William James and Sigmund Freud: "The Future of Psychology Belongs to Your Work"

William James and Sigmund Freud: "The Future of Psychology Belongs to Your Work"Author(s): Eugene TaylorSource: Psychological Science, Vol. 10, No. 6 (Nov., 1999), pp. 465-469Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the Association for Psychological ScienceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40063471 .

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WILLIAM JAMES AND SIGMUND FREUD: "The Future of Psychology Belongs to Your Work"

Eugene Taylor

PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE

Special Section

Saybrook Institute and Harvard University

Abstract - Although James and Freud are generally not considered scientific by experimental psychologists, both wrote about their view of what a scientific psychology should look like. Their radically different philosophical epistemologies and historical origins are reviewed, to provide an understanding of their respective visions for psychology. James took his stand on a new metaphysical foundation for the way experiments should be conducted with his formulation of radical empiricism. Freud attempted a neurological explanation of the unconscious in his "Project for a Scientific Psychology." Remarkably, their definitions of psychology as a science had a similar ring. Likely, this is because both took a phenomenological position with regard to how they defined science, which is also probably the primary reason their ideas on the subject have always been rejected by experimentalists. The humanistic implications of the neuroscience revolution, however, have caused a reassessment of their respective positions, as philosophical questions about the nature of consciousness have brought both Freud and James back into vogue, but in new and unexpected ways.

As difficult as it may be to comprehend, it is probably true that most experimental psychologists are actually not very familiar with the work of two of the 20th century's most well-known figures - William James and Sigmund Freud. Psychologists have always been fond of quoting James in detail, but a close look at the actual references shows that, in most cases, only James's Principles of Psycholo- gy (1890) has been consulted, and that only selectively - usually just those chapters in a particular psychologist's specialty (Taylor, 1998). Moreover, experimental psychologists continue to insist that James had no psychology after 1890, although the archival evidence shows that the 1890s were the years when James's work on educational psychology, experimental psychopathology, psychical research, the psychology of religion, and his metatheoretical conceptions for the discipline as a science flourished (Taylor, 1996). Instead, while James's name remains ubiquitous at least throughout the older generation of experimental psychologists, most agree with Gregory Kimble (1990), who looked into the Principles at its hundredth anniversary in 1990 and proclaimed that he could not find a single principle in it.

Freud remains a similar case. Psychologists are largely familiar with his Interpretation of Dreams (1900/1953), but only in translation. Studies in Hysteria, which Freud coauthored with Josef Breuer, is still widely available in paperback (Breuer & Freud, 1895/1953), as is Stra- chey's translation of Freud's New Introductory Lectures on Psycho- analysis (Freud, 1933/1953), so at least the undergraduates are a little more familiar with Freud than with James. But beyond those titles, few psychologists have probably looked deeply into Freud's essays on sex- uality, his works on psychoanalysis and art, or his psychoanalytic interpretation of culture. If they have, the judgment has usually been that

Special Section: The End of Psychological Science?

Just because some 6th-century monk didn't have the concept of zero, that's no reason for Psychological Science not to celebrate the new century, and the new millennium, at the proper time.

In this issue, PS presents a trio of articles that look back at psychology's past, critically examine its present, and look forward to its future. Eugene Taylor, a historian of 19th-century psychology, writes about the relationship between William James, who at the turn of this century defined psychology for the scientific commu-

nity, and Sigmund Freud, who defined psychology for popular culture. Award-winning science writer John Horgan, famous for

announcing "the end of science," argues that although the mind is science's last frontier, the problems that psychology seeks to solve

may well be intractable. Brendan Maher, distinguished clinical researcher and academic administrator, reflects on the future of

training in basic and clinical psychological science. And then there's the rest of the issue: birth order and personal-

ity development, social categorization, cognitive aging, visual illu- sions, attention and masking, spatial perception, goals and

perception, categorization and memory, learning, and implicit self- esteem. The end of psychological science? Not likely.

Freud's work is literature and not psychology. And although American

psychology includes a significant body of studies on the experimental analysis of Freudian concepts, stretching from Robert Sears, Saul

Rosenzweig, and Franz Alexander in the 1920s and 1930s to John Dol- lard and Neil Miller in the 1950s, it is still historically accurate to say that Freud never had the impact on the core of American academic psychology and psychiatry that most people think that he had. Freud, after all, had no impact on psychopharmacology, which forms the core of

experimental psychiatry, nor did he influence laboratory psy- chophysics or animal behaviorism, which dominated the definition of academic psychology up to the cognitive revolution of the 1960s.

Yet both James and Freud specifically addressed the issue of what a scientific psychology should look like from their respective points of view. In fact, their conceptions of experimental psychology actually reveal a number of intriguing similarities. But to compare what they had to say and to assess whether or not it might be relevant for an

experimental psychology in the 21st century, we must first understand how big the differences are between the two, both historically and

philosophically, if we are to comprehend their common message.

