Why We Should Reject ‘Nudge’

Research and Analysis

Why We Should Reject ‘Nudge’ponl_1430 85..92

Tom GoodwinUniversity of Warwick

This article argues that the use of ‘nudge’ tactics in UK policymaking ought to be rejected. Nudgecontravenes the coalition government’s aspirations to promote ideas such as empowerment,freedom and fairness. Moreover, it is not an effective strategy for bringing about the kind ofbehavioural changes required to solve society’s ‘big problems’ – problems around climate changeand public health, for example. The article mines political theory in a way that is distinctly absentfrom the current literature on ‘nudging’ and brings a fresh and insightful perspective to the nudgedebate.

The prospect of ‘nudging’ people into changing their behaviour has generated greatinterest and enthusiasm among policymakers, particularly in the UK. Indeed, oncoming to power in the May 2010 general election, David Cameron established a‘nudge unit’ tasked with resolving the classic Conservative dilemma: what to doabout the undesirable social consequences that inevitably follow from a small stateand low taxation policy (McSmith, 2010).

The term ‘nudge’ was first used in Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s book of thesame title to describe ‘any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’sbehaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantlychanging their economic incentives’ (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, p. 6). Whilenudging is not a new theory – it builds upon psychology and sociology dating backover a century to explain how environments shape and constrain behaviours – itnevertheless has two novel elements. First, it draws on insights from behaviouraleconomics (Becker, 1962; Mead, 1997) and social psychology (Ross, 1977) toexplain why people behave in ways that deviate from rationality (as defined byclassic economics). And second, it is underpinned by what its authors refer to as‘libertarian paternalism’, a philosophy that seeks to guide people’s choices in theirbest interests while permitting them to remain at liberty to behave otherwise.

Politically, nudge’s roots as a policy lever can, in the UK at least, be traced back tothe previous Labour administration. In 2004, for example, the Cabinet Officepublished a report (Halpern et al., 2004) which provided an overview of the waysin which libertarian paternalism could be employed across a range of policy areas.As a result, this document and related pronunciations facilitated the spread ofnudge-type principles and practices throughout a wide array of public policy sectors(Jones, Pykett and Whitehead, 2011).1

However, although nudge may appeal to governments and policymakers, to whatextent is it fit for purpose with respect to tackling society’s ‘big problems’: can it be

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used to improve public health or deal with the problem of climate change, forexample? Furthermore, given the current coalition government’s stated aspirationsaround increasing citizen empowerment and promoting freedom and fairness(Cameron and Clegg, 2010), to what extent does nudge support these aims?

More pointedly, can nudge be empowering and can it bring about changes that arefair? Should we be worried about the paternalistic aspect of nudging: is nudge infact a subtle form of manipulation, of coercion even? In addition, while nudge maybe able to arrange the choice architecture in such a way as to influence choice, canit bring about the more substantive shifts in people’s value structures that areneeded to affect deeply ingrained behaviours with a view to solving society’smajor ills?

The aim of this article, therefore, is to sketch out some preliminary answers to theabove questions – questions that have not been properly addressed hitherto by thecurrent literature on nudging. Despite the growing literature on nudge andlibertarian paternalism (Jones, Pykett and Whitehead, 2011; Pykett et al., 2011),and although there has been some attempt recently to discuss nudge from aconceptual viewpoint (Hausman and Welch, 2010; John, Smith and Stoker, 2009),an attempt to address these specific questions is, by and large, distinctly absent fromthe current debate. Furthermore, the overt manner in which the current adminis-tration has sought to deploy nudge tactics, coupled to the questions this raises whenconsidered in conjunction with its commitment to empowerment, freedom andfairness, does provide a specific focus for an important critique.2

In short, my contention is that nudge and the notion of libertarian paternalism aredeeply troubling. What is more, given the kind of commitments to which thecoalition government appear to be wedded, I argue that nudging is not an appro-priate policy instrument. First, the concept of liberty on which it hinges precludesnudge from being empowering in any substantive sense and it also renders nudginginherently unfair. Second, the paternalistic aspect of nudging is also worrying.Although, for example, we would be hard pressed to argue that nudge does actuallyconstitute a form of coercion, nudge seeks to exploit imperfections in humanjudgement and to this extent it is manipulative. Third, more generally, nudgingalone is not an effective strategy for changing behaviour on the kind of scale neededto solve society’s major ills.

