wills set 1WILLS

7/28/2019 wills set 1WILLS

1/26

1

G.R. No. L-68053 May 7, 1990

LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ, petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT andJESUS YANES, ESTELITA YANES, ANTONIO YANES,ROSARIO YANES, and ILUMINADO YANES, respondents.

Francisco G. Banzon for petiti oner.

Renecio R. Espiritu for private respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of: (a) thedecision of the Fourth Civil Cases Division of t he Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 31, 1983 in AC-G.R. CV No. 56626entitled "Jesus Yanes et al. v. Dr. Rodolfo Siason et al." affirming thedecision dated July 8, 1974 of the Court of First Instance of NegrosOccidental insofar as it ordered the petitioners to pay jointly andseverally the private respondents the sum of P20,000.00 representingthe actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental and reversing the subject decision insofar asit awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actualdamages, moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively and (b) theresolution of said appellate court dated May 30, 1984, denying themotion for reconsideration of its decision.

The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as Lot773-A and Lot 773-B which were originally known as Lot 773 of thecadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental. Lot 773, with an area of 156,549 square meters, was registered in the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes under Original Certificate of Title No. RO-4858 (8804)issued on October 9, 1917 by the Register of Deeds of OccidentalNegros (Exh. A).

Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe andTeodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus,are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other privaterespondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe.Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib. 1 It is not clear why the latter is not included as a party in this case.

Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three hectares of Lot 823 as she could not attend to the ot her portionsof the two lots which had a total area of around twenty-four hectares.The record does not show whether the children of Felipe also cultivatedsome portions of the lots but it is established that Rufino and his

children left the province to settle in other places as a result of theoutbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from the "Japanesetime up to peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question but "after liberation", when her brother went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago,Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. 2

It is on record that on May 19, 1938, Fortunato D. Santiago was issuedTransfer Certificate of Title No. RF 2694 (29797) covering Lot 773-A with an area of 37,818 square meters. 3 TCT No. RF 2694 describes Lot773-A as a portion of Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia and asoriginally registered under OCT No. 8804.

The bigger portion of Lot 773 with an area of 118,831 square meters was also registered in the name of Fortunato D. Santiago on September6, 1938 Under TCT No. RT-2695 (28192 ). 4 Said transfer certificate of title also contains a certification to the effect that Lot 773-B wasoriginally registered under OCT No. 8804.

On May 30, 1955, Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B.Fuentebella, Jr. in consideration of the sum of P7,000.00. 5Consequently, on February 20, 1956, TCT Nos. T-19291 and T-19292 were issued in Fuentebella's name. 6

After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, theadministratrix thereof (Arsenia R. Vda. de Fuentebella, his wife) filedin Special Proceedings No. 4373 in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, a motion requesting authority to sell Lots 773-A and 773-B. 7 By virtue of a court order granting said motion, 8 onMarch 24, 1958, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots forP6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. 9 Hence, on April 1, 1958 TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 covering Lots 773-A and 773-B were respectively issued to Rosendo Alvarez. 10

Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino, namely, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed in theCourt of First Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint againstFortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and theRegister of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of theownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. They also prayed thatan accounting of the produce of the land from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint be made by the defendants, that after court approval of said accounting, the share or money equivalent due the plaintiffs bedelivered to them, and that defendants be ordered to pay plaint iffsP500.00 as damages in the form of attorney's fees. 11

During the pendency in court of said case or on November 13, 1961, Alvarez sold Lots 773-A, 773-B and another lot for P25,000.00 to Dr.Rodolfo Siason. 12 Accordingly, TCT Nos. 30919 and 30920 wereissued to Siason, 13 who thereafter, declared the two lots in his namefor assessment purposes. 14

Meanwhile, on November 6, 1962, Jesus Yanes, in his own behalf andin behalf of the other plaintiffs, and assisted by their counsel, filed amanifestation in Civil Case No. 5022 stating that the therein plaintiffs"renounce, forfeit and quitclaims (sic) any claim, monetary orotherwise, against the defendant Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella inconnection with the above-entitled case." 15

On October 11, 1963, a decision was rendered by the Court of FirstInstance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 5022, the dispositiveportion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, ordering the defendant Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to the plaintiffs lots Nos. 773 and 823 of theCadastral Survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 in the name of said defendant, and thereafter to deliver the possession of said lots tothe plaintiffs. No special pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 16

It will be noted that t he above-mentioned manifestation of Jesus Yanes was not mentioned in the aforesaid decision.

However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respectto Lot 773. In his return of service dated October 20, 1965, the sheriff stated that he discovered that Lot 773 had been subdivided into Lots773-A and 773-B; that they were "in the name" of Rodolfo Siason whohad purchased them from Alvarez, and that Lot 773 could not bedelivered to the plaintiffs as Siason was "not a party per writ of execution." 17

The execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 having met ahindrance, herein private respondents (the Yaneses) filed on July 31,1965, in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition forthe issuance of a new certificate of title and for a declaration of nullity of TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 issued to Rosendo Alvarez. 18Thereafter, the court required Rodolfo Siason to produce thecertificates of title covering Lots 773 and 823.

Expectedly, Siason filed a manifestation stating that he purchased Lots773-A, 773-B and 658, not Lots 773 and 823, "in good faith and for a valuable consideration without any knowledge of any lien orencumbrances against said properties"; that the decision in thecadastral proceeding 19 could not be enforced against him as he wasnot a party thereto; and that the decision i n Civil Case No. 5022 couldneither be enforced against him not only because he was not a party-litigant therein but also because it had long become final andexecutory. 20 Finding said manifestation to be well-founded, thecadastral court, in its order of September 4, 1965, nullified its previous


2/26

2

order requiring Siason to surrender the certificates of title mentionedtherein. 21

In 1968, the Yaneses filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of analias writ of execution in Civil Case No. 5022. Siason opposed it. 22 Inits order of September 28, 1968 in Civil Case No. 5022, the lower court,noting that the Yaneses had instituted another action for the recovery of the land in question, ruled that at the judgment therein could not beenforced against Siason as he was not a party in the case. 23

The action filed by the Yaneses on February 21, 1968 was for recovery of real property with damages. 24 Named defendants therein were Dr.Rodolfo Siason, Laura Alvarez, Flora Alvarez, Raymundo Alvarez andthe Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. The Yaneses prayed for thecancellation of TCT Nos. T-19291 and 19292 issued to Siason (sic) for being null and void; the issuance of a new certificate of title in thename of the Yaneses "in accordance with the sheriffs return of servicedated October 20, 1965;" Siason's delivery of possession of Lot 773 tothe Yaneses; and if, delivery thereof could not be effected, or, if theissuance of a new title could not be made, that the Alvarez and Siason jointly and severally pay the Yaneses the sum of P45,000.00. They alsoprayed that Siason render an accounting of the fruits of Lot 773 fromNovember 13, 1961 until the filing of the complaint; and that t hedefendants jointly and severally pay the Yaneses moral damages of P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00 plus attorney'sfees of P4, 000.00. 25

In his answer to the complaint, Siason alleged that the validity of histitles to Lots 773-A and 773-B, having been passed upon by the court inits order of September 4, 1965, had become res judicata and the Yaneses were estopped from questioning said order. 26 On their part,the Alvarez stated in their answer that the Yaneses' cause of action had been "barred by res judicata, statute of limitation and estoppel." 27

In its decision of July 8, 1974, the lower court found that RodolfoSiason, who purchased the properties in question thru an agent as he was then in Mexico pursuing further medical studies, was a buyer ingood faith for a valuable consideration. Although the Yaneses werenegligent in their failure to place a notice of lis pendens "before theRegister of Deeds of Negros Occidental in order to protect their rightsover the property in question" in Civi l Case No. 5022, equity demandedthat they recover the actual value of the land because the sale thereof executed between Alvarez and Siason was without court approval. 28The dispositive portion of the decision states:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, judgment ishereby rendered in the following manner:

A. The case against the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason and theRegister of Deeds are (sic) hereby dismmissed,

B. The defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez being the legitimate children of the deceased Rosendo Alvarezare hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-Bof Murcia Cadastre, Negros Occidental; the sum of P2,000.00 as actualdamages suffered by the plaintiff; the sum of P5,000.00 representingmoral damages and the sum of P2.000 as attorney's fees, all with legalrate of interest from date of the filing of this complaint up to finalpayment.

