thePanamaCanal,thepresidentdeclared:

Hereistheloomallreadyuponwhichtospreadthethreadswhichcanbeworkedintoafabricoffriendshipandwealthsuchaswehaveneverknownbefore!Therealwealthofforeignrelationships,myfellow-citizens,whethertheybetherelationshipsoftradeoranyother kind of intercourse, the real wealth of those relationships is thewealth ofmutualconfidenceandunderstanding.Ifwedonotunderstandthemandtheydonotunderstandus,we cannot tradewith them,much less be their friends, and it is only byweaving theseintimatethreadsofconnectionthatweshallbeabletoestablishthatfundamentalthing,thatpsychological,spiritualnexuswhichis,afterall,therealwarpandwoofoftradeitself.Wehavegottohavetheknowledge,wehavegottohavethecooperation,andthenbackofallthathasgottoliewhatAmericahasinabundanceandonlyhastorealize,thatistosay,theself-reliantenterprise.16

Given these liberal assumptions,WilsonopposedGermanmercantilist principles,whichimpliedthenecessityofpoliticalcontroloverforeignpeoplesfortheadvancementofGermanindustry. Speaking before the American Federation of Labor in November 1917, Wilsonpraised the German success: “The whole world stood at admiration of her wonderfulintellectualandmaterialachievements.…Shehadaccesstoallthemarketsoftheworld.…Shehad a ‘place in the sun.’”But given the structure and attitudes ofGermanbusiness, thepresidentcontinued,“theauthoritiesofGermanywerenotsatisfied”:

There is no important industry inGermany uponwhich theGovernment has not laid itshands,todirectitand,whennecessityarose,controlit.…Youwillfindthattheywerethesamesortofcompetitionthatwehavetriedtopreventbylawwithinourownborders.Iftheycouldnot sell theirgoodscheaper thanwecouldselloursataprofit to themselvestheycouldgetasubsidyfromtheGovernmentwhichmadeitpossibletosellthemcheaperanyhow, and the conditions of competitionwere thus controlled in largemeasure by the


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GermanGovernment itself.But thatdidnot satisfy [them].All thewhile therewas lyingbehinditsthoughtinitsdreamsofthefutureapoliticalcontrolwhichwouldenableitinthelongruntodominatethelaborandtheindustryof theworld.Theywerenotcontentwithsuccess by superior achievement; theywanted success by authority… [thus] theBerlin-BaghdadRailwaywasconstructed.…Isawamapinwhichthewholethingwasprintedinappropriate black the other day, and the black stretched all the way from Hamburg toBaghdad—thebulkofGermanpowerinsertedintotheheartoftheworld.17

Thepointisworthemphasizing,foritwouldreappearinAmericanconducttowardGermanyafter1945:GermancapitalistsweretobeobligedtoseetheworldfromaliberalOpenDoorperspective, not from amercantilist point of view,which implied the necessity of politicalcontroloverforeignpeoplesfortheadvancementofGermanindustry.

Wilson was also outspoken in his distrust of unregulated American trusts. Politics, noteconomics,shouldcommand.SoundingeverybittheProgressive,Wilsonwarned:“Menwhoare behind any interest alwaysunite in organization, and the danger in every country is thatthesespecialinterestswillbetheonlythingsorganized,andthatthecommoninterestwillbeunorganized against them. The business of government is to organize the common interestagainst the special interest.” The same logic applied abroad. He broke with Taft’s dollardiplomacy,forcedAmericanbanksoutofChina,andresistedloanstoLatinAmerica,whichhefeltmightcompromisenational sovereignties in the region.Similarly,writingof theRussianRevolution toward theendofhis life,Wilson remarked“thatgreat andwidespread reactionlike that which is now unquestionably manifesting itself against capitalism do not occurwithoutcauseorprovocation”:

…beforewecommitourselvesirreconcilablytoanattitudeofhostilitytothismovementof the time,we ought frankly to put to ourselves the question: Is the capitalistic systemunimpeachable? … Have capitalists generally used their power for the benefit of thecountriesinwhichtheircapitalisemployedandforthebenefitoftheirfellowmen?Isitnot,onthecontrary,tootruethatcapitalisthaveoftenseemedtoregardthemenwhomtheyused as mere instruments of profit?… if these offenses against high morality and truecitizenshiphavebeenfrequentlyobservable,arewetosay that theblamefor thepresentdiscontentandturbulenceiswhollyonthesideofthosewhoareinrevoltagainstthem?18

One body of literature has seenWilson’s primary postwar project as the creation of aliberal internationaleconomicorder,with theLeagueofNationsservingas itsguarantor.Bytheselights,Wilsonianismisessentiallysynonymouswith“liberalcapitalist(notdemocratic)internationalism,”andthismaterialandclassinterest,notthepoliticalrhetoricofdemocracy,istheheartofhisappealtolaterAmericanleaders.19

TheproblemwiththisinterpretationofWilsonianismisthatittakesanaspectofWilson’sagendaandmistakesitforhiswholeprogram.CertainlyWilsonwasaninternationaleconomicliberal; thatpoint isnot indoubt.ButWilson’sprimaryconcernswerepolitical.Asidefromsponsoring democratic national governments, his first priority was the League of Nations,


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whosebasicmandatehesawasprovidingcollectivemilitarysecurity;economicissuesweresecondary in its functioning (and even then included the creation of the International LaborOrganization,whichmightbe seenas a constrainton liberal capitalism).Nordid thePeaceConferenceengageinprolongeddeliberationsonanewworldeconomicorder.Germanywasnot ushered into a liberal economic order internationally; the closed new states of EasternEuropewerenobettersuitedforsuchanarrangement.More, theUnitedStateswasadamantthat interallied loansbe repaid,puttinga serious strainonglobal finances. In fact,Wilson’sshortcomingwasthathedidnotstressenoughtheeconomicdimensionofhisagendaforworldorder.JohnMaynardKeynesmayhaveclearlyseenat thetimetheneedforaneconomicallyintegratedEuropeincooperationwiththeUnitedStates,butitwaspreciselybecauseWilsondid not fully understand what was needed that Keynes became such a harsh critic of thepresident.20