JAMES AND FREUD COMPARED

First of all, let us dispense with the biographical question. The two did know of each other, did refer sporadically to each other's work, and did actually meet, possibly on more than one occasion.

According to the Harvard College Library Charging Records, James was an avid reader of the American Journal of Insanity in the 1 880s and

Address correspondence to Eugene Taylor, Psychological Testing Center, Massachusetts General Hospital, 5 Emerson PI., Boston, MA 021 14.

VOL. 10, NO. 6, NOVEMBER 1999 Copyright© 1999 American Psychological Society 465




James and Freud

might have seen the first notice of Freud on a psychological topic - a defense of Jean Martin Charcot's neurological theory of hysteria, which Freud had launched before the Vienna Medical Society in 1886. The presentation and a discussion that followed were reported in the Ger- man-language periodicals and abstracted in English in the American Journal of Insanity in 1887 (Anonymous, 1887). Freud had translated both Charcot's and Hippolyte Burnheim's works on hypnosis into Ger- man; James had been the first to review Burnheim's mentor, A.A. Liebeault, in the English language in 1868, and himself had attended Charcot's lectures on hysteria at the Salpetriere as early as 1882. Both James and Freud attended the First International Congress of Experi- mental Psychology, held in Paris in 1889, where James chaired one of the major sessions, so Freud must have at least known what James looked like. Freud, we know, was also familiar with what James had written on the perversion of the instincts in Principles of Psychology.

For his part, James was the first to notice Freud in the American psychological literature when he abstracted Breuer and Freud's "Pre- liminary Communication on the Nature of Hysterical Phenomena" in James Mark Baldwin and James McKeen Cattell's inaugural issue of Psychological Review in 1894. Thereafter, James referred to Breuer and Freud in his graduate lectures on psychopathology, which he delivered at Harvard from 1893 to 1898 (Gay, 1938), and he cited sev- eral of Breuer and Freud's cases from Studies in Hysteria in his Low- ell Lectures on Exceptional Mental States in the fall of 1896 (Taylor, 1983). In The Varieties of Religious Experience, James (1902) ranked the work of "Breuer and Freud" next to the accomplishments of F.W.H. Myers, Morton Prince, Boris Sidis, and others.

James and Freud even met, probably on more than one occasion (Freud, 1925/1953, p. 52). At the Clark Conference in 1909, James met Freud and Carl Gustav Jung at President G. Stanley Hall's house; they all posed for the famous Friday photo, and, according to Rosen- zweig (1992), the next day Freud may have walked James to the train station. There are two or three clues that they may have also met again, when James, it has been alleged, secretly slipped into Vienna for a consultation with Freud in March of 1910, just a few months before James himself died (Kardiner, 1977; Taylor, 1995).

JAMES'S ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY

Additionally, some psychologists may be astonished to learn that James played a major role in the development of the academic fields of abnormal, social, and personality psychology, and by virtue of his con- tribution to the field of experimental psychopathology contributed to the development of modern scientific psychotherapy.1 Although James and Freud subscribed to radically different models of personality and consciousness and came from completely different worldviews - one was

the quintessential Irish American familiar with European high culture but actually more the ardent francophile, whereas the other was an Old World Viennese Jew who was drawn to Germanic ideas and came to America once but swore he would never come again - both were physi- cians with a specialty in neurological and psychological topics, they were only 1 4 years apart in age, and their professional circles often over-

lapped more than most psychologists realize (Taylor, 1992). We know that Freud used hypnosis in his early psychotherapeutic

work with Breuer before developing the technique of free association; James, in fact, was also himself an expert hypnotist. Freud, we also know, saw a steady stream of private patients in his office; there is evidence that James saw patients as well, although there were only a few, most of whom he took into his own home for treatment. Primarily, he carried out studies in the laboratory on dissociation and hypnosis using Harvard students as well as local mediums. And like Freud, James also

developed a dynamic theory of the subconscious, but one based on his own cases and the work of Pierre Janet and F.W.H. Myers. James also contributed to the literature on multiple personality, and he is credited in Tuke's (1892) Dictionary of Psychological Medicine with originat- ing the term "dissociation" in psychology, a chemical analogy that he first applied to analyzing British philosophical doctrines on the association of ideas. Indeed, there is ample evidence to show that James was a major player in the development of psychotherapeutics in Amer- ica long before Freud was ever an influence on the scene (Burnham, 1967; Gifford, 1978; Hale, 1971); moreover, his influence in this arena was international in scope (Taylor, 1982, 1988, 1995).