C. The cross-claim filed by the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siasonagainst the defendants, Laura, Flora and R aymundo, all surnamed Alvarez is hereby dismissed.

D. Defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez are hereby ordered to pay the costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED. 29

The Alvarez appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court whichin its decision of August 31, 1983 30 affirmed the lower court's decision"insofar as it ordered defendants-appellants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs-appellees the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia,Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moraldamages and attorney's fees, respectively." 31 The dispositive portionof said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed insofar as itordered defendants-appellants to pay jointly and severally theplaintiffs- appellees the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia,Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moraldamages and attorney's fees, respectively. No costs.

SO ORDERED. 32

Finding no cogent reason to grant appellants motion forreconsideration, said appellate court denied the same.

Hence, the instant petition. ln their memorandum petitioners raisedthe following issues:

1. Whethere or not the defense of prescription and estoppelhad been timely and properly invoked and raised by the petitioners inthe lower court.

2. Whether or not the cause and/or causes of action of theprivate respondents, if ever there are any, as alleged in their complaint

dated February 21, 1968 which has been docketed in the trial court asCivil Case No. 8474 supra, are forever barred by statute of limitationand/or prescription of action and estoppel.

3. Whether or not the late Rosendo Alvarez, a defendant inCivil Case No. 5022, supra and father of the petitioners become a privy and/or party to the waiver (Exhibit 4-defendant Siason) in Civil CaseNo. 8474, supra where the private respondents had unqualifiedly andabsolutely waived, renounced and quitclaimed all their alleged rightsand interests, if ever there is any, on Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre as appearing in their written manifestation datedNovember 6, 1962 (Exhibits "4" Siason) which had not beencontroverted or even impliedly or indirectly denied by them.

4. Whether or not the liability or liabilities of Rosendo Alvarezarising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastreto Dr. Rodolfo Siason, if ever there is any, could be legally passed ortransmitted by operations (sic) of law to the petitioners without violation of law and due process . 33

The petition is devoid of merit.

As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, it is powerless and for thatmatter so is the Supreme Court, to review the decision in Civil Case No.5022 ordering Alvarez to reconvey the lots in dispute t o herein privaterespondents. Said decision had long become final and executory and with the possible exception of Dr. Siason, who was not a party to saidcase, the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 is the law of the case betweenthe parties thereto. It ended when Alvarez or his heirs failed to appealthe decision against them. 34

Thus, it is axiomatic that when a right or fact has been ju dicially triedand determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as itremains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and thosein privity with them in law or estate. 35 As consistently ruled by thisCourt, every litigation must come to an end. Access to the court isguaranteed. But there must be a limit to it. Once a litigant's right has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, heshould not be granted an unbridled license to return for another try.The prevailing party should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless litigation were to be allowed, unscrupulous litigations willmultiply in number to t he detriment of the administration of justice. 36

There is no dispute that the rights of the Yaneses to the properties inquestion have been finally adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022. As found by the lower court, from the uncontroverted evidence presented, the Yaneses have been illegally deprived of ownership and possession of the lots in question. 37 In fact, Civil Case No. 8474 now u nder review,arose from the failure to execute Civil Case No. 5022, as subject lotscan no longer be reconveyed to private respondents Yaneses, the samehaving been sold during the pendency of the case by the petiti oners'


3/26

3

father to Dr. Siason who did not know about the controversy, there being no lis pendens annotated on the titles. Hence, it was also settled beyond question that Dr. Siason is a purchaser in good faith.

Under the circumstances, the trial court did not annul the saleexecuted by Alvarez in favor of Dr. Siason on November 11, 1961 but infact sustained it. The trial court ordered the heirs of Rosendo Alvarez who lost in Civil Case No. 5022 to pay the plaintiffs (privaterespondents herein) the amount of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of the subdivided lots in dispute. It did not order defendantSiason to pay said amount. 38

As to the propriety of the present case, it has long been established thatthe sole remedy of t he landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if theproperty has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value,for damages. 39 "It is one thing to protect an innocent t hird party; it isentirely a different matter and one devoid of ju stification if deceit would be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of hisnefarious decided As clearly revealed by the undeviating line of decisions coming from this Court, such an undesirable eventuality isprecisely sought to be guarded against." 40

The issue on the right to the properties in litigation having been finally adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022 in favor of private respondents, itcannot now be reopened in the instant case on the pretext that thedefenses of prescription and estoppel have not been properly considered by the lower court. Petitioners could have appealed in theformer case but they did not. They have therefore foreclosed theirrights, if any, and they cannot now be heard to complain in anothercase in order to defeat the enforcement of a judgment which haslonging become final and executory.

Petitioners further contend that the liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. RodolfoSiason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of hisestate, after his death.

Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining inthis jurisdiction on the general transmissibility of the rights andobligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus,the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:

Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which theproperty, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of theinheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to anotheror others either by his will or by operation of law.

Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights andobligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death.

Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assignsand heirs except in case where the rights and obligations arising fromthe contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of theproperty received from the decedent.

As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes inthe case of Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc. 41

The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party isnot altered by the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of adeceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before theresidue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the state is ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in factdiminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have beenentitled to receive.

Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractualrights and obligations are transmissible to the successors.

The rule is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco hascharacterized the history of these institutions. From the Romanconcept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolvedinto a relation from patrimony to patrimony with the personsoccupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitupersonae, in consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other.

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannotescape the legal consequences of their father's transaction, which gaverise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not inheritthe property involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction,the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father'shereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets arealways liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate.42

It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to theextent of the value of their inheritance. With this clarification andconsidering petitioners' admission that there are other properties left by the deceased which are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged infavor of private respondents, we see no cogent reason to disturb thefindings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above stated, theassailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costsagainst petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Cortes, JJ ., concur.

Bidin J., took no part.

G.R. No. 77029 August 30, 1990

BIENVENIDO, ESTELITA, MACARIO, LUIS, ADELAIDE,ENRIQUITA and CLAUDIO, all surnamed, GEVERO,petitioners,

vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DEL MONTEDEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

Carlito B. Somido for petitioners.

Benjamin N. Tabios for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the March 20, 1988decision 1 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in AC-GR CV No. 69264, entitled Del Monte DevelopmentCorporation vs. Enrique Ababa, et al., etc. affirming the decision 2 of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of MisamisOriental declaring the plaintiff corporation as the true and absoluteowner of that portion of Lot 476 of the Cagayan Cadastre, particularly Lot No. 2476-D of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450, containingan area of Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy Eight (7,878)square meters more or less.

As found by the Appellate Court, the facts are as follows:

The parcel of land under litigation is Lot No. 2476 of the SubdivisionPlan Psd-37365 containing an area of 20,119 square meters andsituated at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. Said lot was acquired by purchase from the late Luis Lancero on September 15, 1964 as perDeed of Absolute Sale executed in favor of plaintiff and by virtu e of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4320 was issued to plaintiff (DELCOR for brevity). Luis Lancero, in turn acquired the same parcelfrom Ricardo Gevero on February 5, 1952 per deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero which was duly annotated as entry No. 1128 at the back of Original Certificate of Title No. 7610 covering the mother lotidentified as Lot No. 2476 in the names of Teodorica Babangha 1/


4/26

4

share and her children: Maria; Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquioand Ursula, all surnamed surnamed Gevero, 1/2 undivided share of the whole area containing 48,122 square meters.

Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II and was survived by her six children aforementioned. The heirs of Teodorica Babanghaon October 17,1966 executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement andPartition of the estate of Teodorica Babangha, consisting of two lots,among them was lot 2476. By virtue of the extra-judicial settlementand partition executed by the said heirs of Teodorica Babangha, Lot2476-A to Lot 2476-I, inclusive, under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450 duly approved by the Land Registration Commission, Lot 2476-D, among others, was adjudicated to Ricardo Gevero who was thenalive at the time of extra-judicial settlement and partiti on in 1966.Plaintiff (private respondent herein) filed an action with the CFI (now RTC) of Misamis Oriental to quiet title and/or annul the partitionmade by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the sameprejudices the land which it acquired a portion of lot 2476.