WhatmatteredfarmoretoWilson,andwherehis thinkingwasmoreoriginal,wasinhisambitiontobuildaliberalcollectivesecuritysystemcenteredonEuropeafter1918,anideathatwasembodiedintheLeagueofNations.21AsWilsonaccuratelyperceived,theprospectsfor the survival of the young democracies of Eastern Europe he was working so hard toestablish would be greatly enhanced if they could have cooperative relations with a fullydemocratizedGermanyandwiththemoreestablisheddemocraciesofWesternEuropeandtheUnitedStatesintheLeague.Asthepresidentputitearlyin1919:

Doyou realizehowmanynewnationsaregoing tobesetup in thepresenceofoldandpowerful nations in Europe and left there, there, if left by us, without a disinterestedfriend? Do you believe in the Polish cause as I do? Are you going to set up Poland,immature,inexperienced,asyetunorganized,andleaveherwithacircleofarmiesaroundher?Doyoubelieve in theaspirationsof theCzechoslovaksandJugo-slavsas Ido?Doyou know how many powers would be quick to pounce upon them if there were notguarantees of the world behind their liberty? Have you thought of the sufferings ofArmenia?YoupouredoutyourmoneytohelpsuccorArmeniansaftertheysuffered.Nowsetupyourstrengthsothattheyshallneversufferagain.22

ThegeneralpremiseonwhichWilson’sargumentdependedwastoberepeatedtimeandagaininwordssimilartothoseheusedinJanuary1917:

Thequestionuponwhichthewholefuturepeaceandpolicyoftheworlddependsisthis:isthepresentwarastruggleforajustandsecurepeace,oronlyforanewbalanceofpower?Ifitbeonlyastruggleforanewbalanceofpower,whowillguarantee,whocanguarantee,the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement?Only a tranquil Europe can be a stableEurope.Theremustbe,notabalanceofpower,butacommunityofpower;notorganizedrivalries,butanorganizedcommonpeace.23

Three basic assumptions undergirdedWilson’s notion of the League. First, itwas to becomposed of democratically constituted states. “A steadfast concert for peace can never be


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maintainedexceptbyapartnershipofdemocraticnations.Noautocraticgovernmentcouldbetrusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be a league of honor, apartnershipofopinion.…Onlyfreepeoplescanholdtheirpurposeandtheirhonorsteadytoacommon end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own.”24Subsequently, the strictureon theneed tobedemocraticwas loosened in favorof admittingstates thatweresimply“fullyself-governing,”while themandatesystempledged theLeagueeventually to welcome other peoples under foreign control to a club of self-determiningcountries.Of the thirtystates thatsigned theoriginal instrumentcreating theLeague in1919,fewerthanhalfweredemocracies.In1938,whenLeaguemembershiphadincreasedtofifty-sevenstates,theproportionwassmallerstill.25

Wilson’s second assumptionwas that these self-governingpeoples shouldbe capableofdisinterested moral judgment and should recognize that henceforth their individual interestwould best be served by pursuing the common good enshrined in international law andorganization.“Thenationsoftheworldhavebecomeeachother’sneighbors,”hedeclaredinMay1916.“Itistotheirinterestthattheyshouldunderstandeachother.Inorderthattheymayunderstandeachother,itisimperativethattheyshouldagreetocooperateinacommoncauseand that they should so act that the guiding principle of that common cause shall be even-handedandimpartialjustice.”26TheFourteenPoints,announcedinJanuary1918,weretobeastatementofgeneralrulesaswellasspecifictermsforpeaceinEurope.Beyondthis,Wilsondid not go, assuming that the League should work out its mechanism of interactionexperimentally as it dealt with issues of world order. His presumption was that once acommitmenthadbeenfreelyundertakenbymemberstatestoliveinternationallyunderaruleoflaw,itwasuptotheLeaguetoprescribethedetailsofitsconductasitfacedthechallengestoitsmandate.27

Wilson’sthirdassumptionwasthatwhiletheworlddesperatelyneededtoendarmsraces,theLeaguemustrecognizetherewouldbeoccasionsonwhichitmightbeobligedtouseforce.“Mere agreements may not make peace secure,” he observed in January 1917. “It will beabsolutelynecessarythataforcebecreatedasaguarantorofthepermanencyofthesettlementsomuchgreater than theforceofanynationnowengagedoranyalliancehithertoformedorprojectedthatnonation,noprobablecombinationofnationscouldfaceorwithstandit.Ifthepeacepresentlytobemadeistoendure,itmustbeapeacemadesecurebytheorganizedmajorforce of mankind.”28 Later, Wilson was to retreat from such a radical suggestion, with itsimplicationthatasupranationalgovernmentwouldhaveatitsdisposalforcessopowerful.TheLeaguewasnottohaveanindependentmilitaryforcenoritsownfinancialresources,anditsCouncilhadtobeunanimousforcollectivedeterrenceofaggressiontotakeplace.TheLeaguewasnotaworldgovernment.29

WILSONIANISMINPRACTICENationalism, democracy, a liberalworld economic order, a system of collective security, amoralcommitmenttoleadershipinsuchanarrangementonthepartof theUnitedStates: this


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wastheWilsonianprojectofliberalismforworldorderafter1918.Intheinterwaryearstheseambitionscametonaught.NowaywasfoundtointegratetheSovietUnion,bornofthatwar,intotheEuropeanbalanceofpower,whilethethreatofcommunismdomesticallyputaheavystrain on democratic forces throughout the continent. Except in Czechoslovakia, democracywasunabletofindfertilesoilinEasternEurope,whereazoneofweakstateslookedwithfearalternativelyatBerlin andMoscow.After1929, aweakly structured systemof internationaltradeandfinancebuckledunder theweightof theDepression.After fourteenyearsofeffort,democracycollapsedinGermanyin1933withtheriseofHitler.DemocraticforcesinFranceandBritainlosttheirself-confidence.TheUnitedStatesrefusedtojointheLeagueofNationsandlapsedagainintoisolationism.

