Group B

Garson 200

Rough Draft

15 Nov 2013

Rough Draft

INTRODUCTION RELAYING FACTS OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL ETC

The demands that the Kyoto protocol places upon its member states include measures

that the signatories believe will eventually help to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The

protocol is internationally binding; as long as a state remains a member, the state is expected to

comply with the agreed upon emission reduction targets. In addition to the member states

complying with the reduction of emissions, the Kyoto Protocol also requires its signatories to

monitor the expressed levels of allowed emissions using several different mechanisms. These

structures include registry systems, national reporting, a specialized compliance system, and a

system created to assist with any changes that the protocol may have to adapt to. The Kyoto

protocol calls for these systems to enable each of the member states to not only keep track of

their own success in compliance, but also to hold one another accountable (Kyoto Protocol). The

registry and compliance systems also help in the event that one nation is having problems

observing their quota, by putting in place three mechanisms that are able to supplement the

required primary, national funding (Registry Systems, Compliance).

These three mechanisms were put in place to stimulate, assist, and encourage the

countries to reach their goals in attempting to combat climate change. They are Emissions

Trading, the Clean Development Mechanism, and Joint Implementation (Mechanisms).

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Emissions Trading allows countries with unused units to sell them to those who may be in

danger of going over capacity (Emissions Trading). On the other hand, both CDM and Joint

Implementation are mechanisms that allow a Kyoto protocol signatory to earn emission

reduction units through projects in non-member, or developing countries and other member

states, respectively (Clean Development Mechanism, Joint Implementation). All of these systems

and mechanisms that have been put in place to ensure that the member states of the Kyoto

Protocol have no excuse not to comply with the emission targets.

The Kyoto Protocol was adopted on the 11th of December in 1997, however it was not

until 2005 that it entered into force. As late as 2008, however, was when the first commitment

period began. For the first commitment period, which ended in 2012, the member nations agreed

to commit to "reduce [greenhouse gas] emissions to an average of five percent against 1990

levels" (Kyoto Protocol). During the current and second commitment period, the nations chose to

raise the commitment to at least 18 percent below 1990 levels. This is obviously a large step

from the first commitment period's five percent, however the second commitment period has

been granted for an additional three years to the first commitment period. The numbers are based

upon the December 2012 adopted "Doha Agreement," which not only granted the second

commitment period, but also revisited the list of greenhouse gases that will be required to report

on, as well as amending the issues that the signatories believed needed updating for the second

commitment period (Doha Amendment).

The emissions targets for each of the individual member nations were set based upon

three main criteria. James Garvey explains each of the three criteria in his book The Ethics of

Climate Change: Right and Wrong as historical responsibilities, present capacities, and

sustainability. As far as historical responsibilities for present climate change are concerned, it is

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obviously already developed countries that have caused the changes. In addition, developed

countries are currently in a better position to help stave off the consequences of climate change.

The framework of the Kyoto protocol calls for all of the member nations to ensure that the

carbon dioxide emissions around the globe do not exceed the assigned amount for the

commitment period (Massai 67). Not all nations, however, were considered to be responsible to

signing and upholding the protocol. These three criteria put forth by Garvey are also the main

reason why only developed countries are included in the Kyoto protocol. Countries such as

China and India, who were considered to be developing countries in 1997, are not held to the

same standards because, historically, they are not as responsible for the current changes in

climate and, more currently, they are not in a similar position to help reduce greenhouse gas

emissions.

One of the main issues that the developers of the Kyoto protocol, as well as systems that

attempt to limit greenhouse gas emissions, is the debate over what amount of emissions can be

allowed morally, that are also scientifically possible. Because emissions had no caps when

already developed countries were beginning to develop, a lot of progress was made while

perhaps testing the bounds of what is morally sound and safe for the environment. While most

scientists now agree that there has to be a way to limit the global emissions of greenhouse gases,

the same scientists struggle with whether or not that is feasible when much of a nation's

economic success rests on the ability to use factories and technology that do emit greenhouse

gases.