Plaintiff now seeks to quiet title and/or annul the partition made by theheirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same prejudices the land which it acquired, a portion of Lot 2476. Plaintiff proved that beforepurchasing Lot 2476-A it first investigated and checked the title of LuisLancero and found the same to be intact in the office of the R egister of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City. The same with the subdivision plan(Exh. "B"), the corresponding technical description (Exh. "P") and theDeed of Sale executed by Ricardo Gevero all of which were found to be unquestionable. By reason of all these, plaintiff claims to have bought the land in good faith and for value, occupying the land sincethe sale and taking over from Lancero's possession until May 1969, when the defendants Abadas forcibly entered the property. (Rollo, p.23)

After trial the court a quo on July 18, 1977 rendered judgment, thedispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendereddeclaring the plaintiff corporation as the true and absolute owner of that portion of Lot No. 2476 of the Cagayan Cadastre, particularly LotNo. 2476-D of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450, containing anarea of SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT(7,878) square meters, more or less. The other portions of Lot No. 2476are hereby adjudicated as follows:

Lot No. 2476 B to the heirs of Elena Gevero;

Lot No. 2476 C to the heirs of Restituto Gevero;

Lot No. 2476 E to the defendant spouses Enrique C. Torres andFrancisca Aquino;

Lot No. 2476 F to the defendant spouses Eduard Rumohr andEmilia Merida Rumohf ;

Lot Nos. 2476-H, 2476-I and 2476 G to defendant spousesEnrique Abada and Lilia Alvarez Abada.

No adjudication can be made with respect to Lot No. 2476-A considering that the said lot is the subject of a civil case between theHeirs of Maria Gevero on one hand and the spouses Daniel Borkingkitoand Ursula Gevero on the other hand, which case is now pendingappeal before the Court of Appeals. No pronouncement as to costs,

SO ORDERED. (Decision, Record on Appeal, p. 203; Rollo, pp. 21-22)

From said decision, defendant heirs of Ricardo Gevero (petitionersherein) appealed to the IAC (now Court of Appeals) whichsubsequently, on March 20, 1986, affirmed the decision appealed from.

Petitioners, on March 31, 1986, filed a motion for reconsideration(Rollo, p. 28) but was denied on April 21, 1986.

Hence, the present petition.

This petition is devoid of merit.

Basically, the issues to be resolved in the instant case are: 1) whether ornot the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero to Luis Lancero is valid; 2) in the affirmative, whether or not the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica Babangha in one of the litigated lots, lot no. 2476 under OCTNo. 7610 is included in the deed of sale; and 3) whether or not theprivate respondents' action is barred by laches.

Petitioners maintain that the deed of sale is entirely invalid citingalleged flaws thereto, such as that: 1) the signature of Ricardo wasforged without his knowledge of such fact; 2) Lancero had recognizedthe fatal defect of the 1952 deed of sale when he signed the documentin 1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoi d the Litigation"; 3) Ricardo'schildren remained in the property notwithstanding the sale to Lancero;4) the designated Lot No. is 2470 instead of the correct number beingLot No. 2476; 5) the deed of sale included the share of EustaquioGevero without his authority; 6) T.C.T. No. 1183 of Lancero segregatedthe area of 20,119 square meters from the bigger area (OCT No. 7616) without the consent of the other co-owners; 7) Lancero caused the 1952Subdivision survey without the consent of the Geveros' to bring aboutthe segregation of the 20,119 square meters lot from the mother lot2476 which brought about the issuance of his title T-1183 and toDELCOR's title T4320, both of which were illegally issued; and 8) thearea sold as per document is 20,649 square meters whereas thesegregated area covered by TCT No. T-1183 of Lancero turned out to be20,119 square meters (Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 62-78).

As to petitioners' claim that the signature of Ricardo in the 1952 deedof sale in favor of Lancero was forged without Ricardo's knowledge of such fact (Rollo, p. 71) it will be observed that the deed of sale inquestion was executed with all the legal formalities of a publicdocument. The 1952 deed was duly acknowledged by both parties before the notary public, yet petitioners did not bother to rebut thelegal presumption of the regularity of the notarized document (Dy v.Sacay, 165 SCRA 473 [1988]); Nuguid v. C.A., G.R. No. 77423, March13, 1989). In fact it has long been settled that a public documentexecuted and attested through the intervention of the notary public isevidence of the facts i n clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. Ithas the presumption of regularity and to contradict all these, evidencemust be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant(Rebuleda v. I.A.C., 155 SCRA 520-521 [1987]). Forgery cannot bepresumed, it must be proven (Siasat v. IAC, No. 67889, October 10,1985). Likewise, petitioners allegation of absence of consideration of the deed was not substantiated. Under Art. 1354 of the Civil Code,consideration is presumed unless the contrary is proven.

As to petitioners' contention that Lancero had recognized the fataldefect of the 1952 deed when he signed the document in 1968 entit led"Settlement to Avoid Litigation" (Rollo, p. 71), it i s a basic rule of evidence that the right of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,declaration, or omission of another (Sec. 28. Rule 130, Rules of Court).This particular rule is embodied in the maxim "res inter alios acta alterinocere non debet." Under Section 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court "whereone derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, oromission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property is evidence against the former." It is however stressed that theadmission of the former owner of a property must have been made while he was the owner thereof in order that such admission may be binding upon the present owner (City of Manila v. del Rosario, 5 Phil.227 [1905]; Medel v. Avecilla, 15 Phil. 465 [1910]). Hence, Lanceros'declaration or acts of executing the 1968 document have no bindingeffect on DELCOR, the ownership of the land having passed toDELCOR in 1964.

Petitioners' claim that they remained in the property, notwithstandingthe alleged sale by Ricardo to Lancero (Rollo, p. 71) involves a questionof fact already raised and passed upon by both the trial and appellatecourts. Said the Court of Appeals:

Contrary to the allegations of the appellants, the trial court found thatLuis Lancero had taken possession of the land upon properinvestigation by plaintiff the latter learned that it was indeed LuisLancero who was the owner and possessor of Lot 2476 D. . . . (Decision,C.A., p. 6).

As a finding of fact, it is binding upon this Court (De Gola-Sison v.Manalo, 8 SCRA 595 [1963]; Gaduco vs. C.A., 14 SCRA 282 [1965];Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola, 19 SCRA 289 [1967]; Tan v. C.A., 20 SCRA 54


5/26

5

[1967]; Ramirez Tel. Co. v. B ank of America, 33 SCRA 737 [1970];Lucero v. Loot, 25 SCRA 687 [1968]; Guerrero v. C.A., 142 SCRA 130[1986]).

Suffice it to say that the other flaws claimed by the petitioners whichallegedly invalidated the 1952 deed of sale have not been raised beforethe trial court nor before the appellate court. It is settled jurisprudencethat an issue which was neither averred in the complaint nor raisedduring the trial in the court below cannot be raised for the first time onappeal as it would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice anddue process. (Matienzo v. Servidad, 107 SCRA 276 [1981]; Dela Santa v.C.A., 140 SCRA 44 [1985]; Dihiansan v. C.A., 157 SCRA 434 [1987]; Anchuelo v. IAC, 147 SCRA 434 [1987]; Dulos Realty and DevelopmentCorporation v. C.A., 157 SCRA [1988]; Kamos v. IAC, G.R. No. 78282,July 5, 1989).

Petitioners aver that the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica (mother of Ricardo) in Lot 2476 under OCT No. 7610 was not included in the deedof sale as it was intended to lim it solely to Ricardos' proportionateshare out of the undivided 1/2 of the area pertaining t o the six (6) brothers and sisters listed in the Title and that the Deed did not includethe share of Ricardo, as i nheritance from Teodorica, because the Deeddid not recite that she was deceased at the time it was executed (Rollo,pp. 67-68).

The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is transmitted or vestedimmediately from the moment of the death of the "causante" orpredecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777), andthere is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity)disposing of his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequentliquidation of the estate (De Borja v. Vda. de B orja, 46 SCRA 577[1972]).

Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II, hence, the rightsto the succession were transmitted from the moment of her death. It istherefore incorrect to state that it was only in 1966, the date of extrajudicial partition, when Ricardo received his share in the lot asinheritance from his mother Teodorica. Thus, when Ri cardo sold hisshare over lot 2476 that share which he inherited from Teodorica wasalso included unless expressly excluded in the deed of sale.

Petitioners contend that Ricardo's share from Teodorica was excludedin the sale considering that a paragraph of the aforementioned deedrefers merely to the shares of Ricardo and Eustaquio (Rollo, p. 67-68).