The structure of this article proceeds as follows. I begin in section 1 with a briefexposition of nudge and the concept of libertarian paternalism. In section 2, Iexplain why the kind of freedom to which nudging adheres precludes it from beingempowering in any meaningful sense and, crucially, why it renders nudging unfair.I also address my contention that nudge constitutes a subtle form of manipulation.Finally, in section 3, I explain why nudging is not an effective strategy for substan-tively changing the way people behave. In conclusion I argue that the policy ofnudging therefore ought to be rejected.

1. Unpacking ‘nudge’Although most people value their health, they often persist in behaving in waysthat undermine it (Marteau et al., 2011). While I may wish to lose weight, for

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example, I may still persist in buying a chocolate bar that is displayed at a tillcheckout. In short, certain environmental cues combine with my desire for imme-diate and certain pleasure and this conjunction takes precedence over my desire toeat healthily, which seems more remote from this point of view.

This kind of technique has been employed by advertisers and retailers for decadesin order to affect our choices and elicit financial gain. It has also informed the workof Thaler and Sunstein (2008, p. 8), whose book Nudge examines the emergingliterature on the science of choice and builds on the assumption that humandecision-making is ‘not so great’. They cite two important lessons that they drawfrom this literature: first, that the power of inertia should not be underestimated;and second, that this power can be harnessed.

As such, Thaler and Sunstein (2008, p. 12) employ these lessons to demonstratehow policymakers (qua choice architects) can make major improvements to thelives of others by designing ‘user-friendly environments’, the aim of which is totackle a range of social problems from obesity and binge drinking to climate change.Examples of nudge policies might therefore include serving drinks in smaller glassesand designating sections of supermarket trolleys for fruit and vegetables (Marteauet al., 2011, p. 263). Nudging may also include requiring household energy bills tocontain information, enabling households to compare their energy consumptionwith others – the idea being that this encourages the use of less energy (Osborne,2008).

Underpinning nudge theory then is the concept of libertarian paternalism. Whilethis concept may seem contradictory (in relation to each other, its components aretypically regarded as mutually exclusive ideas), Thaler and Sunstein argue that if itis properly understood, it actually reflects common sense. As they note, the liber-tarian aspect of this conjunction is generated by the insistence that people should befree to do what they like and to thereby opt in (or out) of arrangements if they sodesire. What is more, Thaler and Sunstein use the term ‘libertarian’ in this contextto modify the word paternalism, to mean ‘liberty preserving’. The paternalisticaspect of the conjunction stems from the claim that it is legitimate for the ‘choicearchitect’ to attempt to influence or steer behaviours, so as to make people’s liveshealthier, longer and better. Nevertheless if people do want to smoke, eat badly ornot save for their retirement, libertarian paternalism will not force them to dootherwise: ‘nudges are not mandates’ (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, pp. 5–6).

2. Freedom, empowerment and fairnessHowever, although the claim is that nudge preserves freedom, what kind offreedom is being preserved here? Is it the kind of freedom that is able to meetthe coalition’s aspirations around empowerment, for example? At a minimum,empowerment suggests the power to do something – to have a choice, for instance.To this extent nudge could be seen as empowering due to its desire to preserve orincrease choice. However, more substantive definitions of empowerment usuallyinclude some notion of transformative power – the power to develop one’s capaci-ties or abilities (Wartenberg, 1990). Does nudge provide the space for this? It maydo, for some people, as I shall explain presently. But what hinders nudge’s ability to

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be genuinely empowering (in the thicker sense of the word) is that it appears to bewedded to a very narrow definition of freedom, which stems from its libertarianroots.

Libertarians tend to be committed to the idea that freedom is a negative concept(see, for example, Hayek, 1960; Nozick, 1974; Steiner, 1994) and thus to the claimthat freedom resides solely in the extent to which we are not physically preventedfrom acting by external obstacles (Berlin, 2002). In other words, negative freedomis merely concerned with whether you are, strictly speaking, able to make a choice;it is not concerned with the qualitative nature of the choice being made. At its mostcaricatural, negative liberty would maintain that even if I put a gun to your headand promised to shoot you unless you acceded to my malevolent demands, youwould nevertheless have options here and you would be free to pursue them.Certainly though, this view of freedom pays no heed to other less obvious barriersto our liberty: lack of awareness, false consciousness, repression or other internalfactors of this kind. Indeed, to speak of such factors in relation to one’s freedom isan abuse of words for the advocate of negative liberty.