Duringthe1920s,aleadingexplanationofthefailureofWilson’sambitionshadtodowiththeconductofthepresidenthimself.Wilsonabandonedhisprinciples,theargumentwent,andintheprocessbetrayedthehopesofthoseEuropeandemocratswhoheldtothem,theGermansmostof all.Thepresident thencompoundedhismistakes inParisby failing to convincehisfellowAmericansof theimportanceofhisprogram.America’ssubsequent isolationism—theSenate’s rejection of the ParisTreaty, theRepublican victory in the presidential election of1920,Washington’sinabilitytostoptheeconomiccrisisinEuropethereafterortocountertherise of fascism—was certainly not the intended consequence of Wilson’s policies.Nevertheless,isolationismwastheregrettablebutnotsurprisingresultofastyleofleadershipthatwas tooabstract and toomoralistic to anticipate thedifficultiesof implementing suchavisionarypolicy.Thiswastheessentialchargeofinfluentialcommentatorsatthetime,suchasJohn Maynard Keynes, Harold Nicolson, and Walter Lippmann, all devoted Wilsonians in1918,whoweresorelydisappointedbythepeacesettlement.Keynes’sindictmentisthemosttrenchantandfamousevermadeofWilson.Underthepressureofquicker,sharpermeninPariswho fought for national interests only (especially French Prime Minister GeorgesClemenceau),Wilson losthisbalance, soKeynesmaintained, andpermitteda“CarthaginianPeace:…ifever theactionofa single individualmatters, thecollapseof thePresidenthasbeenoneofthedecisivemoraleventsofhistory.”30

ThemostobviouswaytocriticizeWilson in termsofhisownprincipleswas tocite theconditionsimposedonthedefeatedGermansatVersailles.In1917Wilsonhadmadeacriticaldistinctionbetween theGermanmilitaristicautocracyand theGermanpeople.But thepeacesettlement forced the new republican government of Germany to sign a “war guilt clause”assuming Germany’s sole moral responsibility for the war, saddled that country withreparationsonascalethatappearedruinous,anddepriveditofterritorieswhileforbiddingitsunificationwithAustriainawaythatgoadedtoangerGermannationalism.WhathadhappenedtoWilson’scallin1917fora“peacewithoutvictory?”

Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor’s terms imposed upon thevanquished.Itwouldbeacceptedinhumiliation,underduress,atanintolerablesacrifice,andwouldleaveasting,aresentment,abittermemoryuponwhichtermsofpeacewouldrestnotpermanently,butonlyasuponquicksand.Onlyapeacebetweenequalscan last.


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Only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in acommonbenefit.31

WilsonmayhavethoughttosavehimselffromthebrutalityofthepeacewiththepromiseoftheLeague.YetaccordingtoLippmann,Nicolson,andcompany,notonlywasthisadoubtfulgamblegiven the compromises hehad tomake to achieve it and thevolatile tempers of thetimes,butthepresidentmaderepeatedmistakesinhiseffortstopersuadetheAmericanpublicofthewisdomoftheaccords.Thus,Wilsonshouldnothavemadethecongressionalelectionsof November 1918 a test of loyalty to his program. Or he should have taken a bipartisandelegationwithhimtoParisinJanuary1919(prominentfriendlyRepublicanssuchasTaftorRoot, for example). Most importantly, when the treaty came up for Senate ratification inNovember 1919 and again in March 1920, he might have accepted reservations to theprovisionsfortheLeaguethatwouldnothavesubstantiallycompromiseditsoperations.Inallof these respects,Wilson significantlydamaged theprospects that his fellowcitizenswouldwillinglyengagethemselvesinadramaticshiftinAmericanforeignpolicytowardaprominentandpermanentengagementinEuropeanpolitics.

Was the president’s stubborness due to his Calvinism, as many havemaintained; to hisshaken physical state and the toll this took on him psychically, as more recent work hassuggested;oragain, to thechanging roleof thepresidency inAmerican life?32Whatever theverdict,Wilsoncouldhavepromotedhispolicyfarmoreskillfullythanhedid.

Yet, suppose that Wilson had been in full possession of his faculties and had built abipartisan consensus around his ideas. Would the world then have been made safe fordemocracy?ToputthequestionofWilsonianisminthesetermsistoshiftthefocusofanalysisfromthepresidentandhisprogramtotheworldinwhichitwastooperate.

Circumstances in Europe created four major categories of objective difficulties forWilson’s plans: the character of Allied (and especially French) demands for the postwarsettlement;theimpactoftheBolshevikRevolutiononclasstensionsinEurope(evenmorethanonrelationsamongstates);theprospectsfordemocracyoverthemediumterminGermany;thesituation politically in Eastern Europe, a largely agrarian region with ethnically mixedpeoples.

The first of theseobstacles toWilson’svision—French security concernwith respect toGermany—was the most politically charged matter at the Peace Conference.33 Thedetermination of America’s allies—and the French in particular—that Germany would bemadetopaydearlyforthewarprovedtremendouslycostlytoWilson.WithoutFranco-Germanreconciliation,whatchancecouldtherebeforliberaldemocraticforcestojoinhandsacrossnational boundaries? How could a liberal economic order be maintained; how could theLeague function effectively? Under Georges Clemenceau’s leadership, the French wereworking to divide and bleedGermany to such an extent that its preponderance over Francewouldforeverbeended.WhereasWilsonproposedtocontrolGermanpowerbyintegratingitintoamoreunitedEurope,theFrenchproposedtodealwiththeproblembydismemberingthecountry.


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Clemenceau’swar aims (not themost radical expressed in France)made short shrift ofWilson’s call for “peace without victory.” In the east, in addition to favoring maximumboundariesforCzechoslovakiainthepeacesettlement,theFrenchsupportedmaximumPolishclaims(forUpperSilesiaandDanzigespecially,aswellasforeasternGalicia)—alltohavestrong allies against Germany in the region. To the south, the French prevented AustrianunificationwithGermany.In thewest, theFrenchnotonlyexpectedthereturnofAlsaceandLorrainebutalsocovetedtheSaarandinfluenceoveranautonomousRhenishstateontheleftbankoftheRhine.SomuchforWilson’sideasofFranco-Germanrapprochementorhisnotionofextendingtheprinciplesofnationalself-determinationtotheGermansandAustrians.34

Asforreparations,theGermanswouldpaydearly.SomuchfortheideasofanintegratedEuropeaneconomicsystemwheretheadvantageofeachismaximizedbytheadvantageofall.EvenifClemenceauwasonlythinkingdefensively,andeveniflatereconomistswereskepticalastohowdamagingthereparationsactuallywere,herewastheold-fashionedworldofpowerpoliticsofadirectandbrutalsort.35

Wilson’sproblemwith theFrenchwasaggravatedbyanegotiationprocessat thePeaceConference,where theFrenchcould findsupport from theBritishor the Italiansonspecificmatters.Inaddition,thecomplexityoftheissues,thetimeinvolved,thecallsforrevengeintheUnited States as well as among the allies—all of these wore down an already physicallyexhaustedWilson.“Hang theKaiser;”“squeeze theorange til thepipssqueak”: thiswas themoodoutsidetheconferencewalls.AndwhatwereWilson’salternatives?Asevenhiscriticshave conceded, had he walked away from the conference the British and French positionsmighthavehardenedandthenewdemocraticleadersinGermanybeenhandicappedevenmoreintheirfunctions.36PerhapstheLeaguecouldsetrightwhatthepeacesettlementhadsobadlycompromised,orsoWilsonmusthavehoped.