It is well settled that laws and contracts shall be so construed as toharmonize and give effect to the different provisions thereof (Reparations Commission v. Northern Lines, Inc., 34 SCRA 203[1970]), to ascertain the meaning of the provisions of a contract, itsentirety must be taken into account (Ruiz v. Sheriff of Manila, 34 SCRA

83 [1970]). The interpretation insisted upon by the petitioners, by citing only one paragraph of the deed of sale, would not only createcontradictions but also, render meaningless and set at naught theentire provisions thereof.

Petitioners claim that DELCOR's action is barred by laches consideringthat the petitioners have remained in the actual, open, uninterruptedand adverse possession thereof until at present (Rollo, p. 17).

An instrument notarized by a notary public as in the case at bar is apublic instrument (Eacnio v. Baens, 5 Phil. 742). The execution of apublic instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing (Art. 1498,1st Par., Civil Code) and is deemed legal delivery. Hence, its execution was considered a sufficient delivery of the property (Buencamino v. Viceo, 13 Phil. 97; [1906]; Puato v. Mendoza, 64 Phil. 457 [1937]; Vda.de Sarmiento v. Lesaca, 108 Phil. 900 [1960]; Phil. SuburbanDevelopment Corp. v. Auditor Gen., 63 SCRA 397 (1975]).

Besides, the property sold is a registered land. It is the act of registration that transfers the ownership of the land sold. (GSIS v. C.A.,G.R. No. 42278, January 20, 1989). If the property is a registered land,the purchaser in good, faith has a right to rely on the certificate of titleand is under no duty to go behind it to look for flaws (Mallorca v. DeOcampo, No. L-26852, March 25, 1970; Unchuan v. C.A., 161 SCRA 710[1988]; Nuguid v. CA-G.R. No. 77427, March 13, 1989).

Under the established principles of land registration law, the persondealing with registered land may generally rely on the correctness of itscertificate of title and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind thecertificate to determine the condition of the property (Tiongco v. de laMerced, L-2446, July 25, 1974; Lopez vs. CA., G.R. No. 49739, January 20, 1989; Davao Grains Inc. vs. IAC, 171 SCRA 612 [1989]). Thisnotwithstanding, DELCOR did more than that. It did not only rely onthe certificate of title. The Court of Appeals found that it had firstinvestigated and checked the title (T.C.T. No. T-1183) in the name of Luis Lancero. It likewise inquired into the Subdivision Plan, thecorresponding technical description and the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero in favor of Luis Lancero and found everything in order.It even went to the premises and found Luis Lancero to be inpossession of the land to the exclusion of any other person. DELCOR had therefore acted in good faith in purchasing the land in question.

Consequently, DELCOR's action is not barred by laches.

The main issues having been disposed of, discussion of the other issuesappear unnecessary.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSEDand the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 89783 February 19, 1992

MARIANO B. LOCSIN, JULIAN J. LOCSIN, JOSE B. LOCSIN, AUREA B. LOCSIN, MATILDE L. CORDERO, SALVADOR B.LOCSIN and MANUEL V. DEL ROSARIO, petitioners,

vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE JAUCIAN,FLORENTINO JAUCIAN, MERCEDES JAUCIAN ARBOLEDA,HEIRS OF JOSEFINA J. BORJA, HEIRS OF EDUARDOJAUCIAN and HEIRS OF VICENTE JAUCIAN, respondents.

Aytona Law Office and Siquia Law Offices for petitioners.

Mabella, Sangil & Associates for private respondents.

NARVASA, C.J.:

Reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-11186 affirming with modification the judgment of the Regional TrialCourt of Albay in favor of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7152 entitled"Jose Jaucian, et al. v. Mariano B. Locsin, et al.," an action for recovery of real property with damages is sought. in these proceedingsinitiated by petition for review on certiorari i n accordance with Rule 45of the Rules of Court.

The petition was initially denied due course and dismissed by thisCourt. It was however reinstated upon a second motion forreconsideration filed by the petitioners, and the respondents wererequired to comment thereon. The petition was thereafter given duecourse and the parties were directed to submit their memorandums.These, together with the evidence, having been carefully considered,the Court now decides the case.

First, the facts as the Court sees them in light of the evidence onrecord:

The late Getulio Locsin had three children named Mariano, Julian andMagdalena, all surnamed Locsin. He owned extensive residential andagricultural properties in the provinces of Albay and Sorsogon. Afterhis death, his estate was divided among his three (3) children asfollows:


6/26

6

(a) the coconut lands of some 700 hectares in Bual, Pilar,Sorsogon, were adjudicated to his daughter, Magdalena Locsin;

(b) 106 hectares of coconut lands were given to Julian Locsin,father of the petitioners Ju lian, Mariano, Jose, Salvador, Matilde, and Aurea, all surnamed Locsin;

(c) more than forty (40) hectares of coconut lands in Bogtong,eighteen (18) hectares of riceland in Daraga, and the residential lots inDaraga, Albay and in Legazpi City went to his son Mariano, whichMariano brought into his marriage to Catalina Jaucian in 1908.Catalina, for her part, brought into the marriage untitled properties which she had inherited from her parents, Balbino Jaucian and Simona Anson. These were augmented by other properties acquired by thespouses in the course of their union, 1 which however was not blessed with children.

Eventually, the properties of Mariano and Catalina were brought underthe Torrens System. Those that Mariano inherited from his father,Getulio Locsin, were surveyed cadastrally and registered in the name of "Mariano Locsin, married to Catalina Jaucian.'' 2

Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina, as the sole and universal heir of all his properties. 3 The will was drawn up by his wife's nephew and trusted legal adviser, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. Attorney Lorayes disclosed that the spouses being childless, they had agreed that their properties, after both of them shall have died should revert to their respective sides of thefamily, i.e., Mariano's properties would go to his "Locsin relatives" (i.e., brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces), and those of Catalina toher "Jaucian relatives." 4

Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after alingering illness. In due time, his will was probated in SpecialProceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay without any opposition from bothsides of the family. As directed in his will, Doa Catalina was appointedexecutrix of his estate. Her lawyer in the probate proceeding was Attorney Lorayes. In the inventory of her husband's estate 5 which shesubmitted to the probate court for approval, 6 Catalina declared that"all items mentioned from Nos. 1 to 33 are the private properties of thedeceased and form part of his capital at the time of the marriage withthe surviving spouse, while items Nos. 34 to 42 are conjugal." 7

Among her own and Don Mariano's relatives, Doa Catalina wasclosest to her nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, her nieces, ElenaJaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and Maria Olbes-Velasco, and thehusbands of the last two: Hostilio Cornelio and Fernando Velasco. 8Her trust in Hostilio Cornelio was such that she made him custodian of all the titles of her properties; and before she disposed of any of them,she unfailingly consulted her lawyer-nephew, Attorney Salvador

Lorayes. It was Atty. Lorayes who prepared the legal documents and,more often than not, the witnesses to the transactions were her nieceElena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio, Maria Olbes-Velasco, or theirhusbands. Her niece, Elena Jaucian, was her li fe-long companion inher house.

Don Mariano relied on Doa Catalina to carry out the terms of theircompact, hence, nine (9) years after his death, as if in obedience to his voice from the grave, and fully cognizant that she was also advancing in years, Doa Catalina began transferring, by sale, donation orassignment, Don Mariano's as well as her own, properties to theirrespective nephews and nieces. She made t he following sales anddonation of properties which she had received from her husband'sestate, to his Locsin nephews and nieces:

EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICEWITNESSES

23 Jan. 26, 1957 Deed of Absolute Sale in 962 P 481favor of Mariano Locsin

1-JRL Apr. 7, 1966 Deed of Sale in favor of 430,203P 20,000

Jose R. Locsin

1-JJL Mar. 22, 1967 Deed of Sale in favor of 5,000P 1,000 Hostilio Cornello

Julian Locsin (Lot 2020) Helen M. Jaucian

1 Nov. 29, 1974 Deed of Donation in 26,509favor Aurea Locsin,Matilde L. Corderoand Salvador Locsin

2 Feb. 4, 1975 Deed of Donation in 34,045favor Aurea Locsin,Matilde L. Corderoand Salvador Locsin

3 Sept. 9, 1975 Deed of Donation in (Lot 2059)favor Aurea Locsin,Matilde L. Corderoand Salvador Locsin

4 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,424Hostilio Corneliofavor of Aurea B. Locsin Fernando Velasco