Despite claims that ratifying the Kyoto Protocol was for the greater global good, its

immediate benefits would be largely intangible. That is to say, signatory countries would be

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required to ante up large sums of money in order to meet CO2 reduction deadlines, but would not

see any kind of immediate economic or environmental rewards as a result. Overall, international

cooperation was generally low with regard to this treaty, especially in the cases of those

countries whose economies depend heavily on many of the processes that the Kyoto Protocol

would limit. Although it was projected that this protocol would have had considerable success in

limiting greenhouse gas emissions, the costs that it represented to potential signatory countries

overshadowed much of the reasoning that supported it. In addition, the original Kyoto Protocol

that was proposed in 1997 at the 3rd Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework

Convention of Climate Change left questions unanswered pertaining to its implementation,

which compounded much of the skepticism that already existed around it. For example,

information about the credits that would be awarded for carbon sinks was ambiguous, and it was

also unclear as to the tradability of emissions rights between countries.

Ultimately, the United States did not ratify the Kyoto protocol because both the Clinton

and Bush administrations saw it as a fundamentally flawed treaty economically, morally, and

because of the amount of uncertainty that still surrounds issues of climate change. One of the

most prominent reasons that the United States chose not to ratify the treaty was because the

Clinton and Bush administrations both claimed that it would threaten jobs and greatly affect the

US economy. The fact of the matter is that the United States is responsible for roughly 25% of

greenhouse gas emissions, and it leads in consumption of both coal and oil. The potential

economic deficit increases further when one considers that large sums of money would also have

to be allocated to studies and buildup of alternative fuel sources and jobs in the wake of this

significant shift away from fossil fuels.

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The United States was also unhappy with the Kyoto Protocol on the basis that it was

unfair that developing countries like Japan and China were subject to much looser restrictions.

Unlike the industrialized West, these countries were in some cases even allowed to increase their

CO2 production, albeit only temporarily. The justification for this was that these countries

deserved to develop themselves in order to increase their economic standing and their overall

quality of life. Then they would curb their output and submit to harsher output quotas. It was also

argued that heavier restrictions were immediately placed upon countries like the United States

because they were most directly and consistently responsible for the largest CO2 outputs, but

realistically, this policy would put these countries at a disadvantage against newly industrializing

countries. Consequently the opinions of American voters concerning the fairness of the Kyoto

Protocol were dismal, and resulted in a general sentiment that it was morally defective because it

was intrinsically unfair.

The effects of climate change, even just a temperature increase of a few degrees, can be

disastrous. Climate change threatens global biodiversity, water supply, habitable land, food

supply, and is the potential cause of extreme weather events. Climate change can jeopardize

human rights because everyone has the right to a healthy life (Caney 16). As a result, it is clear to

see why climate change is not only an environmental and economic problem, but is a moral

problem and should be treated as such. The Kyoto Protocol is the first step in addressing this

issue on a global level, which is commendable on its own. However, it is important to evaluate

whether it recognizes moral values such as fairness, compensation for historical wrongs, and the

right of poor countries to develop economically. At face value the Kyoto Protocol ideally does

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recognize these values, however, in practice it provides a balance between these values and

adapting to an economic environment.

Before evaluating the morality of the Kyoto Protocol, it is imperative to assess and

understand the ethics of climate change as a whole. As Jamieson posits in “Ethics, Public Policy,

and Global Warming,” the problem of climate change should be “confronted as a fundamental

challenge to our values and [we should] not treat it as if it were simply another technical problem

to be managed” (Jamieson 85). It is extremely difficult to do this because climate change is

caused by a large amount of people, almost everyone contributes in differing degrees to the

problem, and the harms caused by climate change are global and greatly affect future generations

(Garson Lecture 16). Therefore, it is common to express indifference towards addressing the

problem because the effect that one person can seem insignificant. This is the result of trying to

address climate change by calculating outcomes and treating it as a “technical problem”

(Jamieson 85). It is important to base our action on climate change on moral values, such as the

ones previously stated, because this is what will incite participation and responsiveness, which

will lead to positive moral progress on this detrimental global issue. Therefore, ethical questions

should be essential to formulating climate change policies (Gardiner 88).