A second obstacle toWilson’s liberal democratic internationalism outside his power tocontrolcamefromthetriumphofLenininRussia.WilsonhadwelcomedthefalloftheCzarinMarch1917,buthedidnotapproveoftheBolshevikRevolutionthatNovember.Yethekeptacarefuldistance,justifyingthesmallnumberoftroopshesenttotheSovietUnionintermsofcontinuingthestruggleagainstGermany.“Theword‘Bolshevik’coversmanydifferentthings,”he declared at the Peace Conference in March 1919. “In my opinion, to try to stop arevolutionarymovementislikeusingabroomtosweepbackaspringtide.…ThesolemeansofcounteringBolshevismistomakeitscausesdisappear.Moreover,itisaperilousenterprise;wedon’tevenquiteknowwhatitscausesare.”

Giventhiscaution,Wilsontemporized,apparentlyhopingeitherthattheRevolutionwouldturnmoremoderateorthatitwouldcollapseduetointernalconditions.AlthoughthepresidentwantedtheSovietstobeinvitedtothepeaceconference,theUnitedStateshadnofixedpolicytoward the Soviet Union during its critical deliberations. As his comments of May 1919reveal, his overtures were based on caution: “We can recognize none of these [rival]governmentsasthegovernmentofRussia,andwemustbindthemtoaprocedurewhichwilllead to the formation of a regular democratic government. If they resist, we can break offrelationswiththem.”37


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The French deplored Lenin’s success for the fact that the revolution had expropriatedimportantFrenchinvestmentsanddeniedParisthereassuranceofanallytotheeasttocounterGermany.WhereasthisconcernmighthavereconciledthemtocloserrelationswithBerlin,theFrenchwerenottobemoved.

Perhaps most importantly, by splitting the left and by terrifying the right, the RussianRevolutiondimmedtheprospectsfordemocracyinGermanyandEasternEuropeevenmore,whilecomplicatingpoliticalmattersinFrance,Spain,andItaly.InGermany,therightbecamemore assertive, the democratic left moremoderate. In Eastern Europe, the new democraticregimes installed from the Baltic to theAdriatic and the Black Seawere soon swept frompoweras theregiondeliberated itspredicamentbetweenMoscowandBerlin.38 Inshort, theconsequencesoftheBolshevikRevolutionseriouslycomplicatedWilson’shopesforapeacebased on democratic regimes in Europe by weakening the ranks of the democrats, whoexperiencedanewwaveofassaultsfromextremestotheirrightandleft.

The third obstacle toWilsonianism in the interwar period came from the prospects fordemocracy inGermany.Wilson hadwanted theKaiser to abdicate and representatives of anew German republic to negotiate the surrender, which the Germans understood would bebased on the Fourteen Points. Had the settlement followed these expectations, might thedemocratic promises of 1848 finally have been realized for Germany? Certainly thedemocraticpartiestherewouldhavereceivedabiggerboost:theGermanrightwouldnothavebeen able to lay so much blame on republican forces for the defeat; important bourgeoisinterestsmight have viewed the new regimemore favorably; the tensions involvedwith thehyperinflation of the early 1920s, incurred while making reparation payments, would havebeenavoided;immediatemembershipintheLeaguewouldhavepromptedagreatersenseofdemocraticcomradeship.HencethepoignancyonefeelsinthewordsofthefinalcapitulationofthenewlyformedGermanrepublicangovernmenttothestiffultimatumofthevictors:

TheGermanpeople,aftertheirterriblesufferingsoftheselastyearsarewithoutmeansofdefending their honor against the outside world. Yielding to overpowering might, thegovernmentof theGermanRepublicdeclaresitselfreadytoacceptandtosignthepeacetreatyimposedbytheAlliedandAssociatedgovernments.Butinsodoing,thegovernmentoftheGermanRepublicinnowiseabandonsitsconvictionthattheseconditionsofpeacerepresentinjusticewithoutexample.39

Yet it isdifficult tomakeanunequivocalargument thata“peacewithoutvictory”wouldhaveguaranteedtheconsolidationofdemocracyinGermany.Itshouldberememberedthatinthelate1920s,“thespiritofLocarno”spelledaperiodofrapprochementamongthedemocratsofBritain,France,andGermany,whenforatimeitappearedthecurseoftheGreatWarhadbeenlifted.Democracydidsinkroots inGermansoilbefore1933,butnotdeeplyenoughtohold the spectre of Hitler at bay; probably not deeply enough even had the peace been ongenerous terms.40Wilsonnever proposed to dispossess theoldGerman ruling class of theirprivileges. Although the Kaiser went to live out his days in Holland and the aristocrats’undisputedpoliticalpreeminencewasnowclearlyover,thesocialheartofGermanmilitarism


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continued tobeat. Irredentistclaimspersisted to theeastwithmillionsofGermans living inPolandandCzechoslovakiaespecially.Economicaffairsremaineddominatedbymercantilistcartels.AndtheDepressionstillfellinallitsfuryonafrightenedpeople,whereamilitantleftalignedwithMoscowhadbrokenwiththedemocraticleft,andwhereanunrepentantrightusedthethreatofacommunistrevolutiontojustifyitsownoutragesagainstthedemocraticorder.