5 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,456P 5,750 Hostilio Cornelio

favor of Aurea B. Locsin Elena Jaucian

6 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,237P 5,720 - ditto -

favor of Aurea B. Locsin

7 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,404P 4,050 - ditto -

favor of Aurea B. Locsin

15 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 261P 4,930 - ditto -

Aurea Locsin

16 Oct. 17, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 533P 2,000 Delfina Anson

Aurea Locsin M. Acabado

17 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 373P 1,000 Leonor Satuito

Aurea Locsin Mariano B. Locsin

19 Sept. 1, 1975 Conditional Donation in 1,130 P 3,000- ditto -

favor of Mariano Locsin

1-MVRJ Dec. 29, 1972 Deed of Reconveyance 1,5110.66P 1,000 Delfina Anson

in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Antonio IllegibleRosario whose maternalgrandfather was GetulioLocsin

2-MVRJ June 30, 1973 Deed of Reconveyance 319.34P 500 Antonio Illegible

in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Salvador NicalRosario but the rentalsfrom bigger portion of Lot 2155 leased to FiloilRefinery were assigned toMaria Jaucian LorayesCornelio

Of her own properties, Doa Catalina conveyed the following to herown nephews and nieces and others:

EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE

2-JJL July 16, 1964 Deed of Sale in favor 5,000P 1,000

Vicente Jaucian (lot 2020)(6,825 sqm. when


7/26

7

resurveyed)

24 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale 100P 1,000

in favor of Francisco M.Maquiniana

26 July 15, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 130P 1,300

favor of FranciscoMaquiniana

27 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 100P 1,000

favor of Ireneo Mamia

28 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 75P 750

favor of Zenaida Buiza

29 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150P 1,500

favor of Felisa Morjella

30 Apr. 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 31P 1,000

favor of Inocentes Motocinos

31 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150P 1,500

favor of Casimiro Mondevil

32 Mar. 1, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 112P 1,200

favor of Juan Saballa

25 Dec. 28, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 250P 2,500

of Rogelio Marticio

Doa Catalina died on July 6, 1977.

Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973affirming and ratifying the transfers she had made during her lifetimein favor of her husband's, and her own, relatives. After the reading of her will, all the relatives agreed that there was no need to submit it to

the court for probate because the properties devised to them under the will had already been conveyed to them by the deceased when she wasstill alive, except some legacies which the executor of her will or estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, proceeded to distribute.

In 1989, or six (6) years after Doa Catalina's demise, some of herJaucian nephews and nieces who had already received their legaciesand hereditary shares from her estate, filed action in the Regional TrialCourt of Legaspi City (Branch VIII, Civil Case No. 7152) to recover theproperties which she had conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime,alleging that the conveyances were inofficious, without consideration,and intended solely to circumvent the laws on succession. Those who were closest to Doa Catalina did not join the action.

After the trial, judgment was rendered on July 8, l985 in favor of theplaintiffs (Jaucian), and against the Locsin defendants, the dispositivepart of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment for the plaintiffs andagainst the defendants:

(1) declaring the, plaintiffs, except the heirs of Josefina J. Borjaand Eduardo Jaucian, who withdrew, the rightful heirs and entitled tothe entire estate, in equal portions, of Catalina Jaucian Vda. de Locsin, being the nearest collateral heirs by right of representation of Juan andGregorio, both surnamed Jaucian, and full-blood brothers of Catalina;

(2) declaring the deeds of sale, donations, reconveyance andexchange and all other instruments conveying any part of the estate of Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin including, but not limited to those in theinventory of known properties (Annex B of the complaint) as null and void ab-initio;

(3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Albay and/or Legazpi City to cancel all certificates of title and other transfers of the realproperties, subject of this case, in the name of defendants, andderivatives therefrom, and issue new ones to the plaintiffs;

(4) ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to reconvey ownership and possession of all such properties to the plaintiffs,together with all muniments of title properly endorsed and delivered,and all the fruits and incomes received by the defendants from theestate of Catalina, with legal interest from the filing of this action; and where reconveyance and delivery cannot be effected for reasons thatmight have intervened and prevent the same, defendants shall pay forthe value of such properties, fruits and incomes received by them, also with legal interest from the filing, of this case

(5) ordering each of the defendants to pay the plaintiffs theamount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the further sum of P20,000.00 each as moral damages; and

(6) ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs attorney's feesand litigation expenses, in the amount of P30,000.00 withoutprejudice to any contract between plaintiffs and counsel.

Costs against the defendants. 9

The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV-11186) which rendered its now appealed judgment on March 14, 1989,affirming the trial court's decision.

The petition has merit and should be granted.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the privaterespondents, nephews and nieces of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin,entitled to inherit the properties which she had already disposed of more than ten (10) years before her death. For those properties did notform part of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and transmissiblerights and obligations existing at the time of (the decedent's) death andthose which have accrued thereto since t he opening of the succession."10 The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from themoment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until such time. 11Property which Doa Catalina had transferred or conveyed to otherpersons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at thetime of her death to which her heirs may lay claim. Had she diedintestate, only the property that remained in her estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if those transfers were,one and all, treated as donations, the right arising under certaincircumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or revocation of adecedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the respondents sinceneither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs. 12

There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on t he part of DoaCatalina, in transferring the properties she had received from her latehusband to his nephews and nieces, an intent to circumvent the law in violation of the private respondents' rights to her succession. Saidrespondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended thatshe had any such, hence there were no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired by any transfer of her property during her lifetime. All thatthe respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted herfreedom to dispose of even her entire estate subject only t o thelimitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were breached, the respondents may not invoke:

Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor or part thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or inusufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself, and of allrelatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be supported by t he donor. Without such reservation, thedonation shall be reduced on petition of any person affected. (634a)

The lower court capitalized on the fact that Doa Catalina was already 90 years old when she died on July 6, 1977. It insinuated that becauseof her advanced years she may have been imposed upon, or unduly influenced and morally pressured by her husband's nephews andnieces (the petitioners) to transfer to them the properties which she


8/26

8

had inherited from Don Mariano's estate. The records do not supportthat conjecture.

For as early as 1957, or twenty-eight (28) years before her death, DoaCatalina had already begun transferring to her Locsin nephews andnieces the properties which she received from Don Mariano. She sold a962-sq.m. lot on January 26, 1957 to his nephew and namesakeMariano Locsin II. 13 On April 7, 1966, or 19 years before she passedaway, she also sold a 43 hectare land to another Locsin nephew, Jose R.Locsin. 14 The next year, or on March 22, 1967, she sold a 5,000-sq.m.portion of Lot 2020 to Julian Locsin. 15

On March 27, 1967, Lot 2020 16 was partitioned by and among DoaCatalina, Julian Locsin, Vicente Jaucian and Agapito Lorete. 17 At least Vicente Jaucian, among the other respondents in this case, is estoppedfrom assailing the genuineness and due execution of the sale of portions of Lot 2020 to himself, Julian Locsin, and Agapito Lorete, andthe partition agreement that he (Vicente) concluded with the other co-owners of Lot 2020.

Among Doa, Catalina's last transactions before she died in 1977 werethe sales of property which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin andMariano Locsin in 1975. 18

There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that Doa Catalina was mentally incompetent when she made those dispositions. Indeed,how can any such suggestion be made in light of the fact that even asshe was transferring properties to the Locsins, she was also

contemporaneously disposing of her other properties in favor of theJaucians? She sold to her nephew, Vicente Jaucian, on July 16, 1964(21 years before her death) one-half (or 5,000 sq.m.) of Lot 2020.Three years later, or on March 22, 1967, she sold another 5000 sq.m. of the same lot to Julian Locsin. 19

From 1972 to 1973 she made several other transfers of her properties toher relatives and other persons, namely: Francisco Maquiniana, IreneoMamia, Zenaida Buiza, Feliza Morjella, Inocentes Motocinos, CasimiroMondevil, Juan Saballa and Rogelio Marticio. 20 None of thosetransactions was impugned by the private respondents.

In 1975, or two years before her death, Doa Catalina sold some lotsnot only to Don Mariano's niece, Aurea Locsin, and his nephew,Mariano LocsinII, 21 but also to her niece, Mercedes Jaucian Arboleda. 22 If she wascompetent to make that conveyance to Mercedes, how can there be any doubt that she was equally competent to transfer her other pieces of

property to Aurea and Mariano II?