In order to judge whether or not the Kyoto Protocol is based upon or recognizes moral

values, it is imperative to include opposing critiques that touch upon its mechanisms and analyze

the validity of each critique. In order for countries to meet their targets, the Kyoto Protocol

provides three mechanisms: Emissions Trading, The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),

and Joint Implementation (JI). These mechanisms have essentially transformed CO2 (the primary

greenhouse gas emitted) emissions into a commodity that can be bought and traded. The use of a

carbon market is what the designers of the Kyoto Protocol hope will lead to a reduction in

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emissions and ultimately reduce global temperatures by at least a few degrees if free market

forces prevail. Under the Kyoto Protocol, developed countries are required to either limit or

reduce their greenhouse gas emissions within a set time limit. If countries are unable to meet

their emissions targets, they can “buy allowances” from another country that is doing better in

reducing CO2 emissions than required of them (Garvey 121). The Clean Development

Mechanism (CDM) allows developed countries to fund sustainability projects in developing

nations in exchange for certified emission reduction credits (CERs). The Joint Implementation

program is very similar to the CDM, where an Annex B developed nation can fund a project in

another Annex B country in return for emission reduction units (EMUs).

Three Critiques of the Kyoto Protocol:

There has been major opposition to the Kyoto Protocol not just based on its functionality,

but also arguing that it falls short ethically. In regards to whether or not the Kyoto Protocol

recognizes moral values such as fairness, compensation for historical wrongs, and/or the right of

poor countries to develop economically, there are three strong critiques that the Kyoto Protocol

does not do so.

The main goal of the Kyoto Protocol is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and thereby

reduce average global temperatures. It sets restrictions on how much a country can emit and sets

emission reduction targets that they ought to meet in by the end of a given time frame.

Developing countries, like China and India, are currently not required under any binding

regulations to limit their emissions. Some countries that are currently not signed up for the Kyoto

Protocol, such as the United States and Canada, argue that this is inherently unfair and therefore

serves as basis for inaction. However, this principle of the Kyoto Protocol is fair and just in that

it is giving undeveloped countries equal opportunities to develop as current developed countries

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have already had the opportunity to do so. The argument also focuses on the present statistic that

China is currently the world’s leading emitter of CO2, yet there are no current plans to limit

China’s emissions. There is fault in this argument in that developed countries still have and most

likely will have greater emissions per person than developing nations will ever have. Therefore,

even though countries like China may be currently emitting more than developed countries,

developed countries will still be emitting more per person. This adds to the fact that developed

countries historically have emitted more than developing countries. In addition, in regards to

present capacities, developed countries have greater ability than developing countries to limit

their emissions and make gains in adapting to new sustainability projects. When considering

historical responsibility and present capacities, it is not unfair to allocate greater accountability to

developed countries. Therefore, the argument that it is unfair for developing nations to not face

as strict emissions regulations does not invalidate the benefit of reducing global emissions.

The concept of a carbon market, in making greenhouse gas reduction credits a commodity,

appears on the surface a distancing from moral values that will possibly leave developing

countries vulnerable to being taken advantage of by wealthy developed countries. The developed

countries have the ability to purchase the most reduction credits. The fear is that the leaders of

these nations will look upon developing countries as just a means to their ends, which will in turn

lead to the disrespect of the economic and environmental well-being of developing nations.

Another part of this argument focuses on the possibility that with programs like the Clean

Development Mechanism, the smaller developing nations that don’t have as many credits to offer

will be left “on the side-lines of the global carbon market” (Najam et al 225). Therefore, as a

result of making emission reduction credits a commodity, there will be an unethical and unequal

distribution of “help” given by developed countries amongst the world’s developing nations.

