William Angelette

Drawing the line:  

Rational Cognitive Therapy, Information,

and Boundary

It has been claimed that cognitive therapists endorse sets of uplifting beliefs BECAUSE the client feels better believing them: not because they lead towards greater verisimilitude, a purported cognitivist’s hallmark of rational choice. Since the therapist asks us to choose sets of beliefs that interpret evidence on the basis of grater individual happiness (all other things being equal), this suggests that the basis of choice goes beyond rationality. I contend that the case against the rationality of cognitive therapy is not made if one allows a broadening of what to count as rational cognitive therapy. The rationality of therapy consist in how well it achieves its goal. My claim is that at least one goal is, or ought to be, greater information value of the client’ dialogues. Among other things, information values encode affect. Understanding reason in this way effectively transforms our understanding of rationality in a way that may be incommensurable with the standard view. If incommensurable, there is no way to discover that we are still talking about the same thing. So, a challenge for this competing view is to say on what basis the term cognitive therapy may be projectable. I identify some constraints on this project and sketch a possible solution.

Abstract

Theoretical claim:

Persons with mental disorders have habits of irrational thinking.

Irrational thoughts cause mental distress.

Methodological prescription: Induce Rational thinking which leads to “cure”.

The Standard View of Rational Emotive Behaviourial Therapy and Cognitive Behaviourial Therapy

Multiple equivalent belief networks describe any given affective condition.

". . . emotional states will always be more primitive than belief networks and so can be fully described by more than one. . . . . The therapist or counselor (with the client) is at liberty to remove one belief network and replace it with

another network” (Waller 2001, p. 30). There will be multiple equally rational

ways to account for how one feels.  So, therapists must have some other basis

for advocating one set of beliefs to their clients. 

Pick sets of beliefs that are likely to improve how the client feels.

Underdetermination of cognitive theories:

The subjective feel of considering beliefs can be considered evidence for or against those beliefs- i.e. justificatory grounds

Irrational belief system : “I’m always late for work.”; “I’m a failure.”; “The boss hates me.”

Feelings as evidence:

My beliefs must be factual or else I wouldn’t be feeling the way I do.

Resultant feelings:

hopeless, worthless,

sad, dissociative

Outcome –

Reinforcement of the dysfunctional belief system

 The methodology of REBT/CBT is either

not well motivated, or is incoherent when conjoined with the theories in the standard ways.

 because there may be many equivalent

belief sets there need be no rational constraints on belief choice !

One might be tempted to infer that:

The challenge is to produce a competing characterization of

theory and methodology for “therapy” that preserves the place of rationality while also taking account of emotions.

if we consider a different ontology for the domain of counseling - one who’s objects are dialogues (the goal of counseling becomes greater information of dialogues), we can accommodate a place for emotions in rational belief revision.

Alternative Proposal :

concept force & information, goal directedness & and a

methodology,hierarchical aims & (R1), a belief/desire scale & dialogue

The components of the competing characterization of therapy

Df: the force of a concept is an individual subjective valuation of the object of search.

When clients realize that the force of a

concept that they are encoding in their speech acts is different than the force encoded in the speech of others the information value of the dialogue is increased.

By some accounts information is surprise

Concept force & Information

Methods: Produce hierarchical list of wants, goals, desires. how are items mentioned in the lists drawn upon to

determine the orderwhat is the effect of changing, limiting the number of list

entriesnotice effects of changing goals relative to contextwhat are the dynamics of introducing conflicting

informationwhat is the relationship between the value of the goal and

the value of the effort expended in the search

Note: Different combinations of aims and constraints impact search strategies differently.

hierarchical aims & (R1),

If actions of a particular sort, m, have consistently promoted certain cognitive ends, e, in the past, and rival actions , n, have failed to do so, then assume that future actions following the rule “if your aim is e, you ought to do m” are more likely to promote those ends than actions based on the rule “if your aim is e, you ought to do n” (Laudan 1987 p. 25.).

Laudan’s R1:

Lewis/Davidson/Jeffrey’s Desirability Axiom:

Just in case there is a difference in the probable truth [disquotational sense] of two sentences, then the difference in an agents desiring what is expressed in one or the other sentence can be understood as a ratio, i.e., the sum of the combined subjective probability-desirability of one, P(s)des(s), plus the combined subjective probability-desirability of the other, P(t)des(t), over the sum of their combined probabilities (D. Lewis. 1987 , 109-110).

  if two sentences are equal in desirability (and preferred to a logical truth) and

their negations are also equal in desirability, the sentences must have the same probability. By the same token, if two sentences are equal in desirability (and are preferred to a logical truth), but the negation of one is preferred to the negation of the other, then the probability of the first is less than that of the second” (Davidson 1990 p. 328).

If we hold some particular des(s) constant, then the desirability-probability of any sentence pairs (s,t) will fall into a ratio scale as specific values relative to that constant.  

belief/desire scale

To effect rational valuation of competing systems of belief among conversants we embed Laudan’s R1 in Lewis’s reshifting of Davidson’s Desirability Axiom which Davidson in turn borrowed from Jeffreys.

Putting the components together we assert the following:

So, it may be helpful to incorporate feelings together with coherence in our notion of rational choice. To affect this incorporation, we need to reflect that, to some extent, judging an agent as acting rationally involves taking his or her aims seriously and there is little doubt that greater happiness is a common aim.