The trial court's belief that Don Mariano Locsin bequeathed his entireestate to his wife, from a "consciousness of its real origin" which carriesthe implication that said estate consisted of properties which his wife

had inherited from her parents, flies in the teeth of Doa Catalina'sadmission in her inventory of that estate, that "items 1 to 33 are theprivate properties of the deceased (Don Mariano) and forms (sic) partof his capital at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items 34 to 42 are conjugal properties, acquired during themarriage." She would have known better than anyone else whether thelisting included any of her paraphernal property so it i s safe to assumethat none was in fact included. The inventory was signed by her underoath, and was approved by the probate court in Special Proceeding No.138 of the Court of First Instance of Albay. It was prepared with theassistance of her own nephew and counsel, Atty. Salvador Lorayes, whosurely would not have prepared a false inventory that would have beenprejudicial to his aunt's interest and to his own, since he stood toinherit from her eventually.

This Court finds no reason to disbelieve Attorney Lorayes' testimony that before Don Mariano died, he and his wife (Doa Catalina), beingchildless, had agreed that their respective properties should eventually revert to their respective lineal relatives. As the tru sted legal adviser of the spouses and a full-blood nephew of Doa Catalina, he would nothave spun a tale out of thin air that would also prejudice his owninterest.

Little significance, it seems, has been attached to the fact that amongDoa Catalina's nephews and nieces, those closest t o her: (a) herlawyer-nephew Attorney Salvador Lorayes; (b) her niece andcompanion Elena Jaucian: (c) her nieces Maria Olbes-Velasco andMaria Lorayes-Cornelio and their respective husbands, Fernando

Velasco and Hostilio Cornelio, did not join the suit to annul and undothe dispositions of property which she made in favor of the Locsins,although it would have been to their advantage to do so. Theirdesistance persuasively demonstrates that Doa Catalina acted as acompletely free agent when she made the conveyances in favor of thepetitioners. In fact, considering their closeness to Doa Catalina it would have been well-nigh impossible for the petitioners to employ "fraud, undue pressure, and subtle manipulations" on her to make hersell or donate her properties to them. Doa Catalina's niece, ElenaJaucian, daughter of her brother, Eduardo Jaucian, lived with her inher house. Her nephew-in-law, Hostilio Cornelio, was the custodian of the titles of her properties. The sales and donations which she signed infavor of the petitioners were prepared by her trusted legal adviser andnephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. The (1) deed of donation datedNovember 19,1974 23 in favor of Aurea Locsin, (2) another deed of donation datedFebruary 4, 1975 24 in favor of Matilde Cordero, and (3) still anotherdeed dated September 9, 1975 25 in favor of Salvador Lorayes, were all

witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio (who is married to Doa Catalina'sniece, Maria Lorayes) and Fernando Velasco who is married to anotherniece, Maria Olbes. 26 The sales which she made in favor of AureaLocsin on July 15, 1974 27 were witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio and

Elena Jaucian. Given those circumstances, said transactions could nothave been anything but free and voluntary acts on her part.

Apart from the foregoing considerations, the trial court and the Courtof Appeals erred in not dismissing this action for annulment andreconveyance on the ground of prescription. Commenced decades afterthe transactions had been consummated, and six (6) years after DoaCatalina's death, it prescribed four (4) years after the subjecttransactions were recorded in the Registry of Property, 28 whetherconsidered an action based on fraud, or one to redress an injury to therights of the plaintiffs. The private respondents may not feignignorance of said transactions because the registration of the deeds wasconstructive notice thereof to them and the whole world. 29

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision datedMarch 14, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 11186 isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private respondents' complaint forannulment of contracts and reconveyance of properties in Civil CaseNo. 7152 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch VIII of Legazpi City, isDISMISSED, with costs against the private respondents, plaintiffstherein.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 125835. July 30, 1998]

NATALIA CARPENA OPULENCIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ALADIN SIMUNDAC and MIGUEL OLIVAN,respondents.

D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN, J.

Is a contract to sell a real property in volved in testate proceedings validand binding without the approval of the probate court?

Statement of the Case

This is the main question raised in this petition for review before us,assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-GR CV No.41994 promulgated on February 6, 1996 and its Resolution[3] datedJuly 19, 1996. The challenged Decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower court

dismissing the complaint is SET ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered declaring the CONTRACT TO SELL executed by appellee infavor of appellants as valid and binding, subject to the result of theadministration proceedings of the testate Estate of Demetrio Carpena.


9/26

9

SO ORDERED. [4]

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the challengedResolution.[5]

The Facts

The antecedent facts, as succinctly narrated by Respondent Court of Appeals are:

In a complaint for specific performance filed with the cou rt a quo[herein private respondents] Aladin Simundac and Miguel Olivenalleged that [herein petitioner] Natalia Carpena Opulencia executed intheir favor a CONTRACT TO SELL Lot 2125 of the Sta. Rosa Estate,consisting of 23,766 square meters located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna atP150.00 per square meter; that plaintiffs paid a downpayment of P300,000.00 but defendant, despite demands, failed to comply withher obligations under the contract. [Private respondents] thereforeprayed that [petitioner] be ordered to perform her contractualobligations and to further pay damages, attorneys fee and litigationexpenses.

In her traverse, [petitioner] admitted the execution of the contract infavor of plaintiffs and receipt of P300,000.00 as downpayment.However, she put forward the following affirmative defenses: that theproperty subject of the contract formed part of the Estate of DemetrioCarpena (petitioners father), in respect of which a petition for probate was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Bian, Laguna; that

at the time the contract was executed, the parties were aware of thependency of the probate proceeding; that the contract to sell was notapproved by the probate court; that realizing the nullity of the contract[petitioner] had offered to return the downpayment received from[private respondents], but the latter refused to accept it; that [privaterespondents] further failed to provide funds for the tenant whodemanded P150,00.00 in payment of his tenancy rights on the land;that [petitioner] had chosen to rescind the contract.

At the pre-trial conference the parties stipulated on [sic] the followingfacts:

1. That on February 3, 1989, [private respondents] and[petitioner] entered into a contract to sell involving a parcel of landsituated in Sta. Rosa, Laguna, otherwise known as Lot No. 2125 of t heSta. Rosa Estate.

2. That the price or consideration of the said sell [sic] is P150.00

per square meters;

3. That the amount of P300,000.00 had already been received by [petitioner];

4. That the parties have knowledge that the property subject of the contract to sell is subject of t he probate proceedings;

5. That [as] of this time, the probate Court has not yet issued anorder either approving or denying the said sale. (p. 3, appealed Orderof September 15, 1992, pp. 109-112, record).

[Private respondents] submitted their evidence in support of thematerial allegations of the complaint. I n addition to testimonies of witnesses, [private respondents] presented the following documentary evidences: (1) Contract to Sell (Exh A); (2) machine copy of the last willand testament of Demetrio Carpena (defendants father) to show thatthe property sold by defendant was one of those devised to her in said will (Exh B); (3) receipts signed by defendant for the downpayment inthe total amount of P300,000.00 (Exhs C, D & E); and (4) demandletters sent to defendant (Exhs F & G).

It appears that [petitioner], instead of submitting her evidence, filed aDemurrer to Evidence. In essence, defendant maintained that thecontract to sell was null and void for want of approval by the probatecourt. She further argued that the contract was subject to a suspensivecondition, which was the probate of th e will of defendants fatherDemetrio Carpena. An Opposition was filed by [private respondents].It appears further that in an Order dated December 15, 1992 the court aquo granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the complaint. It justified its action in dismissing the complaint in the following manner:

It is noteworthy that when the contract to sell was consummated, no

petition was filed in the Court with notice to the heirs of the ti me andplace of hearing, to show that the sale is necessary and beneficial. A sale of properties of an estate as beneficial to the interested partiesmust comply with the requisites provided by law, (Sec. 7, Rule 89,Rules of Court) which are mandatory, and without them, the authority to sell, the sale itself, and the order approving it , would be null and void ab initio. (Arcilla vs. David, 77 Phil. 718, Gabriel, et al., vs.Encarnacion, et al., L-6736, May 4, 1954; Bonaga vs. Soler, 2 Phil. 755)Besides, it is axiomatic that where the estate of a deceased person isalready the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, theadministrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it withoutprior approval of the probate Court. (Estate of Obave, vs. Reyes, 123SCRA 767).