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This fear of corruption is not a sufficient argument for invalidating the carbon market. The

only results from using carbon emissions credits as a commodity are morally positive and just.

Developed nations get the flexibility in obtaining more emissions reduction credits if they need

it, while developing nations get sustainability projects, which will in the long term help them

lower their emissions and contribute to action on climate change. It would be impractical to

demand developed nations to decrease their emissions by a great amount without room to adjust.

While creating this concept of a carbon market, the Kyoto Protocol will be able to function in a

world run by economic interest. It establishes motivation for directly and indirectly reducing

greenhouse gas emissions. A country can directly reduce their emissions by meeting the goal

allotted to them by the Kyoto Protocol, or a country can reduce emissions indirectly by trading in

emissions with countries that have extra emissions credits (Joint Implementation), or through

funding sustainability projects in other countries (Clean Development Mechanism). This is a

principle based on “justice or utility,” in that it allows for developed countries, which without the

concept of emissions trading would be required to reduce unrealistic amounts of greenhouse

gasses, some flexibility in meeting their targets (Singer 196). This is an ideal and effective

mentality to have in regards to climate change since it is a global issue.

Another critique of the Kyoto Protocol is that developing countries are hit with the worst of

climate change disasters, yet they are not involved in making the major decisions regarding

climate change mitigation. The argument focuses on the fact that in the drafting of the Kyoto

Protocol, the voices and interests of developing nations are not heard and that this is unethical

and unjust. Even though ideally it would be necessary to include the developing nations in major

decision-making, practically this will not work. The developing nations under the Kyoto Protocol

are not given any limitations on their emissions and are given the opportunity to develop their

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economies. Therefore since developed nations are currently restricted in their carbon emissions,

they should have a majority say in these decisions made in the Protocol. Once developing nations

make significant progress in their economies and are included in the emission restrictions, then

they should have a more equal say in the decision-making process. In this instance, even though

there is inequality in representation during the drafting of the Kyoto Protocol, it is justified since

developing nations are given the unequal advantage to emit greenhouse gasses without

limitation. Another argument closely linked to this advantage is that the Kyoto Protocol does not

compensate developing nations for historical wrongs. It is true that the Protocol does not respect

this moral value; however, it is politically infeasible to do so. The Protocol focuses on fixing the

present to make a better future. It compensates for not recognizing this specific value by

providing developing countries with the opportunity to develop economically, which is an

important moral right for a treaty to respect.

After evaluating these three major criticisms, it is clear to see that the Kyoto Protocol

does recognize certain moral values. It does not do so ideally; however, it creates an effective

and fair balance between recognizing moral values and functioning in an economic environment.

The Kyoto protocols, so far, have not been a successful as the international community

has hoped. The refusal of countries such as America, Australia, and the revocation of Canada’s

signature was unkind to the ambitions of the Kyoto commission. The foremost alternative to the

Kyoto protocols is the Contraction and Convergence model. America and Australia had both

indicated an interest in this model, should the international community look to change the

structure of climate change regulations. The Global Commons Initiative proposed the C&C

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Model in 1989. The main distinction between the C&C Model and the Kyoto Protocol is in the

C&C’s refusal to consider vengeance.

The Global Commons Institute, based in England, proposed the Contraction and

Convergence model in 1989. It was proposed during the discussions of the Kyoto Protocol as an

alternative to either adopt in whole or in part. The tagline for the project was “Climate Justice

Without Vengeance”, which summarizes the ideology behind the proposal.

The Contraction portion of the system is the idea that over time, we will utterly reduce

the amount of carbon in the atmosphere. The example given by the Global Commons institute is

that of 450 ppm by 2100. The benefit of this is that each country is given an individual rate to

reach the goal at. Some countries will have very sudden imposition of very rigid requirement,

like America. Other countries will actually receive a bubble of time by which they are

encouraged to increase carbon emissions and develop, to increase the standard of living of their

lower classes.