However, notwithstanding the counter-intuitive nature of the negative libertycaricature, the problem is that by failing to recognise these other less obviousbarriers to our liberty, it also rules out the strong intuition that freedom is, inaddition, coupled to individual independence and self-fulfilment – what CharlesTaylor (1979) calls the ‘post-Romantic’ idea that each person’s form of self-realisation is particular to him or her. Crucially, says Taylor (1979, p. 419), thisnotion of freedom can be compromised for internal as well as external obstacles:‘[w]e can fail to achieve our own self-realisation through inner fears, or falseconsciousness, as well as because of external coercion’. For example, I might reallywant to give up smoking, but I might fear (albeit irrationally) what will happen ifI do. In this case, I clearly experience this internal fear as an obstacle and I may feelthat I am less than I would be if I could only overcome it. Crucially, the failure toaccept this view of freedom raises serious questions as to whether nudge really isempowering. Although in the absence of such internal obstacles to a person’sfreedom nudge could be seen in this light, its failure to engage with this moresubstantive concept of liberty rules out of court its ability to foster this thickernotion of empowerment.

In response, however, the nudge theorist might invite us to explain why nudgeneeds to be empowering in this thicker sense of the word. As long as it can deliversome kind of behavioural change in areas such as public health, at a low cost, sowhat if it cannot empower those who are afflicted by internal obstacles to theirfreedom? However, if the coalition cares about empowering citizens beyond therather impoverished minimal sense of the word, this raises serious questions aboutnudge’s pedigree as a suitable policy tool.

In addition, the problem with the suggestion that we need not worry about thismore substantive notion of empowerment is that it raises certain questions aboutfairness. Fairness – like freedom – is a slippery concept: it can be understood inmore, or less, substantive terms. When libertarians talk about fairness they areconcerned merely with a narrow understanding of the concept – one that again failsto recognise the moral significance of the fact that people’s capacity to choose varies

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considerably, due in part to the kinds of internal obstacles mentioned above, as wellas variances in people’s wider talents and assets. According to this narrow view,fairness is merely the opportunity to take advantage of choice and so long as aperson is not hindered from making this choice by the presence of externalobstacles, then the choice architecture remains fair.

However, a powerful critique of this view of fairness is presented by John Rawls(1999) in his seminal text, A Theory of Justice. Essentially, Rawls opposes narrowdefinitions of fairness on the grounds that capabilities, talents and assets, and eventhe efforts deployed by some people to become more capable, are arbitrary from amoral point of view – they are, in short, a matter of good luck. To ignore suchdifferences is therefore to carry over into political arrangements the arbitrariness ofsocial and natural contingencies. We deserve as individuals, says Rawls, neither thetalents our good fortune may have brought, nor the benefits that flow from them.

While I do not have the space here to explore fully Rawls’s argument and to offera complete defence of his views on fairness, these objections cast into sharp reliefthe contention that, without serious social interventions designed to ensure thatthe positive freedom to take advantage of nudge opportunities is distributed morewidely, nudging is inherently unfair.

However, in addition to the problem regarding the kind of freedom that underpinsnudging, should we be worried about the paternalistic aspect of nudge? Is nudge infact a subtle form of manipulation, of coercion even? Based on our commonunderstanding of what it means to coerce, which suggests the attempt to pressurisea person (or persons) into adopting different behaviours, usually by using force, mycontention is that it would be difficult to construct a plausible argument as to whythis applies in the case of nudge. Although nudging appears to take advantage ofcertain pieces of conventional wisdom (namely that human beings are not particu-larly good at making decisions and frequently suffer from inertia) and to this extentit could be seen as manipulative, it is difficult to see how nudge involves force. Afterall, nudge allows people to remain at liberty to behave otherwise (albeit in a narrowsense).

However, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) may be overselling the extent to which theirparadigm is genuinely libertarian. The inference is that nudge works best whenpeople are unaware that their behaviour is being influenced. Thus, by exploitingthe imperfections in human judgement and decision-making, the choice architect isaiming to substitute his or her judgement of what should be done for the ‘nudgee’s’own judgement. And this threatens an individual’s control over his or her ability tochoose. Therefore, although it would be difficult to construct an argument as towhy nudge is coercive, the extent to which nudge attempts to undermine anindividual’s control over his or her deliberation gives cause for concern and does, Ibelieve, warrant further investigation. A more detailed exploration of the way inwhich nudge is manipulative would therefore be a fruitful exercise.