As held by the Supreme Court, a decedent s representative(administrator) is not estopped from questioning the validity of hisown void deed purporting to convey land. (Bona vs. Soler, 2 Phil, 755).In the case at bar, the [petitioner,] realizing the illegality of the

transaction[,] has interposed the nullity of the contract as her defense,there being no approval from the probate Court, and, in good faithoffers to return the money she received from the [private respondents].Certainly, the administratrix is not estop[ped] from doing so and t he

action to declare the inexistence of contracts do not prescribe. This is what precipitated the filing of [petitioners] demurrer to evidence.[6]

The trial courts order of dismissal was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private respondents who alleged:

1. The lower court erred in concluding that the contract to sell is nulland void, there being no approval of the probate court.

2. The lower court erred in concluding that [petitioner] in good faithoffers to return the money to [private respondents].

3. The lower court erred in concluding that [petitioner] is not underestoppel to question the validity of the contract to sell.

4. The lower court erred in not ruling on the consideration of thecontract to sell which is tantamount to plain unjust enrichment of [petitioner] at the expense of [private respondents].[7]

Public Respondents Ruling

Declaring the Contract to Sell valid, subject to the outcome of thetestate proceedings on Demetrio Carpenas estate, t he appellate co urset aside the trial courts dismissal of the complaint and correctly ruledas follows:

It is apparent from the appealed order that the lower court treated t hecontract to sell executed by appellee as one made by the administratrix

of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena for the benefit of the estate. Hence,its main reason for voiding the contract in question was the absence of the probate courts approval. Presumably, what the lower court had inmind was the sale of the estate or part thereof made by theadministrator for the benefit of the estate, as authorized under Rule 89of the Revised Rules of Court, which requires the approval of theprobate court upon application therefor with notice to the heirs,devisees and legatees.

However, as adverted to by appellants in their brief, the contract to sellin question is not covered by Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Courtsince it was made by appellee in her capacity as an heir, of a property that was devised to her under the will sought to be probated. Thus, while the document inadvertently stated that appellee executed thecontract in her capacity as executrix and administratrix of the estate,a cursory reading of the entire text of the contract would unerringly show that what she undertook to sell to appellants was one of theother properties given to her by her late father, and more

importantly, it was not made for the benefit of t he estate but for herown needs. To illustrate this point, it is apropos to refer to thepreambular or preliminary portion of the document, which reads:


10/26

10

WHEREAS, the SELLER is the lawful owner of a certain parcel of land, which is more particularly described as follows:

x x x x x xx x xx x x x x xx x xx x x x x xx x x WHEREAS, the SELLER suffers difficulties in her living and has forced

to offer the sale of the above- described property, which property wasonly one among the other properties given to her by her late father, toanyone who can wait for complete clearance of the court on the Last Will Testament of her father.

WHEREAS, the SELLER in order to meet her need of cash, has offeredfor sale the said property at ONE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (150.00)Philippine Currency, per square meter unto the BUYERS, and with thisoffer, the latter has accepted to buy and/or purchase the same, less thearea for the road and other easements indicated at the back of TransferCertificate of Title No. 2125 duly confirmed after the survey to beconducted by the BUYERs Licensed Geodetic Engineer, and whateverarea [is] left. (Emphasis added).

To emphasize, it is evident from the foregoing clauses of the contractthat appellee sold Lot 2125 not in her capacity as executrix of the will oradministratrix of the estate of her father, but as an heir and moreimportantly as owner of said lot which, along with other properties,

was devised to her under the will sought to be probated. That being so,the requisites stipulated in Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court whichrefer to a sale made by the administrator for the benefit of the estate donot apply.

x x x x x xx x xIt is noteworthy that in a Manifestation filed with this court by appellants, which is not controverted by appellee, it is mentioned thatthe last will and testament of Demetrio Carpena was approved in afinal judgment rendered in Special Proceeding No. B-979 by theRegional Trial Court, Branch 24 Binan, Laguna. But of course suchapproval does not terminate the proceeding[s] since the settlement of the estate will ensue. Such proceedings will consist, among others, inthe issuance by the court of a notice to creditors (Rule 86), hearing of money claims and payment of taxes and estate debts (Rule 88) anddistribution of the residue to the heirs or persons entitled thereto (Rule90). In effect, the final execution of the deed of sale itself upon

appellants payment of the balance of the purchase price will have to wait for the settlement or termination of the administrationproceedings of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena. Under the foregoingpremises, what the trial court should have done with the complaint wasnot to dismiss it but to simply put on hold further proceedings until

such time that the estate or its residue will be distributed in accordance with the approved will.

The rule is that when a demurrer to t he evidence is granted by the trialcourt but reversed on appeal, defendant loses the right to adduce hisevidence. In such a case, the appellate court will decide thecontroversy on the basis of plai ntiffs evidence. In the case at bench, while we find the contract to sell valid and binding between the parties, we cannot as yet order appellee to perform her obligations under thecontract because the result of the administration proceedings of the

testate Estate of Demetrio Carpena has to be awaited. Hence, we shallconfine our adjudication to merely declaring the validity of thequestioned Contract to Sell.

Hence, this appeal.[8]

The Issue

Petitioner raises only one issue:

Whether or not the Co ntract to Sell dated 03 February 1989 executed by the [p]etitioner and [p]rivate [r]espondent[s] without the requisiteprobate court approval is valid.

The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Contract to Sell Valid

In a nutshell, petitioner contends that where the estate of thedeceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestateproceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transactioninvolving it without prior approval of the Probate Court.[9] Shemaintains that the Contract to Sell is void because it was not approved by the probate court, as required by Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, orotherwise encumber estate. The court having jurisdiction of theestate of the deceased may authorize the executor or administrator tosell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate, in cases provided by these rules and when it appears necessary or beneficial, under thefollowing regulations:

xxx

Insisting that the above rule should apply to this case, petitioner arguesthat the stipulations in the Contract to Sell require her to act in hercapacity as an executrix or administratrix. She avers that herobligation to eject tenants pertains to the administratrix or executrix,

the estate being the landlord of the said tenants.[10] Likewisedemonstrating that she entered into the contract in her capacity asexecutor is the stipulation that she must effect the conversion of subject land from irrigated rice land to residential land and secure thenecessary clearances from government offices. Petitioner alleges thatthese obligations can be undertaken only by an executor oradministrator of an estate, and not by an heir.[11]

The Court is not persuaded. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals,Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, because

petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as anheiress, not as an executrix or administratrix of the estate. In thecontract, she re presented herself as the lawful owner and seller of thesubject parcel of land.[12] She also explained the reason for the sale to be difficulties in her living conditions and consequent need of cash.[13] These representations clearly evince that she was not actinon behalf of the estate under probate when she entered into theContract to Sell. Accordingly, the jurisprudence cited by petitioner hasno application to the instant case.

We emphasize that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirsfrom the moment of the decedents death.[14] Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died.Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract toSell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the wholeor a part of her share in the estate of her late father.[15] Thus, inJakosalem vs. Rafols,[16] the Court resolved an identical issue underthe old Civil Code and held:

Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that the possess ion of hereditary property is deemed to be transmitted to the heir withoutinterruption from the instant of the death of the decedent, in case theinheritance be accepted. And Manresa with reason states that uponthe death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided ownerof the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formedamong the coowners of the estate while it remains undivided. xxx Andaccording to article 399 of the Civil Code, every part owner may assignor mortgage his part in the common property, and the effect of suchassignment or mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may beallotted him in the partition upon the dissolution of the community.Hence, where some of the heirs, without the concurrence of the others,sold a property left by their deceased father, this Court, speaking thruits then Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano, said that the sale was valid, but that the effect thereof was limited to the share which may beallotted to the vendors upon the partiti on of the estate.

Administration of the Estate Not Prejudiced by the Contract to Sell

Petitioner further contends that [t]o sanction the sale at this stage would bring about a part ial distribution of the decedents estate


11/26

11

pending the final termination of the testate proceedings.[17] This becomes all the more significant in the light of the trial courts finding,as stated in its Order dated August 20, 1997, that the legitime of on e of the heirs has been impaired.[18]

Petitioners contention is not convincing. The Contract to Sellstipulates that petitioners offer to sell is contingent on the completeclearance of the court on the Last Will Testament of her father.[19]Consequently, although the Contract to Sell was perfected between thepetitioner and private respondents during the pendency of the probate

proceedings, the consummation of the sale or the transfer of ownershipover the parcel of land to the private respondents is subject to the fullpayment of the purchase price and to the termination and outcome of the testate proceedings. Therefore, there is no basis for petitionersapprehension that the Contract to Sell may result in a prematurepartition and distribution of the properties of the estate. Indeed, it issettled that the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance,subject to the pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of such administration.[20]

Estoppel

Finally, petitioner is estopped from backing out of her representationsin her valid Contract to Sell with private respondents, from whom shehad already received P300,000 as initial payment of the purchaseprice. Petitioner may not renege on her own acts and representations,to the prejudice of the private respondents who have relied onthem.[21] Jurisprudence teaches us that neither the law nor the courts

will extricate a party from an unwise or undesirable contract he or sheentered into with all the required formalities and with fu ll awareness of its consequences.[22]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailedDecision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 126334. November 23, 2001]

EMILIO EMNACE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,ESTATE OF VICENTE TABANAO, SHERWIN TABANAO,

VICENTE WILLIAM TABANAO, JANETTE TABANAODEPOSOY, VICENTA MAY TABANAO VARELA, ROSELA TABANAO and VINCENT TABANAO, respondents.