The Convergence focuses on the end goal of each country’s emissions level. Ultimately,

the Convergence model wants to achieve equal per capita emissions. This is the simplest version

of fairness that is operable. By the end of 2030 in the current example, the entire world will be

emitting equal per capita emissions. The Global Commons Institute also illustrates a hope that

eventually, technology and society will develop to the point that we can achieve a zero level of

carbon emissions, though that is much further down the line.

The main point of the Contraction and Convergence model is the idea of “Climate Justice

without Vengeance”. The Global Commons institute saw in the Kyoto Protocols a moral issue

that discouraged its adoption. The Kyoto Protocols works to redress historical wrongs. They take

into consideration the idea that much of the developed world had utterly unregulated ability to

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grow and pollute as it needed. Therefore, the Kyoto Protocols put more weight upon those

countries to cut back their emissions, and do not put similar restrictions on countries that are still

developing such as China or India. They feel that the burden of work, or of expense, or of

limitation, belongs on those who have the longest time to reap the benefits of an industrial

society. The ideology boils down to a mother’s admonishment – you made the mess, so you’re

going to clean it up.

The Contraction and Convergence model does not take any of this into consideration. It

saw how many of the developed countries refused to sign on the Kyoto Protocols, and realized

that exacting “vengeance” for development opportunities was not the way to coerce the world

into saving the environment. So instead, they focused on a system that would not take into

consideration the responsibilities of the past. The Contraction and Convergence model does not

put heavier burdens based on historic emissions. They only consider the level of development in

relation to how quickly a country will need to cut down its emissions levels. In the end, all

countries will cut the same amount of emissions and be subject to the same strict rules. The only

difference is that some countries will do it in 10 years while others will do it in 20 or possibly 30.

Each country is expected to contribute equally to the overall goal of an emissions-free earth.

That is not to say that the Contraction and Convergence system doesn’t have moral flaws.

Some believe that we should take historic wrongs into consideration. The developed world

exploited the carbon sinks of the undeveloped world, and are not giving them any recompense

for it. One of the moral arguments made by Garvey is that you must address historic wrongs, and

if you hold to Garvey’s ideals, this is an issue. Some would point out that attempting to redress

historic wrongs is less important than saving the environment. If you can get everyone to

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cooperate, is the continued existence of the human race not enough? Must we really draw more

issues into the discussions of climate change?

Another issue to be taken with the Contraction and convergence model is the goal of

“equal per capita emissions”. This system means that each person in the world has an equal

allowance of carbon emissions. However, you cannot allocate carbon emissions directly to each

person. So, the population of a country determines its total carbon emission allowance. However,

this does not take into consideration the varying needs of different communities. People who live

far north of the equator are going to need to use a considerable amount more energy in order to

heat their homes during the winter than those who live further south. One could argue that it

simply puts pressure on northern territories to come up with more ingenious ways of avoiding

creating carbon, but it still is discordant with the toted idea of fairness.

Another failure of the equal per capita emissions system is that it does not take industry

into consideration. If the nations are responsible for doling out credits to corporations, which

could negatively impact the citizens of that nation. There could be a cut back of people’s

allowances for energy and transportation needs if the government found itself in need of

placating large industries. In addition, there would need to be a discussion as to who would pay

for possible overages. If the payments go to a United Nations group, the payments would have to

come through the national government. If a country’s major export requires emitting a large

amount of carbon into the atmosphere, who will be blamed for any overages? This system

creates a complicated moral issue. What is more important: the people’s ability to heat their

home, or the ability of a corporation to provide jobs for these people? Corporations would be

encouraged to find innovative ways to stay within the national allowance, but they would also be

encouraged to take their businesses elsewhere. It is analogous now to the exportation of labor

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from areas with high labor cost to areas where minimum wages is not that high. You would see a

movement of highly pollutive industry to areas where the carbon emissions regulations were less

strict and the population higher. The resulting economic stimulation would aid developing

countries in the short run. However, having a large industrial sector based in work that requires a

great deal of emissions would make it more challenging for these nations to meet the global

requirements. It could also cause them to put their citizens in a place of secondary importance, as

an expendable resource. Carbon trading markets have been put in place in the Contraction and

Convergence model, however these alone may not be enough to prevent an abuse of the human

labor markets by corporations. This is on top of the current encouragement to outsource labor to

developing countries since “Why pollute America when you can pollute China?” There is much

potential for corporate and government abuse of the per capita emission system.