We can now look at the dialogue between Karl and Anna. For a moment, methodologically assume Karl’s

language is optimally like ours

 T(Ao) , stands for the sentence “‘This is how best to find

water’ is true” as expressed in Karl’s idiolect. Lets consider s to be something like the sentence ‘Karl desires to degree n.’

  Here we have a place to model a wide range of affective

responses that may apply to and quantify a range of emotional drives such as feeling happier as one approaches certain goals.

dialogue.

  F(Ao), - - - [ Anna believes {(Ao)= ‘This doesn’t lead towards water.’ is

true., (Ao)1 = ‘This1 does lead towards water’ is

true.,. . ..(Ao)n} ]

 where “This” is replaceable by actual

methodological considerations couched in terms of R1 and is a specification of propositional attitudes - in particular, of a system of beliefs.

However, Anna’s belief net includes:

.... P must tell us the physics and the physical states of those things [i.e., the facts about Karl’s physical and occult properties] as well. Both Ao and Ak are to be specifications of Karl’s propositional attitudes - in particular, of Karl’s system of beliefs and desires . . . Ao specifies Karl’s beliefs and desires as expressed in our language; Ak specifies them as expressed in Karl’s language; until we find out what the sentences of Karl’s language mean, the two sorts of information are different. We take Karl’s beliefs and desires to admit of degree, with the zero and unit of desire fixed arbitrarily. Also, we allow them to vary with time. Thus, Ao and Ak will consist of ascriptions of the form:

Karl {believes, desires}, to degree d, at time t, the proposition expressed, in context c, by the sentence ‘_____’ of {our, Karl’s} language

A word about P

.... M, the third component of our desired interpretation [sic] of Karl, is to be a specification, in our language, of the meanings of expressions of Karl’s language. Primarily, M specifies the truth conditions of full sentences of Karl’s language (perhaps relative to contexts of utterance) . . . Secondarily, M specifies a way of parsing the sentences of Karl’s language, the denotation or sense or comprehension or what-not of the constituents from which sentences may be compounded, and the way that the denotation (or whatever) of a compound depends on that of its constituents. In short, it specifies the syntactic and semantic rules of a grammar capable of generating Karl’s sentences plus the truth conditions thereof (D. Lewis. 1987, 109-110).

What was the problem again?

Have any problems been solved?

Any residual issues left unresolved?  The initial problems reappear at the

next level up.  Where do we go from here?

Part II

Are rational aspirations of standard cognitive therapies (REBT/CBT) foiled by non-rationally motivated methodological concerns with how patients feel?

the problem again

Three ways to answer:

NO

YES

Maybe

Have any problems been solved?

(A.) If rational thought must be considered in contradistinction to emotion, then the story I’ve told cannot apply to the standard view of cognitive therapy.  

(B.) Even if emotions can find a place in rationality by being imbedded in the desirability axiom, by itself, this does nothing to undo the underdetermination of my patients belief net.

 (C.) The new proposal ignores how whacky my

patients beliefs are!

Three ways to answer NO

Cognitive therapy is in a hard place. It might want to give up the hard line of (A.) and come along for the ride.

Yes:

Standard cognitive therapy is in a harder place still. Nothing here challenged the underdetermination thesis at all. Patients belief nets may be underdetermined still.

 But (B) (underdetermination of the

patient’s belief nets) is irrelevant to the methodology of the new proposal being put forth - choose or assimilate.

Maybe:

The question for the Standard cognitive therapy is, can it find a way to coherently assimilate the new proposal?

to see if there is a coherent way to tie standard cognitive therapy to the competing proposal and

 what’s to be said about the patients whacky beliefs.

Residual issues left unresolved

So, it remains

It looks as though there is no hope for a coherent fit between standard cognitive therapies and the new proposal if they are incommensurable.

The initial problems reappear at the next level

Failure of Intertranslatablity On occasion, we may become unaware of the fact that the ontology implied by each approach to counseling undergoes a change.

from [standard view of cognitive therapy]an idiom where the targets of counseling are

determined and defined in relation to terms in an ontology of individuals (the client) and their properties (cognitive states),

 to [proposed alternative view]an idiom where they are determined and

defined in relation to terms in an event ontology (movement towards goals - greater information) and abstract objects (dialogues).

The change is

Factors motivating choices among beliefs [belief nets containing the therapist’s methodological prescriptions] are, unconsciously, interpreted differently from within each approach.

 Ontology of Standard View assumed in

criticism of the rationality of cognitive therapy:

Individuals and their speech acts behaviors.

Ontology of Competing proposal: Comparative information of

dialogues

Who counts what as rational

After coming this far, is there anything left in the new proposal that warrants the name “cognitive therapy”?

Where do we go from here?

 A further nest of problems.

Can a general - dimensional account of valuation, embodied in affect, be integrated into an account of rational decision making?

General accounts:Generalizes across all

types of valuation hypothesize that the

neuro-biological underpinnings of valuation events are [or more weakly, are best modeled as] some single set of functions implemented throughout our neural nets.

focus on differences between moral valuation,

economic valuations, aesthetic valuation,

etc.

Non-general accounts

Dimensionalhypothesize that

differences in behaviourial output [which we term variously as moods, impressions, interpretations, etc ] are, when viewed from the perspective of neuro-biology, best understood as implementing a function at various degrees or levels of activation.

focus on discrete categories such as

good, bad, true, false, functional,

dysfunctional, and produces

hierarchical classification, e.g. DSM-IV-TR.

Non dimensional