Afourthandfinalmajorobstacletoliberaldemocraticinternationalisminthepostwareracomes from an assessment of the prospects for democracy in Eastern Europe in the belt ofstatesfromtheBalticinthenorthtotheBlackSeaandtheAdriaticinthesouth.Inthislargelyagrarianregion,democracyalarmedthetraditionalelitesalmostasmuchasBolshevism,whileeconomic difficulties and ethnic and border tensions resulting from the peace settlementincreased tensions markedly. Authoritarianism was an ever-present temptation, often topreemptattemptstoseizegovernmentbytheextremeright.All thestatesof theregionbegantheinterwarperiodasdemocracies;bytheearly1930sonlyoneremained.41

Czechoslovakiawasthesingleexception,theonecountrywhereWilson’sideasborefruit.AdemocraticgovernmentwasrecognizedbytheAlliesinOctober1918andstayedinpoweruntilthefinalGermanonslaughtin1939.CzechoslovakiaisaninterestingexampleofthekindofcircumstanceswhereliberaldemocraticinternationalismdidprovideapracticalframeworkforAmericanforeignpolicy.

Themost important factorexplaining the successofdemocracy inCzechoslovakia in theinterwarperiodisthattherewasnotraditionalrightthereandnoobvioussocialbaseforanauthoritarianreaction.Thecountrywasbornfromafragmentofanempireandthustherewasno native monarchy—the Slovaks having been under Hungarian rule, the Czechs underAustrian.Norwas thereaCzechorSlovak landedelitewithwhich thenewrepublichad todeal.Instead,mostofthelargelandownerswereGermansorMagyars.By1920,areformbillhadprovidedfor theredistributionof these lands tosmall farmers,whobecameenthusiasticsupportersoftherepublicandwhoseAgrarianpartycombinedelementsofboththeCzechandSlovakpopulations(aswellassomeMagyarsandRuthenians—aUkrainianpeople—awarethatconditionsthenbecamebetterforthemthanfortheirbrethereninotherlands).42

By historical coincidence, then, Czechoslovakia came into being as a “bourgeois”republic.A SocialDemocraticmovement had an established pedigree before independenceand was solidly republican. The Communist party harbored no revolutionary illusions butcooperatedwith thenewdemocraticorder. Ithelped that thecountrywasrich—in1937, theCzechregionsenjoyedapercapita incomehigher thanFrance.Asolidmiddleclasshadtheskillstoadministerthegovernmentably,undertheleadershipofsuchoutstandingdemocratsasThomasMasarykandEduardBenes.Whenthefarmersralliedtotherepublic,thedemocraticconsensuswasfirmlyestablished.Inaddition,thecountrywaseconomicallybalancedbetweenagrarianandindustrialactivities,whichhelpedtomitigatetheeconomicdifficultiesthatbesettheareagenerallyduringtheinterwaryears.

Tensions between the country’s ethnic groups did seem at times to threaten politicalstability.Of its population of 14million,more than 3millionwereGerman, seven hundredthousand were Hungarian, and three hundred thousand were Ruthenians. The Germans and


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Hungarians were accustomed to belonging to the dominant ethnic group under the formerimperial system. They did not reconcile themselves easily to Czecho-slovakian sovereigntyandcouldcomplainthattheParissettlementhaddeprivedthemoftherighttothenationalself-determinationthathadbeenaffordedtoothers.

NorwererelationsbetweenthedominantCzechsandSlovakssmooth(astheirseparationin1992intotwocountrieswastodemonstrate).Historically,theyhadlivedseparatepoliticallives; their first joint association was in the state founded in 1918.Moreover, the relativeeconomic backwardness of the Slovaks and their cultural provincialism meant that theyresented themoreprosperousand secularCzechsand their leading role in the affairsof thenewregime.WhatevertheCzechefforts,theywereneverabletoovercomeatendencyonthepart of many Slovaks to want more autonomy—and a corresponding willingness of someSlovakstoflirtwithright-wingideologieswhenthetemptationarose.

Nevertheless, it ispossible tospeculate that thesevery tensionshelpedCzechoslovakiandemocracy.A singledominant ethnicgroupcouldhaveprovedmorehostile tominorities; itmighthavesacrificedcertaindemocraticfreedomsforthesakeofethnicadvantage.Byhavingto bid constantly for Slovak support, the Czechs had to ensure the viability of a system ofmutual understanding and compromise. Meanwhile, both communism and fascism could beseenasforeigntothedemocraticcastofCzechoslovakiannationalism.

ThisethniccompromisewasworkedoutwithinapoliticalsystemborrowedinpartfromtheFrenchThirdRepublic.Thepresidentwaselectedbythelegislature,whichalsoselectedacabinet. Thanks to proportional representation, Czechoslovakia had a multiparty system—cabinetstypicallycountedtheparticipationoffiveparties.InotherEasternEuropeancountries(andinFrance)suchapartysystemmadegoverningcoalitionsdifficulttosustain.InPraguethecooperation of Czechs and Slovaks proved crucial. Though there were fourteen differentcabinetsinpowerbetween1920and1938,multipartydemocracysurvived.WhenthecountryfelltoGermanyitwasamorallossofthefirstordertotheWest.

Wilson’s relationship to Czechoslovakian democracy beganwith diplomatic support forthat country’s creation in 1918, and with his call for secure borders for it in 1919. Asstatements by the republic’s foreignminister and later PresidentEduardBenes demonstrate,Wilson’s League of Nations was indeed the kind of international guarantee a vulnerabledemocracy such as Czechoslovakia needed after 1920. But the achievement ofCzechoslovakiandemocracywasfundamentallyanactofthesepeoplesthemselves.Atcertainmoments,Wilson’s effortswere critical, but far from decisive. Similar ambitions along thelengthofEasternEurope—inPolandorYugoslavia,forexample—fellonfarlessfertilesoil.

Torecapitulate:Wilson’seffort tocreatealiberaldemocraticalternativetotheforcesofreactionandrevolutionfounderednotsomuchonhisstyleofleadershipasonthesocialandpolitical reality he faced inEurope.No observation aboutEasternEurope could have beenmoremistakenthanthatofThomasMasaryk,sayingthewarhadlefttheregion“alaboratoryatopavastcemetery.”43Despitetheupheavalsofthewar,Europewasnotatabularasa,butacontinentofsocialandpoliticalforcesandinfiercecontention.Hence,Wilson’sprojectwasthwarted by a French determination to be donewith theGermanmenace, by the Bolshevik


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Revolution, by splits on the left and the resurgenceof the right inGermany, by the agrariansocialstructuresofEasternEuropewithclassandethnicantagonismsofgreatintensity,andbyanAmerican nationalist opinion reluctant to see its national security involved in dangerousnewforeignentanglements.