D E C I S I O N YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioner Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in a business concern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing

Industry. Sometime in January of 1986, they decided to dissolve theirpartnership and executed an agreement of partition and distribution of the partnership properties among them, consequent to JacintoDivinagracias withdrawal from the partnership.[1] Among the assets to be distributed were five (5) fishing boats, six (6) vehicles, two (2)parcels of land located at Sto. Nio and Talisay, Negros Occidental, andcash deposits in the local branches of the Bank of the PhilippineIslands and Prudential Bank.

Throughout the existence of the partnership, and even after Vicente

Tabanaos untime ly demise in 1994, petitioner failed to submit toTabanaos heirs any statement of assets and liabilities of thepartnership, and to render an accounting of the partnerships finances.Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over to Tabanaos heirs the deceaseds 1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership,amounting to P30,000,000.00, or the sum of P10,000,000.00, despiteformal demand for payment thereof.[2]

Consequently, Tabanaos heirs, respondents herein, filed againstpetitioner an action for accounting, payment of shares, division of assets and damages.[3] In their complaint, respondents prayed asfollows:

1. Defendant be ordered to render the proper accounting of all theassets and liabilities of the partnership at bar; and

2. After due notice and hearing defendant be ordered topay/remit/deliver/surrender/yield to the plaintiffs the following:

A. No less than One Third (1/3) of the assets, properties, dividends,cash, land(s), fishing vessels, trucks, motor vehicles, and other formsand substance of treasures which belong and/or should belong, hadaccrued and/or must accrue to the partnership;

B. No less than Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) asmoral damages;

C. Attorneys fees equivalent to Thirty Per cent (30%) of the entireshare/amount/award which the Honorable Court may resolve theplaintiffs as entitled to plus P1,000.00 for every appearance incourt.[4]

Petitioner filed a motion to di smiss the complaint on the grounds of improper venue, lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action orsuit, and lack of capacity of the estate of Tabanao to sue.[5] On August30, 1994, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. It held that

venue was properly laid because, while realties were involved, theaction was directed against a particular person on the basis of hispersonal liability; hence, the action is not only a personal action butalso an action in personam. As regards petitioners argument of lack of jurisdiction over the action because the prescribed docket fee was not

paid considering the huge amount involved in the claim, the trial courtnoted that a request for accounting was made in order that the exact value of the partnership may be ascertained and, thus, the correctdocket fee may be paid. Finally, the trial court held that the heirs of Tabanao had a right to sue in their own names, in vi ew of the provisionof Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that the ri ghts to thesuccession are transmitted from the moment of the death of thedecedent.[6]

The following day, respondents filed an amended complaint,[7]

incorporating the additional prayer that petitioner be ordered to sellall (the partnerships) assets and thereafterpay/remit/deliver/surrender/yield to the plaintiffs theircorresponding share in the proceeds thereof. In due time, petitionerfiled a manifestation and motion to dismiss,[8] arguing that the trialcourt did not acquire jurisdiction over the case due to the plaintiffsfailure to pay the proper docket fees. Further, in a supplement to hismotion to dismiss,[9] petitioner also raised prescription as anadditional ground warranting the outright dismissal of the complaint.

On June 15, 1995, the trial court issued an Order,[10] denying themotion to dismiss inasmuch as the grounds raised therein were basically the same as the earlier motion to dismiss which has beendenied. Anent the issue of prescription, the trial court ruled thatprescription begins to run only upon the di ssolution of the partnership when the final accounting is done. Hence, prescription has not set inthe absence of a final accounting. Moreover, an action based on a written contract prescribes in ten years from the time the right of

action accrues.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,[11]raising the following issues:

I. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or withgrave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of a case despite thefailure to pay the required docket fee;

II. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or withgrave abuse of discretion in insisting to try t he case which involve (sic)a parcel of land situated outside of its territorial jurisdiction;

III. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in allowing the estate of the deceased toappear as party plaintiff, when there is no intestate case and filed by one who was never appointed by the court as administratrix of theestates; and

IV. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or withgrave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the case on the ground of prescription.


12/26

12

On August 8, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the assaileddecision,[12] dismissing the petition for certiorari, upon a finding thatno grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction was committed by the trial court in issuing the questioned ordersdenying petitioners motions to dismiss.

Not satisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review, raising thesame issues resolved by the Court of Appeals, namely:

I. Failure to pay the proper docket fee;

II. Parcel of land subject of the case pending before the trial court isoutside the said courts territorial jurisdiction;

III. Lack of capacity to sue on the part of plaintiff heirs of VicenteTabanao; and

IV. Prescription of the plaintiff heirs cause of action.

It can be readily seen that respondents primary and ultimate objectivein instituting the action below was to recover the decedents 1/3 sharein the partnerships assets. While they ask for an accounting of thepartnerships assets and finances, what they are actually asking is forthe trial court to compel petitioner to pay and turn over their share, orthe equivalent value thereof, from the proceeds of the sale of thepartnership assets. They also assert that until and unless a properaccounting is done, the exact value of the partnerships assets, as wellas their corresponding share therein, cannot be ascertained.

Consequently, they feel justified in not having paid the commensuratedocket fee as required by the Rules of Court.

We do not agree. The trial court does not have to employ guesswork inascertaining the estimated value of the partnerships assets, forrespondents themselves voluntarily pegged the worth thereof at Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00). Hence, this case is one which isreally not beyond pecuniary estimation, but rather partakes of thenature of a simple collection case where the value of the subject assetsor amount demanded is pecuniarily determinable.[13] While it is truethat the exact value of the partnerships total assets cannot be shown with certainty at the time of filing, respondents can and must ascertain,through informed and practical estimation, the amount they expect tocollect from the partnership, particularly from petitioner, in order todetermine the proper amount of docket and other fees.[14] It is thusimperative for respondents to pay the corresponding docket fees inorder that the trial court may acquire jurisdiction over the action.[15]

Nevertheless, unlike in the case of Manchester Development Corp. v.Court of Appeals,[16] where there was clearly an effort to defraud thegovernment in avoiding to pay the correct docket fees, we see noattempt to cheat the courts on the part of respondents. In fact, thelower courts have noted their expressed desire to remit to t he court

any payable balance or lien on whatever award which the HonorableCourt may grant them in this case should there be any deficiency in thepayment of the docket fees to be computed by the Clerk of Court.[17]There is evident willingness to pay, and the fact that the docket fee paidso far is inadequate is not an indication that they are trying to avoidpaying the required amount, but may simply be due to an inability topay at the time of filing. This consideration may have moved the trialcourt and the Court of Appeals to declare that the unpaid docket feesshall be considered a lien on the judgment award.

Petitioner, however, argues that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in condoning the non-payment of the proper legal feesand in allowing the same to become a lien on the monetary or property judgment that may be rendered in favor of respondents. There is meritin petitioners assertion. The third paragraph of Section 16, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court states that:

The legal fees shall be a lien on the monetary or property j udgment infavor of the pauper-litigant.

Respondents cannot invoke the above provision in their favor becauseit specifically applies to pauper-litigants. Nowhere in the records doesit appear that respondents are litigating as paupers, and as such areexempted from the payment of court fees.[18]

The rule applicable to the case at bar is Section 5(a) of Rule 141 of theRules of Court, which defines the two kinds of claims as: (1) those which are immediately ascertainable; and (2) those which cannot be

immediately ascertained as to the exact amount. This second class of claims, where the exact amount still has to be finally determined by thecourts based on evidence pres

wills set 1WILLS

Documents

Transcript of wills set 1WILLS