The Global Commons Initiative also never explains how to determine the “population”

used for a per capita analysis. One fear is that a per person allowance will encourage countries to

falsify census data. They could also encourage increased population growth to gain a greater

allowance. This would directly counteract the attempt that the Contraction and Convergence

model makes to improve the life of the lower classes, by giving rewards to those who have larger

families, which contributes to the continuation of the cycles of poverty. The only remedy to that

is to use a projected population size. By projecting the population, you reduce the opportunity to

encourage increased reproduction. However, the projected population size doesn’t take into

consideration any actual growth of countries that naturally occurs. For example, should China lift

its one-child laws, and experiences a boom of second children, how will their transportation

needs be taken into consideration, when they were not included in the projected population

growth? The impact of mass emigrations and immigrations, due to natural disasters, political

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turmoil, or even climate change cannot be taken into consideration. Horrific acts of genocide

under unstable political regimes would also skew any projected population growth as well.

The Contraction and Convergence model is just as flawed as any other proposed solution

to climate change. There are parts that will likely be helpful and beneficial, and there are parts

that will create a great deal of difficulty. The advantage to the Contraction and Convergence

model is its appeal. During talks about the Kyoto Protocols, several world superpowers indicated

an interest in the Contraction and Convergence model, should discussions ever be held on it.

Getting the approval of countries such as America, Australia, and Canada would increase the

global reduction, since at this time; none of those countries are under pressure to reduce their

emissions.

Among the possible solutions to mitigating climate change, the use of carbon markets is

perhaps the most encouraging prospect. As greenhouse gas emissions continue to climb, more

and more nations are deciding to implement carbon markets in an attempt to combat carbon

dioxide levels. Although carbon markets have existed for years, their effectiveness remains

disputed. Many argue that carbon markets provide strong incentive to minimize emissions while

others argue that carbon markets are not a useful tool in mitigating climate change because they

are volatile and easily exploited.

The use of carbon markets to mitigate climate change is a market-based approach

intended to lower the amount carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere. Carbon markets

operate on a cap and trade basis. In other words, a governing authority does research and sets a

reasonable limit on the amount of carbon dioxide that may be produced. Depending on the

design of the market, the central authority will distribute carbon dioxide emissions permits

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among nations or business firms. A single emissions permit is typically equivalent to one metric

ton of carbon dioxide. The overseeing authority may auction off these emission permits to

participating firms or simply allocate them as it sees fit. Firms are not allowed to produce

emissions that exceed the value of their permits. However, firms may purchase more emission

allowances from other firms that are below their emissions quota. This commodification of

carbon dioxide emissions penalizes those who pollute by indirectly charging them for excessive

emissions. Alternatively, those firms that are able to minimize their emissions and maintain

unused permits may profit by trading with firms that require more emissions allowance.

Furthermore, in addition to selling permits, firms that have extra emissions allowance may also

save their permits for use in future cycles of the market. This system provides strong economic

incentive for participants to not only maintain emissions that are consistent with the carbon

dioxide cap that was previously set, but to reduce emissions to a level that is well below that cap.

Advocates of emission trading argue that carbon markets are the best option to mitigating

climate change because of their flexibility. The International Emissions Trading Association

claims that unlike a regulatory carbon tax, carbon markets are effective because they place an

actual limit on the amount of emissions in the form of a cap. Furthermore, carbon markets enable

participating nations to fund carbon projects in nations outside the market. Projects involving

forestation and energy inefficiency will help these nations develop practices that are in

accordance with lower carbon emissions.

