Willard Van Orman Quine: Philosophy of

Science

W. V. O. Quine (1908-2000) did not conceive of philosophy as an activity separate from the general

province of empirical science. His interest in science is not best described as a philosophy of

science but as a set of reflections on the nature of science that is pursued with the same empirical

spirit that animates scientific inquiry. Quine’s philosophy should then be seen as a systematic

attempt to understand science from within the resources of science itself. This project investigates

both the epistemological and ontological dimensions of scientific theorizing. Quine’s

epistemological concern is to examine our successful acquisition of scientific theories, while his

ontological interests focus on the further logical regimentation of that theory. He thus advocates

what is more famously known as ‘naturalized epistemology’, which consists of his attempt to

provide an improved scientific explanation of how we have developed elaborate scientific theories

on the basis of meager sensory input. Quine further argues that the most general features of reality

can be examined through the use of formal logic by clarifying what objects we must acknowledge

as real given our acceptance of an overarching systematic view of the world. In pursuing these

issues, Quine reformulates and thus transforms these philosophical concerns according to those

standards of clarity, empirical adequacy, and utility that he takes as central to the explanatory power

of empirical science. While few philosophers have adopted Quine’s strict standards or accepted the

details of his respective positions, the general empirical reconfiguration of philosophy and

philosophy of science recommended by his naturalism has been very influential. This article

provides an overview of Quine’s naturalistic conception of philosophy, and elaborates on its

examination of the epistemological and ontological elements of scientific practice.