I would like to highlight these points with a few illustrations (Tay- lor, 1982). Figure 1 shows the state of scientific psychotherapy in

Europe as it first developed within neurology, extending from the period immediately after Charcot's rehabilitation of hypnosis in 1881 before the French Academy of Sciences until just after the turn of the century. According to Henri Ellenberger (1970), all major developments in dynamic psychology during this period emanated from France: Hypnosis was the primary research tool, hysteria and multiple personality were the primary diagnostic classifications, and dissociation theory was the reigning model of consciousness. Meanwhile, developments in Europe proliferated, more or less as variations on these themes, but remained separated from one another. Freud was in Vienna, still in his years of glorious isolation, and if known in America at all, remembered as the junior partner to Breuer at least up to 1915 (Putnam, 1915).

Figure 2 is the left half of the same map, covering approximately the same period, although extending to around 1920. The French dissociation schools still dominated the psychotherapeutic landscape, but their influence was organized around an international consortium of investi- gators whom I have referred to as the French-Swiss-English-American psychotherapeutic alliance. Evidence suggests that this loose-knit alliance dominated developments in scientific psychotherapy in the West for approximately a 40-year period between 1880 and 1920. In this alliance, psychical research was a major contributor to dynamic theories of the subconscious, and personality was conceived as an ultimate plurality of states, waking consciousness being only one possible state among many, while the most influential formulations about the nature of consciousness contained within them what I have called the iconog- raphy of the transcendent - the appeal to a growth-oriented dimension of consciousness higher than the one in which humans normally find themselves. Here is where William James, M.D., internationally known philosopher and psychologist, had his influence, leading the group var- iously known as the Boston School of Psychotherapy or the Boston School of Abnormal Psychology (Taylor, 1982).

1. By this phrase I refer to the cyle of laboratory testing and retesting of experimental concepts, followed by the equivalent of clinical trials in a con- trolled hospital setting, culminating in publication in what was judged legiti- mate scientific literature of the time. This then permitted psychotherapeutic techniques to be employed with large-scale populations of patients in an ambu- latory hospital setting. This process can be documented as under way in psychology beginning in 1882 in the Harvard psychological laboratories under James, influencing James Jackson Putnam's delivery of psychotherapeutic ser- vices in the Out-Patient Department of Diseases of the Nervous System (neurology) at the Massachusetts General Hospital after 1884 (Taylor, 1988).

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Eugene Taylor

Fig. 1. Scientific psychotherapy in Europe, 1881-1900.

Figure 3 shows the same international arena stretching from

Europe to the United States after the 1920s. The picture was dominated by Freud and his followers, the majority of whom ended up in the United States. The new axis was Berlin, Vienna, and New York, instead of Paris, Geneva, and Boston. Psychoanalytic language pre- dominated, free association was the preferred method, and Freud's hierarchical, reductionistic, but nevertheless dynamic formulation of what is now called the unconscious prevailed. There appeared to be no trace of the former alliance.

Although much more could be said about these two very different historical periods, my point is simply to suggest at the outset that James and Freud represent two rather massive epistemological systems that are so radically different that few theoretical comparisons can be made offhand. At the same time, there are some important similarities in the way they both spoke about what scientific psychology looked like from their respective points of view. These points of view

are, of course, in direct contrast to the way experimentalists wish to view their own history - that is, as derived from the Wundtian tradition of German experimental laboratory psychology (Boring, 1929, 1950).

JAMES AND FREUD ON EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY

James formulated a critique of experimentalism in psychology and in science generally with the development of his metaphysics of radical empiricism (Taylor, 1996). He wrote his Principles of Psychology in 1 890, he said, from a positivist point of view because there were no other metaphysical systems sophisticated enough to displace the positivist's metaphysics; moreover, a more compelling reason was that positivism must be the foundation of any newly developing science. However, he emphasized in the preface to his Principles that positivist epistemology was relevant for a science only in its infancy. Sooner or later, in order to mature, all young positivistic sciences must be reno- vated by philosophy.

James took up the problem of the metaphysical basis of experimental psychology again in his presidential address to the American Psy- chological Association in 1894. He surprised his audience by saying that, instead of continuing to defend the positivist agenda, he intended to throw it over completely in favor of a new metaphysics for experi-

Fig. 2. The French-Swiss-English-American psychotherapeutic alliance.

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James and Freud

Fig. 3. The Freudian empire, 1913-1930.

mentation, to which in 1897 he finally gave the name radical empiricism. By the rejection of reductionistic positivism, he meant that the purview of experimental psychology must be more than just the sum total of all sensory input. His focus instead was on pure experience, which comes to us in the immediate moment (Taylor & Wozniak, 1996).