Although many carbon markets exist in the world today, the oldest and largest ongoing

market is the European Union Emission Trading Scheme. The European Union Emission

Trading Scheme operates in a fashion typical of carbon markets. Member states of the union

come together and collectively decide on the national emission caps for countries with the

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approval of the European Union Commission. In turn, countries divide the cap and allocate

emission allowances among its companies and other industrial firms. Participating firms may

trade privately or choose to buy and sell internationally. Emission allowance trading works in a

way similar to a stock market; brokers may be employed and the price per allowance fluctuates.

The European Union Emission Trading Scheme operates independently from the Kyoto Protocol,

but was designed to incorporate similar mechanisms. For example, an EU allowance unit (EUA)

is equivalent to one tonne of carbon dioxide emissions and is also equivalent to a certified

emissions reduction (CER) under the Kyoto Protocol. In other words, EUAs and CERs may be

traded within the same system.

As of late, more and more carbon markets are beginning to take shape around the globe.

China, which was exempted from reducing emissions under the Kyoto Protocol, recently

launched a carbon market campaign in an attempt to reduce emissions. In June, China launched

its first of many trading schemes in the city of Shenzhen (Qiu). Since then, six other similar

markets have sprouted in major Chinese cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. Jiang Zhaoli, head

of climate change at the National Development and Reform Commission of China, notes that

carbon markets are proving to be valuable tools in reducing emissions (Carr). Indonesia, one of

the world’s the biggest emission culprits, has begun planning an emission trading scheme that

could possibly reach across national boundaries if successful (Reklev). China and Indonesia are

not alone. In fact, South Korea and Thailand plan to develop their own markets by 2015

(Reklev). There are an increasing number of countries that are turning to carbon markets as a

form of climate change mitigation.

Although carbon markets appear to be popular mechanisms for mitigating climate

change, they face vigorous criticisms concerning their effectiveness. Perhaps the most

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fundamental criticism of carbon markets is that the emission caps are simply too high to result in

meaningful reductions. As was the case in the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU

ETS), emission caps are typically decided by identifying how much is already being emitted. In

turn, large portions of the permits are distrubuted to the biggest emitters. In other words, the cap

for the EU ETS was not set to a level that is consistent with the avoidance of the catastrophic rise

temperature (Naughten 11). Rather, the cap was set according what emissions have historically

been.

Another flaw inherent to carbon markets is that caps are “leaky” and easy to circumvent.

Naturally, emission caps can only apply in nations participating in carbon markets. What if

industries in capped nations move their carbon emitting operations to areas outside the cap? In

this way, firms appear to have reduced their emissions, but in reality they merely exported them

to nations that are not limited by a cap (Naughten 12). Thus, the amount of global emissions

remains unchanged. This issue is compounded by the fact that accurately measuring emissions is

costly.

Opponents of carbon markets also contend that markets are ineffective because of the use

of offset credits. In all existing carbon markets, participating firms can use offset credits to allow

emissions that exceed the cap. These credits are obtained by paying a party in another country to

reduce their emissions. The funds received from offsetting are intended to be used for carbon

reducing projects. Essentially, firms are allowed to produce excess emissions if they pay

someone in a developing country to decrease their emissions instead (Naughten 7). Again, this

results in little to no net decrease in global emissions.

Carbon markets are often celebrated as an alternative to the less popular notion of a

carbon tax. Supporters of carbon markets claim a tax would only discourage emissions, not

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actually limit them. A carbon tax would not be choice because like all taxes, it would be difficult

to politically advocate. However, given their current state, I would argue that carbon markets are

not an ideal solution to climate change. Cap and trade schemes are celebrated for their flexibility,

but this flexibility inevitably leads to exploitation. The use of offset credits in the system seems

to undermine the goal of carbon markets. The world’s largest emitters of carbon dioxide choose

to offset their emissions rather than restructure their operations to produce lower emissions. This

is because offset credits are vastly cheaper than the restructuring their carbon emitting processes.