THEDILEMMAOFAMERICANPOLICYINEUROPEAswithhispolicytowardLatinAmerica(reviewedinthelastchapter),sotoowithhispolicytowardEurope,Wilsonfailedinhiseffortsbothtorootdemocraticforcesincountrieswheretheywerestrugglingtotakepowerandtoestablishastablenewconfigurationofpoweramongthestatesofthecontinent.Germandemocracywasnotrobust;Franco-Germanrapprochementdidnotoccur;outsideCzechoslovakia,democratic forceswereweak inEasternEurope; theRussian Revolution remained militant; communist parties in Western Europe sappeddemocratic forces; fascism came into power in Italy in 1922, encouraging like-mindedmovementstoduplicateitssuccess;nowaywasfoundtocountereconomicnationalismandthedestructiveimpactoftheDepressionthatbeganin1929;collectivesecurityprovedunabletohaltItalianaggressioninEthiopiaorJapaneseattacksonChina;andtheAmericanpeopleandCongress refused to identify the national security with an active hand in the protection ofliberaldemocracyinEurope.

WasthereabetterguidethanWilsonianismastohowAmericashoulddefenditslegitimateconcerns in the founding of a stable European order friendly to this country’s interests?Between1940andtheearly1950s,themostinfluentialthinkersinthiscountryontheproperconduct of American foreign policy—Walter Lippmann, George Kennan, HansMorgenthau,andReinholdNiebuhr—took special pains touseWilson as a negative example, a textbookstudyofhowforeignpolicyshouldnotbeformulated.Fortheseanalysts,WilsonianismstandsfortheAmericanpenchanttoconductitsforeignconductbymoralizingaboutit,byassumingthat somehow democracy is a panacea for the world’s problems. In their eyes, liberaldemocraticinternationalismbetraysaveinofnaiveandUtopianidealismill-fittedtoeffectiveparticipationinglobalpolitics.TheafflictiondidnotstartwithWilsonnorendwithhim,buthis presidency marks its high-water point. Realism, the dominant school of internationalrelations theory in the United States, was founded at this time by these men and built itsconceptsbyconsciouslypittingitselfagainstthebasictenetsofWilsonianism.

Thus,referringtothesettlementof1919,GeorgeKennanwrote:

This was the sort of peace you got when you allowed war hysteria and impracticalidealismtoliedowntogetherinyourmind,likethelionandthelamb;whenyouindulgedyourselfinthecolossalconceitofthinkingthatyoucouldsuddenlymakeinternationallifeover into what you believed to be your own image; when you dismissed the past withcontempt, rejected the relevanceof thepast to the future,and refused tooccupyyourselfwiththerealproblemsthatastudyofthepastwouldsuggest.44


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InHansMorgenthau’swords:

Intheend,Wilsonhadtoconsenttoaseriesofuneasycompromises,whichwereabetrayalofhismoralprinciples—forprinciplescan,bytheirverynature,notbemadetheobjectofcompromise—andwhichsatisfiednobody’snationalaspirations.ThesecompromiseshadnorelationatalltothetraditionalAmericannationalinterestinaviableEuropeanbalanceofpower.ThusWilsonreturnedfromVersaillesacompromisedidealist,anemptyhandedstatesman, a discredited ally. In that triple failure lies the tragedy not only ofWilson, agreatyetmisguidedman,butofWilsonianismasapoliticaldoctrine.45

WalterLippmann’schargeswereevenharsher, for theyallege thatWilson’smistakes setthestagefortheriseoffascismandtheinabilityofthedemocraciestorallyeffectivelytothechallenge:

Toendthestruggleforpower,Wilsonsoughttomakethenationspowerless.TheWilsonianprinciples stipulate that the nations should disarm themselves physically and politicallyand then entrust their independence and their vital interests to an assembly of debatingdiplomats.…Thecynicismwhichcorroded thedemocracies in the intervalbetween thetwoGermanwarswasengenderedbyamoralorderwhichwasinfactamoralfrustration…which,insofarasitsprohibitionshadinfluenceindisarmingthenations,disaggregatingalliances,anddisruptinggreatstates,wasapreparationnotforpeaceunderthelawbutforaggressioninthemidstofanarchy.46

How,then,shouldAmericanforeignpolicyhavebeenformulated?Thesewritersconsiderthemselvesrealists.Theyinsistthatthenationalinterestshouldbedeterminedratherstrictlybycalculationsoftherelativeamountofpoweramongstates,withaviewofpreventingthreatstothe existence or independence of the United States. Seen from this perspective, the onlyobvious antagonist of the United States in world affairs at that time was Germany, whichWashington should forthrightly have mobilized to contain. They have no patience with the“idealism” of a “utopian,” “moralistic” crusade to change the character of internationalrelations by making states democratic, such as Wilson advanced, for this talk only put asmokescreenovertheessentialmatterofdealingwithGermanpower.

Lippmann put the argument first and best, declaring in 1943, inwords that hemeant toapplytoWilson,thatAmericans

have forgotten the compelling and, once seen, the self-evident common principle of allgenuine foreign policy—the principle that alone can force decisions, can settlecontroversy,andcan induceagreement.…[Hence]apolicyhasbeen formedonlywhencommitments and power have been brought into balance. This is the forgotten principlewhichmustberecoveredandrestoredtothefirstplaceinAmericanthoughtifthenationistoachievetheforeignpolicywhichitsodesperatelywants.47


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Morgenthauinsistedonmuchthesamepointwhenhewrote:

Whatpassedforforeignpolicywaseitherimprovisationor—especiallyinourcentury—theinvocationofsomeabstractmoralprincipleinwhoseimagetheworldwastobemadeover.…embracingeverything, it came togripswithnothing. Inpart, however, itwas amagnificent instrument for marshaling public opinion in support of war and warlikepolicies—andforlosingthepeace.48