Freud wrote his "Project for a Scientific Psychology" at about the same time, in 1895 (Freud, 1895/1953). According to certain inter- preters, at least, it was a masterful attempt to understand the mecha- nisms of the unconscious, including repression and wish fulfillment, on the basis of then-known theories of neurone energy. Even a few months after he penned the piece, Freud wrote to a correspondent that he could not understand what state of mind he must have been in to write it. By this he meant that the state of reductionistic science was still so primitive that most of the subtleties of unraveling the meaning of symbolism in dreams, parapraxes, and the fantasy life of his hysteric patients were still beyond the gross formulations of physiology. Thus, he felt he had to abandon any purely physiological explanation of psychogenesis for the time being and proceed with developing the method of symbolism, hopeful that one day neurology would catch up.

Experimental scientists are likely to reject both James and Freud automatically for a variety of different reasons. James is thought of as an armchair philosopher and Freud as a clinician, and neither is asso- ciated with the laboratory or with problems of quantification. But there is one point in particular I would like to dwell on as central, and that is the respective views of both James and Freud that psychology itself is a foundational discipline in the family of the sciences.

In the second half of the 19th century, the new generation of experimental psychologists saw psychology as one of the natural sciences, allied with physics and biology in method and outlook. Both James and Freud, however, saw psychology as a form of phenomenology -

thinking that no objective science could exist without factoring into the equation the scientist's state of consciousness that defines science in the first place. For James, the basic datum of psychology was pure experience in the immediate moment, before the differentiation of subject and object. For Freud, it was the content of consciousness that was determined in large part by the dynamic processes of the unconscious. We may think of psychology in this sense as erkenntnistheorie - that

is, as epistemology, or as the way in which all knowledge comes to us as immediate experience. The reality of the object is always dependent on someone's consciousness somewhere.

THE EXPERIMENTALIST'S VIEW

Experimental psychology in the United States, in contrast, has never been based on this implicit assumption. One controls for all sub- jective influences, operationally defines one's constructs, isolates the

independent and dependent variables, and then controls the variation of the independent variable so that any functional relations between it and the dependent variable can be measured. Repetition of the experiment ensures reliability, and comparison with an external measure ensures validity of the phenomenon under study; replication in different laboratories leads to the confirmation of causal laws.

The process is purely objective. In the ideal experiment, it does not matter if the subject is a pigeon, a rat, a chimp, or a human, if lawful- ness is generalizable to the behavior of many different types of organ- isms, nor does it matter who the experimenters are, so long as they remain objective and unbiased in carrying out their study.

SOME IMPLICATIONS

We stand at the threshold of a new era in modern science, however, with the coming of the neuroscience revolution. Before, pure science was able to brush the philosophical questions aside and, indeed, ban- ished all but the most positivist rhetoric from the discussion of what constituted scientific reality. Now, the neuroscience revolution, with its interdisciplinary communication between the basic sciences, its cross- fertilization of methods, and its focus for the first time on the biology of consciousness, appears to have important humanistic implications far beyond the dictates of the reductionistic approach that spawned it (Schmitt, 1984, 1990). The relation of the brain to the mind is but one of the many philosophical topics now being debated, as is the role of the observer in the perception of the object (Velmans, 1993).

At the same time, in this ultra-post-Freudian era, psychoanalysts are aligning themselves with such theories as Edelman's neural Dar-

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winism (Modell, 1994), or with new advances in brain neurophysiolo- gy that explain psychogenesis and affective experience (Henningsen, 1998). Meanwhile, geneticists such as Francis Crick are carrying on discussions about consciousness in the pages of Scientific American by beginning with none other than quotes from the evolutionary psychology of James, complete with a distinguished photo of James in the center of the page (Crick & Koch, 1992).

Jung once remarked that, in his opinion, the reason why scientists

rejected Freud's sexual theories was so that they did not have to

acknowledge the reality of the unconscious (Jung, n.d.). James himself at the end of his life advised psychologists to study the fall of the threshold of consciousness. Further, he said that we should do this as

psychologists even if we did not know what we were looking at, as it would take us more than a few generations just to grasp the outlines of the larger picture. His radical empiricism suggests that this larger picture refers to the inextricable dependence of the knower on the object as well as what is known about it.

According to James's view, experimental psychology may yet incorporate more of the phenomenology of the science-making process into its purview, at the same time that our understanding of consciousness, which has already changed dramatically through cognitive information processing models and the hidden determinants of

perception revealed by artificial intelligence, will become consider-

ably more wide and deep. In all likelihood, this is what James was

alluding to when he allegedly put his arm around Ernest Jones, then a

young, newly converted psychoanalyst, at the Clark University conference in 1909 and assured him by saying: "The future of psychology belongs to your work" (Jones, 1955, p. 15).

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(Received 5/26/99; Accepted 5/28/99)

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William James and Sigmund Freud: "The Future of Psychology Belongs to Your Work"

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