Furthermore, offset credits function on the unrealistic basis that the hypothetical emissions

prevented in another country are equal to the excess emissions released by the credit buyer. If

carbon markets are to be truly effective, stricter regulations must be put on offset credits or

offsetting must be abandoned completely.

Carbon markets give an illusion that the emission caps they implement are concrete

mechanisms to limiting the amount of greenhouse gases. However, industries may just move

their polluting operations to areas that are not restricted by the cap. Caps are only effective in the

nations they encompass. Perhaps this would not be the case if a single, unified carbon market

existed to span across all nations, but no such global market has begun to take shape. Carbon

markets must be drastically redesigned if they are to be used as our primary tool for climate

change mitigation.

CONCLUSION

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Works Cited

1

Adaptation, http://unfccc.int/adaptation/items/4159.php

Adaptation Fund,

http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/adaptation_fund/items/

3659.php

Clean Development Mechanism,

http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/clean_development_mechanism/items/

2718.php

Compliance, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/compliance/items/2875.php

Doha Amendment, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2012/12/20121217%2011-40%20AM/

CN.718.2012.pdf

Emissions Trading, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/emissions_trading/items/

2731.php

Joint Implementation,

http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/joint_implementation/items/1674.php

Kyoto Protocol, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php

Massai, Leonardo, The Kyoto Protocol in the EU, "The EC and the Member States in the Kyoto

Protocol", http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-90-6704-571-1_4/fulltext.html

Mechanisms, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/items/1673.php

Registry System, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/registry_systems/items/2723.php

Reporting, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/reporting/items/3879.php

Group B 20

2

3

Dale Jamieson’s “Ethics, Public Policy, and Global Warming”

Stephen M. Gardiner’s “A Perfect Moral Storm”

Simon Caney’s “Global Justice and Future Generations”

Peter Singer’s “One Atmosphere”

Adil Najam, Saleemul Huq, and Youba Sokona’s “Climate negotiations beyond Kyoto:

developing countries concerns and interests”;

http://climate-talks.net/2006-ENVRE130/PDF/Najam-CliPol%20Climate%20and

%20SD.pdf

http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php

4

Contraction and Convergence. The Global Commons Institute, n.d. Accessed Friday November

15th 2013. www.gci.org.uk

Garvey, James The Ethic of Climate Change New York, Continuum International Publishing

Group, 2009. Book.

5

Carrington, Damian. "Carbon Emissions Trading System 'seriously Flawed'" Theguardian.com.

Guardian News, 19 June 2009. Web. 13 Nov. 2013.

Naughten, Austen. "Designed to Fail? The Concepts, Practices and Controversies behind Carbon

Trading." Fern.org. FERN, n.d. Web. 14 Nov. 2013.

Group B 21

Qiu, Jane. "China Gets Tough on Carbon." Nature.com. Nature Publishing Group, 12 June 2013.

Web. 11 Nov. 2013.

Reklev, Stian. "Indonesia to Launch Voluntary Carbon Market." Thejakartaglobe.com. Berita

Satu Media Holdings, 13 Nov. 2013. Web. 14 Nov. 2013.

Wadhams, Nicholas, and Mathew Carr. "China Tests CO2 Emissions Markets Before Tax,

NDRC Official Says." Bloomberg.com. Bloomberg L.P., 17 Oct. 2013. Web. 13 Nov.

2013.

"What Is Carbon Credit | Carbon Trade Exchange." What Is Carbon Credit? Carbon Trade

Exchange Ltd., n.d. Web. 12 Nov. 2013.

"Why Emissions Trading Is More Effective Than a Carbon Tax." IETA.org. International

Emissions Trading Association, n.d. Web. 14 Nov. 2013.

Group B 22