Inaword,therealistsmaintainedthatWilsondidnotadequatelyappreciatethecharacterof“powerpolitics”or the“balanceofpower” inhisdeliberations,bywhich theymeant theneedtocontainGermanpowersothatitwouldnotdominatethecontinent,aturnofeventsthatwouldhavebeenseriouslythreateningtoAmericannationalsecurity.InLippmann’sview,forexample,WilsonfailedtoexplaintotheAmericanpeoplewhythecountrywenttowar:“Thereasons he did give were legalistic and moralistic and idealistic reasons, rather than thesubstantial and vital reasons that the security of the United States demanded that noaggressivelyexpandingimperialpower,likeGermany,shouldbeallowedtogainthemasteryoftheAtlanticOcean.”49

Thesechargesaskforanindictmentthattheevidencedoesnotwarrant.Thus,Wilsonwasnotapacifist,andhisproposalsfordisarmamentarebestunderstoodasconfidence-buildingmeasures among states, not as a reluctance to back commitments with force, as Lippmannsuggested.Again,theLeagueofNationswasnottohaveeitherfinancialormilitaryresourcesindependent of the states that participated in it, and its Council had to act by unanimousagreement;theLeaguewasnottobeaworldgovernment.More,thecallforself-determinationwasnot intendedas ablank check for secessionistmovements.Wilson respected economic,strategic, andhistorical considerations thathad tobeweighedagainstnationalist feelings; itwasonlytowardtheendofthewarthathefinallyresignedhimselftothedismembermentoftheAustro-Hungarianempire rather than to seeing it reconstitutedasademocratic federaliststructure.

But most importantly,Wilson intended the League to be the vehicle to bind the UnitedStatespermanently toamanagement role inworldaffairs.Whatever the shortcomingsof thedetailsinhisplan,AmericanmembershipintheLeaguemightwellhaveprovidedthecheckonGermany that Wilson’s critics allege his naivete and moralizing prevented him fromestablishing.

ForWilson,thevitalissueatthePeaceConferencewastheLeague;forhiscritics,itwasGermany.YettheLeague’sveryexistenceimplicitlyaddressedtheessentialissueforEuropefrom1871until1945(andperhapsonceagaintoday):theGermanquestion.GivenGermany’spopulation,economicstrength,militaristichistory,politicalstructure,andgeography,coulditlivepeacefullywithitsneighbors?Weretheonlyalternativestodestroyitorbeconqueredbyit? American leadership of the League portended that Germany might be contained byAmerican power.Once contained, domestic reformsmight be consolidated so thatGermanycould livewith its neighbors by progressively shedding itsmilitaristic elements in favor of


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developing itself as a democracy capable of interacting peacefully with the other states ofEurope.ButevenwithoutGermanreforms,membershipintheLeaguewouldautomaticallytieAmericaintotheEuropeanbalanceofpowerandsosafeguardAmericannationalsecurity.

Wilsonianismdid, therefore,meaningfully address the critical issue ofwhat to do aboutGermany.IftheLeague’sfundamentalpurposewastocheckaggressionagainstweakerstatescreatedby thedismembermentof theRussian,Ottoman, andAustro-Hungarianempires after1918,ifitscollateralambitionwastofosterdemocraticgovernmentandliberalinternationaleconomicexchange,thenwhatbettersafeguardcouldbeputonGermanpower?AsawayofaddressingthegrowingpresenceoftheSovietUnioninworldaffairs,itofferedausefulforumaswell.

In addition to the League, Wilson had two other ways of influencing Germany. Hispreferred approachwas to control German power by absorbing it into a liberal economic,political,andmilitaryarrangementthatwouldeffectivelyintegrateGermanywithitsneighbors(especiallyFrance)andtheUnitedStates.HerewasthegermoftheAmericanideaafter1945topushforEuropeanintegrationbasedonFranco-Germanrapprochement.WilsonalsoagreedtojointheBritishinguaranteeingFranceagainstGermanattackinatreatyindependentoftheLeague.TheSenatedefeatedthislatterprojectalongwithbarringAmericanmembershipintheLeague.

Itistrue,ofcourse,thatthefailuretodealgenerouslywithGermanyin1919meanttherewasasympathyonthepartofmanyEuropeanliberalsforGermandispleasurewiththepeacesettlement.Inturn,thissympathy,incombinationwithanantimilitaristprejudice,contributedtoaliberalinabilitytodealwiththeriseofHitler.Buttosuggest,asWalterLippmanndid,thattheentireliberalpeaceprogramwasactuallylittlemorethananexerciseinfomentingthenextwaristolayfarmoreofachargeonWilson’sshouldersthanisdeserved.ItisasiftheimpactonGermanpoliticsoftheRussianRevolutionortheDepressionofthe1930sweresomehowof trivial importancegiventheblindersWilsonallegedlyplacedon liberals’appreciationoftheGermanquestion. In fact, it is precisely the antidemocratic,mercantilist, andmilitaristicThirdReich that a properWilsonian should be primed to oppose from the first. (The samepoint can bemade against thosewho allege that FDR’swillingness to try toworkwith theSovietUnionwasWilsonian.)

Nor doWilson’s critics—the unreconstructed advocates of balance of power thinking—demonstrate how theywould have handled European affairs better.What reason is there tothinkthataGermanydismemberedin1919mightnothavefoundawaytoriseandavengeitself(perhapsinleaguewiththeSovietUnion)?Withinafewyears,theBritishwerebeginningtosuspectFranceofhegemonicambitionsinEurope,whilenowaywasfoundtoworkwiththeSoviet Union—tinder enough for another war, one might say, had Wilson’s liberal peaceprogramneverbeenmooted.Wouldaworldthatdeniedthepowerofnationalism,spurnedtheappealsofdemocracy,beenuninterestedinliberalinternationaleconomicpractices,andmadearecoursetoarmsthefirstdutyofstatesbeensuchanattractivealternativetoWilson’svision?In short, it is far from obvious that Clemenceau’s formula for handlingGermanywasmorefarsighted thanWilson’s.Wilsonianismmay have been a failure after 1919, but the realists