3. Can nudging be genuinely transformative?In this final section, I now turn to address my claim that nudging is unable todeliver the kind of substantive changes that are needed to tackle the big problems



that society faces. In support of my contention, the view from the current literaturein relation to nudge’s potential here is certainly sceptical.

As Theresa Marteau et al. (2011, p. 342) contend, without regulation to controlexisting environments that are shaped largely by commerce, nudging peopletowards healthier behaviour may struggle to make much of an impression on thescale needed to improve the population’s health. The problem, it seems, is thatnudging people in one direction leaves them vulnerable to being nudged backagain. If we consider that for every pound spent on public health marketing therewill be many more spent on getting the public to eat Walkers crisps, for example,the economics of nudge starts to look flawed.

Furthermore, some claim that small nudges to improve energy efficiency orincrease the rate of recycling will not be enough on their own to tackle issues suchas climate change, which will require the ‘large-scale recognition on the part ofcitizens that more major shifts in lifestyle are probably necessary’ (John, Smith andStoker, 2009, p. 368).

And herein lies yet another problem with nudge, so I argue. Essentially it places toomuch emphasis on individual preferences and upon atomistic ways of thinking. Itfails to take advantage of what Hannah Arendt (1970, p. 44) refers to as the ‘humanability not just to act, but to act in concert’. If we really want to solve the bigproblems faced by society we need to think and deliberate together rather than inisolation.

ConclusionSo what then is the solution from a policy perspective? I would argue that not-withstanding the cost implications, more, not less, government intervention isrequired, not only to make nudging fairer, but also to combat the power of rampantcommercialism and unregulated markets which potentially undermine attempts tonudge us in the ‘right’ direction, so to speak. However, ideally, rather than relyingon manipulative nudge tactics, the government ought to embrace more deliberativemodels of democratic and public engagement, which arguably encourage people tothink more collectively and engage with issues more deeply, thereby providing theopportunity for more substantive citizen empowerment (see, for example, Elster,1986; Knight and Johnson, 1999; Miller, 1992).

In summary, this article has offered a preliminary discussion of some of the prob-lems associated with nudging. Although, due to space limitations, I have by nomeans exhausted all lines of inquiry here, my mining of political theory to informthe discussion has made a substantive contribution to the nudge debate. In short, Ihave argued that nudge is deeply troubling: the concept of liberty on which ithinges precludes it from being empowering in any substantive sense and it alsorenders nudging inherently unfair. With respect to the paternalistic aspect of nudge,I argued that although we would be hard pressed to maintain that it constitutes aform of coercion, the fact that it seeks to exploit imperfections in human judgementsuggests something quite manipulative. In more general terms, I argued that nudgeis not effective in changing deeply ingrained behaviours and, as such, that it will

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struggle to make an impression on the scale of behavioural change needed to tacklesociety’s major ills. In light of these failings, my conclusion is that the policy ofnudging ought to be rejected.

In closing, the above discussion suggests a number of research avenues that providefood for thought for further investigation. First, a more substantive defence of theclaim that nudging is unfair is needed. Second, the concern raised about the extentto which nudge is manipulative requires more theorising – particularly the idea thatnudge’s libertarian credentials are undermined by the fact that it targets individualsin their pre-rational state. And finally, a detailed exploration of the way in whichdeliberative democratic models could be used as an alternative to nudge would alsobe a fruitful exercise.

Author contact detailsTom Goodwin, E-mail: [email protected]. Twitter: @tomlloydgoodwin

AcknowledgementsI would like to thank Jonathan Davies, Michael Synnott, Rebecca Reilly-Cooper, Francine Hoenderkamp,Richard Caesar, David Goodwin and Marilyn Devonshire for their helpful comments and suggestions.

Notes1 See, for example, DWP, 2006; DEFRA, 2007.

2 Although it would be a fruitful exercise to consider the extent to which the previous iterations oflibertarian paternalism and the behavioural change policies of other administrations may be subject tothe criticisms raised here, such a task is unfortunately beyond the scope of this article.

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Why We Should Reject ‘Nudge’

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