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indicatenomorerealisticwaytoproceed.Fail though itdidat the time, thevirtuesofWilson’spolicy for thepostwarworldwere

threefold.First,itacknowledgedthefundamentalpoliticalimportanceofnationalism,seekingtodirectratherthantorepressitsenergy.Second,itsoughttochannelthedemandsforpopularsovereigntycontainedinnationalisminthedirectionofdemocraticgovernment,andawayfromauthoritarian or totalitarian regimes (though the latter—a particular curse of the twentiethcentury—was not yet clearly visible when Wilson was in office). Third, it attempted toprovideastructureofinternationalinstitutionsandagreementstohandlemilitaryandeconomicaffairsamongdemocraticallyconstituted,capitalist states. Inallof these respects,AmericannationalsecuritythinkingfollowedWilson’sleadafter1945.Againtoday,intheaftermathofthe coldwar,we can see the prescience of his proposals aswedeliberate the problemsofnationalisminEasternEurope, thecourseofWesternEuropeanintegrationbasedonFranco-Germanunderstanding,andtheneedfororganizationalmechanismstoprovideforthepeacefulformulationofagamutofissuesfromtheeconomictothemilitary.50

Itiscommonlyobservedthatpoliticsasanartrequirespursuingthedesirableintermsofthepossible.Thedilemmaofleadershipistodecidewhenitisweaknesstofailtoexploittheinevitable ambiguities, and therefore possibilities, of the historicalmoment, andwhen it isfoolhardy toattempt toovercome immovableconstraintssetbyacombinationof forcespastand present. Since options are always open to some extent, greatness requires creatingopportunitiesandtakingriskswithinthelimitssetbyhistory.

While the constraints of history nullified Wilson’s hopes, his efforts did not totallycontradicttheforcesofhistime.DemocraticnationalistforcesdidexistinGermanyandpartsofEasternEurope.IfitwasunlikelythattheBolshevikRevolutionwouldeverhaveturnedinademocraticdirection,itwasnotuntil1921(withtheTenthPartyCongress,whichestablishedirondisciplinewithintheCommunistparty,andwiththecrushingoftheKron-stadtmutiny,asailors’ uprising against Lenin’s rule) that its totalitarian cast was definitely set. If it wasunlikelythatdemocracywouldconsolidateitselfinGermanygiventherancorsoftheright,thesplittingoftheleft,andtherigorsoftheDepression,itcertainlywasnotuntilafter1930thatthisbecamemanifestlyevident.Again,althoughtheSenatehadrepudiatedtheLeaguein1919–20,itcouldreconsideritsposition,asattimestheAmericangovernmentseemedinterestedindoing.Inshort,Wilson’sgambleontheforcesofdemocracyandcollectivesecurity(whichinpractice would have been the balance of power under another name) was not totallyunrealistic.Andwhatwerehisotheroptions?Indeedhisgreatnessasavisionarycomesfromhowclosetosuccesshisprogramcame.SupposeAmericahadjoinedtheLeagueingoodfaith,anorganizationbasicallyofhisdevising?Bythatsingleact,thecourseofhistorymighthavebeenchanged,foritwouldhavecommittedtheUnitedStatestothemaintenanceofaEuropeanequilibriumcontainingGermany.

Thebestevidenceof thepowerofWilsonianism,however,comesfromitsresurgenceinAmericanforeignpolicyintheaftermathofWorldWarII.BrettonWoods,theinitialplansfortheUnitedNations,thehopesforWesternEuropeanintegrationthatlaybehindtheoccupationofGermany and theMarshall Plan—all this was essentiallyWilsonian in inspiration (even


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whenoperationalizedbypeoplelikeKeynesandKennanwhosawthemselvesasopponentsofWilson’s position in Paris in 1919).51 In the late 1940s,Wilsonianism was thus to have asuccessthatitwasdeniedintheearly1920s.Butitwasinthelate1980sthatWilson’stimetrulyarrived.Ofalltheextraordinarydevelopmentsconnectedwiththeendofthecoldwarin1989,surelyoneofthemostnoteworthywasthewaySovietleaderMikhailGorbachev’s“newthinking” for Europe—with its insistence on the importance of national self-determination,democratic government, and collective security—echoedWilson’s appeals of seventy yearsearlier.

Accordingly,whenCzechoslovakia’sPresidentVaclavHaveladdressedanemotionaljointmeeting ofCongress onFebruary 21, 1990, the firstAmerican hementionedwasWoodrowWilson,whose“greatsupport”in1918forCzechandSlovaknationalistshadmeantthatthey“couldfoundourmodernindependentstate.”HavelacknowledgedthespiritofWilsonianismas well: that small nations deserve to be free; that their sovereignty should be based onnational self-determination, which in turn implies the establishment of constitutionaldemocraticgovernment;thattheintercourseofnationsshouldbebasedonnondiscriminatory,liberaleconomicarrangements;andthatdemocraticstatesshoulddefendtheircommoninterestagainstthethreatofselfishaggrandizementandwar.Finally,hedeclared:

Withoutaglobalrevolutioninthesphereofhumanconsciousness,nothingwillchangeforthebetterinthesphereofourbeing.…Westilldonotknowhowtoputmoralityaheadofpolitics,scienceandeconomy.Wearestillincapableofunderstandingthattheonlygenuinebackbone of all our actions, if they are to bemoral, is responsibility—responsibility tosomethinghigherthanmyfamily,mycountry,mycompany,mysuccess.52

ItwasinrecognitionofWilson’sspirit—andnotsimplyhisactions—thatduringtheinterwaryearssomanyboulevards,statuesandparksinRumania,Poland,Yugoslavia,andespeciallyCzechoslovakiawerenamedafterhim.Intheaftermathofthemostterriblewartheworldhadseen, many of the peoples of Eastern Europe regardedWilson as a liberator, indeed as afoundingfatheroftheirnew-bornstates.53

Unlikemoststatesmen,then,Wilsondeservestobemeasurednotonthebasisofachievingtheendsofhispolicyintheirtime,butbythemagnitudeofhiseffortsandtheinfluencetheycontinuedtohaveinlateryears.Seenfromtheperspectiveofthemid-1990s,three-quartersofa century since he left office, Wilson’s concern that nationalism abroad be turned in thedirection of democratic government for the sake of the American national interest seemssoundlyconceived.Writingin1889on“LeadersofMen,”Wilsonhaddeclared:

Greatreformersdonot,indeed,observetimeandcircumstance.Theirsisnotaserviceofopportunity. They have no thought for occasion, no capacity for compromise. They areearlyvehiclesoftheSpiritoftheAge.Theyarebornoftheverytimesthatopposethem.…Theirs to hear the inarticulate voices that stir in the night-watches, apprising the lonelysentinelofwhatthedaywillbringforth.54


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Wilson and a World Safe for Democracy - cuni.cz

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